7 Conclusion: DFID's future engagement
144. The legacy of the colonial period and unresolved
issues from the transition to independence mean that the UK's
relationship with Zimbabwe is a difficult one. This affects the
way DFID is able to work in the country. Nevertheless, the UK
has provided essential support to Zimbabwe through its period
of political, economic and humanitarian crisis.
145. DFID's 2009 White Paper promised an increased
focus on fragile states.[222]
The Secretary of State defined fragile states as "countries
where the government cannot or will not deliver core functions
of the state for the majority of its people."[223]
It is clear that, despite the signs of recovery, the Government
of Zimbabwe will lack the capacity to deliver adequate basic services
for all its people for some time. It therefore falls into the
category of fragile states to which DFID is committed to providing
increased assistance.
146. Zimbabwe is also one of the 14 countries in
Africa where DFID monitors its performance against its Public
Service Delivery Agreement by assessing progress towards the Millennium
Development Goals. The Minister emphasised that "Zimbabwe's
recovery could help to drive progress towards the Millennium Development
Goals across the whole of the region" of sub-Saharan Africa.[224]
He told us that this was one of the reasons for the high priority
which both DFID and the FCO give to Zimbabwe. This was reflected
in "a significant amount of both ministerial and very senior
official time" being devoted to Zimbabwe.[225]
It is right that the UK gives a high priority to Zimbabwe through
the work of both DFID and the FCO. We strongly believe that the
assistance which DFID provides should continue, in co-ordination
with Foreign Office staff. This assessment is based on the evidence
we saw of the effectiveness of UK aid in reaching poor and vulnerable
people, and the level and scale of ongoing need across the country.
147. DFID is one of the leading donors in Zimbabwe
in terms of the amount of aid provided. Increased funding has
been accompanied by an innovative approach to tackling the challenges
of delivering aid effectively, both in the types of programmes
it implements and the relationships it has formed with delivery
partners, using both international NGOs and community-based local
organisations. These local bodies, in particular, are able to
assist DFID in identifying groups of people and communities who
most need assistance and ensuring that targeted support reaches
them. This approach may result in slightly higher administrative
costs but the overall cost-effectiveness and value for money represented
by the programmes appears to justify this expenditure.
148. DFID's projects, particularly the Protracted
Relief Programme, the Programme of Support for vulnerable children,
and the Expanded Support Programme for people affected by HIV/AIDS,
are strong interventions which other donors have been keen to
support. Immediate humanitarian relief will continue to be necessary,
including food aid but DFID should ensure that the transition
to longer-term development assistance is smooth and takes place
as soon as the conditions in any sector are appropriate. These
programmes have been innovative in combining an immediate response
to urgent needs with a longer-term approach. There is scope to
build upon them.
149. We considered whether DFID is right to favour
buying at "best value for money" over procuring development
materials or services locally. We understand that tendering competitively
in an international market ought to provide more material of a
certain quality per pound spent. However, one important purpose
of development spending is to promote economic development. This
is particularly important in a country like Zimbabwe which has
lost 80% of its GDP in a decade. In such circumstances, it may
make development sense to buy goods or services from a local supplier,
even though the cost may be greater, rather than buying at the
lowest possible price from abroad. It is inconsistent to talk
up the need for economic development in a country but not to stimulate
economic activity where possible. We recommend that, in response
to this Report, DFID set out how much of the £60 million
of British aid provided in 2009-10 for Zimbabwe was actually spent
in Zimbabwe. We also recommend that the Department review the
circumstances in which it may be right to buy in-country to stimulate
local economic activity, even where this is not the cheapest option.
150. The DFID Minister was clear that there were
no plans to channel funding through the Government of Zimbabwe
for the foreseeable future. He told us: "we are a long way
off from having confidence in the systems of the government of
Zimbabwe" and that it would be long time before money would
be put directly into the Government's budget. However, a number
of ministries were developing pro-poor plans designed to assist
the most vulnerable communities across the country. The Minister
believed that UK support could be aligned to these plans and told
us that discussions were taking place with the Government about
this.[226]
151. We agree with DFID's assessment that the
time is not right to move to direct budget support in Zimbabwe.
The political situation remains fragile. Until Zimbabwe has demonstrated
that free and fair elections can take place, with transfer of
power between parties if this is the wish of the people, uncertainty
will remain.
152. The international community's focus should
be on strengthening the capability of the Government of National
Unity so that it is better placed to determine its own development
priorities and to deliver them. For this to happen, the rights
of all parties to function without intimidation must be implemented
in practice. It also requires a willingness within all elements
of the Government to meet the needs of the people, especially
the poor. Continuing political violence and harassment is incompatible
with this.
153. Progress on human rights and democracy need
to be demonstrated before all the EU's restrictive measures placed
on named individuals and organisations can be lifted. However,
donors should continue to provide humanitarian and development
assistance, based on the needs of the people and the capacity
for this assistance to be absorbed. The UK has shown leadership
in this and should continue its important work, based on strong
co-ordination with development partners and alignment of its approach
with the pro-poor elements in the Government's own policies.
222 DFID, Eliminating World Poverty; Building our
Common Future, Cm 7656, July 2009 Back
223
See Fourth Report of Session 2009-10, DFID's Performance in
2008-09 and the 2009 White Paper, HC 48-I, para 99 Back
224
Q 132 Back
225
Q 132 Back
226
Q 80 Back
| 
