| Summary
Cocaine, even if taken only occasionally, is in no way a 'safe' drug. In 2008 some 235 sudden deaths were associated with cocaine, and it is linked to heart disease, long-term erosion of cognitive brain function, and of extremely toxic effects when combined with alcohol. It rightly deserves its 'A' classification.
Cocaine powder use in the UK has risen steeply. The number of adults reporting cocaine use within the past year quintupled from 1996 to 2008/09, as did the number of young people: this trend bucks the overall trend in illicit drug use in the UK, which fell during the same period. The number of individuals in treatment for primary cocaine powder addiction has also risen, from 10,770 in 2006/07 to 12,592 in 2007/08. Purity of cocaine at both wholesale and street level has fallen, most notably at street level, with some seizures now containing as little as 5% cocaine. The wholesale and street level prices of cocaine have adopted opposing trajectories to one another: a 'line' of cocaine has halved since 1999, whereas wholesale price at the border has doubled.
Any successful policy against cocaine must address both supply-side enforcement and demand reduction. To co-ordinate action across the many disparate government agencies, we recommend the appointment of an Independent Drugs Advisor to ensure that Government drugs policy is fully implemented, and in an integrated manner.
In tackling supply, both SOCA and UKBA actively export disruption of the cocaine trade overseas, on the rationale that it is better to prevent it reaching UK shores than intercept it once here. We support this strategic approach in principle and recommend that it continue to form the basis of the UK law enforcement response. In this context, we highlight the success of UKBA Operations Airbridge in Jamaica and Westbridge in Ghana in intercepting drugs couriers before they depart for the UK, and recommend similar operations be established in other transit countries.
It is far more difficult, however, to establish how successful this strategic approach has been in practice. SOCA, which leads UK efforts in overseas disruption, seized 85.1 tonnes of cocaine worldwide in 2008/09—but this was in joint operations with other partners, and it is impossible to determine what proportion was due to SOCA alone. We make two recommendations to improve this situation: that the two criteria SOCA currently uses to determine whether to include a seizure in its figures be replaced with a more detailed scale which records the agency's involvement, and that the criteria for measuring this scale be published. More generally, we conclude that seizures alone do not adequately measure the success of 'upstream' disruption of trafficking networks and propose a more nuanced scoring system to measure the impact of SOCA and UKBA operations overseas, grading operations on the basis of their disruptive impact.
With regard to cocaine which reaches the UK border, although the amount can only be estimated, we are shocked to discover that despite the combined efforts of the police, UKBA and SOCA, only 3.5 tonnes of cocaine was seized in the UK last year, whilst 25-30 tonnes enters it annually. We consider that interception of only 12-14% of cocaine reaching the UK is woefully inadequate. In particular we note that the number of seizures made by UKBA fell in 2008/09, and conclude that its target to seize 2.4 tonnes of cocaine this year is both deeply unambitious and perplexing since it is lower than the amount it seized in both previous years. Whilst we praise individual customs officers, we suggest that UKBA's low seizure targets reflect a culture of complacency regarding the interception of goods as opposed to people. We recommend that individual targets for UKBA, SOCA and the police be replaced by a joint seizure target for UK law enforcement agencies.
Overall, although we agree that the doubling in wholesale price of cocaine at the UK border between 1999 and 2009 suggests that law enforcement efforts has had some impact on supply to the UK, we saw no evidence that enforcement has affected availability on the street. Instead, we conclude that demand-driven trends in cocaine use offer more compelling explanations for the fall in street-level purity: including the emergence of a 'two-tier' market for cheaper, more heavily-adulterated cocaine available alongside a purer, more expensive product, the use of more sophisticated cutting agents and the sheer increase in the number of users.
Users of cocaine powder have diversified from the 'rich and famous' to a far wider cross-section of society. This, coupled with the large increase in cocaine powder users, suggests that greater attention must be focused on targeting demand, in particular to challenge the socially acceptable image of cocaine powder and its misguided reputation as a 'safe', non-addictive party drug.
Public information campaigns have a key role in tackling demand. We praise the success of the Government's Talk to Frank campaign, but suggest certain messages could be better exploited, especially the effect of cocaine on executive brain function, the risks of heart attack and sudden death, and the dangers of adulterants. The Colombian Government's Shared Responsibility campaign about the environmental and human costs of the cocaine trade should be further promoted in the UK.
Access to community-based treatment for cocaine misuse has vastly improved since 2002, with waiting times reduced from three months to six days. However, we are concerned by reports that residential rehabilitation is not readily available, and recommend that the Government increase funding for this treatment. We warn that restricting the definition of a 'problem drug user' to opiate and/or crack users only may reduce treatment for cocaine powder users, and recommend that the Government revise its definition to include powder users.
Finally, we are impressed with high-visibility anti-cocaine operations run by some police forces in town centres at night, which combine zero-tolerance enforcement with treatment. We urge more Chief Constables to run such operations and recommend that all police forces invest in hand-held drug trace machines.
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