2 Proposed Measures
4. The Home Secretary told the House that "no
one measure will be enough to defeat inventive and determined
terrorists, and there is no single technology that we can guarantee
will be 100% effective".[5]
Paul Clark MP agreed, and told us that "the whole approach
to security is multi-layered. There is no one operation or process
that will guarantee you everything that you need. Having a multi-layered
approach actually helps to make sure that you have a much stronger
security regime".[6]
During this inquiry, we have taken evidence on the effectiveness
of all of the measures announced by the Home Secretary and Prime
Minister, and inquired into what else can be done to improve airport
security.
BODY SCANNERS
5. Full-body scanners of the type to be introduced
in British airports use high-frequency "millimetre"
radio wave or x-ray technology to produce a real-time, rotatable
image of individuals as they pass through. The image produced
highlights any foreign body hidden beneath clothing or elsewhere
which may then require closer examination. Body scanner technology
of this type has been used for many years by the customs authorities
to scan identified passengers as they disembark at British airports.
6. Paul Clark MP confirmed to us that body scanners
such as these "are starting to roll out now and they will
continue to roll out throughout this year".[7]
In subsequent written evidence he confirmed that body scanners
had been deployed at Heathrow and Manchester airports on 1 February,
and were expected to be deployed at Birmingham airport "over
the course of this month".[8]
In a further letter of 19 February, the Department for Transport
confirmed that a timetable to complete the roll-out process had
yet to be agreed with the industry.[9]
7. Lord West told us that these scanners were around
50-60% effective at detecting threats but he was confident that
they would become more effective as the technology developed.[10]
Given the level of effectiveness of the current generation of
body scanners, Paul Clark told us that they would only be used
as a secondary element of securityin addition to scans
by traditional "archway" metal detectors; certain individuals
would be selected either at random or after "various other
measures [had been] taken into account" to pass through the
scanner. He also confirmed that "there will be no right to
refuse to go through the scanner".[11]
Press reports have subsequently stated that children would not
be exempted from this requirement.[12]
8. Mr Philip Baum is "a long-time proponent
of body scanners" as an additional level of aviation security,
but he cautioned against relying on one type of scanner, which
he said would render airport security predictable:
There are different types of body scanners out
there using a variety of technologies, and I would like to see
an environment where we deploy a range of different types of body
scanner
so that when we arrive at the airport we do not
know which technology is going to screen us.[13]
Richard Kemp agreed that it was "very important
that we have multiple sensors; we do not just rely on a particular
technology". He also suggested that rather than concentrating
scanning equipment at one area of the airport terminal:
security on an airport's concourse and routes
by which people approach airport security should be stepped up
including the potential use of [more advanced] terahertz body
scanners around the approach to the check-in point, where people
can perhaps be looked at at random.[14]
Richard Kemp also suggested that these arrangements
and the "unpredictability" of airport security be publicised
to provide a level of deterrence, "that does not exist at
present because you assume that you are going to get there and
you are going to be subject to a specific test".[15]
9. We were disappointed that new technology had not
been introduced earlier, and were puzzled why scanners were only
now being deployed on a major scale since the technology is already
in use at British airports and trials of similar equipment had
been carried out in 2006 in the aftermath of the "liquid
bomb plot" and Operation Overt. Paul Clark suggested to us
that this delay had been caused by the Government's desire not
to "put in place security measures that are deemed to be
at that time unnecessary, to create delays or inconvenience for
the travelling public ... It is about making a decision about
the proportionality of the measures that you put in place to protect
those concerned".[16]
He further told us that the Government aimed to bring in measures
"that are relevant for the given time" based on the
current assessment of the threat.[17]
10. The wider introduction of full-body scanners
is a welcome development in airport security. We look forward
to improvements in technology which will allow more effective
and quicker scanners and urge the Government to work closely with
industry in developing and introducing newer, improved models
that would be more than 60% effective. We also recommend that
the Government place greater emphasis on varying the measures
put in place rather than relying on a mass deployment of one make
and model Passengers, and terrorists, should not know what regime
they will face when they arrive at airports; greater unpredictability
and a higher level of deterrence is needed in airport security
arrangements.
11. The institution of "proportionate"
measures, as described by Paul Clark strikes us as a euphemism
for adopting a wholly reactive stance and waiting for terrorists
to demonstrate their new capabilities before implementing improved
security measures. In view of the ongoing terrorist threat to
airline passengers and staff we urge the Government to constantly
look for further technological measures to improve airport security,
This should be matter of the utmost priority for the Ministers
concerned.
PROFILING
12. While body scanners can add another layer of
security, they are appreciably slower than traditional archway
metal detectors. To process every passenger through the equipment
would therefore lead to long queues and increase the time passengers
spend in airport terminals. Mr Baum told us that this is a problem
in itself since it creates a target for suicide bombers within
airport terminals and also creates "a lot of unhappy passengers
who are perpetrating acts of air rage on board aircraft and they
could one day bring down an aircraft".[18]
To complement the deployment of scanners and to prevent long queues
forming at airports, the Government's solution as the Home Secretary
confirmed to the House and Paul Clark suggested to us, is greater
use of "behavioural analysis techniques" or profiling.
A trial of such techniques "is currently under way at Heathrow
Airport". The Department for Transport has confirmed that
decisions about whether, and how, behavioural analysis techniques
should be rolled out more widely will not be taken until this
trial is complete.[19]
13. According to Lord West, profiling, as envisaged
by the Government, would be a "behavioural, intelligence-based
assessment" based on, for example, how the passenger paid
for his ticket, his luggage and his behaviour at the airport.[20]
Lord Adonis confirmed to the House that profiling purely on ethnic
or religious grounds would not be used.[21]
Lord West told us that much of the intelligence-based assessment
would involve computerised analytical tools to highlight higher-risk
passengers before they arrived at the airports and these individuals
would be targeted for further security checks.[22]
14. Mr Baum was keen to stress the importance of
moving passengers through airport terminals quickly and preventing
long queues forming. He called for an "intelligent"
way to speed up the process. He suggested that the best way to
do this would be profiling, "it is possible, it is do-able
and it has been proven to work many times".[23]
Mr Baum also urged us to view airport security as being "a
continuum from the moment somebody makes their reservation until
they reach their destination", and identifying potential
threats through profiling "on the basis of somebody's appearance
and behaviour, [and] also on their passport and ticket details
and what we know about them," would be a key part of that.
He stressed that many threats, "could be flagged up before
they arrive at the airport" and differentiated between identifying
threats on the basis of appearance and behaviour, and profiling
based on crude racial or ethnic identification, "the best
examples of profiling working are not on the basis of race, religion,
gender or colour of skin".[24]
Richard Kemp stressed that these measures would require greater
numbers of better trained and more highly skilled airport security
staff:
I would extend it from strict profiling to behaviour
pattern recognition to everybody who is involved in the airport
security or the check-in process and any staff process being able
to identify specific signs of behaviour, not for the colour of
the skin or the type of dress but looking for suspicious ways
in which they act.[25]
15. Following the Parliamentary statement of 5 January
which announced the introduction of profiling, the Equality and
Human Rights Commission wrote to the Home Secretary expressing,
"serious concerns that the practice of profiling is, in its
operation, likely to be discriminatory, contrary to domestic legislation
and harmful to community relations", and they "remain
to be convinced that the proposals are an effective response to
the current threat, and therefore justifiable".[26]
They have echoed these concerns in written evidence to us, raising
queries on the impact on specific groups such as the transgender
population, the disabled and "people of certain religious
beliefs".[27] These
comments have been echoed by other groups such as the Quilliam
Foundation.[28]
16. If done correctly, profiling is clearly a
powerful tool against terrorismthe earlier and more precisely
that a threat can be identified, the easier the security operation
will be; terrorist activity does not make a distinction between
people of different origins, faiths or nationality. While we
therefore cautiously recommend the use of profiling, we note that
its use is also fraught with danger, as we have also noted in
our Report into The Cocaine Trade,[29]
targeted security should not be perceived to be undertaken on
crude racial or ethnic grounds. The code of practice announced
by Lord Adonis on 1 February is therefore welcome. The Government
should now take steps to publicise its existence and ensure that
airport staff adhere to the guidelines. In addition to the requirement
in the draft code of practice that security officers must have
completed appropriate training,[30]
the Government, should also mandate universal Behaviour Assessment
and Security Screening (BASS) training, or similar, for all airport
security staff at all UK airports, not just those operated by
BAA, as a condition of employment.
EXPLOSIVE TRACE DETECTION EQUIPMENT
17. Explosive trace detection (ETD) equipment which
can detect small particles of explosives is already used in many
airports. During our visit to Smiths Detection we were told that
using ETD equipment is a quicker process than full body scanning
and is considered the most effective way to identify specific
substances. Given this we asked Paul Clark why body scanners would
be introduced by the "end of the month", but trace detection
equipment would only be operating "by the end of the year".
The Minister agreed that trace detection equipment was an important
part of the "multi-layered approach" but gave no firm
date by which trace detection equipment will be introduced, or
why its introduction would take until the end of 2010.[31]
18. In a subsequent letter to us, dated 4 February,
Paul Clark confirmed that the deadline for airports to "have
Explosive Trace Detection capability in place and operating"
remained 31 December 2010. He also confirmed that many larger
airports already possessed ETD technology and in these airports
the number of individuals subject to ETD screening had been increased.
He said that small airports which did not currently possess the
technology were required to subject a greater number of passengers
to hand searches as an interim measure.
19. Given the importance of explosive trace detection
(ETD) equipment, particularly in conjunction with the introduction
of "profiling", we do not understand why its introduction
on a wider scale is not required before 31 December 2010. We still
have not received a satisfactory answer as to why there is such
a discrepancy in deadlines between the introduction of body scanners
and trace detection equipment. We recommend that the Government
speed up the deployment of ETD equipment and inform us why wider
deployment will take up to 12 months.
WATCHLISTS
20. While the Government has operated a transport
watch list for many years, the information on it is stored primarily
for immigration, not security, purposes.[32]
The work on "no fly" lists and similar is therefore
ongoing, and we received little detail on how the lists would
operate in practice. Pending a Home Office-led review on the implementation
of such lists, the Government has been unable to tell ushow
large the lists would be; whether it would follow the USA model
of designating specific countries as "countries of interest"
and subjecting all passengers from those countries to tighter
security measures; who would take responsibility for updating
and enforcing the list; and how it would be applied in practice.[33]
21. While we appreciate that certain technical
measures on the implementation of the proposed lists have yet
to be decided, we are surprised that the Government is unable
to share some relatively basic information on how the new system
will operate. For example, it is disappointing that the Government
cannot estimate, even to a low degree of accuracy, how large such
lists are intended to be. Pending the results of the Home Office
implementation review, we will not comment on the effectiveness
of the "watchlist" measures except to suggest that this
review should be completed as soon as possible and the results
shared with the Committee. While we await this information we
note the statement from Colonel Richard Kemp, a security expert,
on the general effectiveness of watchlists: "These things
are important but are only as good as the intelligence that feeds
into them and only as good as the conscientiousness with which
the information is spread around the place".[34]
INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS
22. We heard from industry sources that coordinated
international action in the area of airport security is difficult
because states struggle to agree on a common assessment of the
threat and consequently differ in their interpretation of what
action needs to be taken. Consequently while states have agreed
common standards with regards to the "baseline" requirement
of security measures to be taken at airports, they achieve this
level by adopting different methods and applying different regulatory
standards. This hinders efforts to raise the overall level of
security and the development of new equipment by manufacturers.[35]
23. Niki Tompkinson, Director, Transec, Department
for Transport, told us that Britain was a signatory to two sets
of international standards governing airport security; the International
Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO) standards which govern 190
states; and slightly more stringent standards set by the European
Union which are applicable to all EU Member states.[36]
Paul Clark said that the Government have been pushing for stronger
standards, both within the ICAO and the EU, but "there are
limits to what we can insist on".[37]
However, According to Mr Baum, both the IACO and the EU standards
were misdirected and inadequate:
the problem is that the international standards
for aviation security are extremely low and are based on identifying
suspect or prohibited items and not looking for intent.[38]
24. As well as criticising the regulatory standards
in place, Mr Baum also cautioned us against placing too much emphasis
on viewing increased security standards as the solution to improving
aviation security. He told us that the desire for increased security
measures will always be tempered by financial reality:
It is all very well trying to increase the standards
but somebody has got to pay for it at the end of the day and aviation
security is a very expensive business. You have to have a regime
in place that can work in the Cote D'Ivoire and in the Solomon
Islands and in the United States and in the UK, and in coming
up with a baseline it is always going to be significantly lower
than we are going to put in place here.[39]
We asked Mr Clark and Ms Tompkinson what efforts
the United Kingdom was making in improving airport security around
the world. Mr Clark suggested that the British Government was
providing skills and budgetary support to poorer nations:
A very important point in terms of the work that
we do
is working closely with countries where there are
issues of concern in terms of security levels
and through
various resources both in the counter-terrorism budgets and with
expertise and skills that are within the aviation or security
areas.[40]
Ms Tompkinson also told us that in extreme circumstances,
while the Government has the power to prevent direct flights from
certain countries landing in the UK,[41]
the practice when the United Kingdom has serious concerns over
the safety of a particular state, is to "negotiate with that
country a reasonable outcome
we work overseas to offer
advice, support and assistance to countries where we think the
vulnerabilities are greatest
countries are quite keen to
take us up on that".[42]
25. The Department for Transport's capacity building
work is funded from the Countering Terrorism and Radicalisation
Fund (CTRF) as part of the Countering Terrorism and Radicalisation
Programme run by the Foreign Office. This fund is budgeted at
£37 million for the period 2009/10 and £38 million for
2010/11. Since 2007 the CTRF has paid for 23 inward visits hosted
by the Department to allow the sharing of UK "best practice";
42 aviation security staff training courses; 14 explosive trace
detection machines and 60 "archway" metal detectors
or similar, for installation in poorer countries; and the hosting
of 4 Regional Aviation Security Workshops.[43]
26. International standards in aviation security
must be made tougher and the Government must push for tighter
measures both in the EU and IACO, while reserving the right to
unilaterally refuse direct flights from countries which are unwilling
to agree tougher standards and encouraging IACO to be more willing
to impose sanctions where needed. Rather than merely negotiating
a reasonable outcome with the country concerned, the Government
should be more willing to refuse direct flights, which in turn
would create a commercial incentive for all states to improve
their security regime. Help, both financial and technical, should
be provided to help all willing states unable to reach the higher
baseline. During this inquiry we have heard that a full-body scanner
costs in the region of £100,000, it is clear that the funding
allocated to the CTRF could therefore provide much in the way
of equipment and training.
27. More must be done to tackle terrorism at the
source; it will not be enough merely to improve security at British
airports. Despite the work done by the Department of Transport
overseas it is clear that weak points exist in global airport
security and the security regime in some countries, through a
combination of a lack of resources and training, will be relatively
lax. The British Government should do more, more quickly to improve
airport security across the globe, particularly in identified
"hot spots" of terrorist activity. We therefore welcome
the funding allocated through the CTRF and urge the Government
to ensure a much greater provision of direct help in the form
of body scanners, ETD equipment and training to vulnerable areas.
5 HC Deb, 5 January 2010, col 28 Back
6
Q 50 Back
7
Q 65 Back
8
Ev 17 Back
9
Ev 19 Back
10
Q 29 Back
11
Q 52 Back
12
See: "Profiling is essential in battle to beat terrorist
threat, says Yard Chief", The Daily Telegraph, 30
January 2010 Back
13
Q 78 Back
14
Q 79 Back
15
Q 79 Back
16
Q 64 Back
17
Q 63 Back
18
See, Q 78 and Q 82 Back
19
Ev 19 Back
20
Q 36-38 Back
21
"Interim Code of Practice for the Acceptable Use of Advanced
Imaging Technology (Body Scanners) in an Aviation Security Environment",
January 2010, http://www.dft.gov.uk/pgr/security/aviation/airport/bodyscanners/codeofpractice/ Back
22
Q 29 Back
23
Q 81 Back
24
Q 81-84 Back
25
Q 91 Back
26
Ev 22 Back
27
Ev 20 Back
28
See: "Talal Rajab: Profiling air passengers could make terrorist
attacks easier", The Independent, 5 January 2010 Back
29
The Cocaine Trade, Home Affairs Committee, Seventh Report
of Session 2009-10, HC 74-I Back
30
"Interim Code of Practice for the Acceptable Use of Advanced
Imaging Technology (Body Scanners) in an Aviation Security Environment",
January 2010, http://www.dft.gov.uk/pgr/security/aviation/airport/bodyscanners/codeofpractice/
Back
31
See Qq 65-68 Back
32
Q 34 Back
33
Ev 18 Back
34
Q 88 Back
35
As of 1 March, the European Commission had not introduced "EU-wide
measures in response to the Detroit Incident". See Ev 19 Back
36
Q 55 Back
37
Q 59 Back
38
Q 98 Back
39
Q 99 Back
40
Q 51 Back
41
On 19 January 2010 direct flights by Yemenea Airways to Britain
were suspended by the British Government. Back
42
Q 57 Back
43
Ev 18 Back
|