Government response
I wrote to you on 24 October with an interim response
to the Home Affairs Committee Report Policing of the G20 Protests
which was published on 29 June 2009. I now write to provide you
with a detailed response to the recommendations contained within
your Report. This response builds on the HMIC Report Adapting
to Protest, Nurturing the British Model of Policing published
on 24 November, and the Government's position on the policing
of protest set out in the Policing White Paper, Protecting
the Public: Supporting the Police to Succeed published on
2 November.
The Government welcomes the Home Affairs Committee
Report, together with the other Reviews into policing and protest
published this year. The Government agrees with the Home Affairs
Committee in its assessment of G20 as a "remarkably successful
operation". The Government also agrees that there are some
key lessons to be learnt from G20, and from other recent policing
operations, and is committed to working with the police and other
stakeholders to ensure those lessons are learnt.
As we set out in the Policing White Paper, the public
have the right to expect the highest standards of policing at
big public events and we have to support every officer in delivering
those high standards, recognising the impact that a single image
or incident can have on the public confidence. Forthcoming events,
notably the Olympics, make this all the more pressing.
I will not rehearse here what is in the White Paper
in any great detail except to say that we agree with the HMIC
Report that the policing of protest needs to be built on the British
model of policing, and that the key principles of the British
model need to be reflected in the updated guidance and training
that the Association of Chief Police Offices (ACPO) and the National
Policing Improvement Agency (NPIA) are already working on, which
in turn need to be underpinned by a Code of Practice that both
sets the strategic framework and supports common standards across
forces.
This programme of work will directly address a number
of the Home Affairs Committee's recommendations. The detailed
response that follows accordingly majors on this programme, which
we have given an undertaking to deliver by next summer. Our response,
which is set out in the following pages, also recognises the progress
the police have already made in learning the lessons from G20
which in itself illustrates the police's proactive commitment
to constantly improve its service to the public in all spheres
of policing.
The Committee made 32 conclusions and recommendations.
Some of these have been grouped together for this response.
Relations with the Media
1. We accept that it is not possible for all
officers on front-line duty, some of whom may be inexperienced
in this line of work, to know, understand and fully implement
the ACPO guidelines, particularly in a high tension environment
like the G20 Protests. However, we cannot understand why those
officers who were unable to communicate with journalists were
not willing or able to pass this problem on to a more experienced
officer. We suggest that at the heart of most communication difficulties
experienced by journalists is a lack of leadership on the ground
and an inadequate briefing before the protests. (Paragraph 10)
2. At the very least all officers should be
aware of the existence of a designated media contact point, who
is trained in basic communication with journalists and able to
give correct information on request. It seems to us that some
members of the media experienced a broken chain of command and
ignorance on the part of the police which impaired their ability
to do their jobs. (Paragraph 11)
3. We accept the difficulties implicit in
briefing freelance journalists, some of whom may not wish to be
contacted by the police prior to an event, and to some extent
we sympathise with the Metropolitan Police who appear to be keen
to improve relations in this area. However, more must be done.
While accepting that it is not possible to brief every journalist
who wishes to attend large public protests, and that at the G20
Protests budgetary and time constraints prevented every officer
from being adequately briefed beforehand on "handling the
media", we propose two relatively simple solutions which
could be implemented at little cost. (Paragraph 13)
4. Since it is to everyone's benefit that
the relationship between the police and journalists is clear and
codified, we suggest that the briefings given to members of the
media before public protests be published on the website of the
police and the National Union of Journalists prior to the event.
While there may be operational reasons why a complete brief cannot
be published, we are surprised that a version of this information
is not made public already. In this way anyone who is planning
to attend a public protest in a media capacity will have the ability
to receive a briefing in this area and at the very least be assured
that a media contact point will be available on the day. We urge
the police to consider this action. (Paragraph 14)
5. Equally, we cannot understand why experienced
officers on the ground were not granted a degree of discretion
in how the police strategies were enacted. While we accept that
communications between the control centre and the front-line can
always be improved, we are yet to be convinced of the absolute
necessity of why a relatively simple message like "please
let them out if they are bona fide press" needed to be sent
from the Gold Commander, who presumably had many other more pressing
matters to concern him. (Paragraph 15)
6. We recommend that in its promised review
of police tactics on public order situations HMIC looks at the
command structure at big events and considers the benefits of
allowing experienced officers on the ground the power to make
relatively simple, non-controversial decisions such as these.
As far as possible, power should be devolved to officers on the
ground authorised to react to changing situations. (Paragraph
16)
Both the Government and police agree that good, open
and transparent communication between the police and the media
is important in all areas of policing and a key element in upholding
our democratic traditions. As the Home Affairs Committee (HAC)
Report acknowledges, these principles are already set out in ACPO
Guidance and will be reinforced and refined in the updated Keeping
the Peace Manual in line with the findings from HMIC's Adapting
to Protest Report.
The Government agrees with the HAC and HMIC that
public order command training should be enhanced to provide explicit
guidance to officers on communication strategies before during
and after public order policing events. This is the key to the
proper exercise of discretion highlighted in the HAC Report.
Encouragingly, through operational briefings and
dissemination of good practice, improved communication strategies
with the media have already been put in place at public events
since G20, such as the policing of Climate Camp At Blackheath
in the summer. Adapting to Protest recognises, "the
positive steps already taken by the MPS, such as the integrated
communication strategy developed for Climate Camp in August 2009".[1]
The Gold Strategy at Blackheath included developing
a strategy to facilitate effective communication with the media
and providing an information network for use by persons involved
with or potentially affected by climate camp actions. Adapting
to Protest again recognised that, "this tactical plan
is a useful template for policing operations of this kind and
HMIC welcomes ACPO's dissemination of a document outlining the
learning outcomes of their policing operation".[2]
7. The police must be aware that, as a matter
of course, their actions will be filmed whether or not journalists
are present. They must amend their attitude and tactics accordingly.
The police should be aware that in the modern world actions which
may be justifiable under the rules may nonetheless be completely
unacceptable. (Paragraph 19)
The Government is very clear that the attitudes and
tactics employed by the police should in all circumstances be
appropriate and proportionate irrespective of whether their actions
will be filmed or whether journalists are present. As we have
set out in the Policing White Paper, Protecting the Public:
Supporting the Police to Succeed, the public have a right
to expect the very highest standards of service from all police
officers with whom they come into contact and this applies as
much to policing big public events as to neighbourhood policing.
8. We echo Sir Paul Stephenson's comments:
in many ways the problem for the police in these situations is
not their actual actions, but the perception that they are seeking
to avoid accountability for these actions. We are therefore surprised
that the problems of identification posed when officers change
into protective equipment have not been addressed before and recommend
more funding specifically for solutions in this area. (Paragraph
22)
9. Senior officers must take personal responsibility
for ensuring that all officers are displaying their identification
numbers and the individual officer must be provided with enough
numbers so that these can be worn at all times and on all equipment.
It would be helpful if the Home Office and Metropolitan Police
would let us know the length of time it takes between the ordering
of a new identification badge and this badge being delivered to
the individual officer. It is unacceptable for officers not to
wear identification numbers at such events; this must be a matter
of the highest priority. We urge that any officers found to be
deliberately removing their identification face the strongest
possible disciplinary measures and the police must make every
effort to be identifiable at all times. (Paragraph 23)
The Government strongly endorses the conclusions
of all the reviews into policing of protest that uniformed police
officers should be identifiable at all times by their shoulder
identification numbers. The public has a right to be able to identify
any uniformed officer who is performing their duty. As the Home
Affairs Committee Report recognises this is wholly endorsed by
the MPS and by ACPO.
Display of numerals is one of the areas that the
Policing White Paper flags as requiring particular attention in
revised training and guidance. ACPO has already issued interim
guidance reinforcing the importance of the identification of officers,
and the MPS has included specific reference in all briefing for
the need for officers to display numerals.
Most officers have metal numerals, which are issued
without delay—but may come unattached following heavy contact.
Specialist public order officers have embroidered numerals, which
take between four and six weeks to order. However, metal numerals
are used during the interim period. MPS officers are issued with
two pairs of both.
Communications between the Protesters
and Police
10. We cannot understand why, knowing the
pressures that inexperienced officers would face the police would
use language which would only serve to create a "them and
us" attitude and antagonise the most violent elements within
the protesters. We feel that such statements essentially become
a self-fulfilling prophecy and they should be avoided in future.
(Paragraph 26)
The Government does not accept that the police used
inflammatory and antagonistic language in its briefings and would
draw the Committee's attention to the Joint Committee on Human
Rights' Follow-up report Demonstrating Respect for Rights
which concluded that, "the main responsibility for talking
up the prospect of violence and severe disruption rests with the
media, not the police".[3]
11. Policing public protest is an activity
under much greater scrutiny than twenty to thirty years ago, Sir
Paul Stephenson told us that "as technology changes, there
are different ways and many more opportunities for people to be
caught behaving badly if they choose to behave badly." This
undoubtedly increases the pressure under which front-line police
officers have to work; because of this they have our sympathy.
However, this does not excuse behaviour which appears to contravene
the norms of democratic protest. The police must be aware that
their behaviour will be monitored, recorded and instantly made
public via the internet. They must modify their behaviour and
briefings accordingly. (Paragraph 29)
The Government agrees that there is no excuse for
behaviour which appears to contravene the norms of democratic
protest. We acknowledge that the technologies widely available
for disseminating information in this age of digital communication
exposes the police to increasing levels of scrutiny. As previously
stated however, the behaviour of the police during public events
should in all situations be proportionate and appropriate, reflecting
the principles of community policing and policing by consent irrespective
of the level and immediacy of public scrutiny to which they are
subjected.
12. We recommend that the police wherever
possible refrain from any activity which can suggest violent intent.
Instead, they must firmly prioritise communications and policing
by consent, negating the need for violent action wherever possible.
(Paragraph 30)
The Policing White Paper is clear that the principles
of policing by consent and community policing should lie at the
heart of the policing of protest. It also stresses that a framework
of human rights needs to underpin the policing of protest and
that communication is key. Activity that suggests violent intent
is anathema to that vision.
Adapting to Protest flagged
HMIC's concerns over the lack of reference in public order training
to communication and negotiation as primary tactical options before
any consideration of any use of force.[4]
This is an area that is being addressed in the revised training
curriculum being developed by NPIA and the command courses which
are being piloted this year.
As the White Paper makes clear, none of this is to
suggest that there is no place for use of force in policing
protest if, for example, there is a threat of serious public disorder,
serious damage to property or serious disruption to the life of
the community. The Criminal Law Act 1967 is very clear that any
use of force must be 'reasonable' in all the circumstances and
police officers are not exempt from the normal requirement of
the law that any force used must be proportionate.
13. We also recommend that more funding be
made available specifically for training in the softer issues
of communication and speaking to crowds. At the very least each
unit involved in the policing of large protests should contain
one officer trained and able to communicate with crowds of protesters.
This would enable communications with protesters to take place
on a consistent, codified basis, and increase the opportunities
for large groups of protesters to be policed by consent. (Paragraph
31)
The Government supports the conclusions of the HMIC
Adapting to Protest Report that the police do not need
more training but rather the training provided needs to be smarter—more
directed, more focused and more relevant to the current public
order challenges facing the police.[5]
Time spent on suppressing mass urban disorder could be reduced
and time spent on planning and keeping the peach enhanced.
Again NPIA and ACPO are already updating training
and guidance which gives consideration to the findings of the
HMIC Adapting to Protest Report.
14. It seems paradoxical to us that both sides
stress the importance of communications, and complain when these
are not forthcoming yet are unwilling to put people in place to
make this process easier. Elsewhere in this Report we have recommended
that the police designate 'contact points', we also recommend
that protest groups put ideological concerns to one side and instead
do everything they can to aid communications both before and during
the protests. (Paragraph 34)
The Government agrees that communication between
the police and protesters is of the highest importance. This is
clearly articulated in the Policing White Paper.
The police have already begun to put into practice
ideas such as nominating designated contact points for communicating
with protesters as seen at a number of the English Defence League
demonstrations in the summer. Equally the MPS used Bluetooth messaging
as a means to communicate with protesters during the Tamil Protests
explaining the policing approach and stating that the police did
not intent to disperse protesters and that permission to protest
would continue.
However, we must not lose sight of the fact that,
in the interest of fostering good relationships, communication
with protesters must be a priority for all police officers,
not just designated individuals.
15. We question why these new, up-to-date
tactics used by the Police Service of Northern Ireland have not
been shared and adopted nationally and urge all forces to adopt
newer, more efficient methods for communicating to large crowds
as quickly as possible. (Paragraph 37)
The Government can confirm that the Police Service
of Northern Ireland (PSNI) has shared its tactics with ACPO through
the NPIA. PSNI sit on the ACPO Public Order an Public Safety Working
Group, and chair Sub-Groups of that Working Group.
Use of Containment
16. The use of containment involves a shift
in power and control from the protesters to the police and should
be used sparingly and in clearly defined circumstances. These
circumstances should be codified. The use of containment tactics
should also be closely linked to police intelligence. The police
must have reasonable grounds to believe that the protesters being
contained are liable to cause disturbances elsewhere and innocent
bystanders and non-violent protesters (where they can be identified)
must be allowed to filter out; containment should continue only
for as long as absolutely necessary and the comfort of those contained
must be given as much consideration as possible. As we discuss
later on, this was not the case in the particular example of the
G20 Protests. (Paragraph 41)
17. There is no excuse for the police preventing
peaceful protesters or other people innocently caught up in a
protest from leaving a "contained" area when the police
can be sure that they do not pose a violent threat to society.
This is doubly true when people are asking to leave for medical
(or related) purposes. We are particularly concerned at the evidence
we have received suggesting that an explicit order was given to
maintain the "cohesion" of the police lines at the expense
of peaceful protesters' right to egress and to access medicine.
While it may be true that some protesters would falsely claim
a medical need to leave a contained area for the purposes of causing
disorder, we believe that this is a risk that the police must
be prepared to run; the dangers of denying protesters their needed
medications are too great. (Paragraph 45)
18. The police must reorganise their priorities
with regards to the circumstances under which protesters are allowed
to leave a "contained" area. It is not acceptable for
a blanket ban on movement to be imposed. Again we recommend a
devolution of power in this area. During any containment procedure
experienced officers must be authorised to use discretion and
allow access and egress in cases where a medical need is involved,
trusting their own judgement and experience when necessary. Crucially,
as with the media contact points, their existence and availability
in this role must be commonplace; it must be made clear to front-line
officers in briefings before and during the day. (Paragraph 46)
The Government and police are very clear that containment,
in keeping with the House of Lords decision in Austin,
must be proportionate, used in good faith and enforced for no
longer than is reasonably necessary. Further, all efforts must
be made to provide adequate services to those contained.
The Government supports HMIC's recommendations on
containment as set out in Adapting to Protest Part 1—no
surprises, clear release plan, easy access to information, clean
signposting and awareness and recognition of the UK press card.
We also support Part 2 findings which consider that the
key to achieving proportionate and appropriate use of containment
is good intelligence and information about protest crowds and
crowd dynamics, together with the ability to communicate to them—both
before and during containment—the reasons for the tactic
and how it will be managed. Police use of both technology and
face to face communication will be important in this area.
ACPO has already issued interim guidance on use and
management of containment, and the MPS has established the role
of Bronze Cordon to ensure the correct deployment and management
of containment should the tactic become necessary.
19. We fully endorse Sir Hugh Orde's comment
that "talking works". (Paragraph 52)
20. We are firmly of the view that the problems
that were reported by those "contained" at Bishopsgate
could have been easily prevented through greater communication
throughout the day. We recommend that in future the police exhaust
all possible avenues of communication before using force and be
as open as possible about their intentions at all times. We also
recommend that the police follow their own guidelines and allow
peaceful protesters to filter out of the cordon and go home. This
would minimise and focus force used in a subsequent dispersal.
(Paragraph 52)
The Policing White Paper is clear that the policing
of protest needs to be founded on good communication between police
and protestors drawing on community style policing. The White
Paper is also clear that updated guidance and training will cover
how police and protestors can improve communication with one another
building on the police use of new media over the summer.
In Adapting to Protest, HMIC flagged its concerns
over a lack of reference in public order training to communication
and negotiation as primary tactical options before any consideration
of any use of force. HMIC also flagged its concerns over a lack
of reference in public order command training to the importance
of communication and negotiation with relevant groups at the planning
stage and limited consideration of the impact of police
behaviour and tactics on crowd dynamics.
The Government can confirm the police are committed
to developing better communication with protestors. This is being
addressed through the Bronze courses already piloted and silver
and gold command courses in development.
21. Equally, we recommend that groups of protesters
make every effort to prevent the police viewing them as a threat
to public order. We are of the opinion that in the case of the
'Climate Camp' the degree of reticence on the part of the protesters
adversely affected the police's perceptions of the protest and
made the use of force, unfortunate though it was, more likely.
Groups with peaceful intentions should make every effort to alert
the police to their intentions, removing any suspicions the police
may (rightly) have and aiding the planning process to mutual benefit.
(Paragraph 53)
22. Protesters should remember that "talking
works" is a maxim which is true for both sides. (Paragraph
53)
As set out in the Policing White Paper, Government
is clear that communication needs to be two way: "police
and all public authorities must start from a position of supporting
those who want to exercise their rights to peaceful protest. Those
seeking to exercise their right to protest should act constructively
with the police".[6]
The Use of Force
23. We do not pass comment on the cases of
Nicola Fisher and Ian Tomlinson. However, it remains true that
the images of "distraction" tactics in action have the
potential to undermine the public's trust in the police. We hope
that these pictures and films are the start of a widespread public
debate on the use of force by the police and lead to further discussions
on the tactics available to the police in similar situations.
We recommend that the police publicly clarify how and when they
should legitimately be used. (Paragraph 58)
The Government agrees with the HMIC Adapting to
Protest Part 2 Report that fundamental principles on the use
of force must run as a golden thread through all aspects of police
business. It is critical that all police officers are absolutely
clear about the circumstances in which they can use force and
the legal thresholds that must be met before they use any level
of force. In particular, public order training should not assume
that officers have already acquired knowledge on the use of force
and there needs to be a clear connection between public order
training and officer safety training.
Officers need to be well versed in the minimum use
of force. The Government will use the Code of Practice to articulate
these principles and promote clarity and understanding around
minimum use of force.
ACPO, through the Self Defence and Restraint Committee,
are ensuring that personal safety tactics—e.g. distraction
techniques—are fit for purpose in public disorder scenarios.
The Committee also has a programme of work in place to ensure
that these techniques are assessed by independent medical experts.
24. Never again must untrained officers be
placed in the front-line of public protests. At the very least
each unit should contain a core of fully trained, experienced
officers. While greater funding must be made available, the police
must also allocate their resources better to ensure that all officers
on the front-line of public protest are trained adequately. (Paragraph
60)
The Government is clear that no untrained officers
are placed on the front line in public order situations. The point
the MPS were seeking to make in evidence was that some of the
officers had no 'live' experience of policing public order because
there had not been any major public order challenges for a number
of years.
Again, the Government agrees with HMIC Adapting
to Protest Report that the police do not need more training
but rather the training provided needs to be smarter—more
directed, more focused and more relevant to the current public
order challenges facing the police.
ACPO is committed to revising public order command
training and designing a new National Police Public Order Training
Curriculum. The Bronze command course was piloted in October 2009
and the Silver command course is due to be piloted this month.
The NPIA has arranged a 'train the trainers' course for January
2010 which will include training on human rights and public order
legislation.
25. We are concerned over the police's apparent
reliance on Section 14 of the Public Order Act. Given the importance
with which it is viewed by the police, we find it odd that officers
are not given training on the suitable legal application of this
power. We recommend that all public protest training, especially
that of a more advanced level, incorporates the correct application
of Section 14. Equally, if communications and relations between
the police and protesters are good and both sides put emphasis
on prior communication, as we have already recommended, then it
may be possible to negotiate a mutually acceptable 'finish time',
removing the need for police-driven dispersal. (Paragraph 63)
The Government supports the conclusions of the HMIC
Adapting to Protest Report that, "it is hard to overestimate
the importance of officers' understanding of the law when each
individual officer is legally accountable for the exercise of
his or hers powers especially the use of force".[7]
The Government supports the revision of ACPO training to provide
officers with a clear understanding of the use of police powers
that can apply in a public order situation, including explicit
training on the facilitation of peaceful protest as the starting
point, and human rights obligations on the police. The Government
stands ready to provide input on legislation and powers into training
and guidance.
26. That it takes over a year to investigate
a high-profile case such as the use of force against Nicola Fisher
is distressing. We would like to hear from IPCC as why the inquiry
will take this long and what efforts they are making to speed
the resolution. We are also concerned about such a large proportion
of the Independent Police Complaints Commission's investigators
being allocated to the events of the G20. Greater funding must
be made available to provide the resources the IPCC needs to complete
their investigations in a more timely manner. (Paragraph 65)
The independent investigation into the complaint
from Nicola Fisher alleging that she had been assaulted by an
MPS TSG officer on 2 April 2009 has concluded. The referral was
received by the IPCC on 15 April 2009 and an independent investigation
was declared the same day. The IPCC investigation was completed
and the final report signed off by the Commissioner at the end
of July and a file was sent to the CPS on 30 July 2009.
The Use of Tasers
27. Tasers do have a role in policing. As
an "alternative to lethal force" they are undoubtedly
preferable to firearms and in certain situations, ASP batons,
in dealing with a violent threat to an officer, members of the
public or the subject themselves: (Paragraph 70)
28. The decision to extend the deployment
of Conducted Energy Devices to some non-firearms officers, and
the training they receive, should be kept under review. The use
of this weapon on a general scale poses many issues regarding
public safety and more widespread use of Tasers would also represent
a fundamental shift between the police and the general public.
British policing is based on consent and face-to-face engagement,
the use of Taser has the potential to erode that relationship
and create a rift between the police and the policed. Furthermore,
we would not endorse any move to authorise its wider use beyond
dealing with a violent threat. (Paragraph 71)
29. We recommend that the police continue
their self-imposed ban on the use of Taser in public protest situations.
More generally we urge the police to reject the use of "distance
weapons" in policing demonstrations. Instead of investment
in expensive equipment to give the police "distance"
while policing large scale protests, we suggest that the money
could be better spent on training for front-line officers and
in the planning of operations, removing the need for such "distance
weapons". (Paragraph 75)
The Government is very clear that Taser has a key
role to play in supporting officer and public safety. ACPO guidance
makes it very clear that Tasers are only to be used when there
is a threat of violence to officers, the public or the subject
themselves. Every use of a Taser is recorded, monitored and published.
Independent medical advisers review its safety and the police
review its operational effectiveness.
Both the police and the government are clear that
Tasers will not be used in public protest situations. The Government
also agrees—as is made clear in the White Paper—that
the use of 'distance' weapons like tear gas and water cannon are
not the solution to concerns that have been raised about the policing
of protest.
Conclusion
30. Despite a lack of time for planning, the
policing of the G20 Protests was in many ways a successful operation.
Front-line officers who were untrained and inexperienced in this
area were placed in a highly combustible atmosphere and performed
an admirable job. The vast majority of those wishing to protest
were facilitated in a peaceful manner with a minimum of fuss and
drama. On the whole, the police should be congratulated for their
work. However, this success should not distract from the failings
in the operation which were also on show and we feel that an element
of luck must be attributed to the success of the operation. It
is troubling that the policing operation relied so heavily on
untrained, inexperienced officers. Future events may not be so
calm and some officers will be found wanting through no fault
of their own. (Paragraph 76)
31. This is a risk the police must not run.
We cannot condone the use of untrained, inexperienced officers
on the front-line of a public protest under any circumstances
and this must be avoided at all costs. Equally while "containment"
may have been the optimum tactic available in this operation,
we urge the police to address the specific details of its application
which we have discussed above and make public the situations in
which they consider its use appropriate and the internal checks
they have on its strategic use and practical deployment. We note
the reviews on this matter and urge the police to take decisive
action to prevent a re-occurrence of the problems we have identified.
It is clear that the concerns about the policing of the G20 Protests
have damaged the public's confidence in the police. There must
not be a repetition of this. (Paragraph 77)
32. Above all, the police must constantly
remember that those who protest on Britain's streets are not criminals
but citizens motivated by moral principles, exercising their democratic
rights. The police's doctrine must remain focused on allowing
this protest to happen peacefully. Any action which may be viewed
by the general public as the police criminalising protest on the
streets must be avoided at all costs. (Paragraph 78)
The Policing White Paper acknowledges the professionalism
of the vast majority of police officers in policing protest, and
also endorses the guiding principles and style of policing championed
in HMIC's Report Adapting to Protest: Strengthening the British
Model of Policing. The Report is a significant contribution
to the future direction of the policing of protests, and the White
Paper sets out our commitment to work with the service to take
forward the Report's recommendations.
In particular, we are clear that the starting point
for the police must be the facilitation of peaceful protest and
this must be supported by good communication between all parties
involved. The Government is committed to supporting the police
providing revised guidance and training for public order policing
and this will be underpinned by a Code of Practice. Further, the
White Paper sets out the principles that must underpin the policing
of protest and provides clarity of expectations for both the police
and protesters.
But this is not just a future programme of work.
The police are already learning the lessons. As HMIC has noted,
the MPS policing operation surrounding the Climate Camp at Blackheath
in August 2009 demonstrated a tangible success in integrating
the findings and recommendations of Adapting to Protest Part
1. It is also noted that the committed attempts by the police
to facilitate contentious protests and counter-protests in Derbyshire,
Birmingham, Manchester, Gwent and Leeds over recent months indicate
the vitality of the British policing model.[8]
The commitment of the police to learn lessons was
further illustrated by an International Public Order Policing
Conference hosted by the MPS on 3 December with senior representation
from most forces in the UK. That Conference highlighted the police
service's willingness to be challenged and to question the way
the police operate. The Government is committed to supporting
the police, and to clarifying its own role around public order
in the forthcoming Code of Practice.
1 Adapting to Protest: Nurturing the British Model
of Policing, p 7 Back
2
Ibid., p 63 Back
3
Joint Committee on Human Rights, Demonstrating Respect for Rights?
Follow-up, Twenty-second Report of Session 2008-09, p 16 Back
4
Adapting to Protest: Nurturing the British Model of Policing,
p 104 Back
5
Ibid., p 105 Back
6
Protecting the Public: Supporting the Police to Succeed, p 62 Back
7
Adapting to Protest: Nurturing the British Model of Policing,
p 106 Back
8
Adapting to Protest: Nurturing the British Model of Policing,
p 16 Back
| 
