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GS(Afg)
27: Letter to the Chairman of the Committee from the Secretary of State for
Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, Foreign and Commonwealth Office
Thank
you for your letter of 1 December 2009 regarding the Government's response to
the Foreign Affairs Committee's Report, 'Global Security: Afghanistan and Pakistan.' Our comments on each of
the specific issues you raise are set out below. Quotes from your letter are
written in italics, and our response is in plain text.
1. The proposal in paragraphs 126 and 129 that
the UK
should relinquish the role of lead partner nation on counter-narcotics. (If the
Government rejects this recommendation, the Committee considers that it should
give a statement of reasoning as to why the UK continues to feel that it should
retain this role.)
The UK's
"Partner Nation" status with Afghanistan
on counter-narcotics is scheduled to come to an end in 2011. In view of this,
Ministers, at NSID, have directed officials to work with the Government of
Afghanistan to form a new partnership to lead the fight against drugs in Afghanistan.
The UK is working with the US and other international partners to ensure
that the Government of Afghanistan (supported by the UN Office for Drugs and
Crime) has the capacity to take the lead on counter-narcotics in Afghanistan.
We should be clear, however, that the timescales to
affect sustainable reductions in opium cultivation and trafficking are long. Experience
in Pakistan and Thailand
show that a 15-20 year effort is required. The UK,
alongside the US,
UN and other international partners, will continue to play an important role in
supporting the Government of Afghanistan's counter-narcotics efforts.
2. The
conclusion in paragraph 225 that "there has been significant 'mission creep' in
the British deployment in Afghanistan".
We have always been
clear that the reason we went into Afghanistan
was to protect Britain's
national security. This remains our mission today. As the Prime Minister has
said, "Our aim in 2009 is the same as in 2001. We are in Afghanistan as a result of a hard-headed
assessment of the terrorist threat facing Britain." The Prime Minister has
made clear on numerous occasions that our strategy is for British forces to
remain in Afghanistan
until the Afghan government is able to maintain a stable security situation and
the rule of law. This has not changed since we entered Afghanistan.
3. The
conclusion in paragraph 236 that the British deployment to Helmand was
undermined by unrealistic planning at senior levels, poor coordination between
Whitehall departments and a failure to provide the military with clear
direction.
The
decision to deploy to Helmand was taken by
Ministers on the basis of cross-departmental advice. As the UK presence in Helmand
was established and our understanding of the operating environment improved, we
developed our force structures and dispositions accordingly. But the nature of
the problems we are trying to tackle in Helmand
in particular, the international coalition of which we are a part, and the
ability of the insurgency to adapt and adjust to our actions made, continue to
make this a challenging task.
Rt
Hon David Miliband MP
Secretary of State
Foreign and Commonwealth Office
4 January 2010
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