Examination of Witnesses (Questions 140
- 146)
WEDNESDAY 2 DECEMBER 2009
SIR JEREMY
GREENSTOCK, GCMG AND
SIR DAVID
MANNING, GCMG, CVO
Q140 Ms Stuart: May I pursue
the matter a little further? I would like to hear Sir David's
observations on how opinions in the United States are formed.
Because we talk so much to everybody, do the Administration sometimes
use us as a messenger to other parts of the Administration?
Sir David Manning: Yes, I think
they do. I think it may sometimes be quite deliberate, but it
might sometimes be because certain individuals are hoping to influence
another part of the Administration, or even plant a message with
us. If that does happen, and it suits us, that's fine—let's
use it. It certainly has happened on occasions, yes, and we have
to be aware of that, and conscious of how far we want to be used
in that way.
Sir Jeremy Greenstock: It is important
to bring out an example of where the two systems do not fit together
particularly well. That is on Iraq.Vice-President Cheney and Secretary
of Defence Rumsfeld were giving a particular view of what should
happen in Iraq, in competition with the State Department under
Secretary Colin Powell. Our Foreign Secretary, Jack Straw, had
an extremely good relationship with Secretary Powell; and the
President had a good and constant relationship with the Prime
Minister and vice versa. But it was quite difficult for the British
system to get to what was, by historical comparison, quite a powerful
vice-president, and to influence Vice-President Cheney, because
there was no natural opposite number in the constitutional system.
In the Pentagon, Secretary Rumsfeld was not inclined to listen,
not only to non-Americans but to Americans of the wrong political
character. So it was a narrow but powerful area that we found
hard to influence in the lead-up to and the aftermath of the invasion
of Iraq.
Chairman: Thank you. John Stanley is
next.
Q141 Sir John Stanley: May
I ask you both, following the ratification of the Lisbon Treaty,
whether you think that ratification will prove advantageous, neutral
or detrimental to our bilateral relationship with the US?
Sir David Manning: Shall I hazard
the first guess? I would be surprised if it were detrimental.
Cynical or not, my view is that the big countries in the EU will
continue to run very energetic bilateral policies with regard
to the United States. I am doubtful that the EU and the Commission
will find it possible to do much to dilute that.The United States
has quite high expectations of the EU. I am conscious that this
is a minefield, but I think that it is important to say that the
United States wants Europe to be an effective partner. It wants
it to be an effective pole. It is looking to Europe to be more
effective, more united. Certainly during my time in Washington
it was clear that people on both sides of the aisle wanted us
to be effective within a more effective Europe. America will look
to see whether Lisbon delivers this.From our side of the equation,
I do not have great fears that Lisbon is suddenly going to undermine
our role or the classic way in which we have dealt with the United
States. Perhaps I shall be proved wrong. Instead, we should see
whether there are new levers that we can bring to bear, because
if the United States does want Europe to be more effective and
if the European Union can do more, we want to influence the European
Union to be a more effective partner for the United States.I look
back at my time there and think about the commercial policy. There
is absolutely no doubt in my mind that it was effectively through
the EU that we managed to contain protectionist pressures and
other pressures that it would have been much more difficult to
contain individually. I do not think that we should see the EU
as some threatening competitor. If we are astute, we should be
using the EU as an additional lever for us in Washington, unafraid
that somehow it will replace us in any way as a key interlocutor.
At the same time, we should be conscious that the Americans want
the EU to be an effective interlocutor.
Sir Jeremy Greenstock: I entirely
agree with that. I would go so far as to say that if the relationship
between the United Kingdom and Europe is weakened, the relationship
between the United Kingdom and the United States is weakened.It
is quite important to have a good appreciation of the multifaceted
transatlantic relationship, and if it would help, Mr Chairman,
I would like to leave for the Committee a copy of the record of
a recent Ditchley conference on the transatlantic relationship—US-EU
relations—which gives a very accurate description of the
selective nature of contacts between the United States and Europe.[1]
On first-pillar business, where the European Union has competence
through the Commission—on economic, trade, finance and other
matters, but particularly trade as the lead issue—the United
States will deal with Brussels and with the Brussels Commissioner
in charge. It is a powerful presence that the EU brings to the
table on economic, financial, trade, development, environmental
and other issues. On security and defence—hard defence—issues,
America will have very little to do with the European Union. It
will want to deal with individual countries, but particularly
with NATO. In previous decades that was always, and very strongly,
done through NATO, but as I said earlier, the United States is
no longer a European power because there is a Soviet threat. It
has moved on from that. But NATO can't do everything. It does
some of our security work but it doesn't do everything. So, the
third area is the individual bilateral relationships, or ad
hoc multinational relationships, as with the EU-3—UK,
France and Germany—over Iran. Those three countries act
with the backing of the European Union, but do their own business.There
is an a" la carte menu, particularly on the American side,
which will respond to where the power is—where the action
can get done. That is what the Americans are looking for, with
a hard-headed approach. The United Kingdom needs to know how to
place itself best in those three areas to get the best for the
UK national interest, and that means being hard-headed ourselves
about maintaining the channels and relationships within Europe
with the United States in quite a complex way. I think our Government,
civil service, military and intelligence systems do that very
well.
Q142 Sir John Stanley: Thank
you. May I just ask you a follow-up question on that, impinging
directly on the British diplomatic service in the United States?
The EU clearly has some pretty expansive plans as far as its External
Action Service is concerned, both in numbers and in funding, and
it is a safe bet that the External Action Service is going to
be thickened substantially in Washington, and probably in New
York as well. Where do you think that is going to leave the UK
diplomatic presence? You're going to have the External Action
Service; they are going to be thick on the ground on the Hill,
in the State Department, in the NSC and so on. Do you see that
as affecting the quality, content and influence of our bilateral
diplomatic activity with the US Administration?
Sir David Manning: Again, I am
very sceptical that that would be the outcome, but that may be
wishful thinking on my part. I think the key will be that the
United States Administration and Senators and Congressmen on the
Hill are looking for us to provide effective partnership on key
issues, and I don't think that will suddenly change. If the EU
mission is built up over time, I think it will become more influential,
but I really don't think that need be at our expense.If I may
just make this point, which is a bee in my own bonnet, I think
that a much greater threat to our effectiveness in the United
States is cutting back our own network. I am far more worried
about that. I was the ambassador who had to preside over closing
four posts in the United States and I was very unhappy about doing
that. It is very easy to just look at crude numbers and say, "There
are 470 or 500 people in the Embassy—what on earth are they
all doing?" But I think that a much greater threat to our
impact is to cut back on key people, particularly those who are
working in areas of real interest to the United States—not
just the political and military areas, but science, crime and
international terrorism. We have really got something to offer.
If we are forced to continue closing our network across America,
or cutting back in salami slices, so that it is almost a virtual
network, we will find it very much harder to influence the Americans
in the ways that we want. Then, if the European External Action
Service is there building itself up, we will be leaving something
of a vacuum.I can see that we need to watch what happens with
the European developments very closely, but I am pretty sanguine
that if we maintain the sort of embassy and the quality of the
people we have had—I had splendid people working for me—the
access will stay and we will be able to make our case in successive
Administrations. If we keep taking people away and if, by some
chance, we find ourselves apparently deciding on the numbers of
people we have according to the fluctuations of the exchange rate,
we will certainly be in trouble. In my view, this is a much greater
threat to our position in the United States than the European
External Action Service.
Sir John Stanley: Sir David, we can assure
you that we have been truly fully briefed by Sir Nigel Sheinwald
and his team about the current very serious financial position
that they are facing.
Sir Jeremy Greenstock: I agree
entirely with what Sir David has said. I would add, Sir John,
that the European Union's foreign policy outreach under the Lisbon
Treaty has got to prove itself. Outside the first pillar, in my
experience, the European Union has normally added up to less than
the sum of its parts. When it is capable of punching at or above
its weight, we should start investing in it and divesting from
our own diplomatic service, but I think that is a long way away.
I think that the French, the Germans and others with powerful
diplomatic services will maintain their national approaches to
these issues, and that the UK has a tremendous amount to add,
both for European interests and for UK national interests, by
maintaining a strong diplomatic presence.
Q143 Sir John Stanley: One
final question, not in the EU context, but on the totality. With
the huge experience that you both have in Washington and New York,
do you see, looking ahead, new opportunities that we may be able
to seize in Britain, as a British Government, to strengthen further
our relationship with the US in new areas?
Sir Jeremy Greenstock: David will
have his own ideas. I will mention just one thing that illustrates
some of the things we have been talking about—climate change.
The American states—five of them in particular—have
started to take their own decisions on carbon emission reduction,
which is very much along the lines that we in Europe and the United
Kingdom are trying to go, with the federal Government some way
behind. In having the capability to interact with those states
beyond the federal Government, we are serving our own climate
change interests by encouraging American public opinion to realise
their global responsibility on carbon emissions. I think that
is quite a good illustration of how the UK system can act beyond
the immediate relationship with Washington.
Sir David Manning: I certainly
agree about climate change. As I said, Sir John, I think it is
something that changed quite profoundly in terms of public opinion
even during the Bush Administration. If you accept my proposition
that the new Administration are naturally much more multilateralist,
I think that, where we believe there are real opportunities to
move international issues forward through multilateral machinery,
this is a new opportunity. Climate change is obviously one of
them. I suppose the emergence of the G20 is another, although
if I am candid we have to work out whether the G20 is good for
us because when we were G8 we were one of eight and now we are
one of 20. These sorts of evolutions may not necessarily enhance
our power. In terms of our opportunities, yes you have an Administration
who are thinking in a multilateral way much more like we do. The
rider I might add to this, though, is that one should not have
any illusions. An awful lot of Americans do not necessarily think
that this is a philosophy that they much want to support. I am
not suggesting that there has been a mass conversion, but it will
give us opportunities on big issues if we want to use them and
pursue issues through multilateral machinery.
Q144 Mr Heathcoat-Amory: You
have both stressed the importance of a British global reach in
the diplomatic service and all the benefits this brings, and then
you say that this is under no threat from the External Action
Service, but from two hard-headed diplomats, I find that a little
bit innocent. The plan is to build up an External Action Service
with secondments from national services and staff from the Commission.
Delegations will become embassies. How on earth can we maintain
the number of embassies and the quality and number of our staff
when that happens? It is bound to reduce our global influence.
Are you in denial about this or do you seriously believe that
we are going to run both in parallel?
Sir David Manning: I think it
is much more likely to be both in parallel.
Q145 Mr Heathcoat-Amory: Where
is the money going to come from?
Sir David Manning: That is an
interesting issue. As Sir Jeremy said, you are not going to find
Paris or Berlin, in my view, or probably a lot of other European
capitals outsourcing their key national and international interests
to the External Action Service, certainly not in the short run.
What you describe could develop over the long period, although
I am sceptical, particularly in watching the way that the European
Union has developed. But I think it is unlikely that we will find
that our interests are undermined in any appreciable way by the
emergence of the Action Service. I said earlier—I may prove
to be wrong—that my own view would be that our approach
should be to see whether we can use the post-Lisbon period to
enhance, through the EU, our influence in the United States. The
United States may be looking now to a Europe that it hopes will
be more coherent and more of a player. That is how I see it. Maybe
if we come back in 10 years' time I will have been proved to have
been disastrously wrong.
Q146 Mr Heathcoat-Amory: It
is quite a risk you are running there.
Sir Jeremy Greenstock: I would
argue also that you should not see this as a zero-sum game. I
think that we will gain as the United Kingdom from having a continuing
proficiency in diplomacy as a national organisation, and we will
gain in having an effective and quite powerful EU External Action
Service. If we are going to find recruits for both, if you look
at the number of good graduates who are wanting to join the UK
diplomatic service—about 10 or 20 times the number that
the Foreign Office can take—there are plenty of people to
recruit into both services. Obviously we will have to help them
get going with some secondments of experienced diplomats, but
let's not see this as a zero-sum game. There are real arguments
for having effective services, both at the EU level and at the
national level and that we are perfectly capable of working in
both without losing power at our own diplomatic level.
Chairman: Gentlemen, we are not going
to go on any longer—we've had a very long session this afternoon.
I appreciate you both coming, it has been extremely valuable.
Thank you very much.
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