Police Service Strength - Home Affairs Committee Contents


Memorandum submitted by Association of Police Authorities (APA)

PREAMBLE

  This document should be read in conjunction with a submission by the Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO) to the Home Affairs Select Committee on behalf of all police forces throughout England and Wales.

  The Committee's original call for submissions suggested that individual police authorities might provide a joint response with their forces. However, both ACPO and the Association of Police Authorities (APA) have elected to provide separate, though complementary corporate responses to ensure full and accurate representation of their respective views on the issue of police service strength.

  This document does not include specific data about officer and civilian headcounts, nor financial impact and mitigation strategies of individual forces. Rather, when read together with ACPO's position paper, it contextualises the wider funding environment, notably the anticipated financial pressure upon police authorities. Police authorities were consulted by their forces about metrics supplied with ACPO's submission and are accordingly endorsed by the APA.

A Strategy for the Service

  The APA and police authorities acknowledge the deteriorating state of public finances and the difficult choices ahead for government spending. Prioritisation always has, and always will be a fact of life for government expenditure and the forthcoming period is no exception. What's changed is the size of the challenge.

  The police service is steadfastly focused on continuous improvement to increase value for money and deliver an ever superior service to the public. An enormous volume of activity is underway across the service to squeeze ever greater savings from budgets and increase productivity. Many significant gains have already been made. But we can, and must go further.

  Similar to every area of public expenditure, police funding should not be immune from scrutiny under the circumstances. But we argue that change takes time and needs investment. To reduce funding now will seriously impact the ability of the police service to implement new business models to produce a second wave of productivity and service delivery enhancements. Current business improvement initiatives are typically frame-breaking and mostly untested. Examples include new service delivery models that mix police officers and unwarranted police staff, experimental forms of collaboration between forces and third party providers, better integrated and streamlined systems and processes across the criminal justice system, innovative use of IT and outsourcing.

  Policing is complex. Arbitrary delineation between "back office" and "frontline" activity, for example, seriously undermines and misjudges this complexity. "Bobbies on the beat" (if this in fact defines "frontline") are merely the tip of a sophisticated system of skills, information systems, relationships and networks required to deliver policing services. A cut to any part of the system has flow-on consequences for the productivity and effectiveness of other parts. In the event, many efficiencies have already been exploited within existing business models across the police service. A shift to new models will require additional resources and time for transition.

  There is no easy solution to the funding dilemma. However, we must be clear. The ability of police forces to maintain existing levels of service with smaller budgets has limits. At some point, service must diminish. In particular, calls to maintain "frontline" policing, regardless of funding available jeopardises further productivity improvements, risks backsliding on previous gains and is likely to hollow out the capacity and capability of forces as budgets are skewed to accommodate a simple, narrow conception of policing activity—visible, reactive patrolling.

  Of course every government department will argue their case for priority funding. However, the provision of effective, adequately resourced policing is one of government's primary responsibilities in a developed, civil society. We urge the government to consider the vital role of policing as an enabler of economic recovery, by contributing to public safety and security within the commercial sector.

  The remainder of this document provides further context in support of the APA's argument that police funding should be maintained at least at present levels from 2011 and outyears.

  Commencing with an executive summary of strategic options and considerations for the service to improve productivity and increase value for money, the report goes on to give an account of change initiatives to date, the challenges faced by forces and argue for maintenance of current funding levels.

Strategic options and considerations

  Government and the police service

    — Initiate a fundamental debate on the future role of the service, and how it contributes to national priorities.

    — Implement a broad-sweeping, ambitious programme to reduce bureaucracy and aversion to risk, including a review of roles and accountability of partners.

    — Modernise pay and reward structures to professionalise the police service and increase productivity.

  Police authorities and forces

    — Move the productivity agenda onto a new level, addressing directly the issues raised in the Green Paper and Jan Berry's review, and progressing QUEST and Workforce Modernisation improvements.

    — Police authorities assume a more prominent role in local efficiency planning targets.

    — Police authorities and forces should promote wider collaborative and joint working between forces, authorities, and beyond the police service where this improves services and/or reduces costs without undermining local provision or accountability.

    — Encourage more innovative solutions to delivery services locally; building and strengthening the right culture throughout the service.

    — Establish the necessary structures to enable modernisation. These include:

    — Management structures and resource management capacity.

    — ICT and data collection systems.

    — Development of new skills in change management and organisational improvement.

    — Development of new techniques in resource allocation and benefits assessment.

  Government

    — Articulate a strategic vision for the police service, including priority deliverables and expectations.

    — Take a realistic approach to new responsibilities; recognition through New Burdens funding when this is unavoidable.

    — Demonstrate realistic expectations about further efficiency savings and risks to service levels.

    — Maintain non-block grant funding streams.

    — Commit financial, advisory and technical support for the service to innovate and reduce bureaucracy.

    — Recognise the importance of local prioritisation when resource levels are being reduced. This includes a realistic debate around local council tax levels. The proportion of police spending raised locally has doubled over the last 10 years, and now stands at over 25%. Local consultation exercises confirm that in many areas, the public would be prepared to pay a little more each year if it means that their local policing services would be protected or improved. Arbitrary capping or even the threat of it takes away that freedom.

    — Review central roles and regulations to allow as much flexibility as possible for the service to allocate resources where they are most needed.

    — Facilitate closer working with other parts of the public sector (including the Criminal Justice System) on ways that will provide mutual benefit.

BACKGROUND

  1.  The theme for the last CSR Submission was "Sustainable Policing". It was prepared at a time when the service foresaw growing demands but a financial outlook that was likely to tighten. Compared to what faces the service now, the situation in 2006 was optimistic.

  2.  The priorities in 2006 were to preserve the fabric and the infrastructure of the service, and consolidate the positive progress which had been made in establishing neighbourhood policing and filling the protective services gap.

  3.  Even then, it would be a challenge. Funding levels for both grants and Council Tax would be constrained, and future pay levels could add to the pressure. The role of the efficiency strategy in releasing cash savings which could be at least partially recycled assumed even more significance.

  4.  There was also the matter of "expectations", set by Ministers, the media, the public, and the service itself. In an environment of reducing real resources, expectations can accentuate the pressures.

  5.  Financial prospects for the next CSR period are a step into the unknown. The scale of the required adjustment to public spending has still not been confirmed, but it could rewrite the resource assumptions for the next 10 years. Services such as police may face real terms reductions of 10% or more over the three years from 2011-12. Public services have had no experience of such a change in modern times.

  6.  This is the financial backdrop facing all public services. Those which will secure a degree of protection from the worst of the impact will be those which contribute significantly to the Government's wider economic and social objectives; those which have already grasped the need for modernisation; and those which are operating effectively with a wide range of partners in both the public and private sectors. The police service meets all three of those criteria. If so, the next CSR is a time for consolidation and taking steps not to lose the positive momentum built up in the relatively prosperous years of the early 21st century.

  7.  Policing is not only a victim of the global economic crisis, but a catalyst to recovery.

  8.  The service must look to its inherent strengths:

    — Successful policing helps shape social attitudes and values.

    — Many national strategies depend upon effective policing.

    — There are obvious policy linkages between Policing, Education, Social strategies, Health and Transport.

    — Effective policing is a critical enabler of social security and economic development. Commerce, local regeneration and public standards depend on police enforcement of property rights and personal protection.

  9.  Ineffective policing risks lowering the prospects of a quick economic recovery and ongoing economic stability.

  10.  Policing fully pervades the fabric of society and is accordingly a complex business operating on at least four broad levels—international/national/regional and local. It is also driven by many external factors, including demographic trends, advances in technology, and political events.

  11.  Disregarding the policing "multiplier effect" may have dangerous consequences for security of delivery of many other public services. ie every £ decrease in police funding may produce a corresponding increase in costs to other services, broadly diminishing the capacity and effectiveness of the public service.

  12.  For the next 10 years the central focus for policing will be on capacity. The service has been very successful in improving efficiency and cost effectiveness since 1999, but the first signs of a levelling off are beginning to appear. This is at a time when Home Office is demanding that police authorities set ever more ambitious targets for efficiency savings. Consequently, the productivity and performance of policing services will come to the fore over the next CSR period. Up to now, the debate—and the targets—have been built around concepts such as cash or non cashable savings, with very tight definitions of what constitutes savings or gains.

  13.  While it is true that the capacity for continuing efficiencies in the traditional sense may be levelling off, this does not mean that the capacity to improve is also declining.

  14.  Improvements will flow from several sources. There will be cash reductions in some budgets, but these will be complemented by productivity improvements (doing more for the same) and service improvements (doing the same, or more, but better).

  15.  If the economic prospects are at the lower end of the scale, there may be a need to look again at the mix of policing services and the levels to which they are delivered. The demand for policing services from the public and government is almost infinite, and the constant flow of new legislation will add to the demands. Resources will almost certainly grow at a slower rate than demands over the next couple of CSR periods. Affordability will be paramount, and within the financial limits it will be about achieving the optimum mix.

  16.  It will also be essential to manage expectations, to ensure that the public and other stakeholders appreciate the scale of the challenge facing the service, and the practical limits on what can be achieved. By informing and listening to communities, it will help shape a more effective response to the reduction in resources.

THE FINANCIAL AND SOCIO ECONOMIC BACKGROUND

  17.  Current spending on Policing in England and Wales is £11.2 billion. In per capita terms, that is equivalent to £208 per year. Because of the high proportion of funding which comes from government grants, the actual local perceived cost is much lower. Band D Council Tax levels range from £81 to £199, averaging around £3 per week. The gearing effect of central/local funding has a downside in the sense that small marginal changes in local spending can seem disproportionately expensive in cash terms.

  18.  Police authorities have acted responsibly in setting their 2009-10 budgets. The realities of the financial situation facing the country are obvious, and Authorities have not risked alarming the public unnecessarily about funding gaps and cuts in service. Wherever possible, Authorities have sought to assure communities that they can continue to rely on their policing services, and that the service will strive to ensure that, by working more effectively, it will protect the public from loss of services even though the funding is falling.

  19.  Nevertheless, many Authorities and Chief Constables face some hard choices over the next few years, and it appears inevitable already that there will be an impact on police officer numbers. When this happens, it will be important to view it in context. Numbers do not tell the whole picture, and it is important to look at capacity in the round. For many years, the service has been moving uniformed officers from support roles into front line policing, and at the same time establishing specialist technical teams. The combined effect has been to increase capacity and productivity at the front line. This process has further to go.

  20.  The period between now and the start of 2011-12 provides a degree of breathing space, and the opportunity to reconfigure the base spending level and to put in place the measures which will enable the service to operate effectively within a significantly reduced resource level in the future. In the immediate future the service as a whole should have the resources available, and the opportunities for increased productivity, to protect service levels from unacceptable cuts. The pressure bears differently on individual Authorities; simplistic assumptions on the capacity to absorb more or make savings do not apply equally across the country. A lot depends on the original starting point, and the measures which have already been put into effect locally. There are already some forces which are being forced to cut services while at the same time using reserves to keep within capping limits; at the same time, other forces are continuing to generate efficiencies which are enabling services to be protected.

  21.  The long term prospects get considerably worse.

  22.  The service is feeling the effect of the recession in a variety of ways, and at the same time, there is evidence already of an increase in volume and acquisitive crime, which can be expected to increase if unemployment keeps rising and community regeneration goes into reverse. Evidence from previous recessions is that there could be a time lag before the full effect is apparent; it could take up to three years (2012) before the impact of unemployment feeds through fully into crime patterns. There is evidence of a correlation between serious disorder and rising unemployment since the 1970s.

  23.  Overall, therefore, the 2009-10 settlement provided welcome stability, but the service needs longer term flexibility, and recognition that not all police authorities are at the same starting point, or face the same range of pressures, or have the same capacity to increase productivity. Police authorities need room for manoeuvre in the short term on local funding levels, but also assurances that other central funding streams—which support substantial numbers of policing posts—will not be withdrawn without careful consideration of the consequences.

  24.  The service is already taking steps to adjust to the expected reduction in resources. Recent surveys suggest that the action being taken during 2009-10 includes:

    — Higher efficiency targets.

    — Adoption of QUEST or similar initiatives.

    — Collaboration projects.

    — "Lean management".

    — Invest to save projects.

    — Increase in income and charges.

    — Cancellation or deferral of revenue and capital projects.

  25.  Only a small number of Authorities are expecting to reduce police officer numbers or staff establishments as a whole in 2009-10.

EFFECTIVENESS OF POLICE INVESTMENT

  26.  The service has enjoyed substantial levels of growth over the last 10 years, and the ability to generate efficiency savings over and above this has provided effective potential to increase resourcing by up to 3% p.a in real terms. However, while acknowledging the real growth, it is fair to point out that some of the growth in the early years was to offset reductions in the early to mid 1990s. Also the real growth in funding has been matched by real growth in demand for policing; this is referred to in more detail later in this section.

  27.  It is important to draw the distinction between national and local policing budgets. While local resources have expanded, there has been an even bigger expansion in central resources to deal with serious and organised crime, primarily through SOCA, and in respect of the national terrorism threat.

  28.  Cuts of 10% and more are unlikely to be feasible without impacting upon officer numbers, which remains the primary criterion by which policing capacity is measured. Whole of force productivity, however, cannot be reduced to a simple metric of officer numbers. It seems quite feasible that officer numbers might reduce while productivity and service levels are maintained, or indeed increased. However, while the current misplaced debate continues, the ability of forces to take a holistic approach to improving organisational productivity is constrained. While the public and politicians may continue to focus on police officer numbers, attention needs to shift to overall service delivery,

  29.  Regardless of definition, it stands to reason that cuts to funding must at some point impact service levels and possibly police officer numbers. Such an outcome is sorely undesirable and must be avoided.

  30.  It may be possible to link productivity improvement more firmly to costs by:

    — using productivity and increased capacity to take on new roles; and

    — switching between uniformed and non uniformed establishments.

  31.  While it has been commended for its achievements in bringing down crime level, and expanding officer numbers, there remains a view in some quarters that the extra money has not bought everything that was intended.

  32.  This view has been articulated on more than one occasion by the Home Affairs Committee. While the service would be the first to agree that there is more to be done by way of reducing bureaucracy and working more productively, it has responded robustly to some of the Home Affairs Committee's arguments. In particular the Committee has tended to focus very simplistically on the relationships between funding, officer numbers and crime levels. All three are important criteria, but by restricting the debate to these three factors alone, it ignores many of the realities.

  33.  The true comparison is between police workload (what has to be done) and police capacity (the effective resources with which to do things). Both are much wider concepts, and the effectiveness of Policing is the ratio between the two.

  34.  Workload is a function of:

    — Statutory duties—which keep expanding (examples in recent years include: PACE, Criminal Justice Act, Sex Offender monitoring; Licensing laws; ASBOs, Immigration policy, Freedom of Information, Stop and Search, Health and Safety).

    — The rules and regulations which govern how Policing is delivered; the outcome of public inquiries such as Lawrence, Laming, and Bichard inevitably lead to changes in the way that issues are handled in the future, and these include new codes of practice, data collection and recording systems, and the establishment of new specialisms (child protection being an example).

    — Procedures—because it can affect how long things take.

    — Governance—because it adds to the process.

    — Demands—there is a big difference between crime types in terms of the work needed to deal with them.

    — Expectations—from Government, the media, the public.

    — Changes in the customer base, in absolute terms (population/infrastructure) and in the mix (age, migration, ethnicity, religion).

    — Changes in the style and level of service, including more extensive response to specific policing issues (eg. community intelligence).

    — External factors such as technology and international tensions.

    — Inspection and audit requirements.

  35.  Capacity is a function of:

    — Total staff numbers.

    — Front line resources.

    — Support staff/support resources (equipment, advice, buildings).

    — IT and technical support (it may enable things to be done better and quicker).

    — Training.

    — External influences (transfer of functions; expansion of the wider policing family).

    — Delivery models and productivity.

  36.  Some of the issues are interconnected. Capacity can be influenced by workload. For example, expansion of crime prevention may generate a longer term reduction in crime which leaves spare capacity to utilise on other areas. Similarly CCTV and DNA make the service more effective, but they impact on both capacity (by enhancing the ability to solve crime) and workload (by generating more information and potential crimes).

  37.  The choices for the future are stark. The short term effect of recession will have a double impact—resources could be reduced at a time that demands are increasing, and this could widen the gaps. Labour markets may be reshaped as unemployment rises and the country looks to the sectors which will drive the economy out of recession. In the immediate future, this could leave vulnerable groups (the elderly and immobile, young people, low skills groups, single parents). It is also proven that people living in generally deprived areas perceive more problems in community safety and crime.

TAKING STOCK

  38.  The service has delivered on its objectives; it can point to many positive indicators:

    — Performance levels are holding up.

    — Officer numbers have increased, together with the quality and ranges of services delivered.

    — Overall crime levels are falling, even after allowing for changes in recording practice.

    — The service has outperformed most other parts of the public sector in efficiency gains and "use of resource" audits.

    — Rank structures have been reviewed, and the major element of the growth in officer numbers has been concentrated on police Constables and PCSOs.

    — National initiatives such as QUEST are helping to deliver improved services while releasing resources.

    — There are many powerful examples of local innovation, collaboration and partnership working.

    — The investment in Neighbourhood Policing has delivered gains in confidence and satisfaction: a 42% fall in crime has been accompanied by a reduction in risk of being a victim from 40% (1995) to 24% (2007).

    — Neighbourhood teams are demonstrating the effectiveness of "joined up" policing.

    — Successful regional programmes, and an expansion of regional collaborative working.

  39.  At the same time however, there are some significant negative indicators:

    — Perceptions—despite the reality, only one in five people believe that crime is falling; less than half believe officer numbers are increasing.

    — Public confidence in the service remains too low.

    — The public focus on Neighbourhood level action could take resources away from equally essential protective services.

    — The pressures—both financial and operational—are increasing; future efficiency savings could hit core functions.

    — Future funding levels cannot be guaranteed.

    — The obsession with police officer numbers can restrict options.

    — The biggest threat for the immediate future is whether crime levels start to increase again; if they do, it will have a compounding effect on the fear of crime, and could undermine some of the community cohesion which has been carefully rebuilt over the last five years.

The role of the Police Service in a modern society

  40.  The police service plays a diverse and wide-ranging role:

    — Crime solving and prevention.

    — Maintaining public order.

    — Promoting confidence and feelings of safety.

    — Enforcing standards of behaviour.

    — Maximising the socio-economic benefits of policing.

  41.  So Policing "helps set the tone"; but to do this successfully the service has to be responsive to how society evolves and the challenges it faces.

  42.  The challenges facing society now and in the next five years:

    — Responding to the social and economic impact of the downturn.

    — Shortage of money, which impacts directly on individuals and families, but also indirectly due to the reduction in the resourcing of other public services.

    — Maintaining confidence in public services.

    — Tendency towards lower respect for the law/growth of the black economy as a response to social and economic problems.

    — Loss of direction as money becomes the primary factor in public services.

    — Loss of momentum—strategies which have been carefully developed over many years, such as Equalities, Youth engagement and regeneration, could be sidelined or disrupted, and take many years to re-establish. This could have a detrimental impact on crime levels.

    — Maintaining LAA commitments, and the impact on confidence when they have to be abandoned.

43.  .. in this scenario, what does the police service need to do in order to meet what people and the Government want?

    — Visibility must be maintained

    — The psychological significance of police numbers must be acknowledged

    — There needs to be a speedy response to calls of all types

    — .. and effective action when dealing with the problem

    — Officers must be well trained to deal with the business of policing and community safety

    — The service must provide good and visible VFM and |

    — | install and maintain top class management

    — Authorities and Forces must maintain good governance standards in areas such as ethics/standards/ fairness/holding to account

    — It must be accessible and embedded within the fabric of local communities

Risks of under-resourcing the police service

  44.  The benefits of a well resourced police service are easily visible in terms of public confidence, safer communities, and the reputation of the country as a well ordered society. Over the last decade, the police service has enhanced its capabilities in investigation and response, and has invested massively in community/neighbourhood policing resources. Investment needs to be maintained as far as possible in all three areas. The risks of reducing the resources available in such a way that existing service levels cannot be maintained are significant.

    — Public confidence—Community Policing is crucial to the service's ability to deliver the confidence target, and any reduction in this area—in order to protect response and investigation—could have a serious impact; instead of increasing in line with the Home Office's aspirations in the single target, there could be a downward spiral, which could gain momentum. The psychological impact of a return to increasing crime levels and social disturbance could be very deep, and take many years to reverse.

    — If expectations continue to increase at the same time—because people look to the service to protect them when everything else is under threat—the gap will be accentuated.

    — National resilience could be threatened at a time when it is most needed, in the run up to 2012 and with continuing fears about worldwide terrorism.

    — The expansion and embedding of Neighbourhood Policing within communities could stall at a time when the public most need confidence in their local support.

    — Potential loss of continuity on long term crime and community safety which could change the pattern for future generations.

    — A reduction in the police contribution to delivering other public sector programmes.

    — Unfinished developments; wasted investment in research and change programmes.

    — More difficulty for national and regional police units to target the local areas most in need, because the community presence will have reduced.

DEVELOPING A STRATEGY FOR THE SERVICE

  45.  The first requirement for the next CSR period is realism. There is no point in aiming for unaffordable aspirations. The message on public funding is clear, and while it has not been set out publicly, services could well be advised to plan for a new lower level of spending which may last for up to 10 years.

  46.  The long term underlying trend in demand for Policing is upward, driven by government, demographic and economic changes, and expectations. There is no reason to think that these influences will be any less strong in the next CSR period and beyond. Therefore, a priority for the service will be to manage stakeholder expectations effectively, so that people understand what it is reasonable to expect in the future. This may involve a reduction in current levels in some areas, if other aspects of the service are to be protected. This is where the use of resource allocation techniques and a better understanding of capacity and workload will assist achieving overall VFM for the service.

  47.  It is also essential to be realistic about timescales. Over a period of three years, which is effectively covering most of the next CSR period, the emphasis should be on productivity and achieving efficiency gains on current programmes. Over a longer period (up to five years), it is feasible to look at new ways of doing what is done now. Beyond the five year horizon there is real scope to consider more transformational changes in what the service does, who it interacts with, and how it is delivered. With fixed three year CSR periods, it is easy to fall into the trap of simply fine tuning current services.

  48.  In the forthcoming climate, it is even more important to enter into discussions as early as possible on new approaches to service delivery which might provide the flexibility to join up services and improve outcomes, which will assist the police service in managing within the likely reduced long term funding levels.

Home Office priorities

  49.  The first five of the priorities in the Home Office Strategy 2008-11 relate directly to the police service:

    — To help people feel secure in their homes and local communities;

    — To cut crime, especially violent, drug and alcohol related crime;

    — To lead visible, responsive and accountable policing;

    — To support the efficient and effective delivery of justice;

    — To protect the public from terrorism;

Local Indicators

  50.  The latest guidance shows that there are 188 indicators in the National Indicator Set (NIS). Of these, 19 are APACS indicators. In addition, however, there are at least 36 other indicators which feature in the NIS but not APACS, but where the police service has a direct involvement. Taken together, the two categories represent 29% of the national indicators.

Potential new developments

  51.  The next CSR is not the time for launching major new initiatives unless the costs can be found within existing resource levels by working more cost effectively or by changing the mix of services.

  52.  In establishing the future planning environment, however, it is helpful to capture some of the future changes which have been identified by the service and by independent research, and which will have an impact directly or indirectly on policing in the next five to 10 years.

    — Short term and longer term impact of the economic downturn (impact on individuals, communities, acute localised problems).

    — An increasingly diverse society (there are over 120 nationalities represented in some force areas already).

    — New population clusters; increased risk of local tensions.

    — Continuing globalisation (in terms of industry, migration and crime).

    — Terrorism and international instability, and the need for early, effective intervention.

    — Policing the Olympics and the preparation for the event.

    — Population growth (up to 2020, growth due to migration and longevity is expected to exceed that of the 1980s and 1990s).

    — Family and community structure changes.

    — Climate change.

    — Changes in the role and delivery of other public services (as they are affected by the financial crisis).

    — The generations now reaching middle and old age have higher expectations of public services than their predecessors.

    — Impact of housing and economic growth.

    — The accelerating growth in high-tec crime.

  53.  Resource forecasts for the future:

    — Drawing on recent independent studies of the national finances, the arithmetic concludes that the service could at worst face cash reductions of over 10%, possibly phased in over three years from 2011-12. Even on the most optimistic assumptions, the service could face a cash standstill for several years, which would be the equivalent of 2% or more per annum reduction.

    — | so the challenge for the police will be to maintain services and provide what the public wants/society needs, within a severely reduced resource guideline.

    — The options include:

    — Reducing the unit cost of services through efficiency savings.

    — Adjusting expectations about what is achievable.

    — Reducing service levels by cutting out functions, transferring them or reconfiguring them.

Exploring the potential impact under the most pessimistic scenario

  54.  The impact of a 10% cut in funding would be nearly £1.2 billion per annum. Can this amount of money realistically be cut from policing budgets?

  55.  The cost structure of the service is:


Net costs after
income/grants
£m (*)
%


Uniformed police officers5,441 46.7
PCSO/traffic wardens395 3.4
Other staff2,48521.3
Police pensions1,889 16.2
Other running costs1,311 11.2
Capital financing charges138 1.2
11,659100.0


Notes:

  —  * figures taken from the last published outturn figures, for 2007-08

  —  Pension costs have been extracted from police pay, based on analysis in CIPFA Stats

  —  Income and specific grants have been apportioned over police pay, capital financing, and other running costs based on analysis in CIPFA Stats




  56.  Using the figures above, the required savings for different assumptions on the reductions in total spending are as follows:


£m


5% cut in total spending585
10% cut in total spending1,170
15% cut in total spending1,755
20% cut in total spending2,340





  57.  The capacity to make reductions in spending will vary across the main budgetary heads if the aim is to minimise the impact on front line, visible, policing. For example, external third party costs, or supplies and services might be considered the first targets as they are distanced from the front line. By contrast, continuing to measure service performance in terms of absolute numbers of police officers strictly limits the capacity to reduce costs without adverse consequences.

  58.  The capacity to release costs across the budget is affected by a number of factors:

    — The scale of the expenditure on particular functions.

    — The ease with which savings can be released.

    — The timescales over which that could be managed.

    — The impact on "front-line" policing or the quality of service.

  59.  Some elements of the budget—capital financing costs and large parts of the Pensions budget—are essentially fixed in the short term.

  60.  There are very important interdependencies in other areas. For example, a reduction in police officers numbers may be offset by transferring more operational support work to non-uniformed staff. By the same token, directing reductions towards the "back office" (whatever that is) will not necessarily improve the cost effectiveness of services if it means police officers picking up additional routine bureaucracy, or that the impetus for improvement through IT development and specialist support functions is lost.

  61.  In many ways, staff budgets are the easiest to adjust in the short term, as there is always a natural turnover of staff through retirements and leavers. The biggest element of policing budgets is uniformed officers, which on its own represents nearly half of the costs. It is not surprising, therefore, that many Forces will have to look at these areas of the budget if the required saving in total costs is beyond the service's short term capacity to release savings in other parts of the budget.

  62.  Many of the significant productivity and cost efficiency improvements will take several years to design and deliver fully. Some areas of the policing budget are subject to long term contracts, which will take time to adjust. Similarly the real capacity for collaborative savings will be shaped by the need to bring all the collaborating forces to the same starting point at the same time. This may mean that the short term reaction, in 2009-11, will be in those areas of the budget where the tap can be adjusted easily and swiftly. The more medium term response may look different if the service is successful in making the more fundamental changes which will be required in order to manage within substantially reduced budgets.

Exemplifying the implications of a 10% reduction

  63.  Taking a very basic approach, the order of priority for cost savings might be considered to be:

    (i) non operational support costs;

    (ii) operational support; and

    (iii) front line resources.

  64.  For the reasons outlined in the previous section, this is a gross over simplification of the picture. However, given the cost structure of policing budgets, simple arithmetic indicates that there is a limit to the amount that can realistically be removed from available non-front line budgets without adversely affecting front line delivery. Supplies and services budgets include many outsourced or critical operational services such as custody, forensic science and pathology, interpreter fees, investigation expenses; in addition there are substantial commitments to key infrastructure such as telecoms networks, radio communications and computing. Cuts in these areas could have as big an impact as reducing police officers or staff.

  65.  Even if for example, 20% of support staff budgets were removed, it would only reduce total financial requirements by around 4%. Theoretically taking 20% out of these budgets, even if supplemented by cuts in accommodation, transport and supplies on the same scale, would not create the headroom to take 10% out of the service as a whole without impacting on front line resources. Even in the support budget areas, there are significant elements of costs which are fixed or semi-fixed, and there is a minimum level below which costs cannot fall without affecting the infrastructure of the services. The appropriate level will differ for every force.

The make up of staffing costs

  66.  Nevertheless, if operational capacity is to be maintained, and the headline commitment to police officer numbers protected as far as possible, it is inevitable that non operational staff establishments and other support budgets will come under the spotlight initially. The scope to reduce costs will vary from area to area. Options will include measures to improve productivity, collaboration within the service (between Authorities or regional groups), collaboration with other public services, and national initiatives to promote functions in support of the whole service. There will also be a need to look critically at the functions which are undertaken, and ask challenging questions. Nevertheless, cutting support staff budgets is not a risk free option. In making reductions, it is vital that the basic processes of governance and accountability are maintained. Also, force based support staff play a significant role in maximising police officer capacity by taking on administrative functions. The service must be careful that it creates the most effective balance.

Potential implications for uniformed resources

  67.  Working through the arithmetic, purely for illustration because the impact would differ in every force, if it were feasible to take 20% out of non staff budgets and up to 25% out of non-operational staff budgets, it would still require significant reductions in uniformed staff budgets.


£m


Savings required from uniformed staff budgets
5% cut
Nil
10% cut
260
15% cut
845
20% cut
1,430





Implications for police numbers

  68.  Total uniformed police numbers are approximately 140,000 at present.

  69.  Working on an average cost per employee of £45,000 (including pensions and other employer costs), the implied reduction from the assessment above is a reduction of between 5,800 officers (10% real cut) and over 30,000 officers (20% real cut).

  70.  This demonstrates quite starkly that because there are practical limits on how much can be taken out of non uniformed areas of the budget, the potential impact on police officer numbers increases disproportionately as the overall savings target increases. While the assumptions in the model can be challenged, it is unrealistic to assume that more than 20-25% can be taken out of support budgets without a direct impact on police officer capacity. So the overall conclusion would be unlikely to change.

Service implications

  71.  Reducing the absolute numbers of police officers sacrifices one of the principal national and political objectives. It also potentially undermines the priorities of the public in terms of measures such as visibility, speed of response, follow up, and community involvement.

An alternative approach: increasing output

  72.  To a degree it may be possible to offset some of the impact by working more effectively and productively, so that the same volume of work is done by fewer police officers.

    — How realistic is this given current commitments and expectations? Can these be adjusted downwards, and what is the educative process that needs to take place in order to achieve this?

    — Do the measures currently being evaluated by NPIA, HO/WEF and individual Authorities offer the capacity to achieve that level of reduction in the short term? Do we in fact need a more fundamental look at Policing and how it is delivered, and by whom? (ie does everything which is done now actually need to be done by uniformed police officers?)

    — Can the visibility target be achieved with fewer officers? It may mean:

    — Changes in the style of working, with front line officers concentrating purely on visibility and presence, and other staff dealing with the bureaucracy and the follow up. There would be consequential changes to job content, working regulations and procedures, and information systems.

    — Transferring as many uniformed officers as possible onto front line, visible duties. Risks "hollowing out" support functions and actually decreasing productivity as functions and roles are transferred or stopped.

    — More use of lower cost alternatives to full time warranted officers, including PCSOs, specials, wardens or volunteers.

Can any functions be cut out or transferred to other agencies?

  73.  There have been many reviews over the last 20 years, with some positive impact on areas such as Highways Management, escorting big loads, football policing, and stray dogs. The economic environment we are now facing will make it more difficult for other agencies to pick up duties transferred from police; however, this is a national resource allocation issue—is it better overall to maintain policing presence even if it means even more pressure on other public services?

  74.  Even if further scope exists, it does not necessarily mean that police numbers can be reduced if the "visibility" criterion remains at the top of the priorities.

Consequential impact on other national priorities

  75.  The police service assists other public services to achieve their targets. Reducing police resources can have an adverse impact further up and down the chain. Examples include:

    — The police service input to CDRPs and other local partnerships.

    — Providing the formal statutory frameworks for child protection.

    — Maintaining order and equality in an increasingly diverse society.

    — Balancing enforcement with education in areas such as drug abuse and anti-social behaviour.

    — Using the natural authority of the police service to help set and maintain standards across all aspects of public life.

    — Leading the fight against serious crime and business/IT related crimes.

    — Providing the community intelligence to support the fight against international terrorist activity.

  76.  It is illustrated by the number of national Performance Indicators which indirectly involve the police service.

Managing expectations

  77.  This will be one of the biggest challenges for all public services, but particularly for the police. Ministers, other services, the media, and the public have all developed a concept of what the police will do in terms of all the measures such as visibility, response, follow up, public order, crime solving, and many other indicators. If the cut in resources is at the upper end of the scale, then even with increased productivity and significant cuts in support costs, it is inevitable that there will be an impact on services. Some things will not be done, or they will be done less thoroughly, or responded to in a different way. The public has never had to deal with this situation previously. The sooner that the problem is grasped and the process of reconstructing expectations starts, the smoother will be its implementation.

Restating the challenge

  78.  The anticipated cut back in resources is a national problem, to be shared by everyone. It will only be achieved with compromises, and will not be helped by a pretence that somehow nothing will change, but it will just cost less.

  79.  The challenge is to be realistic in setting sights and aspirations. If this isn't adequately accomplished, the service faces up to 10 years of failure and progressive decline.

CONCLUSIONS

  80.  Police authorities accept the financial reality and are utterly resolved to confronting the challenges ahead.

  81.  Police authorities will adapt as needs demand.

  82.  Much good work and progress on increasing efficiency and producing savings has already been achieved, particularly with support from fora such as the Workforce Efficiency and Finance Group and the more recently convened High Level Working Group.

  83.  The future landscape for the police service is changing. It is inevitable that resource levels will get much tighter in the immediate future. If and when it is confirmed that this represents a new long term level of spending on public services, the sooner the service takes action and adjusts to the new levels, the better for communities and the nation.

  84.  The dilemma will be where reductions should fall if they are required, and the remaining future capacity to absorb more within current resource levels. The risk of responding with short term measures is that the longer term, more fundamental, issues will not be addressed, and the impact could be greater when that time arrives. Once the gap is quantified, it will be of longer term benefit if it is addressed now, so that transitional measures can be put in place.

  85.  Police spending is over £11 billion a year. Inflation and real increases could average around £300 million a year in aggregate.

  The preliminary national forecasts for the next CSR included just over 1% pa real growth in public spending, but this was before the worst of the financial crisis had fed through. Even at that level, however, commitments such as benefit payments and pensions uplift would take all of the real growth and more, leaving other services well into real term reductions. Every 1% shortfall represents over £100 million for the police service (average £2.5 million per Force) and the true shortfall will be significantly higher because there is always inbuilt real growth from demographic changes and new legislation. At the "consensus" level of 10% cuts over three years, the police service needs to remove around £1.2 billion from its budgets.

  86.  In that scenario, the service will need a planned transition to the new level, using a combination of:

    — Efficiency and productivity improvements.

    — Different ways of working.

    — Curtailing or transferring specific functions.

    — Additional charges.

    — Withdrawing from specific roles.

  87.  The service will have a better chance of success if the strategy is planned over at least three to five years. A year at a time approach is unlikely to achieve this.

November 2009





 
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