The Home Office's Response to Terrorist Attacks - Home Affairs Committee Contents


Examination of Witness (Question Numbers 165-179)

MR KEIR STARMER QC

10 NOVEMBER 2009

  Q165 Chairman: Good morning. Thank you very much for coming to give evidence. I know you are extraordinarily busy and we are most grateful to you. It is exactly a year since you were appointed DPP in 2008.

  Mr Starmer: Yes.

  Q166  Chairman: Are you enjoying the job?

  Mr Starmer: Yes, thank you.

  Q167  Mr Winnick: I hope you say so at the end of it.

  Mr Starmer: I will let you know.

  Q168  Chairman: Do you think you would benefit as Director of Public Prosecutions from the admission of intercept material as evidence?

  Mr Starmer: Yes, I do. Evidence obtained by interception would be of benefit to prosecution in this country, particularly in respect of counter-terrorism and organised crime. I base that answer on an analysis of the cases where we have been able to use foreign intercept evidence. There have recently been 11 such cases involving organised crime. In eight of those cases, there were pleas of guilty based on foreign intercept evidence. It is on an analysis of those cases. I am not able to carry out an analysis of our prosecutions and answer the question "Would they have been enhanced by evidence obtained by intercept?" because obviously we do not routinely see that material and there would be no point in us carrying out the analysis. In so far as I have done it with foreign intercepts, it is clear that there would be a benefit in terms of prosecution.

  Q169  Chairman: You have conveyed your views to the Attorney General and the Home Secretary, have you? Ministers are aware of what you would like to see happen as far as intercept evidence is concerned?

  Mr Starmer: Yes. My view is that I am, in principle, in favour. I do think it would be of benefit for the reasons I have just outlined. In addition to that, I should say that, as an organisation, CPS, we have been participating in the workings of the Chilcot team, looking at the question of whether the evidence obtained by intercept could be put into a model that would be consistent with the nine operational principles, but my `in principle' position has been made known.

  Q170  Mr Streeter: We have been told that interception is of most use as a tool for gathering information rather than evidence. We have heard from your illustrious predecessor a second ago that he did not agree with that. What is your view, please?

  Mr Starmer: It is of great benefit in terms of intelligence gathering. I am aware in other jurisdictions where evidence obtained by intercept can be used that it is of benefit and has been used in a wide range of cases. That tends to suggest that the same would be true here. As I have said, on the analysis of foreign intercept—which is our best evidence, in a sense, because it is intercept in this jurisdiction in our court proceedings—there is clearly benefit. What I am not able to do—and I really do not think I should do—is to suggest that it is possible to give any analysis of our prosecutions, that they would in fact have benefited or not, because that analysis simply has not been done by me or anybody else.

  Q171  Patrick Mercer: Can I ask you to throw your mind back to Operation Overt, the intercepted plan to bring down aircraft in the summer of 2006. The procuring of emails from California was crucial in this. Can you clarify the distinction in this particular case between information and evidence?

  Mr Starmer: I have to be slightly circumspect about this case because, as you know, I consider there should be a retrial of the three remaining defendants. That, if it goes ahead, is going to go ahead next year and so the case is still live to that extent. In that case, some email traffic between alleged conspirators was captured by internet service providers overseas. Efforts were made to obtain it and, eventually, through legal assistant it was obtained. There were a series of court orders in January and February of 2009 that released those emails from a US court of law in the district of California in accordance with a request from the UK. Then it was deployed by us in the second trial, the retrial, in that case. We considered that it added to the strength of the prosecution. It was used as evidence.

  Q172  Patrick Mercer: Is the distinction between information and evidence as rigid and absolute as the Minister for Security Lord West suggested?

  Mr Starmer: As a matter of law I think it probably is because evidence can only be evidence if it complies with the evidence of the rules of admissibility in this jurisdiction. That is a real difference. That is not to say that information which is currently collected as intelligence could not be used for evidential purposes, but there is a clear distinction in law between the two.

  Q173  Mrs Dean: Obviously many other countries, both in the EU and the Commonwealth, allow the use of intercept evidence in court, albeit in tightly controlled circumstances. Why do you think the UK does not allow prosecutors this option?

  Mr Starmer: In a sense that is a question of policy which is not for me to answer, but it is important to appreciate—and I think most people do appreciate—that the legal regimes in other jurisdictions are different. By that I mean the legal regime by which intercepts are captured. I do not think there is another jurisdiction that has the same set up as we have here and it is important to appreciate that because it does have practical consequences. In other words, I do not think you can simply transpose one model from another country with a different legal regime and assume that it will automatically apply here. The work of the Chilcot Review was to look at a model that might work here, given our regime.

  Q174  Mrs Dean: Are you of the opinion that that is possible? Do you think that we can introduce a regime that can allow it?

  Mr Starmer: As a matter of principle I think that a legal regime could be devised, in which evidence obtained by intercept could be admissible in evidence. The more difficult question is the question that the Chilcot Review is confronting, whether a model can be devised that is consistent with the principles that they have set down for their review. But I accept that in principle it can be done; you can devise a legal model that would permit evidence obtained by an intercept to be used.

  Q175  David Davies: Mr Starmer, we heard what the former DPP thought about Control Orders; what are your personal views on control orders?

  Mr Starmer: I do not think, for the reasons that my predecessor just gave, that it is appropriate for me to give my personal views about control orders. I recognise the difficulties that the government face and faces in dealing with the threat of terrorism. I accept that measures have to be taken to protect the public. As DPP my involvement with control orders is on the question of whether or not a prosecution could be brought as an alternative to the control order in the first place, and that is a review decision during the currency—

  Q176  David Davies: As DPP you do not think it is appropriate to comment on control orders, but obviously they have been brought in because the Human Rights Act prevents us from sending these people back even though they pose a threat to our security. Why do you think it is not appropriate to comment on control orders but that it is perfectly appropriate to comment on what political parties may or may not think of the Human Rights Act?

  Mr Starmer: I have limited my comments today and in the past to matters which touch on the prosecution and I have not made any comment on the government or the opposition's policy on anything. I simply make comments that the passing of the Human Rights Act as law is useful to us as prosecutors, in particular in protecting the rights of victims and witnesses.

  Q177  David Davies: And people who have posed a threat on our security?

  Mr Starmer: I have not touched on that in any public comment either, no.

  Q178  David Davies: You do recognise that the only reasons we have control orders is because the Human Rights Act prevents us from sending people back who may pose a threat to our security?

  Mr Starmer: I am very aware of the history.

  Q179  David Davies: So you would accept that it is perfectly reasonable for political parties to have discussion as to whether or not the Human Rights Act is working?

  Mr Starmer: Of course I do; I think it is a perfectly legitimate and proper thing.



 
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