Counter-Terrorism Measures in British Airports - Home Affairs Committee Contents


3  Problems that may hinder tighter security

Privacy Concerns

28. The initial trial of body scanners at Manchester Airport led to privacy and child protection concerns in relation to the images produced. It was reported by the media that the body scans would "show up breast enlargements, body piercings and a clear black-and-white outline of a passenger's genitals".[44] Following the Government's announcement on the deployment of scanners, the Equality and Human Rights Commission wrote to the Government expressing concern "that these proposals are likely to have a negative impact on individuals' rights to privacy", requesting information on how the wider use of body scanners would be compliant with the Human Rights Act[45] and suggesting that the use of body scanners, "as currently implemented would not be "in accordance with law" as required under Article 8(2)" of the European Convention on Human Rights.[46]

29. Mr Baum told us that the privacy concerns are "over-emphasised, possibly by the media, rather then being a genuine concern". He told us that "generally the person who sees the screen cannot see the passenger as well, so you are not getting a visual view of the passenger and, on the screen, a visual view of the passenger with no clothes on",[47] while the picture itself is not stored and is destroyed once the individual has passed through security.[48] Mr Baum also suggested that rather than producing a "naked" image of the individual passing through the scanner, "the technology today can show an outline image of somebody without facial features. One of the systems uses a stick figure and can simply superimpose threat items onto that stick figure".[49]

30. Having witnessed these full-body scanners working at first-hand, we are confident that the privacy concerns that have been expressed in relation to these devices are overstated and that full body scanners are no more an invasion of privacy than manual "pat-downs" or searches of bags. Air passengers already tolerate a large invasion of their privacy and we do not feel that full body scanners add greatly to this situation. Privacy concerns should not prevent the deployment of scanners.

STAFFING

31. Technology alone cannot strengthen airport security—it is the human beings who will be operating the new system who remain ultimately responsible.[50] Both experts we took evidence from warned of placing too great a reliance on technology and ignoring the importance of staff. Mr Baum told us that his concern:

    is that we keep looking for another piece of technology to add on to the system and to rely on technology. Ultimately we need to rely on human beings. It is human beings that are going to operate these systems … it is not simply giving them the equipment; it is training the staff to operate the equipment,[51]

while Richard Kemp stressed to us that while "technology is very important … I believe that the human aspect is even more important".[52]

32. Both witnesses, Mr Baum and Richard Kemp expressed concern at the current nature of airport security staffing. Richard Kemp emphasised that airport security is as much a question of the attitude of the employees as of the skills and equipment they possess, "you have got to have the right mentality, you have got to have a constant state of vigilance and you have got to have a constant focus on the problem".[53] Mr Baum was unsure that this "constant state of vigilance" was achievable under the current security arrangements, and contrasted airport security with other work undertaken at airports, "We do not outsource customs or immigration. Those are government agencies, government employees, that carry out those duties. Many airports around the world are relying on contract screening personnel who are relatively low paid ... I think we need to be serious about whom we deploy".[54]

33. We noted Mr Baum's comments and were concerned that neither the Home Secretary on 5 January nor the Prime Minister on 20 January mentioned in any great detail improvements in the training requirements of airport security staff and that the Government was pursuing mainly "technology-based" solutions. We were also concerned that insufficient numbers of female airport security staff were being deployed, which would cause problems with the scanning of female passengers. In a letter of 11 February we raised these concerns with the Home Secretary and Transport Secretary, and also asking for detail on what training requirements were to be mandated for airport security personnel.

34. On 19 February we received a reply from Lord Adonis[55] which confirmed that EC Regulations set a baseline of training standards for aviation security staff training, and these can be supplemented by the UK Government working in consultation with the industry "where we consider this is justified". While the Department is "not aware of any overarching difficulties in obtaining sufficient female security staff", they were unable to provide us with statistic information on either staff numbers, or the gender mix of airport security staff. Lord Adonis also confirmed that the Government would not be taking direct action to either increase the proportion of female security staff deployed at security checkpoints or significantly tighten the training requirements of security staff because the Government, does not "seek to interfere in the manner in which airport operators resource the deployment of airport staff, these being operational decisions".

35. Colonel Richard Kemp, an acknowledged expert in security matters, was correct to place great importance on the human aspect of security measures and, while we would not advocate the Government unilaterally mandating tougher measures and regulations without the cooperation of the industry, we are concerned that Lord Adonis' letter of 19 February suggests a somewhat laissez-faire attitude on the part of the Government towards the matter of airport security staff.

36. The fact that the deployment of staff is an "operational decision" should not prevent the Government from imposing improved security measures where it deems them necessary. In particular, the Government should work more closely with airport operators and security contractors to ensure adequate deployment of female security staff at security checkpoints and to develop and institute an universal improved training regime for all security staff deployed at all UK airports.

SECURITY ANNOUNCEMENTS

37. We asked Lord West whether it was wise to announce the measures that the British Government was taking to improve security at airports as we were concerned that this would just give terrorists the information needed to work around the tightened regime. Lord West told us that the need to reassure the public that measures were in place was tempered by the desire to keep some measures secret, and therefore the Government did not announce every measure it was taking.[56]

38. Richard Kemp argued that while it was important to reassure the public that measures were in place and provide information that would act as a deterrent to terrorists, "it is important that we do not know the technical details of what is happening to us".[57] Mr Baum agreed that the technical specifications of the equipment should not be publicised, and he called it "fascinating" that "when we go through an airport security checkpoint we see technology with the manufacturer's name emblazoned on the side and you can simply go to the internet and find out the spec of that system".[58] The Government is correct not to publicise every measure that it is taking, but should do more to camouflage and hide the technical specifications of security equipment. An initial step that the Government should take would be to insist that, as far as possible, the outside of security equipment is standardised and its technical specifications hidden from passengers.


44   See: "Naked Scanner in Airport Trial", BBC News, 13 October 2009  Back

45   Ev 22  Back

46   Ev 20 Back

47   Q 80 Back

48   See: Body Scanners: X-ray or X-rated?" BBC News, 4 January 2010 Back

49   Q 80 Back

50   Q 83 Back

51   Q 83 Back

52   Q 91 Back

53   Q 88 Back

54   Q 85 Back

55   Ev 19 Back

56   Q 28 Back

57   Q 94 Back

58   Q 94 Back


 
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