CORRECTED TRANSCRIPT OF ORAL EVIDENCE To be published as HC 144-i

HOUSE OF COMMONS

MINUTES OF EVIDENCE

TAKEN BEFORE THE

FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMMITTEE

 

DEVELOPMENTS IN THE EUROPEAN UNION

WEDNESDAY 9 DECEMBER 2009

RT HON DAVID MILIBAND MP and MATTHEW RYCROFT

 

Evidence heard in Public

Questions 1 - 112

 

Oral Evidence

Taken before the Foreign Affairs Committee

on Wednesday 9 December 2009

Members present:

Mike Gapes (Chairman)

Sir Menzies Campbell

Mr. Fabian Hamilton

Mr. David Heathcoat-Amory

Mr. John Horam

Mr. Eric Illsley

Mr. Paul Keetch

Andrew Mackinlay

Mr. Malcolm Moss

Sandra Osborne

Mr. Ken Purchase

Sir John Stanley

Ms Gisela Stuart

 

 

Examination of Witnesses

Witnesses: Rt Hon. David Miliband MP, Secretary of State, and Matthew Rycroft, Director EU, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, gave evidence.

 

Q<1> <Chairman:> Foreign Secretary and Mr. Rycroft, welcome. We have seen you both many times before. This is our normal pre-European Council regular meeting, but we have the advantage of having had a discussion this morning on the FCO's annual report, and we have also just heard the Chancellor's pre-Budget statement. May I ask you, Foreign Secretary, what your response is to the fact that in the pre-Budget statement the Chancellor referred specifically to the commitment for overseas aid to go up to 0.7% of gross national income by 2013? He referred to overseas aid as "a very small proportion of our overall budget." Clearly, Foreign and Commonwealth Office spending is even smaller-it is an extremely small proportion of our overall budget, but there is no reference in the statement to the FCO's budget.

We heard this morning about the very severe pressures caused by the changes with regard to overseas pricing mechanisms, about international subscriptions and about the danger to the work of the FCO. When we went to the United States in October, we were quite shocked to hear about members of FCO staff there working unpaid voluntarily for part of the time, and people taking unpaid leave because of pressures on the budget. What is going to happen with the FCO as a result of the statement today, and where are we going?

<David Miliband:> Thank you for that introduction. It is good to be here. I think the fact that there are no members of the press here should allow me to say that it is probably a good thing that the Foreign Office was not mentioned in the pre-Budget report, because the reasons for it being mentioned would probably have been tough news rather than good news. I think that we may have dodged a bullet in not getting a mention today. Since the press are not here, I can say that.

In all seriousness, the pressures on the Foreign Office, which, as you say, is a very small part of total Government spending, are real, but that is appropriate given that we are operating in the same climate as our colleagues. As the Chancellor said, today wasn't a day for a comprehensive spending review. If you are in the middle of, or just coming out of, an economic hurricane, it is not a good time to take the economic temperature; you need to re-stabilise things.

As you have seen, the Foreign Office has made a lot of steps in the past four or five years in respect of efficiency, value for money, working practices and so on. You have seen the figures on this OPM business as well. We are determined to continue to improve our value for money, and to ensure that where there is surplus estate, or other things that can be better used, we do so. Obviously, we are a Department that is people-rich. A very high proportion of our spend is on staff. We are not a programme-spending Department in general.

In a way, it is a good thing that we have a lot of diplomats working for us around the world. That is not "bureaucracy", "administration", or "red tape". Our whole purpose is to have people in 261 missions around the world, so it is not a victory for us to reduce the number of people working for us, although I think that there is a significant change in the Foreign Office; for example, there is the changing balance between British and locally employed staff, which has been a very healthy development. We will have to work within the budget that we have got and that we get, in the same way that other Departments do.

<Chairman:> We might pursue this in writing as well, based on what we heard this morning. I shall bring Andrew Mackinlay in briefly.

 

Q<2> <Andrew Mackinlay:> I deliberately clocked that you said that you are working in the same environment as other Departments, but in a sense, you're not, are you? By way of an example, you are not in command-you cannot be, by definition-of the very great subscriptions that we make to international organisations. That is on demand, as it were. It seems to me that collectively, in your capacity as members of the Cabinet, you should not penalise further the Foreign Office. If there is a level playing field with the Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs, the Department for Communities and Local Government and so on, that is fair enough. However, on the international subscriptions-the subscription to the UN is only one of them; there are many others, such as the subscription to NATO, the OSCE, the Council of Europe and so on-I would have thought you would argue for full compensation to your Department. It is not for me to argue your case, but it seems that this is a matter where you should be saying, "This is unacceptable."

<David Miliband:> All help is gratefully received. We operate in the same environment as everybody else. There is a new fiscal environment; that is the point. Obviously, we are different in a number of ways: first, because of the way that we are personnel-heavy; secondly, because of the 120 foreign currencies that we operate in; and, thirdly, because of the international subscriptions that you rightly pointed to. In my experience, one must always be careful about suggesting to the Treasury that it should take responsibility for international subscriptions. What happens is that it allows you to bear the rise in costs, and then if ever the costs go down, it will snaffle the gain. There are swings and roundabouts that have to be handled quite carefully.

You are right to say that in spending reviews, the Government have to take an overall look at how they engage with the outside world. You will remember that when we did the strategy refresh of the Foreign Office two years ago, its first objective was to be a vehicle for all Departments to have an appropriate presence around the world. In that sense, the Foreign Office serves not just its own interests, but those of the wider British Government and British society. I totally take the point that-especially with DFID, the MOD, and increasingly the Home Office-we must look like the outward-facing Departments, but we must also remember that the Foreign Office is performing a function that is of benefit to all Departments and the whole country. That needs to be looked at in the round.

 

Q<3> <Sir John Stanley:> I found your reply to the Chairman's question extraordinarily laid back; the word "complacent" almost comes to mind. I invite you to look at the evidence that was given by Sir David Manning to this Committee last week, in which he said that the biggest single risk to the effective viability of the future of the Foreign Office was the degree of financial cuts that it is facing. You rightly say that you are a people business, but one must point out that against the totality of public expenditure, the expenditure on the Foreign Office is almost microscopic. I remind you that we got into one war, which could conceivably have been avoided, as a result of not having the requisite capabilities in Buenos Aires in the lead-up to the invasion of the Falklands. That is the penalty of going right on the Foreign Office in key capabilities.

<David Miliband:> I strongly agree with that. Lest there be any misunderstanding, let me say that I am not in the least bit complacent about the financial situation that the Foreign Office finds itself in, but that is tempered by experience. I have not found that waving bleeding stumps in public is the way to impress one's colleagues. Be in no doubt that I will-and do-defend very strongly the integrity of the Foreign Office's management of its finances, the efficiency with which it delivers them and the value that it gives to any additional resources that it gets. No one is prouder than I am of what we do with a very, very small part of overall public spending, nor is anyone more committed than I am to the notion that Britain can't talk about being one of the most open, globally engaged, international players unless we have an international, diplomatic network to make that go. That is not measured simply by the number of posts-we have 261 posts around the world-but is measured by the quality of the people who we are able to recruit, the skill with which we manage, train and deploy them, and the support that we offer them when they are in the most dangerous places.

More articles have been written about what the Foreign Office does in what are perceived to be pleasant places, such as Paris, than about what it does in tough places such as Kabul, but actually the Foreign Office deploys people in the toughest places and is proud to do that. I very much welcome-not just today-the consistent way in which the Committee has recognised the value of the work that we do, without ever stinting on areas where we have fallen behind. Be in no doubt that it is a very big part of my job to make sure that we maintain the sense of pride and commitment, and also the sense of value that the country gives to its international engagement through the Foreign Office. There is absolutely no complacency about the situation. Anyone who reads the OPM report will realise that complacency is the last thing that should come to mind, given the situation that has arisen.

 

Q<4> <Mr. Horam:> It is not just a question of the difficulty in an economy burdened by a large amount of debt, and every Department having to be looked at afresh. There is also a thing unique to the Foreign Office, namely the depreciation of sterling by 25%, which particularly affects you. As you are aware, Foreign Secretary, there was a mechanism for dealing with this: the overseas pricing mechanism, as a result of which you had to pay back money to the Treasury. The mechanism was unilaterally cancelled in 2007, and that has led to your present difficulties. Do you just have to take that? It is a remarkable thing; you have lost both ways-paying money back when it is good for the Treasury, and then going in reverse when it is bad for the Treasury.

<David Miliband:> That rather informed the answer that I gave earlier to Andrew Mackinlay about the international subs. The figures are laid out in the OPM report. If you take out the international subs, our budget is about Ł830 million, including UKTI. The OPM hit-the sterling depreciation hit-is about Ł80 million. I would prefer to spend all my time on policy questions, but I can't when there are financial and management issues raised by that kind of development.

 

Q<5> <Mr. Horam:> Is there nothing you can do about it?

<David Miliband:> I think you'll agree that it is better for Government to try to make their three-year processes work. The setting of spending over a three-year cycle is better than annual. However, that does not preclude discussions within that period, although it is a particularly difficult period to be having them. Be in no doubt that I understand what's at stake here.

 

Q<6> <Ms Stuart:> My point is about the European Union. I won't labour it. I want you to take something away. You said that the Foreign Office "is a vehicle for...an appropriate presence around the world." I absolutely agree with you. Don't you think there is something distinctly strange in having a Foreign Office that in 2007-08 took a budget cut of 8% and now spends Ł1.93 billion, yet we have DFID-which some people might think is running an alternative foreign policy of just poverty reduction-which has a budget of Ł5.2 billion and in the Chancellor's statement is having its future spend also ring-fenced? So either we start saying that DFID's definition of what it spends its money on is widened so that it can actually work with the Foreign Office, or I'm afraid we're going to end up with a vehicle that may wish to represent us to the rest of the world but is simply running out of fuel.

<David Miliband:> There are three or four very important points there that we need to address. First, the head of the UK presence in any country is the ambassador or high commissioner. When I say that the Foreign Office network provides the vehicle for Departments across Government, I say that advisedly because that is our leading objective. Secondly, DFID does not run an alternative foreign policy. It runs a foreign policy that is mandated by Parliament, by the 1997 Act which set out poverty reduction and associated matters within its rubric. In my experience around the world, the DFID head and team and the Foreign Office head and team-ambassador, high commissioner and team-form a very impressive partnership in country, rather than having competing foreign policy objectives. It is an important part of the Government's approach that poverty reduction is a significant part of our foreign policy vocation. By definition, DFID is not in every country in the world. It has a presence in countries in which poverty reduction is an issue and not in those in which it is not. Therefore, by definition, it is not universal.

Thirdly and importantly, Douglas Alexander's White Paper in June or July showed imagination and innovation in the way in which he was thinking about not just a traditional definition of poverty reduction and aid but conflict prevention, good governance and trade, which is now a significant part of his work. What counts as overseas development assistance is not all spent by DFID. As a tactical point, it would not be healthy or right for the Foreign Office to see DFID as its enemy. I do not see it as that. I do not think that the International Development Committee is your enemy either. Given the cross-party consensus that exists in Britain about the importance of international development, surely it makes sense to try and make that part of our foreign policy rather than an alternative to it.

 

Q<7> <Ms Stuart:> I asked Sir Peter Ricketts this earlier and he, quite rightly, could not answer it. Can you name one other significant country that has split overseas development and foreign policy in the way in which we have?

<David Miliband:> I don't know the answer to that, but I know that quite a lot of countries regard what we have done as an impressive way of doing things.

Q<8> <Ms Stuart:> They have looked at it for the last 12 years, and no one has copied us, as far as I can see.

<David Miliband:> With respect, quite a lot of them have new Administrations who have not been looking at it for 12 years and they are interested. The other point to make is that DFID is a programme-spending Department, and the Foreign Office has a small amount of programmes, so it does not have a major programme spend. I do not think that it is right to judge our influence by the respective size of our cheque books, because our purposes are different. When we are working for the civilian Government in Pakistan-to take that as an example-we do that through our diplomatic and political links and not through our aid budget. However, we know, as sure as night follows day, that the establishment of civilian Government in Pakistan, to which we contributed, is an important basis on which DFID can do its work. That is an interesting example of the distinctive tasks that the Foreign Office and DFID play. The Foreign Office role is to provide political leadership for the UK in countries of the world, and that is what we do.

<Chairman:> A final question on this, and then we will move on to the European Union.

 

Q<9> <Sandra Osborne:> You referred to locally based staff, and we have a number of concerns about that. As well as having advantages, it is cheaper to have locally engaged staff. However, we have heard that the terms and conditions of such staff are different from UK-based staff. They are the ones who have to take unpaid leave. They do not have the same level of diplomatic security, as we have seen in Iran. Locally based staff were arrested, charged and sentenced for going about their legal business. We have also heard that they are more likely to be subjected to bullying, harassment and discrimination, according to the FCO's own staff survey. Do you think that that is acceptable?

<David Miliband:> No, it is certainly not acceptable. There should be no harassment or bullying of any staff, be they British or foreign staff. Although the reports of such behaviour have fallen in the latest staff survey, it is still far too high, and we will not rest until it is down to zero. You are right that locally engaged staff have different terms and conditions, and we have different contractual commitments to them. However, LE staff, who are, by definition, not British, show a high degree of "patriotism" towards the UK. It is quite remarkable when you go around the world and talk to staff, as I am sure that you have, because you find that they feel absolutely committed to Britain in a quite remarkable way, and that is not just because we are their employer. We are often a good employer compared with others in the countries in which we work. It is challenging. The way we have gone about this is right; the balance is now about one third core UK staff, two thirds LE staff-perhaps 40:60. That gives us flexibility, it gives us local routes and it gives us credibility, which is very valuable. It has been pointed out to me that some local staff are British-a good point-notably in parts of Europe.

 

Q<10> <Andrew Mackinlay:> It is the pay cuts issue which I find embarrassing in the extreme. Some are taking a pay cut, and it could become endemic. If ambassadors and high commissioners are constrained, they will say, "What's happened? Well, Washington gave them unpaid leave." There must be a line in the sand where you say, "This is unacceptable." Do you not agree?

<David Miliband:> I assure you that no one is more passionate than I am about the Foreign Office's budget, but sometimes our passion has to be expressed publicly, and sometimes it has to be expressed privately.

 

Q<11> <Chairman:> Thank you, Mr. Mackinlay. We now move on.

Foreign Secretary, you have attended European Council meetings. Are you going to be at the forthcoming one?

<David Miliband:> I'm not going to be there tomorrow, because the Lisbon treaty says that the European Council is for Heads of Government. The interpretation provided by the EU legal adviser is that it means what it says. But in true consensus-building European fashion, there will be a discussion over dinner about whether the treaty means what it says.

 

Q<12> <Sir Menzies Campbell:> So you're going to dinner?

<David Miliband:> I am not invited to the dinner. The dinner is for Heads. Perhaps I should have been more specific. Heads of Government will have a discussion over dinner about whether or not they want each to have an aide-de-camp with them in the shape or form of their Foreign Minister. That is what they are going to do.

 

Q<13> <Chairman:> Is this a decision taken by the Swedes, or is it a decision taken under the new arrangements by Mr. Van Rompuy?

<David Miliband:> It has not been taken by Mr. Van Rompuy; I don't think he has taken any decisions, because he has not yet chaired a meeting. His first meeting will be in January-or the spring Council meeting-but he comes into active office then. It is the Swedes, informed by the legal eagles of the EU.

 

Q<14> <Chairman:> Do you assume that when the new institutional arrangements come into effect, it will mean in practice that Foreign Secretaries will no longer be attending European Councils?

<David Miliband:> To be honest, I did not spend much time as the Lisbon treaty went through thinking about this issue. The particular issue of whether or not Foreign Ministers attend the European Council was not one that detained me unduly. The honest truth is that I think it is a bigger issue in countries where there is a coalition Government and where the Foreign Minister comes from another party than it is under our system. However, there are countries with coalition Governments that want to have the virtues of a rather more intimate, smaller discussion.

One benefit of having one person per Government attending is that it would be far more likely that all the Heads would have to sit around the table for the whole meeting. That is seen as an advantage. The disadvantage, obviously, is that you haven't got an extra person to do extra business. If you take this week, we have just had two days of Foreign Ministers' meetings in Brussels under the Foreign Affairs Council and the General Affairs Council. Am I going to be weeping at the prospect that I'm not spending Thursday and Friday in Brussels going through the motions again? No, I'm not going to be weeping about that.

 

Q<15> <Chairman:> Does this not, however, have a danger within it? We have seen over the years a shift of foreign policy away from the Foreign and Commonwealth Office towards the Prime Minister and No. 10. Is that not in a sense institutionalising it, so that the Prime Minister, any Prime Minister in future, will have to spend more time at such meetings because it has to be a Head of State or Government?

<David Miliband:> I don't think so, no, for three reasons. First, you'll still have the pre-European Council, General Affairs Council and Foreign Affairs Council. For example, this week we have spent a long time talking about Turkey-Cyprus, and a lot of time talking about the Balkans, Iran and Afghanistan. All that has been pre-cooked for the European Council discussions. Secondly, there is no change really, because Heads of Government have always been able to discuss foreign policy and will continue to do so. Thirdly, the Lisbon treaty actually says: "When the agenda so requires, the members of the European Council may decide each to be assisted by a minister", so it is written in that there is flexibility for Foreign Ministers to go along if there is going to be a foreign affairs discussion.

 

Q<16> <Mr. Illsley:> Given that the European Council is now institutionalised in the treaty, Sweden has the presidency and the chairmanship of this meeting-somewhat accidentally, in that Van Rompuy will not chair it-why did the Swedes decide to restrict it?

<David Miliband:> Because they got advice from the Legal Adviser-is that Piris's title?

<Matthew Rycroft:> He is the head of the Council Legal Service.

<David Miliband:> The head of the Council Legal Service advised the Swedes.

<Mr. Illsley:> They are just being specifically very careful.

<David Miliband:> Yes. I think that it is fair to say that this is perceived in a number of quarters as being a unique European Council, because it is post-Lisbon passage, pre-Lisbon delivery.

<Chairman:> Maybe unique for other reasons as well, with certain people not there. May we move on?

 

Q<17> <Ms Stuart:> On these new appointments of the high commissioner and President, did the Foreign Office at any time advise the previous Prime Minister, Tony Blair, that he really did not have much of a chance of getting the job?

<David Miliband:> I don't know that I would classify us as his advisers in this respect. What I know is that his name was discussed at length after his candidacy was floated by President Sarkozy two years ago.

 

Q<18> <Ms Stuart:> Was the Foreign Office somewhat taken unawares by how the two big political parties in the European Union had clearly already done a deal?

<David Miliband:> Not taken unawares, no, I would not say that. And when you say, "already done a deal"-

 

Q<19> <Ms Stuart:> Clearly, they made a deal that did not include the previous Prime Minister.

<David Miliband:> The two main groupings, the Party of European Socialists, of which our party is a member, and the European People's Party, of which the Conservative Party is now not a member, came to play a prominent role quite late in the day, I think it is fair to say-in the run-up to the European Council in October, when this was descried. It was quite late when they came into the fray.

 

Q<20> <Ms Stuart:> As they always do. There is nothing new about that-we always know that they will come into play, although they did so rather late. Particularly given the dynamics of the last European election and the way that they came together, there was nothing late about them.

<David Miliband:> Well, I think it was. Literally it was late, because it happened just before the European Council. The fact that there had been recent European elections and the fact that President Barroso had been effectively installed over the summer meant that there had been some engagement. But I think that the groupings played quite a significant role.

 

Q<21> <Ms Stuart:> Okay. Let's move on. Given that we keep saying that the only way that the British people in particular will appreciate the benefits of the European Union is if we give them something tangible, something that is really meaningful-we need to show a success and what concerns people are jobs and economic prosperity-why did we then not go for an economic portfolio in the Commission but rather thought that our interests were best represented by a foreign policy portfolio?

<David Miliband:> I think we get the best of both worlds. Britain was offered not just the High Representative but the vice-presidency of the Commission, and the Commission is a collegiate body.

 

Q<22> <Ms Stuart:> The two go together anyway. It is not a double offer. With the offer of the High Representative came the vice-presidency, so we didn't get two for one, we just got one, which happened to be two.

<David Miliband:> As you say, it happens to be two, so we got the best of both worlds. We got the High Rep job and we got the First Vice-President of the Commission, with a role, like every other Commissioner, across the piece. I think that that was a very good offer and was well worth having-it is going to work well for us.

 

Q<23> <Ms Stuart:> I won't press you on what I tried to press the Europe Minister on in the debate last week-I was trying to find out, if it does not matter that Michel Barnier is French, why it is then a success that Cathy Ashton is British?

<David Miliband:> The "success" comes from the double-hatted role, because the allegation has been that somehow we have a Commissioner who is only going to be dealing with foreign policy, whereas that is not true. It is a simple structural point. It is not to do with any sort of ethnicity.

 

Q<24> <Ms Stuart:> In that case, I am just glad it is a woman, because running the foreign policy of 27 member states really requires "multi-tasking" well beyond anybody I know.

<David Miliband:> I strongly agree with that.

 

Q<25> <Ms Stuart:> As a final question, were you sufficiently content with the current process of making these two appointments, or would you suggest that when they come up for renewal we change the way we arrive at the winners?

<David Miliband:> Well, this was a one-off, really, wasn't it? I think it will be worth-in, I suppose, five years' time-considering the way this works out. If the cycle continues, then it will always be after a European Parliament election, so some of the factors will be consistent. There was discussion about whether there should be a "Europe's Got Talent" parade, where the different candidates could have exhibited their skills in front of the-

<Mr. Horam:> Traffic?

<David Miliband:> No, in front of the leaders. The traffic comes later, I think.

<Ms Stuart:> Swimsuits?

<David Miliband:> No, no. There's obviously a lot of levity around. I think I've started something off; I should have answered the first question in a far more sober way. All things being equal, it will be good to have that, but given that the President of the European Council was going to involve candidates who are sitting Prime Ministers, it is quite difficult to imagine a scenario where they are going to do, effectively, an audition and advertise that they are going for another job. So I think that there are limitations to the sort of transparency and openness that attaches to the process, but I do not think anyone would say that it is a perfect process.

 

Q<26> <Mr. Hamilton:> Some commentators have said that one of the purposes of the Lisbon treaty was to give the EU a greater global role. Others have said that the appointment of two relatively low-profile candidates actually indicates quite clearly that the EU does not want that role. Baroness Ashton will be subject, obviously, to confirmation by the European Parliament, which will, I understand, conduct its hearings in January. She will be in charge of a budget of €4 billion-about Ł3.6 billion-and a worldwide diplomatic service that is expected to employ about 3,000 people. What message do you think the appointment of Mr. Van Rompuy and Baroness Ashton, as opposed to some of the other possible candidates we have already discussed, sends to our foreign partners outside the EU?

<David Miliband:> Well, that is a very good question. I think that the best answer to that is to say that most of our partners-and we have had recent meetings with the Chinese, Russians and Americans at Secretary of State level-are interested in what the European Union is going to do with its new structures, rather than the personalities. Obviously, Tony Blair has a global reputation and a global personality, so there was some chatter about that. However, people are basically saying, "What is the EU going to do? Is it going to live up to its global role?" I think that that is why the next couple of years are going to be important. So the truth about the answer is that they are less interested in the "message" and more interested in the substance.

 

Q<27> <Mr. Hamilton:> What is your view, though, about the point that has been expressed in some quarters that Baroness Ashton does not have sufficient experience and, not only that, that she has never been elected, in spite of her obvious ability, to any office ever? How does that impact on her ability to do the role?

<David Miliband:> The second point is a fact, but I think that the former point is unfair. She made a presentation to Foreign Affairs Ministers on Monday night and delivered it exceptionally well. I think she will use her consensus-building and management skills to very good effect in what is quite a complicated management challenge to establish the new External Action Service out of the two current organisations. I think she will bring a real determination not to allow consensus to become lowest common denominator-ism. I think she will really search for a stronger version of European unity, so I think that she will prove the critics whom you describe wrong.

 

Q<28> <Mr. Hamilton:> You have made your view clear that the High Representative's job would be one that should primarily carry out the wishes of member states. Would you have preferred the High Representative not to have been somebody whose only experience of EU office was as part of the Commission-and for a very brief period?

<David Miliband:> I don't think that's a problem, no. I think that Cathy addressed that directly on Monday. She is absolutely clear that her strength is ultimately going to come from the degree of unity that exists and can be established across the member states. The fact that she has a background in the Commission is not really an issue.

 

Q<29> <Mr. Purchase:> Could we just look at the politics of these appointments for the moment? When you were talking about traffic stopping and so on, it clearly indicated that there was some wish on the part of the British Government that there would be a pretty high-level appointment. Were you getting pretty poor information from our diplomatic service? Had we missed what was going on with France and Germany? How would you have made your statement had you known that France and Germany were, as it turned out, clearly thinking something up-they clearly weren't thinking what we were thinking?

<David Miliband:> We certainly did have good information, not least because President Sarkozy said publicly that he wanted someone who was more of a traffic stopper, if you want to use that metaphor.

<Mr. Purchase:> It was you, rather than me, if you remember, but never mind.

<David Miliband:> If one is attracted by that metaphor.

A small number of member states had declared support for a different candidate, for example President Sarkozy. For example, we had said that if Tony Blair was a candidate, he would be excellent. Most member states had not either declared their hand or really turned their mind to it in a serious way until after the return from the summer break or even into October. That was why I said that there was some making up of minds to be done. That was what happened. It was a very, very abstract discussion in the first half of this year, not least because the Irish referendum was still up in the air. That gave the name game rather an ethereal quality-a sort of abstract quality-in the first half of this year.

 

Q<30> <Mr. Purchase:> Just a quick follow up. I don't think it's so much about people declaring. I just wonder why the networks, the ears to the ground, the looking for the signs and the listening posts that we established missed the point of what was happening with France and Germany.

<David Miliband:> I don't accept that about France and Germany. Germany was very careful not to declare its hand, not least because it had a general election on 27 September, so it was really out of action for these purposes until then. France did make its position clear. Most other member states were perfectly happy to listen, but were not really committed one way or the other. Then the European elections, the EPP and the PES came into play. I think that this was a pretty open question.

 

Q<31> <Chairman:> You said that France made its position clear, but France then did the opposite of what was in the position that President Sarkozy had announced.

<David Miliband:> Well, I think that the French position developed when other people's positions developed.

<Chairman:> Okay, that's another way of saying it.

 

Q<32> <Sir Menzies Campbell:> May I apologise for not being present when you began your evidence, Foreign Secretary?

May I ask you this question? Do you think it is in Britain's interests that when an appointment of this kind is being considered, the pool of people from whom a British candidate may emerge is restricted to one political party? Do you think it would have been of advantage to the United Kingdom's interests in this matter if, for example, Lord Patten or Lord Ashdown had been available as candidates for this position, not least because of their vast experience and proven achievement?

<David Miliband:> The pool should be as wide as possible; I am absolutely clear about that. Obviously, there is a decision that the Prime Minister has to make, but there is no suggestion that the pool should be restricted. I do not want to get into the individual names for obvious reasons-they are both extremely talented people-but I do not think that it is, or should be, restricted to a pool. I think I am right in saying that when this Government came to nominate the first Commissioner after 1997, there were two nominees.

<Sir Menzies Campbell:> The convention was one from each of the two major parties.

<David Miliband:> That's right. On your point, of course it should not be restricted to one party.

 

Q<33> <Sir Menzies Campbell:> And is that the Government's policy?

<David Miliband:> Absolutely.

 

Q<34> <Sir Menzies Campbell:> What evidence was there of that in the course of the discussions?

<David Miliband:> For the same sort of reasons that I referred to in respect of Prime Ministers doing auditions in front of their colleagues, this was not a publicly canvassed process.

 

Q<35> <Mr. Illsley:> I have no qualms about the ability of the two appointees, but it is generally agreed that they were not the highest-profile individuals suggested. Doesn't that signal that, because it was done through a deal, some of the major players in the European Union will seek to pursue their own nationalistic foreign policy, and that the two appointments will look after EU foreign policy business? What springs to mind is when President Sarkozy turned up in Gaza, despite the fact that the French presidency of the EU had ended. He actually intervened on the Czech presidency.

<David Miliband:> I think that national foreign policy will certainly continue. The Lisbon treaty does not mean the end of national foreign policy at all.

 

Q<36> <Mr. Illsley:> Will it overshadow the President and the High Representative?

<David Miliband:> The truthful answer is that, in some areas, national foreign policies will remain with a higher profile than EU foreign policy. For example, the position of France and Britain-two members of the Security Council-on a range of Security Council matters will be particularly important. However, in other areas, the EU's role will be particularly important. For example, in the Western Balkans, which we will talk about later, the EU's position is more important than any national position, but the EU's position is made up of 27 national positions and there needs to be agreement across them all. So, I think that the appointments speak, if anything, to a rather British, pragmatic view that we have to get the structures working properly and get the delivery right, not the messaging.

 

Q<37> <Chairman:> I understand that Cathy Ashton's office is not going to be with the Council of Ministers, but in the Commission. Does that not send an odd signal, given that the whole basis on which having the High Representative appointed was that it would emphasise the intergovernmental nature of matters?

<David Miliband:> I honestly don't think the location of her office is the key to the future of European foreign policy. I absolutely assure you that the 27 Foreign Ministers will keep a pretty strong guard on the intergovernmental nature of European foreign policy. To be honest, that is the first I have heard about where she is going to put her office. I don't think that is going to be the key at all.

 

Q<38> <Mr. Moss:> Will you confirm that Cathy Ashton was the Government's fourth choice?

<David Miliband:> I am certainly not going to confirm anything of the sort.

 

Q<39> <Mr. Moss:> And yet, following on from an earlier question, all the names that appeared were all Labour party people. It is inconceivable that someone from another party should not have been in the same frame as those four.

<David Miliband:> I'm not getting into the ordering or the foursome. It was not the British Government who put forward my name, so there is an obvious point that we cannot control the names that are put into the public domain. My name was put into the public domain by other people, so I don't accept the premise of the question.

 

Q<40> <Mr. Keetch:> Let us be clear about this. The only names that were publicly known in relation to being either the High Representative or the President were Mr. Blair, Lord Mandelson, Mr. Hoon, you, and then Baroness Ashton appeared. The fact is that no Opposition senior politician, either present or past, was recommended-in terms of being leaked to the press-as having a role in this. In terms of the actual position of the office, there is a very good "Yes, Prime Minister" you ought to watch, Foreign Secretary, that says that the position of offices, in terms of Downing street, is very, very important. I think that Parliament needs to know who was putting these names up. Was it the British Government, or was it other Governments, because if the British Government were simply putting up Labour politicians, I think we ought to know?

<David Miliband:> I have just given you the answer in respect of myself, which I know about more than anything else, for obvious reasons, and that was put out not by the British Government; it came out from abroad. It was not leaked.

 

Q<41> <Sir Menzies Campbell:> It wasn't Washington, was it?

<David Miliband:> We did not have to reach the stage of seeking third country support. So, all I am saying to you is that just because something appears in the newspapers does not mean it has been put up by us. It does not mean that it has been leaked, either.

<Chairman:> We will move on.

 

Q<42> <Mr. Keetch:> Can I come on to the External Action Service, Foreign Secretary? This Committee made some points in our report in January 2008. We were concerned that Parliament should be kept informed of the developments in resolving all the practical, organisational, legal, diplomatic status and financial issues of the European External Action Service. I want to examine not the personalities but the way in which the decisions were made in the October meeting. Can you confirm that the UK, France and Germany circulated a joint policy paper about the External Action Service in advance of the European Council meeting in October?

<David Miliband:> I don't remember a joint paper. Are you referring to a particular paper?

<Mr. Keetch:> I am. Was it a non-paper?

<Matthew Rycroft:> If I could add to what the Foreign Secretary said, there was, of course, preparation of the October European Council, including by those member states that have particular traditions in foreign policy-including those three-but at no point was a joint paper circulated.

 

Q<43> <Mr. Keetch:> But there was an agreed position between the UK, France and Germany as to what kind of format this body would take, or there was a proposal between those three countries as to what kind of service the EEAS would take.

<Matthew Rycroft:> We have our own views, which we bed in, and we also co-ordinated with other member states about their views, so there was a mixture of contributions into the presidency and then the presidency put forward a proposal, which was then negotiated by the 27.

 

Q<44> <Mr. Keetch:> But was there a joint view by the UK, France and Germany that we had collectively, between the three countries-a joint view on that?

<Matthew Rycroft:> There was a joint view on some issues and a national view on other issues. They all went into the presidency, and the presidency put forward the proposal as a draft, which was then eventually agreed by Foreign Ministers.

 

Q<45> <Mr. Keetch:> So the UK, France and Germany had a joint view?

<David Miliband:> No, we agreed on some issues and disagreed on others.

 

Q<46> <Mr. Keetch:> Right, you agreed on some issues. On 21 October, Chris Bryant confirmed in a letter that member state representatives had held no discussions on EEAS on five occasions. How does that match with your view that there was a joint view from the three major states?

<Matthew Rycroft:> From memory, I think he was asked about what discussion there had been among all the 27 member states in a Council, and he gave the answer to that question.

 

Q<47> <Mr. Keetch:> Okay. So he was right in saying there was no collective 27-member state, but there was a three-state, version of this.

<David Miliband:> No. The answers that we always gave before the Irish referendum was that we were preparing for a situation where the Lisbon treaty went through, and we were preparing for a situation where it did not go through, so there was work within the British Government for the eventuality of the creation of an EEAS and there was work in the British Government for the non-creation of the EEAS, so our work went on. It sounds like there is a parliamentary question about a formal discussion of 27. Is that what you are referring to?

 

Q<48> <Mr. Keetch:> No, I am just referring to whether there was a joint UK, French or German view on what the EEAS should be. The Swedish presidency then tabled a report on 26 October, with a set of guidelines about the high commissioner's future proposals. Was this passed to the British, or any other, Parliament?

<Matthew Rycroft:> It was a document for the General Affairs and External Relations Council of that day, in preparation for the European Council. So in scrutiny terms, it would have been treated in the same way as every other draft that goes into the Council.

 

Q<49> <Mr. Keetch:> So there was no scrutiny, from this or presumably any other Parliament, of that document or the-I won't use the word "shady"-agreement between the UK, France and Germany on the position of the EEAS? There was no parliamentary scrutiny by either this Parliament or any other Parliament of either of those documents?

<David Miliband:> Matthew just said that it was the same scrutiny that applies to every European Council document.

 

Q<50> <Mr. Keetch:> So in terms of the overall scrutiny that the EEAS is going to have from national Parliaments, it is going to be pretty low, then.

<David Miliband:> Why do you say that?

 

Q<51> <Mr. Keetch:> On the basis of what we've heard so far, we've not been asked to scrutinise what has come before. For example, if External Action Service members of the British diplomatic service are seconded to the EEAS, will there be UK parliamentary scrutiny of them?

<David Miliband:> What do you mean by "scrutiny of them"?

 

Q<52> <Mr. Keetch:> In terms of just the way we scrutinise you, sir, and the way we scrutinise the Foreign Office. Will we be able to scrutinise what they are doing in terms of their role as UK-

<David Miliband:> You wouldn't scrutinise them as individual officials. We hope that 18 to 25 officials will go.

 

Q<53> <Mr. Keetch:> But will we be able to scrutinise you in terms of what they are doing on behalf of the UK?

<David Miliband:> I hope that you will also examine-I don't want to use the word "scrutinise" if that carries too many connotations-the work of the EEAS. Cathy Ashton has been in the post for just over a week now. She is only just beginning to kick off the process of setting up her own office, wherever its location is, and to begin the process of merging the Council and Commission staff. She is setting out very clear merit-based criteria by which she wants to make her appointments, whether to her own office or more generally. I hope you will, as those plans are published, examine, scrutinise or comment on them.

 

Q<54> <Mr. Keetch:> So we can have an absolute assurance from you, Foreign Secretary, that this Committee will be able to ask you in the future what UK diplomatic staff-

<David Miliband:> No. That is not what I said. If I am responsible for people who work for me, and we second them into the European External Action Service, they are working for the European institutions.

 

Q<55> <Mr. Keetch:> So who will scrutinise them?

<David Miliband:> The European Parliament will be the first body. It is also the case that I, as a Foreign Minister, will be examining and engaging with Baroness Ashton over the work that she is doing in the EEAS. But I will not be saying that my interest in the EEAS is limited to the 25 British people working for it; my interest is in what the whole of the EEAS is doing, for obvious reasons.

 

Q<56> <Chairman:> Mr. Rycroft, you said that there was no paper. I understand that a document exists-I don't know whether we would call it a paper-and was circulated in Brussels during the autumn. It was a joint position of the UK, French and German Governments.

<Matthew Rycroft:> My understanding is that that is not the case. The Swedish presidency had asked what it called a questionnaire to all member states. Each member state gave a response to the presidency, which pooled those responses and came up with the draft guidelines that we were just discussing. I think it is worth noting that they are guidelines, not anything stronger. They are helping to guide Baroness Ashton in her proposal that she will be drawing up in the coming months to establish the External Action Service.

 

Q<57> <Chairman:> How close do you think the Swedish proposals will be to what Baroness Ashton comes up with?

<David Miliband:> I don't know the answer to that. She hasn't yet declared herself. Since she is there to represent the best consensus among member states, and since the Swedish guidelines were based on the representations of member states, I would be surprised if they were radically different; I will put it that way.

 

Q<58> <Mr. Heathcoat-Amory:> The more you say, the more confused I am about the reporting and accountability structure. When the External Action Service was first proposed as part of the European constitution, the British Government were worried. We received assurances-not this Committee, I was not a member; but it was examined with the House of Lords by a Joint Committee-that for foreign policy matters it would sit under the Council of Ministers, and, therefore, the primary influence would be national Government and Foreign Ministries. The Commission would only have influence on other, non-foreign policy matters to do with external action.

It now seems, and we are told, that it is going to sit in a kind of limbo between the Commission and the Council and will be a service of a sui generis nature, with autonomy in terms of its administrative budget and management of staff. That won't do. It is an important body. Whom will it report to, where will its accountability run and how will this Committee be able to do its task? You said that the European Parliament will do it, but we are not Members of the European Parliament. If it sits in this curious element of Euro-space between all these bodies, it seems to me that nobody is going to be able to determine exactly what it does and achieve the required accountability.

<David Miliband:> I'm afraid that that is quite wrong. There is nothing limbo-like about it. It is sui generis, that is true, but it is a new institution, which has very clear reporting lines, most notably to Baroness Ashton who is the High Representative. The role of the European Parliament and other bodies is set out, but it is a European institution, not a British institution. The British Parliament will scrutinise, rightly, the British Government. You can examine all sorts of other activities. You may want to invite Baroness Ashton to appear in front of the Committee and talk about the European External Action Service, but the responsibility for holding Baroness Ashton to account comes from the 27 Foreign Ministers. We have appointed her, and she is there to carry out our wishes on policy and to command the confidence of the Foreign Ministers in the execution of her duties.

 

Q<59> <Mr. Heathcoat-Amory:> But she is also a Vice-President of the Commission. The Commission is unelected, it meets in private and it is certainly not accountable in any sense to this Committee or national Governments. We are talking about a legal status that is sui generis. This worries me if we are setting up something wholly new with a wholly new legal structure between these two bodies. They are going to be taking very important decisions, spending an awful lot of money representing our interests in many delegations overseas and a lot of British diplomats are going to be working for them. I find it intensely unsatisfactory that we have reached this point without clarity. Can you tell us a little more about what we can do in future to examine and report on what is done in our name?

<David Miliband:> I think that it is quite clear. First of all, in respect of the numerous British diplomats, as I said earlier there are 6,000 British diplomats, 16,000 work for the Foreign Office as a whole, and we are talking about 25 going into the European External Action Service. Secondly, the purpose of the External Action Service is set out very clearly in the Lisbon treaty. The responsibility of the High Representative to the 27 member states is set out very clearly. One of the important differences with the constitution is that there is a separate pillar of the European treaties with respect to foreign policy. I do not see the degree of Euro-space, as you describe it; it is actually a European treaty which lays out an inter-governmental basis for foreign affairs and defence policy to be enunciated and promulgated by the European officials.

 

Q<60> <Mr. Horam:> Clarity is important because, as I understand it, the European Parliament has a different view from the view set out by the Swedish presidency. Is that correct?

<Matthew Rycroft:> I am sure that members of the European Parliament have lots of different views.

 

Q<61> <Mr. Horam:> Sure, but they have indicated that they want to see the EEAS administratively located as part of the Commission; you are not aware of that?

<Matthew Rycroft:> It's not going to be part of the Commission.

 

Q<62> <Mr. Horam:> That's a fact?

<Matthew Rycroft:> Yes.

 

Q<63> <Mr. Horam:> The other thing that is clear, I think, is that it is not going to have control of the European neighbourhood policy, which is part of the Enlargement Commissioner's portfolio. Is that correct? In other words, the European neighbourhood policy is not going to be part of Baroness Ashton's responsibility.

<Matthew Rycroft:> That isn't the case. The new Enlargement Commissioner also has responsibility for the neighbourhood but he will work in very close co-operation with the High Representative and there will be what the Commission calls a cluster of Commissioners working to Baroness Ashton on the external side.

 

Q<64> <Mr. Horam:> So she will have responsibility for that whole swathe of countries, stretching from Belarus down to Georgia, down to Maghreb-all that?

<Matthew Rycroft:> The real answer to your question is that she will need to set out in her proposal-for agreement by all the member states by April-exactly that sort of issue. However, we would expect the proposal to be that External Action Service staff, both in Brussels and in those countries, will be working to her and to the Enlargement and Neighbourhood Commissioner.

 

Q<65> <Mr. Horam:> So they will have a double-hatted responsibility?

<Matthew Rycroft:> They would be in the External Action Service but they would provide advice both to the High Representative and to the Commissioner.

 

Q<66> <Mr. Horam:> And to the Enlargement Commissioner?

<Matthew Rycroft:> Yes.

 

Q<67> <Mr. Horam:> Okay. The other element of possible confusion is the role of the Development Commissioner and development policy. That seems to be quite separate. The point about all this-you may be a bit irritated by the extent of the questioning-is the comparison with the ideas that you yourself, Secretary of State, set out in your October speech to the International Institute for Strategic Studies, which had a very clear message about a strong Britain and a strong Europe and a very coherent point of view. Leaving aside the party political bits, which were rather rubbishy, the main thing was very clear.

Looking at it from that point of view, does this really measure up? It is qualified by the disappointment about the appointment of Baroness Ashton in comparison with somebody more traffic-stopping. It is qualified by the differences between the Parliament and the Euro-spaces, as David Heathcoat-Amory put it. All these are things that seem to us to indicate that this a very compromised body even as it starts, in comparison with your own hopes.

<David Miliband:> These are good, not irritating, questions, but it is important that we are not confused. The traffic-stopping was about the President of the European Council, so let's leave that out of the equation.

 

Q<68> <Mr. Horam:> It was about the High Representative as well.

<David Miliband:> With respect, no, it wasn't. It was actually nothing to do with it.

<Mr. Horam:> The two are similar.

<David Miliband:> Well, no, they're not.

<Mr. Horam:> Yes they are. Never mind; let's not argue about that.

<David Miliband:> This is important, because the President of the Council is there to replace the rotating presidency, which has provided a source of infinite confusion and inconsistency in European priorities and policy making. The High Rep is there to bring coherence to what are currently divided responsibilities and divided organisations.

 

Q<69> <Mr. Horam:> With all these restrictions on them, which we have been trying to point out.

<David Miliband:> I think it's a bit early to say that the High Rep and the External Action Service are compromised bodies as they have had only eight days of existence. The High Representative has only been in office for eight days. I think what you are seeing is a determined attempt not to fall into the obvious traps of this, which are, first, to have the High Rep working completely separately from Commissioners, for example, for enlargement. It makes sense to have this clustering approach because otherwise there would be very serious questions about the stovepipes within the Commission.

Secondly, Baroness Ashton has said clearly that she wants a merit-based system, which I think is very important for the appointments that are going to come through. Thirdly, we have not yet had a set of priorities from her. She will do that in due course and then it will be discussed and agreed, or not, or amended by the Foreign Ministers. Of course, there are quite big management challenges in bringing together the Commission and the Council staff. You will remember that the original idea was that the Commission should be smaller. With a Commission of 27 it is necessary to have groups or groupings of Commissioners to bring some coherence to this. I would argue that it is premature to say that this is a compromised body.

 

Q<70> <Mr. Horam:> Do you think it will live up to your noble-

<David Miliband:> I live in hope. I am not ready to give up hope yet. Baroness Ashton's only been going for eight days. I am determined to do everything that I can through my contributions as Foreign Secretary to the Foreign Affairs Council, which is going to set the basis for Baroness Ashton's work, to make sure it is not a compromised body, a lowest common denominator body or a useless body. So I hope you would agree that there is still a lot to fight for. We've not missed the bus yet.

 

Q<71> <Mr. Heathcoat-Amory:> You will recall, Foreign Secretary, that the aim of the reform process was to create a simpler European Union. They were the instructions given to the drafters of the constitution and the treaty. Do you think the structure of the External Action Service, where we have to resort to Latin to describe its legal structure, and with this very bizarre reporting and accountability structure, is simpler and do you think the public will understand it? There is a big gap between the public and the EU in terms of acceptability and understanding.

<David Miliband:> I have never heard the use of Latin as a sort of object of abuse before. Of all the sins it the world, the use of the term sui generis does not seem to be up there as a really dangerous one. We can say, if you prefer, that it is a unique institution. That's really not the problem. What is a more serious issue is the disconnect that you point to. Although we don't hold exactly the same positions on the European Union, I think we would find common ground in saying that there is a disconnect between citizens all round Europe and the European institutions. The question is whether we can overcome them.

How would I like the External Action Service and the High Rep to overcome that disconnect? First of all, to have a clear set of strategic priorities that last for five years, not six months, at a time; secondly, to follow up those priorities with clear plans for action, which are clear about what the European Union is going to do that is distinctive; thirdly, to make sure that the resources flow behind those priorities and those plans. So, for example, I've said that one of the top three priorities for the new High Rep and the External Action Service is to make sure that areas of conflict around the world and areas that are causes of insecurity in Europe should be a priority.

We have a European security strategy; let's make sure that the work of the High Rep follows through to tackle areas of insecurity. One of the biggest areas of insecurity is Pakistan. In respect of Pakistan I'd like to see a comprehensive EU approach ranging from trade to aid to electoral reform to education and development spending. We have to have the resources to back it up. At the moment Pakistan gets €0.45 per head of population, and other parts of the world which are less important for European security get 10 times as much spending per head. So if it achieves that then I think we are in a far stronger position to have the sort of connect, rather than disconnect. We will be able to go to every single one of our constituents and say, "Look, Pakistan's a very important country for us. We've got a bilateral programme there that is important, but my goodness we've got the European institutions giving this priority in the following ways. Doesn't that show that the European Union is useful?" If we are able to do that after five years, we are going to be in a much better position.

 

Q<72> <Mr. Heathcoat-Amory:> Lastly, can you give me one simple answer to a simple question? It is proposed that the External Action Service will take over the civilian military planning directorate, the civilian planning and conduct capability and also the military staff and the situation centre. Can you tell whether in addition to that, they will take over the military committee which comprises member states' military representatives to the EU?

<David Miliband:> I'll have to come back to you on that, David. You are right that the crisis management and planning directorate, the civil planning and conduct capability-I beg your pardon, and the military staff, did you say?

 

Q<73> <Mr. Heathcoat-Amory:> I want to know about the military committee, which has not been mentioned. It does exist and it is obviously very important. I want to know whether they will take over that as well. It is not mentioned and I think that by now we ought to know.

<David Miliband:> I do apologise, but I haven't got an answer to that now. I will get you an answer pronto.

 

Q<74> <Chairman:> Who has been advising Baroness Ashton on the work that she has been doing in the past week? The Swedish presidency said that there should be a small preparatory team. Do you know who they are and where they are from?

<David Miliband:> No, I don't. You will have to ask her, I'm afraid.

 

Q<75> <Chairman:> The British Government haven't got anyone in that team?

<David Miliband:> She has staff left over. Her chef de cabinet is British and he is staying with her, so presumably he is advising her.

 

Q<76> <Chairman:> From when she was Trade Commissioner?

<David Miliband:> Yes.

<Chairman:> Perhaps if you get more information you can let us have it.

 

Q<77> <Mr. Keetch:> I want to return to the EEAS and how it will recruit people. We as a Committee have said that there should be lots of Brits involved in it. The Government have said that they want to increase the involvement of UK nationals and, in a memorandum to the European Scrutiny Committee, that we are under-represented in EU institutions. In our inquiry, we heard that the FCO has been struggling to get people to join the European fast stream of diplomats to join the service. How is the EEAS going to recruit people to get involved in this wonderful new international foreign service?

<David Miliband:> I think the problem with the fast stream is that, if you go into the European institutions, it will be quite a long time before you get a lot of responsibility, whereas in the Foreign Office you can get responsibility quite quickly. Even someone as young as Mr. Rycroft could end up being ambassador in Sarajevo, whereas I think there have been issues in the European fast stream about how quickly people get promoted.

There are no rules yet for the EEAS, but we have said strongly that we want it to be merit-based. That goes against having quotas for different countries, which I think would be a retrograde step; I assume that the Committee agrees with that. We anticipate some 20 to 25 UK staff being in the EEAS at any one time. Obviously, the jobs will have to be attractive in order to lure our staff away from the excitements of the Foreign Office and make them want to apply for them. I think there will be significant opportunities and, if Cathy Ashton is able to follow through on her commitment to merit-based appointments, it will make it doubly attractive.

 

Q<78> <Mr. Keetch:> In terms of UK FCO staff joining that organisation on a five or 10-year appointment, will there still be a job for them at the FCO when they come back? Will their terms of employment be retained and maintained?

<David Miliband:> Yes, as with any other secondment. I happen to believe that secondments are a good way of developing staff and are a good thing to do whether they are for five or however many years. Part of the deal is that you do not ostracise people once they have left the system. You have to recognise what a broader experience can give you. I would be amazed if any staff went to the EEAS and we said, "It's going to count against you when you apply for a job when you come back." My own view is that it will count for people.

 

Q<79> <Mr. Keetch:> What about pre-appointments? This Committee has been very clear about wanting to pre-interview people who might be going from parliamentary positions into Foreign Office staff. Baroness Ashton, for example, is a Member of Parliament, but she has not been interviewed by this Committee or, presumably, any other Committee in any other Parliament. In terms of what we are going to do in the future, will this Committee have any oversight of or view on who goes into these positions?

<David Miliband:> You mean Foreign Office staff?

<Mr. Keetch:> Yes.

<David Miliband:> No.

 

Q<80> <Ms Stuart:> May I do a quick rewind? I am getting really confused. When you talked about Pakistan and overseas aid, you said that, now that we in the EU have a High Representative who is also the Vice-President of the Commission, we can channel much more collective overseas aid to a place that is important, such as Pakistan. So you are perfectly content for overseas aid to be a foreign policy tool at EU level, but at home we split it?

<David Miliband:> As it happens, it will be split at EU level. As the discussion with John Horam showed, the Development Commissioner will be separate and have a distinctive portfolio.

 

Q<81> <Ms Stuart:> But then you said because she's the vice-president of the Commission we can actually produce that.

<David Miliband:> No, I'm sorry. On the situation in Europe, in Brussels, there is still work to be done about the exact relationship between the High Rep and the Development Commissioner, but I do not think anyone foresees the Development Commissioner being abolished or expunged. On foreign policy, it is very much in our interests that in the domestic situation I talk a lot about how Britain's Ł665 million commitment over four years to Pakistan is an important part of our engagement with Pakistan, even though it is not my Department that spends it.

 

Q<82> <Ms Stuart:> I hope you are not deliberately missing the point. If I were precisely to ask, as the role is developing, whether overseas aid at European level should be part of the tools open to the High Representatives to develop an EU foreign policy, would you support that or would you say no, these two should be split the way they are in the UK?

<David Miliband:> Of course, the European development budget is a tool of foreign policy. It is a tool that she will have to agree with the Development Commissioner.

<Ms Stuart:> But at home it is not a tool.

<David Miliband:> No, at home it is a tool, because-

<Ms Stuart:> I thought the 1997 Act precisely made it not to be a tool of foreign policy, but a tool for alleviating world poverty.

<David Miliband:> Actually, from our point of view, the attack on poverty in Pakistan is an important foreign policy tool. Even if the '97 Act of Parliament did not exist, we would say that 3% levels of female literacy in the federally administered tribal area of Pakistan is a serious problem for Pakistan and that we would want to be doing something about it. That is as plain as night follows day, not a question of the parliamentary Act.

<Ms Stuart:> I am reaching the point that whenever poor illiterate women and children are quoted, it is the equivalent of-let's just forget about this one.

<David Miliband:> Poor illiterate women and children in the western part of Pakistan are an important part of Pakistan's problem. A big part of Pakistan's problem is that it has become a central ground for the development of international terrorism.

 

Q<83> <Ms Stuart:> Indeed, but in terms of foreign policy aims and what we do, that is quite different from what we think are poverty relieving developmental aids. It is that link between those two that I really think are important. I would assert to you that we are representing one view at EU level and we are having a different view at home. I have got trouble combining those two.

<David Miliband:> Rather than assert, can I try and explain, or persuade you, why we have got a consistent position? There is a distinctive set of skills and a distinctive mandate that can come for a Development Commissioner, or a Secretary of State for International Development, but it is part of a country's, union's or a region's external engagement. From our point of view, even if there wasn't a parliamentary mandate for DFID to be spending money on poverty alleviation it would be an important part of our foreign policy engagement with Pakistan that we did so.

 

Q<84> <Mr. Keetch:> So why is it that when Mr. Hamilton and I-and I think one other member of the Committee-were in Gaza, EU aid packages had the EU flag on them saying that they were a gift of the European community, as did the American's and others. However, British aid packages did not have the Union Jack on and all they said was that they were a gift from DFID. Even the people who were giving them out did not know what DFID meant and the reason was, we were told, that we did not want to mix aid with foreign policy.

<David Miliband:> No, no, no. I'm sorry.

<Mr. Keetch:> I think Mr. Hamilton agrees with that.

<David Miliband:> Such is the power of your argument, the Government have actually accepted it. If you read the development White Paper that was published in July by the Government, it precisely said that saying DFID does not convey enough of a UK perspective and that is why all UK aid is now branded "UKaid", precisely to tackle that problem.

 

Q<85> <Mr. Keetch:> With the Union Jack on?

<David Miliband:> I think that the Union Jack is the background to a UKaid set of letters. I think they are red, white and blue letters.

<Ms Stuart:> In that case I will congratulate you.

<David Miliband:> So I have persuaded you.

<Ms Stuart:> You are on the way, but you are not there yet.

<David Miliband:> Since we are in the Christmas spirit, when I was at Kabul airport with a group of DFID staff who had taken my team and some other people with me to a DFID project north of Kabul, they were wearing T-shirts with the insignia of UKaid, precisely to address your point.

 

Q<86> <Ms Stuart:> Good. Pre-Lisbon, the permanent members of the Security Council, if they wanted to invite a representative of the EU as an observer, would ask the holder of the presidency. Post-Lisbon, it will be the High Representative. Now, one of things that we noticed when we were at the UN was the language change-they have started talking about P3 and EU3, so there was a distinction between us, France and Germany, and Russia, America and China, who exercise the veto and all such things, whereas the Europeans bring in the Germans. How do we deal with the Germans? We bring them into the big tent. Given that there is nothing on the cards for UN reform-it is just not going to happen-how do you foresee the questions of how we deal with the absence of Germany from the P5 or, more to the point, with the High Representatives and how we embrace them? Can you give us some of your thinking on how France and Britain will deal with that?

<David Miliband:> Well, E3 has a very long history and you will know that it is henomenally unpopular with a lot of other European countries. However, in respect of the E3 plus 3 process with Iran, I think that it has proved itself to be a rather useful innovation.

P3 is a rather different kettle of fish. We can talk about that separately. Obviously the UN is an organisation of states and the EU is not a state. And so there is no question of the EU becoming a voting member of the United Nations, but the UN is also an organisation that has given the Palestinian Authority special status there-that of potential or future states-and I think the Holy See also has a distinctive status at the UN. The EU is not like the Palestinian Authority or the Holy See but, in respect of ability to speak in various forums, then discussion does need to take place about whether we can recognise the distinctive nature of the EU as a regional organisation without any violation of the fundamental basis on which the UN is founded.

<Chairman:> Thank you. We are now going to switch focus and get on to the Balkans.

 

Q<87> <Sir John Stanley:> Thank you very much for your full reply to the considerable number of points that we put to you following our Committee's recent visit to the western Balkans. We very much welcome the fact that at the General Affairs Council you and your colleagues finally persuaded the Dutch that, following Chief Prosecutor Brammertz's latest report, the interim agreement could be entered into and implemented. However, Foreign Secretary, we had very much hoped that having got the Dutch over that particular hurdle, you would have been able to get them over the second, equally-probably more-important hurdle, which is to start the ratification process on the stabilisation and association agreement. I note that the General Affairs Council conclusions simply say: "The Council will turn to the next issue-ratification of the stabilisation and association agreement-in six months' time." I am at a loss to understand what is going to be very different in six months' time. I trust you can tell us that you did your very best to get the Dutch over the second fence, but why was it so difficult to do so?

<David Miliband:> Thank you very much for your visits to Serbia, Kosovo and Bosnia-Herzegovina and the excellent questions and points in the report that the Chairman sent. No doubt we can go through it in some detail, but I do really want to say how useful the Committee's detailed engagement on the Western Balkans issue is-the expertise and experience that exist.

On Serbia, I met the Serbian Foreign Minister on Monday here and we had a written ministerial statement about full compliance. Serge Brammertz did a report to the General Affairs Council on Monday afternoon. The Dutch move is significant, but it has been a move that has been done after a lot of soul searching and a lot of thought in Holland. If we are as we are in six months' time-in other words, the degree of co-operation that currently exists continues over the next six months-I am confident that we will move on to the SAA ratification process.

 

Q<88> <Sir John Stanley:> What was the difficulty this time? What will be materially different in six months' time?

<David Miliband:> One step at a time. I can allow the Dutch Foreign Minister to speak for himself, but he recognised the significant change there had been in the report of Brammertz, but he wanted to be sure that it was sustained. I think that that would be the right way in which to explain it. The final wording of the GAC conclusion, which you quoted-I do not have it in front of me-tried to make it clear that we are now in a sequential process and that the next step is the SAA ratification process. If co-operation continues at current levels, we will be able to proceed smoothly through that.

 

Q<89> <Sir John Stanley:> We take it that, as far as the British Government's position is concerned, you wish to see progress on the ratification of the SAA as quickly as possible. That is your position.

<David Miliband:> Yes, consistent with continued full co-operation.

<Chairman:> Thank you. Fabian Hamilton.

<David Miliband:> Can I make one point? I am terribly sorry, but I think that Sir John asked me about this last time. It is true that the Dutch needed to be persuaded, but it is also true that the prosecutor has reported a change in Serbian co-operation. He has upgraded the degree of co-operation that he has reported. What is significant about this week is not just that the Dutch have moved. The last time I was here, I think that you asked me about it right it at end of the session or may be just before a Division, and we did not have that long on it, but we have to recognise that the Serbian Government have followed through and met the aspirations that we all set for them in terms of the degree of co-operation that they offer. It is not just "the Dutch have shifted", but that the situation has moved on materially in the degree of co-operation that is existing.

 

Q<90> <Sir John Stanley:> Yes, and I think that I and my colleagues in that segment of the Committee who went to Belgrade were left in no doubt by the Serbian Ministers whom we saw that they were determined to do all that they could to try to find Mladić and Hadzić, and co-operate fully with the tribunal.

<David Miliband:> Well, just to finish the point, the commitment of the Tadić Government to the European vocation of Serbia-magnetism of the European Union as a sort of final resting place for Serbia-is very, very strong. It has been followed through well.

 

Q<91> <Mr. Hamilton:> Thank you very much, Foreign Secretary, for your comments. I was on that delegation a few weeks ago in October. It was my first visit to the region. In spite of having read a lot about it, I had never been. I was equally impressed with the determination of the Tadić Government to join the European Union and to overcome any hurdles that remain. Clearly, they have a long way to go, but as long as they progress down that path, we should see progress and it will be beneficial and positive to them and to us.

I want to turn for a moment to Bosnia and Herzegovina because what we found very interesting was the contrast obviously with Serbia, but also with Kosovo. We came straight from Priština to Sarajevo. In Priština, as you know, there is a draw-down of troops. I think that 10,000 UN soldiers will be left there within a few months, and there are just 2,000 remaining in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Yet the situation seems quite fragile. We were not able to meet all of the partners in the tripartite presidency, but we did meet Haris Silajdzić and he was quite engaging. None the less, we were concerned about where they go in the future.

What do you think the European Union could do further to encourage Bosnia and Herzegovina politicians to reach an agreement on the country's institutional arrangements? Clearly, they are temporary; they need to be made permanent so that the fragile peace can be embedded in future peace and prosperity there.

<David Miliband:> You are absolutely right to be concerned. You are absolutely right to say that the situation is very fragile. You are absolutely right to say that Bosnia and Herzegovina is now the main area of concern in the western Balkans. We have to get that into perspective. What we are looking at is Bosnia and Herzegovina falling behind the rest of the western Balkans in making progress towards the EU and in developing itself. I don't think we are talking about a cataclysmic confrontation. None the less, it is worrying because the rest of the western Balkans are moving forward-Montenegro as well as Croatia-while Bosnia and Herzegovina is not. You've asked the $64 million question. If I knew how to make the seven different party groupings and party leaders, who I met in Sarajevo a few weeks before you did, see common ground rather than old enmities, I'd be either a rich man or the European High Representative.

It is a very difficult question. If you think about the two ends of the spectrum, on the one hand there is the determination to revisit the question of entity voting, which was established by Dayton, and on the other, there is a determination to preserve the status quo in respect of the balance between the centre and the entities. Those are incompatible aspirations. The incentive for them is ultimately European membership, also NATO membership. NATO Foreign Ministers were unable to offer MAP-membership action plan-status to Bosnia because of the lack of common ground among the politicians there. So there is an incentive, but if we are absolutely honest, it is not something that is there for them to grab straight away. There is quite a long process both for EU and NATO membership, although it is significant that Bosnian politicians all want EU and NATO membership-it is one of the few things that they agree on.

On the other hand, the pressure for a settlement is not that great, because the situation is not falling into cataclysm, which is obviously a good thing. The US and EU have been working together to try to stimulate a new package that would break the deadlock. That has not been concluded yet, but it is proving to be heavy going. There is no agreement on any constitutional reform of substance. They are now talking about whether some state functionality could be built up. Mr. Rycroft can speak about this, since he was a former ambassador there. I think there isn't an answer to your question. The only answer is that the cost of the current stand-off and the benefits of coming together grow.

 

Q<92> <Mr. Hamilton:> Yes, and that's as logic would dictate. But you still have this massive, yawning gap, as you have alluded to, between Mr. Dodik and his Republika Srpska and Mr. Silajdzić. The other problem we found was the rapid departure and depletion of the Croatian Bosnians. Once Croatia joins the EU, there will be no incentive-I would have thought-for many of them to stay in Bosnia.

<David Miliband:> Well, you are right to describe the problem. There can't be an externally imposed solution-there has to be a negotiated solution. The fragmentation of politics on all sides is obviously part of the difficulty. There are elections next year in Bosnia, which I think will not be a uniting process. That adds to the difficulty.

 

Q<93> <Mr. Hamilton:> What impact have the warming relations between Serbia and the EU had on the EU's determination to deal with the situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina? Has it had any impact?

<David Miliband:> I sent up a flare about the situation in Bosnia over a year ago, when I wrote a letter with the then Czech Foreign Minister Schwarzenberg to all my EU colleagues-I think it was in November '08, but it may even have been a bit earlier-not particularly because of concern that Serbia was powering ahead, but because Bosnia was not going anywhere, which remains the case. The EU, with US help, are working on this, but we haven't had a breakthrough.

 

Q<94> <Mr. Hamilton:> Something for Baroness Ashton to work on, perhaps?

<David Miliband:> Well, we discussed the Balkans yesterday, and it is definitely a priority. I put that as one of my top three priorities as well.

<Chairman:> I have more people on Bosnia, and then we will move on to Kosovo.

 

Q<95> <Sir John Stanley:> Foreign Secretary, I think I am probably a shade more pessimistic than you. To me, it looked to be rather worse than a deadlock situation-to me it looked to be a festering and deteriorating situation. The key is Mr. Dodik. Do you see any individual or any party that may be able to persuade Mr. Dodik that there is actually no future for Republika Srpska, just to maintain the status quo with a constitution that is wholly unworkable and unusable in terms of handling EU accession?

<David Miliband:> You raise an important point, and you have spent a lot of time studying this. I think my perspective is that they are certainly going backwards, relatively speaking, relative to their neighbours. Touch wood, they will not plunge back into the sort of confrontation that marred the '90s. It is not just "touch wood"; the presence of EUFOR and a range of other institutions represents some pre-emptive diplomacy.

In respect of Mr. Dodik, I think the fairest thing to say is that it is going to take all sides-certainly representatives of all three parts of Bosnia and Herzegovina-coming together. I do not think it is just about one person. I met Mr. Dodik, as well as meeting Mr. Silajdžić and meeting the others separately, and then met them as a group. As with all these type of problems, it is going to require everyone to move together, and not just one person moving.

You are right that EU accession is going to require change and development. One of the more worrying things is that the change and development on the table is actually about the functionality of the current state, not about a redistribution of powers between the states and the entities, and that is not being achieved, so that speaks to the degree of mistrust or distrust that exists.

I think that the effort by Carl Bildt and Jim Steinberg, the Deputy Secretary of State in the US, who have now had five meetings with all the parties through the so-called Butmir process, has been a really good-faith attempt to try and bridge the gap. If I had been appearing before the Committee six or eight weeks ago, I would have been more hopeful that they were going to make progress than I am now. The smoke signals are not particularly encouraging. I do not want to say too much, because they have still got a way to go, but I do not think any of them are saying that they are on the verge of a breakthrough. That is a big missed opportunity, I think, because the proximate cause of the EU-US effort was the deadlock on the five plus two conditions for the transition from OHR to EUSR. The designing of a slightly wider package was intended to lubricate that process-defence property is the main outstanding issue-and its failure to do so means that the likelihood of deadlock on five plus two is also increased. That then has a knock-on for the OHR and the transition. So that is where we are.

Q<96> <Sir Menzies Campbell:> How far can we rely on co-operation, and encouragement or otherwise, from Belgrade in relation to Republika Srpska? Or would we have to wait until Serbia became an illustration of what is possible, and what was being missed by the fact that Bosnia was not willing to move in the same direction?

<David Miliband:> Certainly Belgrade is important. I obviously talked about this with Foreign Minister Jeremić on Monday. They are concerned about the situation in Bosnia. They would not accept that Mr. Dodik is the problem, for obvious reasons. The fact that Serbia's EU aspirations have now got some momentum is a good thing in and of itself, but it is also potentially a good thing in terms of the wider situation, because it will certainly raise the profile of Bosnia's relative slippage compared with the other states of the western Balkans. So we certainly will work closely with the Serbian Government on this issue. Matthew, you are a world expert on this. Do you want to add anything on Bosnia?

<Matthew Rycroft:> With the Chairman's permission.

<Chairman:> Yes, of course.

<Matthew Rycroft:> I think that the key issue for the European Union is to demonstrate to everyone in Bosnia and Herzegovina that we mean it when we say that we want them to get closer, and eventually to join the EU, if and when they meet the conditions. We want to keep that alive as a prospect, because it is that magnet of eventual EU and NATO succession that will drive reform in the future. In the end, I think we all need to convince Dodik that it is possible for him to allow greater centralisation of power at the Bosnia and Herzegovina state level in order to allow that state to get closer to the EU without calling into question the future of Republika Srpska. It is not either/or. You can have a Republika Srpska as part of a successful Bosnia and Herzegovina. It is getting that balance right that he has not yet agreed to do.

 

Q<97> <Andrew Mackinlay:> I have always been concerned about importing trouble into the European Union membership as a club. The Serb nationals and Croatian nationals are in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Serbs are demonstrably in Kosovo. If Croatia gets accession, there will be peppered around Bosnia and Herzegovina, probably Serbia, and certainly other parts of the former Yugoslavia, Croatian nationals and European Union citizens. If Serbia's accession was reasonably swift, you would have Serbian nationals in Srpska. Aren't there dangerous unforeseen consequences here? Assuming that the time scale is a variable geometry, and that Bosnia and Herzegovina's accession is not far advanced, will there not be great problems? With these people who are outside Croatia and outside geographical Serbia, but are citizens either of Croatia and Serbia, there could be potential trouble for us all. Do you see the point I am making? I am rather pleased to see you nodding.

I want to come on to the accession of Serbia in a moment. It just seems to me that under the citizenship laws of both Croatia and Serbia, these people who are outside can claim and exercise a right. In fairness to the Serbian ambassador, he said, "Oh no, we'll put a little stamp on the Serbian nationals who are outside Serbia and who are in Bosnia and Herzegovina." I don't think that's worth the paper it is written on, with no disrespect to him. Clearly you get a Belgrade address, even if you live in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

<David Miliband:> In a way, the visa liberalisation that is under discussion and that has taken place with the Schengen countries is a sort of forerunner of some of this. Look, you are right to raise the difficulties. That is why the accession process is not going to be straightforward. We talked the last time I was here about the benchmarks that we expected to be established. I think we focused last time on administrative procedures and judicial aspects for a number of countries. But those are going to be very important. The shifting communities that exist across the former Yugoslavia, across the western Balkans, make this quite a tricky process. I think you are right to say that. I don't think the trickiness, though, is a reason to believe that it would be better if we either blocked the progress towards the European Union of other countries-I know that is not what you are suggesting-or if we said they all had to move at the same pace. That would cause a lot of trouble.

 

Q<98> <Andrew Mackinlay:> Okay. Can I come on to the question of Serbia? Forgive me if it is well-trodden ground between you and me, but I learned the Latin phrase you mentioned earlier from you; you said that Kosovo's recognition is sui generis.

<David Miliband:> I didn't learn Latin at school, by the way. It is one of the few Latin phrases that I know.

<Andrew Mackinlay:> That is where I heard it; I had to go home and say, "What's this?" But that is a one-off.

There is now a problem, isn't there? Let us assume that we have a very pro and robust maintained Government in Belgrade, who wish for accession to the European Union. We all welcome that; we see that as very good. But even the most democratic Government in Kosovo cannot do other than continue to claim, from their perspective, that Kosovo is an integral part of the Republic of Serbia. It is enshrined in all the European Union treaties that further accession has to be agreed by unanimity.

So if Serbia comes in, how will you bring Kosovo-the republic that you personally argued with me had to have international recognition-into the European Union? I simply do not see how it can be done. For the record, I am not opposed to Kosovo-I have some sympathy with Kosovo-but I think that the rush to give it recognition will be a major impediment to Serbia coming in, or you will have the ludicrous position of letting Serbia in and it vetoing for ever and a day Kosovo coming into the European Union. You've got a problem, haven't you?

<David Miliband:> You are absolutely right to point to the intricacies here; I know exactly what you are saying. There are problems. The problems would have been worse if Kosovo had been denied its independence or if Serbia were denied its progress towards the EU, but I do not deny at all that there is a problem. Some of what will solve this problem I can talk to you about privately, but, publicly, first, there is a case in front of the ICJ at the moment and if that comes out in a way that, for the sake of argument, gives strong support to the Kosovan declaration that will be an important step.

Secondly, there is some way to go in working out the details of Serbia's accession process with the EU, but you are absolutely right to say that we must make sure that it is done without prejudice, either to the European Union's credibility and integrity or to its ability to continue to be a stabilising force for the Western Balkans, and that is a tricky thing. It will require some real progress in the way that Serbia and Kosovo view each other. I think that that is as far as I would want to go into at this stage.

 

Q<99> <Chairman:> Foreign Secretary, the Serbian Government seem very confident that they are going to win the International Court of Justice judgment. I had a conversation with their Foreign Minister on Monday and they do not seem to have a plan B. They are working very much on the basis that it will come down on their side. If it came down that way, clearly that would cause a big problem for 22 states within the EU, including ourselves, and other issues.

<David Miliband:> We have submitted a compelling legal brief to the Court and I am very confident-[Interruption.] No doubt, whatever that means.

 

Q<100> <Sir John Stanley:> Just going into the immediacy as far as Kosovo is concerned, as you know, we are now on a basically six-month countdown to the absolutely critical remaining Serb municipality elections, which President Sejdiu has delayed until next May. The crucial thing is going to be to try to achieve something of a turnout, which has been very successfully achieved in the Serbian enclaves in the elections that have just been concluded elsewhere south of the Ibar.

I appreciate that in response to our letter you have to have generalities and you say, "We are also working closely with the international civilian office and EU representatives in Kosovo on their plans for outreach to communities in northern Kosovo". I have to put it to you, Foreign Secretary, that working on outreach is not going to produce the level of turnout that, in my judgment, is necessary. It is a straightforward intimidation issue, and it is all going to hang on the 4,000-odd EULEX people. Are they going to be able to create the conditions that people feel that it is safe to go out to vote in? That is what it is going to be about.

We are very familiar with this; we had to deal with these sorts of things in Northern Ireland, as you well know, and we have dealt with it elsewhere. Basically, the power of the people who are running north Mitrovica rests on fear, intimidation and blackmail, and have anything to do with anything organised by Pristina and you are going to be in dead trouble. That is how it works. Can you give us any assurance that EULEX-the 4,000 mainly police officers-is up to the task of holding a free and fair election that will produce a reasonable turnout in the Serb community in north Mitrovica in six months' time?

<David Miliband:> It is a really good question and really important. I think that there are two parts to the answer: one, although it is a very different situation, the relative success-strong success-of the elections in the south two weeks ago is significant. I am not in the least bit complacent but, to be honest, the turnout and the conduct were better than I expected and certainly better than I feared. That is in part down to the work done by the Kosovan authorities and it is also in part down to messaging from Belgrade. That was an important part of the equation, and will remain an important part for the next six months-the next test.

EULEX is doing a pretty good job in pretty tricky circumstances. It has been staffed up-I gave you some numbers in the letter that I wrote to you. It is being well led, and it is judicious in the way in which it works-it is a fair point to say that outreach is a bit of a euphemism. It is trying to build confidence. We will have to see what the ramifications are of the first round. There have also been Government troubles in Pristina. We know what we must try to support, and we must try to build the confidence to achieve that. I think that that is the fairest answer.

 

Q<101> <Mr. Moss:> Let me turn now, if I may, to Turkey and Cyprus. We know that the UK Government are strongly committed to Turkey's EU accession. However, some observers warn of a possible looming train crash coming at the end of the Swedish presidency. According to some interpretations of Council conclusions from December 2006, the member states set Turkey an implicit deadline of the end of 2009 to implement fully the Ankara protocol, which means that customs union should be extended to Cyprus. Is it your assessment of the situation that such a deadline exists?

<David Miliband:> We discussed this at length yesterday and the day before in Brussels, because this review that you rightly point to has now happened at the meetings in which I represented the UK. You will have seen that the General Affairs and External Relations Council came to some conclusions yesterday about Turkey's accession process. The outcome is that there are no new sanctions against Turkey, and there will be a review as usual at the end of 2010. Chapter 27, on the environment, is being opened. Cyprus has made a unilateral declaration, which was not welcomed by the majority of member states in respect of future chapter openings. It is also the case that Cyprus makes the very strong argument that there is a legal obligation on Turkey in respect of the Ankara protocol, which is of a different order than the trade opening requirements that are said to balance it. I have made that case in Turkey in public as well as in private.

However, many Foreign Affairs Ministers spoke over the last two days about the changes that are happening in Turkey, most notably in respect of the treatment of the Kurds and a range of other issues. They also pointed to the fact that we are at a very delicate point in the Cyprus negotiations. The election is due in April, and intensified talks are taking place between Mr. Talat and President Christofias. What we have here is a careful compromise in the EU. No one proposed up-ending the agreement of the 27 that there should be an accession process for Turkey leading to full membership. Equally, no one will remove their blocks that exist on various chapters.

The Cyprus negotiations, therefore, take on a doubly important role. The first is in respect of the future of the people of Cyprus, and the second is for Turkey's membership aspirations and our aspirations to have it in. That is the best description of the situation. The review has taken place, and there will be a further review in a year's time, and all manner of supporting chicanery has gone with it.

 

Q<102> <Mr. Moss:> So, in other words, the deadline has been extended?

<David Miliband:> Well, you will see that the conclusions have some pretty strong language about the failure to implement the Ankara protocol, which is relevant to that assessment.

 

Q<103> <Mr. Moss:> What signals are being sent to Turkey by Mr. Van Rompuy's appointment as President of the European Council?

<David Miliband:> One of the things that we are clear about-we have told the Turks-and that Mr. Van Rompuy has made clear is that his appointment has no implications for the stated policy of the European Union in respect of Turkey.

 

Q<104> <Andrew Mackinlay:> Isn't there a dilution? We are not being candid with ourselves or with Turkey. Turkey will find it impossible to reach the EU norms in respect of minorities-minority languages, promotion of culture and so on. There are parts of the EU treaties that we do not pay too much attention to, because, by and large, most of the states have taken the accommodation for granted. However, they go to the very heart of, for instance, the Kurd population, which is not the only minority. Turkey cannot and is not in any way fulfilling those obligations, which have long been enshrined in EU treaties, parts of which we have not focused upon, because everyone signs up to them.

<David Miliband:> I don't accept, Andrew, that it is impossible for them to do so. It is certainly less impossible than it was six months or a year ago, because they have made significant reforms during that period. They will have to abide by the acquis in the same way as everybody else.

 

Q<105> <Andrew Mackinlay:> My second point is that I feel the train crash that my colleague referred to is coming owing to the political reality. It doesn't matter how much the United Kingdom is united across the political spectrum in wanting Turkey in. The fact is that the size of the EU is such that there is always going to be a sufficient number, if not a majority, of people who will exercise a veto in any circumstances in relation to Turkey's full membership of the EU. That is going to have to be realised at some stages, and the consequences on that date will probably be catastrophic. It might be our successors, in terms of political generations, who will have to pick that up, because people have not been honest with them at this stage. It is not going to happen.

<David Miliband:> You raise a serious issue. People said there might be a train crash yesterday at the General Affairs and External Relations Council discussion about the review of the Ankara protocol. The train crash was averted, which is good. You are right that it is not in anybody's interests to confront the question now of whether you want Turkey in now, because that is not what is actually on the agenda. You are saying that there are some states that will never reconcile themselves to that. I know why you say that, but, equally, those states did sign up to an accession process leading to full membership. That has been agreed.

The changes within Turkey are remarkable: by 2017, Turkey will be the second fastest-growing economy in the world; its southern and eastern provinces are experiencing remarkable economic development; its relations with Iraq and with the Kurds are significantly improved; and the PKK is significantly on the back foot. We have to believe that progress will be faster than scepticism-there is scepticism within Turkey as well as the EU-because the EU is in danger of missing an incredibly important geopolitical opportunity. I am very concerned about that.

 

Q<106> <Chairman:> Isn't there a danger, though, that, if a Turkish court bans a political party that has 28 members of Parliament and is the fourth biggest party in the country, that will set back the progress with the Kurds that we have talked about?

<David Miliband:> Two years ago, people were worried about Turkish courts banning the Government.

<Chairman:> I know.

<David Miliband:> Look, when courts ban political parties, that is a bad thing and a source of concern for any country that is either in or wants to be in the EU. I think that Europe will get itself on to very thin ice if it is any more sceptical about Turkey's accession, because Turkey is a big enough country to have some choices. The other thing to say is that one of the Foreign Ministers made an absolutely brilliant and obvious point on Monday: who loses when we "punish" Turkey by refusing to open an energy chapter? It is not Turkey that loses; it is the European Union that loses. Talk about shooting ourselves in the foot with some of the actions that are taken. I think it is significant that there is the cross-party consensus that Andrew refers to on this, but, by God, we have a hell of a lot of work to do to keep up the, or gain some, momentum. Unless we do that, we will find our Turkish friends looking at us askance.

<Chairman:> Foreign Secretary, I am conscious that we have had two hours, but there will be a vote imminently. Are you prepared to give us another five minutes until the vote? We can stop then.

<David Miliband:> Yes.

 

Q<107> <Chairman:> Thank you very much. Can I ask you about Iran? Would you say that the E3 plus 3 process of engagement has really come to an end?

<David Miliband:> No, I wouldn't. We are determined not to be the people who roll it up. I think that would be a grave strategic error. Equally, it is clear that the Iranian authorities are not responding in anything like the positive way we would like. The rejection of the Tehran research reactor proposal, which was not formally an E3 plus 3 proposal-it was a proposal from the International Atomic Energy Agency-is deeply disappointing, and we are inevitably being drawn to the second of the dual tracks.

 

Q<108> <Chairman:> And, potentially, to tougher sanctions?

<David Miliband:> Yes.

 

Q<109> <Chairman:> You seem to have the Russians on board very strongly now, in terms of the public statements that have been made recently. Are we likely to get tougher UN sanctions, or will we have to rely on the EU having its own sanctions regime?

<David Miliband:> I hope that I don't sound too "Yes, Minister"-ish when I say that it would be very unwise for me to start predicting the UN sanctions. The worst thing, if you want strong UN sanctions, is to predict that they will happen. I think it's better at this stage if we say that we are deeply disappointed by the Iranian response. We cannot understand the response. It is also refusing to set a date for meetings with the E3 plus 3. I think this is a very dangerous game. We said very clearly at a meeting in New York under my chairmanship in September that we would review by the end of the year progress on the E3 plus 3, and we are very committed to a dual track. That means that there is an engagement track, but there is also a pressure track.

 

Q<110> <Chairman:> And President Obama gave until the end of the year, with his open hand. So clearly the clock is ticking.

<David Miliband:> Yes, the clock is ticking and we have to find the most appropriate way of ensuring that the Iranian authorities understand the credibility and seriousness of the offer, but also the seriousness of our determination to protect the nuclear non-proliferation treaty.

There is a good-are the documents public yet?

<Matthew Rycroft:> The draft from the European Council? Not yet.

<David Miliband:> No. Well, the European Council is going to address this tomorrow and I think it will send a clear signal. It is better if we can get UN sanctions because you want the Gulf and you want Switzerland in it. Equally, the EU sanctions go beyond UN requirements at this stage already.

<Chairman:> Thank you. On the Middle East peace process-I am sorry, but we need to touch on it. John Horam.

 

Q<111> <Mr. Horam:> Would the UK have wanted to see a stronger statement on East Jerusalem?

<David Miliband:> This is one for the anoraks a bit. What you're referring to is the Foreign Affairs Council's statement yesterday.

<Mr. Horam:> Yes.

<David Miliband:> There was a leak of a draft set of conclusions, which referred to the capital of a future Palestinian state being East Jerusalem. We have never said that. We have always seen Jerusalem as an undivided city, a shared capital of both states, so we have never insisted on that kind of division. I was perfectly content with the phraseology that was used in the final statement, which was that we look forward to a Palestinian state with Jerusalem as its capital, just as it is the capital of Israel, or words to that effect. Given the history of east and west Berlin, it is not right to talk about a capital in East Jerusalem and a capital in West Jerusalem. Just to finish the point, though, because people will read what I say in this respect: I think it is reasonable to say that we oppose settlement construction in East Jerusalem. That is a different point from saying that we look forward to the capital of a Palestinian state being East Jerusalem. We look forward to both states having Jerusalem as their capital.

 

Q<112> <Mr. Horam:> You are obviously not satisfied with the progress that has been made.

<David Miliband:> I am very worried about the stalled nature of the so-called peace process in the Middle East. Anyone sensible would be concerned that 2009 should have been a very important and positive year and it has not yet been so.

<Chairman:> Foreign Secretary and Mr. Rycroft, thank you very much. We have had a very good session.