The Home Office's Response to Terrorist Attacks - Home Affairs Committee Contents


Memorandum submitted by the Home Office

SECTION A: INTRODUCTION

The Threat

  1.  The UK faces a real and serious threat from international terrorism. The current UK threat level is judged—independently of Ministers—by the Joint Terrorism Analysis Centre as Substantial, meaning an attack is a strong possibility and could occur without warning.

  2.  The current international terrorist threat is quite different from terrorist threats we faced in the past. The threat to the UK now comes primarily from Al Qa'ida and similar groups. They claim a religious justification for their actions and have a wide ranging religious and political agenda; they are no longer concerned with a single cause. Many seek mass civilian casualties and are prepared to use unconventional techniques (including chemical or radiological weapons); they conduct attacks without warning; and they actively seek to recruit new members in the UK and elsewhere in the world.

The Response: Contest

  3.  The Home Office is the lead government department for counter-terrorism in the UK. The Office for Security and Counter Terrorism (OSCT) was established in 2007 in the Home Office, in order to bring more cohesion and greater strategic capability to our fight against terrorism.

  4.  The Government's response to the terrorist threat we face is well developed. Since 2003 we have had in place a comprehensive strategy for countering international terrorism—CONTEST—and on 24 March 2009 we published a revised and updated version.[1] For the first time in an unclassified document, CONTEST sets out a detailed account of the history of the threat, the impact that this has had on the UK, our understanding of its causes and our view of its likely direction. It also sets out the principles that govern our response to the threat, particularly our commitment to human rights and the rule of law; and our intention to address not only the immediate threats from terrorism but its causes. Finally, it explains who does what in counter-terrorism, sets out what we have achieved to date and outlines comprehensive future programmes of action here and overseas.

  5.  CONTEST is divided into four work streams:

    Pursue: to stop terrorist attacks;

    Prevent: to stop people becoming terrorists or supporting violent extremism;

    Protect: to strengthen our protection against terrorist attacks; and

    Prepare: where an attack cannot be stopped, to mitigate its impact.

Governance of Counter-terrorism

  6.  The Home Secretary has lead responsibility for co-ordinating the strategy and is supported in this by OSCT. Underpinning delivery of the strategy is a CONTEST Board, chaired by the Director General of OSCT, and a series of sub-boards to oversee delivery of each strand of CONTEST and its cross-cutting aspects.

  7.   Governance of Contest (non operational matters)


Cabinet Committee Oversight

  8.  At the same time as OSCT was established, the then Prime Minister announced a new Cabinet committee structure to support the more cohesive and strategic focus on counter-terrorism. Work on national security and counter terrorism, including international terrorism and counter-radicalisation, is overseen by the Ministerial Committee on National Security, International Relations and Development (NSID).[2] NSID is chaired by the Prime Minister and also includes the Home and Foreign Secretaries, the Chancellor, other relevant Ministers, the heads of the security and intelligence agencies, the military and ACPO as appropriate. This committee, and its attendant sub-committees, is responsible for all aspects of counter-terrorism and national security policy (as distinct from operational matters which are the responsibility of the police and the individual agencies involved).

Weekly Security Meeting

  9.  The Home Secretary also chairs a Weekly Security Meeting attended by senior representatives of the intelligence agencies, the police, key government departments and the Cabinet Office. The meeting provides an opportunity for Home Office ministers and the wider Whitehall CT Community, to be kept regularly updated on the latest threat to the UK and the international aspects of the terrorist threat by the Intelligence Agencies and the Police. It also allows tactical coordination of CT strategy, policy and communications.

SECTION B: OVERVIEW OF SPECIFIC ISSUES BEING CONSIDERED BY THE INQUIRY

The immediate response of the Home Office to a terrorist attack (including the effectiveness of COBR) in coordinating an immediate Government response.

  10.  The Home Office has responsibility for leading Central Government's response to a terrorist incident in the UK and will work primarily alongside the Police Service (which has operational responsibility in a terrorist incident) and the intelligence agencies.[3]

  11.  In the event of such an incident the Home Office would immediately contact the Police Gold Commander (the officer in overall command who has responsibility and accountability for the incident) to gain information on the nature of the attack, the impacts, the initial response and to provide a point of contact for any Government assistance or support. A decision would be made on whether to deploy a Government Liaison Team, led by a Home Office Government Liaison Officer (GLO), to support the Gold Commander and provide a single channel of information between the local and central response. Trained Government Liaison Officers and a 24/7 duty rota is in place to ensure rapid deployment of a GLO in the event of a terrorist incident. The GLO is a Home Office official, with experience of working with the police and the military. The role and responsibilities of the GLO are regularly rehearsed through the National Counter Terrorism Exercise Programme. The GLO may be supported by a Government Liaison Team (GLT), consisting of Home Office press officers, support staff, and representatives from other relevant departments and organisations such as the FCO, MOD, the Security Service and the Regional Resilience Team. The exact make-up of the GLT will depend on the nature of the incident.

  12.  Another immediate priority would be for the Cabinet Office in consultation with the Home Office, as lead Department, to decide whether to convene a Strategy Group in the Cabinet Office Briefing Rooms (COBR) at either ministerial or official level representation. Unless the Prime Minister decides otherwise these meetings would ordinarily be chaired by the Home Secretary. Once convened, the Strategy Group is kept fully up to date on developments in order to provide strategic direction and effective decision-making. The Group may have to make decisions in relation to the adequacy of resources, the mobilisation of national assets, the authorisation of military assistance requests to the civil power, the public information strategy and national protective security measures (taking account of the intelligence assessment and the threat level).

  13.  The GLO ensures not only that the Gold Commander's operational interest is taken into account by the Strategy Group but will also advise the Gold Commander of the Government's considerations.

Intercept as Evidence

  14.  The value of intercepted communications in tackling serious crime (including terrorism) and protecting the British public is beyond question. Almost every serious counter terrorist and most organised crime operations involve interception. The safeguards in place mean that interception is used proportionately and respects peoples' privacy.

  15.  The challenge is to find an approach that enables intercept to be used as evidence in criminal trials to increase the number of successful convictions, whilst ensuring that defendants receive a fair trial and national security is protected. This is the task that the implementation team based in OSCT, working with intercepting agencies and prosecutorial authorities and supported by an Advisory Group of Privy Counsellors (AGPC), has been taking forward. The intention, as set out in the Home Secretary's Written Ministerial statement in July, is to issue the final report of this implementation programme to Parliament shortly.[4]

Control Orders

  16.  The protection of human rights is a key principle underpinning our counter-terrorism work. We aim to protect individual liberty whilst maintaining our nation's security. This is a challenge for any government, but we have sought to find that balance at all times—including by introducing control orders. Control orders are the best available disruptive tool for addressing the threat posed by suspected terrorists whom we can neither prosecute nor deport.

  17.  As a result of various judgements—including the June 2009 House of Lords judgment in AF & Others—control orders legislation is fully compatible with human rights.

  18.  In June 2009, the Lords concluded that, for the stringent control orders before them, for control order proceedings to be compatible with the right to a fair trial the controlled person must be given sufficient information about the allegations against him to enable him to give effective instructions in relation to those allegations. This means the Government faces difficult decisions in certain cases as to how best to protect the public interest. In those cases we must balance the importance of protecting the public from the risk of terrorism posed by controlled individuals against the risk of disclosing sensitive material, which would reduce the Government's overall ability to protect the public from a risk of terrorism and could put lives at risk.

  19.  The Government has reviewed all current control order cases to see what further disclosure will be required in the light of that Lords judgment—and whether it was possible to make that disclosure even though it would damage the public interest. We considered that some control orders would not be adversely affected by the judgment, but recognised that the judgment would require a greater degree of disclosure to be made in many other cases. In those cases, the Government is making representations to the special advocates and the court on the extent of disclosure required within the timescales set down for the High Court proceedings in each case. Where the Government concludes in relation to any control order that it will not be able to make enough disclosure to the controlled person to comply with the right to a fair trial, we will consider revoking the order.

  20.  The Government's current assessment is that the control order regime remains viable and that the national security reasons for maintaining it have not changed. However, as further cases are considered by the courts during the autumn we will keep this assessment under review. We will report the outcome to the HAC in due course in our memorandum on post-legislative scrutiny of the Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005. The Home Secretary has also asked the independent reviewer of terrorism legislation to consider whether our assessment is right as part of his next annual report on control orders.

The misuse and misapplication of Anti-terrorism powers

  21.  The nature of the terrorist threat requires specific powers to protect the public. We will only bring in an anti-terrorism power if it is necessary and proportionate to do so. Similarly, if it subsequently comes to light that those powers are not being used appropriately we will take action. Two recent examples of that are with regard to section 44 of the Terrorism Act 2000 and the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000.

Section 44

  22.  Authorisations made under section 44 of the Terrorism Act 2000 allow police officers to stop and search vehicles, persons within vehicles and pedestrians if the authorising officer considers it expedient for the purposes of preventing acts of terrorism.

  23.  There has been criticism of the use of section 44 and Lord Carlile has expressed his concerns about its use. The Home Office and ACPO have responded with a number of measures aimed at reducing the use of section 44. These include publishing updated guidance and the implementation of a number of measures to ensure an enhanced level of effectiveness and scrutiny in the processing of section 44 authorisations. In June 2009 the Metropolitan Police also adopted a more targeted use of section 44 with the aim of bringing about a significant reduction in the number of stops in London. A number of other forces have also either redefined or cancelled their use of s44 since April 2009. Provisional statistical data indicates this new strategy has met its intended aim and Lord Carlile has described this collective work as "significant progress".[5]

RIPA

  24.  Contrary to a great deal of misleading reporting, the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 ("RIPA") is not anti-terrorism legislation. It was introduced to regulate—in some instances for the first time—the use of a range of investigatory techniques, by a range of public authorities, for a range of purposes including the prevention or detection of crime, the prevention of disorder, public health and public safety, as well as national security.

  25.  There have been some instances when local authorities have used techniques under RIPA when most people would say they should not have done. These instances, however, were not and could not have been in relation to terrorism. Local authorities are not permitted to authorise techniques under RIPA for the purpose of investigating national security. Nevertheless, the Government is committed to preventing any repetition of these instances and recently carried out a consultation exercise on its proposals to restrict local authority use of RIPA. It will announce the outcome of the consultation shortly.

Counter-terrorism measures at the European level

  26.  Close cooperation with EU partners is vital in our efforts to combat international terrorism. Primary responsibility for combating terrorism lies with individual EU Member States, but the EU has an essential supporting and facilitative role, and the UK has led and actively participated in various EU initiatives to tackle international terrorism.

  27.  It is clear that the nature of the threat and the EU's free movement of goods, people, capital and services require an EU wide response; working together Member States can more effectively target the threat, and multiply domestic efforts. EU citizens have already benefited from good co-operation—attacks have been prevented, arrests and convictions have been secured.

  28.  Engagement on CT with our European partners brings significant benefits, enabling us to import best practice to strengthen our own capabilities, and multiply our efforts in key areas. It also provides us with an opportunity to export our own best practice and to improve the skills of our closest neighbours, who rely on our experience, knowledge and resources in contributing to making the European space, and ultimately the UK, a safer place.

  29.  The EU CT strategy, effectively incorporates the four pillars of the UK's own CONTEST strategy into an EU-wide strategy. Significant achievements have already been made for example on Pursue the European Arrest Warrant, allowed for the return of Hussain Osman, suspected of involvement in the failed bombings in London on 21 July 2005, who was traced to Italy and arrested on 29 July after a European Arrest Warrant (EAW) issued by the UK.

  30.  The EU Common Position 931 is an EU held list of individuals and organisations concerned in terrorism which enables UK CT tools to have a more disruptive effect throughout terrorist networks with individuals and organisations subject to an EU wide asset freeze, travel ban and arms embargo, which in turn reduces the threat to British citizens.

October 2009






1   Further details can be found at http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/counter-terrorism/ Back

2   Further details can be found at http://www.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/secretariats/committees.aspx Back

3   Further details can be found at http://www.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/media/132685/conops.pdf Back

4   Further details can be found at http://security.homeoffice.gov.uk/ripa/interception/use-interception/ Back

5   Paragraph 43, Report on the Operation in 2008 of the Terrorism Act 2000 and Part 1 of the Terrorism Act 2006, Lord Carlile of Berriew, June 2009 Back


 
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