6 DISRUPTING THE SUPPLY
Policy emphasis: supply or demand?
92. Witnesses had different views on whether the
balance of policy should lie with tackling supply or demand. John
Mann MP argued for supply side emphasis:
There is a clear evidence base is that cocaine
is price sensitive and it is more price sensitive than other illicit
drugs, and therefore the concentration of British policy making
should be to disrupt the supply and force up the price of cocaine.[124]
93. However Professor McKeganey argued that supply-side
enforcement was not succeeding to "anywhere near the degree
we need". His calculations had shown that, in Scotland, only
around 1% of all heroin and around 10% of all cocaine was seized
each year. Steve Rolles agreed that tackling the supply alone
could never be successful:
History shows with crystal clarity that an enforcement
response cannot get rid of the illicit drug trade
it is a
fundamental reality of the economic dynamics of unregulated illegal
markets where demand is huge; the opportunity is created and criminal
entrepreneurs will always exploit that opportunity. Every dealer
or trafficker you arrest, another one immediately fills the void.[125]
Evan Harris MP argued that "if you restrict
supply you will increase the price, but you will also restrict
the suppliers in the marketyou create a more violent market".
94. The Minister, Alan Campbell MP, was adamant that
supply-side enforcement was vital, emphasising that enforcement
needed to focus on criminal networks and traffickers, as much
as on seizing cocaine:
It is not the commodity that we should necessarily
be focusing on; it is the people. We need to do everything we
can to break their networks, preferably in the countries where
they are established.[126]
95. Any public policy which aims to reduce the
number of cocaine users and the harms associated with cocaine
must encompass both supply and demand. Neither supply-side enforcement
nor demand reduction can on its own successfully tackle cocaine
use.
Co-ordinating policy
96. We took evidence from Keith Hellawell, the Government
Drugs Adviser between 1998 and 2002. Mr Hellawell argued that
any successful policy needed to address all aspects of supply
and demand, and in addition should have a designated body or figure
to co-ordinate the work of the different Government departments.
He told us:
When you deal with [drugs] as a strategic issue,
you can begin to have success at seizures offshore; diplomatic
policy in the [source] countries to try to change attitudes. However,
it is important that you have the round. If you do not treat and
educate you will not deter young people coming into drugs. If
you do not treat those who are addicted it will attract other
addicts as part of their group and they will commit crime to support
their habit. It has to be a co-ordinated policy therefore, dealing
with education, treatment and the criminal justice side of it
Co-ordination
of activities needed to be done by someone with the authority
although not the power of the Prime Minister in order that that
individual could have responsibility and a degree of influence
over all the departments.[127]
97. As Government Drugs Advisor Mr Hellawell oversaw
the input of 16 departments into drugs policy, and drew up the
Government's first drugs strategy.[128]
He described some difficulties in the formulation of a role which
was "neither, elected, nor a civil servant".[129]
He had, however, insisted on having "the independence to
speak to all parties, because on appointment I felt that drugs
should not be a political issue". Mr Hellawell told us that,
when responsibility for drugs policy went to the Home Office and
he was given a scaled-down role, "immediately all of the
budgets went back to the departments. Immediately, the co-ordinated
approach and the reporting process, wentand the departments
were left to do their own things".[130]
He said that "a number of things that the Government supported
never happened because the will was lost when there was not someone
who was difficultand I think I was seen to be difficultpushing
this through".[131]
98. Mr Hellawell considered that the role of an independent
drugs co-ordinator was of great value, arguing that it had been
seen as a "gold standard" by other European countries.[132]
ACC Matthews of ACPO agreed that "it is always useful to
have a single point of contact."[133]
However, Mr Hellawell warned that the constitutional position
of a co-ordinator would need to be clarified, to prevent a repeat
of the position he found himself in, where "having an outsider
with some influence was disliked intensely, first by the civil
servants but, as time went on, by Ministers".[134]
99. We asked the Minister, Alan Campbell MP, whether
he considered there to be a need for an independent co-ordinator.
He did "not think so, partly because Keith Hellawell was
able to put into place the building blocks for the policy which
has then been rolled out".[135]
100. We recommend that the Government appoint
an Independent Drugs Advisor, using as a model the role carried
out by Keith Hellawell between 1998 and 2002. The structure of
the drugs strategy which Mr Hellawell initiated remains in place.
However we consider that the proliferation of different departments
involved in drugs policy from supply-side enforcement through
to treatment, necessitates an independent co-ordinator to ensure
that policy is fully implemented, and in an integrated manner.
UK Agencies
101. Internationally, the Serious Organised Crime
Agency (SOCA) leads UK efforts to disrupt the cocaine trade, gathering
and sharing intelligence on smugglers and shipments with international
partners to prevent cocaine reaching Europe, and working with
UK agencies to dislocate the drugs trade within the UK. SOCA agents
are embedded in key countries overseas to co-ordinate intelligence
exchange. At the borders of, and within, the UK, the UK Border
Agency is responsible for detection and seizure of cocaine coming
into the country, whether by air or sea. The UKBA also has liaison
officers (formerly HM Revenue and Customs officers) based in key
partner countries overseas, such as the Netherlands. The police
detect and seize quantities of cocaine being dealt or consumed.
102. The UN Office for Drugs and Crime's World
Drug Report 2009 urged that "law enforcement should shift
its focus from drug users to drug traffickers".[136]
This shift in emphasis has already begun in the UK, with an increasing
emphasis being placed on the international roles of SOCA and UKBA
in taking a strategic approach to drug trafficking, disrupting
networks and making seizures before they reach UK shores.
Disrupting production
103. SOCA's UK Threat Assessment 2009/10 states that
"an estimated 65-70% of the UK's identified cocaine supply
is believed to be produced in Colombia. Peru and Bolivia account
for the vast majority of the remaining 30-35% of cocaine imported
into the UK".[137]
104. According to UNODC figures[138]
in 2008 the total worldwide area under coca cultivation decreased
by 8% to 167,000 ha: this was despite small increases in Bolivia
(6%) and Peru (4%), which were offset by a significant decrease
in Colombia (18%).[139]
Despite this progress, Colombia remained the world's largest cultivator
of coca bush, with 81,000 ha, followed by Peru (56,100 ha) and
Bolivia (30,500 ha). Estimated global cocaine production
decreased by 15% from 994 metric tons in 2006 to 845 mt in 2008largely
due to a strong reduction in cocaine production in Colombia (28%)
which was not offset by increases in Bolivia and Peru.[140]

Figure 4: Global cocaine production (metric
tonnes), 1994-2008[141]
105. In terms of seizures, in 2008 some 200 tons
of cocaine were seized in Colombia, a 57% increase over 2007.
More than 3,200 laboratories were destroyed, an increase of 36%.
In Bolivia there was a 45% increase in seizures of cocaine base
and a 145% increase in seizures of cocaine hydrochloride; in Peru
an 86% increase in seizures of cocaine base and 100% increase
in cocaine hydrochloride.[142]
COLOMBIA
106. Since the 1980s Colombia has implemented a policy
of aerial spraying of herbicides to suppress coca cultivation,
alongside a ground eradication campaign to uproot drugs plants.
Since 1998 Colombia has eradicated 1.5 million hectares of illicit
crops through crop eradication schemes.[143]
107. In addition to crop eradication, the Colombians,
with aid from other countries, in particular the United States,
have invested in alternative development programmes, which aim
to give farmers a viable livelihood growing licit alternative
crops such as cocoa and coffee. Most coca crops are grown by poor
farmers on small holdings in areas which lack the infrastructure
for licit crops to be profitable. Organised drugs gangs own large
swathes of the land, thereby controlling much crop farming. The
Colombian Ambassador told us that "if given an alternative,
[peasants] will move into another crop. For them it is just a
matter of subsistence".[144]
108. Bill Hughes, Director-General of SOCA told us
that his organisation had a "very strong working relationship"
with the Colombian Government, counter-narcotics and fiscal officers,
and that it provided a lot of technical support to the Colombians,
including having SOCA officers embedded in their agencies.[145]
He added that it also had a "very good working relationship"
with Venezuela, although Peru, Bolivia and Ecuador were "more
difficult".[146]
109. Alan Campbell MP told us that the UK spent about
£1million (per annum) on anti-cocaine co-operation with Colombia,
not counting the cost of the SOCA officers based there.[147]
At the end of 2005 the EU was also spending 140 million
supporting 37 alternative development initiatives in Latin America,
14 in Colombia.[148]
The US invests heavily in counter-narcotics programmes: USAid's
Alternative Development Programme had a budget for Latin America
of $492 million for 2010.[149]
110. The Colombian Ambassador, HE Mr Mauricio Rodriguez
Munera, told us that the Colombian Government was "permanently
talking to the UK Government and we appreciate that co-operation
and support".[150]
However he added that "the Colombian Government would like
to see the UK supporting Colombia in the fight against production
of cocaine as much as the US in proportion to the size of the
impact that it has in the UK".[151]
He also called for the establishment of a free trade agreement
between Colombia and the EU, saying that it would "give the
Colombian economy an opportunity to generate employment, to produce
goods and services that can be exported".[152]
111. We were very encouraged by the political
will evidenced by the Colombian Government to work with international
partners to tackle the cultivation and production of cocaine.
The substantial reductions in the last year in Colombia of 18%
in cultivation and 28% in production, and a 57% increase in Colombian
seizures, are impressive, and point to the implementation of more
aggressive anti-cocaine policies.
112. However, the persistence of a high overall
area under cultivation in Colombia, at 81,000 ha in 2008, shows
that the battle has only just been joined. It seems to us that
the key to further success lies as much in alternative development
programmes as in crop and laboratory eradication schemes. Given
the unenviable position of the UK as one of the largest consumers
of cocaine worldwide, the UK has a compelling duty to support
Colombia in tackling cocaine production. In this context the £1million
a year spent by the UK on anti-cocaine operations in Colombia
does not seem very substantial, particularly when compared to
the amounts invested by the EU and US. We therefore urge the UK
Government to re-examine its development budgets to see whether
more could be contributed to Colombian alternative developments
schemes.
PERU AND BOLIVIA
113. Whilst Peru and Bolivia both made substantial
increases in cocaine seizures last year, both countries also saw
increases in the amount of coca cultivation and production. The
Government told us that "Peruvian political commitment to
tackle the drugs trade is strong and has yielded some positive
results" but that the situation in Bolivia was less clear:
"in November 2008 President Morales expelled the US Drug
Enforcement Administration from Bolivia, accusing them of conspiring
against the government".[153]
The Government told us that it funds UK projects with the UNODC
in Peru totalling around £180,000.[154]
114. We regret to note that progress in coca crop
eradication and cocaine seizures made in Colombia do not appear
to have been replicated in Peru and Bolivia, reflecting SOCA's
assessment that relations with those countries were "more
difficult". The UK should use all diplomatic routes at its
disposal to engage with the Bolivian Government on cocaine production,
and seek to increase development of alternative crop programmes
in Peru and Bolivia.
Trafficking into the EU
INTERNATIONAL SMUGGLING ROUTES
115. According to the European Monitoring Centre
for Drugs and Drug Addiction (EMCDDA) there are three key trafficking
routes to Europe from South American countries, as depicted in
Figure 5. The Northern route departs from South America
and reaches Europe via the Caribbean. The International Narcotics
Control Board estimates that 40% of cocaine entering Europe passes
through the Caribbean, reaching the Caribbean either by ship or
air. From the Caribbean to Europe the most common route is maritime:
either 'go-fast' vessels, pleasure boats and container ships,
but drugs mules are also used on aircraft. The Caribbean has a
prominent position due to its historic links with certain European
countries, for example Netherlands Antilles with the Netherlands
and Jamaica with the UK.
116. The Central route runs from South America
more or less direct to Europe, entering at the Iberian peninsula
with possible transits in Cape Verde, the Azores, Madeira or the
Canary Islands, with small vessels and speedboats predominantly
used to run shipments from the transit points to the Iberian peninsula.[155]
Bulk maritime shipments are also used for transportation direct
to the UK or to mainland Europe, particularly the Netherlands
and Spain.[156]
117. Via the African route cocaine reaches
west Africa via Venezuela, Suriname and Brazil by sea in large
cargo or fishing boats, or by air in specially modified aircraft.
SOCA told us that "until mid June 2008 small twin propeller
aircraft and jets flew from Venezuela to the west Africa coastline
(Guinea, Guinea Bissau, Ghana and Togo)" but that "since
June 2008 the airbridge has been disrupted".[157]
Cocaine is moved on using fishing boats to land on the north-west
coast of the Iberian peninsula, or drugs mules on commercial flights.
The route has been a cause of growing concern in recent years
as its role in transit, storage and repacking has expanded rapidly.
124 Q 205 Back
125
Q 162 Back
126
Q 608 Back
127
Q 570 Back
128
Q 572 Back
129
Q 570 Back
130
Q 571 Back
131
Q 577 Back
132
Q 579 Back
133
Q 407 Back
134
Q 582 Back
135
Q 626 Back
136
United Nations Office for Drugs and Crime, World Drug Report
2009, Executive Summary, p.2 Back
137
SOCA, UK Threat Assessment of Organised Crime 2009/10, p.7 Back
138
Two different estimates of coca cultivation and production exist:
the UNODC and the Interagency Assessment of Cocaine Movements
(IACM). They differ slightly on estimates. The figures cited here
are taken from UNODC estimates. Back
139
United Nations Office for Drugs and Crime, World Drug Report
2009, Executive Summary, p.11 Back
140
Ibid., p.11. UNODC estimates are based on the UNODC Crop Monitoring
Programme. The other source of data on cultivation and production
is the annual production surveys carried out by the UK Central
Intelligence Agency and published by the Office of National drug
Control Policy (ONDCP). The data cited here are taken from UNODC
estimates. Back
141
United Nations Office for Drugs and Crime, World Drug Report
2009, Executive Summary, p.11 Back
142
United Nations Office for Drugs and Crime Press Notice, UNODC
Reports Steep Decline in Cocaine Production in Colombia (19 June
2009): http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/press/releases/2009/june/unodc-reports-steep-decline-in-cocaine-production-in-colombia.html.
Trend analysis isbased on coca surveys of the Andean countries.
Back
143
Ev 176 [Letter from HE Mr Mauricio Rodriguez Munera, Colombian
Ambassador to the UK, 10 November 2009] Back
144
Q 334 Back
145
Q 553 Back
146
Q 555 Back
147
Q 614 Back
148
EMCDDA, Monitoring the supply of cocaine to Europe (October 2008),
p.21 Back
149
USAid website: http://www.usaid.gov/locations/latin_america_caribbean/issues/narcotics_issue.html
Back
150
Q 348 Back
151
Q371 Back
152
Q 374 Back
153
Ev 94 Back
154
Ev 94 Back
155
EMCDDA, Monitoring the supply of cocaine to Europe, (October 2008),
p.14 Back
156
SOCA, UK Threat Assessment of Organised Crime 2009/10, p.30 Back
157
Ibid., p.30 Back
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