2 Problems faced
by carriers
Airlines
13. As already mentioned, the difficulties faced
by carriers in implementing the e-borders programme were first
brought to our attention by the airline industry. TUI Travel's
written evidence to us highlighted a number of technical areas
where developments had gone awry, noting in particular changes
in UKBA's requirements and timetables. Some of the more serious
problems listed were:
- the lessons learned from the
pre-cursor Semaphore project had not been fed through to the contractors
responsible for the e-Borders Programme, Trusted Borders. In particular,
the airline industry had advised against the development of any
IT system that did not comply with industry norms. However, the
computer systems developed by Trusted Borders did not meet industry
standards and practices. This situation was complicated by the
fact that individual carriers had different IT systems. As a result,
the industry had lost trust in the service provider;[8]
- delays in the timetable meant the scheme was
supposed to be going live during the peak holiday period rather
than the quieter winter months. The gradual roll-out of the programme
was supposed to begin in October 2008 and conclude by the end
of 2009, but repeated delays meant 'go live' was finally started
on 13 May 2009though completion was still set for the end
of 2009, thus severely curtailing the plan and making it impossible
to sort out any teething problems in the off season;[9]
- UKBA was continuing to give inconsistent instructions
on when and how data should be transmitted by carriers, whether
per passenger or in batches, with the result that some airlines
had invested in developing systems to meet one requirement only
to have UKBA change its instructions (see example below);[10]
- UKBA had originally said that for chartered flights,
where it was known that the same group of passengers who had left
the UK together would be returning together, the data from the
outbound flight could be used for the inbound one. This was important
for those running charter flights that used small, often seasonal,
airports with only manual check-ins, some of which had no computer
facilities at all. UKBA had subsequently changed its advice, stating
that airlines would have to send the data anew from the overseas
airport, without making it clear how the airlines were supposed
to do so in the absence of any computer connections;[11]
- because roll-out was being approved carrier by
carrier, some airlines were expected to have the trouble and expense
of setting up the e-Borders systems earlier than their competitors
on the same routes;[12]
- carriers had been told that the programme would
produce benefits for them and their passengers: these benefits
had been at best delayed and at worst would not happen at all
(for example, 'expedited clearance' was promised for passengers,
whereas the requirement to carry out passport checks on all passengers
had led to longer queues, with a delay of 25 minutes being considered
acceptable by the Home Office);[13]
and
- a number of EU Member States and the European
Commission were questioning whether it was legal to capture the
data that the programme required.[14]
The airline bmi gave an example of the way requirements
had changed. It noted that the Regulatory Impact Assessment published
with the Immigration, Asylum and Nationality Act 2006 stated that
carriers would be required to provide the API (mandatory data)
in respect of all passengers travelling to and from the UK "at
the time of departure" and the OPI (additional data) only
in respect of passengers travelling to the UK, and also "at
the time of departure".[15]
However, since June 2008 these requirements have been changed
several times. By June 2009, airlines were being told that, instead
of transmitting data once at the time of departure, they would
have to transmit data several times before and after the scheduled
departure time, and the OPI would have to be transmitted for journeys
from, as well as to, the UK.[16]
14. TUI praised the early stages of the programme,
saying that the consultation process had been handled well, with
the airlines fully engaged even to the point of being included
in meetings with prospective suppliers as part of the procurement
process. However, implementation of the programme had become "farcical,
with the industry being unclear of what the required deliverables
are some four weeks after go-live".[17]
15. Other airline operators echoed these complaints.
Virgin Atlantic Airways commented:
"After the success of the Semaphore pilot it
was expected that e-Borders would smoothly follow thus allowing
the Home Office to receive the data they required with immediate
effect and with minimal technical changes required by carriers
as the general infrastructure was already in place."
However, the e-Borders programme had, in effect,
started from scratch with different operational and IT requirements.
The result was that in the summer of 2008 the Home Office had
had to intervene to allow carriers more time to change their systems
to the unique standards required by Trusted Borders.[18]
Virgin Atlantic Airways and other operators also emphasised the
difficulties caused by last minute changes in requirements leading
to wasted work and nugatory expenditure, the squeezing of the
timetable for implementation of the programme, the requirement
to 'go live' in the peak summer period, the inequality of treatment
of different carriers (with some forced to implement the programme
much earlier than others) and the lack of benefits for passengers
or carriers.[19]
16. We asked TUI whether the airline industry
had alerted UKBA to the difficulties they faced, and we were told:
"we have put it to the Government, we have met
ministers and put our concerns to ministers, we have written to
the Home Office, to the e-borders directors. We have made these
points, yet we are still being pressured on a daily basis to deliver
today".[20]
It was therefore rather surprising when Lin Homer,
Chief Executive of UKBA, told us a week later: "I think they
[the major carriers] would say we have been involved with them
and working well with them. I am not going to say they are happy
with us all the time".[21]
In support of this, she cited the successful operation of the
pilot, Project Semaphore, and the fact that UKBA was unaware of
any problems having arisen in relation to the data transmitted
by about 100 carriers in June 2009 in the first phase of the roll-out
of e-Borders.[22] She
was unaware that, for example, Virgin Atlantic still had serious
concerns about the programme, and that these were identical to
the concerns of what she described as "a limited number of
people", some of whom operated routes intended to be tackled
later in the programme.[23]
However, Lin Homer emphasised to us that she and her team were
ready and willing to meet any carriers to discuss their problems
and, in particular, she stated "we are not rolling out over
the peak period".[24]
17. Given that it was by then July and the peak
holiday period was imminent, we decided to wait until the end
of the season to ask the carriers what had actually transpired.
We therefore wrote at the beginning of October to all those who
had given written evidence, asking them to:
Describe any problems that may have occurred because
of the requirement to 'go live' on the project in the peak summer
travel months
Update us on whether UKBA has provided the reassurance
you sought on the compatibility of its requirements with the EU
treaties and legislation, and with legislation and/or constitutional
provisions in other EU Member States
Tell us what UKBA's response has been to your concerns
that the roll-out of the project carrier by carrier and route
by route will undermine the competitiveness of those carriers
chosen to adopt the system first
Update us on whether UKBA has yet given clear instructions
about the requirement to collect in-bound data at airports where
only manual check-in exists
Provide us with any information you may have on any
increased costs caused to operators by the compressed timetable
for roll-out due to the delayed start, and by the changes in the
instructions given by UKBA on the operational details of the programme
Tell us whether UKBA have now provided operators
with sufficient clarity about exactly what information is required,
how it is to be dispatched (per passenger or as a batch) and technical
connectivity standards
We also asked whether the discussions they had held
with UKBA and the selected supplier over the previous three month
had given them more confidence that UKBA and the supplier understood
and were responding positively to their concerns about the programme.
18. BAR UK reported: "recent meetings have
been far more productive than for many months, as a result of
which the tone of them has been eased".[25]
This view was shared by BATA, bmi, TUI Travel and Virgin Atlantic,
who said that, following their evidence session with us, UKBA
had "fully accepted the operational and practical difficulties"
that would have arisen from implementing TDI data collection during
the peak summer travel months and had accordingly agreed not to
enforce the requirement to transmit the data in that period.[26]
However, BAR UK said that some of its members already required
to transmit data had experienced a loss of passengers to competitors
not so required, and it continued to express concerns that further
staged roll-out would again disadvantage the pioneer companies.[27]
19. As far as the airlines' other difficulties
are concerned, it appears there has been progress in dealing with
the problem of airports with only manual check-in facilities,
and there is now an agreed timetable with UKBA, though TUI noted
practical difficulties in providing the data exactly when UKBA
requires.[28] In addition,
UKBA has accepted the airlines' arguments about the desirability
of allowing more flexibility in technical areas such as data transmission
formats and the development of appropriate interfaces.[29]
In general, the changes have not caused extra costs for the airlines,
not least because the final specification will provide an industry
standard method of connectivity and at least some airlines have
not incurred costs from the changes in specification as "we
did not have sufficient information to inform our system supplier
in the first instance".[30]
Moreover, there is now clear information as to what information
is required from airlines, and when and how it should be transmitted.
However, some airlines had already made investments in complying
with previous advice.[31]
20. TUI Travel concluded:
There do remain concerns relating to the continued
roll-out of the e-Borders programme, but we believe that the eventual
recognition by UKBA that it would have been foolhardy to push
roll out during the summer, plus their willingness to provide
the flexible connectivity that airlines had sought has changed
the discussion from being adversarial to that of collaborative
working.[32]
21. We are delighted that the
airlines' lack of confidence in the e-Borders programme appears
to be diminishing as a result of a more positive engagement by
UKBA. Without attributing this change entirely to our intervention,
we note that the airlines had been raising their concerns with
UKBA for at least a year before our inquiry and we cannot but
conclude that the subsequent swift response of UKBA was a result
of political interest in this technical area.
22. We asked UKBA who was in
charge of the programme and for how long they had held this responsibility.
Lin Homer said that she had overseen it for a year when she took
up her post as Chief Executive, and she had then handed over the
position of senior responsible official to her Director of Border
Force, Mr Brodie Clark.[33]
However, these very senior people do not have day-to-day responsibility
for managing the programme, and we understand that turnover amongst
those who work more or less full-time on the project has been
frequent.[34]
We suspect that this instability may have played a significant
part in the breakdown of communications between UKBA and the carriers.
It may also have led to the perception that UKBA had been 'captured'
by its chosen provider and lost sight of what was reasonable and
practicable. We hope that there will be greater continuity among
the senior officials responsible for day-to-day management of
the programme in future.
Maritime sector
23. It was always intended that implementation
of the e-Borders programme would be staged, with the airline industry
first, as it operates in a way more conducive to the collection
of data required by the programme. The maritime sector was scheduled
for a later start, and rail was added as an afterthought. Despite
this, the maritime sector was engaged in discussions at an early
stage of the process. However, the overwhelming sense we received
from our maritime witnesses was that, far from laying strong foundations
on which they would be able quickly to build a practical system,
the talks had made little progress and, indeed, had in some respects
gone backwards. The net result was that they were further from
being able to implement the programme now than they had been in
2006.
24. At present ferry and port operators do not
collect the mandatory passenger information that the e-Borders
programme requires. Ferry companies do not have Passenger Name
Records into which the data required by the e-Borders programme
could be inserted. Their principal concern has been to obtain
booking information on vehicles, in order to reserve space on
the vehicle deck; passenger details are subsidiary.[35]
Tickets are purchased by vehicle, with even the number of passengers
being a secondary consideration, and there are currently no facilities
for registering the required information from individual passports
online before the passengers start their journey. Furthermore,
a significant proportion of ferry business is conducted on a 'turn-up-and-go'
basis, with no pre-booking (for example, all freight on the Dover-Calais
routes travels without pre-bookingwell over 1,000,000 lorries
a year[36]as does
10%-20% of tourist traffic); and, in the case of coaches, it is
the coach company that books the space on the ferry and sells
its tickets to the passengers: passenger names and numbers are
not known until the vehicle arrives at the ferry terminal.[37]
25. The Chamber of Shipping argued that the basis
of the e-Borders programme was "long-haul aviation where
all passengers travel as pedestrians with individual tickets"
in contrast to ferry travel "where most passengers are in
groups in vehicles". It noted that the two trials undertaken
at ferry ports under Project Semaphore were unsuccessful, one
for technical reasons and the other had to be suspended repeatedly
because it caused traffic congestion and delays.[38]
JUXTAPOSED CONTROLS
26. An added complexity in relation to both ferry
traffic and rail traffic between the UK, France and Belgium is
the development of juxtaposed border controls. These controls
are based on bilateral agreements between the countries that enable
specified personnel to carry out immigration and customs checks
on passengers and freight in one another's countries. The result
is, for example, that passengers pass through French passport
control before boarding a ferry to France in Dover.[39]
27. Early discussions with the predecessor organisation
to UKBA (in February 2006) were conducted on the basis that, where
passengers passed through the UK's border control checkpoint before
reaching the ferry operator's check-in, as is the case in Calais,
then UKBA would collect the passport data for the e-Borders programme.
This undertaking was confirmed in a draft position statement by
the e-Borders team in December 2006.[40]
In the summer of 2008, however, UKBA changed its mind and put
the responsibility for collecting the data on the ferry operators,
despite the fact that UKBA swipes passengers' passports anyway
and in Calais UKBA officials will have swiped the passports moments
before the ferry operators are required to swipe them again. The
Chamber of Shipping and Dover Harbour Board believed that "the
principal reason for abandoning the earlier commitment is that
it does not fit into the contract signed between the Home Office
and [its contractor] Trusted Borders".[41]
28. As with the specifications for the airlines,
this is just one of several significant changes made by UKBA to
the requirements imposed on carriers in the last 18 months.[42]
29. We do not understand why
it is thought necessary for the ferry operators to send to UKBA
the same information from every passenger's passport as UKBA's
own officials have done minutes beforehand. If the argument is
that, having passed passport control, a vehicle or individual
might be found not to have a valid ticket and be turned back or
held for a later ferry, then surely in thesepresumably
fairly infrequent casesthe UK border control official could
be informed by the operator that a particular vehicle or passenger
was not going to be carried on that ferry. Ferry operators anyway
have to send a manifest of their passengers on each sailing, for
health and safety reasons. This could be used as the checklist
against which the information from the swiped passports is comparedin
much the same way as for airlines, which are unable to produce
a final list of their passengers until boarding is completed and
the plane is ready to depart.
30. The Chamber of Shipping told us it was concerned
that no systems for the registration of data by passengers booking
in advance have been developed and, even if they were to be established,
"the provision of passport data could not be made compulsory
at time of booking" so there would be no incentive on passengers
to provide that information early.[43]
The net result, the industry fears, would be delays and congestion
in the ferry terminals as the ferry operators had to scan in all
the passport information at check-in. A trial in March 2007 showed
that scanning four passports for a car would add 20 seconds to
the dwell time at check-in. This may not appear long, but it represents
an increase of between 50% and 80%, which would increase congestion
at peak periods significantly.[44]
Moreover, the ports would have to be reconfigured and, in some
cases, extended to build the necessary vehicle-holding facilities
to cope with the extra time that vehicles would have to spend
in port. The ferry operators and Port of Dover doubted that UKBA
had even considered the possible need to rebuild parts of the
port to accommodate e-Borders, regarding it simply as an IT project.[45]
Even if rebuilding were possible, the port operators thought it
likely there would be major traffic jams on approach roads at
times of peak freight and/or coach demand.[46]
31. We visited Dover and Calais at the beginning
of Septemberand therefore after the peak holiday seasonto
view current border operations in these busy ports. We were impressed
by the huge volume of freight traffic and the rapidity and efficiency
with which the ferry and port operators and UKBA officials dealt
with the flowan efficiency made all the more necessary
by the fact that the Port of Dover occupies the small area of
land at the base of a cliff, so its capacity for expansion is
severely constrained. Anything
that significantly slows down transit through the Port of Dover
will result in congestion in the port that will overflow into
the town, and, in severe cases, onto the approach roads such as
the M2.
32. The Chamber of Shipping concludes:
No practicable method of capturing ferry passengers'
passport data has yet been identifiedand, in the absence
of a defined process, no work has been done to develop a system
to support it. Progress is effectively now suspended pending resolution
of the legal questions, which will determine what is or is not
permitted. There is no prospect of e-Borders going live in relation
to ferry traffic, as the UKBA contends it will, by the end of
next year.[47]
33. UKBA's response to these problems is to state,
for example, that:
Vehicle carriers have the option of specifying conditions
of carriage to coach operators (as well as their other customers)
in order to encourage the early provision of data in a manner
and time frame that suits their needs.[48]
UKBA has also put forward a 'vehicle-centric' model
for processing vehicles under e-Borders (using automatic numberplate
recognition to retrieve the pre-notified passport data for the
vehicle passengers),[49]
but UKBA still intends to check and possibly to scan the passport
of everyone at its check-points, so the only part of the process
affected would be a slightly speeded up ferry check-in for such
passengers, which may not be motive enough for pre-notification
of passport data.
34. It is difficult to see how
customers could be motivated to provide information in advance
when, for each passenger, inputting data electronically is more
of a chore than waiting for a passport to be swiped, and there
is no easy way of fast-tracking those who have complied through
the port: for example, the only way of ensuring everyone on a
coachload of passengers had provided their data before arrival
at port would be to check each of them against a list, which is
not much of an incentive. The alternativethat ferry companies
would no longer operate turn-up-and-gois something that
UKBA itself has stated that it does not want to see.[50]
35. There appears to be complete
stalemate between the maritime sector and UKBA. We do not understand
why UKBA cannot accommodate some of the practical suggestions
made by the ferry and port operators, such as transmitting data
from the juxtaposed UK border control in Calais rather than the
ferry check-in desk, or putting a requirement to collect passenger
data onto coach companies rather than the ferry operators (we
are aware that the latter would require amending legislation,
but it would be similar to the transfer of responsibility for
cargo from the ferry companies to hauliers, which has already
occurred). The problem of the configuration of the Port of Dover
also requires co-operation rather than confrontation, and we urge
the involvement of the Department of Transport in practical discussions,
given the potential for serious consequences elsewhere on the
road network. If the only solution in Dover is the rebuilding
of facilities, UKBA must recognise that its present timetable
for implementation of the programme is not feasible.[51]
Railways
36. Many of the difficulties highlighted in relation
to the maritime sector apply also to railways, including the vexed
question of operating with shorter check-in times and more cramped
check-in facilities than the airports, and the challenge of operating
the e-Borders scheme in the context of juxtaposed border controls.
Eurostar estimates that the delays to passengers from the need
to scan passport details would significantly reduce the 40 minute
journey time savings made possible as a result of the Government's
investment in the Channel Tunnel High Speed Link.[52]
37. However, the fact that the Channel Tunnel
and the services through it are simply part of a Europe-wide rail
network poses additional problems, which are likely to multiply
after January 2010 when the whole of the European rail network
opens to competition, so a number of rail companies could soon
be running services through the Channel Tunnel.[53]
38. At present, it is possible to buy tickets
for Eurostar services at a large number of railway stations and
other outlets with no facility for recording passport details,
or even passenger names. It is not even necessary to show a passport
to book a ticket. It would therefore be difficult and very expensive
to try to arrange for travellers to provide detailed passport
information electronically at the same time as booking.[54]
39. Eurostar stops at intermediate stations,
and it is not clear whether, and if so, how, checks can be made
on the passports of passengers embarking and disembarking at the
intermediate stops. It also means that the data of passengers
might have to be transmitted repeatedly.[55]
40. It is not clear whether the national railways
of France and Belgium would be breaking their national laws in
providing the information required by the programme. According
to Eurostar, French law only allows French carriers (such as the
French railway company, SNCF) to collect and transmit data for
services to and from countries outside the EU. Moreover, under
national law, neither SNCF nor its Belgian equivalent, SNCB, has
the power to require passengers to produce passports or identity
cards: only police and customs staff at international stations
have this authority. Finally, both SNCF and SNCB require assurance
from their national data protection authorities that they would
not be acting illegally if they transmitted data to a third party,
such as UKBA.[56] The
German Data Protection Agency has already stated that processing
data in the manner required by e-Borders would be prohibited by
national law.[57]
41. Like the maritime sector, Eurostar has been
suggesting to UKBA that the existence of juxtaposed controls where
passports are scanned could provide a solution to the difficulties
of those who have been unable or unwilling to provide passport
details in advance.[58]
Eurostar UK Ltd (the UK partner in the jointly-owned operation)
also developed a proposal for passengers to provide their TDI
online, in the terminal or via manual check-in counters in the
UK. Eurostar noted that similar systems could be developed in
France and Belgium, if SNCF and SNCB agreed and the legal issues
could be overcome.[59]
42. When we asked in October what progress, if
any, had been made in tackling Eurostar's difficulties, they told
us that there had been a further meeting with UKBA officials on
September, at which the officials made it clear they thought Eurostar
was ready to 'go live' with the programme, and noted that they
were "now" examining the legal issues in France. Eurostar
categorically denied to us that it was ready to go live: neither
the operational nor the legal problems have been solved.[60]
43. It is obvious that the e-borders
programme will have to be adapted to meet the needs of the railway
sector, which is part of a much more integrated transport network,
with many more embarkation points, than airlines and ferriesespecially
in view of the hopes of making it easier to travel seamlessly
from major cities outside London to Continental Europe and from
major European cities direct to the UK. It is also clear that
UKBA has only just started to consider the difficulties posed
by national data protection regulations and national laws to protect
citizens against the spread of state powers beyond a tightly defined
cadre of officials. UKBA cannot impose one-size-fits-all requirements
on such different sectors as planes, ferries and railways. It
would be more productive if, instead of trying to do so, they
adapted their requirements more closely to how each sector actually
operates. In the case of railways, the unique problem is that
of intermediate stops. It is not at all clear to us what is supposed
to happen in relation to e-Borders if, for example, a passenger
boards a train at Brussels but decides to disembark in France
instead of travelling through the Channel Tunnelor, indeed,
to stay on the train instead of disembarking in France.
E-Borders and the EU
44. All our witnesses expressed concerns about
whether the e-Borders programme was compatible with EU law, and
in particular the principle of free movement of people. The EU
Directive cited by UKBA as a basis for its project relates to
the transport of passengers by air over the EU's external borders.
Moreover, the carriers were concerned that other EU countries
to which their services travelled were increasingly questioning
the legality of requiring their citizens to provide data, rather
than simply producing a form of identification (passport or ID
card) before they were allowed to travel to the UK.[61]
45. Repeated requests to UKBA over several years
for reassurance that the European Commission considered the programme
legal in so far as it interfered with freedom of movement met
with the responses that "e-Borders is entirely compatible
with all relevant national law" and "The UK has retained
the ability under EU law to control its frontiers, including the
ability to verify the right of EEA nationals to enter the UK".[62]
However, as we have seen, UKBA still does not know whether its
requirements are compatible with French national lawand
maybe other countries' lawsand the right to verify is accomplished
by checking passports or ID cards at borders, and does not necessarily
imply the requirement to provide data in advance as a condition
of travel.
46. Given the repeated assurances that the European
Commission knew all about the programme and was content that it
was legal, we asked Lin Homer in July to provide the carriers
with sight of a letter from the Commission confirming this.[63]
We are still waiting.
47. This issue is central to the programme. We
therefore sought independent legal advice about EU law in this
area. We were informed that, because the e-Borders programme can
have the effect of stopping an EU citizen from entering or leaving
an EU Member State, this does amount to an obstacle to the free
movement of people in EU terms. The question then was whether
the obstacle was justified. We were told that the question had
to be considered in the context of free movement of persons being
a fundamental freedom of the EU, derived directly from the EC
Treaty and not solely from EU legislation, and a defining trait
of the internal market. This right is most recently implemented
by Directive 2004/38/EC, the Citizens' Rights Directive. Previous
judgments of the European Court of Justice have established that
the Court regards this right as very broad in scope[64]
and the Directive itself states that restrictions to such free
movement on the grounds of public policy, public security or public
health "should be based exclusively on the personal conduct
of the individual concerned". This, as summed up in one judgment,
means that the restrictions:
must be regarded not as a condition precedent
to the acquisition of the right of entry and residence but
as providing the possibility, in individual cases where there
is sufficient justification, of imposing restrictions on the exercise
of a right derived directly from the Treaty. It does not therefore
justify administrative measures requiring in a general way formalities
at the frontier other than simple the production of a valid identity
card or passport.[65]
[our emphasis]
48. We conclude that it is only
in exceptional cases, based exclusively on the conduct of the
individual concerned rather than as part of a blanket requirement,
that an EU Member State can impose any requirement other than
simple production of a valid identity document to restrict the
entry into or exit from that Member State of an EU citizen.[66]
The e-Borders programme is therefore, as far as we can ascertain,
likely to be illegal under the EU Treaty.
49. Despite constant reassurances
to the contrary, we have seen no proof that UKBA's predecessors
held serious discussions with the European Commission about the
e-Borders programme. More recent and frequent efforts by a variety
of carriers to clarify these legal issues with UKBA have met with
no success. We suspect that UKBA has only recently started to
take these issues seriously, possibly as a result of setbacks
such as the forced postponement of the programme in relation to
air routes to Germany because of national legislation. This is
not good enough. UKBA is imposing expensive requirements on the
private sector in the name of urgent public good apparently without
having confirmed that the requirements are lawful. UKBA must urgently
seek an authoritative opinion from the European Commission on
this issue, and must make it a priority to discuss all data protection
problems with the relevant national bodies.
50. UKBA must report the results
of these discussions to us by, at the latest, the end of February.
In the meantime, any proposals to extend 'go live' to further
intra-EU routes must be put on hold.
8 Ev 20, para 2 Back
9
Ibid., para 1 Back
10
Ev 21, para 4 and Q 83 (TUI Travel) Back
11
Ev 20, para 5 For a more detailed explanation of the difficulties,
see Ev 43 (TUI Travel) and Qq 91-92 Back
12
Ev 21, para 7 Back
13
Ibid., para 8 Back
14
Ev 20, para 3 Back
15
Para 29 of the Regulatory Impact Assessment Back
16
Ev 39 Back
17
Ev 20 Back
18
Ev 23 Back
19
Ev 23 (Virgin Atlantic), Ev 27-28 (Flybe), Ev 28-29 (BAR UK),
Ev 38-41 (bmi), Ev 41-42 (BATA) Back
20
Q 75 Back
21
Q 106 Back
22
Ev 43 Back
23
Work of UKBA evidence, Qq 108 and 105 Back
24
Work of UKBA evidence, Q 102 Back
25
Ev 49 Back
26
Respectively Ev 50, Ev 51, Ev 57, Ev 2 - the last being attached
to this Report Back
27
Ev 50 Back
28
Ev 57 Back
29
Ev 50, Ev 51-52 and Ev 56 Back
30
Ev 56 (Flybe) Back
31
Ev 52 (bmi) Back
32
Ev 59 Back
33
Work of UKBA evidence, Q 97 Back
34
Ev 28, para 3 and Ev 52 Back
35
Q 5 Back
36
The Port of Dover overall handles 2.3 million lorries a year,
the majority of which take the Dover-Calais route. Back
37
Qq 14, 30 and 45, Ev 16-18 and Ev 32-33 Back
38
Ev 46-47 Back
39
A car booked onto a ferry from Dover to Calais passes, in this
order: French frontier police, Kent police plus UKBA officials
(who intercept only some vehicles, on the basis of intelligence),
the international security checkpoint administered by the Department
of Transport, and finally check-in with the ferry operator. Back
40
Ev 31-32 Back
41
Ev 32 and Q 50 Back
42
Ev 32-36 Back
43
Ev 16, para 7(c) Back
44
Ev 17, para 7(d), Ev 49 and Q 46 Back
45
Ev 53 Back
46
Ev 18, paragraphs 4 and 6 Back
47
Ev 17, para 10 Back
48
Ev 33 Back
49
Described fully in Ev 36 Back
50
Work of UKBA Evidence, Q 120 Back
51
Qq 54-57 and 65-66 Back
52
Q 104 Back
53
Ibid. Back
54
Q 108 Back
55
Ev 24-25 Back
56
Ibid. and Ev 42, Qq 104 and 110 Ferry companies have a
similar problem in respect of their operations in France: see
Q 32 Back
57
Ev 44 Back
58
See, for example, Ev 56 and Qq 104 and 122 Back
59
Ev 27 Back
60
Ev 56 Back
61
See in particular Ev 36-38; also Qq 32, 36 and 104, Ev 17, para
9, Ev 20, para 3, Ev 25-26, Ev 53 and Ev 55 Back
62
Ev 17, para 8, and Ev 37-38 Back
63
Q 114 Back
64
Case C 33/07 Jipa; See also Joined Cases C 482/01 and C
493/01 Orfanopoulos and Oliveri Back
65
Case C 157/79 Regina v Stanislas Pieck Back
66
Case 67/74 Bonsignore v Köln taken together with Case
C 48/75 Royer Back
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