Examination of Witness (Question Numbers
45-59)
RT HON
DR JOHN
REID MP
13 OCTOBER 2009
Q45 Chairman: Dr Reid, thank you very
much for giving evidence to the Committee. Welcome back, if I
may say so, to the Home Affairs select committee. We are extremely
grateful to you because we know that you are unwell and you have
left your bed at home to come here specifically to give evidence
before us; we are extremely grateful. We believe very firmly in
this Committee with short questions and short answers because
we have a number of witnesses coming up. As you know, this is
an inquiry into the counter-terrorism agenda of the Government—in
particular, what are the structures that have been used—some
of which organisations you have chaired. You chaired COBR; you
set up the Terror Warning System; and you were involved in Operation
Overt, which the Minister referred to just now when he gave evidence.
I understand you would like to make a very short statement outlining
your points, is that correct?
John Reid: Yes. Thank you for
your invite and I am pleased to accept for two reasons: one is
that I think national security is above party politics and it
is an issue that a committee like this can deal well with; and,
secondly, while I am here I am not getting investigated in hospital,
so I am happier here than I will be later this afternoon! Two
things I think: I have done your Committee the courtesy of looking
at what you are inquiring into, Chairman, and I would make two
points: the first is that, from my own experience, COBR on the
specific nature of the questions you are looking at, for all its
faults—and any system has personality/power clashes and
has difficulty coordinating such a multifarious series of participants
in dealing with the problem of counter-terrorism—works very
well in general terms. You are right I did chair it; on several
occasions I was a participant, so I speak with some experience.
I was involved in establishing some of the warning systems and
so on. The second point I would make is that what I am probably
more pleased with, especially after listening to Admiral Lord
West, is the establishment of the Office for Security and Counter-Terrorism.
I think that was absolutely essential. It was not unanimously
supported at the time, I have to say; there was huge resistance
in certain quarters of Government, as there always is when you
establish something that is as radical and as new as this; but,
in a sense, the strengths of COBR, which were illustrated during
Operation Overt to which you referred earlier, coordination, communication,
real-time information, but COBR itself is reactive; it is temporary;
it is ad hoc; it is formed for a specific purpose for a limited
period. What the Office for Security and Counter-Terrorism did
(and this is why I wanted it formed) is it institutionalised that
coordination, that exchange of information, that grouping together
of MI5, MI6, defence intelligence, Foreign Office and so on, in
the Home Office but participated in and owned by all of the counter-terrorist
elements pan-government. That is absolutely essential because
the threat against us is seamless. It can no longer be divided
into foreign affairs, defence, home affairs and so on, and therefore
our response has to be seamless.
Q46 Chairman: Given what you have
just said, is it now not the time for the establishment of a National
Security Council along the American model, where you have a permanent
body at a very senior level dealing with the Prime Minister and
the Home Secretary that will take what you have established to
the next step?
John Reid: Personally that is
what I favoured. I wanted to streamline the whole of our counter-terrorist
operations and, insofar as we could, coordinate and channel it
towards a common effort. Let me take one step back in answering
the question. The first thing that I wanted to do was to analyse
the threat; and the threat was largely, though not exclusively,
from Islamic extremism like al-Qaeda. What were the characteristics
of that threat? One, it was seamless. It could no longer be divided
into the old compartments; two, it was politically overseen and
driven; it was franchised out to local organisations, but globally
it was driven by a political narrative and a political drive;
three, it was strategic; in other words, it looked over 30, 40
and 50 years; four, it had an ideological base, and therefore
there was a narrative and an argument behind al-Qaeda. If that
was the nature of the threat, I believe that should be the nature
of our response. Therefore, the Office for Security and Counter-Terrorism
was formed in order to make it seamless, to coordinate it, to
have it politically overseen by the ministers like Lord West and
then the Home Secretary, up to the Prime Minister himself, and
that it was strategic that it looked not only at today's problems
but tomorrow's threats as well. If you were going to do the Office
for Security and Counter-Terrorism like that you should have a
chain of command that went clearly up to one Cabinet committee,
which in my view should be entitled and formed as a National Security
Committee on which you would have the Chair of the Prime Minister,
but you would also have an advisor like Robert Hannigan at present
or Lord West, who would be the personal advisor to the Prime Minister,
and who would also have a chair at Downing Street.
Q47 Chairman: Very similar to the
American system where you have Condoleezza Rice and others coming
in?
John Reid: Absolutely. In the
nature of all change, I had to compromise because there is resistance
to change. The Prime Minister backed me on the Office for Security
and Counter-Terrorism. It appears that nobody wants to get rid
of that now. Everyone thinks it is a success, although at the
time there were pretty much elements against it. Now, of course,
the second element, which is the National Security Council, is
worth considering.
Q48 Chairman: A recent book on MI5
suggested that the Security Services took a long time to recognise
the threat specifically from Islamist terrorists based in the
United Kingdom. While you were Home Secretary did you feel that
you had sufficient resources to give the Security Services and
others to tackle the threat specifically of Islamic terrorists?
John Reid: There was a considerable
increase in the resources. There is no doubt at all that the intelligence
agencies faced a huge and radical challenge. Why? Because the
nature of this new threat was different from almost anything they
had formed before. The two elements of threat as you well know,
Chairman, are intention and capability. Generally speaking, the
intention of terrorists prior to this had not been unconstrained
mass murder. It is obvious now that that is an untrammelled intention.
Up until relatively recently nor did terrorists have the possibility
of having unconstrained capability; but with the development of
chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear weapons, terrorists
now have both unconstrained capability and constrained intent.
So the nature of the challenge was huge for intelligence services.
I think we did increase the resources hugely. I think the intelligence
services responded with huge efforts; but actually it is not as
easy to spend some of these resources as you would think; because
in order to recruit new people with new language skills, new cultural
appreciation, in new communities when you change towards, say,
Islamic extremism, is actually quite difficult. By and large,
the intelligence services did their job. My assessment was that
we in Government had not created the pan-government systems and
structures that fully complemented the new seamless response by
bringing people together; that is why the OSCT was so important.
Q49 Mr Winnick: Dr Reid, of course
we all wish you a full recovery very soon. MI5 plays a very, very
important role, obviously, in trying to defend our country against
all forms of terrorism and indeed subversion. The recent book
that the Chairman mentioned made the point about what happened
in the 1970s that MI5—and I would like your view on this
as a previous Home Secretary—was accountable of course to
the Prime Minister of the day; that is the rule of law. Yet the
person MI5 was responsible for, the Prime Minister Harold Wilson,
was indeed the subject of an investigation and inquiry. Does that
not seem to you to undermine the rule of law?
John Reid: I am not qualified
to comment on what happened then. I have read some of the press
reports about what was going on. In theory I suppose no-one is
above the law, including MPs, ministers and presumably theoretically
also the Prime Minister.
Q50 Mr Winnick: And MI5 itself?
John Reid: And MI5 itself indeed,
which is why the job of committees such as this and the Intelligence
Committee are so important. Everyone in the country is subject
to the law, and presumably if somebody is breaking that law or
there is prima facie evidence that they are then the intelligence
services have to do their job. As I said, I cannot comment on
something that happened long before I was an MP and for all I
know, along with many other Cabinet ministers, might have been
the subject of the same surveillance.
Q51 Mr Winnick: During the time you
were Home Secretary, you were satisfied that all was well as far
as MI5 was concerned?
John Reid: Yes. To the best of
my knowledge MI5 were operating within the law. They were accountable.
They were directing their energies towards the main enemy, which
was then and is now al-Qaeda but there are other threats:
the dissident Republicans of course that we mentioned; and I think,
like everyone at this Committee, I very much welcomed the statement
from the INLA the other day, two days ago, that for them the military
struggle was over; we will wait and see if that promise sticks,
but I certainly hope it does; but there is also espionage from
the East, which became an increasingly difficult challenge for
the Services to face; but so far as I was concerned throughout
this I thought that MI5, under Eliza Manningham-Buller and then
Jonathan Evans, MI6, under John Scarlett, performed admirably
in the face of huge challenges.
Q52 Mr Winnick: One further question,
different from the two I have asked, Dr Reid, is this: as far
as 7/7 is concerned, when those atrocities took place 52 totally
innocent people murdered and many others seriously injured four
years ago, many and that includes me had a strong suspicion that
it was not just home-grown—that the terrorists had been
involved with al-Qaeda abroad; and yet MI5 gave the impression
then and for a time afterwards that they were not so persuaded;
they have been since, I understand, because of a video made by
the ringleader of the mass murderers. I am wondering why it is
that lay people involved had a pretty strong suspicion, as I have
mentioned, but not MI5 itself?
John Reid: I think like anything
else in a fast-changing world all of our ideas and understanding
are developing, and there are two things that are developing:
one is the nature of the threat itself; and the second is our
understanding of it. The nature of the threat that we are now
facing I have already said is unconstrained in intention and capability;
but it is also—and there is a horrible sociological word—"glocal";
it is global and local. That is why I say it is seamless; it cuts
across domestic and foreign affairs. That is one of the reasons,
incidentally, why it is better to have one committee dealing with
this, rather than divide it up into the old domestic affairs committee
and the home affairs committee; it is better to have a national
security committee. Basically, there are elements of global and
local parts of the threat. The perfect example hypothetically
is a plan that is hatched and developed abroad, which concerns
a transatlantic airliner, which comes over national airspace,
possibly near a local power station where there is a local community.
There you have all the elements of a global and a local threat.
Mrs Dean: Dr Reid, can you explain to
us what happens in the immediate aftermath of a terrorist attack?
How does the Home Office respond?
Q53 Chairman: Before you do that,
we are under huge time constraints, Dr Reid, so if you could be
as brief as possible in your answer.
John Reid: Basically what happens
if you want to run through the various elements of it, once an
incident, which looks like a terrorist incident, is declared someone
called a "government liaison officer" in the Home Office
team (this is certainly how it happened three years ago; some
of it is now incorporated within the Office for Security and Counter-Terrorism
under Charles Farr) would be dispatched to the police force concerned.
Contact would be made with the local commander, the Gold Commander,
who would be appointed. The head of the Counter-Terrorism Unit
in my term as was—it has now been replaced by a Home Office
operational support team—briefs the Home Secretary, and
then remains contact between the Gold Commander on the spot and
the Home Secretary himself; simultaneously, as the Home Secretary
is being briefed, consideration will be given to the raising of
COBR within a very short period if it is serious enough; COBR
will bring together all of the various elements from the various
departments and intelligence agencies who can exchange and coordinate
information but, and very importantly, COBR does not run
the operations; the operation is always run by the Gold Commander.
What COBR can do is supply support; make sure that in real time
everybody is working on the same information picture, and carry
out communications to the public and perhaps internationally and
diplomatically. That is as short as I can be.
Q54 Mrs Dean: Do you think COBR is
fit for purpose when dealing with terrorist emergencies?
John Reid: Yes, I do. I was in
it as a participant during 7/7, I chaired it and I suppose led
deliberations during Operation Overt and during Litvinenko, and
in my experience it contributed hugely to coordination of effort,
communication and support. I understand there have been criticisms,
not least by Andy Hayman. Andy is a great cop; was a very good
head of the Counter-Terrorist Unit. I do not know why he felt
the way he did about some instance of COBR; but I understand at
the time he was dealing with it basically there could have been
a perception that there was not a clear chain of command; because
at that time I think there were two permanent secretaries in the
Home Office, for instance; and, secondly, there was this burgeoning
question of who was ultimately responsible for the counter-terrorist
coordination. Was it the Cabinet Office or was it the Home Office?
There may have been elements there that caused that perception
to arise on his part, I do not know; you would have to ask him.
Certainly from my experience it is a hugely valuable tool. The
only limitation is it is reactive and temporary, which is why
I tried to institutionalise it in a permanent Office for Security
and Counter-Terrorism.
Q55 Bob Russell: Dr Reid, if we do
track down Mr Hayman and get him here we will indeed put that
question to him, but he is being elusive at the moment. In your
experience, is COBR the correct vehicle for coordinating the immediate
Government response?
John Reid: Yes; for the immediate
Government response, yes. I repeat it is not the operational unit.
The operational unit is around the Gold Commander; but, when an
incident is as important as some of these counter-terrorism incidents
are, it is absolutely essential that everybody has the same information.
The first thing you start with at COBR is called CRIP—the
common recognised information picture—and so everybody is
working from the same basis; and that is very important. So I
think it is the appropriate body.
Q56 Tom Brake: The Committee understands
that the membership of COBR does vary depending on the situation.
If that is the case, could you explain to us who actually decides
who should be there?
John Reid: Ultimately, it would
normally be the Home Secretary in consultation with the Cabinet
Office, who perform a lot of the functions, and the Office for
Security and Counter-Terrorism who deal with a lot of the substance
and strategic thinking. Perhaps an example is the best thing.
If you were dealing with a normal counter-terrorist operation,
for instance Operation Overt, a key element of that who obviously
would have to be there would be transport; therefore throughout
that I was very glad that the Secretary of State for Transport
Douglas Alexander, as he was then, was involved in all of these
meetings throughout the night in order to work in partnership
with us. On the other hand, with the Litvinenko problems, where
we were worried about perhaps some sort of spread of disease or
chemical attack on the population in London, the Health Protection
Agency would have been a key element being there, and perhaps
AWE, Aldermaston or the Atomic Weapons Authority or some of our
scientific-based organisations would be more prominent in other
instances. It is, I suppose, a mix and a match according to the
nature of the incident itself.
Q57 Tom Brake: From what you have
described, in effect the Home Secretary has the veto on who is
there or not?
John Reid: The Home Secretary
would ultimately be probably in most cases the most determining
factor, because the Home Secretary would normally chair COBR,
although there would be occasions when, if it was important enough,
obviously the Prime Minister might do it; but on occasions it
would normally be the Home Secretary; indeed, I can remember chairing
COBR meetings where the Deputy Prime Minister came in and sat
but played a participant role at his decision and allowed the
Home Secretary to get on with the chairing of it.
Q58 David Davies: Dr Reid, you have
already mentioned the role of the Government Liaison Officer who
goes to the scene, liaises with the Gold Commander and goes back
to COBR. Could you tell us whether they get specific training?
Without giving away the individual's name: is it one, more than
one; what sort of background do they have; are they coming from
a military, police or security service background, or a civil
service background?
John Reid: One, there are several
of them at any given time available.
Q59 David Davies: 24 hours a day?
John Reid: Absolutely, so that
they could work in shifts; they could be available at any time
of the day; they are very, very important. The Government Liaison
Officer would often sit with the Gold Commander, which means that
he would liaise between the Home Secretary and the Gold Commander,
freeing the Gold Commander to do his operational job. He would
be appointed in those days by the Home Secretary, now by the Deputy
or the Director of the Office for Security and Counter-Terrorism,
and there would be several people who would get specialist training
for the job; they might come from any number of different backgrounds;
they would traditionally be part of the Office for Security and
Counter-Terrorism; they would do on-the-job training; and they
would complete several, I think three, live exercises a year.
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