Examination of Witnesses (Question Numbers
1-19)
RT HON
ALAN JOHNSON
MP, SIR DAVID
NORMINGTON AND
CONSTABLE ADRIAN
PARSONS
15 DECEMBER 2009
Q1 Chairman: Home Secretary, Sir David
Normington, thank you very much for coming to give evidence to
us. This is almost a wash-up session, Home Secretary; going through
all the various things that we really desperately wanted to ask
you and which we hope to do so.
Alan Johnson: Miscellaneous!
Q2 Chairman: We are, in particular,
interested in four areas that are the subject of four current
inquiries: counter-terrorism; the cocaine trade, immigration and
one or two other issues that have come up during the year. Can
I start with a question on counterterrorism, and that is what
has happened since 9/11 and the move across the Atlantic where
the American Government decided to consolidate their counterterrorism
activities into three departments: the Department of Homeland
Security, the FBI and the CIA. Would you favour such a move in
the United Kingdom—the consolidation of all these various
security services?
Alan Johnson: No, not in the same
way; I think each country has its own way of doing these things.
I saw how the Department for Homeland Security was working and
actually met the CIA and the FBI when I was over there. What we
have done is to consolidate through the formulation of the OSCT
without losing the expertise in the other areas. So I would not
be in favour of full consolidation. Indeed, I think, if I can
quote your own counterterrorism Sub-Committee, they said: "Based
on the evidence we have taken, both in public and in private,
and the briefings we have received, we are satisfied that the
UK's counterterrorism apparatus is first-class, effective and
as joined up as any system of government can expect." I think
it would be dangerous to interfere with that by trying to mirror
what is happening in America.
Q3 Chairman: If only you would do
that to all our reports, Home Secretary.
Alan Johnson: That one was particularly
good.
Sir David Normington: Can I add
one thing, which is that if you go to the US it is certainly not
the case that there are only two agencies and a department involved
in counterterrorism; there are a very large number, and of course
the White House is involved, the National Counterterrorism Centre,
the Department of Justice and, of course, myriad of police forces.
So it may look very simple from over here, but it is not.
Q4 Chairman: One of the things that
we discovered during our inquiry (and we went to visit COBRA—and
we are very grateful to all those who have facilitated our visit)
was the issue of training for Ministers in chairing these various
bodies in the case of an emergency. Do you feel that you have
had sufficient training to deal with those emergencies which could
occur in your life, at practically any time of any day of any
week?
Alan Johnson: I chaired COBR through
the national flu pandemic and then handed it over, as it got much
worse, to my successor. So I have got experience of chairing COBR.
We also run dummy exercises. We did one a couple of weeks ago,
where there was a very realistic exercise and I chaired COBR in
those circumstances. So in that sense we do get that kind of training.
Q5 Patrick Mercer: Home Secretary,
I think I can speak for the Sub-Committee that we were profoundly
impressed with the work of the OSCT. Without wishing to swing
the lamp too much, I was involved in the very painful process
of establishing the counterterrorism and intelligence network
in Northern Ireland that took us a disgracefully long time to
do (that is not a reflection on anyone, probably, other than myself)
but there were all sorts of lessons there; it took us the best
part of 15 years to get it right. Why, therefore, did it take
the OSCT, the CTUs, etc. etc. so long to, first of all, be established
and then to get into their step?
Alan Johnson: I do not know whether
it did take them that long. You have to remember we had a counterterrorism
strategy at the time of 9/11, or shortly after 9/11. The real
galvanising incident was Operation Overt and the liquid bomb attack.
That galvanised my predecessor, John Reid, into looking at this
again and deciding that we should set up OSCT, and the fact that
the Cabinet Office were responsible for this was an anomaly given
that the police were so closely involved and it was properly a
Home Office responsibility. The strategy CONTEST came from that
very quickly. The other thing you have to take into account, as
you will appreciate, is the amount of time it takes to set up
facilities—sometimes new buildings—to recruit people
who have to be vetted very closely and have to have security clearance.
So in that sense I would not say it has taken a long time. I do
not know what David thinks. I know you are seeing Charles Farr
later but I think it is more a case of doing this in three years
rather than doing in seven years.
Q6 Patrick Mercer: Home Secretary,
we are where we are, and there is no doubt that a combination
of luck and skill has saved us from a series of very nasty terrorist
attacks. I give full credit for that. The fact remains that we
had very serious, high-grade terrorists, as early as 2002, in
custody saying that the Tube was going to be attacked, Heathrow
was going to be attacked and centres of Western decadence were
going to be attacked—in 2002. In my then shadow ministerial
capacity I was warning and agitating about exactly that. All three
have happened. If we knew from 2001, and if our enemies were telling
us that this was going to happen, the 2005 bomb attacks—which
were wholly predictable, wholly predictable—why did it therefore
take Operation Overt (full credit, wonderful work by the security
forces)—why? Have we not been incredibly lucky?
Alan Johnson: If you look at what
happened after 7/7, there have been reports (I think this Committee
produced a report—certainly the Intelligence and Security
Committee did) and I think there was recognition that in those
circumstances it would have been very difficult to actually predict
what was going to happen then. We did have all the different elements
in place, and we were increasing to an enormous degree the number
of staff and the amount of resources going into this. The gist
of your question is that if we had done this sooner maybe 7/7
would not have happened. I do not think the evidence suggests
that that is the case. What did happen as a result of Overt and
the liquid bomb plot were changes not just made to counterterrorism
but changes made to the Home Office, very substantially, given
the number of things that came together at the time, which David
might want to comment on. However, I do not think that suggests
that because we formed OSCT then we were somehow deficient either
in strategy or resources.
Q7 Patrick Mercer: I am sorry, was
that "efficient" or "deficient"?
Alan Johnson: Deficient. That
we were deficient.
Q8 Patrick Mercer: Can I just plead,
then, that the history books are there to help; to show the painful
process and the mistakes we made 20, 30 years ago in Northern
Ireland, and there are still more lessons to be learnt from that.
If I can help in any way I would be very happy to.
Alan Johnson: Thank you.
Chairman: He will leave you his
mobile number later!
Patrick Mercer: I think he has
got it.
Q9 Mr Winnick: Home Secretary, is the
country any safer now than at the time of the murderous attack
by the psychopaths of 7/7?
Alan Johnson: Yes, I would like
to think it was, in the sense that you are constantly evolving
and improving operations; you are constantly adding to your store
of knowledge. You are constantly learning from what has happened
in other countries, and you are constantly refining your preparations
for any such attack. I think things have improved. Certainly,
the police involvement and the setting up of the regional counterterrorism
units have been an enormous advance and I think in that sense
we are, I would like to think, always safer than we were the year
before, but without suggesting that there has been some default
in previous years.
Q10 Mr Winnick: You accept, presumably,
that there are those who are, if they have the opportunity, planning
attacks in the same way as what happened in 2005?
Alan Johnson: Yes, absolutely.
We might have gone from "severe" to "substantial"
but it is still a very, very real threat.
Q11 Mr Winnick: The figure of 2,000
possible suspects has been given. That remains the position, does
it?
Alan Johnson: I would not like
to comment on that.
Q12 Mr Winnick: There have been reports,
Home Secretary, that in prisons those who have been convicted
of terrorism are trying actively (perhaps not surprisingly given
their distorted and evil attitude towards Britain) to recruit
people to try and make them sympathetic and, perhaps, active in
terrorism. Are you satisfied that all the necessary steps are
being taken in prison to isolate those who are aiming to recruit
in this fashion?
Alan Johnson: I am satisfied.
I have spent sometime looking at the work that is going on in
prison. The work of Prevent, for instance, one of the strands
of the CONTEST strategy, is very important in seeking to de-radicalise
or prevent radicalisation, and prison is one of those areas. You
can always ensure that you keep these things under close review,
and there are always lessons to be learned continuously, so I
would not be complacent about it, but I do think there is a really
good operation now taking place in our prisons.
Q13 Mr Winnick: Are you kept informed
on a regular basis, or your department, about what is happening/
Alan Johnson: Yes.
Q14 Mr Winnick: Final question, if
I may, Chairman: the amount of money which has been spent, understandably,
has substantially increased for the security services and the
police in combating terrorism in the last few years. Do you take
the view, Home Secretary, that there is sufficient co-ordination
in the way in which this money is being spent in order to protect
our country?
Alan Johnson: Yes, I do think
there is sufficient co-ordination, and that is really what OSCT's
value is.
Q15 Mr Winnick: It leads on from
the previous question.
Alan Johnson: Yes, it is part
of that. That co-ordination is all-important. That is the nub
of your question on America. We are all seeking to co-ordinate
much more closely. I think it is the involvement of the police,
once again, that is crucial as well. Our people who are working
in counterterrorism do a tremendous job; there was not that link
with inter-police forces that we have constructed since 2006.
Q16 Patrick Mercer: Home Secretary,
we are necessarily concentrating, I suspect, on Islamist fundamentalism,
yet we hear that the IRA and their successors are very busy. We
hear that they are planning something before Christmas. Are we
across it?
Alan Johnson: Yes, we are very
much across it. It has been the subject of discussions between
myself and Shaun Woodward. The situation in Northern Ireland is
kept under very close review.
Patrick Mercer: Thank you very much.
Thank you, Chairman.
Q17 Mrs Dean: Home Secretary, the
Home Office has transferred £45 million from the Office of
Security and Counterterrorism to the DCLG affordable housing programme,
"Building Britain's Future". What impact will this have
on your ability to protect the country from terrorist attacks?
Alan Johnson: We would not have
given them the money if we were not convinced that we would still
be as secure. This was something across government and it happens
quite regularly in government; you set a programme of spending
well in advance; you start thinking about the next spending review
two years before it happens, so in a sense you are setting out
three years in the distance, and by the time you get to that year,
you find that there is some money available, perhaps, to dedicate
to another government priority, and that was the case here, but
it has not left us deficient in any way, in terms of security.
Sir David Normington: It is £45
million out of a billion; there is £1 billion, about, being
spent on counterterrorism from the Home Office's budget, and it
was £45 million of that.
Q18 Mrs Dean: Why had this money
been requested as part of your spending review, and how much has
already been spent on the activity that it was earmarked for in
the previous financial year?
Alan Johnson: This was particularly
about communications data. We had some money to proceed with something
on which we then found that, actually, it was better to have a
longer public consultation, so we were not going to spend it in
that year and we were not going to spend it in this spending review
period. So, in that sense, it did not have any effect on our programme.
Mrs Dean: Thank you.
Q19 David Davies: It is probably
me—it must be the early morning—but I did not quite
get the answer to that: how £45 million that has been transferred
from the Office of Security and Counterterrorism into a housing
budget is going to help protect us from terrorism. I know it is
only a small amount of a large amount, but that does not quite
answer the question for me. What is that actually doing to protect
us from terrorism? It is just another case of double-counting,
is it not, so that the next department can say: "We have
had £45 million for housing"?
Alan Johnson: I can take both
answers together. The money was there for a communications data
initiative that, actually, we found we did not need because we
needed longer public consultation. So it will not be spent in
this period. So we had an under-spend in that particular budget
(a very small under-spend, as David says, on a very big budget)
that could go and be contributed to another issue. It happens
in government all the time.
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