Written evidence submitted by Saferworld
NEPAL: CONTEXT
AND IMPLICATIONS
FOR DFID PROGRAMMING
Saferworld is an independent NGO working to
prevent violent conflict and promote cooperative approaches to
security. We have been working in Nepal for three years and currently
have three members of staff based in Kathmandu running projects
looking at security and justice sector reform.
This submission is based on the experience of
those staff working at both the grassroots level and with high-level
political and security actors1; discussions/consultations with
Nepali and international partners; and Saferworld's ongoing work
to build an evidence base around security, justice and public
safety issues in Nepal, including:
— District assessments undertaken in Banke,
Jumla, Kailali, Nawalparasai, Siraha and Sunsari (April and May
2009).
— An annual public perceptions survey looking
at changing attitudes to security and access to justice across
Nepal (January 2008, April 2009 and forthcoming January 2010).
THE CURRENT
SECURITY AND
POLITICAL CONTEXT
IN NEPAL
Members of the Constituent Assembly do not often
leave Kathmandu to visit their constituencies but, outside Kathmandu
Valley, life is difficult. There are few jobs, the police are
often feared or inaccessible and armed groups conduct frequent
extortion. The Terai in particular has seen the emergence of a
large number of these armed groups in the past and our most recent
survey shows that it is the most insecure place in Nepal.
Pistols can be bought for around NRs 1,000 (£8)
in the Terai. Young, unemployed men are keen to arm themselves
so they can acquire the "3-Ms"—mobile phones,
money and motorcycles. The porous and open border with India makes
it difficult for the police to control arms trafficking. Although
the recent government "Special Security Plan" has helped
reduce crime in the Terai, new trends have emerged such as extortion
and threats from phones using Indian registered sim cards. Maoists
are increasingly engaged in land grabbing and forest clearing
in the Terai to provide settlements for their supporters from
the mid-hills region.
One consequence of the Maoist struggle was to
make women more politically active and there are currently 197
women out of a total 601 Constituent Assembly members. However,
violence against women is prevalent in Nepal. For instance, research
undertaken by the United Nations Population Fund in 2009 found
that, in Surkhet and Dang districts, 9% of women interviewed felt
they had experienced sexual abuse and 75% felt they had experienced
verbal sexual abuse. In addition, 31% of women reporting experiences
of domestic violence (both physical and emotional) identified
the threat of weapon use in association with this. NGO activities
have begun to help both men and women become more aware of gender
equality and women's rights.
The Maoists plan to unilaterally declare 13
ethnic and region based autonomous states and protests of support
have been planned from 11-18 December. Similarly, Terai Mukti
Morcha has announced a series of protest programmes from 3 December
to 9 January and the National People's Front Nepal will protest
against federalism from 18-29 December. The proliferation of these
political strikes, or `Bandhs'—which close businesses, roads
and schools for days at a time—was noted as a concern in
almost all of the districts Saferworld assessed this year.
The Maoists' demands to cancel the President's
reinstatement of the then army chief—and subsequent protest
programmes—have deepened an ongoing political crisis. The
most inclusive Assembly ever elected in Nepal has been blocked
for five months—there is a logjam of legislation waiting
for ratification, important national issues are not being debated
and progress is slow on the constitution-writing. There is a desperate
need to work out a high-level power sharing mechanism, but grassroots
politics is full of both apathy and antipathy towards the governing
coalition.
Progress on the integration and rehabilitation
of former Maoist combatants will only be taken forward when there
is some shared understanding among the political leadership. Privately,
the Communist Party Nepal (United Marxist Leninist) and Nepali
Congress would like to limit integration of Maoist combatants
into the Nepal Army to around 5,000 people, whereas the Maoist's
position is to integrate as many as possible and also to secure
them senior positions. This is proving an extremely divisive issue.
The Maoists have missed several meetings of the "Special
Committee for Supervision, Integration and Rehabilitation of Maoist
Army Combatants" and this has delayed finalisation of the
code of conduct prepared by the Technical Committee for "cantoned"
Maoist combatants. There are currently believed to be 19,602 former
combatants living in 28 cantonments—in addition, there are
4,008 individuals that have been disqualified by a verification
process undertaken by UNMIN, and the process of discharging them
is not yet complete.
WHY IT
IS VITAL
FOR DFID TO
PROMOTE SECURITY
AND JUSTICE
AS BASIC
SERVICES IN
THIS CONTEXT
DFID's 2009 White Paper on International Development
made a welcome commitment to promoting the provision of security
and access to justice as basic services "on a par with health
and education". Saferworld believes that, unfortunately,
Nepal provides an excellent example of why "security and
justice" deserves a place within the development mainstream.
Poor people, like any others, want to feel safe—and
Saferworld strongly believes that insecurity is a form of poverty
in and of itself. However, in Nepal, insecurity and a lack of
access to justice also undermine development efforts which seek
to address wider poverty and exclusion.
A lack of democracy and poor public responsiveness
and accountability from the government have been key causes of
conflict in Nepal in the past decade, with poor accountability
and transparency of security and justice services a key part of
this. Although people do feel much safer than they did before
the Comprehensive Peace Agreement was signed, unrest and tensions
related to poor governance persist and could result in renewed
violence if reforms are perceived to be ineffective by ordinary
people throughout Nepal.
The conflict destroyed much local infrastructure
and has led to a security vacuum in many rural areas. Our 2009
perceptions survey found that nearly 60% of those interviewed
said there is no Nepal police in their locality and that the percentage
of people who feel government is able to maintain law and order
"somewhat well" has fallen from 32% in 2007 to 18% in
2009. The percentage of people who feel it is "very safe"
for a female member of their family to go out after dark has also
fallen by 2% since 2007, whilst the number of people reporting
incidences of physical assault/beating in their community rose
7%, with reports of political violence rising 4% and extortion
3%. The number of people who feel that the level of law and order
`will improve in future months' dropped from 41% to 28%. Only
10% of those interviewed feel that the Nepal Police are "very
reliable" in bringing those who have committed a crime to
justice. Lastly, 82% of people felt that the police did not treat
poor people fairly and 71% felt that courts did not treat poor
people fairly.
As noted above, Bandh strikes often result in
school closures and affect the ability of communities to access
markets to buy and sell goods or find employment. A rise in extortion
and threats to teachers, and the abduction and recruitment of
children into criminal groups whilst at school in the Terai (most
recently documented by UNICEF in early 2009), has also meant that
parents have kept children home from school. Armed groups are
increasingly using children to traffic small arms from Bihar and
smuggle goods across the border including tobacco, wood and sugar.
Children are also used as the messengers by armed groups during
extortion activities.
Cutting across these issues is the reality that
poor, uneducated and politically unconnected groups—especially
those from certain caste and ethnic backgrounds—are more
likely to experience the consequences of insecurity. Without reforms,
continued heavy handedness and impunity among security agencies
risks entrenching divisions and sparking further conflict. And
so there is an urgent need for the Nepal government to help overcome
this marginalisation and disenfranchisement through more responsive
security and justice service delivery before tensions erupt into
further violence. Security and justice sector reform needs to
include improvements to police effectiveness, civilian oversight
of the security sector and the legal framework of the security
sector as a whole (including steps to reduce its politicisation)—all
of which are integrally linked to the wider Rule of Law framework.
IMPLICATIONS FOR
DFID
DFID Nepal actively encourages and supports
dialogue between stakeholders such as political party leaders,
security and justice providers, government officials and civil
society on security and justice issues. In the past year, this
approach has become increasingly flexible and adapted to the context—for
example, extending support to a Kathmandu-based think tank, Nepal
Institute for Policy Studies (NIPS), to support the work of the
Technical Committee after its mandate was reinstated in August.
DFID continues to promote a "systems-widex"
approach to security and justice reform, which includes, for example,
community-based policing, informal justice mechanisms and promoting
the role of civil society in the security and justice sector.
DFID also promotes gender equality and women's
rights, encouraging security and justice sector actors to adopt
more gender responsive approaches. Diversity and inclusiveness
are key issues and DFID strongly encourages initiatives such as
security and justice sector reform to be Nepali-led and owned.
Donors, including DFID, are relatively well
coordinated—although perhaps more on integration and rehabilitation
issues, and coordination could be improved around public security
work.
DFID is to be congratulated for supporting research
and articles by Nepali security experts designed to increase understanding
and awareness of security and justice issues in the Nepali context.
Saferworld's experience is that there is a lot
of information sharing between DFID, FCO and MOD—especially
in-country. The three ministries seem to be well connected and
in regular contact on security and justice issues. This is important
in a context where the political environment is constantly changing,
national security and the future of the security sector is a key
political issue, and there are high levels of poverty. Nevertheless,
although this integrated approach appears to be currently functioning
well, it does not take away the need for well designed policy
and institutional frameworks to ensure that such a constructive
approach endures over time. In turn, Saferworld believes this
underscores the importance of joint country strategies between
at least these three ministries.
There are also three areas in which Saferworld
believes DFID's approach could be further strengthened.
Taking a "twin-track" approach
The currently stalled political context provides
challenges for promoting reforms, especially in such politically
sensitive areas as security and justice. Subsequently, there is
a need for DFID to ensure it takes a connected "twin-track
approach" which supports both grass roots and high-level
work.
"Bottom-up" support to civil society
is a long term investment. There will not be many tangible results
in the short term, but it is a necessary and effective way of
influencing attitudes and behaviours and challenging cultural
norms. It also allows for an inclusive approach—engaging
with marginalised and vulnerable groups including women, youth
and disadvantaged caste and ethnic groups.
For instance, Saferworld is working with the
Nepali NGO Antenna Foundation to produce the "Nepal Chautari"
radio talk show that discusses security and justice issues such
as the future of the Nepal Army, policing and the inclusion of
minorities in the security sector. The show is broadcast throughout
Nepal every Sunday morning over a network of 59 FM radio stations
and listeners can join in the discussion through a toll-free telephone
line. Speakers on the programme include political and civil society
leaders, prominent lawyers and security experts and the show has
not only helped inform the public but also strengthened relationships
between communities, local police and local government authorities.
However, such `bottom-up' activities must be
complemented by "top-down", high level work engaging
with policy experts and decision makers in Kathmandu (and districts).
For instance, Saferworld is working with the Nepal Institute for
Policy Studies to hold roundtable meetings with government officials,
academics and military figures as well as commissioning Nepali
security experts to author articles exploring different options
for security sector reform in Nepal.
Crucially, both bottom up and top down strands must
be connected so that they do not exist in parallel isolation but
instead work towards the same objectives and benefit from information
sharing and lesson learning up and down the chain. This will be
especially important for challenging, for instance, engrained
attitudes to domestic violence and violence against women—which
will not happen overnight, nor from introducing centralised government
policy alone.
The need for baseline data, tracker information
and monitoring and evaluation
Even though the context may be changing in Nepal,
people's perceptions are not necessarily changing at the same
pace. Subsequently, DFID should ensure it is always aware of what
ordinary people are feeling and thinking as well as what is happening
on the policy/high-level political scale.
And so there is a need for accurate baseline
data and tracker information that represents attitudes across
different Nepali communities, and not just those of Kathmandu
Valley. DFID programmes should support such public perceptions
surveys as a means of gathering baseline data and identifying
monitoring and evaluation indicators for its programmes. DFID
could then monitor and evaluate these indicators against the tracker
information provided on an annual basis or other timeframe. This
would help identify ongoing adjustments that might be needed to
ensure programmes have an impact over the long term and so prove
truly effective.
At the same time, there are a number of other
serious challenges around the monitoring and evaluation of security
and justice reform. These include (but are not limited to) the
inherent complexity of the security and justice sectors, limited
access to sensitive or "national security" information,
the need to measure change over the long term not just at the
project or programme level, ensuring the participation of marginalised
groups, and ensuring that the process of conducting evaluations
does not itself inadvertently trigger or inflame conflict. For
DFID to be able to best monitor and evaluate its security and
justice work in Nepal—and in turn ensure that this work
is most effective and having real impact—it will need to
develop solutions to these challenges.
Investing in politics
The political context highlights the reality
that, in Nepal, development is "political". Supporting
the space for transformative and mature political processes to
develop will be critical. These politics may be messy, complicated
and take a long time to mature but supporting them will be critical
for both ensuring long-term peace and helping to create an environment
wherein broader poverty reduction efforts have most chance of
success.
DFID's recent White Paper suggested that it
would put politics at the heart of the action and increase its
use of political economy analysis. This is welcome but only half
the story—the UK must certainly understand the contexts
it works in so as to most successfully navigate their complex
political realities and identify agents of progressive change,
but it should also put effort and resources into supporting local
and national level political processes.
This may mean supporting political parties directly
through the Westminster Foundation for Democracy, but it will
also mean supporting wider initiatives that help create and maintain
the space for political processes to take place—such as
supporting a plurality of media outlets, citizen-based journalists
and new media reporting, or civil society groups who organise
and promote public debate and discussion on a range of issues.
December 2009
| 
