Letter to the Chairman of the Committee
from the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs
Thank you for your letter of 25 November reporting
the Foreign Affairs Committee's visit to Serbia, Kosovo and Bosnia
and Herzegovina (BiH).
SERBIA
1. You raise several important issues surrounding
Serbia. On your first point regarding the Dutch block on the implementation
of Serbia's Interim Agreement, we have lobbied the Netherlands
to shift its position on this issue many times over the last year,
including at Ministerial level. I have personally raised this
issue with Foreign Minister Verhagen on several occasions. We
have also raised the question of the definition of "full
co-operation", where the Netherlands government has said
that the best proof would be the arrest of Ratko Mladi? and his
transfer to the International Criminal Tribunal for the former
Yugoslavia (ICTY). As you mention in your letter, Prosecutor Brammertz
has indicated that he will not use the phrase "full co-operation".
Nevertheless, it is possible that Prosecutor Brammertz's very
positive assessment on Serbia's co-operation with ICTY, delivered
on 3 December to the UN Security Council, will have an impact
on the Dutch position. I attach the relevant section of his report,
for your information.[1]
2. On the issue of Serbia's co-operation,
I attach a Written Ministerial Statement which will be laid before
Parliament on Monday 7 December.[2]
This makes clear that the Government welcomes Brammertz's very
positive assessment of Serbia's co-operation, and assesses that
their efforts amount to full co-operation.
3. You raise the issue of security and disposal
facilities at the Vinca nuclear site. The UK is not directly contributing
to security or disposal costs. However, there is agreement for
the Russian Federal Centre for Nuclear and Radiation Safety to
remove spent nuclear fuel from the Vinca site and transfer it
to Russia. This €25 million project is part financed by EU
donations, as well as by Serbia, the IAEA, the US, and the Czech
Republic.
KOSOVO
4. Our efforts to help Kosovo join international
organisations are led by the priorities of the Kosovan Government.
The range of organisations that could be joined is huge, so we
encourage Kosovo to consider membership of those which will be
of most practical benefit and where the membership process is
likely to be successful. Once Kosovo has taken a decision to apply,
we show our support by explaining to other countries the benefits
membership would bring not only for Kosovo but also for the organisation
and its members. Where there is a vote, we support Kosovo and
lobby on its behalf for a favourable outcome, as we did successfully
when Kosovo applied for IMF and World Bank membership.
5. Kosovo is keen to join the European Bank
for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) and the FCO is in regular
contact with the Kosovan Government and the EBRD on this matter,
helping to create an atmosphere conducive to Kosovo's application
being approved. British Missions to other international organisations,
such as the Council of Europe, assess the prospects of Kosovo's
membership so that we can provide sound advice to the Kosovan
Government.
6. On Kosovo's prospective membership of
the Inter-Parliamentary Union, we undertake to research membership
criteria and the procedures and will provide support to the Kosovo
Assembly should it decide to apply. The active interest taken
by Members of Parliament, including through the All Party Parliamentary
Group on Kosovo, can only help any future Kosovan application
to the IPU. I regularly lobby Foreign Ministers of sympathetic
states to recognise Kosovo, as do my Ministerial colleagues at
FCO and officials worldwide. The votes cast on Kosovo's application
for IMF and World Bank membership and New Zealand's recent decision
to accept the appointment of an Ambassador from Kosovo show that
support for Kosovo runs much wider than the countries who have
formally recognised.
7. The UK Government's principal contribution
to supporting rule of law in Kosovo—including to the judiciary—is
through the mentoring, monitoring and advising activities of EULEX
Kosovo. Five British secondees are currently working in the justice
component of EULEX. DFID, with funding from the Conflict Pool,
also provides support to Kosovo in establishing its Constitutional
Court through a project delivered by local experts. This includes
training of legal advisers, lawyers and municipal officials. There
are no current plans to suggest the introduction of close protection
for judges in Kosovo. However if the Kosovan Government were to
raise this with us, we would be willing to look at ways of sharing
UK expertise in this area.
8. Kosovo's municipal elections on 15 November
were a success. The British Embassy in Pristina will continue
its programme of outreach to encourage participation in the second
round of mayoral voting on 13 December and in the municipal and
mayoral elections in Partes±/Partesh and North Mitrovica/e
next year. We continue to impress upon the Kosovan Government
the importance of participation of all communities in these elections
for the legitimacy of the institutions concerned and for the successful
integration of all communities in Kosovo. We are also working
closely with the International Civilian Office and EU representatives
in Kosovo on their plans for outreach to communities in northern
Kosovo.
9. I fully appreciate the benefits that
effective levels of UK representation can bring to delivering
the UK's policy aims of conflict prevention in Kosovo. Due to
limited and committed budgets, further funding is highly unlikely
to be available for additional UK secondments this Financial Year.
For 2010-11, Departments are currently looking at priorities across
the range of Conflict Pool programmes, from Afghanistan to Zimbabwe.
We are therefore not yet able to say how many staff we will second
to individual missions (such as ICO and EULEX). However, the UK
remains fully committed to civilian missions under the European
Security Defence Policy as a key tool to manage international
crises and to prevent and resolve conflict, including the EULEX
mission in Kosovo.
10. I am determined that the FCO must do
all it can to ensure that the international missions to which
the UK contributes are maintained at the right level to fulfil
their mandate and ensure value for money. Kosovo is no exception
and with regards to the UN and OSCE missions, whilst the UK's
ability to directly control its financial obligations is limited,
we strive to ensure appropriate levels of commitment through contacts
with the relevant secretariats and through the UN and OSCE finance
committees.
11. With regards to the UN Mission in Kosovo
(UNMIK), there has been a substantial decrease from a 2008-09
presence of 4,900 to a current presence of 500 now that EULEX
has reached Full Operating Capability. Some concern has been expressed
in the Security Council that UNMIK's current operating strength
and mandate should be maintained. The UK will nevertheless continue
to seek an optimal size for UNMIK against its current remit, taking
full account of the changing political and security environment
and the presence of the other international missions.
12. The proposed OSCE Unified Budget for
2010 outlines a 16% cut in the OSCE Mission in Kosovo's (OMIK)
resources, equating to €4.4 million. We fully support this
and will press strongly for its adoption. We have long argued
for a significant decrease in OMIK's funding, which last year
amounted to more than 15% of the total OSCE Unified Budget. We
acknowledge that there remains important work for the OSCE to
do in Kosovo, but strongly believe the Organisation cannot be
a surrogate for Kosovan Government responsibility.
13. The UK Government is working closely
with NATO to ensure that during KFOR's transition to a deterrent
presence, a safe and secure environment is maintained at all times.
The transition will be a gradual process, with three distinct
"gates"—each requiring approval from the North
Atlantic Council (NAC). Each decision regarding troop reduction
will be based on the political and security environment at the
time. NATO will ensure that the force, which will include reserves,
fully meets the evolving security requirement.
14. The British Embassy in Pristina will
not acquire biometric capture capability by the end of 2009. A
business case for the necessary equipment is being considered
by UKBA decision-makers. If approved, the equipment should be
in place in Spring 2010.
BOSNIA AND
HERZEGOVINA (BIH)
15. Constitutional reform is not a formal
requirement for the closure of the Office of the High Representative
(OHR), but reforms to make Bosnia and Herzegovina more functional
will be necessary for progress towards EU integration. Whilst
the UK will therefore support constitutional amendments designed
to make the state more effective, the exact nature of changes
to the constitution needs to be agreed internally by Bosnian politicians.
The EU/US initiative has given Bosnian politicians an excellent
opportunity to come to an agreement on making constitutional changes
as well as completing the conditions and objectives required for
OHR transition, and the UK has been vocal in its support of this
initiative. On a visit to Sarajevo on 5-6 November this year,
I expressed my strong support for the ongoing talks and urged
the leaders of all the country's main parties—including
Milorad Dodik of the SNSD—to engage in the process and work
together to reach agreement.
16. You highlighted potential risks associated
with the "time lag" between EU accession for Croatia
and BiH. The UK will continue to make every effort to encourage
BiH in its European perspective. This is one of the reasons that
we are investing so much time in BiH, and why we remain strongly
supportive of the High Representative/EU Special Representative's
efforts to drive reform. We will continue to defend robustly the
principle of conditionality, so that the draw of EU integration
can be used as a lever to encourage reform in BiH and co-operation
between its politicians.
17. Transition from OHR to EUSR, once the
necessary objectives and conditions have been fully met, remains
the UK's long-term aim. Following transition, the EUSR will not
retain the Bonn Powers, as these are specifically linked in legal
terms to the High Representative. However, the UK has consistently
supported the view that the reinforced EUSR should not just offer
the `carrots' entailed in closer EU integration, but should also
wield the necessary "sticks" to discourage acts which
undermined the state or failed to comply with the Dayton Peace
Agreement. The Government has consistently argued that the strengthened
EUSR would need strong powers to replace the former OHR ones.
These would include the explicit right to recommend EU measures
against individual politicians (such as travel bans or asset freezes),
the ability to influence decisions on EU funding granted to BiH,
and the power to make recommendations as to BiH's progress towards
EU accession.
18. Whilst the current situation in BiH
is stable, the UK is conscious of the potential future risks of
instability. I continue to make clear to my European colleagues
that, while it is right for the EU to be planning for how the
force can best be reconfigured to support our common objectives
in BiH, it would be unwise to decide whether and how this reconfiguration
should take place before we have clarity regarding the nature
and timing of OHR transition. Planning for the option of reconfiguring
EUFOR to a smaller, training force has been carried out, but on
the clear understanding that the planning to date is without prejudice
to an eventual decision.
UK VISA POLICY
19. Since the UK does not participate in
this element of the Schengen acquis and is not bound by the EU
Common (Schengen) Visa List, we will not be lifting visa requirements
for the nationals of Macedonia, Montenegro and Serbia to travel
to the UK. However, we take note of the European Commission's
proposal that these countries should move to visa free travel
within the Schengen area as of 19 December 2009 and we welcome
the progress that these countries have made against their individual
Schengen visa liberalisation roadmaps.
20. Commencing in 2007, the UK undertook
a global review of its own visitor visa regimes—the Visa
Waiver Test. The results for the Western Balkan countries did
not warrant lifting the visa regime for any of the countries.
The next Global Visa Waiver Test is not scheduled to take place
before 2011, at which point the UK visa regimes in place for Western
Balkan countries will be reviewed.
I would be happy to discuss any of the answers
given above in more detail when I give evidence to the Committee
on 9 December.
Rt Hon David Miliband MP
6 December 2009
1 Not printed. See UN Security Council, Letter
dated 12 November 2009 from the President of the International
Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious
Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the
Territory of the Former Yugoslavia since 1991, addressed to the
President of the Security Council, Annex II, Paras 30-38:
(http://www.icty.org/x/file/About/Reports%20and%20Publications/CompletionStrategy/completion_strategy_13nov2009_en.pdf) Back
2
Not printed. See HC Deb, 7 December 2009, col 2WS: (http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200910/cmhansrd/cm091207/wmstext/91207m0001.htm£0912073000011) Back
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