Conclusions and recommendations
COBRA
1. While
it is difficult to hold regular meetings during an emergency situation,
we are surprised that two former senior policemen raised concerns
over the frequency of COBRA meetings and suggested that the timing
of meetings was unpredictable. We recommend that as far as possible
a fixed schedule of regular meetings be maintained. Participants
in COBRA meetings need to feed back the results of the main meeting
and implement emergency plans—there is a danger, without
a relatively fixed schedule, that COBRA gets in the way of this
and actively hinders the operational response. (Paragraph 7)
2. A degree of demarcation
exists between 'operational' and 'political' actors within COBRA.
Formalising this may produce better informed decision-making,
but we cannot see how further demarcation and "sub-groups"
would be avoided, negating any advantages. As long as everyone
involved in a COBRA meeting is aware of their roles (and we have
no evidence that they are not) then we do not see any major problems
caused by the current informal demarcation between "political"
and "operational" actors. (Paragraph 9)
3. It is imperative
that key actors, especially Ministers who will be taking major
decisions, experience a full "COBRA simulation" before
facing a real-life incident. We are disappointed that the perception
exists among some operational actors that the Home Secretary and
other relevant Ministers have not participated as fully as could
be expected in the exercise programme. We strongly recommend that
in future, participation in such exercises becomes a key part
of Ministerial life. (Paragraph 12)
4. As a forum for
coordinating information after a terrorist attack, COBRA is as
good a system as possible, and aside from the minor technical
issues we have noted concerning the timing of meetings and participation
in exercises we have no complaints with how it operates. (Paragraph
13)
Co-ordinating an immediate response to attacks
5. The
Weekly Security Meeting—a meeting of which we were previously
unaware—performs many of the functions that a National Security
Committee would perform; in effect a de facto National Security
Committee already exists and functions, however discreetly. (Paragraph
14)
6. While we are not
placed to comment on the effectiveness of the Weekly Security
Meeting, the lack of public awareness of its existence is troubling.
The public have a right to know who is protecting them from terrorist
threats and in turn, those protecting the public should expect
to be accountable and have their performance reviewed. To achieve
these aims we propose the transformation of the "Weekly Security
Meeting" into a more formalised, standing body known as the
"National Security Committee", chaired by the Home Secretary
or Prime Minister who would invite outside, non-governmental experts
to attend as the situation arises. The work of this Committee
should also be assisted by prominent appointed National Security
Advisers who could also be fully accountable to Parliament. (Paragraph
15)
Policing Structure
7.
The police must remember that while regional Counter Terrorism
Units (CTUs) may allow for an increase in the skills and expertise
available to disrupt and prevent attacks happening, this expertise
will be rendered useless without adequate information gathered
from within communities. The creation of "supra-regional"
bodies also carries the risk of breaking the vital link with local
communities. Despite creating regional bodies, the police must
take every care to maintain the links with local communities which
will be at the core of any intelligence gathering. (Paragraph
17)
8. We would like to
know exactly when the development of regional counter-terrorism
units was first considered by the Home Office and police service.
We remain unclear as to how much impetus the events of 2005 provided
for this change. We must place on record our concern that the
Government and the police appear to have been lethargic in driving
through necessary reforms to the policing system, and that there
was insufficient political will to provide solutions. The Government
and enforcement institutions must be proactive and identify problems
themselves before a fatal attack acts as a catalyst for reform.
(Paragraph 19)
9. Many forces already
rely on the Metropolitan Police for operational support. The primacy
of the Metropolitan Police Service in counter-terrorism operations
should be enshrined in statute. (Paragraph 24)
10. Successful counter-terrorism
measures will rely on organisations working closely together and
we are therefore pleased to hear that the many different bodies
working on counter-terrorist activity are to a very great extent
integrated. Whilst the creation of a National Terrorism Agency
would remove the problem of coordinating the work of 52 separate
police forces, we see no great operational benefits through the
formation of a single, national agency and the experience of the
USA suggests that such an action is not a panacea. The problems
which a National Terrorism Agency would claim to solve are, to
our eyes, overstated, while the problems that it could cause are
potentially very great. We remain convinced that police skills
and knowledge, rather than policing structures, are the key to
preventing terrorism. (Paragraph 30)
Use of intercept
11. We
dispute the claim that the admission of intercept material would
lead to vastly increased costs for enforcement agencies and fear
that this argument is being put forward to divert attention from
the main issues. We would like to see an estimate of what the
additional costs have been calculated to be. (Paragraph 39)
12. Other states have
adopted the use of intercept evidence without compromising the
work of their security agencies so it is clear that a way can
be found without impacting on security services too adversely.
We suspect that that the apparent unwillingness of security agencies
to approach this matter in a constructive manner is attributable
as much to institutional inertia and a deeply felt cultural reflex
as to insurmountable technical barriers. The clear desire of Prime
Ministers and the Government to allow the admission of intercept
material should not be frustrated by such responses. (Paragraph
41)
13. While we accept
that in many cases the need to maintain national security outweighs
the benefit of admitting intercepted material in court, this will
not be the case in every situation and there are no good reasons
for completely disallowing even the possibility of admitting intercept
evidence in court. We are extremely worried that this prohibition
is not purely driven by a rational analysis of the costs and benefits.
When we last looked at this issue in December 2007 we commented
that:
We consider it ridiculous that our prosecutors are
denied the use of a type of evidence that has been proved helpful
in many other jurisdictions … We can learn from other similar
countries, such as the USA and Australia, how to protect our intelligence
sources …It would not be compulsory to use intercept evidence
if it were felt that the damage from doing so outweighed the benefit
…
We see no reason to revise our earlier conclusions
and strongly recommend that the Government immediately introduce
legislation allowing the admission of intercept evidence in court.
(Paragraph 43)
Control Orders
14. In
2006 we supported the introduction of control orders. We believed
at the time that they could be used to disrupt terrorist conspiracies
and that there would be circumstances in which it would not be
possible to charge individuals but where close monitoring of a
suspect would be necessary. However, control orders no longer
provide an effective response to the continuing threat and it
appears from recent legal cases that the legality of the control
order regime is in serious doubt. It is our considered view that
it is fundamentally wrong to deprive individuals of their liberty
without revealing why. The security services should take recent
court rulings as an opportunity to rely on other forms of monitoring
and surveillance. (Paragraph 49)
Funding
15. That
the United Kingdom faces a grave threat from terrorism cannot
be disputed; we are therefore pleased that budgets for both counter-terrorism
policing and the security services have increased substantially.
(Paragraph 51)
16. By ring-fencing
counter-terrorism budgets, we are concerned that the government
is suggesting that counter-terrorism policing can be "segregated"
from other areas of police work. There is an implicit danger that
by marking out counter-terrorism policing as somehow "different"
from other activities, specialist counter-terrorism units lose
the local link which is rightly prized. (Paragraph 52)
17. We suggest that
the Intelligence and Security Committee or the newly-formed Joint
Committee on the National Security Strategy would be better suited
than a committee of the Association of Police Authorities to take
responsibility for providing Parliamentary oversight of all counter-terrorism
spending and that this Committee should Report to the House on
a regular basis. (Paragraph 53)
18. We were told that
MI5 has reconsidered the shift in its budget from Northern Ireland
terrorism to deal with the threat from Islamic extremists. We
welcome this reappraisal but note it illustrates the risks inherent
on prioritising threats from different sources. (Paragraph 54)
19. We remain firmly
of the belief that the Prevent strand of CONTEST, and engaging
local communities in the fight against terrorism, is of the utmost
importance. We are encouraged by the way members of all communities
have cooperated with the authorities in exposing those individuals
who plan to resort to violent extremist methods. (Paragraph 55)
Parliamentary Scrutiny
20. The
Parliamentary Committee on the National Security Strategy was
first proposed by the Prime Minister in October 2008. It was not
until 13 January 2010 that this Committee was actually established.
While we welcome the establishment of this body and we are glad
to see our Chairman nominated to serve on it, we feel that this
does not inhibit us from further scrutiny of Project CONTEST as
the need arises. We also question why this process has taken over
a year to complete and suggest that it shows a lack of urgency
on the Government's part. (Paragraph 56)
21. Changes in the
threat level should be explained to Parliament at the earliest
practicable opportunity and Ministers should seek to explain their
decision in front of a Parliamentary Committee. As well as announcing
the change in the threat level, as far as possible Ministerial
statements should include how this change will impact on the public.
We therefore welcome the attendance of Lord West in front of
this Committee on Tuesday 26 January to discuss the change in
threat level. (Paragraph 57)
22. During this inquiry
we have often heard suggestions for reforms to the counter-terrorism
structure rebuffed because "it works well at the moment",
or "the benefits are not yet proven". There may well
be salience to these remarks but it also gives us the impression
that a degree of institutional inertia has set in and those involved
in counter-terrorism may be willing to settle for existing sub-optimal
solutions, rather than proactively reforming to meet ever-changing
threats. Time and time again we have been struck by how long it
has taken to establish apparently much-needed measures such as
the regional counter-terrorism units and the Office of Security
and Counter-Terrorism. While the structures that we now have in
place may be suitable for combating the terrorist threat as currently
constituted we are not confident that government institutions
have the desire to constantly adapt to meet ever-changing threats.
(Paragraph 58)
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