Letter to the Chairman from the Secretary
of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs
Thank you for your letter of 1 December 2009
regarding the Government's response to the Foreign Affairs Committee's
Report, Global Security: Afghanistan and Pakistan. Our
comments on each of the specific issues you raise are set out
below. Quotes from your letter are written in italics, and our
response is in plain text.
1. The proposal in paragraphs 126 and 129
that the UK should relinquish the role of lead partner nation
on counter-narcotics (If the Government rejects this recommendation,
the Committee considers that it should give a statement of reasoning
as to why the UK continues to feel that it should retain this
role)
The UK's "Partner Nation" status with
Afghanistan on counter-narcotics is scheduled to come to an end
in 2011. In view of this, Ministers, at NSID, have directed officials
to work with the Government of Afghanistan to form a new partnership
to lead the fight against drugs in Afghanistan. The UK is working
with the US and other international partners to ensure that the
Government of Afghanistan (supported by the UN Office for Drugs
and Crime) has the capacity to take the lead on counter-narcotics
in Afghanistan.
We should be clear, however, that the timescales
to affect sustainable reductions in opium cultivation and trafficking
are long. Experience in Pakistan and Thailand show that a 15-20
year effort is required. The UK, alongside the US, UN and other
international partners, will continue to play an important role
in supporting the Government of Afghanistan's counter-narcotics
efforts.
2. The conclusion in paragraph 225 that "there
has been significant `mission creep' in the British deployment
in Afghanistan".
We have always been clear that the reason we
went into Afghanistan was to protect Britain's national security.
This remains our mission today. As the Prime Minister has said,
"Our aim in 2009 is the same as in 2001. We are in Afghanistan
as a result of a hard-headed assessment of the terrorist threat
facing Britain". The Prime Minister has made clear on numerous
occasions that our strategy is for British forces to remain in
Afghanistan until the Afghan Government is able to maintain a
stable security situation and the rule of law. This has not changed
since we entered Afghanistan.
3. The conclusion in paragraph 236 that the
British deployment to Helmand was undermined by unrealistic planning
at senior levels, poor co-ordination between Whitehall departments
and a failure to provide the military with clear direction
The decision to deploy to Helmand was taken
by Ministers on the basis of cross-departmental advice. As the
UK presence in Helmand was established and our understanding of
the operating environment improved, we developed our force structures
and dispositions accordingly. But the nature of the problems we
are trying to tackle in Helmand in particular, the international
coalition of which we are a part, and the ability of the insurgency
to adapt and adjust to our actions made, continue to make this
a challenging task.
David Miliband
4 January 2010
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