Conclusions and recommendations
1. It
is currently impossible to say with certainty how many crimes
are detected, let alone how many result in convictions, due at
least in part to the matching of crime scene DNA to a personal
profile already on the database, but it appears that it may be
as little as 0.3%—and we note that the reason for retaining
personal profiles on a database is so that the person can be linked
to crimes he/she commits later. (Paragraph 6)
2. We wish to make
it clear at the outset that we are strongly of the belief that
DNA profiling and matching are vital tools in the fight against
crime; and that it is essential, wherever possible, to gather,
profile and store information relating to DNA discovered at crime
scenes. Although it is very unlikely that DNA on its own could
bring about a conviction for a crime—and, indeed, we understand
that the Crown Prosecution Service requires further corroborative
evidence before it will bring a prosecution—DNA evidence
places a person at the scene of the crime and he/she then has
to explain why they were there or prove that the DNA match is
faulty. (Paragraph 11)
3. Nor do we question
the taking of DNA samples from everyone arrested for a recordable
offence. We note that the identification of perpetrators of some
very serious crimes, including murder, has been made possible
by the matching of a personal sample taken in connection with
a later, less serious offence with a crime scene sample. We also
support the principle, as set down in the Crime and Security Bill,
of destroying the actual personal samples as soon as practicable,
not least as they could theoretically be used to derive other
personal information about the individual such as family relationships
or information about health. In this Report we are solely concerned
with the retention of personal profiles on the database: whose
profiles should be retained, for how long they should be stored,
and the processes for getting one's profile deleted from the database.
(Paragraph 12)
4. It is not known
how many crimes are solved with the help of the stored personal
profiles of those not previously convicted of a crime. The highly
complicated calculations made by GeneWatch to try to answer this
question on the basis of information from various sources already
in the public domain, and the provisional nature of its conclusions,
underline the need for the Home Office to undertake research specifically
on this issue. (Paragraph 15)
5. It could therefore
be argued that the DNA from those never charged with an offence
should be treated differently from those charged but not convicted.
However, this runs counter to the principle in England and Wales
that in law people are either innocent or guilty by introducing
gradations of innocence. It also does not tackle the nub of the
problem: arrest should be a high threshold. At least in part,
the anomalies have arisen in the current system because of the
way in which offences are treated—for example, far more
incidents are now classified as crimes of violence even if no
physical assault has taken place—and target-driven policing
has encouraged police officers to treat minor incidents formally
in order to reach targets. We hope that both these trends will
be mitigated by the move back to 'commonsense policing'; if so,
the number of arrests for flimsy reasons should decline sharply.
We therefore do not recommend the return to the pre-2004 situation
of DNA being collected only on charging not on arrest. (Paragraph
28)
6. However, the counter-balance
to this is that it should be easier for those wrongly arrested
or who have volunteered their DNA to get their records removed
from the database. We recommend some changes to make this possible
later in this report. (Paragraph 29)
7. It is arguable
on the basis of natural justice and the ECHR's judgment that those
suspected of committing the most serious crimes should be treated
differently from those suspected of more minor crimes. Ms Abbott,
Liberty and GeneWatch clearly thought so. We support the distinctions
made among juveniles, not least because numerous studies have
shown that many 'get into trouble with the law' for something
comparatively minor and never offend again. This leaves the question
whether the same distinction should be made among adults. The
police argued that enough people progressed from committing 'minor'
crimes to serious crime that the effectiveness of the database
would be seriously undermined if those suspected of minor crimes
had their DNA profiles deleted earlier than others. We accept
this, and therefore do not recommend that the Bill's provisions
relating to adults make a distinction between those arrested for
major and minor crimes. (Paragraph 31)
8. The Home Secretary
is right to caution against a simple identification of a second
arrest, with no indication of outcome, as being proof of guilt.
If faced with a crime such as burglary, where it is known that
a high proportion of offences is committed by a limited number
of repeat offenders, it is right for the police to look first
at suspects previously arrested for a similar crime, rather than
to the general population. Arrest to arrest data reveal the likelihood
of being arrested again, but do not equate to the risk of offending
after an initial arrest. (Paragraph 34)
9. Decisions on retention
periods must balance public safety against individual privacy.
We are not convinced that retaining for six years the DNA profiles
of people not convicted of any crime would result in more cases
being cleared up—let alone more convictions obtained—than
retaining them for three years. We therefore recommend a three
year limit, and a draft amendment to the Crime and Security Bill
to this effect is in the Annex to this Report. (Paragraph 37)
10. We understand
that the Government would be willing to table amendments at Report
Stage of the Bill to give the National DNA Database Strategy Board
the central co-ordinating role, as the organisation to which applications
for deletion of records would be made, handling the case, making
a recommendation to the relevant chief constable based on the
statutory guidance that it (the Board) would issue, and informing
the applicant of the result. We support these proposals. (Paragraph
40)
11. We consider that
the then Home Affairs Committee should be consulted by the Board
on the draft guidance. The Home Secretary cited an example of
where DNA data should not be retained— that of someone arrested
for shoplifting when trying to exchange goods for which she was
carrying the receipt. This example is absolutely cut and dried;
we expect the guidance to allow for the destruction of data in
a far wider range of cases. (Paragraph 41)
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