Conclusions and recommendations
1. The
wider introduction of full-body scanners is a welcome development
in airport security. We look forward to improvements in technology
which will allow more effective and quicker scanners and urge
the Government to work closely with industry in developing and
introducing newer, improved models that would be more than 60%
effective. We also recommend that the Government place greater
emphasis on varying the measures put in place rather than relying
on a mass deployment of one make and model Passengers, and terrorists,
should not know what regime they will face when they arrive at
airports; greater unpredictability and a higher level of deterrence
is needed in airport security arrangements. (Paragraph 10)
2. The institution
of "proportionate" measures, as described by Paul Clark
strikes us as a euphemism for adopting a wholly reactive stance
and waiting for terrorists to demonstrate their new capabilities
before implementing improved security measures. In view of the
ongoing terrorist threat to airline passengers and staff we urge
the Government to constantly look for further technological measures
to improve airport security, This should be matter of the utmost
priority for the Ministers concerned. (Paragraph 11)
3. If done correctly,
profiling is clearly a powerful tool against terrorism—the
earlier and more precisely that a threat can be identified, the
easier the security operation will be; terrorist activity does
not make a distinction between people of different origins, faiths
or nationality. While we therefore cautiously recommend the use
of profiling, we note that its use is also fraught with danger,
as we have also noted in our Report into The Cocaine Trade, targeted
security should not be perceived to be undertaken on crude racial
or ethnic grounds. The code of practice announced by Lord Adonis
on 1 February is therefore welcome. The Government should now
take steps to publicise its existence and ensure that airport
staff adhere to the guidelines. In addition to the requirement
in the draft code of practice that security officers must have
completed appropriate training, the Government, should also mandate
universal Behaviour Assessment and Security Screening (BASS) training,
or similar, for all airport security staff at all UK airports,
not just those operated by BAA, as a condition of employment.
(Paragraph 16)
4. Given the importance
of explosive trace detection (ETD) equipment, particularly in
conjunction with the introduction of "profiling", we
do not understand why its introduction on a wider scale is not
required before 31 December 2010. We still have not received a
satisfactory answer as to why there is such a discrepancy in deadlines
between the introduction of body scanners and trace detection
equipment. We recommend that the Government speed up the deployment
of ETD equipment and inform us why wider deployment will take
up to 12 months. (Paragraph 19)
5. While we appreciate
that certain technical measures on the implementation of the proposed
lists have yet to be decided, we are surprised that the Government
is unable to share some relatively basic information on how the
new system will operate. For example, it is disappointing that
the Government cannot estimate, even to a low degree of accuracy,
how large such lists are intended to be. Pending the results of
the Home Office implementation review, we will not comment on
the effectiveness of the "watchlist" measures except
to suggest that this review should be completed as soon as possible
and the results shared with the Committee. While we await this
information we note the statement from Colonel Richard Kemp, a
security expert, on the general effectiveness of watchlists: "These
things are important but are only as good as the intelligence
that feeds into them and only as good as the conscientiousness
with which the information is spread around the place". (Paragraph
21)
6. International standards
in aviation security must be made tougher and the Government must
push for tighter measures both in the EU and IACO, while reserving
the right to unilaterally refuse direct flights from countries
which are unwilling to agree tougher standards and encouraging
IACO to be more willing to impose sanctions where needed. Rather
than merely negotiating a reasonable outcome with the country
concerned, the Government should be more willing to refuse direct
flights, which in turn would create a commercial incentive for
all states to improve their security regime. Help, both financial
and technical, should be provided to help all willing states unable
to reach the higher baseline. During this inquiry we have heard
that a full-body scanner costs in the region of £100,000,
it is clear that the funding allocated to the CTRF could therefore
provide much in the way of equipment and training. (Paragraph
26)
7. More must be done
to tackle terrorism at the source; it will not be enough merely
to improve security at British airports. Despite the work done
by the Department of Transport overseas it is clear that weak
points exist in global airport security and the security regime
in some countries, through a combination of a lack of resources
and training, will be relatively lax. The British Government should
do more, more quickly to improve airport security across the globe,
particularly in identified "hot spots" of terrorist
activity. We therefore welcome the funding allocated through the
CTRF and urge the Government to ensure a much greater provision
of direct help in the form of body scanners, ETD equipment and
training to vulnerable areas. (Paragraph 27)
8. Having witnessed
these full-body scanners working at first-hand, we are confident
that the privacy concerns that have been expressed in relation
to these devices are overstated and that full body scanners are
no more an invasion of privacy than manual "pat-downs"
or searches of bags. Air passengers already tolerate a large invasion
of their privacy and we do not feel that full body scanners add
greatly to this situation. Privacy concerns should not prevent
the deployment of scanners. (Paragraph 30)
9. Colonel Richard
Kemp, an acknowledged expert in security matters, was correct
to place great importance on the human aspect of security measures
and, while we would not advocate the Government unilaterally mandating
tougher measures and regulations without the cooperation of the
industry, we are concerned that Lord Adonis' letter of 19 February
suggests a somewhat laissez-faire attitude on the part of the
Government towards the matter of airport security staff. (Paragraph
35)
10. The fact that
the deployment of staff is an "operational decision"
should not prevent the Government from imposing improved security
measures where it deems them necessary. In particular, the Government
should work more closely with airport operators and security contractors
to ensure adequate deployment of female security staff at security
checkpoints and to develop and institute an universal improved
training regime for all security staff deployed at all UK airports.
(Paragraph 36)
11. The Government
is correct not to publicise every measure that it is taking, but
should do more to camouflage and hide the technical specifications
of security equipment. An initial step that the Government should
take would be to insist that, as far as possible, the outside
of security equipment is standardised and its technical specifications
hidden from passengers. (Paragraph 38)
12. The threat of
terrorist attacks against airports and airplanes, as we noted
earlier, is very real and ongoing. We therefore welcome the steps
announced in the aftermath of the attempted attack of 25 December
and urge the Government to speed up the roll-out of body scanners,
and, particularly, Explosive Trace Detection equipment. We are
confident that both of these devices and the other announced measures
will form a better, "multi-layered" security regime.
(Paragraph 39)
13. Airport security
should not be viewed as something which occurs purely once a passenger
steps into an airport terminal, but should begin the moment that
a ticket is booked. In this context, the demarcation between transport
security ("Transec") based in the Department for Transport
and wider counter-terrorism activity, centred in the Office for
Security and Counter-Terrorism, based in the Home Office is unhelpful.
We do not understand why transport security remains institutionally
separate from wider counter-terrorism work and intelligence-gathering,
and we cannot see the benefits of this separation of responsibility.
Close collaboration between Government departments is a poor substitute
for centralising policy and control under one roof. We recommend
that Transec becomes the responsibility of the Home Office under
the auspices of the OSCT. (Paragraph 40)
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