Memorandum submitted by Dr Martin Elvins,
University of Dundee
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
— The Caribbean is an important transit
region for cocaine destined for Europe and the drug trade is the
primary factor behind the relatively high (and rising) levels
of crime and violence that afflict the region.
— Deep-seated links make Caribbean-UK trafficking
especially resilient.
— The region is a complex political environment,
where resource inequalities are a significant barrier to effective
collaboration, and provide weak links for traffickers to exploit.
— International collaboration is fragmented
and regional cooperation largely ineffective against the cocaine
trade.
— The UK diplomatic presence in the Caribbean
is steadily diminishing, and drugs and crime is no longer a strategic
priority in the global work of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office
(FCO).
— These decisions project a negative message
that Caribbean countries are being left to their own devices.
— The HMRC/UKBA Airbridge programme has
successfully limited drug courier traffic to the UK from Jamaica,
but displaces aspects of the problem back to the Caribbean.
— Until consumer demand for cocaine falls
substantially, the best the UK can hope for are periodic operational
level gains.
— Opportunities for effective engagement
exist but would require major investment (and an FCO U-turn).
INTRODUCTION TO
THE AUTHOR
I am a Lecturer in Politics and International
Relations at the University of Dundee, where my research specialises
in the study of public policy and law enforcement in relation
to illegal drugs. For example, I am the author of Anti-Drugs
Policies of the European Union, published by Palgrave Macmillan
(2003).
With regard to the terms of reference for this
inquiry, my knowledge of the cocaine trade is focused on the issue
of international collaboration in transit countries, and encompasses
analysis of the roles of both SOCA and HMRC/UKBA. This knowledge
is informed by a current research project entitled UK and Dutch
counter-drugs policies in the Caribbean: a comparative analysis,
which began in 2008 and is due for completion in summer 2009.
The project is funded by a significant research grant from the
Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC). The project entails
extensive face-to-face interviews with UK (and foreign) diplomatic
staff, Caribbean government officials and law enforcement and
customs officers (as well as Caribbean-based SOCA liaison officers).
A substantial proportion of the fieldwork is already complete,
and has included research visits to Barbados, Guyana, Curaçao,
St Lucia, and Trinidad and Tobago.
UK GOVERNMENT EFFORTS
TO PREVENT
AND DISRUPT
COCAINE TRANSHIPMENT
VIA THE
CARIBBEAN
1. The growing use of cocaine in Europe—particularly
apparent in the United Kingdom (UK)—has been well documented
in recent years. To reach potential consumers those involved in
the cocaine trade utilise a diverse range of routes and shipping
methods which move or change (sometimes temporarily) often as
a direct consequence of law enforcement activity along the various
stages of the drug supply chain. The recent emergence of West
Africa as an indirect cocaine trafficking route into Europe has,
for example, been widely interpreted as evidence of more effective
law enforcement along more well-established routes, of which the
Caribbean is a prominent example. The mostly island states of
the Caribbean region are drug transit countries for two unavoidable
reasons: their geographic proximity to the three main coca and
cocaine producing countries and the vast size of the Caribbean
Sea (over a million square miles in area) which has long provided
a haven for illicit shipments.
2. The Serious Organised Crime Agency (SOCA)
has recently estimated that 35 to 45 tonnes of cocaine powder
enters the UK each year, supplying both the cocaine powder and
crack cocaine markets. This is part of an estimated 250 tonnes
of cocaine that, according to Europol, enters the European Union
(EU) annually via maritime shipments, air freight and couriers.
In 2008, the International Narcotics Control Board estimated that
around 40 per cent of the cocaine that reaches Europe had transited
the Caribbean, which equates—on the basis of the Europol
estimate—to 100 tonnes annually.
3. The Caribbean is thus a significant dimension
of the cocaine trade, with the drug reaching the UK consumer market
via both direct (Caribbean—UK) and indirect (Caribbean—EU—UK)
routes. However, a number of Caribbean countries have a unique,
enduring relationship with the UK that transcends this unwelcome
modern trade. The UK is one of three EU countries with the closest
ties to the region, joined by France and the Netherlands. Trade
links, scheduled airline flights and well-established citizenship
ties and cultural networks are focused on certain countries, reflecting
the patchwork legacy of the colonial history on the region. These
links provide fertile conduits for the cocaine trade and its associated
criminal networks. Whilst the overall UK diplomatic presence maintained
by the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) in the region has
seen a steady decline in recent years, the delivery of counter-drugs
assistance has been focused on Jamaica and in the Eastern Caribbean
(the British High Commission in Barbados is accredited to seven
countries). The missions in Guyana and in Trinidad and Tobago
have more limited engagement on the drugs issue. The FCO also
has responsibility for the security and governance of the six
British Overseas Territories (BOTs) in the Caribbean (about which
serious concerns over their vulnerability to money laundering
were raised by the House of Commons Committee of Public Accounts
in 2008).
4. The UK, in common with all EU member
states, would clearly like to prevent and disrupt as much cocaine
trafficking as possible both in source countries and at any point
possible along the supply chain to Europe. Whilst this has obvious
intrinsic logic in terms of preventing and reducing crime and
health harm manifested in Europe, it points to the important issue
of responsibility for the impact of trafficking on transit countries.
This can be viewed as, at least in part, a moral responsibility
in light of the inexorable causal pull of drug demand from European
consumers. A 2007 joint report by the World Bank and United Nations
Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) concluded that while levels
of crime and associated circumstances vary by country across the
Caribbean, the strongest explanation for the relatively high (and
rising) rates of crime and violence in the region is drug trafficking.
With many countries having weak criminal justice systems, the
potential of the drug trade to overwhelm the smallest states and
undermine the development of all states is one of the biggest
challenges faced by the region. The widespread availability of
firearms is strongly associated with drug trafficking and contributes
to some of the highest per capita murder rates in the world, notably
in Jamaica and in Trinidad and Tobago. In the latter, the murder
rate has doubled in the past two years.
5. As well as firearms, drug flows generate
a series of interrelated problems in the Caribbean. Emergent local
drug markets arise from "payment in kind" in the form
of drugs made to local shipment facilitators who seek to sell
on local markets (in turn exacerbating gang conflicts, prostitution
and other crimes). Corruption of local law enforcement officials
and civil servants further undermines good governance and, particularly
in some countries, money laundering seriously undermines legitimate
economic activity.
6. Resources vary enormously across the
region both in terms of economic wealth and human capital, so
a country such as Trinidad and Tobago (with a large petrochemical
industry, and a population of 1.3 million) is infinitely better
placed to implement counter-drugs action than, say, St. Kitts
and Nevis (with a population of 50,000 and economically dependent
on tourism). The scale of problems faced by the former, as noted
above, is correspondingly larger of course but, ultimately, even
though both countries are sovereign states Trinidad and Tobago
is much freer to choose its own actions and investment decisions
(it has, for example, committed to purchase UK-built offshore
patrol boats). However, the smallest states are almost totally
reliant on outside assistance if they are to strengthen their
indigenous capacity to be an effective first line of defence:
Caribbean law enforcement agencies and coast guards are often
poorly paid professions and lack adequate resources such as surveillance
equipment or fast intercept boats.
7. The context described above conveys the
environment in which the FCO has attempted to deliver programmes
in support of Caribbean countries to counter the cocaine trade.
The principal method for providing UK assistance has been provision
of law enforcement training, delivered mainly to the Eastern Caribbean
states and Jamaica. Alongside this, deployment of SOCA (and before
that, Her Majesty's Revenue and Customs [HMRC]) drug liaison officers
to the Caribbean has been used to develop criminal intelligence
and evidence for so-called downstream (that is, in the UK or EU)
interventions and—the ultimate aim—prosecutions. Historically,
liaison officers have built working relationships on the ground
with local and other foreign drug enforcement agencies active
in the region but their role is operationally focused on the impact
of the drugs trade on the UK. Similarly, a project emerged in
2002 in response to the emergence of a specific problem affecting
the UK.
8. In 2002, HMRC established Operation Airbridge
in Jamaica in order to address the problem of very significant
numbers of drug couriers (or "mules") bound for the
UK at that time, many of whom were swallowing packets of cocaine.
This programme worked on the principle of posting UK officers
overseas to try and stop couriers at source before they reach
the UK. Data presented to Parliament show that Airbridge has unquestionably
achieved its objective of deterring large numbers of couriers
from Jamaica. However, whilst some displacement to other countries
has almost certainly resulted it is impossible to measure precisely
how and where this has occurred. Airbridge continues to operate
and is now a joint UK Borders Agency (UKBA)-Jamaican government
initiative, yet plans to implement an equivalent programme in
St. Lucia in 2008 were abandoned after opposition from the government
of St. Lucia at that time.
9. However, the UK approach to how drugs
and crime assistance is delivered overseas has recently undergone
fundamental change. In April 2008, following a review that resulted
in a new Strategic Framework for the FCO, it was decided that
the FCO should no longer lead on international aspects of international
crime and drugs (and instead focus on areas such as climate change).
Sir Peter Ricketts, Permanent Under-Secretary at the FCO recently
explained to the House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee that
it was felt that there was "better synergy" for the
Home Office to lead on international as well as domestic policy.
This decision had immediate and precipitate consequences for the
work being carried out at the time by the FCO in the Eastern Caribbean.
10. Under FCO auspices the UK Security Advisory
Team (UKSAT) had been established in 2005 to implement training
for Caribbean law enforcement in the Eastern Caribbean. Prompted
by its revised strategic priorities the FCO has determined that
UKSAT will close by March 2010. The maritime training unit in
Antigua was closed in March 2008 and its assets (mainly training
boats) were donated to the Regional Security System (RSS) which
is entails collaboration between seven Eastern Caribbean countries.
In reviewing the outcomes from UKSAT the value of its legacy has
been questioned: the UK had no control over the deployment of
personnel trained under the scheme. Whilst political-level drug
cooperation will continue to form part of diplomatic dialogue,
once UKSAT closes the only full-time drugs work in the Caribbean
will be carried out by the network of SOCA liaison officers (SLOs)
posted to a small number of Caribbean countries (SOCA has some
140 SLOs worldwide, but only a handful are based in the Caribbean).
11. The role of the Royal Navy in the region
is limited by resource constraints and, despite occasional maritime
drug interdictions, its primary role in the region is to provide
humanitarian assistance during the annual hurricane season. The
cost effectiveness of using a warship to police an area where
most drug shipments are small is any case questionable.
12. One way of addressing resource inequalities
is of course international collaboration to tackle the drug trade
in the Caribbean, but in practice this is both limited and fragmented.
The United States has other hemispheric priorities, principally
in Mexico and Colombia, hence aside from some law enforcement
training the Caribbean is not seen as worthy of large scale investment.
The three EU countries with closest links to the region define
their own interests in relatively narrow terms and, aside from
operational cooperation between law enforcement (including limited
naval assets) their engagement is mostly bilateral. Regional collaboration
between Caribbean countries is hampered by a number of factors.
The largest regional organisation, CARICOM, has 15 member states
(depending on the method of counting there are 20 or 30 countries
or territories in the Caribbean) but its Crime and Security portfolio
is yet to yield substantive outcomes, in part due to what some
see as an over-dominant Trinidad and Tobago in the lead role.
The aforementioned RSS, founded in 1982, has a small air wing
that patrols the joint waters over its seven member states. Although
it is highly regarded its resources limit its effectiveness.
CONCLUSONS
13. The evidence submitted has highlighted
that drug transit has a severe impact on many countries in the
Caribbean, and most available data point to a rising trend. Furthermore,
international assistance is fragmented and bilateral programmes
tend to focus on areas where direct and quantifiable consequences
occurring in the donor country can be demonstrated. For example,
Operation Airbridge is claimed by UKBA to yield a monetary benefit
to the UK of £130 million per annum. Whilst UKBA is patently
fulfilling its statutory responsibilities and at the same time
preventing some of the worst examples of human exploitation it
must not be overlooked that the success of Airbridge in effect
transfers the challenge (and some of the costs) back to the Caribbean
region, in turn causing traffickers to adopt new methods or routes.
The emergence of the West African route can be interpreted as
evidence of a more radical shift, yet the Caribbean remains highly
vulnerable if attention and investment is diverted away. The timing
of the FCO withdrawal from drugs and crime work is particularly
unhelpful, as valuable lessons identifying the scale of the challenge
have been gained from recent programmes. Nevertheless, some examples
show the way forward: comparison with Dutch investment in coast
guard and specialist detectives in its Kingdom territories (Aruba
and the Netherlands Antilles) is instructive, as funding a proper
coast guard for the RSS states could be highly effective. Overall,
realism about what can be achieved is needed: failure to control
demand for cocaine imposes a moral responsibility on all consumer
countries, but the UK bears particular responsibility in the Caribbean.
Recent actions have, unfortunately, projected a somewhat negative
message.
June 2009
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