House of Commons - DFID's Programme in Nepal - International Development Committee

DFID's Programme in Nepal - International Development Committee Contents

4 Governance, justice and security

Impunity

39. We were frequently told that there was a "culture of impunity" in Nepal and no apparent sanctions for wrong-doing. A report published by the International Crisis Group on 14 January stated that "failure to address the systematic crimes committed during Nepal's ten-year civil war is threatening the peace process". It highlighted that there has not been a single prosecution for abuses in civilian courts and that "political parties have shown no interest in dealing with past crimes." International Crisis Group asserts that "of the more than 13,000 people killed during the war, the vast majority died at the hands of the state. […] Many victims were from disadvantaged communities long marginalised by the state and more influential social strata."[60]

40. Senior Army officers accused of human rights abuses have not been brought to justice and "even high-profile alleged abusers have been deployed in lucrative posts in UN missions".[61] DFID highlights that the promotion to Deputy Chief of Army Staff of a general implicated in "grave human rights abuses" during the conflict "has sent a particularly negative signal regarding the government's intentions to address past abuse." However, it believes that a recent order from the Prime Minister to the Army to hand over to the police a major, also accused of grave human rights abuses, "may represent the first steps towards addressing such impunity".[62]

41. Witnesses stressed that impunity was the greatest challenge Nepal faces, including this lack of accountability for atrocities committed during the conflict. Saferworld's view was that "impunity among security agencies risks entrenching divisions and sparking further conflict".[63] Professor Subedi said that it was his "number one worry". Liz Philipson agreed that "Impunity has to be the biggest issue for ordinary people in Nepal at this moment, above anything [...]. Impunity affects the lives of ordinary people, it affects the rule of law, it affects progress against corruption". She pointed out that this is not just an historical issue: "Impunity is not only about crimes during the war, it is about the girl who was raped this morning and I bet there were several in Nepal as we speak and not only will there be no prosecution there will be no recourse to law." She believed that "big people" needed to be held to account to ensure that "small people" could have greater confidence in the justice system.[64]

42. The DFID Minister told us "we would recognise that there is a culture of impunity in Nepal, not just resulting from the conflict but general rule of law as well." He was disappointed that the mechanisms established in the CPA for dealing with this had not "kicked in". However, he thought that there were "signs of some movement" in that Bills were now before parliament to establish a committee on truth and reconciliation and set in motion investigation of disappearances during the conflict, as provided for in the CPA.[65]

43. The Head of DFID Nepal stressed that the diplomatic community and development partners had raised the issue of impunity "time and time again with the government and pushed for action. We have publicly said that it is regrettable that some of the high profile cases have not been resolved and in our view have not been taken to a satisfactory conclusion." She said that "one of the important roles we can play is to keep this very high on the agenda and to continue the international pressure for the human rights cases on all sides to be taken seriously and resolved."[66]

44. The international community is also lobbying for the extension of the mandate of the UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), which currently runs out in June.[67] The UK is one of the major funders of OHCHR. DFID says that the organisation "has been key to ensuring both national and international actors place human rights at the centre of the peace process". Its work during the conflict led to the end of conflict-related "disappearances" carried out by the Army by 2005, and it "acted as an important preventive influence on the patterns of abuses" committed by the Maoists. It says that more recently, "OHCHR has helped create greater space for human rights issues to be addressed; for human rights defenders to carry out their work, and for public dialogue on human rights issues to continue even in the face of suppression."[68] The Asian Centre for Human Rights cautions that the Government of Nepal is considering whether to refuse to extend OHCHR's mandate beyond June, or to restrict the extension to six months and with a more limited role.[69]

45. It will be much more difficult to achieve long-term peace if people believe that there has been no redress for abuses committed during the conflict. We were pleased to hear that the UK and other members of the international community are robust in raising the issue of impunity and respect for human rights with the Government of Nepal. The UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) has made a significant contribution to upholding human rights both in the difficult circumstances of the conflict and since peace was agreed. We recommend that the UK lobby at the highest levels for the OHCHR mandate to be extended beyond June 2010 so that this important work can continue.

Corruption

46. DFID identifies fraud and corruption as one of the key risks in Nepal and says that corruption has been "endemic in Nepal for decades".[70] Professor Moore told us: "I have rarely seen as corrupt a country as Nepal".[71] DFID is working with the Government on strengthening government systems against corruption and reform of public financial management, in joint work with the World Bank. Support has been provided at district level, including technical assistance to facilitate electronic transfer of data between the centre and districts. DFID says that performance has improved on "core public financial management issues as a result of performance-based funding, pioneered by DFID, and changes in district and village-level procedures to ensure greater participation of excluded groups in local development planning".[72]

47. The DFID Minister observed that the problem with corruption was that it "poisons the whole atmosphere in which development takes place" and that the Department had a "zero tolerance approach".[73] The high levels of corruption have significant implications for DFID's work in Nepal. Professor Moore believed that it was important for DFID to ensure that its money was not stolen by people in power, particularly at local level, given the problems around donors' tendering and contract processes. He was dubious about whether corruption could be effectively tackled at present but said that "a lot of effort" was being made by DFID to ensure that its funding was correctly used.[74]

48. DFID highlighted a number of threats to its operations from corrupt activities which include: fraud-related coercion, attempted "programme manipulation" through intimidation, particularly by youth groups of political parties; demands to comply with "pre-conditions from violent, federalist, non-state actors"; and increased fiduciary risk from groups seeking "to finance political activities or use opportunities created by weak law and order".[75] Mary Hobley, an independent development consultant, said that district level development staff were under "huge pressure to deliver services to particular groups" and suffered threats to their families on a regular basis if they did not. People were afraid to challenge or speak out because of fear of reprisals from political parties, and particularly their youth groups.[76]

49. The proliferation of NGOs involved in delivering services and advocacy in Nepal exacerbates the risk of corruption. Professor Costello told us:

[...] forming an NGO has been a route to corruption. When the Maoist government came in they clamped down a lot on NGOs and certainly a number of my friends said a lot of people were on the make here; they would set up an NGO as a way of getting money and then cream it off. What the extent of that problem was is difficult to quantify, but certainly it is the case that people were using the format of NGOs, and so when they had to be reregistered I think a lot of them were put out of business[77]

50. That donors and international and local NGOs were targets for manipulation and fraud by both particular interest groups and criminals was reinforced during our visit. Coercion was reported to us as being a problem in tenders for contracts with intimidation being used to prevent competitors bidding, or to demand a share of contracts won. The Head of DFID Nepal acknowledged that this risk "is a constant issue in Nepal". Development partners have adopted a unified approach and agreed Basic Operating Guidelines which make clear that development assistance "is not political and cannot be used for any kind of political and/or other forces other than specifically delivering on development". Donors had made representations about particular incidents to both the Prime Minister and Maoist leaders and action had been taken. However "it is a continuous issue and [...] it is not something that is easy to resolve."[78]

51. Procurement, for example of medicines and health supplies, is particularly vulnerable to corruption. DFID has had to put robust systems in place to ensure that the procurement which it funds is not open to abuse. This had been a "an area of very serious debate" for DFID in planning the next phase of its sector support for health and it had been decided to take procurement out of the sector support until government systems had been further strengthened.[79] DFID said that it was supporting a joint government-donor procurement action plan to address "the issue of collusion and intimidation of bidders" and was undertaking a comprehensive assessment of procurement in the health and rural roads sectors with the World Bank.[80]

52. The Head of DFID Nepal was, however, confident that "we have pretty thorough mechanisms [...] to safeguard our funds".[81] The Minister said that, more generally in relation to the risk of corruption, he had personally "tested the system out", including by asking for specific allegations to be investigated. He acknowledged that at a time "when public sector settlements are tight and people are looking at how the Government is generally using its money, we have to be seen in terms of development to make sure that the money does exactly get to people on the ground for whom it is intended." He stressed that it was important that "we are seen to be whiter than white when it comes to tackling corruption".[82]

53. We were pleased to hear the Minister's assurance that DFID took these issues seriously. However, we investigated fraud and procurement procedures as part of our recent annual scrutiny of the Department's overall performance. We expressed concern that "DFID may not yet be taking the threat of fraud as seriously as it should" and highlighted that steps to improve procurement procedures were described by the Department itself as "a work in progress".[83]

54. It is a matter of serious concern that the people of Nepal have to suffer the detrimental effects of living in a society plagued by corruption. DFID's support to the Government of Nepal to strengthen its own public finance systems is an essential part of its programme there. DFID should ensure that the highest standards of audit and scrutiny are applied to all of its own operations and that leakage in the form of corruption is prevented. DFID also needs to continue to work with development partners and political leaders in Nepal to prevent development assistance being open to manipulation by special interest groups. We recommend that, in response to this Report, DFID provide us with more detailed information about the precise anti-corruption and anti-fraud measures it has in place in Nepal.

Absence of local government systems

55. There have been no local elections in Nepal for six years. Elections will only be possible once overall agreement has been reached on the Constitution and the new federal structure.[84] The Prime Minister told us that local government was being run by appointed officials. We observed that this was the case in our visits to Nepalgunj and Baglung and were able to talk to some of the officials concerned about the burden this placed on them. The Head of DFID Nepal stressed that re-establishing local government was "absolutely" a governance priority for DFID but reiterated the need to await "a decision on how federalism will actually operate".[85]

56. Professor Subedi emphasised that the impact was being felt by local people who had no properly functioning local bodies to rely on for delivery of basic services.[86] Professor Costello agreed that "the biggest gap in Nepal [...] is the weakness of local Government [...] In the mid and late 1990s local government really began to take off and my experience of working in districts then was finally you had some very committed people trying to make changes and it was quite successful." However, for the last seven or eight years "local government has been virtually dead in Nepal [...] you have only got civil servants there." He believed that accountable local politicians and better systems were "absolutely crucial" to delivery of local services.[87]

57. Liz Philipson stressed that the absence of local government did not mean there was a vacuum: "services have been delivered by somebody, somehow". In many cases this was by political parties and other interest groups, which might be a potential trigger for conflict when new structures were put in place under the new Constitution.[88] Mary Hobley believed that the impact of the 10-year conflict was that donors, including DFID:

[…] focused on delivery of quick impact activities through non-governmental organisations […] which in many cases act more like private management companies, bypassing any nascent local government structures and delivering services and money directly to local people.

This had resulted in community-based organisations (CBOs) "beginning to occupy the political space left empty by the lack of elected local government". She acknowledged that NGOs and civil society had made a significant contribution to the provision of services and to representing the interests of particular groups, but was concerned that they had become "the engines of local development and have to an extent supplanted the role of local government". This had undermined the democratic accountability between citizens and the state.[89] She also argued that CBOs "have the ability to determine who should or should not gain access to a service or resource" which risked reinforcing existing inequalities because such groups were often "highly exclusionary both of the extreme poor and socially marginalised".[90]

58. The Head of DFID Nepal was clear that the possible risk of directing support to "the better educated because they write better proposals" was mitigated by DFID staff focusing on the needs that would be addressed by funding support rather than how well-written the proposal was. She said "we do encourage minority groups to put forward proposals and we have funded quite a number of those proposals."[91] DFID has provided £4.3 million to civil society through its Enabling State Programme and the multi-donor Rights, Democracy and Inclusion Fund. This has been aimed particularly at supporting excluded groups (including Dalits) to increase their voice and influence and to negotiate proportional representation in state institutions and greater representation in the Constituent Assembly.[92]

59. In a post-conflict state such as Nepal it is highly likely that formal delivery mechanisms, including local government systems, will have broken down. We accept that donors, including DFID, have to work with the situation that exists on the ground to ensure basic needs, including health and education are met. This may mean using community-based and other non-governmental organisations to deliver services. However, DFID must exercise caution, particularly in a highly complex country such as Nepal, that use of informal structures does not exacerbate exclusion and inequality and that services are genuinely provided to those in need rather than those most capable of lobbying for them. We discuss the challenge of reaching the poorest of the poor in more detail in the final chapter on DFID's future engagement in Nepal.

60. Democratic accountability and a well-defined relationship between citizens and the state are key elements in good governance. The lack of elected local government and local service delivery mechanisms is one of the key weaknesses in Nepal. DFID has already provided some valuable support to district level authorities. It needs to build on this and expand its work with local government, both now and when the new structures have been agreed under the Constitution. We recommend that, in response to this Report, DFID provide us with more details of how this work will be taken forward in the period covered by the Country Business Plan.

Security and access to justice

61. Access to formal justice is limited both by geographical distance and by social and economic factors. We were told that it had been estimated that 85% of disputes were resolved by informal processes. Liz Philipson said that "there is a grave need for the formal justice system to function" but as this was going to take years, "there is also an immediate need for there to be other systems." She emphasised that these should be "informal justice systems [...] not illegal justice systems" and pointed to the problem of some traditional systems discriminating against women. She was clear that where informal systems worked properly, they "can form a very important part of helping to provide a little more security for ordinary people in Nepal".[93] Mary Hobley told us "I am not sure the justice system is redeemable until some of the bigger elements are in place, most particularly the constitution" and believed that in the meantime, paralegal committees did provide effective help at the local level.[94]

62. DFID is funding initiatives aimed at improving access to justice for disadvantaged groups, including women, at community level. This work is also intended to tackle violence against women and will include a community mediation project in 10 districts and £6.5 million for women's paralegal committees across the country.[95] DFID told us that these committees have been found to be "a useful tool for mediation and resolving [...] issues at the local level". It will scale up its current support from 500 paralegal committees in 23 districts to 1,300 in all 75 districts.[96]

POLICE

63. Saferworld reiterated points made during our visit regarding political interference in the police and said that the police were poorly equipped, under-resourced and poorly paid.[97] Crisis Group describes the police force as "demoralised, ineffective and increasingly desperate".[98] We were told that, when the police arrested criminals, local politicians often contacted them and demanded the release of the suspects. People did not trust the police and believed them to be corrupt, including expecting payment for helping a member of the public. The police were also believed to discriminate against poor people. In a recent Saferworld survey, 82% of respondents said that the police did not treat poor people fairly.[99]

64. The Prime Minister acknowledged in his discussions with us that there was political interference with the police, that the service the police offered was not satisfactory and that morale within the police force was low. The Government plans to establish an independent commission to deal with police recruitment and promotion, to ensure that it is based on merit. The Prime Minister said that the capability of the police to investigate crimes needed to be increased and systems strengthened so that political interference would not be possible.

65. The 2009 DFID White Paper said that the Department "will treat access to security and justice as a basic service" on a par with health and education, and that it would triple its direct project funding in this area.[100] The DFID White Paper made clear that support to Nepal would include "strengthening the core functions of the state by supporting the police to maintain law and order".[101] DFID told us in written evidence that:

Discussions are underway with the Home Ministry for a major DFID funded public security support project. This would focus primarily on helping the police improve the service they provide to the public at the community level, but would also provide strategic policy and planning support centrally to the Police and Home Ministry.[102]

However, it is not clear that there has been any progress on development of this programme since our visit. The Country Business Plan says almost nothing about justice and very little about security, beyond the indication that DFID is in discussion with the Government and that it is awaiting "the outcome of a security sector reform commission to define need".[103]

66. We accept that it may be difficult for the Government of Nepal to define its own security and justice priorities in advance of full implementation of the peace agreement. This in turn hinders determination of DFID's priorities in this sector. However, if the White Paper commitment to treat justice and security as a basic service is to be honoured, DFID needs to approach it with the same degree of urgency as ensuring people's demands for health and education are met. This is particularly important given that the people of Nepal have themselves identified security as their top priority. We recommend that, in response to this Report, DFID make clear how it plans to honour its pledge on increased support for justice and security in Nepal, particularly in relation to police reform and formal justice structures. We also request more details on the services which the women's paralegal committees are providing and the timescale for expansion of this support.

60 International Crisis Group, Nepal: Peace and Justice, 14 January 2010, Executive Summary Back

61 ibid Back

62 Ev 66 Back

63 Ev 81 Back

64 Qs 5, 7, 25 Back

65 Q 142 Back

66 Q 143 Back

67 Q 143 Back

68 Ev 59 Back

69 Asian Centre for Human Rights Briefing Paper, The Withdrawal of OHCHR-Nepal: agreeing an alibi for violation?, March 2010 Back

70 Ev 55 and 57 Back

71 Q 82 Back