4 DFID's work in Zimbabwe|
DFID's current approach
63. DFID told us that the formation of the GNU changed
the balance of risk and opportunity, and "justified a structured
and incremental re-engagement with Zimbabwe".
It said that:
We have focussed on aligning behind the Government
of Zimbabwe's own commitments as agreed by the three main parties
in the GPA. This cohesion has been time-consuming to build and
maintain but it has become a very useful mechanism to communicate
clearly with the Inclusive Government around the kind of reform
needed in Zimbabwe for donors to increase their support.
Although the GNU has provided an opportunity for
greater engagement and an improved working relationship between
DFID and elements of the Zimbabwean Government, DFID's view is
that "the Inclusive Government is not yet the partner we
require to sustain a full development relationship."
It says that "no money at present goes through Government
systems. However, in line with the cross-Whitehall strategy for
Zimbabwe, [DFID has] recently begun to provide technical assistance
and policy support to reforming Ministries to help build momentum
for political and economic change."
64. Donor re-engagement will be determined against
implementation of the GPA and progress towards the "Hague
Principles" established for international engagement with
state that non-humanitarian assistance will be closely linked
to progress on governance and democracy. Any approved assistance
would be targeted only towards reform-minded elements of the transitional
government. The reforms specified in the Principles include:
and equal access to humanitarian assistance;
to macro-economic stabilisation;
of the Rule of Law, including enforcement of contracts, an independent
judiciary, and respect for property rights;
to the democratic process and respect for internationally accepted
human rights standards, including a commitment to freedom of expression,
freedom of print and broadcast media, freedom of assembly, and
freedom of association; and
to timely elections held in accordance with international standards,
and in the presence of international election observers.
65. DFID highlights that the uncertain future in
Zimbabwe requires "a flexible and adaptable strategy"
to ensure that it can continue to deliver "a high impact
aid programme under volatile and challenging conditions and under
a range of potential scenarios, from strong reform and change
to sharper decline and deterioration". The core of its programme
aims to deliver practical assistance "to poor and vulnerable
people in greatest need, including humanitarian assistance and
protracted relief and basic services".
66. The UK is one of the leading donors in Zimbabwe,
as shown in the table:
UK, EC, US and all donor aid to Zimbabwe:
ODA disbursements, since 1980
($ millions & %)
Note: (a) Multilateral agencies were -$16.3 million,
and non-DAC countries -$0.6 million in 2000.
Source: OECD, Development Assistance Committee
database, table 2a (accessed 12 March 2010)
DFID has allocated £60 million to Zimbabwe for
2009-10. £55 million is being spent on meeting humanitarian
and other essential needs; £4 million is supporting local
food production, including tools, seeds and fertilisers; and a
contribution of £1 million has been made to procurement of
school textbooks. DFID delivers its aid programme in Zimbabwe
through UN agencies and established NGOs.
The division of funding between NGOs and multilateral agencies
is shown in the figure below.
Delivery routes for DFID bilateral aid to Zimbabwe
(excluding humanitarian assistance)
Source: DFID, Statistics on International Development
2004/05 - 2008/09, p
Working with NGOs
67. NGOs who work with DFID were positive about its
approach. World Vision welcomed DFID's efforts to address the
complex causes of vulnerability in Zimbabwe. It said that DFID
balances "the needs of relief and transitional work in the
country". The "focus on social protection and the rights
of vulnerable groups" was especially appreciated as these
policies had made funding available to agencies not previously
engaged in human rights issues.
Christian Aid also praised DFID's work: "In Harare, DFID
has consistently been one of the most forward-thinking donors;
often setting the agenda for counterpart donors, UN agencies and
68. However, Christian Aid also voiced some concerns.
It said that DFID had "appeared to channel a large proportion"
of financial aid for its short-term emergency support through
UN agencies, which had occasionally worked against NGOs. It pointed
to the UN administration fee applied when agreeing contracts with
implementing NGOs and the "seemingly bureaucratic nature
of grant disbursement for relief activities", which could
take many months. It argued that this "has the potential
to render DFID's response to rapid onset emergencies, such as
health epidemics, less effective."
NGOs also raised with us some specific concerns about DFID's use
of managing agents for the Protracted Relief Programme (PRP).
We discuss these in the section on the PRP below.
69. Many international NGOs supported by DFID implement
their programmes in Zimbabwe through local civil society organisations
(CSOs). As well as playing a key part in delivering services,
DFID says that CSOs play an important role in strengthening state
[...] protecting the human rights of Zimbabwe's
citizens, supporting their participation in key decision making
processes, strengthening the media and doing more to monitor state
performance. Key priorities include the Constitution-making process,
media, Parliament and the next elections.
Support for these activities is made available to
CSOs through DFID's normal central funding channels including
the Civil Society Challenge Fund, Programme Partnership Agreements
and the Governance and Transparency Fund (GTF). Funding from the
Zimbabwe country office is also provided through the Conflict
Pool and a Gender Support Programme.
Working with other donors
70. The UN is the largest manager of DFID funding
in Zimbabwe. DFID says that UN agencies, particularly UNICEF and
the World Food Programme (WFP):
[...] have offered effective and practical ways
of working to respond to critical needs, ranging from food aid
to essential drugs and [...] ensuring safe drinking water. They
have national coverage and are able to negotiate access in politically
DFID currently leads the Donor Steering Committee
in Zimbabwe. The DFID Minister believed that donor co-ordination
with OECD DAC bilateral donors was working fairly well but that
co-ordination with the World Bank and UN agencies could be improved.
71. World Vision commended DFID's leadership, but
believed that co-ordination among donors needed to be further
improved, to address inconsistencies and overlaps in funding.
It was encouraged by the formation of a Multi-Donor Trust Fund
(MDTF) (see below) and the pivotal role DFID played in its development.
However, it called for DFID to "lead the development of a
broader common strategy among donors for Zimbabwe, which should
include common needs and [...] impact assessments for the whole
Rob Rees of CAFOD expressed concern about DFID funding through
multilateral agencies in the health sector. In particular he said
that there had been "lots of delays [...] in the provision
of the relief assistance" which DFID had channelled through
UNICEF during the cholera epidemic in 2009.
WORLD BANK AND AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT
72. Between 1980 and 2000 the World Bank provided
$1.6 billion in assistance to Zimbabwe. The World Bank suspended
its lending programme to Zimbabwe in 2000, when the country went
into arrears. In 2008 these were estimated at $600 million with
a further $429 million owed to the African Development Bank (AfDB).
The World Bank stated that resumption of financial support would
hinge on arrears clearance and government commitment to a sound
economic recovery programme with international support. Its role
in Zimbabwe has been restricted to technical assistance and analytical
work focusing on macroeconomic policy, food security, the social
sector, infrastructure, and HIV/AIDS programmes.
Engagement with the AfDB has been similarly limited due to arrears.
73. However, as the political and economic situation
in Zimbabwe has improved, the World Bank and AfDB have both increased
their involvement in the country. The AfDB is providing technical
assistance and funding.
The World Bank is providing the secretariat for a Multi-Donor
Trust Fund (MDTF). DFID's written evidence indicated that:
A second MDTF mechanism focused on major programme
funding will now enable donor funding to flow into infrastructure
investment, using World Bank procedures to ensure funds are allocated
and implemented effectively. These funds will be mostly targeted
at critical poverty reducing and growth enhancing investments
(eg water supplies and possibly energy) where the World Bank is
especially well placed.
However, the DFID Minister stressed that this second
MDTF was "not up and running yet".
74. Analysis on which DFID has drawn shows that humanitarian
assistance will continue to be required in Zimbabwe for at least
another two years. It attributes this to "the impact of failed
policiesincluding chaotic land reform, economic mismanagement
and collapse, the erosion of basic services and the general challenge
of erratic rainfalls" which has led to "hunger, and
disease outbreaks, coupled with the inability of the most vulnerable
to access life-saving services."
Wherever possible DFID is providing multi-year funding to address
hunger and vulnerability, while also ensuring it is able to respond
rapidly to "sudden onset emergencies".
The table below shows the amount of humanitarian and total bilateral
aid provided by DFID since 2003/04.
DFID bilateral aid and humanitarian assistance, 2003/04
|Total bilateral aid
|of which humanitarian aid
Source: DFID, Annual Report and Resource Accounts
2008-09, Volume 2, p 76
75. The TUC recognised the "significant contribution"
which DFID had made to humanitarian assistance in Zimbabwe and
expressed its support for its continuation, where necessary and
appropriate. However, the TUC also called for the "the expansion
of DFID action beyond humanitarian relief into more development-oriented
interventions including the provision of technical advice and
assistance where appropriate in collaboration with multi-lateral
agencies and bilateral donors."
ACTSA believed that "DFID in Zimbabwe has in challenging
circumstances supported an informed and effective humanitarian
response". However, it stressed that "humanitarian assistance
should avoid seeing Zimbabweans as passive recipients of aid.
It should seek to build up self reliance, community organisation
76. We asked witnesses whether DFID had the right
balance between humanitarian aid and development assistance. Dr
Kibble pointed out that, with 2.2 million people still food insecure,
humanitarian aid should continue, but there was a need to examine
how it could be translated into development aid, in a sequential
way. He thought that money could be directed into long-term developmental
assistance provided it used "clean [...] mechanisms"
such as international NGOs and multilateral agencies. He believed
that there could be steady progress towards "straightforward
developmental assistance" but that direct budgetary support
was "quite a long way off yet."
77. Professor Brett argued that the creation of employment
was the most effective intervention to enable people to generate
what they needed to support themselves. He felt that DFID had
not been investing sufficiently in microfinance and called on
it to support small micro-enterprise projects that would encourage
people to become involved in small businesses.
78. When our predecessors reported in 2003, 7.2 million
Zimbabweans were in need of food aid. They noted that the immediate
cause then was a "huge shortfall in cereal production"
and that poor government was a key factor in the crisis. They
concluded that "politicisation of food aid, the exclusion
of the private sector from any role in importing food and poor
relationships between the government and donors had hindered responses
to the crisis."
Last year, the requirement was at a similar level: DFID reported
that 7 million Zimbabweans received food aid in early 2009; £9
million was provided by DFID to the World Food Programme (WFP)
for this. 
79. Food availability has improved in the last year,
which DFID says was due to "a good harvest, an end to the
Grain Marketing Board monopoly on importing cereals into the country,
dollarisation of the economy and availability of donor-funded
agricultural inputs." Nevertheless, it stresses that "extensive
humanitarian support will remain critical to avoid the erosion
of livelihoods and protect the health and nutrition status of
WFP estimated that 2.8 million people would require food aid in
early 2010 and DFID has allocated £4 million to WFP for this
year. Mark Lowcock,
the Director General for DFID Country Programmes, told us in
oral evidence that estimates of future food aid requirements would
be updated in late March, once the likely quality of this year's
harvest became clearer.
80. DFID has provided essential humanitarian support
to Zimbabwe, including food aid, over the last decade. Although
the situation has improved, DFID believes it will be necessary
for humanitarian assistance to continue for at least another two
years. We recognise the priority which DFID and other donors have
to give to meeting humanitarian needs in Zimbabwe's current situation.
However, we would hope that, as the economy continues to recover,
people will be more able to support themselves and donors can
then review the need for food aid and other short-term interventions.
We recommend that DFID regularly reassess the balance between
humanitarian aid and development assistance and that more of its
programmes shift to a longer-term development approach at the
Internally displaced people
81. The UNDP has estimated that a million farm-workers
and their families lost their homes and livelihoods as a result
of the Fast Track Land Reform Programme. A further 570,000 people
were made homeless by the urban demolitions of Operation Murambatsvina
("clear the filth") in 2005. In late 2006 and early
2007 the Government destroyed the homes of thousands of informal
mine workers in Operation Chikorokoza Chapera ("stop
the gold panning"). Estimates of the displacement caused
by electoral violence in 2008 range from 36,000 to 200,000 people.
82. A substantial proportion of Internally Displaced
Persons (IDPs) have been displaced multiple times by successive
operations. For example, many displaced farm-workers who went
to the towns and cities or to mining areas were later caught up
in Operation Murambatsvina or Operation Chikorokoza
Chapera. Some of the people who were internally displaced
have left Zimbabwe and are included in the estimate of three to
four million migrants.
83. The International Displacement Monitoring Centre
(IDMC) says that UN agencies and international NGOs have struggled
to respond to the needs of IDPs, because of obstruction by the
authorities and a lack of clear arrangements for leadership on
The Government of Zimbabwe had consistently failed to acknowledge
that its actions have caused a displacement crisis in Zimbabwe,
or to take responsibility for providing humanitarian assistance
to the victims. It has been extremely difficult for humanitarian
agencies to obtain access to displaced communities; even where
access has been granted, the Government has often withdrawn its
permission on arbitrary grounds. Humanitarian agencies
have also often had to plan their interventions on the basis of
incomplete information. Both local NGOs and international donors
have voiced strong concerns over what they describe as the UN's
overly cautious approach in its dealings with the Government of
Zimbabwe. Local NGOs in particular have expressed disappointment
that the UN has not done more to create a space for them to assist
84. DFID has allocated £6.5 million over four
years for emergency and humanitarian assistance to IDPs.
This includes a programme with the International Organisation
for Migration (IOM) that provides emergency assistance, in the
form of food, non-food items and temporary shelter, to IDPs, together
with humanitarian assistance at border crossings. The IOM are
currently assisting 251,000 individuals. In 2006 it established
the Beitbridge Reception Centre on Zimbabwe's border with South
Africa, which has assisted 320,000 returning migrants. DFID's
programme is due to end in March 2010.
85. We asked the DFID Minister about the level of
support available for IDPs. He believed that the Inclusive Government
was more willing to recognise their existence and needs, but said
that he "would not want to downplay the challenges that still
remain." In addition to the direct support DFID provided,
many of its mainstream programmes were assisting IDPs. He accepted
that there was a clear need for more to be done "across the
range", but believed that DFID's programmes, and those of
others in the international community, were helping to deliver
aid to IDPs.
86. Hundreds of thousands of people in Zimbabwe
have been driven from their homes as a result of deliberate, forced
evictions by the Government in pursuit of political ends, or in
reaction to more general insecurity, violence and intimidation
or unemployment. Some have been forced to move several times.
DFID is providing support to internally displaced persons (IDPs)
through targeted projects and through its general livelihoods
and basic service assistance. Its emergency assistance programme
for IDPs is due to end shortly but substantial need clearly remains.
We recommend that, in response to this Report, DFID clarify how
support for IDPs will be provided by the donor community over
the next two years and the role which it will play in this assistance.
Protracted Relief Programme
87. DFID's Protracted Relief Programme (PRP) provides
a good example of an intervention which combines humanitarian
assistance with longer-term livelihoods support. DFID states that
[...] assists the poorest and most vulnerable
households suffering from the effects of erratic weather, economic
decline and the HIV and AIDS epidemic. Its main objectives are
to improve the food security of the poorest through production
and income-generating activities, to improve access to water and
sanitation, and to provide social protection and care to the most
vulnerable such as the chronically ill.
Phase I of the programme began in mid-2004 and ran
for two years at a cost of £18 million. The range of activities
helped beneficiaries to increase their food production, and provided
home-based care to the chronically ill. PRP I was implemented
by 10 international NGOs, many of whom worked with local NGOs
and community-based organisations. UN agencies helped provide
technical co-ordination, while three international agricultural
research centres in Zimbabwe supplied further technical services.
88. Phase II of the PRP started in 2008-09 and will
continue until 2012-13. The UK will contribute £54.8 million
over that period, with £14.5 million being allocated in 2009-10.
PRP II is now a multi-donor programme and includes Australia,
Denmark, Norway, Netherlands, the EC and the World Bank. These
donor partners will contribute a further £24 million over
the lifetime of the programme, most of which will be channelled
through DFID. The programme is implemented by a broad range of
89. DFID told us that the target for the programme
was to reach 300,000 households, which was about two million people,
or between 15% and 20% of the population.
Mark Lowcock said that the programme was already reaching the
target number of beneficiaries.
DFID says that in 2008-09 the PRP:
almost two million of the poorest people to grow more food;
one million of the poorest people to gain access to clean water;
food vouchers, shelter and access to education for 700,000 urban
agricultural inputs to 200,577 households. 
PRP II aims to build on the experience of the first
phase, with closer collaboration with government. There will be
increased emphasis on social protection and the use of "relevant
participatory tools", which will lead to "increased
community participation in the planning, implementation, and monitoring
and evaluation of partner programmes".
90. The PRP received praise from several witnesses.
Christian Aid said that:"It is arguably the pre-eminent large-scale
institutional donor-funded humanitarian programme in Zimbabwe.
It is driven by the needs of vulnerable communities, and is relevant,
sustainable and cost-effective through NGO implementation".
This was reiterated in oral evidence where it was described as
"a flagship programme" which DFID "should be proud
World Vision said that: "The implementation of PRP
II has been greatly helped by the highly participatory nature
of DFID's design process, which takes into consideration local
realities and changing contexts."
Its Chief Executive, Justin Byworth, welcomed the programme's
"focus on the vulnerable, including vulnerable children,
combined with a focus on livelihoods to lift up the communities,
through such things as conservation agriculture, together with
safety net and social protection programming to support those
who are most vulnerable."
CARE International UK commended the PRP for the flexibility
which it gave DFID "to respond to the basic needs of people
[...] with provision of [...] services, such as food distribution,
HIV/AIDS support, [and] agricultural [and] livelihoods capacity
91. We saw a number of examples of PRP projects
during our visit to Zimbabwe. These included such diverse activities
as home-based care; employment generation, including floor-wax
production and tailoring; and agricultural development, including
provision of fertilisers and seeds, small-livestock farming and
farming education. Participants told us about the benefits that
they had gained and the difference it had made to their lives.
92. DFID's Protracted Relief Programme (PRP) has
already reached millions of vulnerable people in Zimbabwe and
has been praised by the NGOs who participate in it as an innovative,
flagship programme of which DFID should be proud. We agree with
this assessment. Other donors have already seen the value of funding
Phase II of the PRP and it has become an effective multi-donor
intervention. Its excellence lies in its ability to meet the needs
of the most vulnerable people and the breadth of its reach, from
home-based care for sick people to agricultural extension and
employment generation. There is clearly further scope for scaling
up the programme in Zimbabwe, where the need is still acute for
many people, and indeed using the lessons learned to replicate
it in other countries. We recommend that DFID explore both these
93. As we have described above, the PRP is implemented
through a range of NGOs who in turn contract local organisations
to deliver services. DFID uses a managing agent, GRM, to administer
NGOs drew our attention to some problems which arose from this.
Christian Aid told us that the "decision to outsource the
management of the PRP to a managing agent needs to be supported
by more accessible evidence of cost-effectiveness and efficiency."
Rob Rees of CAFOD said that, while he understood DFID's obligation
to reduce transaction costs, the use of managing agents had increased
the distance "between civil society organisations that are
actually implementing the programme on the ground and the donor."
The partners CAFOD worked with "would like to feel that they
have some opportunity for more direct contact with DFID"
so that both they and DFID had a "good understanding of the
situation that they are working in." He called for improvements
in communications and dialogue between civil society and DFID.
94. World Vision was critical of the onerous requirements
made of PRP implementing partners. It said that the "impact
measurement and meeting requirements are, at times excessive and
a symptom of a lack of internal co-ordination." These affected
its capacity to deliver quality programmatic work.
Its Chief Executive, commented that, although his organisation
was happy with the use of agents, and that they worked effectively,
they could be more co-ordinated and that "internal systems
tend towards silos". He agreed that there had been a loss
of communication with DFID. He called for "a bit more access
to DFID perhaps in terms of policy dimensions."
95. We put these concerns to the Minister. He told
us that a decision had been taken to use managing agents in Phase
II of the PRP as it was a more ambitious programme than Phase
I had been and more complex in that it involved other donors.
This put pressure on DFID staff, and their ability to work on
other important projects would have been reduced if they had continued
to run the programme directly. The Minister said that there were
quarterly meetings with civil society and that he was satisfied
with the level of direct contact with NGOs.
Mark Lowcock pointed out that there were three members of DFID
staff in the Harare office who still worked primarily on the PRP:
"they are spending less of their time on the routine administration
and more of it on the strategic dialogue". They travelled
to local areas at least once a month to check on PRP implementation.
96. Another area of concern was the administrative
costs of the programme, given the number of levels through which
funding has to pass before it reaches the eventual beneficiaries:
managing agents, NGO partners and then local organisations which
actually deliver the assistance in the villages and communities.
The Minister believed that involving all these players helped
accountability by ensuring that funding went to the most needy
people. He acknowledged that, as the programme had expanded, some
concerns had been expressed, but he thought that it was important
that "we have the administration element in there so that
we do have proper checks and balances."
Mark Lowcock pointed to the cost-effectiveness of the programme:
As well as the cost of delivering the programme
we need to think about what the returns and benefits of the programme
are. It costs about $70 per household to provide the assistance
we provide under the PRP and the value of the production that
is generated by that $70 is about $140, it is a very high rate
of return. The alternative to providing some of the inputs that
we have provided would be in many cases to provide food aid which
would cost us between $700 and $1,000. The opportunity saving
of this programme is very high and the rate of return on the programme
is also very high. The numbers I have given you reflect the administration
costs as well as the costs of the inputs. We honestly think that
in terms of value for money this is a very effective programme.
97. We asked the Minister for a breakdown of programme
expenditure for the PRP. DFID told us that:
of costs are allocated to the management agents to cover: programme
administration; technical advice and support; best practice and
knowledge sharing; and monitoring and evaluation;
· 3% is
used for financing and procurement fees, and covers the "costs
of working as seamlessly as possible in a difficult and rapidly
is allocated to delivery on the ground, including NGO overheads
and the costs of local community staff who provide services for
60% covers physical transfers to households in the form of agricultural
inputs, small livestock support, soap and hygiene items and small-scale
food and cash transfers.
These administrative costs seem quite high. However,
as we have said in relation to DFID's programmes in Bangladesh
and Nepal, targeted programmes to reach the most vulnerable and
poorest in society are inevitably more expensive to run because
of the staff time needed to devise and implement them, whether
this is done directly by DFID staff or through NGOs and agents.
98. We accept the concerns expressed by delivery
partners that the use of managing agents to administer the Protracted
Relief Programme creates a distance between NGOs and DFID. DFID
needs to do more to address these concerns. However, given the
headcount constraint under which DFID operates, we believe it
is sensible to contract out management of programmes once they
are in operation, in order to release specialist DFID staff to
undertake more strategic and innovative work.
99. The administration costs of the PRP are quite
high but this has to be weighed against the cost-effectiveness
and the value for money offered by the programme. Moreover, other
donors would not be so keen to join the PRP if they did not consider
that it was a worthwhile use of their funds. We believe the crucial
point is that the most vulnerable and needy people in Zimbabwe
are reached through the PRP. DFID should monitor the programme
closely to ensure pro-poor benefits continue to be the focus,
particularly if the programme is extended. DFID should also satisfy
itself that its auditing mechanisms are sufficiently robust to
ensure that PRP funding is reaching the intended beneficiaries,
particularly given that it passes through several organisations
100. One component of the PRP programme supports
conservation agriculture. Christian Aid said that it recognised
"DFID's consistent support to this area despite initial reluctance
by other key stakeholders" and highlighted that it "has
been particularly beneficial to vulnerable communities" and
"proven to lift households out of subsistence poverty".
William Anderson of Christian Aid explained to us the benefits
it brought: "conservation agriculture is teaching people
how to better manage their land and how to get a profitable harvest."
A family of six requires 1.2 metric tonnes of grain per annum
to meet its food needs but the national average in Zimbabwe is
0.2 metric tonnes. "Conservation agriculture practice enables
households to get at least 2, 3, 5 and in many cases over 10 metric
tonnes per hectare." He believed that the conservation agriculture
aspect of the PRP programme was "an excellent agricultural
practice that should be promoted across Africa."
101. We saw examples of conservation agriculture
projects during our visit. We heard from project beneficiaries
about the conservation farming techniques that they had been taught
and how they had been provided with fertilisers, seeds and tools.
We were told that the increased production that had been achieved
had helped move the farmers from below subsistence to having surplus
crops to sell. The additional income was used for such things
as paying school fees and investing in small savings schemes.
102. We were impressed by the benefits which the
conservation agriculture element of the Protracted Relief Programme
is bringing to communities in Zimbabwe, some of whom are the most
vulnerable people in the country. Moving farmers from below subsistence
to generating an income from selling crops provides direct and
quick support for livelihoods. We recommend that DFID explore
how this work can be expanded, both within Zimbabwe and in other
96 Ev 51 Back
Ev 52 Back
Ev 52 Back
Ev 48 Back
Ev 52 Back
See USAID, FY 2009 Supplemental Justification, pp 32-33,
available at www.usaid.gov Back
Ev 50 Back
Ev 52 Back
Ev 92 Back
Ev 43 Back
Ev 43 Back
Ev 54 Back
Ev 54 Back
Ev 54 Back
Q 80 Back
Ev 90 Back
Q 24 Back
World Bank, Zimbabwe Country Brief, March 2009 Back
Ev 54 Back
Ev 54 Back
Q 109 Back
Ev 55 Back
Ev 55 Back
Ev 80 Back
Ev 36 Back
Q 19 [Dr Kibble] Back
Q 19 [Professor Brett] Back
Third Report of Session 2002-03, The Humanitarian Crisis in
Southern Africa, HC 116-I, paras 9-10 Back
Ev 49 Back
Ev 55 Back
Ev 49 Back
Qs 124-5 Back
Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC), Zimbabwe, available
at www.internal-displacement.org Back
IDMC, The Many Faces of Displacement: IDPs in Zimbabwe,
August 2008, pp 4-6 and 43 Back
Ev 56 Back
Ev 97 Back
Q 127 Back
Ev 96 Back
Protracted Relief Programme: output to purpose review,
Food, Agriculture and Natural Resources Policy Analysis Network,
available at www.fanrpan.org Back
Ev 60-61 Back
Q 83 and Ev 61 Back
Qs 83-86 Back
Ev 61 Back
Protracted Relief Programme: Zimbabwe website at www.prpzim.info/ Back
Ev 43 Back
Q 22 [Mr Anderson] Back
Ev 90 Back
Q 22 [Mr Byworth] Back
Ev 42 Back
Ev 53 and Ev 96 Back
Ev 43 Back
Q 24 Back
Ev 90 Back
Q 43 Back
Qs 89-90 Back
Q 90 Back
Q 92 Back
Q 92 Back
Ev 94 Back
See Third Report of Session 2009-10, DFID's Programme in Bangladesh,
HC 95-I, paras 50-61 and Sixth Report of Session 2009-10,
DFID's Programme in Nepal, HC168-I, paras 143-6 Back
Ev 43 Back
Qs 22 and 25 [Mr Anderson] and Ev 43 Back