Memorandum submitted by the Home Office
SECTION A: INTRODUCTION
The Threat
1. The UK faces a real and serious threat
from international terrorism. The current UK threat level is judged—independently
of Ministers—by the Joint Terrorism Analysis Centre as Substantial,
meaning an attack is a strong possibility and could occur without
warning.
2. The current international terrorist threat
is quite different from terrorist threats we faced in the past.
The threat to the UK now comes primarily from Al Qa'ida and similar
groups. They claim a religious justification for their actions
and have a wide ranging religious and political agenda; they are
no longer concerned with a single cause. Many seek mass civilian
casualties and are prepared to use unconventional techniques (including
chemical or radiological weapons); they conduct attacks without
warning; and they actively seek to recruit new members in the
UK and elsewhere in the world.
The Response: Contest
3. The Home Office is the lead government
department for counter-terrorism in the UK. The Office for Security
and Counter Terrorism (OSCT) was established in 2007 in the
Home Office, in order to bring more cohesion and greater strategic
capability to our fight against terrorism.
4. The Government's response to the terrorist
threat we face is well developed. Since 2003 we have had
in place a comprehensive strategy for countering international
terrorism—CONTEST—and on 24 March 2009 we
published a revised and updated version.[1]
For the first time in an unclassified document, CONTEST sets out
a detailed account of the history of the threat, the impact that
this has had on the UK, our understanding of its causes and our
view of its likely direction. It also sets out the principles
that govern our response to the threat, particularly our commitment
to human rights and the rule of law; and our intention to address
not only the immediate threats from terrorism but its causes.
Finally, it explains who does what in counter-terrorism, sets
out what we have achieved to date and outlines comprehensive future
programmes of action here and overseas.
5. CONTEST is divided into four work streams:
Pursue: to stop terrorist attacks;
Prevent: to stop people becoming terrorists
or supporting violent extremism;
Protect: to strengthen our protection
against terrorist attacks; and
Prepare: where an attack cannot be stopped,
to mitigate its impact.
Governance of Counter-terrorism
6. The Home Secretary has lead responsibility
for co-ordinating the strategy and is supported in this by OSCT.
Underpinning delivery of the strategy is a CONTEST Board, chaired
by the Director General of OSCT, and a series of sub-boards to
oversee delivery of each strand of CONTEST and its cross-cutting
aspects.
7. Governance of Contest (non operational
matters)
Cabinet Committee Oversight
8. At the same time as OSCT was established,
the then Prime Minister announced a new Cabinet committee structure
to support the more cohesive and strategic focus on counter-terrorism.
Work on national security and counter terrorism, including international
terrorism and counter-radicalisation, is overseen by the Ministerial
Committee on National Security, International Relations and Development
(NSID).[2]
NSID is chaired by the Prime Minister and also includes the Home
and Foreign Secretaries, the Chancellor, other relevant Ministers,
the heads of the security and intelligence agencies, the military
and ACPO as appropriate. This committee, and its attendant sub-committees,
is responsible for all aspects of counter-terrorism and national
security policy (as distinct from operational matters which
are the responsibility of the police and the individual agencies
involved).
Weekly Security Meeting
9. The Home Secretary also chairs a Weekly
Security Meeting attended by senior representatives of the intelligence
agencies, the police, key government departments and the Cabinet
Office. The meeting provides an opportunity for Home Office ministers
and the wider Whitehall CT Community, to be kept regularly updated
on the latest threat to the UK and the international aspects of
the terrorist threat by the Intelligence Agencies and the Police.
It also allows tactical coordination of CT strategy, policy and
communications.
SECTION B: OVERVIEW
OF SPECIFIC
ISSUES BEING
CONSIDERED BY
THE INQUIRY
The immediate response of the Home Office to a
terrorist attack (including the effectiveness of COBR) in coordinating
an immediate Government response.
10. The Home Office has responsibility for
leading Central Government's response to a terrorist incident
in the UK and will work primarily alongside the Police Service
(which has operational responsibility in a terrorist incident)
and the intelligence agencies.[3]
11. In the event of such an incident the
Home Office would immediately contact the Police Gold Commander
(the officer in overall command who has responsibility and accountability
for the incident) to gain information on the nature of the attack,
the impacts, the initial response and to provide a point of contact
for any Government assistance or support. A decision would be
made on whether to deploy a Government Liaison Team, led by a
Home Office Government Liaison Officer (GLO), to support the Gold
Commander and provide a single channel of information between
the local and central response. Trained Government Liaison Officers
and a 24/7 duty rota is in place to ensure rapid deployment
of a GLO in the event of a terrorist incident. The GLO is a Home
Office official, with experience of working with the police and
the military. The role and responsibilities of the GLO are regularly
rehearsed through the National Counter Terrorism Exercise Programme.
The GLO may be supported by a Government Liaison Team (GLT), consisting
of Home Office press officers, support staff, and representatives
from other relevant departments and organisations such as the
FCO, MOD, the Security Service and the Regional Resilience Team.
The exact make-up of the GLT will depend on the nature of the
incident.
12. Another immediate priority would be
for the Cabinet Office in consultation with the Home Office, as
lead Department, to decide whether to convene a Strategy Group
in the Cabinet Office Briefing Rooms (COBR) at either ministerial
or official level representation. Unless the Prime Minister decides
otherwise these meetings would ordinarily be chaired by the Home
Secretary. Once convened, the Strategy Group is kept fully up
to date on developments in order to provide strategic direction
and effective decision-making. The Group may have to make decisions
in relation to the adequacy of resources, the mobilisation of
national assets, the authorisation of military assistance requests
to the civil power, the public information strategy and national
protective security measures (taking account of the intelligence
assessment and the threat level).
13. The GLO ensures not only that the Gold
Commander's operational interest is taken into account by the
Strategy Group but will also advise the Gold Commander of the
Government's considerations.
Intercept as Evidence
14. The value of intercepted communications
in tackling serious crime (including terrorism) and protecting
the British public is beyond question. Almost every serious counter
terrorist and most organised crime operations involve interception.
The safeguards in place mean that interception is used proportionately
and respects peoples' privacy.
15. The challenge is to find an approach
that enables intercept to be used as evidence in criminal trials
to increase the number of successful convictions, whilst ensuring
that defendants receive a fair trial and national security is
protected. This is the task that the implementation team based
in OSCT, working with intercepting agencies and prosecutorial
authorities and supported by an Advisory Group of Privy Counsellors
(AGPC), has been taking forward. The intention, as set out in
the Home Secretary's Written Ministerial statement in July, is
to issue the final report of this implementation programme to
Parliament shortly.[4]
Control Orders
16. The protection of human rights is a
key principle underpinning our counter-terrorism work. We aim
to protect individual liberty whilst maintaining our nation's
security. This is a challenge for any government, but we have
sought to find that balance at all times—including by introducing
control orders. Control orders are the best available disruptive
tool for addressing the threat posed by suspected terrorists whom
we can neither prosecute nor deport.
17. As a result of various judgements—including
the June 2009 House of Lords judgment in AF & Others—control
orders legislation is fully compatible with human rights.
18. In June 2009, the Lords concluded that,
for the stringent control orders before them, for control order
proceedings to be compatible with the right to a fair trial the
controlled person must be given sufficient information about the
allegations against him to enable him to give effective instructions
in relation to those allegations. This means the Government faces
difficult decisions in certain cases as to how best to protect
the public interest. In those cases we must balance the importance
of protecting the public from the risk of terrorism posed by controlled
individuals against the risk of disclosing sensitive material,
which would reduce the Government's overall ability to protect
the public from a risk of terrorism and could put lives at risk.
19. The Government has reviewed all current
control order cases to see what further disclosure will be required
in the light of that Lords judgment—and whether it was possible
to make that disclosure even though it would damage the public
interest. We considered that some control orders would not be
adversely affected by the judgment, but recognised that the judgment
would require a greater degree of disclosure to be made in many
other cases. In those cases, the Government is making representations
to the special advocates and the court on the extent of disclosure
required within the timescales set down for the High Court proceedings
in each case. Where the Government concludes in relation to any
control order that it will not be able to make enough disclosure
to the controlled person to comply with the right to a fair trial,
we will consider revoking the order.
20. The Government's current assessment
is that the control order regime remains viable and that the national
security reasons for maintaining it have not changed. However,
as further cases are considered by the courts during the autumn
we will keep this assessment under review. We will report the
outcome to the HAC in due course in our memorandum on post-legislative
scrutiny of the Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005. The Home Secretary
has also asked the independent reviewer of terrorism legislation
to consider whether our assessment is right as part of his next
annual report on control orders.
The misuse and misapplication of Anti-terrorism
powers
21. The nature of the terrorist threat requires
specific powers to protect the public. We will only bring in an
anti-terrorism power if it is necessary and proportionate to do
so. Similarly, if it subsequently comes to light that those powers
are not being used appropriately we will take action. Two recent
examples of that are with regard to section 44 of the Terrorism
Act 2000 and the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000.
Section 44
22. Authorisations made under section 44 of
the Terrorism Act 2000 allow police officers to stop and
search vehicles, persons within vehicles and pedestrians if the
authorising officer considers it expedient for the purposes of
preventing acts of terrorism.
23. There has been criticism of the use
of section 44 and Lord Carlile has expressed his concerns
about its use. The Home Office and ACPO have responded with a
number of measures aimed at reducing the use of section 44. These
include publishing updated guidance and the implementation of
a number of measures to ensure an enhanced level of effectiveness
and scrutiny in the processing of section 44 authorisations.
In June 2009 the Metropolitan Police also adopted a more
targeted use of section 44 with the aim of bringing about
a significant reduction in the number of stops in London. A number
of other forces have also either redefined or cancelled their
use of s44 since April 2009. Provisional statistical data
indicates this new strategy has met its intended aim and Lord
Carlile has described this collective work as "significant
progress".[5]
RIPA
24. Contrary to a great deal of misleading
reporting, the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 ("RIPA")
is not anti-terrorism legislation. It was introduced to regulate—in
some instances for the first time—the use of a range of
investigatory techniques, by a range of public authorities, for
a range of purposes including the prevention or detection of crime,
the prevention of disorder, public health and public safety, as
well as national security.
25. There have been some instances when
local authorities have used techniques under RIPA when most people
would say they should not have done. These instances, however,
were not and could not have been in relation to terrorism. Local
authorities are not permitted to authorise techniques under RIPA
for the purpose of investigating national security. Nevertheless,
the Government is committed to preventing any repetition of these
instances and recently carried out a consultation exercise on
its proposals to restrict local authority use of RIPA. It will
announce the outcome of the consultation shortly.
Counter-terrorism measures at the European level
26. Close cooperation with EU partners is
vital in our efforts to combat international terrorism. Primary
responsibility for combating terrorism lies with individual EU
Member States, but the EU has an essential supporting and facilitative
role, and the UK has led and actively participated in various
EU initiatives to tackle international terrorism.
27. It is clear that the nature of the threat
and the EU's free movement of goods, people, capital and services
require an EU wide response; working together Member States can
more effectively target the threat, and multiply domestic efforts.
EU citizens have already benefited from good co-operation—attacks
have been prevented, arrests and convictions have been secured.
28. Engagement on CT with our European partners
brings significant benefits, enabling us to import best practice
to strengthen our own capabilities, and multiply our efforts in
key areas. It also provides us with an opportunity to export our
own best practice and to improve the skills of our closest neighbours,
who rely on our experience, knowledge and resources in contributing
to making the European space, and ultimately the UK, a safer place.
29. The EU CT strategy, effectively incorporates
the four pillars of the UK's own CONTEST strategy into an EU-wide
strategy. Significant achievements have already been made for
example on Pursue the European Arrest Warrant, allowed
for the return of Hussain Osman, suspected of involvement in the
failed bombings in London on 21 July 2005, who was traced
to Italy and arrested on 29 July after a European Arrest
Warrant (EAW) issued by the UK.
30. The EU Common Position 931 is an
EU held list of individuals and organisations concerned in terrorism
which enables UK CT tools to have a more disruptive effect throughout
terrorist networks with individuals and organisations subject
to an EU wide asset freeze, travel ban and arms embargo, which
in turn reduces the threat to British citizens.
October 2009
1 Further details can be found at http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/counter-terrorism/ Back
2
Further details can be found at http://www.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/secretariats/committees.aspx Back
3
Further details can be found at http://www.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/media/132685/conops.pdf Back
4
Further details can be found at http://security.homeoffice.gov.uk/ripa/interception/use-interception/ Back
5
Paragraph 43, Report on the Operation in 2008 of the Terrorism
Act 2000 and Part 1 of the Terrorism Act 2006, Lord
Carlile of Berriew, June 2009 Back
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