International Development Committee

The International Development Committee is appointed by the House of Commons to examine the expenditure, administration, and policy of the Department for International Development and its associated public bodies.

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Powers

The Committee is one of the departmental select committees, the powers of which are set out in House of Commons Standing Orders, principally in SO No 152. These are available on the Internet via www.parliament.uk.

Publications

The Reports and evidence of the Committee are published by The Stationery Office by Order of the House. All publications of the Committee (including press notices) are on the Internet at www.parliament.uk/indcom

Committee staff

The staff of the Committee are Carol Oxborough (Clerk), Keith Neary (Second Clerk), Anna Dickson (Committee Specialist), Ian Hook (Senior Committee Assistant), Vanessa Hallinan (Committee Assistant), and Alex Paterson (Media Officer).

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Witnesses

Tuesday 26 January 2010

Mr Donald Steinberg, Deputy President (Policy), International Crisis Group; Professor Teddy Brett, Associate Programme Director, London School of Economics; and Dr Steve Kibble, Zimbabwe Europe Network

Mr Rob Rees, Africa Advocacy Co-ordinator, CAFOD; Mr William Anderson, Country Manager Zimbabwe, Christian Aid; and Mr Justin Byworth, Chief Executive, World Vision

Tuesday 23 February 2010

Mr Gareth Thomas MP, Minister of State, and Mr Mark Lowcock, Director General, Country Programmes, Department for International Development, and Mr John Dennis, Head of Zimbabwe Unit, Foreign and Commonwealth Office

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The following written evidence has been reported to the House, but to save printing costs has not been printed and copies have been placed in the House of Commons Library, where they may be inspected by Members. Other copies are in the Parliamentary Archives (www.parliament.uk/archives), and are available to the public for inspection. Requests for inspection should be addressed to The Parliamentary Archives, Houses of Parliament, London SW1A 0PW (tel. 020 7221 3074; email archives@parliament.uk). Opening hours are from 9.30 am to 5.00 pm on Mondays to Fridays.

Oral evidence

Taken before the International Development Committee
on Tuesday 26 January 2010

Members present
Malcolm Bruce, in the Chair
John Battle Hugh Bayley Richard Burden
Mr Virendra Sharma Andrew Stunell

Witnesses: Mr Donald Steinberg, Deputy President (Policy), International Crisis Group; Professor Teddy Brett, Associate Programme Director, London School of Economics; and Dr Steve Kibble, Zimbabwe Europe Network, gave evidence.

Q1 Chairman: Thank you very much for coming in. As I think you will know, the Committee is actually visiting Zimbabwe next week and we are obviously anxious to get your expertise and your views to help us focus our questions. Can I say that we have a particularly busy week as we are going away next week, so we are a little bit tight for time. We do want to hear from you, but perhaps if you could be reasonably crisp with your answers; not all of you have to comment on every question, but do tell us what you think we need to know. If we can start with the general political situation, which is clearly complicated. The Government of National Unity has been in existence for coming on for a year. Obviously there has been dollarization of the economy which seems to have led to some recovery, and there is some indication that there are things in the shops; that schools are functioning, and so on. However, from your perspective what do you believe is the current political and economic situation; and how firmly is the Global Political Agreement embedded? It has had a pretty rocky road; so if you could give us a take on that? I should have asked you, for the record, to introduce yourselves, so if you could do that first?

Mr Steinberg: I am Donald Steinberg and I am Deputy President for Policy of the International Crisis Group.

Dr Kibble: Steve Kibble, representing the Zimbabwe Europe Network.

Professor Brett: Teddy Brett from the London School of Economics.

Mr Steinberg: Mr Chairman, when Morgan Tsvangirai and the MDC decided to join the Unity Government last January I think a lot of people said that he was setting himself up for a fall; that he was simply the latest victim of Robert Mugabe’s attempt to divide and conquer and that the Government of National Unity was doomed from the word go. In the year since that Government was formed we have seen a continuation of intimidation; we have not seen much political debate, we have not seen much political diversity, we have not seen much evidence to justify the views of sceptics but enough evidence as well to justify the faith that Morgan Tsvangirai, Arthur Mutambara and others had in that process. We have indeed seen a solidification of the economic situation—very little new growth but stability, a currency that is stable, goods returning to market places. We are seeing a Government of National Unity that performs after a fashion; we have seen the creation of a plan for national reconstruction that has worked to at least convince international donors that something serious is going on here. At the same time we have seen a continuation of farm seizures—about 150 during the course of the last year; we have seen a continuation of intimidation; we have seen hard line elements within ZANU-PF in particular stifle the working of this Government. So the question is: are you seeing a process that is moving towards a successful conclusion or are we about to see the process fall apart? I think that there are three formal challenges that we have to see met and three informal challenges. Just very quickly, on the formal side we have to see completion of the Global Political Agreement. There are a number of key steps that have to proceed. We have seen some good movement, both in terms of formation of the Government and formation of committees on human rights, on the media, on electoral processes, but the record is still very mixed. We have not seen the National Security Council, for example, take over the security dimension from the heinous Joint Operations Command; we have not seen the appointment of MDC governors; we have not seen a resolution of the issues regarding the Chairman of the Reserve Bank, Gideon Gono, or the Attorney General. So that is a real question. The second formal challenge is to complete the constitution. There is a process underway right now; it is stalling for the time being but I think there are some relatively good signs out there that people understand that this is not a process that can be run exclusively by the Executive and by the legislature. It is a people-orientated process—or at least it should be. There are other signs that the Kariba Draft, which is the anti-democratic executive power structure draft that was agreed to before, is being put aside and that would be a positive element. On the elections, I think there is an emerging view that 2011 would be too soon to hold elections and we as the International Crisis Group would support that view. We believe that holding premature elections, allowing politics to reassert themselves at this point would be a somewhat dangerous process. I think the MDC is coming to that view as well, both as they try...
to show the people of Zimbabwe that they are reasonable stewards of the public domain, and also they are very concerned about how the military would react to the election of the MDC at that point, which I think is a forgone conclusion. On the ZANU-PF side, they are not anxious to hold elections right now. A recent poll showed that they have about 10% of the vote; they have geriatric leadership; they are not viewed as a change agent; and they are not particularly excited about going to the polls at this point. Chairman, those are the three formal challenges. The three informal challenges are: on the first hand there is a need for political maturity in this process; both parties have to recognise that even as they are competitors in the political arena they are partners both in the Unity Government and in building the future of Zimbabwe, and on that front we are going to have to see some radical changes within ZANU-PF. It is very difficult as long as Robert Mugabe is at the helm, but there are movements beneath him—especially Vice President Joice Mujuru’s movement. And at the same time the MDC recognises that they have to prove themselves to the people of Zimbabwe as reasonable stewards, not corrupt, able to run a government. The second challenge is the security side. There are a dozen or so generals who have veto power over this transition process. It is a very dangerous phenomenon; it is the reason why MDC is not anxious to see a transform and transfer of power right now. I think that Zimbabweans are coming to the conclusion that some sort of soft landing is necessary to move these generals on during this transition process. The final challenge that we are looking at is the challenge of rebuilding the economy. Even as we look at the very significant changes that have occurred over the last year we still see 90% unemployment; we still see an agricultural sector that this year is probably likely to produce 40% to 50% of average crops. We still see a manufacturing sector that cannot get electricity and basic raw materials, and we still see an international community that is sceptical about the process; that is not going to come in with major amounts of investment or aid unless some positive developments occur. So, again, a very mixed picture at this point.

Q2 Chairman: Perhaps you could pick up different points.

Dr Kibble: Yes. I think one of the interesting things is that the dollarization of the economy means that ZANU-PF networks are unable to be served by inflationary money printing like they were in the past, which is a step forward if you like. My major concern is the fact that the militarisation of the state that occurred over the last 10 years has really not significantly been challenged—something at which Donald hinted there. To be honest, I do not think that the nature of the state has changed at all; it is still a kleptocratic state with a certain amount of what you might call social democratic interventions in the economy. To that extent I am probably slightly more pessimistic than Donald, but do see that the continued existence of the Government of National Unity-inclusive Government is actually a plus. But the major decisions have still to be confronted, in my opinion.

Professor Brett: I think that was a very useful summary of the situation. I am just as pessimistic as Steve. It seems to me that the nature of the situation at the moment is that it is an intrinsically unstable situation—it is an interim situation because basically ZANU’s objective is to recapture power, and in the memo I sent to you if you look at the fifth party conference that has just taken place they are absolutely intransigent; they are totally opposed to the GPA; they are going to resist every possible concession they have to make because basically they simply do not accept the legitimacy of the MDC or the democratic process. Any call for political maturity in a context of a situation governed by gangsters and crooks who have stolen half the assets of the country—each of these army officers has his political power and has used his political power to amass huge estates and so on—the notion that somehow they are going to be willing to give this up voluntarily as a result of the democratic process is simply unjustifiable. So I think this is an argument for the postponement possibly of that electoral process because the whole process of the political conflict right now is on the fact that at the next election the MDC will, if it is a free and fair election, come to power; and that will threaten the whole structure of economic power that has been built up through this process and through the fact that the state has been allocating resources to ZANU cronies and these ZANU cronies are threatened with losing their assets, for example if there is a land reform process that the MDC introduces, because all this land that has been used by these military officers is lying unused and it is one of the reasons why Zimbabwe is dependent on food aid now. So I think the critical problem is that one has to see this as an interim situation and one has to recognise that within the next two or three years there is going to be a really major crisis that has to be confronted. My own expertise started in Uganda. In Uganda in 1987 the new Government that took over could take over and not confront this problem because it won a civil war; because it destroyed the power of the existing military apparatus. This is not the case in Zimbabwe and that is the central political problem—that you have a military-economic complex of business people who have their resources out of the power of the state that actually will confront losing those resources if they lose genuine political power, and that seems to me to be the medium-term crisis that we have to confront when we think about dealing with that situation.

Q3 Hugh Bayley: A question for Donald Steinberg. You have said that there is a risk that donors will doom the Government of National Unity. The problem is this: we are damned if we do and we are damned if we do not. If we provide aid we may strengthen ZANU-PF’s hand and delay the process of reform; if we stand back we may expose the
reformists’ weakness or inability to deliver. So what should donors do in the situation we are in now, after a year of Unity Government? **Mr Steinberg:** The second threat that you identified I think is a more real threat than the first. People in Zimbabwe know that the only thing that has changed over the last year is the entry of the MDC into Government and therefore to the extent that there are positive things that are emerging the MDC gets most of the credit for that. We are now faced with a situation where that first round of euphoria is about to disappear. We are, for example, seeing the possibility in February of massive civil service strikes, from teachers, from nurses, from doctors. The biggest sign that Zimbabwe was back on the road was the opening of schools, the opening of hospitals. The reason that these civil servants are about to go on strike is that they are being paid $160 a month. They are saying that that is not even enough to go to work every day. They are demanding $620 a month; the Government is saying, “We can pay $263.” The bottom line is that schools are going to close, hospitals are going to close and MDC is going to be painted with the same brush that ZANU-PF is—“What have you done for me?” This is the biggest threat to the MDC right now because they are being perceived with either, “Have you gone over to the other side?” Are you now Government as opposed to civil society with the people?” And the concerns that we are starting to hear about corruption are tainting them as well. So for me the clear answer here is to provide resources through clean mechanisms, including the Multi-Donor Trust Fund, which the IMF has in effect certified as being worthy of receiving $500 million of their funds; to do it in line with the Finance Ministry, to clearly put aside the Reserve Bank, which has been tainted, which is discredited, which, even in the past year when everybody has been watching, has taken millions of dollars and transferred them from reserve accounts into funding presidential scholarships and foreign diplomatic missions, et cetera—so continuing the policies of the past. The one footnote I would put is that in order to encourage movement by ZANU-PF, sanctions have to stay in place on a personal basis. So what we are arguing for is targeted assistance but targeted sanctions as well.

**Q4 Hugh Bayley:** A few months ago I had quite a long conversation with Lovemore Moyo1 and he was encouraging a greater British engagement but was cautious of using aid to fund government services. Of course you can provide food aid through NGOs and you can provide HIV clinics and so on without engaging the Government; but to do what you are proposing, to fund schools, to put in train economic reform, to provide a network of state health services, health services, education services and so on. I am not in touch with what is going on in this government collective. If it is in fact in a position to do this and to identify those sorts of things most critically, what one wants is to be able to say, “We are going to give”—whatever it is—“£5 million to rebuild hospitals.” And to be able to give that in a cast-iron way so that we can actually track that money and show that that £5 million ended up in new hospitals rather than in somebody’s bank account. So what seems to me to be the issue is that you have to start building real relationships with donors in a cast-iron way so that we can actually track that money and show that that £5 million ended up in new hospitals rather than in somebody’s bank account. **Mr Steinberg:** The Government of Zimbabwe has helped in this regard by indeed setting up the Multi-Donor Trust Fund, by putting together a policy through the Finance Ministry that is clean, that has been shown to be effective so far, and so it is not a question of you as the foreign government picking and choosing and you will support a ministry led by an MDC minister but not one by a hard line ZANU-PF minister, but to simply support the process. I would say that the line does already get a little blurred here because if you go, for example, into sanitation projects by definition you have to provide resources that in some sense are fungible, that are going to be able to pay the salaries or the stipends of those people doing those projects. The course that agricultural development. We had focused in the past on this phrase “humanitarian plus” assistance, until I think most of us realised that humanitarian plus really just meant reconstruction if you define it broadly enough and it became a phrase that had no meaning. So I understand the concern but I would also say that at some point we are going to have to realise that if you want to sideline the hardliners and you want to give that country a peace dividend that will inure to the benefit of the democratic process then we are going to have to bite the bullet as an international community and support these projects.

**Q5 Hugh Bayley:** Can I ask Professor Brett whether you share that analysis and, in particular, should aid have been targeted on the MDC and other progressive civil organisations? **Professor Brett:** I think that phrase “targeted support” and “targeted sanctions” is an extremely good way of describing the issue and of course that means that basically you need to give the aid and you need to, in a sense, give it to somebody who has the capacity to know how it can be used effectively, by whom, who to give it to and who not to give it to. I would want to reinforce the proposition that at this stage, given that we have a very small window of opportunity that depends upon the MDC being able to come into partial power and deliver something, that it is absolutely critical that that process be given maximum support. I also take the point that it has to take the form of tangible service delivery. I would also go on to say that while the current mode of delivering most of our aid via NGOs has been a necessity because it has not been possible to give money to either the Ministry of Health or Education under ZANU without expecting it to be simply stolen, we do need to start creating the opportunity to reconstruct state capacity with the delivery of free services, health services, education services and so on. I am not in touch with what is going on in this government collective. If it is in fact in a position to do this and to identify those sorts of things most critically, what one wants is to be able to say, “We are going to give”—whatever it is—“£5 million to rebuild hospitals.” And to be able to give that in a cast-iron way so that we can actually track that money and show that that £5 million ended up in new hospitals rather than in somebody’s bank account. So what seems to me to be the issue is that

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1 Speaker of the Zimbabwe House of Assembly
particular ministries, which hopefully will be run by MDC but even if they are not run by MDC, even if they are run by ZANU officials, to give them the money in a way which makes it possible to be sure that it is going to be spent on what it is supposed to be spent on. There is always a fungibility problem which is that that money will free something else. That problem is not so strong in Zimbabwe because the Zimbabwe state actually has no other resources to spend anything on; so the money that you are giving it would not have been spent on hospitals and it is not going to free up anything that is going to go into the pocket of some ZANU politician or general, and that seems to me to be the critical issue. We have to say that we need to support obvious candidates. Health and sanitation systems—two years ago thousands or people were threatened by or died of cholera because sanitation systems had collapsed. Of course that means that you also have to strengthen state capacity; you have to be able to offer civil servants a living wage because if you do not offer them a living wage they are not going to come to work.

Q6 Hugh Bayley: Can I ask one final question? If one tends to favour or concentrate aid resources on MDC-led ministries how should Britain then avoid the neo-colonial accusation; that we are picking which leader and which team should run our former colony? There are plenty of people in Africa outside of Zimbabwe as well as in Zimbabwe who would say that. And to what extent should we be putting our aid in bilaterally or through multilateral agencies, and if it goes through multilateral agencies do we as a government have any say over to some extent? Professor Brett: There is a problem—and I tried to lay it out in my paper—that basically what we want to do is to make it possible for the MDC to take over Zimbabwe. Basically Zimbabwe is going nowhere without regime change and whether we say that out loud or whether we say it quietly that actually seems to me to be the fundamental prerequisite for the reconstruction of Zimbabwe—that ZANU loses its capacity to control policy. Obviously that creates a serious problem around issues of sovereignty and our role, which is particularly sensitive in Zimbabwe because of the whole neo-colonial story that has been used by Mugabe and others to keep himself in power. Despite the fact that that is what we are doing I think in relation to this issue it is possible to simply present this very clearly not as an issue of supporting MDC ministries, but of supporting particular kinds of basic essential services. We know that Zimbabweans are now living half as long as they were 40 years ago because of the collapse of health services and all these other kinds of things. So what we need to do is to develop a coherent strategy for the reconstruction of basic merit good services—a pro-poor service delivery strategy. We need to present that and we need to design mechanisms for delivering it on the basis of consultation with particular ministries; based on sanctions that we can use if we see that those things are not being delivered properly. Whether the minister in charge of the ministry is ZANU-PF or MDC is not going to be the criterion that you are going to use to do that. I guess—and, again, I have to admit that I do not know who controls which ministry—my sense is that ZANU-PF’s people have gone into the security side and into agriculture because that is what they want to control to stay in power. I suspect they have handed over some of the health and so on, the social security ministries to MDC, in which case we do not have a problem—we will end up and say we want to spend this much on health, this much on education, this much on sanitation and so on and we will go to the ministries concerned and build a process for doing that with them, and possibly try to talk about creating some systems of administrative reform that create incentives that give officials money if they deliver services rather than if they put it in their pocket. There are all sorts of ways in which one can address that issue. Whether you do it multilaterally or bilaterally is another issue. Frankly, I am not all that concerned about being tarred with the neo-colonial brush. What comes to my mind is a conversation which I had with a young man who was trying to sell me a nine-foot highcrested crane made out of metal—very beautiful and nobody was buying it—and I said to him, “I am English,” and he said, “What is wrong with your Mr Blair? Your Mr Blair has gone into Iraq and got rid of the dictator there; why has he not come here and done it for us?” I suspect that is a view that would be very widely held in the townships of Zimbabwe. That is a story that is being told by Mugabe and I do not think it carries much weight now, particularly since handing over the land to the people means handing it over to generals who are now starving the people to death. So I think we should not be too sensitive about that issue. But I do think that by developing a well targeted and well organised and well thought through programme of supporting services through the state and building state capacity by doing this we can actually to some extent deal with that problem.

As I say, the bilateral/multilateral for me would be a practical issue; I would want to know just how effective that bi/multilateral programme was. They can often be relatively inefficient and I have to say I have a prejudice against the United Nations as a service delivery organisation. Whenever I have done research—and I have done a lot of research on practical issues—the quality of DFID projects has always been significantly higher by a factor of several percentage points than any UN project that I have seen. So that is a prejudice of my own. Again, I think that that is something you would have to look at and ask yourselves, “Can we see whether that process is an effective one or not?”

Chairman: I am conscious of time and I know that Dr Kibble wants to come in, but if he does not mind can I bring in John Battle because it is a related thing, and if Dr Kibble could come back to us.

Q7 John Battle: In the background of this in my mind is the whole question of corruption because Transparency International suggests that corruption is now a major challenge, not just organisational, but economic and political. Obviously corruption would keep donors away. What is the scale of the
corruption? What are the worst areas affected and its impacts? And what should Zimbabwe be doing to reassure the international donors it is a place to which they could send their money?

**Dr Kibble:** Transparency International reckons that Zimbabwe is the eleventh most corrupt nation in the world at the current time, despite the fact that there has been an anti-corruption unit since 2005 and despite the fact that Zimbabwe signed up to the various SADC2 and AU3 protocols on anti-corruption. In a sense the question you are asking is not just the kind of epiphenomenal stuff, it is the fact that it is embedded into the culture now and has become so widespread that it is actually part of the normal transaction system. So you have a severe problem in trying to combat this and it is not going to be an easy one. The two things go together in terms of the kleptocracy of the regime and the human rights abuses that are associated with it. So in that sense you are seeking a kind of transition and we are not even in post-conflict yet—we are still looking at transition. There are certain mechanisms that Teddy has hinted at in terms of immediate delivery of services and tracking revenues. My only proviso with that is that of course for many people Tsvangirai missed a trick when he accepted that the permanent civil servants, the secretaries, all the people staffing the ministries remain as ZANU-PF appointments, which means that you have a major problem not just of delivery but of even any kind of acceptance that this is a legitimate thing for outside donors to be doing. But there are groups inside Zimbabwe like ZIG Watch of the Sokwanele NGO tracking Government performance, they are looking at the whole issues of transparency; and to some extent there is awareness as the process goes that corruption is always there. For instance, the constitutional outreach teams are supposed to be about 560 strong but ZANU-PF Women’s League suddenly jumped in there and all of a sudden there are 1,000 people involved. So the Constitutional Commission then has to do its own audit, which if it actually produces something will be a first for Zimbabwe for several years. A number of audits have taken place but no action has ever been taken against perpetrators of either human rights’ abuses or, indeed, of massive plundering of state assets. So there are things that outside donors can do. There are certainly questions of supporting civil society organisations that are looking at transparency issues and Transparency International still has an office inside Zimbabwe, I believe.

**Mr Steinberg:** If I could address that as well because there is also a context here of a decade or more of absolute lack of accountability and transparency and I would again like to focus on the Central Bank where essentially the answer was that if you wanted to fund anything or anybody you just printed money. They invented things called the Productive Sector Facility, the Basic Commodity Supply Side Intervention, the Local Authorities’ Reorientation Programme, which were just ways to print money and give it to your cronies. As long as the Central Bank Governor remains in place there is a clear sense that it is business as usual. They have passed legislation that has put a fence around the Central Bank and it is now literally broke. It is being sued by suppliers because they simply do not have resources.

**Q8 Chairman:** Is the Central Bank the Reserve Bank?

**Mr Steinberg:** Right; I am using the terms interchangeably. The fence around the Reserve Bank is a good thing because this is an organisation that, even in this last year, the IMF has reported has used $16 million of statutory reserves to pay for embassies, to pay for presidential scholarships for friends of Robert Mugabe, to pay for trips for 55 people to attend a World Food Programme Summit in Rome. So you need to attack that. The other point I would make is that the MDC has been very aware of its need to avoid the taint of corruption. There are cases right now that are floating around but they have been very quick to jump in to establish codes of conduct, to establish committees, to investigate that situation because, again, they need to prove that they are different and that they are not going to be simply falling for any Animal Farm type exercise and adopting the practices of ZANU-PF.

**Q9 Andrew Stunell:** You have painted a very bleak picture—I am sure quite rightly. There has been huge migration out of Zimbabwe to neighbouring countries and clearly that affects the relationship of those countries with Zimbabwe. Can you say something about those developing relations there, particularly with South Africa, and the links between those countries and Zimbabwe in terms of unravelling things for the future?

**Dr Kibble:** Funnily enough, the last time I gave evidence to a parliamentary committee was to the Foreign Affairs Committee, specifically on the issue of why South Africa behaves towards Zimbabwe as it does; so I will put that on the record and I can always send you the relevant documentation.

**Q10 Andrew Stunell:** We can take a second look at what you said there.

**Dr Kibble:** The migration issue is a complex one. A number of people have tried to document the number of people who have actually left Zimbabwe, and you can either do this by trying to count them or you can do it by extrapolating from what you think the population would have been, bearing in mind the HIV and AIDS epidemic, et cetera. Largely speaking there seems to be some kind of calculation that up to three million Zimbabweans have left the country and they are currently in South Africa, Botswana and what is also known as Harare North, ie London and Luton. The general problem has been not just xenophobia from South Africa, although that has been a major problem—although that is not just targeting Zimbabweans—but I think the major problem has been the refusal to see this as anything other than economic migrants. So the treatment of Zimbabweans inside the region has been that of, “These people are only coming to seek jobs and it is nothing to do with the current crisis inside

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2 Southern African Development Community  
3 African Union
So there has been a disjuncture. I think, between SADC attempts to try to solve the problem politically and to some extent judicially around Zimbabwe and the kind of reaction that is often quite a populist reaction to the numbers of Zimbabweans actually inside Southern African regional countries. This goes against the kind of support that those nations gave to the anti-apartheid struggle inside South Africa and the liberation movement inside Zimbabwe. It is very costly to deport lots and lots of Zimbabweans every day when 35% turn round immediately and go back in again. So you have a whole problem of cross-border traders, economic migrants, political refugees all being lumped together, and if you do not have refugee status then your treatment cannot be under the specific international conventions that deal with refugees. So the problem continues and it may be that with the World Cup coming up in South Africa that there will be a greater appreciation of how to actually deal with this economic situation that has caused Zimbabweans to leave when they would much prefer to stay in their own country.

**Professor Brett:** If I could take up the second half of your question, which was the political implications of relationships with the SADC community and South Africa in particular. Of course that has been one of the central questions that has been asked right through the last decade, which is to say given that the ZANU regime has clearly, from the beginning of this century, been breaking every rule in the book—it has been rigging elections and all of those kinds of things—why is it that ZANU has had almost 100% support from the region? The only pressure that was applied to them by Mbeki when he was President of South Africa was this notion that he had to have soft diplomacy because if you did not have that he was not going to be listened to at all and therefore he argued, probably legitimately, that if he tried to put any real pressure on ZANU to change its behaviour he would simply have been marginalised. That might have been true but of course the question is the extent to which either South Africa, or South Africa in collaboration with the other countries in the region that take leadership from South Africa, would be willing to recognise the two kinds of damages that Zimbabwe is doing to them. The one damage is very clearly economic and social, which is to say that they are confronted with three million people who are semi-indigent wandering around towns doing unpleasant things. When I lived in Johannesburg a couple of years ago one of my friends said that these two old ladies were locked up in a bathroom for half a day because a bunch of Zimbabweans had broken into their house in Johannesburg and stolen things from them, so that whole bunch of people without real incomes are a massive problem in the region. Of course the whole loss of the Zimbabwe economy—Zimbabwe used to be the major player after South Africa in the regional economy and all of that has gone—has imposed huge losses on everybody in that region. And we can see that those are clearly associated with political immorality of various sorts and kinds. The damage that ZANU has done to the Zimbabwean people is infinitely greater than the damage that Smith did to the Zimbabwean people; during the Smith UDI regime the Zimbabwe economy grew 7% a year. This lot have basically killed half the population or forced them to leave. So you have that political question and of course that political question is difficult because this whole thing happened during the period when Mbeki was talking about the new African renaissance and African states were going to police each other’s actions. He then has Zimbabwe that broke every rule in the book for their programme that was set up and yet he went in and connived with this; so there is a huge loss of credibility of African governments.

**Chairman:** Can I bring in Richard Burden because there is a specific question arising out of that and it might be helpful to get that in.

**Q11 Richard Burden:** It is really about where there looks like or there could be some hope of pressures, particularly through the SADC—and I am thinking of the SADC Tribunal last year, which found in favour of the cases being brought and we are aware of the specific case of Mike Campbell and so on; but the implications are of 79 white farmers and potentially a lot more than that in terms of land seizure generally. What is happening about this? It was November 2008 that all of this happened; so where does it go from here?

**Mr Steinberg:** Step back for a second and focus on the transition in South Africa because we really have seen a much different approach under Jacob Zuma than we did under Thabo Mbeki. Jacob Zuma has taken his three top advisers and put them directly on the account and these people include Mac Maharaj, who has the greatest revolutionary credentials in the world; he cannot be out-revolutionised by Robert Mugabe. No one is going to accuse Jacob Zuma of being a tool of the West. He went into Maputo following the decision of Morgan Tsvangirai to withdraw from the Government and read the riot act to Robert Mugabe in private, such that we have heard that Mugabe was shocked. He went back and within several weeks you had an electoral commission established; you had a human rights commission established; South Africa is paying attention to this issue at this point and is applying the kind of pressure that we are talking about. They need to continue to do that, and I would argue—and this addresses the previous comment—that they need to do it with the co-operation of the international community. The easiest way to avoid charges of neo-imperialism is to say that SADC negotiated this Global Political Agreement; they are the guarantors of the agreement—“Mr Zuma, working in cooperation with you, how can we help this process move ahead?” That is the single answer to charges of British national interests overwhelming these processes. The answer to your specific question about the Tribunal’s decision is that the current Government of Zimbabwe, the Attorney General remains a ZANU-PF hardliner, who has basically

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4 Unilateral Declaration of Independence in Rhodesia in 1965 under Ian Smith, Prime Minister
thwarted the rule of law, who got his Government to essentially say, “This has no meaning for us,” and it is now up to SADC to put its foot down and to say, “Yes, it does and we are starting to talk about issues of suspension from SADC if you do not obey the judgment of a ruling to which you were a party.”

Q12 Richard Burden: But it is some time ago now—it was November 2008, the Tribunal decision, and it was probably clear before then about what the response was going to be and that the Zimbabwean legal team walked out even before the decision was there. So what are the vibes coming from South Africa?

Mr Steinberg: I will let Dr Kibble address it, but the one thing I will say is that we are not yet in a situation in Zimbabwe where the rule of law applies; it is still a situation where the rule of power applies and that is part of the reason we are so committed to this transition and, frankly, in my mind, one of the reasons why we need to see the movement of Gideon Gono and Johannes Tomana out of the positions that they currently occupy.

Dr Kibble: In terms of the SADC Tribunal, that decision in the Campbell case was November 2008. The Zimbabwe High Court has shown no great willingness to follow up the judgment. It has said it will do it in due course. It is interesting that if you look on the positive side you might say that the SADC judicial process it is actually going much further than the SADC political process. Most of the cases that have come before the SADC Tribunal so far have been to do with Zimbabwe. There is currently a case outstanding from the Human Rights NGO Forum about torture victims. So in that sense at least the SADC Tribunal under the registrar Charles Mkandawire, who is trying to push things along, has been quite a positive move. The problem is that of course SADC is the ultimate court—the SADC Council of Ministers is the ultimate court to actually bring those decisions to fruition. You can get a decision through the SADC Tribunal—fine, you get a legal judgment—but there is no mechanism for the SADC Tribunal to actually put that into practice without the SADC political organisations taking part, and that bit is obviously much trickier.

The fact that the judgment exists is an interesting one and the counter factual, that if that Tribunal had found in favour of the Zimbabwe Government, you cannot imagine that that would not have been celebrated by ZANU-PF as a success. So the picture is fairly mixed on that one. The North Gauteng Court currently has a case from Afri-Forum, which is a South African NGO that works on land issues in terms of making sure that that decision by the Tribunal becomes part of South African law, which will mean that if Zimbabwe is found to be in default of the SADC Tribunal its assets inside South Africa could theoretically at least be seized.

Mr Steinberg: If I could just say that the critical point about the ZANU Government is that it will never do anything that it does not want to do unless it is absolutely forced to do so. So the critical question is what sanctions could SADC use to push these things through? And is it politically willing to actually do that?

Q13 Chairman: Can I take that forward, on both SADC and the UN, on the issue of internally displaced people? We get very mixed reports—the Government say there are none and others say that there are hundreds and thousands of people migrating backwards and forwards across the border. I think actually in the discussion after we watched the film the point that was being made was that nobody knows because these are under the control of ZANU-PF and you cannot actually get at them, but they are also the means by which they can secure victory in future elections—by forcing people to vote the right way or not vote at all—by stopping them voting for anything other than ZANU-PF. The local NGOs are saying that the UN should be doing something about this; there should be some direct action; that we should be able to reach these people and we should be able to support these people. What in reality could be done?

Dr Kibble: 2005 saw Operation Murambatsvina “drive out the filth” in some versions, or “restore order” in others, in which 750,000 people were directly affected and one and a half million at least indirectly affected, and there was the report by the UN Special Rapporteur, Anna Tibaijuka, pointing out that this was a major human rights abuse. Since then we have also had the displacement from March to June 2008 associated with Operation Mavhoterapapi, which was about displacing MDC supporters—burning their houses, torture, rape and mayhem in general. So the internal displacement issue has never gone away and the impacts of it are still not being dealt with to any great extent, certainly not by the Government. The reason for these kinds of displacements are the subject of debate, but one reason is possibly the idea of driving MDC supporters from urban areas into rural areas where they are more under the control of the local ZANU-PF command structures and local Joint Operations Command.

Professor Brett: There is an earlier displacement, of course, because something like a quarter of a million agricultural workers were displaced off commercial farms when they were expropriated. I was told when I was doing research in 2004 by a woman at the IFO that within five years of that displacement something like 50,000 of those people had died from neglect, disease and all of those things. The problem is that when people are displaced like that they do not go off as a group and appear somewhere as a million displaced people; they disappear off the farms and they just become part of the great army of the unemployed who are, in any case, 90% of the population. It is an interesting issue of whether somebody who has been displaced forcibly by the Government or somebody who simply lost his job because the whole economy has collapsed has the greater problems and greater needs. I think that that is an issue which could be addressed specifically as something we might want to target as a donor agency. I think it would be precisely the sort of thing
that might be given to an international NGO to manage if one wanted to do that. But I think more broadly the problems of somebody who has lost his job as a result of an economic crisis is not at all that different from the problems of somebody who has lost his job because of some specific political event. So it is that bigger issue that we have to address: how do we put resources in that get the economy back to work so that we can create real employment for millions of people?

Q14 Chairman: But in this insane situation is it not the case in reality that ZANU are very happy for these people either to disappear or to be forced into the rural areas which they control? In a normal situation these people would be voting for some change so they are either not voting at all or they are voting for things to stay the same because they are beaten into submission to do so. So how on earth does the international community break that log-jam?

Mr Steinberg: One of the keys here is to reduce the power of these forces that you are talking about and we are absolutely convinced that so long as you have a dozen senior leaders who, as we have talked about before, see their personal stake and the continuation of this regime as paramount then they will do what is necessary to keep themselves there. These are generals, senior security officials who have a series of personal motivations. Some truly believe that Tsvangirai will sell out the revolution and they have revolutionary fervour and do not want to see it returned to the good old days of Ian Smith. Others are very concerned about their personal wealth because, indeed, they have accumulated great wealth. Others are very concerned about justice being applied to them because some were in fact involved not only in the electoral abuses that we have seen over the past couple of years but going all the way back to the 1980s and their actions in Matabeleland, which most people would acknowledge is either genocide or crimes against humanity. So they are very concerned and will continue to use their power to thwart a transition process. They recognise that time is against them, they recognise that ZANU-PF in a recent poll got 10% support from the Zimbabwean people—a very credible poll in fact. So our view is that something has to be done to get those Generals to move on. It is a very disagreeable option to look at a possible amnesty, a domestic amnesty, a question of arranging a soft landing for the individuals—it is not one that we like to talk about. But it is one that the Zimbabweans themselves are talking about; they are talking about, “Are we really going to allow a dozen people to have the veto power on our future?” So I would urge the Committee to think about asking people about those questions. Again, it is for the Zimbabweans to decide, not the international community, but they need to be able to legitimise that conversation.

Professor Brett: Can I say that this leads directly into the issue of managing the next election because all of these problems manifest themselves in attempts to control politics, control voting and all of those kinds of things; so I think all of the issues around how the next election is going to be managed, who is going to manage it, the forms that it is going to take, how you are going to avoid abuses and how you are going to monitor it, those issues need to be addressed and they need to be addressed in co-operation with people in the region because it is much more credible to bring in monitors from South Africa than from here.

Q15 Richard Burden: A credible register would be a difficulty, would it not?

Professor Brett: That whole issue is a major issue and, as I say, I think it is something on which you need to take a general position and think about what sorts of things can be put into that. The second point I would make just in terms of what you do when you get to Zimbabwe, it is very important for you to try to get close to and have serious conversations with ZANU-PF people as well as MDC people because I think the other possible thing that might turn the situation around is the fact that ZANU as a political organisation is deeply divided. There are probably people in ZANU who do realise the enormity of the problem that confronts them and the critical point coming up is if ZANU can be split—and ZANU is clearly under huge stress, the last congress was one of the most divisive that has ever existed and even Mugabe publicly came out and said, “We are being destroyed from within” —and it is important to get a sense of what is going on inside ZANU to see whether there are possibilities from inside that you could build a much more reasonably broad-based Government that included some of ZANU without ZANU being in control.

Q16 Hugh Bayley: One of the other things that affects the electoral process is the number of Zimbabweans living abroad. I have had MDC people say to me, “You are just absorbing all our voters.” To what extent are migrants deterred from returning to Zimbabwe by the economic situation and to what extent are they deterred through fear of political reprisals?

Dr Kibble: There was a judgment by the Immigration Tribunal here called RN that anybody who could not demonstrably show support for ZANU-PF was at least theoretically at risk if returned to Zimbabwe. So the British Government—given that is a Tribunal decision—has had to reconcile that with its desire to get rid of migrants as much as possible. So people are scared of what is going to happen to them if they return to either their area or an area under the control of a ZANU-PF chief who does not know who these people are and they (these chiefs) will be suspicious and will report to security structures. There is that element of fear of the political consequences of returning. One of the reasons that Tsvangirai was barricaded at Southwark Cathedral when he said that it was time for Zimbabweans to go home was precisely because people were extremely vulnerable and extremely aware of what was to face them if they were returned to Zimbabwe. Undoubtedly people are here because they cannot make a living inside
Zimbabwe. I think the political imperative of them remaining here still remains much the same as it has been for the last two years.

Q17 Hugh Bayley: What do you estimate in the number of Zimbabweans living currently in other countries in Southern Africa and the numbers in “Harare North”?

Dr Kibble: Harare North, if you include Luton! I do not think that anybody really has a complete handle on it, but certainly between three and four million Zimbabweans inside Southern Africa—overwhelmingly in South Africa but some in Botswana, a few in Zambia, Malawi and Mozambique. The population here has been estimated at between 100,000 and 200,000, of whom some are undoubtedly illegal over-stayers, some have residency rights and some have refugee status. Those are the figures I have heard. I have no independent backup on those figures whatsoever, and it would be an interesting piece of research to find out. The whole issue—because of necessity certain people are overstaying on student visas and visitors’ visas—is clouded with a certain mystification.

Q18 Hugh Bayley: These people are disproportionately professionals and skilled or semi-skilled workers. What impact does that absence have on the economy of Zimbabwe? And if one has to provide economic progress to create the conditions on the economy of Zimbabwe? And if one has to skilled workers. What impact does that absence have disproportionally professionals and skilled or semi-skilled workers. What impact does that absence have on the economy of Zimbabwe? And if one has to provide economic progress to create the conditions that are necessary for political progress, what can be done to help those skilled workers to return?

Dr Kibble: I think Donald wants to come in, but just to say that all the Zimbabwean nurses could return and all the teachers currently teaching in South Africa that would make a major boost to the reconstruction of Zimbabwe.

Mr Steinberg: I was going to start by making that same point, that you have indeed seen, even over the last year, a brain drain that is leaving not only the social sectors that we are talking about, but the manufacturing sector, the agricultural sector, the mining sector as well, which brings up the larger question of how do you restore this economy? Indeed, I do believe that the key to getting three to four million people back from the region and the key to getting people elsewhere in the world back is to give them economic opportunities. What that insists upon is not only completing the Global Political Agreement so that people know that this process is in fact going to take place, but you have to remember what happened in October when Morgan Tsvangirai temporarily suspended his participation in Government and people thought that maybe this was going to fall apart, and you saw a move of people leaving Harare for rural areas; you saw hoarding of gasoline and other products; you saw the stock market crash. So the economic implications of even a temporary blip in this process are tremendous. If the process were to fall apart the 3 or 4% growth that we have seen this last year would be a 20% decline over the next year. Zimbabweans also have to take steps themselves, though. They have right now anti-business laws and regulations. The indigenisation law is a disaster; it is scaring off foreign investment and trade. They have to provide security for ownership in their country. Zimbabwe is one of the 25 worst places to invest in the world right now according to the World Bank’s estimate, and people understand that. Again, you have to put in place mechanisms for clean foreign assistance to come in, and again I would point to the Multi-Donor Trust Fund. God grant that the Zimbabwe dollar is dead forever and they have to formally accept another currency as their own currency—the South African rand would be a good choice, the American dollar would be just fine; there are other governments around the world who do the exact same thing. Zimbabwe needs to finally put a dagger into the 20 trillion dollar Zimbabwe notes that I have plastered on my wall in my office. Finally, I need to stress again that the Central Bank Governor has to go because he is the single symbol of the old regime.

Chairman: We have slightly run out of time but if I could just bring in Richard Burden.

Q19 Richard Burden: Just very briefly about the DFID aid expenditure. For all the reasons we have been talking about because of the severity of the crisis in Zimbabwe a huge amount proportionally of DFID’s aid is devoted now to humanitarian assistance and a number of organisations have said that whilst it is understandable, that the balance is wrong and that there needs to be a way of getting that contribution more towards long-term development rather than simply humanitarian assistance. Do you agree that it is just a function of the crazy situation of the whole thing, or is there something that can be done at the moment to shift that balance?

Professor Brett: I agree absolutely with that proposition. Clearly one does not want to stop spending on the social sectors at all, but critically creating employment is the way that you make it possible for people to generate the resources they need to support their own services. I think that there are two issues: there is the formal economic sector and the informal sector. The formal sector can actually be got going virtually costlessly, simply by eliminating a whole set of controls over it that have stopped people from investing and the first control, which was the whole monetary system and doing away with that, has already produced massive results at virtually zero costs. I think that given the fact that there is 80% or 90% of apparent unemployment—it is not unemployment because if people are unemployed they do not eat and they starve to death, so they must be doing something—there is a small informal sector operating, and I think the crucial thing that DFID could do would be to build some small micro-enterprise projects that would in effect encourage people to get into small business activities of various sorts and kinds, and that could be done either using the state or, in parallel with the state, by setting up micro-finance enterprises and a whole array of other sorts of things. But that seems to me to be where DFID has not actually been investing and that is where the most important investment should go, particularly given that
Zimbabwe, of all African countries, actually went in and systematically destroyed that informal business sector that was responsible for the livelihoods of probably half of its populations, in Operation Murambatsvina in 2005, when they virtually destroyed half of the businesses in Harare and Bulawayo in the most devastating kind of way. That would be my major recommendation in terms of thinking about an allocation of DFID resources that would change the way they operate.

**Dr Kibble:** At the moment we are in a humanitarian-plus transitional phase. We are not yet in a post-conflict phase. We obviously need the humanitarian aid to continue with 2.2 million people being food insecure right now and a major shortfall in cereals, et cetera, but we do need to look at how that translates into developmental aid in a sequencing way. It is not quite as crude as a stick and carrot approach. You cannot institute development-orientated aid right now, but what you can do is to say these are mechanisms that could work, this is the money that is available, the clean kind of mechanisms that Donald is talking about. Money going through international NGOs and various other multi-lateral agencies into more and more specifically developmental long-term assistance, once certain preconditions are met, once you have indicators on the ability of the state to handle that money, the ability of all the different ministries to be able to come up with plans that are met, that have no corruption attached to them. More and more you can move into straightforward developmental assistance and possibly, lastly, you can move into direct budgetary support but that is, in my mind, quite a long way off yet.

**Q20 Chairman:** I think we recognise that.

**Mr Steinberg:** Dr Kibble’s point about using aid as an opportunity to move the process ahead is very important. I would also argue that sanctions and the lifting of them should be much more deliberately tied to the steps that we really want to see here. I will give just one example on using aid as an opportunity. Right now under the Global Political Agreement there is a commitment to do a land audit and this is very significant because it gets to the heart of what land reform is all about in Zimbabwe. It is not just a technical exercise. It is an effort to say okay, we have transferred all of these large white tracts of land to someone. Who have we transferred it to? What are they doing with that land? Is it just lying fallow? Does a single general own tracts and tracts of land? Is this what we really meant when we were talking about breaking up the white farms and giving it to the people of Zimbabwe? It is going to take another step. It is going to say what do those smallholders need? Do they need fertilisers? Do they need water? Do they need credit? This is not just a technical exercise. This is the heart and soul of this whole question about land reform and right now the Minister of Agriculture says that it is too soon to do this. Even though we committed in the Global Political Agreement, even though we have already allocated the $31 million we need for it, even though the EU have already said they will pay for 40% of that cost, apparently it is ‘too soon’ to do that exercise. Under this situation, I do not understand how you could put money into a land reform programme in Zimbabwe, which is absolutely necessary. No-one is defending the past situation, and, with all due respect, I think to say that people were better off under Ian Smith than they are today or that the Government was more committed to growth than, is particularly un-useful in this exercise, but, having said that, we need to get to the root of what this is all about. Is it really land reform or is it just empowering the cronies of Robert Mugabe? That is what this is going to show us and any assistance we provide to the agricultural sector ought to be tied to the completion of an honest land audit.

**Chairman:** That saved me asking the last question because that was an answer. Thank you to all three of you. It has been very useful for us to have your insight. It is obviously a confused and complicated situation that could go in a lot of different directions but I think you have given us a good feel for how aid and the development of aid can interact. I want to thank you very much indeed.

**Witnesses:** Mr Rob Rees, Africa Advocacy Co-ordinator, CAFOD; Mr William Anderson, Country Manager Zimbabwe, Christian Aid; and Mr Justin Byworth, Chief Executive, World Vision, gave evidence.

**Q21 Chairman:** Can I say welcome to you and thank you very much for coming in. You will probably appreciate that we are slightly pressed for time and one or two colleagues may have to leave. We want to hear from you and if you can be crisp in your answers that would be helpful but please tell us what you think we need to hear. You have been in before and heard what has been going on in the previous session. I will start with what DFID has been doing with its Protracted Relief Programme but, firstly, could you introduce yourselves for the record.

**Mr Anderson:** I am William Anderson.

**Mr Byworth:** I am Justin Byworth from World Vision.

**Mr Rees:** I am Rob Rees from CAFOD.

**Q22 Chairman:** DFID ran this Protracted Relief Programme I and II which attracted some degree of support. How effective has it been? What have its problems been? What do you think they could or should have learned which might help inform the next stage?

**Mr Anderson:** Let me just make a quick point. Overall, I think DFID has a very good programme in Zimbabwe. I think DFID has responded to the needs very well. It has set the agenda for all other donors really, so we should be very proud of what DFID is doing in Zimbabwe in a very difficult
situation. The Protracted Relief Programme is the flagship programme of DFID particularly related to secure livelihoods. It is a key part of humanitarian plus, as it were. It is not really relief but it is recovery and in many ways development. We are in the second phase of the PRP. We have had three years and then a review period and now we are in the second three-year period, or possibly five years. I would say that it is an extremely good programme. Other donors really want to come on board and support it. One particular aspect of it, if I can come straight on to that, is conservation agriculture. DFID has supported conservation agriculture since 2002. It has supported a task force in Zimbabwe on conservation agriculture. It has supported a manual that is now out. It has done this to some opposition within Zimbabwe. There were a few agricultural academics who said that conservation agriculture does not work, particularly in the drier parts of the country. These academics have now been proved to be wrong and they have said that this is the best agricultural practice. In that respect, DFID has stuck to their guns and I think it is an excellent agricultural practice that should be promoted across Africa. I would like to see DFID promote that much more.

Mr Byworth: I agree with everything that William has said. I think PRP is a flagship programme that DFID should be proud of. World Vision and others as partners of that have seen real impact in the lives of communities that we are working with. One particular aspect of it that we welcome is its focus on the vulnerable, including vulnerable children, combined with a focus on livelihoods to lift up the communities, through such things as conservation agriculture, together with safety net and social protection programming to support those who are most vulnerable.

Q23 Chairman: Could you explain that a bit more, though, because this is in a country where the Government has been crashing around destroying things all over the place. To what extent can they be sure that this sticks? What has been the reaction of the Government to this if then they decide they want to work in an area or displace people? Has that happened or how have they managed to protect it?

Mr Byworth: Certainly where World Vision is working is at that interface between community and the lowest tier of government, particularly government service deliveries in health and education. In those places obviously in the last 12 months we have seen real progress on that in terms of staff being there and able to deliver those basic services, so certainly we are more hopeful about that now than we were 12 to 18 months ago. Of course the future is uncertain.

Q24 Chairman: Are there no-go areas, parts of the country you just would not go to?

Mr Byworth: Not for World Vision. We have been working in several parts all around the periphery of the country and we do not have that issue, certainly not recently since the NGO ban, but that was a different matter.

Mr Rees: I would endorse what they have said about the programme overall. Just a slight comment though on the way that the programme is managed through a contracting agency, GRM. We recognise that DFID needs to minimise transaction costs and save its own costs, but there is a feeling that it increases the distance between civil society organisations that are actually implementing the programme on the ground and the donor. Through the partners that we work with they would like to feel that they have some opportunity for more direct contact with DFID in order to be able to get a better understanding and to ensure that DFID has a good understanding of the situation that they are working in. This applies to a certain extent in the health sector as well. At the time of the cholera crisis DFID gave the funds for the response to cholera all to UNICEF and there were a lot of delays subsequently in the provision of the relief assistance. Generally, we think that there should be some improvements in the means of communication and dialogue between civil society and DFID.

Chairman: Thank you for that.

Q25 Richard Burden: On the same area of DFID programmes around agriculture, it is good to hear what you say about the conservation agriculture programme. DFID’s work in terms of improving agricultural productivity has also been praised. Are there any ways that you think that that work can be improved upon and built upon for the future? I take your point about GRM as well, about mechanisms for distributing support to small farmers.

Mr Anderson: The key part of conservation agriculture is teaching people how to better manage their land and how to get a profitable harvest. The national average in Zimbabwe is 0.2 metric tonnes per hectare. For a family of six just to be subsistent they will need 1.2 metric tonnes per annum of grain. The conservation agriculture practice enables households to get at least 2, 3, 5 and in many cases over 10 metric tonnes per hectare. That is in ideal conditions. This then comes to a point where once you have got a good harvest what do you do with that maize, sorghum or millet? That is where we need to address the issue of market because if you cannot sell the maize, in particular, then that household is not able to use it. It is going beyond that and thinking about storage and about markets and about better crops, better grain, more suitable to the areas. People do prefer maize. Sorghum, millet and cassava are promoted by DFID and perhaps it is looking into this as well, how can we get across the idea that for dry areas these are the crops that are much more suitable. DFID is doing this but perhaps they can be nudged in that direction further. It is certainly not off their radar; it is on their radar.

Mr Byworth: One point to add in terms of building on that, I think it is important also in supporting agricultural development and greater food production to link, from that, into the area of nutrition. Obviously even where you have higher yields and higher consumption, it does not automatically translate into better nutrition for children and women. There have been examples of
other projects, Healthy Harvests for example with UNICEF, where that work has been combined with greater education on good nutritional practice in the home, and certainly World Vision would advocate that a link is made between the agricultural-based programmes with also the child-focused vulnerable programmes to improve child nutrition. The levels of chronic malnutrition and stunting in young adults in Zimbabwe is horrendous. It is huge although the acute wasting malnutrition is not so high. I believe they are just doing a nationwide nutrition survey at the moment and UNICEF and many other agencies are involved in that. We should make the link from agricultural production to nutrition, particularly for children.

Mr Rees: Conservation farming is aimed at making better use of resources and particularly rainfall, but at the end of the day the overall productivity will depend on a successful rainy season. Just at the moment there is a very big fear that the rains have stopped. There has been a three-week break in the rains in many places and yields are going to be greatly reduced and possibly be in total failure unless they resume. This then adds additional complications because farmers have taken resources, fertilisers and seeds on credit and the question is whether they are going to be expected to repay those loans even though they have no harvest and how they will do that. It raises the issue of land and land ownership, which is quite a critical factor in the matrix.

Mr Byworth: I think next week some of you will be there. I was there 10 days ago and I saw literally the contrast where the conservation farming had been applied or not in terms of surviving the period without rain. I have not heard good news that there has been rain, but I heard from some farmers and they said last year they had good rains and a better harvest but because of the economic and political situation they did not have access to the inputs; this year they have access to the inputs and now they have no rain.

Q26 Chairman: The Committee has a reputation for finding the rain.

Mr Byworth: That is fantastic. The rainmakers!

Mr Anderson: I have a couple of points, harking back to what was said before. One is about internally displaced persons. That is a term that cannot be used in Zimbabwe by agencies because the Government does not like it—they prefer "mobile vulnerable population"—but DFID has been consistent in its support of internally displaced persons (IDPs), and the work that they do with the International Organisation for Migration (IOM) should be commended as well. I hope you are going to look at that. It comes on to the point about how they support some of the displaced persons perhaps from Murumbatsvina in communities and the existing communities there. Over a period of time the support went just to those displaced persons, which caused conflict and tension in the community. But now through IOM, with DFID support and with other NGOs, the support is more holistic, so lessons have been learned along the way as well, just to add that point. Another point is that at the local government level often the local government really wants the NGOs with DFID support to be there. They will be falling over themselves to get in the NGO support. They really want the support from NGOs. It is very different to the message of the national government. I think that is a key point as well. NGOs were really only banned for those few weeks after the first election in 2008. There was a ban and we were not able to operate but since then, I think across the country, NGOs do have access at the moment. At election time that becomes restricted and few field staff will be able to visit those areas. That is for three or four weeks before the election.

Q27 Hugh Bayley: As the health system has contracted health needs have increased. What can be done to recruit and retain and, dare I say, repatriate health staff?

Mr Byworth: That is a very good question. Obviously there is an international dimension on which I do not think myself and World Vision are best-placed to comment in terms of the diaspora, for example, in the UK. Certainly having just been there, I was encouraged that staff—and I visited three health clinics all in southern Matabeleland—had returned to work again in the last 12 months and were being paid and were working. Certainly we have seen an improvement in that. Obviously there is a huge reliance on local community-based volunteers. Whether it is on caring for people living with HIV or whether it is on outreach programmes for children, there is a huge reliance on local volunteers where NGOs like World Vision and others can help link up to the system. Obviously one long-term policy issue we would like to see is access free at the point of service, free at the point of use. Access to health care does not exist and obviously, although economically things are much better now in a dollarized economy, prices, although they have dropped a little in the last couple of months, are still high and the cost both for the recipient and also for staff with salaries the way they are is a struggle. Long-term you need a strong health system top to bottom, but we recognise the constraints in addressing that in terms of government-to-government.

Q28 Andrew Stunell: If I could just pick up the specifics of the HIV programme where DFID has allocated £40 million over the next five years. Do you think DFID’s focus on that is correct? Is it working? What would you say about the programme itself and the outcomes we might expect to see?

Mr Rees: I would say it is a major priority and DFID does have its level of commitment right. Zimbabwe now has one of the lowest levels of life expectancy of anywhere in Africa. It is 34 years for a male and 37 years for a female, with over one million orphans estimated across the country. I think there are questions, as was mentioned a moment ago, about access to health services since the dollarization. People in rural areas particularly have very limited opportunity for accessing hard currency and therefore have limited access to health services,
which then raises a question of access to and distribution of the antiretrovirals (ARVs) and how the costs of distributing those will be covered.

Q29 Andrew Stunell: What about the vulnerable and marginalised groups?

Mr Byworth: As you mentioned, particularly the orphans and households made vulnerable by HIV, the scale of it is just immense. DFID has responded well to it. I think the programme of support that they have given through UNICEF has been very well received and well used. I think it is completing later this year in 2010, so we would certainly encourage DFID to look at continuing that. Rob mentioned earlier that UNICEF in terms of an intermediary and a grant-making body to NGOs and civil society has not been set up to do that as efficiently, say, as GRM have done for the PRP, so I think they either need some support to get better—we have had all kinds of problems with procurement through them—or look at an alternative intermediary. We certainly support what UNICEF is doing there and the DFID work with UNICEF. Although HIV prevalence rates have reduced, the numbers of orphans and those affected has increased, so it is going to be many years that this needs to be continued for.

Mr Rees: Within the work that we do under PRP with DFID support we try to prioritise families and communities that are affected by HIV, so single-parent families particularly and those mothers who are HIV positive will be given preferential treatment and access to support through that programme. It is a matter of targeting assistance to try to encourage and maintain self-reliance within the family and within the community because the problem is so big that institutions are not the response.

Q30 Andrew Stunell: Compared to other African countries, the amount of aid going in for HIV projects appears to be lower. Is that a function of the instability or is there government resistance or have we just not got round to it?

Mr Anderson: Lower than what? I think one of the reasons why there is not a huge amount of money is because of some of the large foundations, for example the Bill Gates Foundation and PEPFAR5, which are supporting Zimbabwe at the moment. In terms of the priority of HIV/AIDS, it is a huge issue and DFID is right to concentrate on it. Coming back to the prevalence, it was about 25% five years ago and it has now come down to about 16%. That is attributed partly due to behaviour change, and I think DFID’s role in that can be evidenced. It is also partly due to the number of people who have died. There are 3,000 people dying every week from AIDS-related illnesses. In terms of the actual support, there is also an organisation called Population Services International (PSI). Again that is with USAID so DFID has done well to co-ordinate its funding of that with another large donor. I think that is a good programme as well. I am not qualified to talk about it but it is something you can certainly look into. There is an Extended Support Programme which is considerable in Zimbabwe. They work through the Government, the Ministry of Health, as well as large UN agencies and larger NGOs. Again that is a huge programme that I am not qualified to talk about but I would suggest you look into it as well. In terms of the priority of HIV, it is a huge issue and they are right to do that.

Mr Byworth: We certainly have not come across the social stigma that was there some years ago or a “head in the sand” political mentality about this. That has not been an issue that we have encountered locally. Programmes are able to be effective there but the need is huge. There is a great link with cross-border migration as well, with South Africa particularly, which complicates things.

Q31 Mr Sharma: In the last few years the child mortality rate has increased. What are the main causes of that and illness in the country and how do you then go about addressing these issues?

Mr Rees: I think it is a combination of factors reflecting the chaos that has prevailed within the country and within the primary health care sector: the reduction of the number of medical staff, the trained nurses and doctors who have left the country, so there are not the personnel on the ground to provide the services; lack of basic supplies; the inability of the poorer sectors of the community to be able to pay for the services. Especially pre-dollariization where prices were going up by the minute, then it was a very difficult situation for anybody to plan ahead for and to be able to make the necessary allowances in terms of their own personal expenditure.

Mr Byworth: Certainly under-five child mortality is an absolute top priority. World Vision has a global campaign on that at the moment to try and reduce the 8.8 million child deaths each year, to try and reduce the 6 million or so of those which are largely preventable. Certainly in Zimbabwe the major childhood killers are there to see—diarrhoea, respiratory infections, malaria, et cetera. Poor hygiene and access to water and sanitation is a major factor. Poor nutrition is a major contributing factor underlying the vulnerability which leads from not getting access to health care. When you do not get access to health care it has more damaging effects. Certainly we would like to see a redoubling of focus on both the maternal and child health Millennium Development Goals not just for Zimbabwe but for all countries where child mortality is high. There are about 30 what we call “high burden” countries which have the largest percentage and largest number of children under five who die. Zimbabwe needs to be right up there with a big strong focus on it, both through strengthening health systems and community-based measures. A lot of times with child mortality it is simple, community-based preventative measures such as re-hydration for diarrhoea and those types of things that are proven to reduce mortality. If you look at Malawi just across the border, child mortality has improved significantly in the last few years in contrast to Zimbabwe and a few places like Kenya. It gets

5 US President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief
strong investment but it needs to be both community-based and also health strengthening. DFID is well placed on that at a policy level through the International Health Partnership they have been promoting A bit of a stronger capacity for DFID in country in Zimbabwe on health would be good. They are not as strong as perhaps they might be. 

**Mr Anderson:** It is due to the breakdown of Zimbabwean society and the social services structures. It is as basic as that.

**Q32 Mr Sharma:** You did mention that poor child health is due to malnutrition. How effective has the food aid programme been in tackling it?

**Mr Anderson:** Food aid now through the World Food Programme has been going on for eight years and there are very good things in that it has stopped people from dying. It has operated during the hunger gap period from around November/December to around March/April when the harvests come in. I would say it has saved lives. In terms of how we can improve that, I would suggest that there are areas that WFP should be looking at and nudged by DFID, particularly food for work, because simple food aid for eight years on the trot does induce dependency on food aid and people perhaps might decide just to take the bag of food at the end of the month rather than try to grow their own food. There are also things like issuing worm tablets. It is a very simple operational activity to issue worm tablets with the food aid. There are lots of other things that could be done like that to support the food aid. In general, I think the World Food Programme could be held a little bit more to account by DFID. NGOs are under strict accountable measures through the GRM and the TLC. The TLC is very good and they have certainly improved the capacity of international and national NGOs in particular. It would be nice to see a bit more accountability for UN structures as well.

**Mr Byworth:** World Vision has partnered with the World Food Programme and also the USAID food programme as significant suppliers of food aid for the whole of that period, so certainly we can attest first-hand to lives being saved through that, but we would also agree that with conditions economically improving, there needs to be a move (which has happened) to greater targeting of the most vulnerable because even if you move away from general food distributions, which has not yet happened and probably cannot yet happen fully but needs to happen over the coming years, you are going to still need some targeted food assistance for particularly vulnerable groups. Yes, there will need to be a move towards more livelihood-based use of food such as food for work and to combine that with agricultural development programmes to reduce dependency. I would not say it is time to stop yet but it is time to start the transition to a more targeted and more livelihoods-based approach. Definitely that transition needs to happen. DFID’s view on that has been largely correct. Even in the PRP they are pushing for a more economically viable approach to recovery now, which again the conditions allow for more now than they did 12 or 18 months ago.

**Q33 John Battle:** Just as infant mortality is rising maternal mortality is rising as well and DFID has taken some actions to try and decrease the rising rate of maternal mortality. Is it successful? Is it helping? 

**Mr Byworth:** Not sure is the answer.

**Mr Anderson:** I do not know but just as an anecdote, private hospitals were extremely good in Zimbabwe but even in private hospitals now, due to the collapse of the system, there are not enough medicines to go around, certainly not enough staff, so even if you wanted private expensive medical care in Zimbabwe you might be thinking about going down to Johannesburg. At the community level/communal level outside of these private hospitals you have very little to support you.

**Mr Byworth:** Certainly World Vision is not as involved with maternal health except in as much as the link with that and child and neonatal health particularly. I know the number of women having deliveries at home is very high. Up until the last couple of years it is 40% or something like that. The number of skilled birth attendants is not enough and access because of distances to travel are difficult. Again anecdotally, I saw women come for ante-natal check-ups just 10 days ago at a clinic in Matabeleland, and there was a woman who had had a baby two years before, and she contrasted that experience with the child that she had with her of four months on her knee and she talked about the difference of both access for delivery at the health centre more recently and also access to immunisation and child monitoring. She talked of a real difference and a real improvement between her second child who was a baby and her first child who was two/two and half. That is anecdotal. In terms of DFID’s impact I do not have any evidence.

**Q34 John Battle:** DFID themselves highlight the high rate of contraceptive use in Zimbabwe. Has that made a big difference?

**Mr Byworth:** It links to PSI perhaps.

**Mr Anderson:** I do not know the PSI programme.

**Mr Byworth:** They talk about the high rate of female condom usage in Zimbabwe more than almost any other country in sub-Saharan Africa, I believe, but I do not have any first-hand evidence of that.

**Q35 Hugh Bayley:** What were the causes of the cholera outbreak last year? Are you expecting another outbreak this year? What should DFID be supporting in terms of promoting better public health and hygiene?

**Mr Anderson:** Cholera has always been in Zimbabwe. Every year there are a number of deaths. This year seven people have died. Last year was an epidemic waiting to happen. It was the result again of the breakdown of social services, very bad sanitation in high-density suburban areas and very poor living conditions. It was going to happen really and it was
26 January 2010  Mr Rob Rees, Mr William Anderson and Mr Justin Byworth

talked about at various humanitarian agency co-
ordination strategy working groups even before it
broke out. We were discussing it before it happened
so we knew it was coming, in a way. In terms of what
DFID could do further, it is all about community-
based improvement of sanitation at the moment
because local government do not have the funding to
improve these services. DFID needs to work out
how—and you talked about it in the earlier session
as well—to support local government in that and
how to support the community in that.

Mr Rees: In the longer term there has to be major
rehabilitation of the infrastructure. Community-
based responses really are just short-term measures,
particularly in densely populated areas like Harare
and the suburbs. It is a project for the future to
rehabilitate both the sewerage and water supply
systems which will then provide the protection that
will be needed.

Q36 Hugh Bayley: I can see the need for the
immediate response and I can see that that is possible
now but what political conditions would you need
for major infrastructure projects to be viable?

Mr Rees: It will be dependent upon economic
recovery within the country and, as William alluded
to, the financial resources being committed by the
national government, whether it is from its own
internally generated income or whether it is through
aid packages after the resumption of normal aid and
financial support from the international financial
institutions. As I say, that is an issue to be dealt with
in the future when those basic economic and political
questions have been addressed.

Q37 Hugh Bayley: Can I ask a slightly wider
question. It is a chicken and egg situation, is it not?
If you wait until conditions are right, conditions will
never be right. Politics is about a process of moving
from the dire position you are in to a better position.
How does the nexus of aid and politics help you?
In other words, should you be planning this now and
how would you plan it now? Should you be telling a
big infrastructure player like the EU to put together
a programme? How do you get to a position where
you can improve infrastructure in a relatively near
timescale?

Mr Anderson: There is a recovery plan and DFID
was part of producing that. It was based on the
Hague Principles in October 2007 and then a major
donor meeting in Ottawa last year. It is all to do with,
as we were discussing in the first session, whether the
Government of Zimbabwe is really there for its
people or there for itself. Unless that has been
addressed, that is a fundamental issue where, no
matter what is poured in, it might not work, it might
not be targeted, it might be liable for corruption. In
terms of improving these services, yes, DFID has to
work as far as it can but make sure that there are
certain benchmarks which they have already got in
writing that are met. At this time the Hague
Principles are not met and most of those benchmarks
are not being met and so therefore withhold the
funding and hopefully if these benchmarks are
starting to be met then release some of the funding
but, yes, it is very difficult.

Q38 Andrew Stunell: Can we just take a look at
education and children. The DFID allocation is 2%
of aid going to education. There has been talk about
schools getting back to work and so on and yet there
are clearly some priority areas. Could you just
comment on the amount of money that DFID is
allocating and the effectiveness of what it is doing.
Are we short of teachers? Are we short of buildings?
Are we short of security? What do you see as being
the problems or perhaps there are not any problems?

Mr Rees: All of the above, I would say. There is a
shortage of teachers. Along with health
professionals many teachers have migrated out of
the country. I heard an interesting report that some
of the best education in the countries around
Zimbabwe is provided in schools where there are
Zimbabwe exiled teachers. In the past Zimbabwe
had a very high standard of education and a very
high standard of teaching. Quite rightly it was proud
of it. As with health professionals, some system and
some opportunities need to be created to bring those
professionals back into Zimbabwe to support the
schools. There needs to be investment in schools and
in school materials in the same way that there needs
to be investment in primary health care facilities as
well, particularly in the rural areas.

Q39 Andrew Stunell: So do you think this is
something which can come through the state or
DFID can only contribute through the state? In
terms of the amount being given, 2% of DFID's
money is going to education; is that about right, is it
too much or too little?

Mr Anderson: I do not know. In terms of the
Ministry of Education, it is run by David Coltart at
the moment. He was the only MDC MP not to
accept a brand new Mercedes Benz when he took
office. He is trying to drive out corruption but again
his hands are in effect tied to a large extent because
of the political deadlock between ZANU-PF and the
MDC. He is also completely tied by the fact that
teachers are not paid so they want to go to South
Africa and get a proper salary. I do not know
whether the the 2% is right or not but it is certainly
a huge area.

Mr Rees: I do not think there is any country in
Africa where there is enough investment in
education. There is always a need for more.

Mr Anderson: I think in 1980 ZANU-PF said that
they were going to provide free primary education.
We have not seen that to date.

Q40 John Battle: I think it was Justin that mentioned
that there are over a million orphans and vulnerable
children. In your submission you ask DFID to carry
out a Child Rights Situational Analysis. I want to
ask a little bit about how effective you think that
would be. I understand that many of the orphans go
to stay with extended family. What is the support
given to extended families with over one million children pushed out to relatives to cope with? What is your view on the orphan situation?

Mr Byworth: We talked about it a little earlier. It is an enormous situation. Obviously family coping mechanisms are stretched beyond breaking point in many cases. World Vision’s point on child rights is that in some respects DFID often uses a human rights framework to look at things and obviously that was relevant when they put together their strategy for Zimbabwe. We have certainly found as a child-focused organisation that using child rights as an entry point is a helpful one. It is less politicised and there are the wider human rights issues. Where we hear the voices of children saying things that are right, whether it is education and schools, as we talked about just now, or health services, we are able to amplify those voices of children to get them heard. It is an effective way in. We have talked about the vulnerability of children as a whole. Whether it is child rights in a framework that can be looked through or whether there is a greater understanding of the rights of children, that is certainly something we would encourage in DFID. The orphan situation needs continuing investment. It is the point I made earlier: if DFID could continue and extend either the programme of support through UNICEF or something else like that, that would be very much welcomed.

Q41 Chairman: You have all been complimentary about DFID’s basic programme in Zimbabwe but you have criticisms about some of the bureaucracy. In particular, World Vision have criticised DFID for “bureaucratic impediments” and we have heard from others of you that it requires a rather intensive application of people to monitor and keep up with the system. What would you want DFID to do? How do you think it would affect their programmes? Their starting point, presumably, is they are terribly worried about leakage but you are saying that complying with their requirements, by implication, is undermining delivery?

Mr Byworth: Firstly, let me say from World Vision’s perspective there is a wider issue about DFID instruments of aid and using intermediaries like GRM to move transaction costs out of DFID, the head count and all of those things, into a third party where the transaction costs are lower.

Q42 Chairman: You are suggesting it is more to do with that bureaucratic pressure within DFID than it is to do specifically with the situation in Zimbabwe, or both?

Mr Byworth: I am just saying there is a wider issue about DFID’s aid instruments. I think GRM work well. We have been happy with them and they work effectively. The people and the way that they work has been good. The one major concern we have raised is we are very happy to have the highest level of compliance and monitoring in terms of standards to demonstrate impact and to demonstrate outcomes. That is not an issue for us but where you have multiple advisers on different thematic areas and you have compliance monitoring and all the frameworks that come with that, you can get three meetings in the same week from different people and they are not always very joined-up. In our case we are working out of Bulawayo and Matabeleland. If those meetings happen in Harare on a Monday, Wednesday and Friday you can imagine how much hassle it is?

Q43 Chairman: Would it be better delivered if DFID appointed one person to deal with each NGO or each programme rather than dealing with it by sectors?

Mr Byworth: We have good contact points within GRM on the programme. For good reason, they have set up an elaborate mechanism to get good technical advice and support. William mentioned the support they have given to NGOs, both international NGOs and local ones. That is welcome but they could do with being a bit more co-ordinated. Their internal systems tend toward silos. It is more about streamlining what is happening. Plus I think the point Rob made, a bit more access to DFID perhaps in terms of policy dimensions of things. If you subcontract a programme, the relationship should be subcontracted in terms of partners. If DFID had a bit more of a partnership arrangement with civil society in terms of dialoguing about bigger picture issues rather than project management issues, I think a combination of fewer silos in GRM and better co-ordination and streamlining with a bit more access and co-ordination more in the sense of policy would be helpful.

Mr Rees: I have nothing really to add to what I said before about the specific example that my colleagues informed me about. They sometimes feel that it is difficult for them to get access directly to DFID to talk about the policy issues, to talk about the broader aspects of the programme because their relationship is constrained to dealing with the managing agent.

Q44 Chairman: Is that because there are not enough people and they are too busy or do you think it is because they have created a mechanism where it just does not happen?

Mr Rees: They seem to have created this mechanism but what the real thinking is behind that, whether it is because of pressure of work and people are too busy or whether it is just a policy to simplify the management from their point of view, I am not sure.

Q45 Chairman: We can explore that obviously but do you have anything to add, William?

Mr Anderson: Just to stress my earlier point that it would be nice to see greater accountability of the UN in the same way that NGOs are held to account.

Chairman: We can all shout “hallelujah” to that. Okay, thank you for that. John Battle?

Q46 John Battle: I think you mentioned, William, that the World Food Programme perhaps needs more accountability but perhaps its operations as well. DFID gives them £9 million and will probably give more. Should we be pursuing other approaches
to the World Food Programme? How could we change it to make it more effective as well as just tracking the money?

Mr Anderson: That is a very big question. In a drive for efficiency and effectiveness, the UN perhaps is not the best mechanism at the moment but it is the only mechanism we have, so DFID has to put in place some more accountability measures that hold the UN to account for that.

Mr Byworth: One of the things that World Vision does where we partner with the World Food Programme in terms of delivering food to vulnerable populations, we have established in many of our agencies work on areas of humanitarian accountability to give the people who receive the food a voice. In every place where we are doing food distribution we have a complaints mechanism and a helpdesk. I have sat there and looked at the logs of people who were meant to be receiving food complaining if someone in their family was not registered properly or if they were not happy with the rations or type of food. Building in mechanisms where the beneficiaries themselves have a voice and that is heard needs to happen more across the board, both in Zimbabwe and in many other places, but certainly the UN agencies could benefit from more of that.

Mr Anderson: Just thinking back to 2008, the UN set up the Office for the Co-ordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) against the Government’s wishes in 2005 after Murambatsvina. In 2008 the head of OCHA was rather a block to NGOs trying to ensure that the operational ban did not happen or to respond effectively to what the needs were on the ground. We complained as NGOs to the donors, particularly DFID, quite a lot about this and eventually we wrote a letter to the UN in New York and the head of OCHA was actually removed. We also complained about the Resident Representative there and there is now a different Res Rep. It was Augustine Zacharias and there were certain question marks over him as to how effective he wanted the UN to be in terms of standing up to ZANU-PF. Again, perhaps we felt as NGOs that our voices when they were raised with DFID were heard but we were not quite sure what happened after that.

Q47 Chairman: Obviously there is a whole substructure there about the relationship with international organisations. Just one particular point about the WFP. We did a report on them 18 months ago at the height of the food price crisis, as it turned out, but they were keen of course not just to respond to emergencies but actually to anticipate them, not just with emergency back-up but with actual planting programmes. Are they doing any of that kind of work in Zimbabwe or is it just food relief? Of course in that context DFID maybe is not terribly interested in supporting that aspect of the WFP and they want to just see it as a food relief agency.

Mr Anderson: I think it is pretty much business as usual, it is pretty much food relief. I know they were talking about possibly distributing some seeds and fertiliser almost with the FAO or in co-ordination with them, but, to be honest, I do not know.

Q48 Chairman: That is fair enough. We can obviously ask about that because I think we are looking at some of the basic agricultural support programmes that DFID is supporting and I just wondered whether WFP and DFID are in competition or at odds with each other on that.

Mr Byworth: I believe they have done some maize seed distributions but it has not been a massive change of strategy. Certainly World Vision, together with WFP inputs and other support, have done quite a lot of agricultural inputs. I am not sure to what extent they have shifted. As you said, it is business as usual.

Q49 Chairman: Thank you very much indeed. We appreciate the informal evidence you have given us but it is nice to have a bit of information on record which is helpful to our inquiry and the production of our report at the end of the day, so can I thank you all three of you very much indeed for coming in.

Mr Byworth: Have a very good trip for those of you who are going.

6 Food and Agriculture Organisation
Tuesday 23 February 2010

Members present
Malcolm Bruce, in the Chair

John Battle
Hugh Bayley
Richard Burden
Mr Nigel Evans
Mr Mark Lancaster
Andrew Stunell

Witnesses: Mr Gareth Thomas MP, Minister of State, and Mr Mark Lowcock, Director General, Country Programmes, Department for International Development, and Mr John Dennis, Head of Zimbabwe Unit, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, gave evidence.

Q50 Chairman: Thank you, Minister, for coming to give evidence. This is the final session on our inquiry into the situation in Zimbabwe. Would you—for the record—introduce your team?

Mr Thomas: Mark Lowcock, who is the Director General for Country Programmes, is on my left, and on my right is John Dennis, who is the Head of the Zimbabwe Desk at the Foreign Office.

Q51 Chairman: Thank you for that. As you know, we visited Zimbabwe a couple or so weeks ago. I will start by saying that we have an extract from an Economist article saying that, since we left, things have deteriorated including with strikes. It says things like: the unity government is "as good as dead" and Harare is "abuzz" with talk of early elections and so forth. What is the political situation? Has it changed that dramatically in the last couple of weeks? Perhaps that would be the first question to ask, and then a couple more will arise from it.

Mr Thomas: I do not think the political situation in Zimbabwe can ever have been described as easy. We have always expected that there would be difficult periods between the formation of the Inclusive Government and eventually free and fair elections taking place. You are obviously aware that there have been reports of both strike action over salaries and of other tensions within the Inclusive Government. Whether or not it leads to elections sooner rather than later, I am not in a position to make that judgment, frankly, and I do not think any of us are in a position to make that judgment. We knew that the period between the formation of the government and elections would be a protracted and difficult period, and events are bearing that out.

Q52 Chairman: Have you seen this article from The Economist?

Mr Thomas: I have not seen that article.

Q53 Chairman: Is that an accurate reflection of the current situation? That is worse than the situation we would have observed three weeks ago. Saying things like the Government of National Unity is "as good as dead." and "Mr Zuma appears to agree that the unity government has become a sham" but that he does not want any trouble before the World Cup. It says that Mr Tsvangirai has given up all his demands, other than to try to see if he can get space for free and fair elections. There is then this "indigenisation" rule, saying that every company worth more than half a million dollars needs to provide a 51% stake to black Zimbabweans—which is a blatantly racist policy. That, even in relation to three weeks ago, appears to be a serious degradation of the situation.

Mr Thomas: I have no sense that the President of South Africa has given up on the mediation process that SADC have in place and have under way. Our sense, certainly, is that the key players in the Inclusive Government have not given up the sense of the work programme to which the government is committed. As I say, there are tensions at the heart of the Inclusive Government. As we all recognise, political power continues to be very contested. Inevitably, when you have a situation like that there are going to be moments of high tension as well as moments where tensions are relatively lessened. I think we are probably in one of the tenser periods at the moment.

Q54 Chairman: We will explore this in more detail, but for the ordinary people, some of whom at least were getting access to education and health and other services, has the position changed significantly in the last few weeks? Or, in spite of those background difficulties and the strikes, are those services still being delivered?

Mr Thomas: There has been an improvement in the delivery of basic services, as I think you had the chance to see for yourselves when you were in Zimbabwe. Having said that, there are huge challenges still in terms of the delivery of those services. The crisis in terms of access to healthcare which was at the heart of the cholera epidemic in Zimbabwe has not gone away, albeit there are more health workers in place. In terms of your specific question, our sense is that basic services are still in place, but they are very basic, and there is still a much longer transition to more recognisable, good quality health, education and other services to take place. The Department staff in Zimbabwe continue to look at what else we can do to improve the quality of those basic services, but that is very much a job in hand, as I suspect you will have seen for yourself when you were there.

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1 South African Development Community
Q55 Chairman: The final political point: a call for early elections. That was in the air when we were there. The counter-argument was that you could not possibly have free and fair elections if they were early because the register does not exist—and to the extent that it does exist, it is completely stacked to the benefit of ZANU-PF. Is this call for early elections a realistic call? Is it achievable? Is it desirable?

Mr Thomas: It is difficult to believe that free and fair elections would take place if they took place in the short term. As you say, there are substantial changes that are required, in terms of thinking through issues around voter education, constituency boundaries, the behaviour of the security forces, the role of the diaspora in getting the right to vote. It is difficult to see how free and fair elections could take place in the short term, certainly.

Q56 Chairman: That would imply that you think more time is needed to get those issues straight.

Mr Thomas: Certainly, our view is that what was included in the Global Political Agreement (GPA) in terms of changes that were going to be needed has not happened as yet. The Electoral Commission is not up and functioning yet, albeit its head has been appointed—although not, I believe, formally confirmed. We would want to see the Electoral Commission being able to go about its work, completing the process of reform that everybody recognises is necessary if free and fair elections are going to take place.

Q57 Chairman: Mr Dennis, do you want to add any comments?

Mr Dennis: I have no comments to add, thank you.

Q58 Richard Burden: One of the pots of support that DFID has been providing has been to the Office of the Prime Minister. We understand that the purpose of that funding is around enabling that as an office to fulfil its role under the GPA. When we met Prime Minister Tsvangirai over there, he felt that that DFID funding had been particularly useful in fulfilling the obligation to the GPA but he felt more could be done and extra support to his office would be well used, in particular, on the same sort of areas: helping the Prime Minister in his role to lead executive business in parliament and so on. Are there any plans to increase that support?

Mr Thomas: Certainly, if further approaches for assistance were made to us, be it by the Prime Minister or indeed any other ministry that is committed to reform and to a pro-poor agenda, then we would look at them very sympathetically. As you say, our support is designed to enable the Office of the Prime Minister to carry out the sort of normal functions that a head of state’s office would, including oversight of the budget, making sure that the different ministries are following through on the government’s agreed work plan, and helping to resolve disputes between government departments were they to happen. Certainly, that has been the purpose behind granting the assistance that we have done. We also, as you may be aware, granted assistance to a number of other departments to help them carry out the basic functions of their ministries, not least the Ministry of Finance to help them with the budgeting process.

Q59 Richard Burden: In terms of the level of that support, if a case were made that increases in that would be consistent with the objectives, would that be something that we would be prepared to look at?

Mr Thomas: Absolutely. We have increased our aid programme to Zimbabwe over the last 12 months from £49 million to £60 million. Of course, we are looking for the measures that can have most impact most quickly in terms of helping the Zimbabweans get access to better services. Clearly, helping key ministries be better functioning so that they can drive that process, is sensible. When a prime minister or other key minister asks for assistance, of course we always look at that sympathetically. We would have to make a judgment about its relative merit as against other programme asks, but we certainly would not rule it out by any means.

Q60 Richard Burden: What kind of conditionality would be applied if funding were to be extended?

Mr Thomas: We would want to make sure that the assistance that is offered is being used to help promote reform, is being used to help deliver pro-poor services. Those would be the key conditions, as such. “Conditions” is probably the wrong phraseology to use in that sense, in that it has a resonance of the bad old days of structural adjustment programmes. “Conditions” is not a term we would use, in that sense. Certainly, in terms of the decisions we might take about how we allocate aid in future, be it for a minister’s office or for a big programme of humanitarian assistance, we would want to be convinced that it was helping to deliver a pro-poor agenda, that it was going to lead to significant reforms in the way services are delivered. Those would be, if you like, the guiding principles for the decisions we might take.

Q61 Hugh Bayley: I want to ask a question about support for a free and independent media. I should preface my remark by saying that, if any government anywhere in the world funds the media, you need to ensure that there is editorial independence and no control from the funder, as, for instance, with the BBC World Service. I recall in the run-up to liberation in both Namibia and South Africa there was British funding for the Namibian newspaper, possibly for The Sowetan, and it was seen as important to have some forums which were not under state control disseminating information. The print media in Zimbabwe is very strongly controlled by the state. I wonder what thought both of your Departments have given to ensure that, in the run-up between now and elections, whenever they come, there is fair and unbiased information about electoral registration, about the platforms of relative parties, the achievements of ministers and their ministries. Is that something which your Department should be funding or possibly the Foreign Office should be funding, or both?
Mr Thomas: First, there is no doubt that we would want to see reforms in the way the media operate and are organised to allow more independent activity by different media operations of one sort or another. The return of the BBC is undoubtedly a positive step. Key to wider change in how the media sector operates is the establishment of the media commission as heralded in the GPA. Again, like the Electoral Commission, it has not yet started doing its work, and that will be a key issue for the international community to continue to watch. It is certainly a key issue set out in the GPA where progress is needed. In terms of the run-up to free and fair elections, absolutely. A substantial programme of voter education would be required, the media clearly would have an important role in that. If we were asked to be part of a multi-donor group supporting an election process, of course we would want to consider doing that. Again, where we have been asked to enable elections to take place in a free and fair way, we have provided support in other countries to election funding arrangements. As I say, we would be happy to look at that, if we were asked, when the time came.

Q62 Hugh Bayley: Given that the barriers to the dissemination of information and the history of intimidation are probably greater in rural areas than in urban areas, I would have thought radio was a particularly important medium. Are you satisfied that there is wide access to radio giving independent and unbiased news across the country?

Mr Thomas: It is not just radio where there is an issue; it is the media in general. There is not free and fair access to the media in any way in which any of us in the room would recognise. That is clearly one of the areas, as set out in the GPA, where substantial reform is necessary. Like others in the international community, we would want to see progress in that area, not just so that elections can take place but, also, so that the executive can be held to account regardless of their political affiliation in that sense.

Hugh Bayley: One final question on culture. DFID does not normally make the promotion of culture a priority: you would defer, I suppose, to the British Council or others. We held a reception at the Book Cafe and that seemed to me to be an oasis of free expression. Would either of your Departments—yours through the British Council, Mr Dennis, or DFID—think about providing unusually and atypically support for freedom of expression through culture or arts?

Mr Thomas: I do not know where the Foreign Secretary is on music. In terms of DFID, again it is about the balance and the opportunity cost of providing funding in one particular way as against others. You are right that freedom of expression is hugely important, whether it is through music, through media, through other sources of activity.

Q64 Hugh Bayley: We were given a couple of booklets published by the British Council, which I thought was quite a courageous bit of work.

Mr Thomas: Do not get me wrong, I think the British Council does hugely important work. We are contributing, along with others, in helping to promote freedom of expression through the constitution review process, where UNDP, with our support, have started to fund work that we hope will allow civil society to engage in thinking about the type of constitution and the type of state that Zimbabwe should have in the future. That is one of the few ways at the moment—though it is very imperfect, as you will, I am sure, have had a sense—in which civil society and Zimbabwean citizens can begin to air views and bounce ideas around about the future of their country. In that sense, it is a hugely important process. It is not just us who are funding it—it is being led, as I say, by UNDP—but it is one way in which we are beginning to see some signs of growing freedom of expression.

Q65 Mr Lancaster: Thank you, Chairman. I want to explore slightly beyond Zimbabwe’s boundaries and its relationship with other countries in the region. Of course historically, before 1994, when we saw the end of apartheid, Zimbabwe was very much the centre for the region, but relationships with surrounding countries have deteriorated to a degree, particularly those with South Africa and Botswana because of the Zimbabwe diaspora. What do you think surrounding countries can do to help in assisting the development of Zimbabwe, not least when it comes to finding a permanent political solution?

Mr Thomas: SADC, in that sense, the group of Zimbabwe’s neighbours, has a key role to play and has accepted that role in terms of acting as guarantors of the Global Political Agreement. It is encouraging that there is a mediation process underway. It is a process I welcome but it is very much a process that we need to respect, as SADC leading on that process and fulfilling the role that it has. You asked me specifically about South Africa. South Africa is probably the country that has seen most migration of Zimbabweans who have fled the country or have left the country into South Africa. Zimbabwe is very much a domestic issue for President Zuma and the South African government, as it is an international or a regional issue. You are right to flag the continuing importance of the region for resolving the political tensions in Zimbabwe. It is a process that we are obviously monitoring closely, but SADC is very much in the lead in that process.

Q66 Mr Lancaster: I agree with you wholeheartedly, and I think SADC do have a key role to play, but, given the Chairman’s opening questions and the deterioration at the moment, and notwithstanding that it is right that SADC should take the lead, what
more can we do in supporting SADC to try to resolve some of these situations? Or should we not do anything?  

**Mr Thomas:** First, we have to respect the mediation process that President Zuma has put in place. He has appointed a high-level team with significant reputations themselves to lead on that mediation process and, despite moments of high tension, which we all recognise will occur as the GPA process moves forward, we have to respect that mediation effort that President Zuma’s team on behalf of SADC is leading. The other ways in which we can help are more direct, frankly, and that is through our development programmes. It is important for the people of Zimbabwe that there has been economic progress, and I think the economic progress is beginning to throw the spotlight on to the lack of political progress that has taken place in Zimbabwe. Through some of the assistance to the Ministry of Finance and through our humanitarian programmes we have played a small role, but an important role, along with others in the international community, in helping the stabilisation of the economy, and in that sense allowing the issues around the political process and the lack of sufficient political reform to be further highlighted, both for SADC to continue to deal with and also for the government to continue to have to deal with.

**Q67 Mr Lancaster:** Is it quite a difficult tightrope to walk really? For example, when we were there, you will be aware from all the talk in the papers that they had seized on comments that the Foreign Secretary will be aware from all the talk in the papers that they walked really? For example, when we were there, you

“I don’t recognise SADC. It doesn’t bother me. If it suits me, I will pray them in aid, otherwise I will ignore them.”

What can we do to persuade SADC to stand up for what it says it believes in?

**Mr Thomas:** If SADC was not prepared to play the role that it is playing, we would not have seen President Zuma set up a high-level mediation group, and we would not have seen that mediation group engaging in the very direct way in which it has done. I do think we have to be careful not to respond to some of the bluster from particular politicians in Zimbabwe at the moment and allow the SADC mediation process to continue. On occasion, we deliver blunt messages to all the members of the Zimbabwe government when it is required, and we provide direct assistance to help the journey of reform where it is appropriate to do so. There is also this international effort through SADC, and we have to allow it to continue to do its work and not be put off, if you will forgive me for saying so, by particular articles or particular comments by particular leaders in Zimbabwe.

**Chairman:** Nigel Evans.

**Q70 Mr Evans:** Thank you, Chairman. President Zuma is in London next week for a State Visit. Do I assume that yourself and the Foreign Secretary will be meeting with him and, if so, that you will raise the mediation process?

**Mr Thomas:** It would be pretty odd if he came to the UK and there were not conversations with the Foreign Secretary and the Development Secretary. I am sure there will be a whole series of conversations about affairs in southern Africa, and Zimbabwe will inevitably be one of those areas that gets discussed, but there is a broad agenda for the State Visit, so it is not the only issue that will come up by any means.

**Q71 Mr Evans:** No, I assume that other things will be spoken about as well, but clearly his important role in Zimbabwe is fully recognised by the world community.

**Mr Thomas:** Absolutely. We recognise that he is playing a key role and we respect that. The decision that he took to set up a three-member mediation team and to include in that team some people who are extremely well-respected in southern African politics was a sign of the seriousness with which he views the situation in Zimbabwe, but those were decisions that he took and we have to respect his leadership, given the importance of South Africa to SADC. Obviously, as I say, we will talk inevitably about Zimbabwe. It is one of the issues that will be on the agenda, but there will be a whole series of other issues that we have to talk through as well.

**Q72 Mr Evans:** I want to touch on land reform, but before I do that the Chairman referred to The Economist piece about businesses having a 51% stake by black Zimbabweans. Does the Government see that as a racist policy?

**Mr Thomas:** With all decisions in Zimbabwe, the key test is avoiding explosive language. The concern we would have is more about the impact of particular policies on the economy and on the people of...
Zimbabwe, so if it makes investment in Zimbabwe less likely, if it reduces the chance of jobs being made available, then of course it has to be a considerable concern. One of the issues, as the Committee will recognise, as to why so many people have left Zimbabwe is the lack of job opportunities, so anything that prevents the private sector from beginning to develop, anything that further discourages private sector investment, is clearly going to be a major concern, but in the end this has to be a decision that Zimbabwe takes for itself.

Q73 Mr Evans: But clearly it is a racist policy. If you say that there are a lot of white Zimbabweans living there and people who are not black Zimbabweans living there, surely they should have an opportunity to be able to be a major partner in whatever businesses exist within a country. If any other country did this sort of thing, we would be banging the table and saying, “This is racist.”

Mr Thomas: We want everybody in Zimbabwe to have equal economic opportunities in that sense, quite clearly, but sometimes there is a way of recognising that a whole series of reforms are required. I appreciate, Mr Evans, that you might want me to use particular phrases to describe a particular set of policies but, with respect, I am not going to do that. The broad message is that there has been progress in terms of the economy. We do not want that progress put at risk. We want the economy to stabilise still further. That is going to require a whole series of political reforms now to take place to create the conditions for longer-term private sector investment to take place.

Q74 Mr Evans: That leads me on to land reform, which is part of the reforms that clearly are essential to get some sort of progress and stability within Zimbabwe. Have you seen the documentary Mugabe and the White African?

Mr Thomas: I have not, no.

Q75 Mr Evans: I would heartily recommend it because our Committee has had an opportunity to see it. It is quite startling exactly what pressures clearly are on white farmers who exist within Zimbabwe. It is an incredible and very moving documentary. Clearly a number of people have had their lands grabbed, basically in a way that is not helping Zimbabwe. One can understand the reason for reform—we talked to the Commercial Farmers Union when we were in Zimbabwe and they can understand the sense for reform too—but something that is not orderly, something that is not structured, and something that leads to so much farmland being taken out of production and, indeed, then handed over to the cronies of politicians or friends within Zimbabwe, clearly is not doing Zimbabwe any favours.

Mr Thomas: I would agree with that. I would go further and say that not only do we condemn the huge number of farm invasions that have taken place, but we have seen terrible human rights abuses committed as part of those invasions which are completely unacceptable, both on an individual basis, the individual rights of the people affected, but also, as you quite rightly describe it, in terms of the devastating impact it has had particularly on the rural agricultural economy. Frankly, “economic madness” would be an appropriate phrase to use to describe that. I hope that that situation will desist. We will continue to make that clear in our comments to the politicians in Zimbabwe. It is clear that we do need to see a land policy that is fair, that is pro-poor, that is transparent, because that will, as you say, help to revive the economy, particularly in rural areas. It would help to revive the agriculture sector. We are a long way from that point at the moment, but we would stand ready, as part of a wider donor group, to help in that process if the political conditions were right. I suspect, frankly, the first step would be for some sort of land audit to take place, if the Inclusive Government were so minded, but, at the moment, we are not seeing signs that there is a willingness by all the parties to the Inclusive Government for a fairer land policy to take place.

Q76 Mr Evans: They seem to be dragging their feet on doing anything about a land audit, but clearly that looks like being a necessary forerunner to making some real progress in that area. You have just mentioned the international community doing its bit, along with the United Kingdom, in trying to bring some sort of commonsense solution to this issue. What do you think the international community and Britain specifically can do in this area?

Mr Thomas: As I have said, we do stand ready to provide assistance, as part of a wider donor group, if we are asked to. As I have said, the first thing would be to conduct an audit of land. Frankly, we would only see a merit in such an audit taking place if we had confidence that the information that such an audit gleaned would be used to promote the type of pro-poor, sensible, transparent land reform policy that most people independent of some of those in Zimbabwe recognise as being necessary to revive the rural economy there. We stand ready to help as part of a wider international effort if the conditions are right. They are not right at the moment.

Q77 Mr Evans: Even with the hyperinflation that the country has gone through, a lot of white farmers have gone to neighbouring African countries, as I understand it, and set up businesses there and are doing rather well. I suspect that Zimbabwe is importing some of the produce now of the former white Zimbabwean farmers—which is clearly insane. Do you think we are getting any closer to the political reality within Zimbabwe that a solution should be found? Or do you think that the mentality is still: no, we wish to right the wrongs of many generations and we do not care about economic or humane consequences of what the policy is that we are now doing in Zimbabwe?

Mr Thomas: Unfortunately, land is one of those issues around which the political power continues to be very heavily contested. As I described in my comments earlier, whilst we have seen some progress in terms of the stabilisation of the economy in
Zimbabwe, we have not yet seen the major political changes which the GPA has set out as being necessary. One of the areas where we are continuing to see (to use a diplomatic phrase) “unfortunate activity” is around land. I hope, as the economy has begun to stabilise, that there will be recognition in all parts of the Inclusive Government of a series of further steps that need to be taken to help that economic progress. If those political realities kick in, then perhaps we will get closer to the situation that you describe.

Q78 Hugh Bayley: Do you not think it would be helpful if the British Government were to acknowledge that the terms on which white settlers, many from this country, obtained land at the end of the 19th century and the beginning of the 20th century was not fair and did not follow the rule of law, and that the consequence for many indigenous people was that they were forced on to marginal land and suffered enormously? If we were to say that, then perhaps we would be in a better position to oppose the wrongs of fast-track land reform and to move the debate on to a position you were talking about, of pro-poor, rural development—which is what Zimbabwe clearly needs—rather than a return to settler plantations.

Mr Thomas: With respect, Mr Bayley, I am not sure it would be helpful. I think I should take responsibility for what we as a party have done since we took power in terms of our aid programmes and our foreign policy since 1997. I am not sure we should try to reach back all the time into history to look at what happened a very long time ago. We need to deal—forgive me for saying so—with the realities on the ground at the moment. In that sense, the report that your all-party group produced was very helpful in trying to put to bed some of the misnomers that have existed around what happened in 1980, but, despite the importance of that report, we should rather think ahead. We should recognise, as Mr Evans has described, the continuing adverse implications of the land policy which particular elements in the government are pursuing from time to time and recognise that there needs to be a comprehensive change in terms of land policy at some time which needs to be led by the government in Zimbabwe, but which, if the conditions were right, we would stand ready to support.

Q79 Hugh Bayley: I think you are right to want to see a land audit, but if British money alongside money from other donors is to go towards establishing land title for poor landless Zimbabweans, how would you see that process unfolding? In other words, how would you select the landless poor? Who would get land? How would you compensate?

Mr Thomas: Mr Bayley, with respect, I am not going to go down that particular route. That is a process that the government of Zimbabwe has to lead, and I hope it is a government that would be elected in free and fair elections so that it had a clear mandate. I have said that we would be ready to help as part of a series of donors with such an audit if we could be convinced that the information from that audit was going to be used properly. We do not have those conditions at the moment. We do stand ready to help, as I say, but we are not going to put money on the table when, frankly, we know that there is a series of other priorities where we can have a sense that our money were to achieve good outcomes for the poor in Zimbabwe more immediately. But we recognise the importance of the land issue and staff and ministers will be ready to respond if the political conditions changed.

Q80 Chairman: We agreed, anyway, that, whilst we would refer to the land issue, it was not going to be central to our report because it is such a major issue, but I think Mr Bayley has put his finger on some of the background to it. You just mentioned about effective DFID programmes. Indeed, DFID is doing a lot of the co-ordination on the ground and that seems to be welcomed by a number of the NGOs and charities. Two things were said to us: one was that if things improve a lot more donors are likely to come in and it is important that co-ordination is established in advance, otherwise it could get chaotic. That, on the other hand, may be too optimistic in terms of what is likely to happen. But you cannot give the funding directly to the government in most cases. Does that make it much more difficult to co-ordinate? Clearly other donors may not be very keen to hand it over to one lead donor, so what mechanisms do you need to have in place, or what could you do to ensure that the relationship between donors and the government is more direct than it is now? What are the criteria that would need to be met?

Mr Thomas: We are a long way away from having confidence in the systems of the government of Zimbabwe, so it is a long way off before we would want to be putting money directly into the government of Zimbabwe’s budget. Nevertheless, there are a number of ministries which are developing plans which are pro-poor, which are designed to help all communities across Zimbabwe and behind which we feel we can align some of our support, so there are discussions with government about their future plans and we are trying, as you say, to work with other donors where we have confidence in those plans or in the merits of those plans to put our financial assistance to support the achievement of those plans. In terms of the broader issue about donor co-ordination, you are right that donors are co-ordinating in general fairly well, particularly those which are traditional OECD Development Assistance Committee donors. There could still be better co-ordination with the World Bank and others within the UN system. In the longer term, if we can draw some of the non-traditional donors into the donor co-ordination process, players like China, like South Africa, like Brazil, that would clearly be an aspiration that we would want to have, not just in the Zimbabwe context but in a whole series of other developing country contexts too. Also, the donor co-ordination mechanisms are relatively informal at
the moment. As you say, if conditions continue to improve and other donors were to come in, then we would need perhaps to formalise some of the donor co-ordination structures that are there at the moment, but, in general, relations between the main donors are very positive, as you describe.

Q81 Chairman: You have increased the programme in recent years in difficult situations. If you were going to put more money in, are you satisfied that the mechanisms you have in place would be effective, or would you need to find different or better ways of delivering it?

Mr Thomas: We are comfortable that the mechanisms we have available at the moment are strong enough and robust enough to ensure that the money that we are spending in Zimbabwe is going to where it should go. Clearly, if you increase your aid programme into a country, you have to think through what implications that has for the particular funding instruments that you use. We work, as you know, with UN agencies and NGOs but also with a number of private sector organisations which manage particular programmes of aid for us. As I say, we have a strong process for monitoring how our money operates. Thus far, we are confident that we have managed to make a significant difference with our money. If we were to increase funding substantially, then clearly we would look at the mechanisms we had available to us.

Chairman: If we are moving on to that, I will bring in John Battle.

Q82 John Battle: In a sense, the real issue is governance, from my experience of the visit we did, in particular the field visits, I would like to express gratitude to the staff at DFID who took us out of Harare to Bulawayo. I went with some of our colleagues to Tsholotsho and I was very encouraged and impressed by work on the ground, not least around the Protracted Relief Programme (PRP). All these things have great titles, but I found a programme there to reach to people who were poor, the poorest of the poor, the people who were landless, to try to get back their livelihoods, with a whole range of activities from home care right the way through. I was very, very impressed by that programme. I just want to ask you a couple of questions about it. If that has gone in the right direction, can it be amplified and done elsewhere?

The programme has two phases, as I understand it, and we have just entered Phase II. Phase I was going for a few years. I am lost at the scale of it. As I stood in a field in Tsholotsho with those older women, trying out new cultivation techniques for getting more water into their plants so that their fields of maize and cowpeas would look rather healthier than the ones across the way, I asked whether there was just one field or thousands of fields like that. In the DFID evidence it says that the programme is reaching over two million poor and vulnerable people, but the plan for Phase II is to reach two million people, and sometimes we include the two million that we have not quite yet reached. I want to know the extent of the programme. Is it really being disseminated across the country? Do you have just one field in Tsholotsho or do you have programmes elsewhere in the country? Can it be scaled up? I know the programme is working with other donors as well, but is the scaling up happening and is it possible for it to happen? Can you find the land? Can the people respond to it? Can it be a much more mobile programme than just one or two little pivotal projects?

Mr Thomas: I will bring in Mr Lowcock in just a minute, but, first, thank you for your comments about DFID staff in Zimbabwe. If I may, I will put on record my appreciation for the work they do. They have had to operate in some extremely difficult circumstances in the past.

Q83 John Battle: Indeed.

Mr Thomas: As Members will recognise, we have some of our most talented staff deployed in Zimbabwe, given the importance of the work we are doing there. The Protracted Relief Programme has expanded. It is not just that one field that you were sent to, but let me bring Mr Lowcock in to amplify on that.

Mr Lowcock: It is a long time since I have been in Tsholotsho, so I am glad to hear that particular report. The programme covers 300,000 households, which is about two million people, which is probably 20% of the total population.

Q84 John Battle: At present?

Mr Lowcock: At present, yes.

Q85 John Battle: The target for Phase II was to reach two million people.

Mr Lowcock: I think that is the current coverage.

Q86 John Battle: So you are already well ahead.

Mr Lowcock: I think that is the case, Mr Battle, yes.

Q87 John Battle: Good. What about the range of activities? Many of the NGOs praise the programme for its innovation in reaching from home care, and quite personal support, to innovative agricultural techniques, including community participation. While we sometimes focus on, as I said, governance at the government level, community engagement of the people is the real innovative work that DFID and other NGOs are leading internationally. Is that integration being extended? Is that development of those kinds of participatory tools able to take place?

I felt the local officials were not resisting it at the local level, which augured well for the future of Zimbabwe if it could be scaled up from the bottom. Is that the view of the Department in the work that is going on at field level, at floor level?

Mr Thomas: Absolutely. We would want to continue to see that programme scaled up. There is a series of developing countries—and I think of Afghanistan—where we have similar grassroots programmes. We are particularly fortunate in Zimbabwe to have very many committed civil society organisations which are playing, as you describe, a crucial role in helping to identify who most needs the support that the PRP programme can give in communities. As you say, the
Mr Thomas: We need to recognise that there was a substantial difference between Phase 1 of the PRP and Phase 2. Phase 2 is inevitably much more ambitious and involves a series of other donors. In a sense, what you want from your staff is that they make things happen on the ground in terms of developing countries. Our staff initiated this programme and as others come onboard the pressures on those staff and their ability to do other things would inevitably have been much more constricted if they had continued to run the programme direct, so we took the decision to bring in a private sector operator and there was an international tender, as I understand. Inevitably, when you have that sort of change there are one or two bumps along the process. What the head of the DFID office in Zimbabwe is making sure happens is that there are regular, I believe quarterly, meetings with the heads of civil society groups in Zimbabwe to make sure that we continue to have good coordination with civil society. That will clearly be of importance, not just in terms of the PRP programme but also in terms of the other programmes that we have.

Q90 John Battle: I will pass to Andrew in a second. It was expressed to us that there could be a distancing built in. What would worry me is that what seems to be really radical—to use a word, I think it is connected to the word “roots”—about DFID’s work is that ability to reconnect at the ground floor level and get the pro-poor development going on there and then feed it back up through. If you build a layer in that cuts them off again it could undermine some of the good work that has been done. I think Andrew wanted to follow through on this.

Mr Thomas: May I just pick that point up and bring Mr Lowcock in in a second. I think if there was not regular communication with civil society then, you are right, that would be a concern. In order specifically to avoid any suggestion that we are getting remote we wanted to set up a proper process for communicating with key players in civil society, and that is what we have now initiated.

Mr Lowcock: I would just like to put on the record that we have three members of staff in the Harare office who still work primarily on this programme and they are spending less of their time on the routine administration and more of it on the strategic dialogue and, indeed, at least once a month going out to regions like Tsholotsho and seeing what is happening. In terms of the objectives of making sure we stay in touch with the goals and the delivery of those goals, the way we have organised the work is an improvement on the past arrangement.

Q91 Andrew Stunell: If I could just pick up where John finished. First of all I want to say that we saw some excellent on the ground projects which will be
Q92 Andrew Stunell: The “but” is that there are so many levels between the money going in from the office in Harare to the wheelchair-bound lady with her four chickens in the compound outside Bulawayo that we have paid for. There is the managing agent, there is the Zimbabwe-wide NGO and there is civic society. When we pour £100 in at the top in Harare, how much goes out and buys chickens at the bottom, where does the other money stop on the way and what is the value of that other money on the way in terms of the investment in civic society and so on?

Mr Thomas: I would have to get you the exact breakdown in terms of the portion of what we put into the PRP programme that is taken up, if you like, as administration costs. We need to be careful and to recognise that those different layers, as you have described them, also play a key function in helping us to account for how the money is spent, making sure that money goes to the most needy people in Zimbabwe but also that we have proper accounting processes in place. I can see that as the programme has got bigger certainly one or two people have raised concerns, but I do think it is important that we have that administration element in there so that we do have proper checks and balances. We will very happily provide for the Committee, Mr Stunell, a more detailed explanation of what portion of the PRP programme goes as administrative costs if that would be helpful.

Mr Lowcock: May I make an additional point? As well as the cost of delivering the programme we need to think about what the returns and benefits of the programme are. It costs about £70 per household to provide the assistance we provide under the PRP and the value of the production that is generated by that £70 is about £140, it is a very high rate of return. The alternative to providing some of the inputs that we have provided would be in many cases to provide food aid which would cost us between £700 and £1,000. The opportunity saving of this programme is very high and the rate of return on the programme is also very high. The numbers I have given you reflect the administration costs as well as the costs of the inputs. We honestly think that in terms of value for money this is a very effective programme.

Q93 Chairman: I think it is a very important question that Mr Stunell is asking. As you will know, Minister, we are up against rather tight timetables. The constitutional requirements tell us that we have to have this report done in a very short space of time, so if you are able to give us that breakdown we need it very soon. I think it would be very helpful.

Mr Thomas: Okay. We will get that to you even quicker than usual.2

Q95 Richard Burden: This is really on the same subject. From what we saw, I think we do understand why managing agents are used and the good pressures that lead DFID to go down that road. It is also fair to say that in terms of the projects we saw in Tsholotsho and the engagement with the women by GRM3 there it appeared to be good. However, I think the uncertainty that some of us still feel is whether we will get to a stage where the tail starts to wag the dog. If the need to have those managing agents is because of their expertise and they get such expertise that they are used not just by DFID but other partners as well, the danger is that they could then become intermediaries that start determining what happens rather than intermediaries that do what is required from the grassroots or reflecting policy. I do not think we are saying that is what is happening but we see there is a danger that could happen. The question really is, is it right that could be a danger and, if so, how do you guard against it?

Mr Thomas: Let me bring Mr Lowcock in in a second. When we take a decision that we want to contract out, if you like, the management of a particular programme there are a whole series of well-established processes which we follow. We are very happy to provide some further information to the Committee if that is what you need to give you some confidence that the tail will not wag the dog in this particular context. There is good donor coordination in Zimbabwe and, as I say, we have some very experienced staff operating in our office, so I do not believe, if you like, the worst case scenario that you are posing would happen. Let me bring Mr Lowcock in to give you some further detail.

Mr Lowcock: I think you are exactly right, Mr Burden, that in principle the problem you have described could be one we face. We have tried to describe how we are mitigating it in this case. The Committee knows very well the staff of the Department is quite stretched. If we had more staff available to us in Zimbabwe my own view would be that are other things I would rather they did next before more administration and more detailed monitoring and engagement on the PRP. I am satisfied with the approach that we have to the management of the PRP at the moment.

Mr Thomas: Just one other point to make. It is not just us as one donor who plays a role in this, there are a series of other donors who also are funders of the PRP. In a sense, it is a shared process for looking at the administrative cost element and taking decisions about tenders, et cetera, which in that sense I hope gives further confidence and further checks into the system.

2 Ev 94
3 The managing agents for the PRP.
Q96 Andrew Stunell: I would like to hear from Mr Lowcock that if he did have those extra staff and it is not what Mr Burden was postulating, what would it be that the extra staff would be dedicated to?

Mr Lowcock: One of the issues that came up in discussions yesterday with the Finance Minister in Harare was follow-up to a discussion he had in Washington last week when the board of the IMF restored Zimbabwe’s voting rights. He had some discussions with the staff of the IMF about what it would take for Zimbabwe to move towards fuller normalisation of its relations with the international financial institutions, including potentially debt relief. We have a very good economist, who I am sure will be dedicated to that office in Harare, who is one of a rather small number—I think I could count them on my fingers, excluding the thumb, of one hand—of international macroeconomists in Harare at the moment. That is a big prize for Zimbabwe to normalise its relations to that degree, an awful lot has to be done to secure that prize, but that would certainly be an area where it would be worth putting additional professional resources in. We will find ways to do that. That is one example I would give in answer to your question.

Q97 Mr Lancaster: We will move on to health, if we may. The Committee visited two hospitals, the Mpilo Hospital in Bulawayo and a hospital in Harare. We saw the maternity unit and we saw programmes associated with HIV/AIDS which Mr Evans will ask questions about in a moment. What we saw was very good. One of the key points that was put across to us, and perhaps we should not be surprised at this given the diaspora and of a migration, was that there is a real shortage of skilled health workers, many of whom have gone abroad. For example, in the hospital in Bulawayo they had only recruited approximately 50% of midwives, although there is a midwife shortage in the UK so perhaps that is a bad example. What are we doing to try and recruit and retain health specialist staff in Zimbabwe?

Mr Thomas: One of the things, as I suspect the Committee will be aware of, that has, if you like, continued to focus our attention on the health sector was the cholera crisis in 2008–09 where the crisis was sparked by a long-term lack of investment in water and sanitation, but also the substantial deterioration in the health sector which was caused by many health workers wanting to migrate or simply not coming into work because they were not being paid. What we have done is to ensure that there is an allowance paid directly into health workers’ bank accounts which has helped recruitment to pick up. We are also helping to fund the supply of crucial drugs. If you look at the government of Zimbabwe’s budget, they simply cannot afford to pay all the salaries of health workers that are required or all the needs for drugs, so it is the donor community which has to plug that gap. It is not just us, it is a number of other donors too that are playing a role.

Q98 Mr Lancaster: You say the government cannot really afford to pay the wages, so given that we have strikes at the moment in Zimbabwe, and I think they are currently paid $200 a month and they are demanding $500, is that realistic? What effect would that have? What can we do?

Mr Thomas: One of the things we can do is not to get involved in what is a conversation that has to take place between those workers themselves with their own government. What we can do, as I have said, is to respond to the requests that we have had from the government, the Inclusive Government, to provide support to the health sector, and through the continuation of these allowances that is what we are doing and by making further money available to target, for example, maternal health and to continue our different aid programmes.

Q99 Mr Lancaster: Workers’ pay and drugs to one side. I suppose the other key element to try to improve the health structure in Zimbabwe will be infrastructure. I know that we are investing in six hospitals in Zimbabwe at the moment. Can you perhaps outline what the aims of that programme are and whether or not you intend to increase it, or how you see it us moving forward in that area?

Mr Thomas: Obviously we want to move from, if you like, the crisis phase of the health support to getting a longer term plan in place for the health sector, one that can tackle all the different health challenges that the people of Zimbabwe face. I would not want to underestimate to you the scale of the challenge that there still is, we are still in a situation where I think substantial humanitarian assistance will have to be provided for Zimbabwe. The scope to dramatically expand our health programme, whilst I think it is there, is perhaps more limited than we would like. You are right, we have to continue to invest in infrastructure but continue to make sure there are health workers in place and that those health workers are being paid and, crucially, that the basic drugs and other supplies that they need to go about their business are in place. If you like, the next ambition that we have is to try to reduce maternal and child mortality where there has been a substantial deterioration in Zimbabwe more recently. We have recently committed some £25 million over the next five years to help people continue to get better access to family planning.
services, to antenatal care, to obstetric services and newborn care services. If you like, that is the next iteration of our support to the health sector.

Q100 Mr Evans: Another health subject is HIV/AIDS, which you have already touched on. We all had an opportunity to see some of the projects involved with that and I think we were all impressed with what we saw. It is tremendous if one considers that in parts of Zimbabwe some of the aid is somewhat thin. Certainly where we were in Bulawayo and Harare we saw some tremendous projects, so I was very pleased with that, but still last year 140,000 people died in Zimbabwe of AIDS. Compared to other countries, Zambia for instance, where the amount of money spent is way above, I think it is US$187 per person as opposed to Zimbabwe where it is $4, why is there such a staggering disparity?

Mr Thomas: I think often the disparity, frankly, relates to the political situation in Zimbabwe and the ability for the international community to spend money effectively to tackle HIV/AIDS. With our programmes on the health sector we have wanted to get to a stage where other players in the international donor community would support it. The Global Fund are now funding the health workers' support programme. As I say, I think the economic situation stabilises there will be more opportunities to do more on healthcare, of which HIV/AIDS will continue to be a priority for ministers. Nevertheless, I think the UK can take some pride in the success that there has been, notwithstanding the significant levels of death because of AIDS that there is in Zimbabwe, for the fact that it has not been even higher. HIV prevalence has come down, it has halved over the last 10 years, and our aid into the sector over that period has been absolutely pivotal to helping those who wanted to make a difference in this area in Zimbabwe be able to do so.

Q101 Mr Evans: I have got no doubts about that whatsoever. We went to see one of the hospitals there where the storeroom had eight months’ worth of supply whereas two years ago they would have had nothing.

Mr Thomas: That is right.

Q102 Mr Evans: Getting the capacity and getting those drugs out into the villages and into the more rural areas is clearly something that needs to be done. Within the infrastructure that exists there, are we able to target some of the high risk groups like sex workers, children and, indeed, gays and lesbians?

Mr Thomas: We have a behaviour change communications programme which is run by an organisation, Population Services International, who are very well established in this field who are doing hugely important work in terms of getting those prevention messages out on AIDS. There is a whole programme of work around voluntary counselling and testing which has also been very important in making a difference. I am sure the Committee will be familiar with the way in which those who have migrated from Zimbabwe potentially would not get access to information about how to avoid becoming HIV positive, but through funding we give to the International Organisation on Migration we have been able to provide support for them to get help and information to those migrating from Zimbabwe to avoid the obvious risks at transit points, et cetera. One of the keys in terms of preventing the spread of AIDS and HIV infection is making sure there is good access to condoms and that is something we have continued to be in the lead on in the provision in Zimbabwe.

Q103 Mr Evans: One other area which helps greatly is male circumcision which apparently improves the rate of protection to 80%. The target is to circumcise 80% of the males within Zimbabwe as soon as they possibly can. Apparently the cost of that will be around $140 million but they will save over $3 billion if that could be achieved. We visited one of the clinics and talked to a couple of people who had gone through it, so they were acting as peers to encourage other males to go through the procedure. Do you envisage upping the amount of money that we will be directing towards male circumcision within Zimbabwe over the coming months?

Mr Thomas: Rather than just focusing on one specific invention in response to one specific disease, however important that disease is, and I have a longstanding interest in HIV/AIDS, I think the challenge for us, both in DFID and the wider donor community, is how do we get more support more generally into the health sector in Zimbabwe and get a clear coordinated plan that looks at maternal health, that looks at HIV/AIDS, that looks at a range of other diseases too. Many of the responses that you need to tackle HIV/AIDS or to tackle maternal health are common across the piece in terms of having good health workers and good infrastructure in place. The challenge is to continue that process of coordination under good leadership from the government of Zimbabwe to get a series of clear health priorities in place which the international community could get behind. That is certainly what our ambition would be to support. Whether it has to be just DFID upping our funding levels on healthcare or whether there are other players in the international community, such as the Global Fund, who can take up that extra financial need is something that we need to continue to review. Health is certainly one of the areas that we watch very closely.

Q104 Mr Evans: Clearly all the donor organisations talk to one another anyway and that is important to make sure there is no duplication or people working against one another. When we visited the clinics we saw a number of posters with famous Zimbabwean footballers who were saying that they were getting this procedure and encouraging others to do so. It does seem to me to be economic commonsense, never mind humane commonsense, to ensure that as

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4 This programme has been running since 2006. DFID are preparing to renew and extend the programme when it is scheduled to come to an end in 2011.
many people as possible have this particular procedure to better protect the nation, particularly when you look at the colossal number of deaths. This is a bit of a lobbying plea really. All I would ask is that you look at this again and make absolutely certain that not for the want of directing the money there, which as I say will pay dividends in the short and medium-term, we support this procedure as much as we possibly can.

**Mr Thomas:** I recognise both the lobbying plea and I fear one of the specific recommendations that will emerge from your report, and we will obviously respond to the report in the usual way and no doubt faster than we would normally.

Q105 **Chairman:** I think it might be the next government that has to deal with that.

**Mr Thomas:** Mr Evans, I think your point in general about support for HIV/AIDS is well made, not only in the context of Sub-Saharan Africa more generally. We are five years on from Zimbabwe but actually in the context of Sub-Saharan Africa more generally. We are five years on from Zimbabwe where that commitment to try to deliver universal access to anti-retroviral drugs was one of the pivotal elements of the Gleneagles Agreement. We are probably two-thirds of the way towards achieving that commitment, so massive progress has been made but the target has not yet been reached. One of the issues that ministers in DFID are looking at is how we can use the international meetings that are taking place this year to refocus attention on that commitment to universal access, to look at what has worked in Sub-Saharan Africa, what has not worked perhaps, and what else the donor community needs to do. There will be an international meeting that takes place in London very shortly that looks at the Zanu-PF question.

Q106 **Mr Evans:** Hopefully when President Zuma comes as well on South Africa, maybe pushing him a little bit more on that area.

**Mr Thomas:** I hear your message, Mr Evans.

Q107 **Richard Burden:** One of the other major health areas, and you have alluded to it yourself, is the issue of water and sanitation. Six million people still have not got access to clean water and sanitation and obviously there was the bad cholera outbreak just a little while ago. When we met the Mayor of Bulawayo during our visit, if there was one priority that he wanted to identify it was the issue of the water system in the city. He said it was very close to collapse and that was not unique in Bulawayo and his plea was for donors to concentrate on trying to address that as an issue. Where would you see the issue of investing in the water and sanitation network in Zimbabwe and investment in access to electricity. These are long-term issues which we will have to address. However, given the humanitarian need that still exists, and I think will exist for at least another couple of years, the balance of our programme focusing on the delivery of basic services and, where we can, targeted assistance to support reforms in key ministries is broadly right for the moment, but we have got to keep in view those longer term issues like the Mayor of Bulawayo has identified, I think that is absolutely right.

Q108 **Richard Burden:** When you mention the Multi-Donor Trust Fund, are you saying that this is an issue they could look at?

**Mr Thomas:** Possibly, yes.

Q109 **Richard Burden:** Or that they are looking at?

**Mr Thomas:** The Multi-Donor Fund is not up and running yet, there is still a series of preparatory meetings that are taking place to sort out how the fund will operate and what it will focus on. Exactly what it does we are still in discussion on, but it certainly could look at water and sanitation issues. Frankly, if you are looking at a series of other longer term issues, such as infrastructure, roads, et cetera, you have got to think about water and sanitation issues to some extent anyway.

Q110 **Hugh Bayley:** Could I come in on the issue of the diaspora before we move on to a different subject. There are many thousands of Zimbabweans in this country and they tend to be relatively better educated because the better educated migrants migrate longer distances. They are very committed to their country and because of human rights abuses or political or economic pressures they do not want to be there at the moment, but might well return if there was political change. When the Government is talking next week to President Zuma, will you be talking about the issue of a right to vote given particularly that South African citizens in this country are entitled to vote in South African elections?

**Mr Thomas:** I think the point you make about the issue of the right to vote for the diaspora has been recognised as one of the issues that the Electoral Commission when it gets on to do its work will have to address. We all want to see progress on those political parts of the GPA where progress has been made.
much slower. I think the big ticket items are getting the Electoral Commission established so that it is in a position to do its work, of which looking at the voter roll and the issues around the diaspora is one of a series of issues that are key to getting free and fair elections to take place.

Q111 Hugh Bayley: One other thing I wanted to raise that affects the diaspora is: there are circumstances, as you are acutely aware, where money from the UK may appear politically tainted in Zimbabwe. The diaspora traditionally sent a lot of money back through remittances which has played a vitally important part in allowing Zimbabwe to survive an economic collapse. When I met the International Organisation for Migration’s (IDM) director of programmes in Zimbabwe, she talked about imaginative schemes that operate in other countries of the world whereby the government of the country in question from which the migrants have migrated and donors match dollar for dollar, pound for pound remittances that are sent back. Given that remittances tend to be spent locally, not by government agencies but by families on essential services, would your Department look at the feasibility of setting up a scheme both to encourage Zimbabwean citizens living in this country to remit money and to find a good channel for transmitting money from the UK may appear politically tainted in Zimbabwe. The diaspora traditionally sent a lot of money back through remittances which has played a vitally important part in allowing Zimbabwe to survive an economic collapse. 

Mr Thomas: I am not sure we would want to look at a programme that matches exactly what one particular Zimbabwean living in the UK or elsewhere donates to his or her family as such. There are a whole series of obvious technical difficulties with such a scheme. We certainly do want to make it easier for remittances to get back. I would go along with the director-general of IOM in this regard: there are a whole series of innovative programmes around remittances and the use of technology making it easier and cheaper for people to get remittances back. I would go along with such a scheme. We certainly do want to make it easier for people to get remittances back. I would go along with such a scheme. We certainly do want to make it easier and cheaper for people to get remittances back. I would go along with such a scheme. 

Mr Thomas: We have a couple of programmes that are supporting the education sector. One is a programme of support to orphans and vulnerable children, which is managed by UNICEF which helps to pay the school fees of a number of the most vulnerable children in Zimbabwe. We estimate that we have helped almost 250,000 schoolchildren through that process and we are hoping that the programme will expand this year to reach almost 600,000 children directly. Some of the other benefits of that programme include better access to nutrition, healthcare, to welfare and to psychosocial support services for those young people so that in turn they can benefit better from the education that is available to them. The other source of funding for the education sector is an Education Transition Fund which we launched the idea of back in June last year and pledged £1 million to it. Our interest has generated pledges now worth a total of $50 million and we are in the process of sorting out the procurement process to enable the purchase of substantial textbooks for schools in Zimbabwe. One of the problems in the education sector, as I suspect you will have seen, is as a result of the political instability there has been a substantial loss of good quality materials for teachers to use. We hope that this fund will be one opportunity to begin to restore that damage.

Mr Lowcock: Can I just clarify the point on your 2% figure, which I suspect we gave you.

Q112 Andrew Stunell: Children have certainly been victims of the current difficulties and it could be said probably that Zimbabwe used to have the best educational system in southern Africa, and it has now probably got the worst, yet DFID is still only contributing about 2% of aid to education. I wondered if you could give us some account of how that priority was set and whether you feel it should be a greater contribution in the future.

Mr Thomas: We have a couple of programmes that are supporting the education sector. One is a programme of support to orphans and vulnerable children, which is managed by UNICEF which helps to pay the school fees of a number of the most vulnerable children in Zimbabwe. We estimate that we have helped almost 250,000 schoolchildren through that process and we are hoping that the programme will expand this year to reach almost 600,000 children directly. Some of the other benefits of that programme include better access to nutrition, healthcare, to welfare and to psychosocial support services for those young people so that in turn they can benefit better from the education that is available to them. The other source of funding for the education sector is an Education Transition Fund which we launched the idea of back in June last year and pledged £1 million to it. Our interest has generated pledges now worth a total of $50 million and we are in the process of sorting out the procurement process to enable the purchase of substantial textbooks for schools in Zimbabwe. One of the problems in the education sector, as I suspect you will have seen, is as a result of the political instability there has been a substantial loss of good quality materials for teachers to use. We hope that this fund will be one opportunity to begin to restore that damage.

Mr Lowcock: I think that refers to £1 million towards the wider Multi-Donor Fund programme the Minister has just described for textbooks in particular. Probably what we should also have explained is that the programme of support for orphans and vulnerable children, which again the Minister has described, is also that education dimension, so to give a fair overall summary of how much we are putting into education we should include that as well. I apologise that we did not do that the first time. I just wanted to correct that on the record.

Q114 Chairman: How much is that?

Mr Lowcock: I will have to calculate that for you, Chairman. It is significant, and we can do it quickly.

Q115 Andrew Stunell: Can I just pull out a couple of points from your two replies, if I may. The underlying problem is that a lot of schools have been lost to use and a lot of teachers have emigrated or fled from the country. Are there any specific plans that DFID is developing or working with the Zimbabwean government to get the restoration of school buildings and bringing back teachers?

Mr Thomas: One of the things that the Inclusive Government did when they came to power was to offer a $100 allowance to all civil servants, including
teachers, which has helped to see a series of teachers returning to post and in that sense has made a difference.

Mr Lowcock: The biggest issue in our opinion is teachers. I am afraid it is going to be a significant challenge for Zimbabwe to attract back many of the best teachers who have left the country. The thing that will attract them back over time is an improvement in the political and economic situation and confidence in the future of their country, so it all turns back on what the Minister was describing about the overall political situation. Clearly there is also a school infrastructure problem and textbook issue, but we think first teachers, second textbooks and probably third infrastructure would be the order of priorities.

Q116 Andrew Stunell: Can I just ask a question about textbooks? I asked a number of questions in Zimbabwe and we received representations from some of the witnesses there. My impression was that we had gone for a big bang solution to getting textbooks which was leading to a substantial delay in getting any textbooks in, when it might have been better or more appropriate to have gone for a small-scale solution with more rapid results. We were told by an official from the Department of Education, I think, that they were still waiting for textbooks which were supposed to have been ready at the beginning of the school year. I would be interested in your commentary on that situation and for some assurance about how the textbook programme, for which we appear to have set aside funds, is actually going to be delivered to a sensible timetable.

Mr Thomas: I think the first thing is that our initial interest back in June in making money available for the supply of textbooks has sparked considerable interest from the wider donor community, perhaps more than certainly I had expected. What we are trying to do is to make sure that money collectively is well spent by having a central procurement programme. We believe that will deliver substantial economies of scale. There has been a process by which the Zimbabwe Ministry of Education has been looking at trying to prioritise a particular core set of textbooks to be delivered across the country. I recognise the appetite inevitably for teachers to want to have access to those books, but it is right that we get the procurement process right and it is right that we try to deliver economies of scale. Given the size of the pot and the increase in the size of the pot it has clearly taken some time to get that right, but we hope we are close to achieving that and getting the textbooks out.

Mr Lowcock: I would, if I may, like to answer the question we promised you a subsequent answer to, which is the share if we had included the programme of support in our total programme in education. It would be about 6%, about £2.4 million going into education through the programme of support and then £1 million this year through the Education Transition Fund. As the Minister said, we were trading off speed with efficiency and value for money. We have got a much cheaper deal and, therefore, can buy many more textbooks in the way we have done the procurement, but I take the point you have made about needing to think carefully about that trade-off between speed and efficiency.

Q117 Andrew Stunell: So when do we now expect those books to be available to schools, bearing in mind the money was allocated back in July, August last year?

Mr Lowcock: We will need to check when we expect the first deliveries, but the procurement process is advanced now.

Q118 Andrew Stunell: And the schools have no books.

Mr Lowcock: Well, most schools have some books. Clearly yes, there is an issue and that was the trade-off we were trying to manage. I will find out for you exactly when we expect the first deliveries.

Q119 Mr Lancaster: The Committee went to see some projects directed at orphans and vulnerable children and the Department estimates that more than 90% of the country’s orphans have been absorbed by the extended family. Indeed, 40% of households in rural areas actually care for orphans and vulnerable children but they have almost no financial assistance, so how do you feel that external donors can help in this process and support them?

Mr Thomas: There are a number of programmes that we contribute to which have an impact on orphans and vulnerable children and the financial needs either of the individual children themselves or those who are looking after them. I described the programme of support to orphans and vulnerable children in answer to Mr Stunell. Paying for education fees of the most vulnerable children is one obvious way in which we can help. The second is through the Protracted Relief Programme which we talked about in answer to questions from Mr Battle. That also provides support often to some of the young people of Zimbabwe who have lost parents and who perhaps head up households themselves because of the loss of parents. Many of those people who have taken in orphans and vulnerable children are beneficiaries of the Protracted Relief Programme and in that sense get support from the international community. As a Department we do not pick the individual recipients, that is done through the NGOs who, if you like, deliver the process and the support on the ground.

Q120 Mr Lancaster: I accept the answer, but I suppose what I am really pushing for is given the sheer scale and how a relatively small percentage are being reached given limited resources from the Department, how can we move forward perhaps in greater collaboration with others. That is really what I am asking.

Mr Thomas: I think the Protracted Relief Programme is expanding. It has gone from the first phase when it was largely just the UK funding it to a much bigger programme which is allowing us to reach many more people, including orphans directly or those who are looking after orphans. Similarly, the expansion of the number of children who will get
support through the OVCS programme up from about 250,000 so far to, we hope, 600,000 this year is an example of the way in which we are trying to expand the numbers that we can access. As we have discussed, in the end it does come back to the economic and political situation in the country moving forward and donors being willing to do more as a result and, frankly, more resources being able to be generated in-country.

Q121 John Battle: If I could just go back to the issue of food security. I think the UN at one point said five million people would be food insecure and the Crop and Supply Assessment Mission estimated around 2.8 million might need humanitarian assistance before the next harvest, which is this April. Some of the reports are suggesting that the weather has not been all that good and the harvest might not be that good. What is your latest prediction for food aid requirements that are coming up in the next year from April?

Mr Thomas: In terms of prediction in terms of hard numbers, I am not sure I can give you that specifically now. We share the analysis that you employed that there are some early indications that this year’s harvest is not going to be as good as in previous years. As I said, notwithstanding that sense of what this year’s harvest is going to be, I think we will have to provide humanitarian assistance anyway at least for the next two years.

Q122 John Battle: The next two years.

Mr Thomas: In recent years there has always been a substantial humanitarian component of our aid programme at different times, almost 50% or more. We work very closely with organisations such as the World Food Programme who deliver that food aid and humanitarian assistance. Frankly, the development of the Protracted Relief Programme is not only an attempt to meet the immediate food needs of those affected but is trying to get at some of the deeper roots of that humanitarian crisis. As well as giving the seeds and fertiliser programme direct support, we are also giving support to NGOs so that they can give actual guidance to people as to how to use those seeds and fertilisers to increase the yields that they do get.

Mr Lowcock: I was going to add a point on when we will have a better sense of this year’s harvest. It will be March-time probably. Most people think that it will be better than 2008 and possibly less good than 2009, so the numbers requiring emergency assistance will be in that range that you described.

Q123 John Battle: Can I thank you for the way in which you gave the answer on the longer term rather than immediate relief. Forgive me, I am not sure I clearly understand this. You provided £9 million to the World Food Programme in 2009 and that aid was mainly for food relief programmes. I wonder whether the World Food Programme itself has that longer term food programme development as well as relief. It is that distinction between your work on the programmes I referred to earlier that are getting sustainable agriculture again, but are you working with the World Food Programme itself on getting those longer term programmes in as opposed to just dishing out food aid, frankly?

Mr Thomas: We are, but it is important to recognise that the World Food Programme has particular expertise at getting food aid to those who need it instantly, who are hungry now in that sense. We are looking as a donor community, which includes WFP, at a cash transfer programme, in a sense, which helps people both to plan for a slightly longer term process as well as meeting their immediate needs now.

Q124 John Battle: If I could follow through from Mark Lowcock’s comment. When will the figures be available? We are in March next week, are we not, so is there a chance that an assessment could be included in our report? Have we got time to get that far?

Mr Lowcock: Normally it is sensible in Zimbabwe to make an assessment of the harvest level by late March. We will give you any update we can at the point at which you want to go to press, but late March is probably the earliest at which we can say something resembling an authoritative answer.

Q125 John Battle: If I can be absolutely clear, that is two things: one to get on to those longer term food development programmes, both our own and working with the World Food Programme, and the other is to look to cash transfers to stimulate that rather than going to handouts. Have I got that right?

Mr Thomas: That is effectively where we are now. Obviously if the harvest is better than anticipated then we can move further up that particular long-term process earlier.

Q126 John Battle: Also not to lose, and sometimes it is lost, may I say, and criticism is made of the UN and the World Food Programme sometimes. People standing in queues and just getting it dished out to them does not always encourage community participation, whereas other methods might include that engagement of development with the people at the local level, which is where I am hoping our programmes are geared towards now.

Mr Thomas: You have to use a range of ways of getting help to people and you have to look at the reality on the ground and adjust what you do to reflect that reality.

John Battle: The direction of the overall programme is very clear from that answer, thank you.

Q127 Richard Burden: Could we move on to the question of internally displaced people, which is clearly a very, very big issue. Estimates vary of IDPs making up between just over 4% of the population and 7.5% of the population. Yet there is also difficulty, there is quite a lot of evidence, a lot of concern being voiced that as far as the Zimbabwean Government is concerned, because they take the view that IDPs do not exist, IDPs are being fairly systematically excluded from a number of relief and humanitarian programmes. Some of the NGOs are saying that really the UN as an institution is not tackling this head on and that it needs to be a lot
more assertive around the question of IDPs, both in terms of Zimbabwe’s own obligation under UN obligations but also from a straight humanitarian point of view; aid is not getting to where it should be getting. What is your response to that?

Mr Thomas: I think that was a situation that was certainly true of the previous Government. I think the Inclusive Government has been better at recognising both the existence of IDPs and their needs, but I would not want to downplay the challenges that still remain. I think many of our existing programmes upon which we have touched are also giving assistance to those who are internally displaced within Zimbabwe but who are perhaps living with other families or who are vulnerable in some other way. Clearly there is more we need to do, as we have described, across the range, but I do believe that our programmes and those of others in the international community, are helping to get aid to those who are internally displaced, albeit there is clearly a lot more that could happen.

Q128 Richard Burden: Certainly the impression we got was that a number of NGOs and others were saying that yes, whilst things may have improved since the formation of the Inclusive Government, the issue is still very much there as far as IDPs are concerned. Partly because of the nature of some of the security ministries, it is quite easy to get in the way of aid programmes where necessary.

Mr Thomas: In that sense, absolutely, I would agree with that. There is a huge problem in terms of the ability of IDPs to move around in terms of particular locations and the level of need that we have described in terms of humanitarian issues, in terms of children or young people, if they have been internally displaced, it is particularly acute in that sense. What I would want to avoid the Committee having the impression is that none of our programme is thinking through issues around IDPs; they very much are. However, as NGOs have described to you, certainly there are real difficulties for IDPs in terms of the security situation.

Q129 Chairman: The aid programme to Zimbabwe has more than doubled in the last four years. You said in a press release last August that the Department was willing to re-engage and support recovery in Zimbabwe provided the new Government can demonstrate: its commitment to sound economic management; the democratic process and respect for human rights; the rule of law; full and equal access to humanitarian assistance; and a timely election held to international standards. I think that was a situation that was appropriate at that time. However, as the economy improves and the security situation improves, do you envisage the funding further, how would you allocate that further?

Mr Thomas: We do look firstly at the humanitarian situation on the ground and we would provide humanitarian aid almost regardless of the political situation, and it is clearly right that we do get help to people who are in desperate need, despite the particular governments that they have. In terms of long-term development assistance, you are right, we will have to look at the political and economic conditions that are operating and are on the ground before we can make big decisions about be it substantial increases in aid or substantial changes in the nature of our programmes. I think there has been progress in Zimbabwe, in particular in terms of the economics of the country. Clearly the political progress in Zimbabwe has been much, much slower, and that certainly affects our ability to do more and more quickly; there is no question of that. If we were to see faster political progress, then there is no question that we could do more, and more quickly, and I am sure that others in the international community would probably see things in the same way.

Q130 Chairman: We were told, and indeed we saw for ourselves, that in spite of the migration of some of the brightest and best people from Zimbabwe, the administrative capacity to deliver services was one of the best in Africa. Even now we saw effective delivery. Do you envisage a situation, if the political background were transformed, where government support or sector support would be a possibility? Obviously it is not today but can you see a scenario where it would and how would you judge that? Is it something you could even incentivise?

Mr Thomas: I think it is a long way off. I would hope that we could get to a situation where the politics of Zimbabwe had moved so radically forward that we could have confidence in government systems or in the particular sector plans of particular ministries. I think we are a long way off from having confidence that the Government’s financial systems are strong enough and robust enough and would be free from political interference. Having said that, there are ministries that are committed to reform and who are starting to try and give direction to what should happen in their particular sectors, and where we have confidence in the plans of those ministries, then we are trying to align our support as a donor community behind those plans. I think moving down the route of sector support or budget support is a long way off. The first stage is what we are embarked on, which is where we have confidence in the plans of a particular ministry thinking through how, without going through government systems, we can support those plans and move forward.

Q131 Chairman: And if you were increasing the funding further, how would you allocate that between multilateral or donor partnerships as opposed to the bilateral work that the NGOs are doing, which, to be honest, is mostly what we were looking at, which was extremely good, but the question is whether it is best to expand that or would it be best to expand it through multilaterals or would it be a parallel process?

Mr Thomas: I do not think we have a fixed view. Frankly, in that sense. We would want to spend money in a way that was going to have most impact
most quickly and for which we can properly account. Whether that is through UN organisations or through civil society, I think in reality it will be through a mixture and quite what the balance of that mixture would be going forward. I do not think we are yet in a position to say. It does depend on how particular programmes work. I think the Protracted Relief Programme is a programme, for example, that has a mixture of a whole series of civil society organisations and is making a significant difference. If the humanitarian situation were to deteriorate, clearly using organisations like the World Food Programme would make a huge amount of sense, but they, too, use civil society organisations, as I understand it, so it is not a question of either/or. I think it will simply come down to a hard decision as to which particular organisations are going to get money on the ground where it is needed fastest.

Q132 Chairman: In spite of the very heavy anti-British rhetoric, the general dynamic on the ground in the attitude between the Zimbabwean and British people is quite positive in terms of that underlying trend. It was suggested to us that Zimbabwe ought to be one of the overriding priorities for the UK, in other words one of the three or four countries in which we do most, not because of that particular British interest, which is just stated as a positive underlying fact, but because it would have such a dynamic effect on the whole dynamic of Southern Africa if it could be turned around. Do you accept that as a possible analysis and, if you do, what could DFID do more that would reflect that priority, taking on board entirely that it is complicated and unpredictable but the argument that so long as you were working in the right direction it justified that kind of prioritisation?

Mr Thomas: Zimbabwe takes up a significant amount of both ministerial and very senior official time in both Departments in that sense, so it is accorded a high level of priority. I think the analysis about the importance of Zimbabwe to sub-Saharan Africa is absolutely right. There is no doubt that if we were to see further economic stability and progress and further political progress, Zimbabwe’s recovery could help to drive progress towards the Millennium Development Goals across the whole of the region. I have a particular interest in regional integration and in the transport infrastructure that helps to drive, if you will forgive the pun, that integration. Zimbabwe has a pivotal place in the north-south corridor, a network of key roads, and therefore the investment, or lack of investment, that Zimbabwe puts into its road network has a fundamental impact on the capacity of sub-Saharan Africa to trade between the countries in that area. I think the analysis is spot on and that is why I hope that we will see the type of economic progress and political progress that I suspect all of us would want.

Q133 Chairman: Thank you very much. The Committee would want to repeat the thanks that have already been made to the DFID staff for the visit they organised. All eight members of the Committee who went on the visit came away with a much more positive impression of what is going on than we had anticipated, although I would hasten to add we are not naive enough not to realise the huge political difficulties and underlying tensions and threats that could blow it all away. We understood that. What we saw was impressive. Our report has to focus on the development agenda rather than the political agenda, but, again, you cannot deliver the one without the other. Our intention is to complete the report in advance of an Election unless we are ambushed.

Mr Thomas: With that in mind, I wonder if I can ask Mr Lowcock to give you the answer on the textbook delivery timescale. I think we have that information.

Q134 Chairman: Anything you have now and anything you do not have now if you can think days rather than anything else.

Mr Lowcock: Could I preface the answer to Mr Stunell’s question by saying that of course we are not in complete control of this because we are a tiny part of the financing. We have to get all the other players into place as well. The answer to the question is that the contract will be let in the next few weeks and the first books will be delivered from about eight weeks from then, so about 12 weeks from now the first books will be delivered.

Q135 Chairman: The Committee will watch with interest the developments which obviously go through convolutions almost daily. Perhaps the one positive thing which was said was that whilst nobody knows where it might head, the feeling was that things had got to the point where going back to a situation where there was no space was perhaps unthinkable unless the situation deteriorated beyond all hope. If I may say so, there were comments and compliments about DFID’s role, and indeed the Foreign Office’s role because it is important to recognise this is a joint operation, in doing that. I think it was the Dutch development representative who said specifically that he wanted to put on record his appreciation of the leadership role that was being provided by DFID in Zimbabwe and how important it was, both politically and in terms of development. I am happy to put that on the record and say that we appreciate it and we appreciate that the team there are doing really good work in difficult and challenging situations, but at the moment not unrewarding because there is something coming back for it. Can I thank you very much indeed for your evidence. I genuinely hope that our report is something that will make a useful contribution to both your work and a wider understanding of what we are trying to do.

Mr Thomas: Thank you, Mr Bruce.
Written evidence

Written evidence submitted by Action for Southern Africa (ACTSA)

1. ACTSA welcomes the opportunity to contribute to the inquiry by the International Development Committee into the assistance provided to Zimbabwe by the UK’s Department for International Development (DFID).

2. ACTSA has long campaigned for democracy and development for Zimbabwe. ACTSA is the successor organisation to the Anti Apartheid Movement which campaigned actively in the UK for Zimbabwe to achieve democracy and liberation. ACTSA liaises closely with civil society organisations in Zimbabwe, as well as those active on Zimbabwe in Britain and Europe. ACTSA works in particular with the trade union movement in Britain, Zimbabwe and South Africa on Zimbabwe.

3. The situation in Zimbabwe did not simply arise. The problems the country now faces are rooted in the policies and actions of the Mugabe led government, failures of the UK Government, international institutions and the complicated history of Zimbabwe. To be able to move forward with effective support for the people of Zimbabwe we need to understand why Zimbabwe is in the social, political and economic crisis that it is today.

4. The Lancaster House agreement paved the way for democratic elections, but did little to help the new Zimbabwean Government redress the gross economic and social inequalities that resulted from white minority rule. Crucially it entrenched property rights for 10 years and laid down that land could only be compulsorily acquired if it was under-utilised and if “adequate compensation” was paid. All other land exchanges had to take place on a “willing seller, willing buyer” basis.

5. Zimbabwe did however make significant strides in social provision and economic development in the period after independence. Between 1980 and 1990, real spending on health more than doubled, on primary education it nearly tripled, infant mortality fell from 88 to 61 per 1,000 and literacy levels increased dramatically. These were great achievements for newly independent Zimbabwe. Set against this however there are the massacres in Matabeleland in the 1980s. Some attribute these to the desire of Zanu PF to eliminate all opposition; others see them in part as a response to the threat of destabilisation by the apartheid regime of South Africa.

6. In 1990 the World Bank imposed a Structural Adjustment Programme on Zimbabwe which eroded its social and economic gains and led to a popular mobilisation against the Government led by the trade unions. Despite the sweeping policy prescriptions urged by the IMF and World Bank, redistribution of land was not advocated.

7. The Government of Zimbabwe/Zanu PF’s response to growing popular opposition has been two-pronged: Increasing repression of the democracy movement and a dramatic escalation of anti-imperialist rhetoric aimed at re-evoking the aspirations of the liberation struggle. This has led to the instruments of the state, police, army, civil service, judiciary all being required to serve the interests of Zanu PF as “the party of liberation” and those opposing it being labelled as serving the forces of imperialism.

8. The Global Political Agreement (GPA) brokered by South Africa led to the formation of an Inclusive Government in February 2009. This government is marked by contestation and mistrust between the political parties. It has led though to an improvement in the economic situation and although there continue to be human rights violations these are not of the scale of 2008. There has also been some improvement in health and education provision.

9. A key challenge now is to assist Zimbabwe to recover; to rebuild its shattered economy, its health and education systems, agriculture and in tandem to support the establishment of effective functioning democracy. The task is to be both developmental and political.

ACTSA’s Views on the Specific Issues Raised in the IDG Inquiry

How DFID works with other donors, multilateral agencies and NGOs to deliver assistance:

10. DFID has played a key role in ensuring a reasonably effective response to the humanitarian crisis. It is seeking to play a key role in stabilising the Zimbabwe economy and support economic recovery. It recognises the need to support democratic renewal but this aspect of its Zimbabwe programme seems less developed. ACTSA believes DFID needs to consider both what it does and how it does it recognising every exchange had to take place on a “willing seller, willing buyer” basis.
Unions (ZCTU). There is also the sensitive issue of whether work with civil society is largely with international NGOs with local and regional civil society groups relatively marginal. It is unclear who informs and influences DFID policy and priorities on Zimbabwe.

11. DFID should not support agencies such as the IMF and World Bank imposing solutions on Zimbabwe. DFID should seek to use the influence it undoubtedly has with the IMF and World Bank to ensure their policy toward Zimbabwe is based on a commitment to support poverty reduction. To further transparency and accountability DFID should publish its advice and requests to the IMF and World Bank on Zimbabwe.

DFID’s contribution to the provision of humanitarian aid:

12. ACTSA believes that DFID in Zimbabwe has in challenging circumstances supported an informed and effective humanitarian response. ACTSA believes the provision of humanitarian aid must be based on meeting need and not party political affiliation. DFID and others must be robust in asking the UN system to strongly communicate this to the Government and political parties in Zimbabwe.

13. The humanitarian situation is currently easing although three million may still require food assistance. Humanitarian assistance should avoid seeing Zimbabweans as passive recipients of aid. It should seek to build up self reliance, community organisation and responsibility.

The effectiveness of DFID’s support for delivery of basic services:

14. DFID is right to be increasing its support for the restoration of basic services. ACTSA recommends this be done through publicly accountable means, through support for public sector provision and it be done in ways that strengthen those working for the restoration of democracy and respect for human rights. ACTSA is concerned that there may be moves from some donors to support the privatisation of basic and public services in Zimbabwe. This could be experienced by people including the Government of Zimbabwe as aid conditionality. Based on the views expressed to us ACTSA does not support the privatisation of public services in Zimbabwe.

15. ACTSA is supportive of the view expressed by the Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions (ZCTU) that international assistance should be provided to the Government of Zimbabwe to improve service delivery. We concur with the view of ZCTU that such support should be provided on a transparent, accountable basis and that it must be clearly demonstrated that funds are spent on the purposes provided.

The impact of DFID’s funding for health and HIV, and its support for orphans and vulnerable children:

16. ACTSA notes that Zimbabwe has reported the greatest decline in southern Africa of the percentage of population who are estimated to be HIV positive. If true, this is to be celebrated. Given the context of Zimbabwe there is some doubt on this estimate. ACTSA welcomes a focus by DFID on women and health and supports calls for more support in this area. We are concerned by increasing violence toward women in Zimbabwe including rape with impunity and urge DFID request the UN and others take up this urgently to reduce and prevent such attacks (see for example the recent report by Aids Free World “Electing to Rape: Sexual Terror in Mugabe’s Zimbabwe”).

17. In ACTSA’s view leadership is required at all levels on HIV/AIDS which challenges stigma and discrimination and develops both policy and an approach which is inclusive. There must be an emphasis on prevention, on sensitive and appropriate support for people living with AIDS (PLWA) and support for people affected by HIV/AIDS.

18. ACTSA believes the most effective way of providing for the safety and welfare of orphans and vulnerable children is through an integrated approach supporting the parents’ and/or carers’ or communities efforts to look after them. DFID should also consider support for the elderly who may now have child care responsibility. DFID should continue its support for the multi-donor Programme for Orphans and Vulnerable Children through UNICEF and NGOs. This programme should include social and psychological support for those affected.

19. ACTSA calls for even greater efforts to reduce, indeed eliminate mother to child transmission of HIV and requests DFID give this higher priority and encourage such as UNDP, Unifem and UNICEF to do the same.

20. ACTSA and ZCTU have co-operated in providing sanitary protection for Zimbabwean women through the Dignity! Period campaign. This need was identified as a priority by the ZCTU Women’s Committee. ZCTU and its structures have demonstrated an ability to identify and meet the priorities Zimbabwean women have identified in health and this is something DFID could seek to develop in discussion with ZCTU.

Strategies for rural development:

21. Land is a key and unresolved issue in Zimbabwe. The issues are who owns, controls and benefits from the land. A comprehensive response is required that deals with land title, historic injustices of land ownership, sustainable livelihoods and poverty reduction. Dealing with land must involve improving the situation of farm workers and DFID should liaise closely with the General Agriculture and Plantation...
Workers of Zimbabwe (GAPWUZ) who organise and represent farm workers. DFID and other donors should not impose models of tenure and agricultural practice. There are calls for a land audit (including from the trade union movement). What is required is a process which has support from all parties, is time limited, which produces recommendations for implementation and which monitors and reports on progress. DFID/the UK Government should provide funding to support a transparent and accountable process of land reform which deals with historic injustices and supports Zimbabwe’s development.

Prospects for a closer development relationship between DFID and the Government of Zimbabwe:

22. Since the formation of the Inclusive Government, there has been some improvement in the economic and social conditions in the country. ACTSA believes that DFID should engage with this government to support its efforts to re-build the economy, improve the delivery of vital public services and build democracy. ACTSA, based on the views expressed to us by key partners and contacts, believes such support must be targeted, very much at social development ministries and the rebuilding of the economy. There is a tension, which should come first, increased DFID support or an improvement in democratic practice? ACTSA believes any benchmarks must come from the Global Political Agreement as this is a document signed by the political parties and the SADC mediator, South Africa. ACTSA suggests DFID should both increase its support for ministries such as health and education and make it clear that such support for the Government and any further increase in support is dependent on the implementation in full of the Global Political Agreement. DFID/UK Government also need to ensure that SADC member states are well informed on what DFID/UK Government is doing in Zimbabwe.

23. ACTSA firmly believes it is Zimbabweans who must be able to freely decide their priorities, without internal intimidation or external interference. When there are clear signs of progress on the restoration of democracy and the people of Zimbabwe can hold their government to account, then the UK should seek to increase their support and mobilise further support from the European Union and financial institutions. Concrete signs of progress could include:

- Resolution of the outstanding issues in the Global Political Agreement including the process of appointments of key government officials including the Governor of Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe, Attorney General, Deputy Minister of Agriculture and ambassadors.
- Stopping of political violence including the cessation of arbitrary arrests of trade union leaders, civic leaders, human rights activists, journalists, lawyers, and MDC members; the unconditional dropping of politically motivated charges facing political prisoners, human rights activists and lawyers; and the disbanding of militia bases in rural communities.
- Cessation of inflammatory reporting in the broadcast and print media; putting in place legislative and media reform.
- Respect for the rule of law and court orders; stopping the State’s interference in one political party’s interference with the judiciary.
- Cessation of politicisation of humanitarian aid and threats to NGOs involved in such work.

24. ACTSA believes that in the changing context of Zimbabwe it is important that DFID engage with the Inclusive Government and any democratically elected successor. It is important in this process that DFID develop and maintain a strong relationship with civil society in Zimbabwe and Britain. ACTSA believes that DFID in Zimbabwe should hold regular consultations with the Zimbabwe trade union movement led by the ZCTU and its close associates, the Zimbabwe Chamber of Informal Economy Associations (ZCIEA) and the Labour, Economic Development and Research Institute of Zimbabwe (LEDRIZ). DFID should push that international support to the Inclusive Government is provided on a transparent basis and monitored by civil society organisations including the trade unions. ACTSA also believes that DFID should consult British civil society organisations including NGOs and the trade union movement on its policy and priorities for Zimbabwe.

Zimbabwe’s relations with its regional neighbours and their impact on economic recovery and development:

25. The solution to the crisis in Zimbabwe has to come from Zimbabwe, facilitated and encouraged by the region. The Southern Africa Development Community (SADC) is leading, on behalf of the African Union, on Zimbabwe and SADC has agreed that South Africa mediate on its behalf. South Africa is hosting an estimated three million Zimbabweans. SADC’s mission to the 2008 Presidential election concluded that the election did not meet SADC’s agreed standards for the conduct of democratic elections. The region wants a resolution to the crisis of Zimbabwe. SADC members have provided assistance to Zimbabwe following the formation of the Inclusive Government and urged the African Development Bank, the IMF, the World Bank and western donors to support the Inclusive Government financially. It is reported that South African business is increasing its investment in Zimbabwe. Investment by the private sector from across the region in Zimbabwe could assist economic recovery. It is important to ensure however that assets are not sold off too cheaply, that investment does assist in reducing poverty, produces decent jobs and does not prop up an undemocratic elite. In the aftermath of the 2008 Presidential election the trade union movement across the region refused to unload a Chinese ship with arms for the Government of Robert Mugabe. DFID should support Zimbabwean civil society, including the trade union movement, informing
and engaging in dialogue with civil society across the SADC region. DFID/UK government should also consider support for regional civil society structures such as the Southern Africa Trade Union Coordinating Council (SATUCC).

26. There is considerable interest in Zimbabwe in Britain. DFID should recognise and welcome this and consider providing support to improve contact and understanding between organisations including trade unions, communities in Britain and Zimbabwe engaged or wishing to engage in twinning and linking based on support for democracy and development.

27. In supporting recovery for Zimbabwe DFID/UK Government should ensure that the possible contribution of the Zimbabwean diaspora is considered. If conditions on the ground permit return then the major obstacle could be loss of their job in the UK and their immigration status. ACTSA urges the UK Government to consider supporting those Zimbabweans who may wish to return to be able to do so on a secondment basis with the right to return to the UK.

January 2010

Written evidence submitted by Professor E.A. Brett

MANAGING AN AID RELATIONSHIP UNDER POLITICAL STRESS
FACILITATING A RETURN TO GOOD GOVERNANCE AND GROWTH IN ZIMBABWE

A Briefing Paper for the International Development Committee,
House of Commons
December 2009

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THE SITUATION

1. Ten years of political and economic mismanagement have turned Zimbabwe from a well run state to one that depends on remittances and aid for food and basic services. This decline began in the late 1990s when the ZANU government’s political monopoly was challenged by radical civic organisations and the Movement for Democratic Change. It responded by using currency and financial market controls, the printing press, a grain and fuel marketing monopoly, and land seizures to transfer resources from efficient producers to political cronies, the security services, and war veterans that it relied on for support. It attacked and intimidated political opponents, forcibly destroyed the urban informal sector, manipulated elections and used its control over land, food and information to retain its majorities in rural constituencies. This enabled it to win elections, but destroyed the economic system, leading to fiscal, food, fuel, and foreign exchange crises.

2. These enabled the MDC to win majority support, and forced ZANU to negotiate a Global Political Agreement (GPA) brokered by the SADC that produced the current uneasy governing coalition. The MDC won clear majorities in Parliament and in the first round of the Presidential elections in 2008, but conceded the presidency because of state a managed programme of violence and intimidation. However ZANU is utterly opposed to this “partnership with ideologically incompatible MDC Formations” (5th Party Congress Resolution D) and has retained control over the security apparatuses the Reserve Bank and Provincial governorships, and agriculture, and is using these to block attempts to introduce a viable reconstruction programme.

3. The MDC has nevertheless introduced important economic and social reforms, and received greater support from the donor community. DFID and other donors now need to increase support to the MDC and other progressive civic organisations, and help them to increase their capacity to provide pro-poor services without reinforcing the ability of the politicians, officers and officials who dominated the old regime to retain control.

THE CHALLENGES

4. Zimbabweans and their supporters confront major political, economic and social challenges. They need to:

   — neutralise the power of the ZANU elites that occupy key political and economic positions;
   — depoliticise the security sector and judiciary;
   — prepare a new constitution to guarantee fair elections under international supervision;
   — restore monetary, fiscal, and financial discipline;
   — rebuild state capacity and eliminate corruption;
— fund an emergency rehabilitation and reconstruction programme designed to repair infrastructure, rebuild productive capacity and provide basic services and safety nets;
— re-establish a legitimate property rights regime and transfer non-performing assets acquired through political influence to those able to use them effectively;
— address high levels of unemployment and exclusion by supporting rural and urban small business development in parallel with support for formal sector firms;
— strengthen the civic associations that provide essential services and increase social cohesion; and
— negotiate agreements with neighbouring states to facilitate the phased return of illegal Zimbabwean economic migrants.

**Political Issues**

5. Donor-Government relationships are particularly difficult in Zimbabwe because the west imposed sanctions on the ZANU leadership and has denied it support for many years. Sanctions had no economic consequences, but the withdrawal of aid to government from the late 1990s, and use of NGOs to deliver humanitarian aid did intensify the crisis and force ZANU into the current agreement with the MDC. This changed the political situation and has presented the donor community with new opportunities and threats. The MDC is the only local political movement capable of mobilising the support and develop the programmes needed to resolve the current crisis, so the major political issue confronting donors is to strengthen its capacity to do so while neutralising opposition from ZANU.

6. The MDC has sustained its organisation and support since 1999 despite electoral fraud and violence. It has a policy agenda and the commitment needed to sustain a credible rehabilitation and reconstruction programme. Its partial control over economic and social services has enabled it to restore goods to the shops, end hyper-inflation, and reduce rent-extraction. However, it cannot address the agrarian crisis, and its representatives are still being systematically targeted by the security services. ZANU has not implemented most of the agreements in the GPA, and still intends to “extricate itself” from it in order to “retain its mantle as the only dominant and ascendant political party”. (Resolution D) It opposes donor support for the MDC, and its control over the Presidency enables it to block or destabilise many of their attempts to do so. This raises difficult political and strategic issues.

7. ZANU has just reaffirmed its hostility to external intervention by resolving that its “national strategic objective … shall be the checking, containment and ultimate defeat of the West’s neo-colonial regime change agenda by securing a decisive and uncontested victory at the next Harmonised Elections”. (Congress, Resolution A1) Its main concern is to defend “the gains of the Liberation Struggle” (D4),—in reality the asset transfers to its supporters through land seizures, black empowerment, and the rents generated by its former control over foreign exchange, credit, markets and the budget. These have created a ruthless security-business complex that depends on ZANU’s continued rule, and controls violence and much of the formal economy. This has important political implications for donors during the years leading to the next election, the election campaign, and its aftermath.

8. ZANU’s continued control over security, agriculture and the Reserve Bank is undermining MDC attempts to rehabilitate the economy, strengthen its own organisational capacity, and deliver the improvements that it needs to make to maintain its own support. ZANU’s failure to implement its side of the GPA and intimidate MDC’s members constantly tempts it to leave government. This would precipitate a major political crisis with consequences that we cannot guess at here and would change the whole political situation. However, assuming that agreement does hold, they should help the MDC to improve public services, increase its political support, and to create the conditions that will ensure that the next elections both free and fair. However this will not be easy.

9. Political instability is increasing rapidly as power struggles intensify within ZANU itself. ZANU is a patronage system based on spoils distributed by the President, Ministers, the security services and key officials. However, patronage has almost disappeared as a result of the crisis, because the MDC controls key economic and financial services; and because the state enterprises, farms and business controlled by the crony elite are virtually bankrupt. This has eroded the leadership’s ability to manage intra-party conflicts, while the likelihood of his early retirement is intensifying competition between factions that support alternative successors. The recent Party Congress showed that this is pushing the organisation to breaking point. Mugabe publicly condemned the dissention inside the organisation, important factions were excluded from key positions, and accusations of treachery and betrayal filled the e-waves. These conflicts raise at least three potential scenarios:
— the collapse of ZANU and its ability to deliver rewards could lead breakaway groups to join a broad-based MDC coalition, even before the next election. This would intensify pressure on Mugabe, and increase the chance of an early election and MDC victory;
— a weakened ZANU under Mugabe or a new and disputed leader could suffer a major defeat at the next election enabling the MDC to take over undisputed control; and
— the security and business elite, confronted with the loss of their assets and impunity for political crimes, could actively resist an MDC take-over. They could use violence again to control the elections, rule by force, or use their military and economic power to systematically disrupt the reconstruction process.

10. The first two outcomes would increase the policy options open to donors and enable them to provide a majority regime with full support. A donor coalition led by the IFIs would negotiate policy agreements and finance a reconstruction programme, similar to the successful programme developed in Uganda under the National Resistance Movement since 1987. However, the NRM had destroyed the power of the old security apparatus and took undisputed control in 1986. This is the first best option for Zimbabwe, and the Uganda case, where the situation was far worse in 1986 than it is in Zimbabwe now, suggests that much of the damage suffered over the past decade could be repaired relatively quickly.

11. However, an electoral victory would not eliminate the security-business complex in Zimbabwe, so an MDC government would confront serious threats that could easily destabilise its reconstruction programme. Senior officers run the major parastatals and have acquired enormous amounts of land and business assets, as do senior party leaders, officials and judges. This transfer of assets creates serious political risks and policy challenges.

— A new government that attempted to retrieve these assets could even lead to a military take-over.
— Coups are out of fashion, but leading officers have claimed that they would not serve an MDC government. This threat is compounded by the possibility of organised rioting by unofficial ZANU youth militias and war-veterans who have been trained to use extreme violence to intimidate the civilian population.
— If the MDC were able to take over, their ability to restore economic discipline and a legitimate property rights regime would depend on their ability to either oblige the new security-business class to use its assets effectively or transfer them to legitimate national or foreign investors. Dealing with this issue under conditions of extreme scarcity would present the government and donors with their greatest challenges.

How should the donors and regional states respond?

12. The short-term threat posed by the security-business complex is very serious, but their ability to retain long-term control over their own economic assets and the state apparatus has been seriously compromised by the destructive effects of the predatory processes through which they acquired them. The parastatals and their farms and businesses are virtually bankrupt, the state can no longer tax and pay officials real salaries or illegitimate rents, while poor pay and conditions have eroded the loyalty of the rank and file and produced serious discontent and high desertion rates in the security services. Their immediate survival now depends on funding from donors which gives them the ability to defend the new regime and enable it to implement difficult reforms. These should bring rapid improvements to the mass of the population, increasing political support for the MDC that could be consolidated if it came to terms with carefully selected members of the old regime. The new regime should take over all unutilised assets, and adopting policies that force all owners to use their assets effectively or lose them.

13. Managing the reform process would raise difficult issues about impunity and the right to retain politically acquired assets. The security services and their political masters have been responsible for serious political crimes including the Matsabeliland massacres in the 1980s, assassinations, illegal imprisonments and torture over the past decade and the illegal destruction of property during the Murambatsvina campaign in 2005. The threat of legal action had ZANU lost the last election explains the violence during the last stage of the 2008 elections, and will play a key role in the run up to the next one. Thus donors will need to decide whether to accept a political settlement that would allow the beneficiaries of these crimes to retire and enjoy their wealth. With impunity, they might leave the public sphere without a struggle; refused it, they could destabilise the political settlement.

14. A new MDC regime could only overcome these threats if it won an undisputed majority at the next election, and had the full support of its neighbours, and especially South Africa, when it took over. A new dispensation would require a new constitution that reduced the excessive power of the Presidency and the ZANU party apparatus, and that guaranteed effective procedures for supervising the elections to prevent the use of fraud and force. These issues are addressed in the GPA, but ZANU is actively resisting all MDC attempts to address them and is a leading exponent of electoral manipulation and intimidation. Donors should make their views known on these issues, but should also invoke the support of Zimbabwe’s neighbours in doing so since they are far better placed than they are to influence events, but have done very little to improve matters over the past decade.

15. SADC and South Africa are seen as legitimate interlocutors by both parties, but the MDC and civic organisations claim, with some justice, that their explicit or implicit support for ZANU over the past decade enabled it to manipulate elections, retain political power and destroy the economy. They did help to broker the GPA but have failed to oblige ZANU to honour its agreements. However, they have been forced to deal with the MDC since the 2008 victory, and do recognise the need for a viable solution to reduce the heavy costs that the crisis has imposed on the region. The UK should attempt to strengthen SADC’s attempts to
oblige ZANU to implement the GPA, to support Zimbabwe's attempts to rebuild its economy and repatriate its economic migrants, and ensure that the constitutional and electoral arrangements adopted before the next election guarantee a free and fair result.

ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL ISSUES

16. A new regime will have to recapitalise a bankrupted economy, restore private property rights, and make some form of restitution to those that have lost their assets and savings. Detailed plans would need to be drawn up to address these issues that we can merely outline here. They would include an acceptable solution to the land problem, the restoration of state capacity and reconstitution of state-owned utilities, rebuilding industrial and export capacity, recapitalising the financial sector, a new investment regime for legitimate local and foreign investors, and removing the impediments to and supporting the activities of the small-business sector. The state controls over currency, credit, the printing press and grain markets that enabled ZANU to transfer assets to its supporters would have to be reformed. Substantial donor/state managed transfers to overcome the foreign exchange and budget crises will be essential. The MDC has produced sophisticated policy programmes to deal with these issues, and can also refer to the successful programmes reconstruction programmes in Uganda and Ghana. We conclude by identifying some of the particularly complex problems generated by Zimbabwe's distinctive recent history.

17. Commercial Agriculture. The land-seizures that began in 2001 have removed most of the best commercial farmers from their land and replaced them with small-holders operating at little more than subsistence level, and political cronies on large farms that they cannot run effectively. The most cost-effective way to restore the productivity of this land would be to encourage as many of the previous owners to return, but this would be politically difficult given the sensitivity of the ownership issue and the residual power of the military-business complex. However, the disastrous outcome of the land seizures in terms of food shortages lost exports and employment may well have discredited the whole programme and enable the regime and donors to restore unproductive land to former owners willing to return, provide the inputs and markets needed to restore the productivity of the large and small-scale farmers who remain.

18. Communal Agriculture. This raises fewer political issues and provides many more people with their food and income. Donors should support a major programme to restore the infrastructure, credit, input-supplies that sustain it, and to remove the regressive state controls over prices and marketing that have prevailed during the past ten years. They could find ways of overcoming many of these constraints by supporting both commercial and NGO based suppliers of inputs, credits, and marketing facilities.

19. Poverty Reduction. Political and economic mismanagement has destroyed jobs and livelihoods, disrupted health and education, and turned a large proportion of the population into economic migrants. Restoring the productivity of the formal sector will be essential, but difficult, given the availability of cheap imports. However, the formal sector has always been capital intensive and generated relatively few jobs. Hence donors need to support the creation of a strong small and medium enterprise sector. The state controls over currency, credit, the printing press and grain markets that enabled ZANU to transfer assets to its supporters would have to be reformed. Substantial donor/state managed transfers to overcome the foreign exchange and budget crises will be essential. The MDC has produced sophisticated policy programmes to deal with these issues, and can also refer to the successful programmes reconstruction programmes in Uganda and Ghana. We conclude by identifying some of the particularly complex problems generated by Zimbabwe's distinctive recent history.

Social Services. Economic and political breakdown intensified by the Aids pandemic, food shortages, the systematic destruction of urban housing and livelihoods, and the collapse of social provision has almost halved life expectancy over the past decade. Donors have hitherto focused most of their resources on these sectors, but have used NGOs rather than the state to deliver resources. They should be able to not only sustain provision through NGOs once the political situation improves, but also support public sector reform programmes designed to increase the resources at the disposal of the state, and strengthen the incentive systems that guarantee its efficiency and ability to serve the poor as well as the rich.

Written evidence submitted by CARE International UK

Please find below brief responses from CARE on the issues being consulted for the Inquiry into DFID's assistance to Zimbabwe.

It seems that CARE missed out on the original communications for the consultation, and we only became aware of it through a phone call from Keith Neary at the International Development Committee on 12 January. Therefore we missed the original deadline.

We were asked to contribute anyway, and by Tuesday 19 January, which we have hereby done. The response from CARE is primarily from a country office perspective, and is based on a 20 minute telephone call to the CARE Zimbabwe Country Director—more time could not be given due to this coinciding with very heavy work schedules, and so the answers are not in great depth but was all we could do under the time available.
How DFID works with other donors, multilateral agencies and NGOs to deliver assistance;

CARE’s engagement with DFID in Zimbabwe is primarily through the PRP II. Since February 2009, GRM has become the managing agent for DFID’s PRP and for this reason, CARE does not have much direct contact with DFID. This has resulted in CARE having reduced knowledge of DFID’s work more generally, with few opportunities to engage directly with them other than the occasional working group or cluster meeting. CARE would appreciated having greater opportunity for direct engagement on broader issues with DFID. CARE is aware that DFID is very involved in the multi-agency working groups and clusters but is unclear as to the extent of this, now being more isolated from these initiatives due to the GRM management of the PRP. CARE assumes that other INGOs, particularly those benefiting from PRP are in a similar position of now having less knowledge of DFID’s strategic programming.

Equally CARE UK’s engagement with DFID is through GRM in Zimbabwe for project management of PRP and since an NGO partner meeting in DFID London in February 2009 to discuss the cholera response, there have been no further meetings despite chasing for a further opportunity.

DFID’s contribution to the provision of humanitarian aid;

CARE does not receive humanitarian aid per se from DFID—although the PRP II funds are technically protracted relief, they are not regarded as emergency response assistance. During the 2009 cholera crisis, DFID channelled additional funding through the WASH cluster and UNICEF, and thus CARE is not aware of how much of any funding received from UNICEF was directed on from DFID. With UNICEF as the conduit, it is hard to assess the scale and impact of DFID’s contribution.

Again, CARE assumes that this is the same situation from other INGOs.

the effectiveness of DFID’s support for delivery of basic services;

CARE appreciates the flexibility that DFID provides in being able to respond to the needs of the more vulnerable communities through the PRP II. Again there is minimal contact directly with DFID to be able to get a sense of the effectiveness of basic service delivery beyond own our PRP. However the PRP is providing a platform to respond to the basic needs of people in Masvingo and Midlands Provinces, with provision of some services such as food distribution, HIV/AIDS support, agricultural capacity building (inputs and training), livelihoods capacity building (savings and loans group development).

DFID is known to do some work focusing on communities but details are not known.

The impact of DFID’s funding for health and HIV, and its support for orphans and vulnerable children;

As above.

Strategies for rural development;

As above.

Prospects for a closer development relationship between DFID and the Government of Zimbabwe;

While the Unity Government is remaining stable to a certain extent, donor confidence increases and discussions do happen about longer term engagement with Government. However this needs to be cautious due to the fragility of the situation. DFID should also consider the differing priorities as GoZ does not want to have handouts (food, farm inputs, cash) and yet this is essential to the short term. Therefore DFID must proceed with caution with exploring opportunities of partnership and engagement with Government strategy, while still focusing on what is really needed on the ground.

It is also thought that even if it was feasible to start channelling bi-lateral funds directly through GoZ, the implementation of activities and service delivery will still rely on the donors and INGOs/NNGOs as Government technical capacity and staff levels have been eroded.

Zimbabwe’s relations with its regional neighbours and their impact on economic recovery and development.

Not able to comment.

Written evidence submitted by Christian Aid

1. INTRODUCTION

1.1 Christian Aid welcomes this opportunity to provide evidence to the International Development Committee on DFID’s programme in Zimbabwe. Christian Aid has a long history of working through partners in Zimbabwe to tackle the symptoms of poverty and the structures that keep people poor. We have supported partners in-country for over 40 years and maintained an office in Harare since 1996. This work focused mainly on emergency relief in the first half of the last decade. Over the last five years, our work in Zimbabwe has developed into a programme promoting good governance, HIV prevention and treatment,
and addressing secure livelihoods through improved agricultural practice and land management. We have focused this submission on issues where we and our partners have expertise and have provided specific ideas and recommendations for action for DFID's programme in Zimbabwe.

2. SUPPORTING ZIMBABWE’S RECOVERY

2.1 In general, DFID's role in Zimbabwe has progressed from being a relief donor to a recovery donor. This move is extremely welcome. Although the humanitarian situation in Zimbabwe has improved over the past year, serious structural problems remain, which leaves the population vulnerable. It is therefore critical to improve essential services such as education, healthcare, water and sanitation and to focus on long term sustainable development. In Harare, DFID has consistently been one of the most forward-thinking donors; often setting the agenda for counterpart donors, UN agencies and NGOs. Two examples of this was DFID's endeavour and drive to support humanitarian work in urban areas through the Joint Initiative and DFID's consistent support to Internally Displaced Persons (called Mobile Vulnerable Population in-country) especially through the International Organization for Migration. Christian Aid believes both of these programmes have been valuable, appropriate and influential, and should therefore continue.

3. PROTRACTED RELIEF PROGRAMME

3.1 Perhaps the best example of DFID's strategic humanitarian support which has positively influenced other donors is the flagship Protracted Relief Programme (PRP), which focuses on livelihoods, food security and social protection. It is arguably the pre-eminent large-scale institutional donor-funded humanitarian programme in Zimbabwe. It is driven by the needs of vulnerable communities, and is relevant, sustainable and cost-effective through NGO implementation. DFID's strategy to move away from dependency-inducing food aid through NGOs has been vindicated, as supported vulnerable communities have been able to consider their own household social protection—and in some cases development—despite the crisis conditions. Christian Aid recognises that saving lives through World Food Programme support has also been important due to the regrettable decline in Zimbabwe's ability to feed itself.

3.2 DFID’s consistent support to conservation agriculture, including to the Food and Agricultural Organisation, Christian Aid and River of Life Church and Training Centre has been particularly beneficial to vulnerable communities. River of Life promotes and trains communities, churches and NGOs in conservation agriculture. Initially met by a degree of opposition from agricultural academics in-country, conservation agriculture has been proven to lift households out of subsistence poverty and its methods the most suitable cropping practice.

3.3 Christian Aid recognises DFID’s consistent support to this area despite initial reluctance by other key stakeholders. A family of six needs roughly 1.2 metric tonnes (MT) of grain per annum to be subsistence. The national average in Zimbabwe is 0.2MT of grain per hectare per annum. Households need to be able to obtain better harvests to break out of poverty and into profit. Communal farmers trained by DFID implementing partners, including Christian Aid, who practice conservation agriculture are achieving two, three, five and some even more MT per hectare. DFID will do well to ensure this particular success of the PRP is widely communicated and actively promoted in its programmes elsewhere in Africa. Support provided to River of Life in this regard would be welcome.

3.4 The decision to outsource the management of the PRP to a managing agent needs to be supported by more accessible evidence of cost-effectiveness and efficiency. The managing agent GRM and its Technical, Learning and Coordination (TLC) team is performing well, and Christian Aid has been impressed with the professionalism and ability of TLC to both monitor and support implementing NGOs. The managing agent closely monitors NGOs implementing the PRP, and rightly so. It would be beneficial to NGOs and UK taxpayers to see similar checks and balances applied to significantly large grants by DFID to United Nations agencies in Zimbabwe.

4. WORKING WITH THE UNITED NATIONS

4.1 For short term emergency support DFID has appeared to channel a large proportion of financial aid through the UN agencies. This has occasionally been at the expense of NGOs due to the UN administration fee when contracting implementing NGOs and the seemingly bureaucratic nature of grant disbursement for relief activities, which can take many months. This has the potential to render DFID's response to rapid onset emergencies, such as health epidemics, less effective. For example, during the 2008/09 cholera crisis in Zimbabwe, large donors including DFID responded by providing financial aid to UNICEF for a coordinated response. The inability of UNICEF to respond quickly led to complaints by many NGOs of delays in both onward fund dispersal and non-food item procurement. There is a need therefore for DFID to ensure UN agencies are more accountable when channelling funds through them. Closer monitoring of the way in which funds are managed, including the speed at which emergency aid is distributed, is critical.
5. SUPPORTING THE INCLUSIVE GOVERNMENT

5.1 Although DFID’s website states that “no funds will go to or through the Government of Zimbabwe”, we are of the opinion that some funds were provided to core Ministries requiring civil servant salary support. Following the signing of the Global Political Agreement in September 2008, DFID may have supported Government Ministries with salary support, even before the Inclusive Government was sworn in in February 2009. Progressive as this decision was, it was arguably too fast in the circumstances when allegations of corruption and fraud were quick to surface. Alleged salary support payments for Ministry of Health personnel in December 2008 were particularly questionable, given the high probability of corruption within Ministries badly affected by rampant inflation. Christian Aid believes that DFID should not channel funds through the Government of Zimbabwe until it has demonstrated an ability and willingness to tackle corruption and strengthen accountability, as well as fulfil the Hague Principles. Until then, DFID should continue to channel funds through NGOs and the UN.

6. SUPPORTING CIVIL SOCIETY AND CHURCHES

6.1 We appreciate the significant support provided by DFID to civil society in Zimbabwe. We encourage DFID to continue to provide this support through NGOs and stress that this support should not be brought to an abrupt end should a Zimbabwean government be elected that meets the Hague Principles and inevitable bilateral support resumed by the UK Government. A vibrant civil society is critical to the recovery of Zimbabwe.

6.2 People living in extreme poverty are vulnerable to manipulation in their approach and actions. In 2008, during the period of politically motivated violence following the elections in March, many ordinary people became caught up and incited as perpetrators of violence against their fellow community members. Christian Aid supports Zimbabwean church groups working to reconcile people in communities who remain deeply scarred; bringing together perpetrators and victims of the violence and encouraging them to choose alternative, constructive and peaceful means to have their voices and opinions heard, in anticipation of another round of elections by 2013.

6.3 We also support local partners to identify and train local people in their entitlements and responsibilities. Local communities have an important role to play in taking collective action to improve their own lives and situation in the meantime by working collectively and using the skills they already possess. For corruption and resource mismanagement to lessen, and for good leadership to grow in Zimbabwe, it is essential that the population understand and know how to demand their rights and are able to bring change to their own lives, however small. DFID should continue to support this vitally important work.

Written evidence submitted by the Commonwealth Local Government Forum (CLGF) and the Local Government Association of England and Wales (LGA)

A STRATEGY FOR LOCAL GOVERNMENT ENGAGEMENT WITH ZIMBABWE

INTRODUCTION

This paper seeks to set out a strategy for enhanced international engagement in support of local government and restoring essential local services and infrastructure in Zimbabwe. The envisaged measures are to be co-ordinated by the Commonwealth Local Government Forum, CLGF (among Commonwealth members) and the Local Government Association of England and Wales, LGA (international and within United Cities and Local Governments, notably European partners) working in partnership with the responsible national local government association in Zimbabwe, the Urban Councils Association of Zimbabwe, UCAZ. This work will involve local government staff and resources as well as international donor funding, both from bilateral and multilateral sources, including the World Bank’s Multi Donor Trust Fund (MDTF).

At present urban and rural local government in Zimbabwe are subject to different acts and legislation. There currently exists a separate Association of Rural Districts of Zimbabwe and discussions are at an advanced stage with UCAZ to establish a united Zimbabwe Local Government Association (ZILGA). ZILGA is already operational in shadow form as the process develops.

POLITICAL BACKGROUND: REASONS FOR ENGAGEMENT

In contrast to the political difficulties at national level, local government in Zimbabwe received a democratic mandate at the 2008 local elections which resulted in widespread victories for the MDC. The party took power in almost all urban councils and many rural councils (traditionally controlled by ZANU- PF), often by overwhelming margins (eg 46 of 48 wards in Harare went to the MDC). There is therefore a strong case that local government in Zimbabwe should be viewed as separate from central government and be accorded proper legitimacy and support from donors in line with its democratic mandate so as to maintain the grass roots momentum for democratic change.
This argument is re-enforced by the fact that Zimbabwe local government has significant responsibilities for local infrastructure and delivery of essential services, including running local health clinics and providing primary healthcare, critical in combating infectious diseases such as cholera. As a result some of the humanitarian and related support by UNICEF and NGOs eg essential chemicals for water purification, has been made available to local government.

At national level a number of international donors including the EU, Swedish SIDA and Canadian CIDA, have already been providing funds to the Urban Councils Association of Zimbabwe, UCAZ. A key priority is training of councillors, given that some 90% of these were newly elected in 2008 and lack experience. UCAZ, with support from CLGF/LGA, is also seeking to access funds for local government from the MDTF.

**International Involvement to Date**

With the political and other difficulties in Zimbabwe in the period 2002–03, which resulted in Zimbabwe’s suspension and subsequent departure from the Commonwealth in late 2003, many international local government partnerships, notably between councils in Zimbabwe and councils in Canada and the UK, were disrupted and discontinued.

The LGA and CLGF, have both maintained their links with UCAZ and continued a local democracy enhancement project initiated in mid 2003 with funding from the EU and the UK. This project was undertaken in cooperation with UN Habitat and involved support for UCAZ and a number of urban councils (both MDC and ZANU-PF); it sought to assess the effectiveness of council governance and service delivery structures and to develop change plans to deal with problems identified. The project included an innovative methodology of international local government peer reviews, involving the city managers and mayors of external partner councils. It was thereby also instrumental in maintaining Zimbabwe local government’s international links. On its conclusion in 2008, the project received a highly positive evaluation and the EU and other donors subsequently allocated funding to implement the change plans and expand the work to other councils. Other local governments in the SADC region, for example in Zambia, are moreover keen to deploy the same methodology in their own countries.

In view of its existing commitment to Zimbabwe and in response to the democratic nature of the 2008 local elections, the CLGF Board agreed in late 2008 and again in 2009 to intensify support for local government in Zimbabwe and a number of CLGF missions visited the country, including a needs assessment team in February 2009 with experts from South Africa and the UK. This identified critical needs faced by local government in Zimbabwe, especially staff skills shortages at all levels—senior managerial, professional, skilled and semi-skilled. In response CLGF has accordingly sounded out several of its members, including in Australia, Canada, India and South Africa, about a coordinated programme of support. It has further consulted with a range of Harare-based international donors and stakeholders, including the ministers of local government and international cooperation of the Inclusive Government.

Discussions have also taken place within the global body representing local government, United Cities and Local Governments (UCLG) and it has been agreed that the LGA, working with CLGF, should take the lead in coordinating wider international support, notably with the Dutch and Swedish LGA’s, which have maintained a strong interest in Zimbabwe.

In July 2009, a Commonwealth roundtable was held in Johannesburg, attended by a range of local government, professional and civil society partners from Commonwealth bodies, including CLGF, SALGA and LGA, from inside Zimbabwe and from the SADC region. This agreed to develop a Commonwealth Special Programme for Zimbabwe, including in a wide range of social, economic, educational and other sectors. One of the suggestions is to provide fellowships for the Zimbabweans, especially those in South Africa and the UK, including work experience within local councils. This matter was raised with Commonwealth Heads of Government at their summit meeting in Trinidad in November 2009.

**Core Areas of Support Proposed**

As a result of such activities and building on the various needs assessments undertaken, five core areas for short-to-medium term support have been identified for Zimbabwean local government;

1. *Local Government input into the constitutional review process*

   Assistance/technical advice to UCAZ/ZILGA to ensure that local government’s interest are incorporated in the current constitutional review process, drawing on relevant African and other international experience. A request for MDTF/other donor support is being sought and being followed up through DFID (UK) in Harare.
2. **Councillor and staff training**

   In November 2009 CLGF/LGA provided materials/expertise for in-country councillor training using already earmarked EU/other funds. Thereafter it is planned to assist UCAZ/ZILGA develop an on-going leadership training and up-skilling/mentoring programme for both councillors and officials for which new funds will be required. Such training could potentially include courses and work placements undertaken in neighbouring countries, as well as involving relevant international exposure and interaction with peers from partner councils outside Zimbabwe.

3. **Capacity-building for UCAZ/ZILGA**

   UCAZ/ZILGA has a key role in acting on behalf of local government in Zimbabwe. Capacity-building for UCAZ, aimed at strengthening its role as the national association of local government and providing advice on managing the merger leading to ZILGA is therefore a high priority. A three-year funding proposal has been submitted to the EU and some limited co-funding is available from VNG-Netherlands and other co-funding is being sought. It is expected that this will also involve providing UCAZ/ZILGA with the necessary capacity to make funding submissions to the MDTF on behalf of its members.

4. **Council-to-council partnerships, targeted at meeting skills shortages and improving infrastructure and essential local services**

   As indicated above, needs assessments have shown critical shortages of council staff at all levels which is impacting on the ability of councils to deliver effective services and restore infrastructure. The LGA and CLGF are therefore meeting with UK Councils on 1 February to discuss ways in which local authorities in the UK can respond creatively and at little or no cost to the needs of their Zimbabwean counterparts. Some UK-Zimbabwe partnerships have continued in recent years, despite the difficulties and the LGA is keen to encourage the strengthening of such support where appropriate.

   An immediate aim would be for partner councils to provide technical advice and if possible short term staff and other secondments to address critical skills shortages and improve infrastructure and service delivery. As necessary, and especially if MDTF and other donor support is available, this may also involve longer-term secondments of skilled volunteers and recently retired local government staff (eg engineers, planners, finance managers, city administrators).

   Support could also involve partner councils taking on Zimbabweans (especially those in countries like South Africa and the UK) for short term work experience in specialised areas to give them professional exposure prior to taking on positions in councils back home. Thereafter, more medium term city-to-city partnership working on specific projects should be encouraged.

5. **Community-based reconciliation**

   A key way to encourage political healing is for local councils to encourage community-based initiatives aimed at promoting reconciliation and community justice. In the short term this can be linked to the existing UCAZ EU funded “City Diplomacy” programme which builds on the previous CLGF local democracy enhancement activity, drawing also on relevant experiences from other Commonwealth countries (eg Northern Ireland, Uganda, Sierra Leone, South Africa). A more expanded programme will also need to be developed and funded, possibly from MDTF resources.

**Development Partner’s Roundtable Meeting, Harare 18–19 February 2010**

In association with UCAZ/ZILGA a meeting of Zimbabwean local government, their international local government partners and international donors will be held in Harare, 18–19 February 2010, at which both CLGF and LGA will be represented.

The aim of the event is to:

— Bring together ZILGA/UCAZ and existing and potential local government partners at technical levels to confirm priority areas of support and how partners can provide direct contributions, building on needs analysis undertaken in 2009.

— Establish a joint mechanism for the effective coordination, management and implementation of assistance between ZILGA and its local government partners, based on the principles of aid effectiveness.

— Confirm existing and potential areas of cooperation and funding for the agreed priority areas of support between local government partners and interested development partners.
Written evidence submitted by the Consortium for Street Children

1. INTRODUCTION:

1.1 The Consortium for Street Children (CSC) is the leading international member-based network dedicated to advocating, promoting and campaigning for the rights of street-involved children. We are committed to creating a better and sustainable future for some of the most disadvantaged and stigmatised children by working together to inform and inspire research and action that influences policy and best practice worldwide. For more information please go to www.streetchildren.org.uk.

1. The main questions from the International Development Committee’s Terms of Reference which is relevant here are: How DFID works with other donors, multilateral agencies and NGOs to deliver assistance; the effectiveness of DFID’s support for delivery of basic services; and DFID’s support for orphans and vulnerable children.

2. STREET CHILDREN IN ZIMBABWE:

2.1 Zimbabwe is currently facing a lot of socio-economic challenges. According to a UNICEF study in 2004, an increasing number of children are finding themselves in the streets and/or in abusive homes. The study further notes that, because of unemployment, the ravaging effects of the HIV and AIDS pandemic, family poverty, persistent droughts, family breakdowns, crime and more often due to neglect, physical or sexual abuse, these children find themselves living outside family environment.

2.2 As of December 2005, the unemployment rate in Zimbabwe is 80%, which means, more than 80% of Zimbabweans are living below the poverty datum line. As a result of this parents are sending their children to the streets to beg and supplement family income. In August 2007 Streets Ahead, a locally based NGO, conducted a quick survey on the streets of Harare to find among other things the origins and nature of children living and working on the streets of Harare. The findings indicated that 36% of the children were from Epworth, a satellite township in the Greater Harare area. The children were on the street mainly on a part-time basis. They come to the streets during school holidays so as to try and raise money for school and other educational requirements. The Jacha area of Epworth had the highest percentage (37.2%) of children on the streets of Harare. 71.2% of the children had lost one or both parents while only 19.1% responded that they still had both parents living. In addition to the loss of parents 70.2% of the children have no birth certificates or any identity documents.

2.3 This resulted in a three-year pilot project implemented by CSC, in partnership with Streets Ahead, Street Child Africa and the Jacha Community. The project carried out a participatory rapid appraisal of one informal settlement in Epworth called Jacha where the bulk of the children going to the streets of Harare are coming from. The participatory rapid appraisal’s finding were that children from this community are likely to go to the streets of Harare because of abuse, poverty related reasons, orphan hood, lack of identity documents and educational opportunity. The participatory rapid appraisal provided an opportunity for Jacha residents to prioritise which problems they wanted to address first, which they agreed to be abuse, education and birth registration.

2.4 The project saw the establishment of a local government-civil society partnership in Epworth to reduce the flow of children to the streets from a slum where the majority of street children originate. The City of Harare sent government officials to participate in the project because, as a government official said, “Rounding up street children doesn’t solve the problem. We want to see if you can offer another way”. Unfortunately, the project was abruptly stopped because of the increase in political violence at the time.

2.5 Although there are national polices through the children’s act, there is no municipal strategy on how to deal with street children in the city of Harare. Therefore, there is still no positive strategy to dealing with children on the street and as a result round-ups and police violence is still a major issue.

2.6 In written answers DFID stated that their Zimbabwe programme of support was going to reach organizations such as Streets Ahead. According to DFID they have allocated the following funding for Streets Ahead:

2.7 July 2005 to March 2009 (project on-going):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Total US$</th>
<th>235,889</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2005–06</td>
<td>USS55,888</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006–07</td>
<td>USS34,225</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007–08</td>
<td>USS52,559</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008–09</td>
<td>USS93,217</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3. CONCLUSION:

3.1 CSC believes that continued direct financial support for NGOs is crucial in the context of Zimbabwe. Civil society organizations have a key role to play in the current political climate, bringing much needed support to street children and poor communities in the absence of a well-functioning national government.

3.2 On a local government level it is crucial that NGOs receive the support and advice needed to engage positively with, for example, the municipality of Harare to develop a street children strategy. DFID should support initiatives aimed at such outcomes.

3.3 Further police training, as part of an integrated street children strategy, should be pursued to decrease the high levels of arbitrary round ups of street children.

Written evidence submitted by the Department for International Development

SUMMARY

Once considered one of the continent’s success stories, Zimbabwe’s economy has contracted by half in the last decade. In early 2009, over seven million Zimbabweans received food aid and hyperinflation had reached the second highest level in history. The migration of skilled labour, combined with shrinking government budgets and increased corruption, led to the deterioration of the country’s previously impressive education and health systems.

Zimbabwe’s decline is the result of years of neglect, repression and economic mismanagement. The roots of the crisis stretch back before independence and involve a succession of policy failures. These include failures to build robust democratic institutions, to challenge structural inequality, to make sound economic decisions and to expand opportunity to more people. Over the last 10 years, the ruling ZANU (PF) party— in power since Independence—has overseen the increasing securitisation of the Zimbabwean state and the independence of key institutions has become increasingly compromised.

Since its installation in February 2009, following the Global Political Agreement (GPA) in September 2008, the Inclusive Government has largely succeeded in stabilising the economy. However, there has been far less progress in restoring the rule of law and ensuring human rights are respected. The Inclusive Government remains Zimbabwe’s best hope, but the transition from crisis to full recovery is promising to be messy, protracted and complex.

DFID Zimbabwe has developed an adaptive and flexible approach to working in these circumstances. We have targeted life-saving assistance to those who most need it but also taken opportunities to address the underlying causes and effects of poverty and marginalisation. Our aid is making a real difference in a difficult environment. Examples of this include: improving food security for more than two million people through the distribution of seeds and fertiliser; supporting the provision of textbooks to 5,300 primary schools; providing supply kits of essential medicines to approximately 1,300 primary care clinics and rural hospitals; and helping to deliver anti-retroviral drugs to 58,000 people.

DFID delivers its aid programme in Zimbabwe through UN agencies and established NGOs; no money at present goes through Government systems. However, in line with the cross-Whitehall strategy for Zimbabwe, we have recently begun to provide technical assistance and policy support to reforming Ministries to help build momentum for political and economic change. Prime Minister Morgan Tsvangirai and Finance Minister Tendai Biti have both acknowledged the impact of DFID support. We are ready to provide additional assistance, as part of a coordinated response by the international community, if we see further progress in implementing the GPA. There is a clear recognition on our part that the current dispensation, for all its faults, presents a unique opportunity to reform and improve the situation in Zimbabwe.

1. OVERVIEW

Inclusive Government

1.1 For almost the entire period since independence, Zimbabwe has been governed by the Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF), under the leadership of Robert Mugabe. A prolonged spiral of decline in recent years, exacerbated by failed government policies, has led to protracted economic, political and humanitarian turmoil. The ZANU (PF) regime has generally reacted to this decline—and growing political opposition—with electoral manipulation, abuse of state power and increasing intimidation of political opponents and civil society.

1.2 However, political pressure on the regime has grown since the late 1990s with the formation, from trade union roots, of an independent and credible opposition—the Movement for Democratic Change, under Morgan Tsvangirai (MDC-T). A shambolic Presidential run-off election led to the SADC-brokered Global Political Agreement which, in turn, culminated in the formation of the Inclusive Government, in February 2009, between ZANU (PF), MDC-T and the breakaway MDC-M.
Since the IG took office the economy has been stabilised…

1.3 The MDC Minister of Finance, Tendai Biti, has made impressive advances in stabilising the economy, aided by US dollarisation and the abandonment of the Zimbabwean currency. Key achievements include:

— an increase in monthly revenues from only $4 million in January 2009 to almost $100 million by autumn;
— payment of monthly salaries to public servants, initially of $100 pcm and now in a range from $100 to $225;
— signs of recovery in the banking sector, with deposits doubling between April and August 2009;
— the 2010 budget—Zimbabwe’s first realistic budget in many years, the preparation of which DFID supported;
— and schools and medical facilities have reopened.

Ministry of Finance officials project a realistic resource envelope of $1.4 billion, funded through domestic revenues, for 2010.

1.4 As well as restoring macro-economic stability, Biti has also greatly contained ZANU (PF)’s access to resources; largely by promoting legislative changes in the governance of the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe (RBZ) and by some improvement in public financial management. The RBZ’s power therefore continues to be significantly reduced. However, the problematic Reserve Bank Governor, Gideon Gono, remains in post.

1.5 DFID and other international donors, in an effort to boost progress on reform, have been providing essential expertise and technical assistance to these economic and governance processes.

And humanitarian needs managed…

1.6 The international community, including DFID, has also played a critical role in helping to improve the humanitarian situation. In 2008–09, Zimbabwe experienced its worst ever cholera epidemic, with nearly 100,000 cases and over 4,000 deaths. DFID helped the World Health Organisation (WHO) establish a Command and Control Centre to ensure a more rapid and effective response. With the support of other donors, DFID is now focusing on maintaining basic health services, including the funding of vital medicines and supplies and the retention of health workers. We are also working to repair and restore water and sanitation systems, promote good hygiene practices and deliver items such as water purification tablets and soap. As of mid-December, there have been only 146 cholera cases this season and five deaths, compared to nearly 18,000 cases and 877 deaths during the same period last year.

1.7 Seven million people received food aid at the height of the last hungry season in early 2009. DFID provided £9 million to the World Food Programme (WFP) to ensure that food was in place when it was needed. This year saw a better harvest and improved availability of food. Even so, the WFP estimates that 2.8 million people are likely to need food aid in early 2010. We have therefore allocated £4 million to the WFP effort.

But human rights and the rule of law are still precarious

1.8 In theory, the Zimbabwean national constitution guarantees many basic human rights, but the state has consistently failed to protect citizens. Institutions, such as the judiciary and media, have in the past shown a reasonable degree of independence and integrity but now exhibit serious weaknesses regarding fundamental freedoms of participation, expression and association.

1.9 The widespread repression and human rights abuses seen at the time of the 2008 elections have decreased under the Inclusive Government. However, arrests of trade unionists and civil society activists, land invasions and politically motivated legal action against parliamentarians have continued, with weak and inconsistent responses from the judiciary. The period immediately following the MDC’s decision (in October 2009) to disengage from some functions of government saw a particular ramping up of violence. Serious human rights abuses have also been reported in the Marange diamond fields, drawing significant international reaction.

1.10 Reform of the security and justice sector into a set of professional and accountable institutions is essential, but opportunities are limited in the current political context. One important opportunity is the Constitution-Making Process under the GPA. A successful review and implementation of the Constitution would likely strengthen the separation of powers and could increase the prospects of free and fair elections. DFID, alongside other donors, is considering support which can make this a more open and accountable process, including strengthening parliamentary oversight and supporting wider civil society engagement.

Progress towards the MDGs

1.11 Zimbabwe was on its way to achieving several of the MDGs in 2000. Impressive gains were made throughout much of the 1990s and early 2000s, including in:

— reducing HIV prevalence (from 24% to 15.6% and currently 13.7%);
— raising primary school enrolment (over 90% in 2004);
— extending adult literacy (over 90% for men and women);
— and increasing access to improved water and sanitation services in both rural and urban areas.

1.12 These gains were made in spite of the government’s shrinking budget and the steady migration of skills. Demand for services in Zimbabwe remained high and continued to grow until just a couple of years ago. Parents’ participation in education coupled with a strong sense of duty and accountability amongst teachers ensured that the education system survived for many years beyond the ability of the government to fund it properly. Similar patterns were evident in the health sector and social welfare.

1.13 The fastest decline was found in services dependent on foreign exchange: for example, immunisation services collapsed completely by 2002 due to the lack of foreign exchange for fuel, vaccines and syringes (all import dependent commodities). Donor support was therefore needed (and provided by DFID, UNICEF, WHO and others) to enable Zimbabwe to rebuild and maintain a functional vaccination programme. Donor assistance also enabled Zimbabwean women to plan pregnancies (almost certainly a contributor to lower than expected child malnutrition and stable child mortality rates).

1.14 The continuing deterioration in physical infrastructure, lack of materials and supplies and the economic opportunity costs of being a teacher or nurse have more recently eroded service provision. In the absence of sustained government commitment and core funding, especially for salaries, MDG indicators have deteriorated rapidly in the last couple of years. In 2006 WHO declared that Zimbabweans had one of the world’s lowest life expectancy rates, at 37 years for men and 34 for women.

Gender and social exclusion

1.15 Pre-existing gender inequalities have been exacerbated further by 10 years of economic decline and political repression. Maternal mortality has risen sharply as services have collapsed and access, especially in rural areas, decreased. Young women, physiologically and economically more vulnerable, are disproportionately affected by HIV and twice as likely as young men to be infected. Women bear the burden of care for the chronically ill and are disadvantaged under customary law.

1.16 Young men under 24 years of age made up over 70% of Zimbabweans deported from South Africa until the recent (and temporary) lifting of visa requirements. With fewer young people able to stay in school, the number of disaffected youths who have little stake in today’s Zimbabwe has burgeoned with serious consequences for future stability.

1.17 Despite some clear success from 15 years of programmes to reduce stigma and discrimination, one in four children in Zimbabwe grows up without one or both parents and many face psychological problems, heightened risk of abuse and decreased access to education and health care. Repressive actions by the former government have led to growing numbers of people displaced—by land reform, urban “clean up” operations and sporadic crackdowns on illegal settlements and mining activities.

DFID’s programme

1.18 Zimbabwe’s future remains uncertain and things could change for the better or worse. A flexible and adaptable strategy is therefore required, to ensure that DFID can continue to deliver a high impact aid programme under volatile and challenging conditions and under a range of potential scenarios, from strong reform and change to sharper decline and deterioration.

1.19 DFID Zimbabwe committed £60 million in development assistance to Zimbabwe for 2009–10, the highest total to date. The core of our programme provides practical assistance to poor and vulnerable people in greatest need, including humanitarian assistance and protracted relief and basic services. All aid is delivered in line with the Paris Declaration and OECD/DAC Fragile States Principles.

1.20 We are also seizing opportunities to bolster reform and build momentum for change, by providing technical assistance to reforming Ministries and supporting opportunities to strengthen the accountability and responsiveness of the State towards its citizens. With international partners, we are pressing for implementation of the GPA, including a Constitutional Review that could increase democratic space and strengthen the prospects for free and fair elections.
1.21 Our aid is making a real difference in a difficult environment. Some of the specific results UK aid is working to deliver in Zimbabwe include:

— distributing agricultural inputs such as seeds and fertiliser to about 375,000 smallholder households, reaching more than two million people;
— fighting HIV by promoting behavioural change including distribution of 70 million male condoms and four million female condoms;
— leading the establishment of the multi-donor Expanded Support Programme for HIV and AIDS that is on target to deliver Anti-Retroviral Treatment to 58,000 people in 2009;
— helping WFP to deliver emergency food aid to an estimated 1.6 million people by March 2010;
— supporting UNICEF and partners to reduce the impact of cholera and other waterborne diseases by improving access to clean water and sanitation for over two million people;
— supporting nutrition outcomes in children: no district in Zimbabwe suffers from emergency levels of malnutrition;
— supporting the provision of textbooks and critical learning materials to 5300 primary schools;
— and providing technical assistance to the Office of the Prime Minister and the Ministry of Finance to strengthen their capacity to implement reforming policies and supporting a payroll audit to identify ghost workers.

Our programmes have been designed to continue operating effectively in either improving or deteriorating contexts in the future.

1.22 Our engagement is guided by a cross-Whitehall strategy on Zimbabwe, agreed among key departments, including DFID, FCO, MoD and HMT. The strategy recognises that the Inclusive Government is Zimbabwe’s best chance for economic recovery and political change, justifying a structured and incremental re-engagement by the UK and international community. It seeks to calibrate UK support against implementation of the GPA. The strategy is built around strong cross-departmental working, both in London and in Harare where the DFID office and UK Mission are co-located.

The future

1.23 Zimbabwe’s recovery in 2009 was in many respects remarkable, if still fragile. At the beginning of the year, the country was on the brink of collapse, with prices doubling every 24 hours, schools and clinics shut down, a cholera epidemic underway and millions dependent on food aid. At the year’s end, inflation was down to single digits, public servants were being paid and food was available in city shops.

1.24 Pro-active South African mediation, following the Maputo SADC Summit in October, has further added to the pressure for change and, if maintained, adds an important new element to the equation. Opponents of reform retain control of the security services and the option of violence, but overall the balance of advantage seems to be steadily swinging behind the reformists, with a growing sense that progress cannot easily be reversed.
1.25 Nevertheless, the political situation remains volatile and unpredictable and the tipping point has not yet been reached. Recovering the quality of life, diversified economy and high calibre civil service that once existed will take some years of sustained effort and good government. Zimbabwe appears to be in a transitional phase but it is a transition that is likely to continue to be protracted, messy and probably non-linear.

1.26 DFID will need to remain flexible and opportunistic, calibrating our engagement to progress on the ground. The core of DFID’s programme going forward will remain focused on support for basic services, livelihoods and humanitarian needs. Resources will continue to be delivered through the UN and NGOs in the near future.

1.27 We will also continue to seek opportunities to build momentum for change by building capacity in reforming Ministries, (especially the Office of the Prime Minister and the Ministry of Finance) and strengthening the accountability of the Executive by building on commitments in the GPA. This is likely to include support to the Constitution Making Process, elections, Parliament, media, civil society and possibly additional small-scale support, with other donors, for security and justice sector reform.

2. PROSPECTS FOR A CLOSER RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN DFID AND THE GOVERNMENT OF ZIMBABWE

2.1 After 2000, DFID was unable to maintain a credible development engagement with the ZANU (PF) regime and, from that period, no funds have been passed through the government. However, DFID and other donors continued to have some engagement with public institutions in Zimbabwe to deliver basic services—where these institutions and national policies were essentially sound and consistent with international standards. This was especially the case around HIV prevention and treatment. This approach has helped to slow the decline of public systems to some extent and has helped avoid the need to establish parallel service delivery structures.

2.2 This approach also positioned DFID well to support a more legitimate government when it arrived. For example—because of our longstanding support to the national treatment programme for HIV, which involved working with existing public health institutions—DFID were able to lead donor work with the Ministry of Health to deliver funding to retain health workers during the cholera crisis. The health retention payments were, though, paid directly to health workers’ bank accounts rather than through government systems.

2.3 The formation of the Inclusive Government in February 2009 changed the balance of risk and opportunity and justified a structured and incremental reengagement with Zimbabwe. A key component of mitigating the risks and realising the opportunities is a coordinated approach by the international community. Donors have been able to maintain a cohesive position around the kind of changes that would signify a return to democratic government and the rule of law. We have focussed on aligning behind the Government of Zimbabwe’s own commitments as agreed by the three main parties in the GPA. This cohesion has been time-consuming to build and maintain but it has become a very useful mechanism to communicate clearly with the Inclusive Government around the kind of reform needed in Zimbabwe for donors to increase their support.

2.4 Donor reengagement is calibrated against implementation of the GPA and progress towards the “Hague Principles” (agreed by like-minded donors in 2007). These principles include full access to humanitarian assistance, a commitment to the rule of law, economic reform, respect for internationally agreed human rights and a commitment to free and fair elections.

2.5 For DFID, the Inclusive Government has created greater opportunity for engagement and better working relationships with some elements of government. As an uneasy cohabitation between political antagonists, the Inclusive Government is not yet the partner we require to sustain a full development relationship. Nevertheless, it provides a platform to continue to develop the programme away from short-term relief and to address underlying, longer-term causes of humanitarian crisis.

2.6 In April 2009, the International Development Secretary announced a further £15 million of aid to Zimbabwe, including funding to rehabilitate Zimbabwe’s water and sanitation systems, whose disrepair was a key contributory factor to the 2008–09 cholera pandemic. In June 2009 the Prime Minister, Gordon Brown, welcoming Morgan Tsvangirai to London, further increased the size of the UK's development assistance to £60 million for 2009–10—our largest ever programme in Zimbabwe. This included an additional £5 million for food security and for education (approximately £4 million and £1 million respectively).

2.7 We have also begun to provide technical assistance and policy guidance to key reforming Ministries and institutions. We have supported the Ministry of Finance to prepare the 2010 budget, Zimbabwe’s first credible budget in nearly a decade. At Prime Minister Tsvangirai’s request, we have also provided flexible TA to his own Office to perform essential policy, parliamentary and other leadership functions.

2.8 Although it does not yet have a poverty reduction strategy as such, the Inclusive Government has developed an agenda to meet immediate needs in the Short Term Emergency Recovery Plan (STERP), the 100-Day Plan and its successor the Government Work Programme. An early priority for DFID was to align
its programme of assistance with the priorities set out in the STERP and 100 Day Plan. For example, we are providing £3 million in 2009–10 for the rehabilitation of Zimbabwe’s six major referral hospitals, including those in Harare and Bulawayo.

2.9 All UK aid is currently delivered through the UN, NGOs and contracted partners. It is unlikely that this will change in the foreseeable future. However by taking steps with other donors to align our assistance to the 2009 and 2010 budgets, we are providing support to Government priority areas and easing budgetary pressures by paying for essential humanitarian and basic services assistance through parallel donor financing.

2.10 The Inclusive Government is an interim arrangement: the political struggle between the ZANU (PF) regime and the MDC has continued within as well as outside government. Our strategy is to provide support to build momentum for change, by working to leverage reform where we see an opportunity, not just by responding to progress as it occurs. Most observers believe that the next elections will be held in the first half of 2011 at the earliest. The period up to then will be difficult and painful, with periods of both improvement and deterioration likely. DFID will need to remain nimble and opportunistic in our response to events. Our development programme, our relations with the region (especially with South Africa) and our approach to the sanctions issue will all impact directly on the prospects for real change.

3 HOW DFID WORKS WITH OTHER DONORS, MULTILATERAL AGENCIES AND NGOs TO DELIVER ASSISTANCE

3.1 DFID delivers its aid programme in Zimbabwe through key strategic partners such as UN agencies and established NGO partners. At present, no money goes through Government systems or the RBZ. South Africa was the only donor who provided $35 million of budget support in 2009 and has signalled the intention of continuing to do so in 2010. We also understand that China has provided $5 million into Zimbabwe’s systems; however, there are uncertainties around the how the aid would be spent and exact volume of China’s contribution. Donors have maintained coordinated positions in line with the Paris/Accra Aid Harmonisation agenda and OECD/DAC Principles for best practice in working in Fragile States. Aid coordination is good and donor funding is increasingly jointly funded or pooled, with DFID leading pooled funding arrangements in several areas.

Transitional Framework

3.2 As mentioned above, ensuring a consistent and agreed approach by the international community to the situation in Zimbabwe has been critical. On the ground in Harare there has been a major focus on ensuring that aid is coordinated and delivered through agreed mechanisms and processes. During 2008 and building on the Hague Principles, donors have developed fuller plans and processes for gauging progress by the Government and sketching out recovery plans and aid volumes and how it will be spent. DFID continues to play a prominent role in developing the emerging aid architecture and donor strategy.

3.3 Representatives from donor capitals also met in Berlin in October 2009 to review progress since the inception of the Inclusive Government. There was a general recognition that Zimbabwe has entered a transitional support phase where definite progress has been made but remains highly fragile. DFID support (both service delivery and technical assistance) is designed to help strengthen the government’s capacity to handle pressing issues (eg. its current fiscal problems) and to help support reform through a difficult and fluid political situation.

Aid coordination architecture

3.4 Examples of key donor coordination processes include:

— UN monthly coordination meetings with donors and bi-monthly meetings with Ambassadors and Heads of Mission.

— The World Bank Multi Donor Trust Fund Policy Group, which includes heads of aid agencies of contributing countries and the UN.

— Sector cluster groups for health, governance, and orphans and vulnerable children.

— The like-minded group—an informal but highly cohesive and influential aid coordination and policy group. There are no hard and fast rules as to membership, but typically the EC, US, UK, France, Germany, Norway, Sweden, Canada, Netherlands, Australia, Denmark and Finland participate.

Delivery of DFID programmes through the UN and CSOs

3.5 DFID Zimbabwe funds many organisations indirectly. Most of our programming goes through strategic partners who in turn implement their programmes through civil society organisations. For example, our livelihoods programme (Protracted Relief Programme Phase II) goes through a contracted managing agent to support the work of 19 NGOs.
3.6 The UN and CSOs continue to be vital partners. Parts of the UN family, especially UNICEF and WFP, have offered effective and practical ways of working to respond to critical needs, ranging from food aid to essential drugs and chemicals to ensuring safe drinking water. They have national coverage and are able to negotiate access in politically challenging situations. The UN remains the largest manager of DFID funding, as they are for most other donors active in Zimbabwe.

3.7 In the past we have questioned whether the UN could be more vocal about the humanitarian situation. UNICEF and the WFP have responded well to the humanitarian crisis and continue to respond to DFID and other donor evaluation processes. About half of our programme will be delivered through the UN in 2009–10.

3.8 CSOs enable donors and UN agencies to reach out to communities across the country and to the poorest within those communities. Zimbabwean civil society organisations also have an important role in strengthening state accountability. This includes protecting the human rights of Zimbabwe’s citizens, supporting their participation in key decision making processes, strengthening the media and doing more to monitor state performance. Key priorities include the Constitution-Making Process, media, Parliament and the next elections.

3.9 There are several funding channels which contribute to these objectives alongside the main DFID programme. We support civil society in Zimbabwe through our central funding channels—(i) the Civil Society Challenge Fund (CSCF), (ii) Programme Partnership Agreements (PPAs) and (iii) the Governance and Transparency Fund (GTF). We also support civil society from the Country Office through the Africa Conflict Prevention Pool and a Gender Support Programme.

3.10 Close working between DFID, the FCO, HMT and MoD is also vital for the success of UK government efforts. In Zimbabwe, all departments are focused on supporting the country to implement the GPA and improve the lives of the poorest and most vulnerable people. Since moving into the joint compound in April 2009, relations have become even closer and more integrated. The Ambassador, Head of DFID and Defence Attache office work together on the shared agenda and staff freely share information and seek input across departments. In London, DFID staff work very closely with the FCO Zimbabwe Unit, HM Treasury, the Cabinet Office and No. 10 guided by a cross-Whitehall strategy agreed and monitored by the National Security International Relations and Development Cabinet Sub-Committee (NSID).

Role of International and Regional Financial Institutions: World Bank, IMF, African Development Bank, and of the EC

3.11 World Bank and AfDB engagement is limited by Zimbabwe’s arrears to both banks. As Zimbabwe begins a process of credible re-engagement, both institutions are stepping up their involvement. The World Bank acts as the secretariat of a Multilateral Development Trust Fund (MDTF), managing technical study and assistance funds agreed in multi-donor sector groups. A second MDTF mechanism focused on major programme funding will now enable donor funding to flow into infrastructure investment, using World Bank procedures to ensure funds are allocated and implemented effectively. These funds will be mostly targeted at critical poverty reducing and growth enhancing investments (eg water supplies and possibly energy) where the World Bank is especially well placed.

3.12 The AfDB is also now engaging in Zimbabwe, providing technical assistance and some funding to critical areas. It is especially well placed to support more politically sensitive areas, for example in supporting Zimbabwe’s capacity to manage its external debt and developing an effective approach to this challenge.

3.13 Zimbabwe’s IMF voting rights were suspended over arrears. Zimbabwe’s recent positive direction of economic policy implementation and re-engagement with the IMF create a concrete prospect for voting rights to be restored soon. The IMF has partially lifted the ban on technical assistance to Zimbabwe and started providing some limited assistance since May 2009, and has subsequently developed an effective relationship with the Ministry of Finance. This is an initial step towards a formally approved IMF programme. This would be important in providing a signal on Zimbabwe’s commitment to sound economic policy and would help build confidence between government and donors. We are discussing this prospect with Board members and IMF staff, to ensure that the conditions for a successful programme are right.

3.14 The European Commission including ECHO is one of the three major donors in Zimbabwe, alongside USAID and DFID, that has been continually active over the last decade. The EC also ensures that funds do not pass through government systems. The EC has been a particularly valuable partner in the health sector for DFID, and been well placed to play an important role in donor re-engagement of the education sector.

3.15 The Global Fund for AIDS, TB and Malaria has approved three rounds of funding to Zimbabwe. However, implementation has been challenging. The capture of Global Fund resources by the RBZ taken out of local bank accounts in early 2008 ($14 million in total, returned in late 2008) led to the freezing of Global Fund resources. The situation has now been resolved and Ministry of Health, donors and other stakeholders are working hard to ensure these critical funds flow more effectively in future. DFID is now one of the two donor representatives on the Global Fund Country Coordinating Mechanism (CCM).
4. DFID’s Contribution to the Provision of Humanitarian Aid

Need, how aid will be spent, coordination and remaining flexible for the future

4.1 Analysis suggests that humanitarian assistance will continue to be needed in Zimbabwe for at least two more years. The impact of failed policies—including chaotic land reform, economic mismanagement and collapse, the erosion of basic services and the general challenge of erratic rainfall—has been hunger, and disease outbreaks, coupled with the inability of the most vulnerable to access life-saving services.

4.2 Wherever possible, DFID Zimbabwe is providing multi-year funding to respond to predictable hunger and vulnerability. Examples include the wide-ranging Protracted Relief Programme—which helps people to grow food and meet basic health, education and other social costs (see Figure 3)—and support for IDPs through the International Organisation for Migration (IOM). Where necessary, DFID Zimbabwe has also responded quickly to sudden onset emergencies: in 2008–09 up to 36,000 were displaced by post-election violence, over seven million people received food aid, and there were about 100,000 recorded cases of cholera.

4.3 In a deteriorating environment, there will need to be a greater emphasis on direct humanitarian assistance while in an improving environment we will use more social protection interventions.

Direct humanitarian assistance  Social protection

Deterioration  Improvement

4.4 DFID works closely with other humanitarian agencies and donors to develop a shared understanding of humanitarian need through the Common Humanitarian Assessment Process and Consolidated Appeals Process (CHAP and CAP). Progress and emerging need is monitored through the Humanitarian Country Team/Donor meetings. DFID is also supporting the UN to improve coordination.

Food security and UK’s humanitarian assistance

4.5 Last year’s hungry season in Zimbabwe was an extraordinary time and the UK gave WFP £9 million to respond to the growing food crisis in the country and avert a major disaster. WFP and its cooperating partners effectively assisted more than five million people per month in both February and March 2009.

4.6 Most food-security actors agree that WFP adapted well to this highly volatile environment and learned valuable lessons. It was able to address perceived needs and increase logistical operations to deliver massive amounts of assistance in a relatively short timeframe. DFID’s contribution to the operation allowed WFP to swiftly pre-position food as the Programme began to scale up activities.

4.7 Food availability has improved since last year following a good harvest, an end to the Grain Marketing Board monopoly on importing cereals into the country, dollarisation of the economy and availability of donor-funded agricultural inputs. Extensive humanitarian support will remain critical to avoid the erosion of livelihoods and protect the health and nutrition status of the vulnerable. DFID funding of £4 million for WFP operations in Zimbabwe this year will contribute to food aid for up to 1.6 million people.

Water, sanitation and cholera and UK’s humanitarian assistance

4.8 Zimbabwe’s cholera outbreak between August 2008 and July 2009 was on an unprecedented scale. In total, there were nearly 100,000 cholera cases with nearly 4,300 deaths of which more than 60% were at the community level (not in a hospital).

4.9 In early 2008 in anticipation of waterborne disease outbreaks, DFID Zimbabwe released £1 million to UNICEF for the procurement and pre-positioning of IV fluid and water tablets. This enabled NGO partners to rapidly respond to cholera and other disease outbreaks and improve water and sanitation hygiene (WASH) provision at clinics and health facilities.

4.10 A further problem during the cholera crisis last year was the very low number of health workers still going to work. Spiralling hyperinflation rendered their pay meaningless and a basic salary did not even cover transport costs. In response, DFID Zimbabwe led a process to establish a national Health Workers Retention scheme that paid health workers a US$ allowance that enabled nurses and other essential health workers to return to their clinics. The retention scheme was joined in early 2009 by several other donors and was then taken over by the Global Fund.

4.11 New cases of cholera began to appear again in September 2009. By 13 December, the total cumulative caseload stood at 146 cases and five deaths. By comparison, this time last year, there were 17,908 cases and 877 deaths. The situation is encouraging although the humanitarian community remains cautious as the rainy season will continue for many more weeks.
4.12 This year (2009–10) there was a big push by the international humanitarian community to carry out preventive rehabilitation work on the water systems and to get supplies in place early to minimise the worst effects of another cholera outbreak. The GoZ has also put $17 million directly into targeted water and sanitation rehabilitation works primarily in Harare and surrounding areas.

4.13 As part of this general effort, the UK gave £4.7 million to UNICEF in advance of the rainy season in early October 2009. This will supply safe water and access to sanitation services for the most vulnerable population groups. UK aid is being used to:

— improve water and sanitation services through emergency rehabilitation interventions;
— enable urban councils to provide equitable water services to all residents;
— ensure health institutions, schools and communities in most “at risk” districts have access to reliable water, sanitation and hygiene;
— increase coverage of critical Non-Food Items (see above) to prevent the spread of cholera; and
— prevent the spread of cholera and other diseases through improved environmental health risk management.

4.14 Ultimately, long-term predictable investment is needed to increase the number of households with safe water and access to sanitation and to decrease the incidence of waterborne disease. DFID Zimbabwe is planning a significant investment to move from emergency preparedness and response this year to transition and long-term recovery in future years. This will complement the water, sanitation and hygiene support already provided to rural communities through DFID’s other basic service programmes.

4.15 The UK is also providing life-saving health services for vulnerable people including the provision of essential medicines to all 1,300 primary care clinics and rural hospitals in the country. Since it began, the Emergency Vital Medicines Support Programme has absorbed £15 million from the UK and about as much again from ECHO, Canada and Ireland. Combined with the Health Worker Retention Scheme, the two programmes have ensured that Zimbabwean health facilities are open and functional across the country.

Internally Displaced Persons and the UK’s humanitarian response

4.16 More than 1.5 million people have been displaced by the policies of the GoZ since 2000 (including the Fast Track Land Reform from 2000 to date and Operation “Murambatsvina”—drive out trash—in 2005) and also by post-election violence since 2008. Despite the establishment of the Inclusive Government, farm invasions continue today and the risk of displacement for remaining farm-worker families remains a serious concern.

4.17 DFID Zimbabwe has had a programme with IOM Zimbabwe to provide emergency humanitarian assistance to IDPs and humanitarian assistance at border crossing points since 2006–07. DFID extended this programme in May 2009. It will now run until March 2010 and its total value is £6.5 million (with £1.5 million of that provided in 2009–10).

4.18 IOM continues to be at the forefront of responding to new displacements and emergencies. IOM has also developed an impressive multi-media information campaign, which appears to target accurately the groups identified as most likely to become potential migrants. The Beitbridge centre was established in May 2006 and by the end of May 2009, it had assisted 320,000 returned migrants.

5. Effectiveness and Impact of DFID’s Support for Delivery of Basic Services

State of basic services in Zimbabwe

5.1 The ability of the Inclusive Government to deliver quality basic services to its people is weak following years of underinvestment and turmoil. The challenge of rebuilding basic services is massive and far exceeds the public purse available. Basic service-related MDG indicators for Zimbabwe are currently a mixed bag (paragraphs 1.12 to 1.15).

DFID interventions

5.2 DFID Zimbabwe has been a major donor in the provision of basic services for many years, working through the UN and other providers (such as Crown Agents) and, when feasible, with GoZ line ministries. Basic services account for over 43% of the UK aid programme in 2009–10. Additional support is provided through other programmes with basic services elements such as those in the humanitarian portfolio (for example, IDP health services or water and sanitation in cholera response or through our broader programme for OVCs).

5.3 Over the last 15 years, we have made a significant and sustained investment in health including the prevention and treatment of HIV and AIDS. Health related services account for the vast majority of our basic services spending (about £25 million). The next section of the memorandum (section 6) looks specifically at the results and impact of our health funding. In 2009, DFID Zimbabwe also entered the education sector through a joint fund managed by UNICEF.
Figure 2
ACTIVE DFID ZIMBABWE BASIC SERVICES PROGRAMMES IN 2009–10

Health related
— Expanded Programme of Support for HIV and AIDS.
— Saving Maternal and Newborn Lives Programme.
— HIV and AIDS Behaviour Change Communication.
— Emergency Malaria Indoor Residual Spraying.
— Health Worker Retention Scheme.
— Emergency Health Support (hospital infrastructure).
— Programme of Support to Orphans and Vulnerable Children.
— International Organisation for Migration which includes HIV.

Education related
— Support to the Multi-Donor Transitional Education Fund.

Water and sanitation related
— Emergency cholera response, cholera prevention and longer term water and sanitation system rehabilitation in both urban and rural areas.
— Protracted Relief Programme Phase II for saving and building rural livelihoods. (See Figure 3)

Further detail on DFID basic services programmes

Education
5.4 By early 2009, the education sector in Zimbabwe was in crisis. The sector suffered from high staff attrition and poor teachers’ salaries, which were insufficient to cover even transport. The number of teachers more than halved from about 120,000 to less than 60,000. On top of this, education was severely disrupted for much of 2008 because of political violence, some of which was actively targeted at teachers, as well as disrupting normal community life for several months.

5.5 On joining the Inclusive Government, the MDC initiated foreign currency allowances ($100) to all civil servants, including teachers. This has had a positive effect on the education system and it is now showing some early indications of revival and most schools are open and functioning again, although at diminished capacity. The new minister has wrestled his way to a reasonable schedule of fees and levies (although with insufficient monitoring) and enrolment is now up again.

5.6 In the summer of 2009, DFID Zimbabwe, along with many other donors, agreed a new level of involvement in the education sector in Zimbabwe. We are spending £1 million in 2009–10 to provide technical advice and seed funding to a pooled financing mechanism called the Transitional Education Fund. The fund’s objectives are to support procurement of education commodities (textbooks, exercise books, classroom furniture, etc) and technical assistance and to provide funding for a strong education technical expert based within the EC to guide, influence and inform policy developments in this neglected sector.

5.7 UNICEF manages the fund and our other partners are the EC, Australia, Germany, Sweden, New Zealand, the Netherlands and the World Bank. Additional donors are expected to join in 2010. The fund is just getting started. Amongst other things, it will provide textbooks and learning material to 5,300 primary schools across the country. We will assess the impact of the fund after its first year.

Vital Medicines
5.8 By 2008, national procurement of adequate medicines was impossible for the Ministry of Health and Child Welfare. The situation had become a serious humanitarian crisis with under-funding and erosion of essential health services and an exodus of health professionals. There was a huge shortage of essential supplies and equipment. DFID Zimbabwe began an emergency programme to procure and distribute essential drug supplies to stock health facilities across all districts in Zimbabwe. This is now a two year programme worth £11.5 million (plus an additional £5 million in 2009–10) that helps meet national health policy goals with a particular focus on the needs of under-fives and women and the prevention and treatment of transmissible diseases.

5.9 The Emergency Vital Medicines programme has become the main vehicle for providing basic medicines and surgical supplies in Zimbabwe. Other donors are ECHO, Canada, Ireland, Netherlands and Australia. The programme has been instrumental in ensuring a basic supply of drugs and sundries are available at all 1,531 health facilities in Zimbabwe and especially at rural health centres and district hospitals. In combination with the Workers Retention Scheme, the two programmes are underpinning access to life-saving services by poor people in Zimbabwe and have kept health services functioning at a very difficult time.
5.10 UNICEF manages the programme and their reports indicate that the programme has successfully led to increased stock in most parts of the country and that stocks of vital medicines are improving. Morale, patient attendance and perceptions of quality are also strengthening.

Emergency Health Support

5.11 In the spring of 2009, the Deputy Prime Minister’s office appealed to DFID for funding for a specific programme of work to improve referral hospital infrastructure in six key hospitals, including the larger cities of Bulawayo, Masvingo, Harare and Mutare. Health services in key referral hospitals were compromised due to lack of key equipment and damage to infrastructure in theatres, laundries, boiler rooms, kitchens and mortuaries. This short-term investment should quickly yield visible improvements. We will contribute £1 million over 2009–10. Crown Agents is managing the project which is due to complete in the spring of 2010.

Emergency Malaria Spraying

5.12 Malaria is the third leading cause of morbidity and mortality in Zimbabwe, after HIV/AIDS and tuberculosis, with over two million people suffering from this preventable disease annually. The most vulnerable are under-lives, pregnant women, the elderly and people living with HIV and AIDS. Improved treatment with new malaria drugs procured through the Global Fund should lower the mortality rate further whilst the roll out of bed net programmes will improve prevention.

5.13 The bedrock of Zimbabwe’s national malaria prevention programme though is indoor residual spraying which is estimated to avert up to four million cases per year and over 1,000 deaths. This year the Ministry of Health has secured $750,000 (of the total cost of $1.5 million) from the Treasury, which is an excellent sign of their commitment and strong prioritisation of this programme. USAID, which funded $1 million of the costs last year (alongside DFID contributions), is unable to support the programme this year so DFID has met the other half of the need.

6. Impact of DFID’s Funding for Health and HIV and its Support for Orphans and Vulnerable Children

6.1 DFID’s programme has had significant impact in recent years, ensuring that:

— the health system in Zimbabwe is still largely functioning and each clinic retains a basic complement of staff, drugs and services. People in Zimbabwe still have access to basic health and HIV services, despite the near collapse of government in late 2008;
— access to anti-retroviral treatment continues to increase and has been increasing for the last five years;
— malnutrition rates in children across Zimbabwe remain below emergency levels in every district despite the economic and political turmoil;
— contraceptive use continues to grow and unmet demand is shrinking: birth spacing is one of the main components in reducing child mortality and saving mothers’ lives;
— and HIV prevalence continues to decline mainly because of behaviour change across the population.

Monitoring, Evaluation and Measuring Impact

6.2 The drive for clearer and more robust evidence of results has meant that impact assessments (or impact evaluations) are playing an increasing role in our monitoring, enabling DFID to assess more effectively how projects or programmes make a difference and how cost-effective they are. Impact evaluation provides a rigorous assessment of the impact of a development intervention on the lives and welfare outcomes for poor people, including what changed and why—a process that is critical to lesson learning especially across different countries.

6.3 A review of our health portfolio earlier this year found that without DFID support the following key health-related impacts would be severely compromised.

— Strong national prevention messaging backed by voluntary counselling and testing and condoms via Population Services International. Condom use has grown substantially through social marketing, which has complemented public sector provision. Part of the reduction in the prevalence rate of HIV in Zimbabwe can be attributed to this long standing programme.
— Rapid scale up of Anti-Retroviral Therapy (ARV)—DFID provides close to 30% of the ARVs, which save 40,000 lives a year.
— Provision of essential drugs—as the largest funding partner, the majority of essential drugs distributed through the public health sector are provided by DFID. Without this funding, the public health sector would not have enough basic essential drugs to prescribe.

— The process to ensure the return and retention of health workers, which DFID led. By October 2008, health services were close to closure, with many hospitals physically closed. The retention scheme enabled these facilities to re-open in January, and by February 2009, they were almost fully functional.

**DFID support to HIV and AIDS prevention, care, treatment and mitigation**

6.4 DFID Zimbabwe has two multi-year programmes that specifically and singularly target HIV and AIDS. These are our Behavioural Change Communication programme and our participation in the Expanded Support Programme for HIV and AIDS.

**Behaviour Change Communications**

6.5 DFID funds Population Services International (PSI) Zimbabwe’s HIV Behaviour Change Programme, which aims to increase adoption of safer sexual behaviour in Zimbabwe. Behaviour change is well established to be a major determinant in the reduction of HIV transmission and, ultimately, premature death from AIDS. The programme supports communication campaigns to address issues such as HIV related stigma and multiple partnerships as well as increasing HIV prevention, testing and counselling services, and availability of socially marketed male and female condoms. We are providing £22 million from 2006–11 (£4.6 million in 2009–10). USAID also fund this programme.

6.6 With well over a year remaining under the grant period, the programme is making good progress and has already met or exceeded three out of six major targets for programme outputs, including condom use, HIV testing and post-test treatment.

**The Expanded Support Programme (ESP)**

6.7 DFID participates in the Expanded Support Programme for HIV and AIDS in Zimbabwe. The ESP aims to support scale up of the national HIV and AIDS response in Zimbabwe including increased access to Anti-Retroviral Therapy through a common mechanism supported by five bilateral donors (Canada, Ireland, Norway, Sweden and the UK) who have committed over $50 million to the ESP during 2007–09. The programme is now in its third year of operation. We are contributing £35 million over five years (£6 million in 2009–10).

6.8 The ESP was established at a time when relations with the government were increasingly strained. Yet, the national plan to expand treatment with Anti-Retroviral medicines to people living with HIV was sound and consistent with international best practice. The results have been significant for the treatment of AIDS and for support to broader health services including safe blood services, laboratory support and transport, training and management. The impact of the programme on other, non-contributing donors was also significant. Having established a dialogue with national HIV and AIDS authorities, the ESP demonstrated it was possible to support national policy and public services without passing money through the government and without becoming entangled in political debate.

6.9 The recent annual review recognised that the ESP has been a significant source of funding for HIV and AIDS and has made an important contribution to the national response and delivery of HIV and AIDS services in the 16 ESP-supported districts. It recognises the ESP as an efficient and flexible funding mechanism that is well coordinated. Progress includes: a five-fold increase in numbers accessing treatment; significant increases in take-up of ARVs; and comprehensive coverage of behaviour change activities.

**Impact of DFID funding on HIV**

6.10 An impact assessment of the ESP programme is being planned for 2010 at the end of a three-year implementing period. Attribution to DFID spend is difficult but DFID was the main funder of the programme and the main driver in getting the programme established. The issue is complicated further because impact indicators such as HIV prevalence declines and numbers of HIV infections averted are difficult to attribute to specific programmes and activities. Two important factors have contributed to the decline in prevalence.

6.11 Firstly, the Government of Zimbabwe demonstrated effective leadership at a very early stage. For example, the government established the AIDS levy which set aside 3% of tax revenue to fund the prevention and treatment of HIV and they established an independent National AIDS Council with clear responsibilities and duties.

6.12 Secondly, donors have delivered sustained and consistent funding over the last 15 to 20 years to HIV prevention programmes. This has enabled behaviour change programmes (such as through ESP or PSI) to focus on consistent messaging around using condoms, reducing the number of partners, and ensuring protection during pregnancy and breastfeeding. The fact that DFID and others have made sustained investments in health, family planning, and HIV prevention over a long period is very likely to have contributed significantly to the decline in Zimbabwe’s HIV rates.
**DFID support to maternal health**

6.13 DFID is working with our partners to reduce maternal and infant mortality. This programme aims to protect the lives of mothers and newborns, especially those affected by HIV and AIDS and to maintain access to family planning services (including contraceptives) and to life-saving obstetric services and newborn care. DFID Zimbabwe is investing £25 million over five years (£4.85 million in 2009–10).

6.14 Despite challenges, the programme has made progress in improving procurement of commodities, increasing mother to child transmission (PMTCT) services, influencing national policy and programming (eg around user fees).

**DFID support for Orphans and vulnerable children**

6.15 DFID contributes £22 million to a multi-donor Programme of Support for Orphans and Vulnerable Children (OVCs) in line with Government priorities. The total pooled fund is worth $85 million. Our funding is for the period 2006–10 and is managed through UNICEF to implement the National Action Plan for OVCs helps these children, plus those who are vulnerable because of other factors (such as abuse and neglect, economic hardship, displacement).

6.16 Examples of results to date are below:

- By July 2009 a total of 353,409 children had been reached: 185,893 girls, and 167,516 boys.
- By the end of the second year of the project, 205,000 children, who otherwise would have missed school, accessed education.
- In 2009–10, we expect to see a surge in OVCs accessing school, with over 700,000 children accessing schooling through the roll out of the BEAM (Basic Education Assistance Module). Through this system, school fees are paid directly to schools.
- 4,243 children have been issued with birth certificates so far. The purpose is to boost birth registration in Zimbabwe, which has declined from 74% in 2005–06 to only 37% in 2008–09 but is essential for children to gain access to basic services like schooling.
- With no inflation challenges, we expect that BEAM will ensure that around 700,000 vulnerable children will be able to access education in the 2009–10 school calendar year without having to pay school fees.

**Impact of DFID funding for OVCs**

6.17 An exercise to assess the impact of the programme on reducing the overall vulnerability of OVCs in Zimbabwe is planned for March 2010. The impact assessment will focus on three particular areas:

- the emerging impact of interventions on children as well as number of children being reached by UNICEF and its partners;
- an analysis of the cost effectiveness of the different approaches to reduce children’s vulnerability; and
- an analysis of the different approaches to reduce the vulnerability of OVCs in Zimbabwe to identify the specific benefits of different approaches together with their strengths and weaknesses. This will highlight opportunities, challenges and lessons learned for the design of a future programme.

**7. Support for and Strategies for Rural Development and Land Reform**

**Rural development and safeguarding livelihoods**

7.1 DFID Zimbabwe’s flagship community development programme is the large and successful Protracted Relief Programme which is now in its second phase (PRP II). It aims to reduce poverty and protect livelihoods by supporting poor and vulnerable households. The PRP reaches 54 out of 60 rural districts and also targets the most vulnerable in urban centres. Managed through a coordinating unit which provides technical and programmatic oversight, it is made up of 27 technical and implementing partners. Together with their stakeholders they provide a dynamic and wide-ranging package of livelihoods support, food security, water and sanitation support and social protection, including support to the chronically ill.

**Figure 3**

THE PROTRACTED RELIEF PROGRAMME II

The PRP II began in 2008–09, following on from the first phase PRP, and will continue until 2012–13, with the UK contributing £54.8 million. In 2009–10, our contribution is £14.5 million. PRP II became a multi-donor programme in 2009 as other donors came onboard. It now includes Australia, Denmark, Norway, Netherlands, European Commission and World Bank who together will contribute at least £24 million over the lifetime of the programme, most channelling their funds through DFID for implementation.
The goal is to reduce extreme poverty in Zimbabwe and the purpose, to prevent destitution and protect and promote the livelihoods of the poor and most vulnerable. Phase II aims to reach two million people (approximately 15% of the country’s population) in peri-urban and rural areas.

In Zimbabwe last year 2008/09, this programme helped:

- nearly two million of the poorest people to grow more food;
- one million of the poorest people get access to clean water;
- 700,000 urban poor people with food vouchers, shelter and access to education; and
- distribute agricultural inputs to 200,577 households.

7.2 This planting season, the programme will reach 375,000 poor and vulnerable households with fertilisers, maize seed, seeds for small grains, and legume seed. The package received is designed to be appropriate to the specific locality and aims to enable a household to meet most of its food needs for the following year. The PRP coordinates closely with the FAO and other donor support to ensure close to national coverage and limit geographical duplication of similar schemes. The FAO estimates that a total of 742,000 households will be reached with seed and fertiliser packages this season between the PRP and other donor funded interventions. This has ensured the poorest 50% of rural households will benefit. As a result, dependency on humanitarian assistance should be further reduced over the next year, and it will enable rural communities to start rebuilding their livelihoods.

7.3 Finally, PRP II makes a significant investment in water, sanitation and hygiene (WASH) interventions. A minimum of 500 new water points are being installed each year, working with the community and local district technicians to help ensure maintenance is also in place. Rural schools and clinics benefit from sanitation provision, as do some particularly vulnerable households. The programme supports health clubs, which have been shown to be effective at encouraging sound hygiene and health practices, working where possible with village health workers and government environmental health technicians to help ensure a more sustainable impact.

Land reform and UK policy

7.4 The UK has made clear to the Government of Zimbabwe its concerns over continued farm invasions by ZANU(PF) supporters since the formation of the Inclusive Government, which contravenes the SADC ruling of November 2008 and the terms of the GPA. The seizure of many of the few remaining commercially productive farms exacerbates Zimbabwe’s capacity to return to sustainable economic growth and provide critical employment opportunities. The Zimbabwe Government’s refusal to protect property rights will also deter regional and international investors just when Zimbabwe most needs to rebuild its economy. Above all, violent invasions demonstrate a lack of respect for the rule of law and we have urged the police and judicial authorities in Zimbabwe to take action.

7.5 The UK has taken a consistent position on land reform. We have always emphasised that reviving the commercial agricultural economy will be an important part of Zimbabwe’s recovery although we recognise there are many ways to do this. We have always expressed our willingness to work with other donors to support a fair, pro-poor and transparent process of land reform. We would be willing to consider supporting this process as part of the wider recovery package assuming it would be designed to provide broad based recovery. We have not agreed, though, that the UK should accept responsibility for compensation.

Land and agriculture background

7.6 Zimbabwe inherited a dual agrarian structure from Rhodesia, with two distinct agricultural systems: a commercial farming sector, which was predominately owned by Zimbabwean white ethnic minority, and a traditional (communal) agriculture farming sector. Funded in part by donors including UK ODA, the Zimbabwean government made some attempt at land reform programmes mostly in the mid 1980s transferring around 9% of total rural land to re-settled farmers through a “willing buyer—willing seller” approach. The UK alone provided £40 million in the 1980s, of which £3 million was returned to the UK by the Government of Zimbabwe. Beneficiaries of these earlier schemes remain in place, referred to as “old resettlement areas”.

7.7 In February 2000, the Fast Track Land Reform Programme (FTLRP) was launched ostensibly to address the inequitable distribution of land once and for all. The FTLRP was initially designed to ensure a maximum size of land ownership which did not discriminate on racial or political grounds. In practice, implementation of the programme was neither just nor sustainable, and the ensuing occupation of thousands of commercial farms was at a high cost to the economy and the people in general.

7.8 Since the onset of the FTLRP over 200,000 farm workers have lost their jobs. Including families and dependents, over one million people have been displaced from commercial farms and total commercial agricultural production has more than halved.

7.9 Land remains a highly emotive issue in Zimbabwe and this often obscures objective analysis, policymaking and implementation. Land distribution at independence was unequal and unsustainable. Following the FTLRP, distribution remains unequal, although more for political than historic reasons.
Moving forward on land

7.10 Land and agriculture remain the backbone of the Zimbabwean economy and are central to any recovery strategy. Commercial agriculture prior to Zimbabwe’s current political and economic crisis was the largest formal sector employer in the country. The smallholder sector is critical for ensuring food security and poverty reduction and has potential for greater economic productivity.

7.11 In Zimbabwe, much of the prognosis for agriculture is tied up with the broader political questions of when Zimbabwe will make the transition to a democratic, technocratic Government that protects the rule of law. As long as access to land remains a politicised issue, it is impossible to envisage a viable policy to start returning production in the commercial farming sector towards 2000 levels. The smallholder sector that is interdependent with the commercial sector has been neglected by government in the wake of erratic land reform policies, despite its potential to contribute up to 70% of the country’s cereal production.

7.12 The encouraging signs of recent progress under the inclusive government, particularly on economic reform, hold out the prospect for deeper DFID engagement on land issues. The GPA commits the Inclusive Government to undertaking a comprehensive land audit. Donors are broadly positive about this.

7.13 Assuming a regime which genuinely wished to increase production levels and has the political will to put appropriate policies in place, a recovery programme for commercial farming could be set out containing the following elements, some of which have already happened:

— a completed land audit as part of a process leading to a constitutionally guaranteed, saleable form of land tenure;
— the return of the rule of law and the resuscitation of institutions providing appropriate land administration services;
— market liberalisation: the positive impact on the ground seen over 2009 has been very substantial, though constraints remain (credit, marketing, etc); and
— government and, where appropriate, donor support to help the sector recover—albeit avoiding subsidies.

DFID’s role in supporting reform

7.14 Options for deeper engagement are being considered in a number of different forums. Key issues in current discussions include:

— how to handle the multi-farm ownership issue that is holding any process back;
— how to handle expectations on compensation and restitution; and
— and the importance of a land audit being part of a wider process, rather than a stand-alone event.

7.15 DFID, with other donors, will consider proposals from the Inclusive Government, with discussion on a potential land audit being an immediate potential step. In the meantime, DFID continues to engage with structures developed for support to agriculture. DFID is a key member of the Agriculture sub-group chaired by the Netherlands, which meets as part of the World Bank’s Multi-Donor Trust Fund mechanism and is supporting analysis and discussions on land as well as the wider agricultural sector.

8. Zimbabwe’s Relations with its Regional Neighbours and their Impact on Economic Recovery and Development

8.1 The Zimbabwe economy and international relations are tied into the region in three main ways: firstly, by the prominent political role played by Zimbabwe in regional institutions such as the Southern African Development Community (SADC), and the Common Market of Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA); secondly, through trade links facilitated by these institutions; and thirdly, by significant outward migration from Zimbabwe to the region.

8.2 Since independence in 1980, Zimbabwe has played a prominent role in both SADC and COMESA. Until the end of Apartheid in 1994, Zimbabwe was the de facto regional centre in Southern Africa and a very wide range of businesses, NGOs and media organisations were headquartered in Harare. Most have moved to South Africa thereby diminishing the role of Harare in the region considerably.

8.3 Over the past 10 years, Zimbabwe’s trade volumes have significantly declined. South Africa is now overwhelmingly the main trading partner—absorbing 31% of trade—followed by the EU (12%), while other SADC countries represent a relatively small 8%. The EU is the only trading partner that imports more from Zimbabwe than it exports.

8.4 Over the past 10 years, Zimbabwe has seen consistent and large emigration flows, especially to neighbouring South Africa and the United Kingdom. Estimates of diaspora figures suggest at least three million Zimbabweans were living abroad at the end of 2007—roughly one person in each household. These figures increased as the economic crisis and political violence reached its peak in 2008. South Africa has the
biggest population of Zimbabwe emigrants (with an official estimate of just over one million though the real number is likely to be significantly higher), followed by the UK (200,000–300,000) and Botswana (100,000–300,000). Emigration is particularly concentrated among high-skilled populations, with surveys indicating that 82% of emigrants hold a formal qualification and 38% holding a first degree or higher.

8.5 The large Zimbabwean diaspora is playing a crucial role in providing financial flows into the country. Estimates suggest remittance flows are between $500 million and $1.3 billion a year (14% to 38% of GDP, funding approximately one quarter to a half of Zimbabwe’s imports). This places Zimbabwe amongst the highest recipient of remittances in Sub-Saharan Africa as a percentage of national income.

8.6 Close economic and political links are shaping SADC and especially South Africa’s involvement in Zimbabwe. South Africa is providing $35 million a year in aid directly to the budget. Most importantly, South Africa facilitated the mediation effort that led to the signing of the GPA.

8.7 As the guarantor of the GPA, SADC has shown little inclination to put pressure on ZANU(PF) to implement the agreed actions. The decision by MDC-T to disengage from the Inclusive Government in October 2009 prompted the more direct involvement of President Zuma, leading to a SADC Summit in Maputo on 5 November. The MDC-T subsequently agreed to re-engage with the Inclusive Government.

8.8 The 6 December SADC deadline for progress on GPA implementation lapsed without agreement on the way forward but the South African facilitation team remains engaged. South Africa considers instability in Zimbabwe a domestic South African problem, given the large Zimbabwe diaspora in RSA and the social implications of further migration. The continued proactive involvement of South Africa is the best hope of a successful transition.

January 2010

Written evidence submitted by Dr Steve Kibble

ASSESSMENT OF THE GLOBAL POLITICAL AGREEMENT (GPA)

“The government must give as much attention to securing human rights reforms as they are to seeking economic resources. There seems to be no sense of real urgency to bring about human rights changes on the part of some government leaders. Words have not been followed by effective action.” (Amnesty International Secretary-General Irene Khan, 18 June 2009 at a press conference in Harare.)

“The … detention of our party treasurer, Roy Bennett, has brought home the fiction of the credibility and integrity of the transitional government. It has brought home the self-evident fact that Zanu-PF sees us as a junior, fickle and unserious movement” Morgan Tsvangirai on 16 October announcing that his party was boycotting the Inclusive Government. Guardian (UK) 17 October 2009

PREFACE

I was asked to produce this paper as background comment on the current situation rather than addressing directly the concerns of the IDC re DFID’s humanitarian assistance to Zimbabwe.

INTRODUCTION

On 11 February 2010, we will have had nearly one year of the “Inclusive (or Unified) Government” (IG/GNU) following the signing of the “Global Political Agreement” (GPA); the context remains, however, the militarisation and “militia-isation” of the Zimbabwean state often referred to as a “silent military coup” under the control of the Joint Operations Command (JOC). The political environment is rocky, the economy has only partially restabilised and the humanitarian situation is precarious. In late January 2009, Zimbabwe’s Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) succumbed to the relentless pressure from regional heads of state in the Southern African Development Community (SADC) and agreed to become part of an “inclusive government” with Robert Mugabe’s ZANU-PF. The GPA, signed in September 2008, after the post-electoral violence of April–June 2008 that led to this government was far from the desired outcome for the vast majority of Zimbabweans. It was hailed by the SADC summit a few days later as “problem solved”, but the GPA effectively “rewarded” ZANU-PF by offering it a seat in government despite

1 See “Bennett imprisonment unacceptable” Zimbabwe Lawyers for Human Rights. Press statement 15 October 2009
3 Although it is not uncommon for states to undergo these processes they manifest themselves in a very particular way in the Zimbabwe context in terms of deployments into certain sectors of the state, and the role that key military figures have played in big business, especially as it relates to primary extractive industry
4 There are two factions—one under Prime Minister Morgan Tsvangirai and a smaller one under Deputy Prime Minister Arthur Mutambara. The latter, however looks to be in a fractured state—“MDC-M splits into 3” The Zimbabwean vol 5 (33) 20–26 August 2009
overwhelming evidence of their responsibility for the violence. Additionally the GPA is a very badly drafted document, and in the context of the problems facing Zimbabwe (especially on human rights violations and related security sector reform needs) is replete with omissions. Most analysts agreed that it lacked a timeframe, was riddled with contradictory statements and laid up as many problems as it solved, as indeed has become apparent. Issues of political control were left undecided which gave the opportunity for Mugabe to sow division amongst his opponents—something at which he is adept.

Morgan Tsvangirai’s installation as Prime Minister on 11 February 2009 meant legitimacy was restored to Robert Mugabe as president of Zimbabwe and raised the possibility of the end of targeted “sanctions” and an injection of Western capital into the country’s beleaguered economy. MDC and civil society activists feared that if Mugabe and his party achieve these three things, there will be little to reverse the trademark tactics of attacking and undermining the MDC and civic associations through kidnappings and extra-judicial killings (including “car accidents”) and assassinations, imprisonment on trumped up charges and intimidation particularly in the rural areas as part of the strategy to retain power at whatever cost. It is noteworthy here that the tragic car accident that killed Morgan Tsvangirai’s wife Susan on 6 March 2009 triggered immediate fears that this was another attempt to assassinate the new Prime Minister given that there had been four previous attacks on him.6 Recent reports of arrests of members of civil society, journalists, human rights activists, lawyers and MDC officials continue to undermine rule of law, the building of a democratic space and public confidence in the political process. A South African delegation was in the country in early December 2009 to try to help break the deadlock in the “unity talks”, but there was little optimism of an early breakthrough.7The biggest problem is that despite an undertaking in the GPA to deal with violence and perpetrators, despite the overwhelming amount of empirical evidence in this regard, impunity continues to characterise the situation and there is no sanction on the use of these tactics. While levels of violence/intimidation have reduced, a recent survey suggests that requisite levels of fear and related immobilisation will be maintained.8

WHAT IS THE GPA? 

The GPA was essentially an uneasy compromise between the two MDCs and ZANU-PF, and resulted from: the weakening of the former single ruling party, ZANU-PF, and the opposition, the weakening of the support base—civil society and trades unions—of the MDCs; the rapid spiralling down of the economy allied to a disastrous humanitarian situation; pressure from SADC, especially after the flawed presidential election second round of June 2008; and growing international isolation of the Mugabe regime. The GPA provided an opportunity for ZANU-PF to maintain its repressive, kleptocratic and economically bankrupt rule and attempt through the MDC to reverse economic decline and normalise its international relations. The MDCs, by contrast, entered the agreement as their only possible viable route to power, and to begin a process of national political and economic revival, but also, no doubt, for some a chance to enjoy the rewards of office.

GPA PROBLEMS AND SADC

The major MDC faction (MDC-Tsvangirai)’s partial disengagement from the IG on 16 October 200910 signalled the fragility of the GPA and the lack of political will by parties for genuine change.11 The pullout was in response to the failure of ZANU-PF to live up to its signed commitments in the GPA and the lack of pressure up till then nationally or regionally (on the guarantors of the GPA) to implement the agreement. According to the human rights organisation Sokwanele which monitors GPA progress in its November 2009 report,12 ZANU-PF was responsible for 89% of the violations of the GPA. The Southern Africa Development Community (SADC), as guarantor of the GPA, urged all parties to respect the deal and to

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5 Essentially the document is an amalgam of ZANU-PF “anti-imperialism” concerns over land, sovereignty, external interference and “sanctions” with MDC concerns over a new constitution, national healing, the role of traditional leaders, youth militias, prevention of violence, a new constitution, and political freedoms.

6 See The Zimbabwean vol 5 (10)12-18 March 2009 on no-one at the funeral believing it was an accident


8 MPOI survey from May 2009 (results released in Sept) found over 80% of Zimbabweans have not demonstrated or protested, and nearly 60% said they never would

9 The background to the GPA is of SADC attempting negotiations from 2007, a process widely seen as flawed under the auspices of Thabo Mbeki. For the text of the agreement see www.nimd.org/document/807/zimbabwe-agreement

10 As is often the case, terminology is a minefield. Local terminology refers to a Government of National Unity (GNU), whereas purists insist it is really an Inclusive Government as essentially the MDC was invited to join the ZANU-PF government, and is certainly far from the transitional government first talked of by the MDC

11 The pullout was not unexpected with dissatisfaction with the failure to deal with a gamut of outstanding issues relating to the implementation of the GPA (13 months after the deal had been designed). Disengagement was designed to ensure more robust SADC intervention. It is a moot point on the extent to which this has materialised with the removal of the Mbeki team, the establishment of a new team, the acceptance of the January 2009 SADC declaration about the outstanding issues

12 Sokwanele ZIG Watch November 2009 newsletter@sokwanele.com
engage in dialogue before mid December.\(^{13}\) There was then a slight pull back from gridlock as MDC-T signalled on 6 November 2009 that it would return to working with ZANU-PF. After agreeing to rejoin the IG Tsvangirai gave his “partners” in government 30 days to address outstanding issues.\(^{14}\) The SADC Troika urged that:

> The GPA parties should fully comply with the spirit and letter of the agreement and SADC Summit decisions of 27 January 2009; the parties should not allow the situation to deteriorate any further; the parties to engage in a dialogue in order to find a lasting solution to the outstanding issues towards the full implementation of the GPA; the Facilitator (the Republic of South Africa) on behalf of the Troika should remain seized with the developments on the implementation of the GPA; the Troika should continue monitoring the progress closely and report to the Chairperson of the SADC Organ Troika on Politics, Defence and Security Cooperation; and the international community to lift all forms of sanctions on Zimbabwe.\(^{15}\)

The Troika meeting also decided that;

> The political parties signatory to the GPA should engage in dialogue with immediate effect within fifteen (15) days not beyond thirty (30) days; the dialogue should include all the outstanding issues emanating from the implementation of GPA and SADC Communique of 27 January 2009; the Facilitator should evaluate progress and report back to the Chairperson of the Organ on Politics, Defence and Security Cooperation.\(^{16}\)

There was a follow-up SADC Troika meeting in Maputo in mid January 2010, which Mugabe attended but not Tsvangirai.\(^{17}\) Despite supposedly 16 of the GPA outstanding 27 issues having been agreed, none of them are at the core of the power-sharing dispute.\(^{18}\) Indeed ZANU-PF claims, somewhat improbably, to have fulfilled their side of the bargain and charges that MDC has failed to get “sanctions” lifted—something that is of course not within that party’s control. The recent ZANU-PF congress in December 2009 suggested a hardline approach, although some of that was for internal consumption.\(^{19}\)

Half the new government ministers are from Mugabe’s ZANU-PF party and Tsvangirai’s authority is restricted with ZANU-PF retaining (with the exception of Finance Ministry) the most important portfolios in terms of reflecting “power”. Mugabe chairs the cabinet; Tsvangirai a council of ministers. It is clear that a divided government is not the best mechanism for addressing the crisis (and also that ZANU-PF in particular has no ideas at all on reversing decline)\(^{20}\). Although MDC controls the finance and spending ministries,\(^{21}\) it could not win control of the police. Under the deal it shared responsibility for the interior ministry with ZANU-PF, which has already in certain cases seemed unworkable. The Cabinet sets overall policy, but Tsvangirai is in charge of government business in parliament and oversees the implementation of government policies through chairing a Council of Ministers made up of cabinet ministers, and at which Mugabe is not to be present. Tsvangirai would supposedly act as the deputy chair in cabinet meetings, but Mugabe continues to resist this.\(^{22}\) Perhaps most importantly, Tsvangirai was scheduled to be a member of the Mugabe-chaired National Security Council which supposedly will replace the JO Command, but firstly looks likely to be still composed of the senior army and police officers who directed the post March election violence and who swore they would not recognise a Tsvangirai-led government (and did not show up for the swearing into office), and secondly has met only once with no indication of the military accepting that Tsvangirai has any power over them. The possibilities for endless conflict over responsibilities and the unwieldy relationship between Council of Ministers and Cabinet allied to Mugabe’s divide and rule tactics.

\(^{13}\) Repeated in a communiqué from the Maputo Heads of State SADC meeting—“Summit also noted with appreciation the efforts of the SADC Facilitator in assisting Zimbabwe to fully implement the Global Political Agreement (GPA) and urged the parties to implement decisions made”. The Double Troika summit spent far longer on Madagascar. Communique of the Double SADC Troika Summit sazf@zol.co.zw 15 January 2010

\(^{14}\) But the timetable is massively behind schedule with the recent month’s delay meaning no signs of any faction being in a hurry “Mugabe in no hurry—Shumba”; “Talks to resume on political agreement” The Zimbabwean vol 6 (1) 7–13 January 2010; “Negotiators break off talks without breakthrough” SW Radio Africa 8 December 2009; “Tsvangirai’s GNU deadline expires” The Standard 6 December 2009; “Talks resume between Zanu PF and MDC formations” SW Radio Africa 23 November 2009

\(^{15}\) SADC Troika Communique, Summit Of The Organ On Politics, Defence And Security Cooperation, Article 11, 5 November 2009

\(^{16}\) Ibid, Article 12; “Zim crisis danger to World Cup” Zimbabwe Independent 11 December 2009; “South Africa’s Zuma pressures Harare power-sharing partners for results in talks” VOA Studio 7 4 December 2011; “SA’s new Zim team plays it safe” Mail and Guardian 4 December 2009

\(^{17}\) “Regional summit this week on Zimbabwe, Madagascar”. http://news.yahoo.com 13 January 2010.

\(^{18}\) Or relate to the major problems such as the security sector, media reform, but look instead at “sanctions” and “pirate” radio stations

\(^{19}\) “Zanu Congress: An exercise in futility” The Zimbabwean vol 5 (50) 17 December 2009 –6 January 2010

\(^{20}\) There is also concern about the overwhelming male predominance and the lack of ministers from Matabeleland which would help the revived ZAPU—the Zimbabwe African National Union formerly in power with ZANU-PF, but which re-formed as an independent party after the Global Political Agreement

\(^{21}\) “Zanu keeps stranglehold on Cabinet meetings” The Zimbabwean vol 6 (2) 14–20 January 2010; “Cabinet frozen as Mugabe goes on leave” nehandaaroo.com 13 January 2010. Mugabe argues that in terms of protocol Tsvangirai ranks below the vice presidents so cannot attend cabinet meetings since there will always be an acting president
made this agreement fragile even before 16 October 2009. There is no evidence that the ZANU-aligned civil servants, military or police are obeying any new MDC minister and plenty of evidence that they are being obstructive. It is even less likely that the youth militia and war veterans would do so.

The agreement pointed to the adoption of a new Zimbabwean constitution within 18 months subject to a Yes vote in a referendum. A parliamentary select committee comprising the three parties was established to guide the constitution-making process. But there are already significant differences over whether a new “Kariba Draft” should form the basis of a new constitution with substantial presidential powers or should be a more “people-driven” one as called for by civil society and some within the MDC. Despite the existence of a Constitutional Parliamentary Committee (COPAC), one of its three chairs has recognised that “a culture of fear gripping a population that has endured years of political violence.. could hamper free debate”. Tsangirai’s predicament was reflected in his statement that “this government will serve as a transitional authority leading to free and fair elections”, whereas Mugabe disagrees and considers himself to guide the constitution-making process.

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As well as the question of equality of posts within the government there is continuing violence, farm invasions, human rights abuses including in the Marange/Chidzwa diamond fields, the failure to abide by the SADC Tribunal judgement that commercial farmers were dispossessed of their land illegally, and corruption. Three days after the Troika meeting on Nov 5th, the President of the Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions (ZCTU) Lovemore Matumbo and four other ZCTU officials were arrested in Victoria Falls under the Public Order and Security Act (POSA). There also continue to be concerns over the continuing politicisation of aid under the drought relief committee, a state-appointed committee found in the country’s 63 districts, chaired by district administrators, with similar concerns over the district councils.

The SADC troika appears at least initially to have put pressure on Mugabe to stick by the GPA and acknowledge the communiqué preceding it as binding—given that it mentions his unilateral appointments of Reserve (Central) Bank Governor and Attorney-General and the appointment of permanent secretaries, provincial governors and diplomats. SADC could subsequently have mentioned his staffing the boards of government-controlled media establishments with military officers and of the ZANU-PF appointees to the parliamentary select committees with MPs known to have been involved in the 2008 election violence, and his private meetings with the supposedly demobilised Joint Operations Command (JOC).

It was on the basis of that communiqué in January 2009 that the MDC agreed to form the IG.

23 Alongside the security/military issue and the deployment of tens of thousands of youth militia into the civil service (and accompanying payroll/stipend issues), many in civil society charge that the MDC-T made a blunder by accepting (after first rejecting) the reappointment of the permanent secretaries in the various ministries. As an activist wrote to me “It effectively means that ZANU-PF apparatchiks maintain pivotal functional roles within each Ministry no matter how progressive their new Ministers are”. See “ZANU-PF working to frustrate civil servants audit” SW Radio 23 November 2009 www.swradioafrica.com


25 Although this draft was agreed by senior party members from each of the three groupings in the context of negotiations in 2007, it is now rejected by many in MDC-T. It is, however, specifically mentioned in the GPA document, which has contributed to the ambiguity around its status.

26 “We can make it a people-driven process—John Makumbe” www.thezimbabwean.co.uk 12 January 2010; “Onslaught to accompany payroll/stipend issues), many in civil society charge that the MDC-T made a blunder by accepting (after first rejecting) the reappointment of the permanent secretaries in the various ministries. As an activist wrote to me “It effectively means that ZANU-PF apparatchiks maintain pivotal functional roles within each Ministry no matter how progressive their new Ministers are”. See “ZANU-PF working to frustrate civil servants audit” SW Radio 23 November 2009 www.swradioafrica.com

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28 “Robert Mugabe has whip hand in coalition of convenience” Sunday Times (UK), 1 February 2009


31 “Rights violations, illegal diamonds exports said to continue in Zimbabwe Field” www1.voanews.com 13 January 2010; “Zimbabwe Lawyers for Human Rights” www.thezimbabwean.co.uk 13 January 2010 “Reforms body postpones consultations” Zim Online 18 January 2010. Human rights organisations have produced lists of named perpetrators of political violence who are “Constitutional Outreach” members and chairs/co-chairs of commissions set up under the GPA/IG (available from me)

32 “ZANU-PF looting natural resources www.thezimbabwean.co.uk 12 January 2010 for details of these allegations

33 The Zimbabwean vol 5 (40) 8–14 October 2009

34 “ZANU-PF” www.thezimbabwean.co.uk 12 January 2010; “UK company demands eviction of SA firms on diamond claim”

35 “Narrowly-avoided diamond sale raises grave concerns” (Zimbabwe Lawyers for Human Rights) www.thezimbabwean.co.uk 13 January 2010 “Land grab—true beneficiaries exposed” The Zimbabwean vol 6 (1) 7–13 January 2010

36 “We can make it a people-driven process—John Makumbe” www.thezimbabwean.co.uk 12 January 2010; “Onslaught to accompany payroll/stipend issues), many in civil society charge that the MDC-T made a blunder by accepting (after first rejecting) the reappointment of the permanent secretaries in the various ministries. As an activist wrote to me “It effectively means that ZANU-PF apparatchiks maintain pivotal functional roles within each Ministry no matter how progressive their new Ministers are”. See “ZANU-PF working to frustrate civil servants audit” SW Radio 23 November 2009 www.swradioafrica.com

37 “Second TV station for Zimbabwe” The Zimbabwean vol 5 (48) 3–9 December 2009

38 “Private meetings ‘worst violation’ of GPA” The Zimbabwean vol 5 (38) 28–30 September 2009

39 “Private meetings ‘worst violation’ of GPA” The Zimbabwean vol 5 (38) 28–30 September 2009

40 “Second TV station for Zimbabwe” The Zimbabwean vol 5 (48) 3–9 December 2009
All the major players in the multiple crisis that is Zimbabwe are experiencing problems in carrying out their plans and in some cases holding on to their support—both MDCs, ZANU-PF, civil society and churches. None of the three parties in the IG, but particularly ZANU-PF (“the state within a state”40) have attempted to use the two years to put forward their strategic view or look to bring in major structural change. Although MDC were largely able to hold mass rallies from October 2009 to explain their position on pulling out of the IG, increasing (if fluctuating) levels of violence41 will undermine this and mean their supporters come under greater threat. Most of those I interviewed42 thought that MDC-T was right to join the IG but also right to suspend cooperation.43 There was a feeling that the timing had been unfortunate since one of the issues was Mugabe’s refusal to swear in Roy Bennett as MDC-T Deputy Minister of Agriculture on the spurious grounds he was facing (highly contrived) charges of treason.44 ZANU-PF attempted, unsurprisingly, to play the race card on this saying MDC were only interested in getting their white man into power.45 A legal academic thought MDC were also right not to advise SADC of their intentions to pull out as they would only have been told to stay in.46

Although MDC-T controls the Finance Ministry under the terms of the Global Political Agreement (GPA) signed with ZANU-PF, they do not have a free hand to deal with the economy. Reserve bank Governor Gideon Gono47 remains in place (although at one point he looked to be going to leave under immunity clauses and joining ZANU-PF structures48) having been unilaterally re-appointed by Mugabe to join the IG but also right to suspend cooperation.49 There was a feeling though that the timing had been unfortunate since one of the issues was Mugabe’s refusal to swear in Roy Bennett as MDC-T Deputy Minister of Agriculture on the spurious grounds he was facing (highly contrived) charges of treason.45 ZANU-PF attempted, unsurprisingly, to play the race card on this saying MDC were only interested in getting their white man into power. A legal academic thought MDC were also right not to advise SADC of their intentions to pull out as they would only have been told to stay in.46

MDC, under simultaneous pressure from ZANU-PF and its own desire to turn round Zimbabwe (and enjoy the trappings of power) has moved from being prepared to compromise on most issues to keep the IG afloat (notably on media reform49) to a more critical stance—although without seeming able to inform its base or society on general on its basic thinking and strategy. Without movement on security sector reform given a weak parliament and a strong executive, the ZANU-PF grip is unlikely to slacken, with a strategy of not changing its ways and of squeezing the opposition (it knows few other strategies). Although ZANU-PF is losing some of its power46 and its ability to pay and feed its client networks, it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that it does have a strategy—brutal but in the past an effective one—and MDC does not have a Plan A let alone B. A profound illustration of this is that MDC did not turn out to visit UN Special Rapporteur on Torture Professor Manfred Nowak51 when he was turned back at the airport on 27 October 2009 despite having been invited to enter—an invitation withdrawn at the last minute, triggering a personal invitation from Tsangrihakora, although to no avail.52

While having the disgraced former Minister for Information Jonathan Moyo53 back was thought to have been a plus for one of ZANU-PF’s faction leaders Emmerson Mnangagwa,54 the fact that the former is driving the project for ZANU-PF control is not necessarily one for the party as a whole. Although capable of Machiavellian strategies he is largely discredited and unpopular in the country, although with some

40 In the view of a local academic
41 “The MDC-T’s pullout was followed by an increase in violence and intimidation and their return to the IG saw this spike in incidents dissipate”—communication from South African-based human rights activist 16 January 2010.
42 Although certainly not the trade unions
43 An action described in Shona as “tinoirega ikaputika makatarisa” (“we will leave and let it blow up in your face”)
44 MDC Minister of Finance was also facing similar charges before being sworn in, and many people see the Bennett saga as illustrating ZANU-PF dislike of Bennett as a white former commercial farmer popular with his constituents, fluent Shona speaker and someone who spent time in prison after a fight with current Justice Minister Patrick Chinamasa following continual taunting from the latter. Latest twists in this saga are in “Judge slams prosecution in Bennett’s case” www.swradioafrica.com 13 January 2010; “Hitschmann denied access to own lawyer” www.thezimbabwean.co.uk 16 January 2010; “Bennett witness faces imprisonment” www.zimonline.co.za 14 January 2010; “Bennett trial: No proof of Hirschmann’s account” Zim Online (SA) 24 November 2009
45 “MDC officials label Mugabe a Racist” www.radiopop.com 17 December 2009
46 Although a South African analyst told me in early November 2009 that Jacob Zuma was angry at being informed of this decision by the press rather than Tsangrihakora. In general this does seem to reflect an ongoing problem that MDC-T have had with communicating effectively with SADC, the Troika & its appointed mediators
47 Frequently described as the “world’s worst central bank governor”
48 “Gono gets senior ZANU-PF position” www.thestandard.co.zw 23 November 2009.
49 As an activist wrote to me “it’s within living memory, however, that media is a luxury in Zim... The most accessible media is broadcast media, with about 50% of Zims have fairly regular access to radio and about 35% to TV. Only 6% read the papers on a regular basis and about 1% have regular access to the internet! Reaffirms the importance of other information dissemination strategies, but of the fundamental importance of freeing the airwaves’ Communication 7 January 2010
50 “Mdc cabinet reshuffle image” www.thezimbabwean.co.uk 16 December 2009
51 It is tempting to see the return of cholera and the Nowak deportation as metaphors for the health of the political process.
52 “Harare races against time as cholera resurfaces” The Standard 1 – 7 November 2009
53 “Govt deploys UN torture expert” Zimbabwe Independent 30 October to 5 November 2009.
54 “Moyo denies any role in Tsholotsho II... but secret doc details plans for new party” www.thezimbabwean.co.uk 13 January 2010 (taken from the Zimbabwe Mail), “The disturbing spectre of Jonathan Moyo” silencechihuri@gmail.com 16 December 2009
55 As a legal expert opines there is the “question of whether Moyo has an eye on a senior post—maybe the top one—but is misreading the mood that no-one believes him?” “Mugabe endorsed to remain ZANU-PF chief” Mail and Guardian 8 December 2009
political and electoral support. 55 One human rights activist thought that the return of Moyo might push ZANU-PF “over the brink” since Mugabe tends to be more cautious. Despite the state-controlled press insisting that Mugabe was acknowledged in the GPA as the legitimate head of state and was therefore the election winner, 56 his party has no legitimacy to run the country given the MDC mandate from the elections of March 2008. “ZANU-PF is bussing in people for rallies from outside on promise of maize and bank loans, but when they find there is no food people run away.” 57 Quasi fiscal extra-budget spending still continues to a lesser degree, but Gono is unable to print money as he was accustomed to. ZANU-PF appear to have miscalculated allowing MDC the finance portfolio believing it would see the lifting of “sanctions” relatively quickly and therefore access to foreign money to service the patronage networks, but this has been undermined by devices to avoid this such as the Multi-Donor Trust Fund bypassing government ministries.

The nature of what are parallel structures in government is that MDC-T control of economy means it is not releasing any money to government ministries before being approved by Cabinet. The MDC partial withdrawal of cooperation with ZANU-PF for three weeks meant that Finance Minister Tendai Biti did not attend Cabinet meetings. ZANU-PF are desperate to ensure that Gono and Attorney-General Tomana remain in post as these are crucial areas for ZPF control of some finances and the use of state security to demoralise the opposition. 58 A politics professor reckoned that if sanctions were lifted (“which hurts them personally”), ZANU-PF can retrieve their money and use it as a war chest. “$50,000 apiece could bend the country over” with a violent campaign and then elections like those of June 2008 (although of course SADC did not recognise that as free and fair). “Key members of the elite undoubtedly have that kind of money somewhere as they stopped banking in West and went to Dubai and further east”. 59

However according to a CIO contact of a human rights activist, ZANU-PF is down to its “bare bones”. To some extent this appears corroborated by the polling organisations Mass Opinion Poll and Gallup reporting that support for the former sole ruling party support has dropped to below 10% in even areas that were no-go ones for MDC. 60 The majority of the population appear to credit MDC with turning around the economy 61 and see that the former sole ruling party has little to offer (bar land and many know the problems associated with lack of inputs and the elite seizing land from new settlers). ZANU-PF’s problem is that if anything changes in key areas such as losing Gono or Tomana, it undermines Mugabe’s own support, but if there is no movement, he comes under increased regional pressure — and the region having supported him so long may eventually run out of patience. ZANU-PF will need a high level of violence to win an election but then such high levels of violence could lead to either/or SADC rejecting it and MDC refusing to participate. ZANU-PF high-handedness was also apparent in it arresting NGO leaders and turning back Nowak in the week that the SADC Troika charged with overseeing GPA progress arrived. Added to this are the conflicts between the ZANU-PF factions, 62 epitomised by the divisions inside the Harare party and over the vice-presidential succession. Either way the party conference (postponed and poorly-funded 63) showed the divisions 64 (although there was never any doubt that Mugabe would be confirmed as the only president/candidate), ZANU maybe more in turmoil than MDC, for some not so much over political differences but more between those more disposed towards political violence to solve problems and those who see the dangers. We could yet see, according to another church activist, the factions becoming a kind of “pre-warlordism”.

55 “Moyo a disgrace” The Zimbabwean vol 6 (2) 14–20 January 2010
56 The wording of the GPA is along the lines of “Robert Gabriel Mugabe will continue as president of Zimbabwe.” But one can note the tacit admission of defeat in the elections by Mugabe at the recent ZANU-PF annual congress
57 Interview with a human rights activist. November 2009
58 “ZANU plans war-chest to sponsor terror—Makumbe” The Zimbabwean vol 5 (40) 8–14 October 2009
59 The view of a Catholic social activist
60 There has to be some care in relation to this figure since over 30% of sample refused to answer who they would support. An analyst commented “when you read the rest of the survey it is evident from the levels of support for reactionary positions on political and civil freedoms etc, that the survey has between 15% and 25% who are ‘reactionary’ — of course this doesn’t mean they’re ZANU-PF supporters, but I reckon the figure is closer to 15 to 20% support — and that’s enough to cause serious problems”. Communication from south African-based activist 16 January 2010. Most activists and activists, however, saw MOP as fairly reliable pointing out that they were more or less right on the 2008 elections
61 “Govt revenue set to increase—Biti” Zimbabwe Independent 30 October to 5 November 2009
62 Perhaps epitomised by physical punch-ups between different factions in the Women’s League. See also “Mavunguro drops Muchinguri following pressure” www.thezimbabwetimes.com/?–25232 about nominations for vice-president in ZANU-PF
63 “New twist to VP battle” Zimbabwe Independent 30 October to 5 November 2009
64 Bill Watch 40/2009 bill-watch@veritas.co.zw 24 November 2009
65 It showed divisions, but it also showed how Mugabe and senior party can stage manage. “I was told that a uniformed military officer was strategically placed in every row to ‘ensure discipline’ and that dissent didn’t spill over .. the Congress also had no plenary, which is remarkable, but avoided providing any platform for dissent to arise — church activist. Interestingly most commentators have seen the ZANU-PF congress as a victory for the Mujuru faction against Mnangagwa (eg “ZANU falls apart” The Zimbabwean vol 6 (2) 14–20 January 2010), but a counter argument might be that this is simplistic and that Mnangagwa was party to this decision. ZANU-PF need a steady hand on the tiller in government and with Mnangagwa as Defence Minister and now acting Mines Minister, he can play a pivotal role there. There is an interesting and inconclusive debate over the factions not transcending fundamental areas of joint interest
The Social and Economic Outlook

Zimbabweans look to the IG to rebuild the economy, with indications of a small turnaround, but questions as to its sustainability in escaping from the interlinked political, humanitarian, HIV and AIDS, economic and social crises. The economy has shrunk by 80% since 1999—a record for a country not at war and seen disastrous land reform policies, draconian measures curbing civil and political liberties, the plundering of the economy by the government, a devastating HIV and AIDS epidemic, cholera, widespread hunger and dependency on outside food aid, a situation exacerbated by the regime in the period June-September 2008 not allowing humanitarian agencies to distribute much needed supplies of food, fertilisers or seeds. This was on the back of threats to deregister all foreign NGOs and to actually ban those working on human rights and governance issues. Zimbabwe’s once adored social services have collapsed in the face of the economic crisis and the HIV and AIDS epidemic. Zimbabwe has one of the highest HIV and AIDS prevalence rates in the world, despite a reported drop from 24.6% to 20.1% of the sexually active population in 2006, and subsequently to 15.3% in 2007. Life expectancy dropped from 61 years in 1990 to 34 for women and 37 for men in 2006 and given the unreliability of statistics since then, it may now be lower. Infant mortality is 76 per 1000 live births and under five child mortality is 123 per 1,000 live births. The 85% unemployment in the formal sector has driven tens of thousands of professionals to leave the country to find work abroad, millions of less-skilled others into the southern African region and Europe. There were announcements in March 2008 of the government seizing majority shares in all foreign-owned businesses—threats renewed in July 2008 once the international community extended and tightened personal financial sanctions against the elite (in addition to the arms ban and travel ban on named individuals). EU special measures (“sanctions”) against the ZANU-PF elite were renewed on 26 January 2009. Zimbabwe has fallen 29 places over the last decade in the ranking of the world’s poorest countries and stood as the 151st poorest out of the world’s 177 ranked countries three years ago (UNDP Human Development Report 2006). Indications are that this has now declined further. It could indeed qualify for LDC status but has until now refused to engage with relevant institutions to do so.

The MDC-T Minister of Finance, Tendai Biti as part of his Short Term Economic Recovery Programme (STERP) effectively dollarised (or in the Bulawayo area “randised”) the economy. There are now goods in shops although these are 100% imported South African and very overpriced. Employment is creeping up with capacity utilisation around 30% according to recent survey by the Confederation of Zimbabwe Industries (CZI) and with Biti having a goal of 60% by year end, although this did not occur, unsurprisingly. Some factories are either opening up or if they survived through the crisis are scaling up. This improvement in livelihoods in the urban areas is not necessarily reflected in the rural areas, where those without access to dollars are worse off and dollarisation has meant prices are three to four times higher than in South Africa. Rural poor are more or less out of the mainstream economy and are dependent on harvesting, trading, and survival. At Marymount hospital in Chinhoyi, 90% of people cannot even afford the $1 medical fee according to the local bishop. School fees rises means that the percentages of pupils at school attendance plummets to just 20% as indicated by Save the Children Fund that they would pull out of distribution if that was to happen.

Although the harvest may be marginally better this year, the need for aid is acute—with 80% of the population having been in need of food aid. Initial estimates in a crop report by the UN Food and Agricultural Organisation (FAO) and World Food Programme (WFP) are that about 2.8 million people will need food assistance until April 2010, contrary to claims by Mugabe that the country no longer needed food assistance until April 2010. Schools have now reopened but without access to dollars are worse o

66 “Zim economy shows signs of recovery” says IMF Reuters 3 July 2009, but stresses Zimbabwe needs to clear its $1.1 billion debts before it can qualify for IMF financial aid. See The Zimbabwean vol 5 (20) 23–29 July
67 “ZANU PF threatens to interfere in Relief Food Distribution” Radio VOP 2 November 2009 and the response by Save the Children Fund that they would pull out of distribution if that was to happen
68 Amnesty International reported on 25 July 2007 that the standard of living was at its lowest level for thirty years and it has declined substantially since then
69 “Final push to remove white farmers” SW Radio 18 February 2009; “Farmers under siege” The Standard 16 January 2010
70 “Zimbabwe journalists urge new minister to improve media environment” www.apanews.net 18 February 2009
71 “Daily cholera update and alerts” available from WHO
72 “School attendance plummets to just 20%” The Zimbabwean vol 5 (1) 8–14 January 2009. Schools have now reopened but not yet universities
73 www.unicef.org/infobycountry/zimbabwe_statistics.html
74 Even diplomats are struggling with some not having been paid for five months and being forced to live in the embassy. “His Excellency Mr Moonlighter” Mail and Guardian (SA) 23 February 2009
75 “South Africa struggles to cope with Zimbabwe refugees” www.voanews.com 18 February 2009
76 “Zimbabwe’s brain drain gathers pace” The Zimbabwean vol 5 (2) 15–21 January 2009; “65% leap in Zim asylum seekers” Cape Argus (SA) 11 January 2009
77 Council Common Position 2009/68/CFSP obtainable from European Commission website or Official Journal of the European Union. “Sanctions” will be up for renewal on 20 February 2010
78 Zimbabwe is amongst countries not measured in the Human Development Index 2008, although it comes at 117 in the 135 countries on the Human Poverty Index. hdr.undp.org/en/media/HD%202008_ENTables.pdf . 2009 also does not have Zimbabwe listed due to lack of data
79 Although precisely what capacity utilisation means in this context might be a little unclear
80 “Bumper Harvest eases Zimbabwe food shortage” The National (SA) 23 February 2009
81 “Aid agencies reject food claims” The Zimbabwean vol 5 (40) 8–14 October 2009
82 Zimbabwe listed due to lack of data
reappearance. The collapse of the health and sanitation infrastructure had made it impossible until the IG to bring the disease under control. Major hospitals had almost closed down due to staff exodus and unavailability of drugs.

The new government has as a priority unlocking overseas aid, needed for rebuilding the shattered economy. Western diplomats in Harare pointed out that development aid hinges on economic and political reform, but donors are only too familiar with the long history of Mugabe reneging on agreements. Foreign donors from the IMF to the EU suggest they are on standby with a rescue package for economic recovery, including lifting the targeted “sanctions” and pumping in $1 billion in aid that is estimated to be needed if the new deal is implemented and appears to be working, with $8.6 billion being the estimate for economic recovery over the next five years. The IMF is prepared to offer limited technical (rather than any kind of budgetary) support for the first time since 2003. Major funding will not, as funders made clear during Tsangirai’s June/July 2009 tour of Western Europe and USA, occur until there is a political will and ability to break decisively from disastrous previous policies; the investment attraction is limited within a context of little liquidity globally and probably many better opportunities.

The United States and Britain, Zimbabwe’s biggest aid donors, are reportedly unhappy that the deal leaves Mugabe in charge of security and the military and that he re-appointed Gideon Gono as head of the central bank. Britain provides £40m of emergency aid each year to Zimbabwe. That could be increased to £200m overnight if it is decided that Tsangirai’s premiership will bring progressive government. Gordon Brown reportedly told Tsangirai that the national unity government must pass a series of stringent tests to allow international donors to treat it as an “ordinary country,” and step up efforts to secure the long-term recovery of the ravaged Zimbabwean economy. Key measures include the immediate release of political prisoners; moves towards greater freedom of the press; the opening of talks with the International Monetary Fund and other bodies about an economic recovery plan; and a “road map” towards fresh elections. How quickly the agreement can help address the concerns of ordinary Zimbabweans, desperately searching for food and survival, is extremely unclear. Tsangirai did obtain increases in humanitarian aid—USA gave $73 million, although not directly through the government. Germany pledged €30 million (for improvements in health, farming and the education sectors) and Britain announced an extra £5 million in transitional aid, bringing the annual total to £60 million.

Biti acknowledged that the country had debts of $5.7 billion, 150% of the GDP, although there was some talk from the IMF Director for Africa of writing off some of Zimbabwe’s multilateral debt. Gono can no longer print money to fund the war machine and elections but is still in place. Credit is very limited and banks are still operating on short lease lending. The battle between Gono and Biti over who controls the IMF special drawing rights of $510 million and how to use them continues with Biti claiming in Parliament in late October that he had “sole authority” over the deal. An IMF team visiting in October 2009 also reported that the Reserve Bank has continued to finance “quasi-fiscal projects,” eroding state
coffers and meaning that the RBZ was $38.6 million short of assets required to bail out banks in any liquidity crunch. They were also gloomy about "the macro-economic outlook for 2010 [as] subject to significant uncertainty" although it could record a possible 3% growth due to commodity exports increases. The IMF also noted that despite Zimbabwe promising in April 2009 to meet its quarterly loan payments to them, nothing had yet been received.

Outside investors are still very cautious, despite some interest and some delegations visiting. As well as uncertainty about stability and violence, there is concern around the economic indigenisation strategies of the government. The head of an international development agency in Harare told me about a visiting trade delegation from his country were welcomed by Vice-President Joice Mujuru but were advised not to invest in land—given the "land reforms" (and continuing invasions with farmworkers being thrown off the land)

"so where would we build anything—in the sky?" was their response. As shown in its response to the World Bank, the IMF, and USA Prime Minister Morgan Tsvangirai, and the visit of the European Union delegation to Harare on 7 September 2009, the international community (aside possibly from the Chinese) is not going to provide significant financial aid and support until there is a demonstrated return to the rule of law, respect for property rights and freeing of the media.

HUMAN RIGHTS CONCERNS

There was some initial scaling down of the violence directed against civic and opposition members from the extreme repression of 2008. However, "despite the signing of the … GPA… little progress has been made in the protection and promotion of human rights in Zimbabwe as seen by the sustained levels of violence from month to month… Some reports received by the Human Rights Forum indicate that ZANU-PF bases that were used as places to torture and main supporters and purported supporters of the MDC during the electoral violence. Some were placed in an operational or re-activated. The harassment and intimidation of human rights and MDC activists was persistent". Additionally the Sokwanele Newsletter notes in its Zimbabwe Inclusive Government Watch of 6 July 2009 (with similar reporting in the September and November reports) "violent and unconstitutional invasions and seizures of property and farms, harassment and deprivation of freedom of individuals through contrived arrests on spurious charges, wanton politically motivated violence, deprivation of the rights to freedom of speech and association and deliberate misinformation by senior public figures".

The National Security Council met for the first time in July and apparently has met once subsequently in late November/early December, but to little avail. The council supposedly replaced the Joint Operations Command (JOC), a pillar of Mugabe’s previous regime which brought together the army, police and intelligence chiefs. There has been continued intolerance of any views contrary to those expressed by the previous ZANU-PF government with major denunciations in the state-controlled press and with Mugabe continuing his tirades against the West at the signing of the GNU agreement and subsequently. Hate speech continues in the state-controlled media with the "The Herald" very splenetic when the MDC pulled out of IG and with the Zimbabwe Broadcasting Corporation at that time referring to Tsvangirai as the opposition leader. Despite promises of media reform no licences for independent daily newspapers or local radio have yet been issued such as for the proposed NewsDay. Many ask what is the point of the MDC

95 Let alone repay the money taken from NGO etc bank accounts by Gideon Gono
96 “RBZ continues quasi-fiscal projects” Zimbabwe Independent 30 October to 5 November 2009
97 “Zimbabwe fails to pay IMF” The Zimbabwean vol 5 (38) 24–30 September 2009
99 There was disagreement between the Prime Minister and Minister of Finance (both MDC-T) over whether or not Zimbabwe leveraged a loan of $5 billion and $950 million credit line from the Chinese government. See Reuters 3 July 2009 “Zimbabwe to re-evaluate all mining contracts”
100 Peta Thornycroft “Donors sidestep Zim’s tainted central bank” Cape Argus 5 July 2009
101 And the arrest in October 2009 of the leadership of the National Association of Non-Governmental Organisations (NANGO) despite the presence of an MDC minister at their AGM
102 Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO Forum “Political Violence Report May 2009”
103 Sokwanele ZIG Watch no 6 July 2009 newsletter@sokwanele.com The 4 August and 8 November issues contains similar charges. See also David Smith “A new beginning! Food in the shops and functioning hospitals, but the beatings go on” The Guardian (UK) 10 August 2009. ZIG Watch November (Issue 10) reports “Despite Robert Mugabe’s outrageous claim to the contrary, Sokwanele has logged an incredible 3,850 breaches of the GPA by Zanu PF since the start of the ZIG Watch project, making this party responsible for 88.5% of all breaches.” See also the Civil Society Monitoring Mechanism for similar analysis. One can additionally note that although civil society has reported many such violations, it has been unable to get an audience with SADC or the facilitators—there are some hopes that the new team might be more sympathetic.
104 Although this is disputed
105 See www.herald.co.zw. Even though according to the MOU hate speech is not supposed to occur, there are still instances of this, including Mugabe’s speech on Heroes Day 11 August 2008. The Zimbabwean vol 4 (32) 14–20 August 2008. See also “Mugabe still scares the hell out of ZANU-PF politicians” The Sowetan 19 September 2008. for latest see “Mugabe ups hate speech” The Zimbabwean vol 5 (27) 9–15 July 2009. Similar rhetoric was employed against EU and UK over the weekend of September 2009 before the EU visit (the first for seven years) to Zimbabwe. “President Robert Mugabe on Friday lashed out at Western sanctions against him, condemning “bloody whites” for meddling in Zimbabwe’s affairs, on the eve of a landmark European Union visit. “Who said the British and the Americans should rule over others? That’s why we say down with you. We have not invited these bloody whites. They want to poke their nose into our own affairs. Refuse that,” AFP 11 September 2009 “We have not invited these bloody whites.”
106 Senior Zimbabwe official admits media laws restrictive” www.zimbabwejournalists.com 20 November 2009; “New Zim paper to debut online before print” TechCentral (SA) 8 December 2009
parliamentary majority if it cannot bring in legislation for media freedom and repeal repressive legislation such as the Public Order Security Act (POSA) and Access to Information and Protection of Privacy Act (AIPPA)—widely used to crack down on any dissent.107

Given the problems that ZANU-PF is facing as outlined above, it is not surprising that its response is militaristic. It is widely alleged that the arms from the Chinese ship108 did eventually arrive but never went through any armoury, and are thus available for use. There are parallel allegations of arms thefts allegedly to frame the MDC from Pomona barracks in October 2009 in Borrowdale, Harare and subsequent raids on their houses—a trademark ZANU-PF strategy seen in 2007 and 2008 (and with similarities to the last years of apartheid). An undisclosed109 number of soldiers have been tortured in connection with this and several are reported to have died under interrogation. Since then, a member of the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC), Pascal Gwezere, has been arrested, allegedly tortured, and charged with the theft.110

There is no evidence that the JOC (still meeting despite its supposed disbandment) has any intention of abandoning its strategies of maintaining its power, its sources of revenue and is determined to avoid international or domestic prosecutions for human rights abuses.111 The JOC’s main focus will be on winning elections with the youth militia (“Green Bombers”) being mobilised under the control of the senior military as the shock troops for a ZANU-PF victory.112 As ZANU-PF has more or less destroyed the education system it now has available and pliable youth at its disposal. Their use of targeted violence against specific groups and specific areas, as in the Operation Mavhoterapapi attacks in Mashonaland after March 2008, but also before shows that there is a strategic purpose and organisation in this being driven by JOC114 and that senior military and police officers … are involved in on-the-ground operations of the militia.115 One can also note the refusal of the police to deal with such “political” incidents, especially from the early 2000s onwards.

A report from the Auditor-General report said that 10,000 youths were employed contrary to the constitution with 30,000 being employed in other areas—security sector, park rangers and even teaching (without expertise). There are also the reports that much militia pay is unaccounted. New settlers intimately tied into ZANU-PF’s client networks on land seized from commercial farmers are also reportedly being recruited. Their land is often next to communal areas and a human rights activist put their threats against them this way “MDC will take land off you and we will if you don’t do as we say”.116

Zimbabwe has a high level of violence117 and patriarchal attitudes are extremely harsh on women, There are still 40,000 girls raped annually before they turn 17 according to the Girl Child Network.118 Rape is also reported to be used as a political weapon.119 The legacy of nine years of abuses against Zimbabwean citizens still has to be addressed. An estimated 25,000 people have been the victims of human rights abuses, along with 200,000 displaced, endemic torture, beatings and murders. It is already clear that there will be great difficulties for the MDC-T in ensuring that the Ministry of Home Affairs, the police, army and CIO can be brought under the effective control of all parties to the inclusive government agreement.119

In terms of lack of media freedom, recent survey material demonstrates that majority of Zimbabweans believe that the “sanctions” are actually hurting ordinary Zimbabweans and the economy at large and not “targeted”—comment from South African based human rights activist

107 The subject of a regional and international campaign against unloading such arms which had substantial success
108 120 is a figure that has been mentioned and a human rights defender alleged that they had confirmed that three were dead
109 “MDC official Wins Bail, but Still in Custody” www.thestandard.co.zw 23 November 2009; “State invokes Act to Keep MDC transport manager in Custody” www.radiovop.com 20 November 2009. Morgan Komichi, deputy organising secretary of the MDC, told IRIN that Gwezere’s arrest was part of “short— to long-term strategy” by President Robert Mugabe to destabilise the MDC. “What we are witnessing is a ZANU-PF tried-and-tested strategy which has been used since the 1980s, so that they can crack down against our party [MDC]. Searches [by the police and military] have already been conducted at one of the houses of senior party officials in Harare, while the transport manager [Gwezere] was kidnapped and now faces charges of stealing the guns,” Komichi said. “My interpretation of the development is that there is collaboration, especially from the military, who are [allegedly] behind the break-in; who, in the event of a constitutional referendum or election, would use the guns to terrorise people,” he said. “If, as is expected, the MDC wins the next election—if it is free and fair—we could see the emergence of armed people with roots in ZANU-PF who would create an unstable environment for an MDC government.”110
110 “The Mugabe regime has moved swiftly to stop all investigations into murders committed by Zanu (PF) www.thelowdown.co.zw 15 February 2009
111 Although there appear to be a fallback by MDC supporters who were attempting to regain properties stolen in 2008 during the anti-MDC electoral violence. www.zimonline.co.zw 24 February 2009
112 “Dogs of war still prowl” Mail and Guardian 11 December 2009; “MDC accuses ZANU PF of rolling out terror campaign” www.swradioafrica.com 20 November 2009; “80,000 complete youth service: minister” www.newzimbabwe.com 24 November 2009; “Thugs ransack homes in anti-MDC attack” The Zimbabwean vol 5 (1) 8–14 January 2009; “ZANU thugs bomb MDC homes” The Zimbabwean vol 4 (49) 11–17 December 2008. One can note that after low-ranking soldiers rioted in Harare after being unable to get their own money out of the banks, there are reports that military disa
113 “ZANU thugs bomb MDC homes” The Zimbabwean vol 4 (49) 11–17 December 2008. One can note that after low-ranking soldiers rioted in Harare after being unable to get their own money out of the banks, there are reports that military disa
114 “Thugs ransack homes in anti-MDC attack” The Zimbabwean vol 5 (1) 8–14 January 2009; “ZANU thugs bomb MDC homes” The Zimbabwean vol 4 (49) 11–17 December 2008. One can note that after low-ranking soldiers rioted in Harare after being unable to get their own money out of the banks, there are reports that military disa
117 An activist writes “Survey results indicate that over 10% of Zimbabweans have been directly affected (i.e. physical violence) by political violence since 1980. When extrapolated this is hundreds of thousands of people … and we know the post—99 human rights documentation shows a huge number of these occurred in the last decade”. 16 January 2010
119 See “Mukoko abducted by state security, admits minister” The Zimbabwean vol 5 (1) 8–14 January 2009

109 human rights documentation shows a huge number of these occurred in the last decade”. 16 January 2010
POINTER TO THE FUTURE

There was a period of quiet immediately after the GPA and the swearing into office of the IG—although abductions of opponents continued and violence and intimidation were still common in the rural areas. ZANU-PF now feels more in charge and violence and violent rhetoric are on the increase—contrary to the terms of the GPA. With the inability of MDC to force major decisions through the IG, it has become apparent that any problems there are not technical but political. Mugabe retains control of the military and intelligence ministries and the whole system of governance (“organised chaos”) from the JOC downwards to ZANU-supporting civil servants and security forces is geared to maintaining the old regime’s rule at whatever cost.120 Faced with the refusal of the West to remove personal sanctions against him and other members of the ZANU-PF elite (as well as the opinion polls referred to above showing ZANU-PF support running at 6%), Mugabe has recently upped the “anti-imperialist” rhetoric.121

MDC now appears to be coming to terms with its previous optimistic hopes that once there is a return to orderly administration and the rule of law, power will leak away from the JOC. Tsvangirai seems to realise that the task of trying to assert his authority not only to ensure he can control Mugabe’s ministers, but to reassure foreign donors who have laid down rule of law and respect for property rights as a precondition for funding to revive Zimbabwe’s wrecked economy122 is extremely difficult. Tsvangirai has talked of “parallel forces” at work and blatant defiance of the power-sharing agreement. Among other things, he accused Mugabe of reneging on a promise to release dozens of imprisoned civic and opposition activists. Money is unlikely to be forthcoming while farms are being confiscated, a fact Tsvangirai acknowledged, saying land seizures are “undermining our ability to revive our agricultural sector and restore investor confidence.” But the perpetrators, farmers’ groups say, are allies of Mugabe. Mugabe himself has a number of farms and has talked of clearing out all the last remaining 300 white-owned farms. There were worries that Tsvangirai on his 2009 European and North American tour could play down the invasions, as well as attacks on his own members and supporters as isolated incidents.

There are a number of immediate tasks in both winning international confidence and, more importantly for the wellbeing of ordinary Zimbabweans, in bringing change for the majority. Humanitarian agencies need to have unrestricted access to the up to seven million Zimbabweans who desperately need emergency food supplies.123 While the ban has been lifted for humanitarian if not human rights NGOs to operate, NGOs still face harassment and bureaucratic delay, and Mugabe has on occasion again threatened to ban NGOs.124 Secondly the repressive legislation restricting freedom of assembly and speech, the Public Order and Security Act (POSA) and Access to Information and Protection of Privacy Act (AIPPA) needs to be immediately repealed.125 Thirdly there will need to be restoration of the rule of law, commitment to the democratic process and timely elections and respect for human rights, with some commitment to security sector reform.126 Fourthly there needs to be assessment of how the key elite personnel should be dealt with.

AN ACTIVIST AMPLIFIED THIS IN THE FOLLOWING WAY:

“a) Given the evidence of recalcitrance and refusal shown in the hardline stance at the December 2009 ZANU congress, Chihuri [chief of police] refusal for an audit of the Police numbers/personnel, the blocking of Morgan [Tsvangirai] visiting prisons and the Attorney Generals further contempt of law, and courts, all of which point to the need for the security sector to be monitored, restrained, brought under democratic/civilian control;

b) The vital importance of a successful land audit AND post audit policy, not least because around 30% of polling stations for a referendum or future election are on “farm land”. This means the need for donors/HMG to support i) the principle and policy ii) practicality of bringing Mozambican, Tanzanian, South African land reform experts and experienced workers to assist in the audit and the planning of followup to the audit;

c) Need to see media law reform not just as technical, but the population being able to see in the flesh/in print/on the air real media plurality;

d) Importance of supporting encouraging/resourcing the guarantors, including the AU here, towards mechanisms such as international monitoring—implementation of GPA—presence (beyond diplomats and the fifth estate);

e) recognise the likelihood of both constitution and national healing processes being stalled/hijacked—eg the principle that “true national healing” can only come about when the political party representing the interests of victims of violence has a dominant role in the national process”. One should have a fallback position in terms of the Constitution that at the very least (if the full constitution process is impeded) progress means creating adequate conditions for a “democratising election” (Nigerian concept)—ie changes in media
conditions, in security and safety, and in electoral practicalities such as the voters roll, ID documents, given that the current UNICEF estimate is that 60% of Zimbabweans do not have birth certificates, and therefore no ID documents. The current backlog on passports is 78,000.  

The situation is currently at stalemate, with no reason other than outside, especially regional, pressure to believe that ZANU-PF would readily implement the GPA agreement since it is entirely against their interest to have a free media, repeal of repressive legislation, reining in of the youth militia, an independent judiciary and a return to the rule of law. As elections approach, violence looks set to increase. There may be a period of intense instability including faction-fighting over the succession within ZANU-PF which could actually lead to a worsening of the repression, but also frustration at the inability of the GNU and specifically the MDC ministries to turn things around.

Necessary Short Term Indicators of Improvement in the Overall Environment (Three Months)

- Resolution of outstanding issues of the Unity Government that include appointments of key government officials and ambassadors.
- Cessation of arbitrary arrests of journalists, lawyers, trade union leaders, civic leaders, human rights activists and MDC members.
- Unconditional dropping of politically-motivated charges facing political prisoners, human rights activists and lawyers.
- Cessation of inflammatory reporting in broadcast and print media.
- Cessation of politicisation of food aid and threats to INGOs.
- Halting of fresh farm seizures.
- Respect for the Rule of Law and Court orders.
- Stop State’s interference with the Judiciary.
- Stopping of political violence.
- Disbanding of militia bases in rural communities.
- Putting in place legislative and media reform.

Recommendations to the UK Government

- To closely monitor the situation against the indicators listed above.
- To urge SADC member states to impress on President Mugabe the need for him to respect the GPA and resolve outstanding issues, as SADC is the guarantor of the GPA.
- To advocate at all levels for cessation of arbitrary arrests of civic leaders, lawyers, human rights activists and MDC officials.
- To continue in their response to the humanitarian crisis, taking due caution to ensure that aid is delivered to the beneficiaries targeted.
- To advocate at all levels to ensure that the space for humanitarian interventions remains open and safe.
- To intensify liaison with civil society groups that are on the ground monitoring progress in relation to the GPA and monitoring conditions on the ground more generally
- To advocate at all levels for repeal of repressive pieces of legislation such as the Public Order and Security Act and Access to Information and Protection of Privacy Act.
- Advocate at all levels for the Zimbabwe administration to put in place urgent mechanisms to effect legislative and institutional reforms as spelt out in the GPA.
- Advocate at all levels for the putting in place of mechanisms to safeguard and protect human rights such as the creation of an Independent Human Rights Commission as outlined in the GPA.
- To agree with EU partners to maintain the Special Measures due for renewal in February 2010 and consider extending these to include those mining companies currently operating with the Zimbabwe government in the Marange/Chiadzwa. To engage with the South African and other companies that have an interest in these companies seeking their disinvestment from such companies.

Dr. Steve Kibble
19 January 2010

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127 Information from the Director of small conflict resolution NGO in Harare 18 January 2010
128 “Mugabe will never fully implement the GPA—Atholl Trollip” www.politicsweb.co.za 17 December 2009
Written evidence submitted by Leonard Cheshire Disability

Leonard Cheshire Disability is a UK-based organisation that works in disability and development with local partner organisations in Africa, Asia and the Americas. Our inclusive education project in Zimbabwe supports up to 1,000 children with disabilities who would otherwise be denied an education to attend their local, mainstream schools. This involves facilitating teacher training to help meet all learners’ needs, mobilising communities to identify and support excluded children, and building accessible classrooms and sanitation facilities. Our other main programme in Zimbabwe supports young people with disabilities to create awareness of the UNCRPD and campaign for its ratification and implementation.

This submission highlights the severe deprivation faced by many disabled people in Zimbabwe and the need for DFID to focus on fully inclusive approaches to eliminating poverty and meeting the Millennium Development Goals. Given the priority that DFID has placed on reaching vulnerable children in Zimbabwe, it is crucial that particular attention should be given to disabled children, as well as to disabled adults who are disproportionately vulnerable. This would include the provision of basic services, and support for livelihoods, training and education.

1. INTRODUCTION

1.1 Leonard Cheshire Disability welcomes the opportunity to submit evidence to the International Development Committee’s inquiry into the assistance provided by DFID in Zimbabwe.

1.2 Working with disabled people, Leonard Cheshire Disability aims to deliver a truly inclusive approach to development and service provision within communities. We believe that the most effective way to fight exclusion from education and work, and its attendant poverty, is to provide targeted support that meets local and individual needs. Our particular expertise is in inclusive education, livelihoods, advocacy and campaigning. We also work with local partner organisations to deliver quality health and rehabilitation services. An evidence base for our policy work and programmes is provided through the Leonard Cheshire Disability Inclusive Development Centre, which is run jointly with University College London (UCL). Leonard Cheshire Disability and our partners work regularly with DFID both in the UK and in many of the developing countries in which we operate. This submission incorporates the informal views of our regional staff from Southern Africa.

2. DISABILITY AS AN INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT ISSUE

2.1 In developing countries poverty is both a cause and an effect of disability. Disabled people tend to be concentrated in the poorest sections of society and it is impossible to separate the poverty of disabled people in developing countries from the wider picture of world poverty. According to the UN, 82% of disabled people living in developing countries live below the poverty line and approximately 90% of disabled children in developing countries are not in school. However, poverty is not simply about a lack of income and education but also a denial of fundamental freedoms and rights as well as the opportunity to develop as a human being and to be included in society.

2.2 Nonetheless, disability as an issue is often ignored and was not included in the targets of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). In recognition of the fact that the MDGs will not be met by 2015 if people with disabilities are not included,130 in December 2009 the United Nations General Assembly passed United Nations Resolution 64/131 Realizing the Millennium Development Goals for persons with disabilities.131

2.3 According to the World Bank and DFID, on average 20% of the population in developing countries have some form of disability.132 Disabled people are less likely to complete primary education than their non-disabled counterparts,133 which often leads to difficulty securing long-term, sustainable employment. This situation then both reinforces disabled people’s marginalisation and exclusion and further compounds other people’s negative perceptions of people with disabilities. The plight of women with disabilities is particularly precarious, as they are even more vulnerable than other women to harassment, sexual abuse and exploitation.134

2.4 In 2009 the UK ratified the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (UNCRPD). Article 32 of this Convention requires that all international development programmes are “inclusive of and accessible to persons with disabilities”. Given the commitment that the UK Government has shown by ratifying this Convention, it is extremely important that DFID ensures that it is adhering to Article 32 of the Convention in its programme planning and implementation.

130 See www.IncludeEverybody.org, a web site illustrating how each of the MDGs is relevant to disabled people
131 http://www.un.org/ga/64/resolutions.shtml
133 A Global Report on Disability Inclusion, Inclusion International and INICO, October 2009
3. The Situation of Disabled People in Zimbabwe

3.1 Disabled people are among the most marginalised, socially excluded and poorest group in Zimbabwe. It is estimated that there are 1.4 million disabled people in the country, but this could be higher because of increasing poverty levels, the HIV/AIDS pandemic and other prevalent health conditions.

3.2 As in other countries, disabled people encounter multiple attitudinal, environmental and institutional barriers that militate against effective inclusion in society. It is a common perception within Zimbabwe that disabled people are passive and economically unproductive and, therefore, constitute a burden on society.

3.3 Disabled People’s Organisations (DPOs) in Zimbabwe are at a nascent stage of development and lack sufficient organisational capacity to play a leading role in advocacy for disabled people’s rights. Although Zimbabwe has enacted disability discrimination legislation, it has not developed the necessary administrative infrastructure for its effective implementation. Disabled people are entitled to receive disability grants, but these are not being allocated because of the country’s current economic turmoil. Zimbabwe has yet to sign the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (UNCRPD).

4. DFID’s Approach to Disability

4.1 Leonard Cheshire Disability welcomes the commitment DFID has shown towards the inclusion of disabled people in programme activities highlighted in the “How to Note” on Disability of 2007. We await developments in the implementation of this document.

4.2 Leonard Cheshire Disability would welcome the Committee’s support in examining in more detail DFID’s work to ensure that the rights of disabled people living in poverty have been considered in the planning and implementation of development and humanitarian aid programmes in Zimbabwe and elsewhere.

5. Inclusive Education as a Priority

5.1 Education is a fundamental and legal right for children throughout the world. The second Millennium Development Goal (MDG) calls for universal primary education for all children by 2015. This goal was also supported by the World Education Forum held in Dakar in 2000, which stated that Education for All must take account of the needs of the disadvantaged, including those with special learning needs, and the Salamanca Statement and Framework of Action coming out of the World Conference on Special Needs Education in 1994. This has also now been enshrined in Article 24 of the newly adopted UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities. Still we see that children with disabilities are disproportionately excluded from education and we call for DFID to address this specifically in their Zimbabwe programme, where the need for action is urgent.

5.2 People with disabilities should be included in MDG monitoring mechanisms. For example when governments report to the United Nations on their delivery of MDG targets, they should disaggregate statistics for disability. In the case of MDG2—universal primary school education—measurement tools must count how many children with disabilities are taking part in primary education.

5.3 Leonard Cheshire Disability has extensive experience of developing and successfully implementing inclusive education programmes. We are able to provide evidence of our highly successful programme in Oriang, Kenya and the education programme in Bangladesh that DFID supports, for example. If the Committee is interested in hearing more about these programmes and how they may be replicated in future DFID work in Zimbabwe, then please do not hesitate to contact us.

6. Issues Recommended for Consideration by the Committee

Leonard Cheshire Disability would welcome the Committee’s assistance in learning more details about DFID’s work in the following areas. We will also be available to provide information or support to the Committee should it decide to look into any of the issues brought up in this submission in more depth.

1. What analyses and baseline studies have been undertaken by DFID in Zimbabwe to assess the relative poverty of disabled people? Has there been an assessment of how effective DFID’s programmes have been in reaching disabled people?

2. How has DFID ensured that the rights of disabled people living in poverty have been considered in the planning and implementation of their country strategy?

137 http://www.DFID.gov.uk/Documents/publications/DisguideDFID.pdf
138 By adopting the Dakar Framework for Action. Education for All: Meeting our Collective Commitments, the 1,100 participants of the Forum reaffirmed the vision of the World Declaration on Education for All adopted in Jomtien, Thailand in 1990.
3. What steps has DFID taken to ensure its own compliance with the new UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities? In particular, what assessment has been made regarding current compliance with Article 32 on International Cooperation and what strategy is in place to achieve compliance? Leonard Cheshire Disability calls on DFID to refer explicitly to the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities in its programme in Zimbabwe and to audit existing programmes to measure social inclusion of people with disabilities.

4. How best can DFID support Zimbabwean civil society to advocate for signing and ratification of the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities?

5. What evidence can DFID provide to show that it is systematically ensuring all its education programmes include disabled children?

6. What can DFID do to encourage the inclusion of disability in disaggregation of data relating to MDG reporting?

7. How would DFID support a post-2015 development system that is genuinely inclusive?

6 January 2010

Written evidence submitted by Donald Steinberg, Deputy President, International Crisis Group

THE INTERNATIONAL ROLE IN PROMOTING DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE AND ECONOMIC RECOVERY IN ZIMBABWE

1. Thank you for the opportunity to address the International Development Committee on the challenges facing the international community in supporting democratic transformation and economic recovery in Zimbabwe. As an international non-governmental organization committed to preventing and ending deadly conflict, Crisis Group believes that Zimbabwe now has its best chance in a decade to put behind it the divisions, abuses, and self-implosion that has plagued the country. The combination of an inclusive government; a re-emerging civil society; an educated population and work force; manufacturing, agricultural and mining sectors primed for recovery; and the good will of countries in its region and beyond can help Zimbabwe open the door to post-conflict recovery. This would benefit both its long-suffering people and the broader southern African region.

2. Nonetheless, major threats could still derail the process, including the resistance of intransigent senior security officials; fractious political in-fighting, especially within the with Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU-PF); a growing gap between the political class and civil society; a battered economy unable to address a 90% unemployment rate and meet the immediate expectations for a peace dividend; and the capricious and ever-dangerous whims of President Robert Mugabe.

3. When Morgan Tsvangirai and his Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) party formed a unity government with ZANU-PF a year ago under the Global Political Accord (GPA), skeptics gave the new formation little chance of success and predicted that Tsvangirai and the MDC would fall prey to Mugabe's “divide, rule, co-opt and destroy” strategy. While even some within the MDC shared this view, others believed there was no option. Mugabe and his hard-line allies and security forces held a monopoly on force, was prepared to repress and abuse its political opponents, and had the obsequious support of most regional leaders, charged by the Southern African Development Community (SADC) to negotiate a solution to the long-standing electoral and political crisis. The MDC calculated that its capacity to affect change would be greater within government than outside it.

4. The new government started out reasonably well. Schools and hospitals re-opened. Civil servants were paid a small stipend and returned to work. As the Zimbabwe dollar was shelved, goods returned to empty store shelves. A cholera epidemic was brought under control; and a bipartisan parliamentary committee was formed to reform the constitution. Human rights activists reported a significant drop in government abuses. An ambitious yet pragmatic reconstruction program—the Short-Term Economic Recovery Programme—called for about $8.5 billion in resources, including foreign assistance and investment, and was generally well-received by foreign donors and the Bretton Woods institutions. Prime Minister Tsvangirai, Finance Minister Tendai Biti and the MDC received much of the credit for these developments—even from the rank-and-file army—and new hope returned to Zimbabwe.

5. But from early on, there were ample signs of concern. Farm seizures continued virtually unabated. While human rights abuses declined, hardline security forces continued to arrest and detain activists and MDC parliamentarians. ZANU-PF partisans Reserve Bank Governor Gideon Gono and the Attorney General Johannes Tomana were unduly reappointed, top generals boycotted the new national security establishments and showed public disdain for Tsvangirai, and ZANU-PF“ delayed or ignored key commitments under the GPA. The constitutional reform process stalled as ZANU-PF insisted that the so-called Kariba draft serve as the basis for a new constitution. Some old regime elements, especially hard-line generals and other Mugabe loyalists, actively thwarted the new government, and undermined it by refusing to implement its decisions.
THE FORMAL CHALLENGES AHEAD

6. Looking ahead, Zimbabwe faces several challenges, including completing the GPA, fashioning a new constitution, and moving toward new elections. On the GPA, there has been some positive movement since the temporary suspension of the MDC’s participation in the unity government in the autumn of 2009 and the subsequent SADC re-engagement at and since the Maputo Summit. Among these steps are the formation of national councils to address issues of the media, human rights, and forthcoming elections. The land audit may soon commence, which would not just be a surveying exercise but an attempt to lay the groundwork for addressing the most sensitive issue of land reform and ownership. There has been a decline in arbitrary and politically motivated detentions and arrests, but such actions must cease entirely and the onerous public order act (POSA) must be amended soon. The appointment of Roy Bennett as Deputy Agriculture Minister, and the regular functioning of the National Security Council in place of the infamous Joint Operations Command must take place as well.

7. The constitutional reform process must be given greater impetus as well. There is a growing recognition that this process cannot be the exclusive reserve of the executive and legislative committees, but must be a national exercise with full participation of civil society. This is essential especially to the MDC, since some worry that the party is losing contact with its popular base as civil society activists and unions have complained that this process is being driven by political elites for their own purposes. Equally positive, it is increasingly accepted that the Kariba draft cannot serve as a reference for the new constitution, as it incorporates a number of anti-democratic principles and further entrenches executive powers. The constitutional reform process seems destined to produce an acceptable draft by the end of 2010.

8. Finally, there must be preparations for new elections. Many in Zimbabwe are discussing a delay of such elections for several years, perhaps until 2013, in order to take politics out of the equation as the country faces massive economic and social requirements. Politically, many in the MDC believe that the party still has not built up enough of a record in government, and are also concerned over the military reaction to a potential MDC victory. By contrast, many ZANU-PF stalwarts worry that their party would be swept aside in new elections, with popular support now judged very low in recent polls. While it is still possible that Mugabe will dissolve the government in an attempt to catch the opposition off-guard and proceed to another undemocratic election accompanied by repression and fraud that secures his “victory”, such an approach seems increasingly less likely, given increased international scrutiny, resolve and engagement.

POLITICAL, SECURITY AND ECONOMIC CHALLENGES

9. However, even if Zimbabwe can complete the GPA, adopt a new democratic constitution and address electoral processes, the transition will face broader challenges.

10. First, there must be a maturation of the political system to ensure that the ZANU-PF and the MDC engage as both competitors in the political arena and partners in the unity government. This will be difficult to achieve, especially under the divisive Mugabe, but other ZANU-PF leaders, including a faction led by Vice President Joice Mujuru, know that their party is reeling, has lost much of its popular support, and needs a generational shift to rejuvenate its leadership. Meanwhile, the MDC knows that it must still demonstrate to the country that it is a viable custodian of the state, showing itself to be competent, clean, and capable of preserving social change since independence. It must also keep faith with its broad following by ensuring that civil society—including trade unions, human rights groups, and women’s organizations—are fully engaged in the process of governance.

11. Equally challenging are security issues. Many observers fear that a dozen or so “securocrats” hold de facto veto power over transition. This topic was so sensitive that it was not even addressed in the GPA negotiations. These generals and other senior security officials are motivated by differing factors: fear of a loss of power and its financial benefits; possible prosecution for their crimes, including Matabeleland killings in the 1980s; hatred of Tsvangirai and the MDC; and a belief that they are the guardians of the country’s liberation. Many Zimbabweans believe it is necessary to achieve their retirement, even at the cost of a “soft landing” allowing them to keep their assets and gain domestic impunity from possible prosecution. Similarly, the living conditions and salaries of the rank and file military must be improved, and security sector reform must ensure an apolitical military and police force respectful of human rights.

12. The devastated economy is an equally daunting challenge. While Finance Minister Biti has won good marks for helping restore confidence and stability to the economy, the prospects for rapid recovery are weak, given years of agricultural decline, infrastructure neglect, anti-business policies, and a weak international economy that rules out large new aid or investment packages. There is a broad consensus among labour and business leaders to reverse the negative impact of an “indigenisation” policy, formally adopt a stable foreign currency to permanently replaced the Zimbabwe dollar, ensure foreign donors that the Multi-Donor Trust Fund will be a clean and transparent mechanism for aiding the country, and secure the departure of reserve bank governor Gideon Gono, whose record of biased and tainted practices have discouraged new donors and investors.
THE RISKS OF INTERNATIONAL DISENGAGEMENT

13. During his visit to London, other European capitals and Washington last summer, Tsvangirai was met with lukewarm encouragement, much skepticism, and little cash. In addition to donors' reluctance to support a government including Mugabe, Zimbabwe's timing is awful. It is seeking massive foreign aid and private investment at a time when donors are cutting aid budgets and foreign investors are seeking safe havens in the stormy global economy. Tellingly, no one called for a “Marshall Plan” for Zimbabwe.

14. In fact, this stance risks thwarting the very changes the international community is seeking, both by weakening the hand of the MDC and moderates in ZANU-PF, and by undercutting popular support for the reform process. The humanitarian situation remains dire, with reluctant donors hard-pressed to address the demands to ward off disease and hunger. The UN and non-governmental organizations have warned of a potential new cholera outbreak ahead of the rainy season. Moreover, doctors and teachers have gone on strike off-and-on to demand real pay.

15. While the primary tasks ahead rest with Zimbabweans themselves, the international community has a vital role to play. SADC must take its role as guarantor of the GPA seriously, as it did during its meeting in Maputo in early November. In particular, the advent of South African President Jacob Zuma and his pledge to stay on top of the brief must convey the message that the region will abide no alternative to the current process. President Zuma's appointment of three of his most respected and trusted advisers to monitor the Zimbabwe account was a welcome indication that he will press a tougher stance vis-à-vis Mugabe on outstanding GPA obligations, respect for rule of law, and cessation of repressive actions by the security forces under his control.

16. The broader international community, especially the UK, U.S., the EU and China, should support and complement SADC's efforts by a careful calibration of trade, aid, and investment to encourage progress, and maintenance of sanctions on the intransigent parties. The outside world should provide new recovery and development assistance only through “clean” and official mechanisms, and new engagement from the IMF, World Bank and African Development Bank.

TARGETED SANCTIONS; TARGETED ASSISTANCE

17. The international community should stand firmly against those thwarting democratic transformation in Zimbabwe. Tough targeted sanctions against such individuals and the companies they control should remain in place to secure the commitment of the recalcitrant parties to their commitments under the GPA. At the same time, the international community must recognize and encourage changes now occurring. One tangible step would be to consider lifting sanctions of certain entities, such as the Agricultural Bank of Zimbabwe, that help revitalize key sectors of the economy without overly benefitting the intransigent parties. The U.K. and EU should make clear to Zimbabwe the specific steps it needs to see in order to lift these and other sanctions.

18. Further, targeted reconstruction and development assistance—channeled through fully transparent, credible and accountable mechanisms and institutions—is essential now. Such mechanisms exist, such as the Multi-Donor Trust Fund. The International Monetary Fund has ensured responsible use of the one-time expansion of special drawing rights to Zimbabwe equivalent to a $500 million loan for the purpose of building and repairing schools, hospitals, roads, railways and communication networks.

19. International donors should assist revival of education, agriculture, water, health and water sanitation, including support for the Government Works Program. Particular attention should be given to assisting women, including reproductive health care and girls’ education. Donors should also help empower a functioning civil service and legislature, and help reform politicized government institutions, including the judiciary. Civil society must be strengthened, given that groups of women, academics, journalists, lawyers, farmers, and others were fractured and polarized in recent years by Mugabe’s tactics. Finally, innovative programs should encourage new trade and foreign investment in Zimbabwe to address the country’s massive unemployment rate and promote the return of millions Zimbabwean migrants who are increasingly the target of xenophobic attacks in South Africa and elsewhere in the region.

BRITISH INTERESTS IN ZIMBABWE’S RECOVERY

20. At a time when more urgent and higher-profile crises fill the in-boxes of British policy-makers, it would be easy to move the slow-simmering crisis in Zimbabwe to the back-burner. Neither the MDC nor ZANU-PF consorts with global terrorists, and collapse of the unity government will not lead to jihad training camps in rural areas. Zimbabwe neither supplies nor traffics in illegal drugs, arms or persons. Its refugees are not flooding into the UK. Zimbabwe has no oil, and many of its minerals face weak global demand. No exotic diseases threaten pandemic: Zimbabwe suffers from “just” cholera, malaria and HIV/AIDS. The country straddles no sea lanes and has no pirates.

21. But there are strong motivations for broad British engagement. Just because the global effects of Zimbabwe’s implosion have so far been modest, this could change rapidly. Transnational threats incubate in unexpected ways in the hothouse of instability and weak governance. What if the H1N1 virus had emerged in Harare and swept through a country where the health infrastructure had been ravaged?
22. Zimbabwe’s recovery is of major regional importance. If Zimbabwe is a smallish country of 12 million people, the southern African region—with a market of 200 million, growing oil production, peacekeepers throughout Africa, and a location along key shipping lanes—is by contrast of great strategic, commercial and political importance to the UK. A prosperous Zimbabwe could be an engine of growth for the region, providing key links to regional communications, transport and electricity grids. Zimbabwe has long been considered a potential breadbasket for the region, based on what used to be efficient agriculture, albeit needing serious and responsible land reform and new capital inputs.

23. By contrast, instability in Zimbabwe is profoundly destabilizing to its neighbours. Zimbabweans fleeing economic hardship and political abuses have flooded across borders, overwhelming the social services and the good will of South Africa, Botswana, and other neighbours. Notwithstanding its stellar record for stability and human rights, Botswana has built an electrified fence and resorted to detention and expulsions to keep desperate Zimbabweans out.

24. Some worry that a strategy of engagement would prematurely reward Mugabe and his hard-line supporters, or somehow reduce the pressure on them to cooperate with the reform process. In truth, political engagement and targeted assistance through credible and transparent channels would strengthen the hands of moderates and make it more difficult for the extremists to again seize power.

25. Put simply: to sideline those who are thwarting the democratic transformation in Zimbabwe, the world should embrace the unity government now.

26 January 2010

Written evidence submitted by the TUC

SUMMARY

The TUC would like the IDC to bring to the attention of the DFID the need for regular consultation with the Zimbabwe trade union movement led by the ZCTU and its close associates, especially, the Zimbabwe Chamber of Informal Economy Associations (ZCIEA) and the Labour, Economic Development and Research Institute of Zimbabwe (LEDRIZ), on all its interventions and for close collaboration with them in the design, implementation and monitoring of all assistance programmes. Moreover, we would like to see:

— The expansion of DFID action beyond humanitarian relief into more development-oriented interventions including the provision of technical advice and assistance where appropriate in collaboration with multi-lateral agencies and bilateral donors.

— More resources being made available to improve the quality of essential public services, especially, health, education, water and sanitation.

— More assistance to fill in the gaps in the national multi-sectoral plan on HIV/AIDS, especially, to address the needs of vulnerable marginalised groups in the prevention of the spread of the HIV/AIDS and treatment and care for PLWHA.

— Closer DFID collaboration with the Government of Zimbabwe, the World Bank and the African Development Bank to explore the possibilities of contributing to a rural development fund to improve the welfare of the rural population:

— DFID engagement with the Unity Government with a view to supporting its efforts to re-build the economy, improve the delivery of vital public services and restore the rule of law on receipt of credible assurances from the Government of Zimbabwe on its willingness to allow the free exercise of democratic rights of all its citizens.

— Financial assistance for the implementation of clearly identified specific projects with discernible outcomes beneficial to the ordinary people of Zimbabwe.

TUC SUBMISSION

1. The TUC welcomes this opportunity to take part in the inquiry into the assistance provided to Zimbabwe by the Department for International Development, expresses its support for the current programmes and hopes that the UK Government and the international community will continue their assistance for the people of Zimbabwe in their efforts to overcome the current difficulties.
2. The TUC enjoys long-standing relations with the trade union movement in Zimbabwe, especially, with the Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions (ZCTU) and appreciates the crucial role it plays in defending democracy, good governance and the rule of law under difficult circumstances. The ZCTU, having long been at the forefront of the campaign for social and political change in Zimbabwe, was instrumental in the formation of the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) in September 1999.

3. The ZCTU has long borne the brunt of the Government’s repression of democratic opposition. The Government of Zimbabwe ratified Convention 98 in 1998 and Convention 87 in 2003, but completely disregards its obligations to observe the workers’ rights enshrined in them. Zimbabwe has attracted criticism from the ILO Committee of Experts on the Application of Conventions and Recommendations on several occasions. In 2008, the ILO Governing Body set up a Commission of Inquiry to look into the complaints on the observance by Zimbabwe of the Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organise Convention (No. 87) and the Right to Organise and Collective Bargaining Convention (No 98).

4. The TUC is currently assisting the ZCTU in its efforts to build capacity through two one-year initiatives—Women’s Empowerment, Rights Awareness and Civic Education and Parliamentary and Advocacy work. This assistance is among the programmes financed from the TUC’s Programme Partnership Arrangement (PPA) with DFID which expires in March 2011. In addition, the TUC has been instrumental in the development of purposeful relations between its UK affiliates and their sister unions in Zimbabwe through twinning arrangements, which has led to a number of mutually beneficial initiatives.

5. The Transport Salaried Staffs’ Association (TSSA) is working in partnership with the Zimbabwe Amalgamated Railway Workers Union (ZARWU). A formal twinning agreement was signed in 2010. Amongst other things, this initiative aims to build strong, sustainable links between members at all levels within both organisations. In addition to solidarity work it is also providing material support to ZARWU in terms of equipment, research, legal assistance etc. In particular, ZARWU faces many acute issues including low pay, high rates of HIV/AIDS amongst workers of the sector and the repression of union activities.

6. The National Union of Journalists (NUJ) is working in solidarity with the Zimbabwe Union of Journalists (ZUJ) in order to improve the conditions for journalists in Zimbabwe and to provide practical support to ultimately improve media freedom in the country. Zimbabwean journalists continue to face repression. NUJ branches are also being encouraged to get involved in the project to help solidify links between the two unions.

7. We have also raised awareness of the crisis in Zimbabwe in the international trade union movement, especially, within International Trade Union Confederation (ITUC) and the European Trade Union Confederation (ETUC) and made it possible for Zimbabwean trade union colleagues to have their voice heard in a number of international fora such as the Commonwealth People’s Forum in Trinidad and Tobago in November 2009.

8. In addition, we have encouraged the development of a constructive relationship between the DFID and British Embassy and the trade union movement in Zimbabwe, notably, the Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions (ZCTU) and will be pleased to support further efforts in this regard. In our view, there is considerable scope for a mutually beneficial purposeful relationship to be developed which will be conducive to the achievement of DFID objectives in Zimbabwe.

9. We are also working in close collaboration with civil society organisations like the Action for Southern Africa (ACTSA) in order to raise awareness of the crisis in Zimbabwe among the general public and mobilise support.

10. The TUC would like the IDC to bring to the attention of the DFID the need for regular consultation with the Zimbabwe trade union movement led by the ZCTU and its close associates, especially, the Zimbabwe Chamber of Informal Economy Associations (ZCIEA) and the Labour, Economic Development and Research Institute of Zimbabwe (LEDRIZ), on all its interventions and for close collaboration with them in the design, implementation and monitoring of all assistance programmes. Moreover, we would like to see:

   — The expansion of DFID action beyond humanitarian relief into more development-oriented interventions including the provision of technical advice and assistance where appropriate in collaboration with multi-lateral agencies and bilateral donors.

   — More resources being made available to improve the quality of essential public services, especially, health, education, water and sanitation.

   — More assistance to fill in the gaps in the national multi-sectoral plan on HIV/AIDS, especially, to address the needs of vulnerable marginalised groups in the prevention of the spread of the HIV/AIDS and treatment and care for PLWHA.

139 ZCTU is the national trade union centre in Zimbabwe, representing workers in all sectors of the economy. It currently has 35 affiliated unions (See Annex). The ZCTU is affiliated to the International Trade Union Confederation (ITUC).

140 Morgan Tsvangirai, President of the MDC and current Prime Minister, was the former General Secretary of the Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions.

141 More information is available at: http://www.nuj.org.uk/innerPagenuj.html?docid = 1394
— Closer DFID collaboration with the Government of Zimbabwe, the World Bank and the African Development Bank to explore the possibilities of contributing to a rural development fund to improve the welfare of the rural population:

— DFID engagement with the Unity Government with a view to supporting its efforts to re-build the economy, improve the delivery of vital public services and restore the rule of law on receipt of credible assurances from the Government of Zimbabwe on its willingness to allow the free exercise of democratic rights of all its citizens.

— Financial assistance for the implementation of clearly identified specific projects with discernible outcomes beneficial to the ordinary people of Zimbabwe.

Please find below our views on the issues raised in the current consultation.

How DFID works with other donors, multilateral agencies and NGOs to deliver assistance

11. The TUC appreciates the need to work in collaboration with other donors, multilateral agencies and NGOs and is in general agreement with the DFID approach in this regard. In line with its position on the harmonisation of policies and practices as set out in the Paris Declaration on aid effectiveness, the TUC supports the channelling of assistance through the most appropriate, specialised UN agencies and NGOs in order to ensure efficient delivery and the achievement of desired outcomes.

12. While we recognize the need for, and the effectiveness of, this strategy in the period prior to the formation of the Unity Government, we believe that there is now a need and scope for the expansion of DFID work in Zimbabwe beyond humanitarian relief and into more development-oriented interventions. We are concerned that the DFID does not appear to have any plans to provide technical advice and/or financial support in areas where, in our view, such assistance is mostly needed. Zimbabwe is in need of technical expertise on good governance, management of the key sectors of the economy, law enforcement etc. In the transition period, it is also necessary to foster the development of harmonious industrial relations through tripartite arrangements involving business, unions and government. Moreover, we think greater collaboration and consultation with the Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions (ZCTU) and its affiliates and the Labour, Economic Development and Research Institute of Zimbabwe (LEDRIZ) and the Zimbabwe Chamber of Informal Economy Associations (ZCIEA) would assist DFID achieve its objectives. It is also important that the DFID, through its close collaboration with the trade union movement, enhances the effectiveness of its programmes and reaches out to the most vulnerable sections in society and ensures that other agencies follow suit.

DFID’s contribution to the provision of humanitarian aid

13. The TUC acknowledges the significant contribution made by the DFID to humanitarian assistance to Zimbabwe and supports its continuity where necessary and appropriate. While recognising the need for channelling urgent humanitarian assistance through specialised international agencies such as the World Food Programme and NGOs, the TUC is of the view that the effectiveness of DFID interventions can be enhanced considerably through close collaboration with the trade union movement. With its membership spread across the entire informal economy, the ZCIEA is in a position to support, and enhance the impact of, DFID humanitarian action targeted on vulnerable sections in society.

14. Zimbabwe has a tradition of strong trade unions with membership in all sectors of the economy including the informal sector. The Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions (ZCTU) brings them together under its stewardship and fulfils a vital role in representing the interests, and in addressing the concerns, of working people. The TUC recommends that the DFID and its partners develop a working relationship with the trade union movement in Zimbabwe in order to improve the effectiveness of their interventions. We should like to point out that the ZCTU and its affiliates played a key role in the successful distribution of sanitary products among Zimbabwean women in the Dignity! Period campaign organised by Action for Southern Africa and supported by the British trade union movement.

15. The inadequacies of the national health system and, especially, those of primary health care were acutely felt during the outbreak of cholera and point to the need for essential medicines and improved access to clean water and sanitation. We are aware that the bulk of DFID support is focused on the delivery of basic services, especially in the health sector. In our view, more resources are needed to improve the quality of essential public services, especially, health, education, water and sanitation. While welcoming the provision of school material for the children affected by HIV/AIDS, we understand that more support is needed in terms of training of teachers to improve the quality of education.

142 ZCIEA was formed in 2002 with a view to protecting and promoting the rights and entitlements of workers in the informal sector, following the successful implementation of the Informal Economy Project by the ZCTU in collaboration with the former Commonwealth Trades Union Council (CTUC). For more information, visit http://www.zciea.org/

143 For instance, the ZCIEA could engage with the DFID on the empowerment of people with disabilities through its Disabled Desk.

144 Since the launch of the campaign in 2005, more than six million sanitary products have been distributed among women in Zimbabwe. See http://www.actsa.org/Pictures/UpImages/dignity/DignityPeriod%20update_july09_final.pdf
16. The TUC is conscious of the difficulties of working with the Government of Zimbabwe. However, we believe that it is necessary to engage the Inclusive Government headed by the Prime Minister and support its efforts to improve essential public services. The TUC shares the ZCTU view that financial support should be limited to projects with clearly identified objectives and that the disbursement should be conditional upon the satisfactory assurance of proper use.

The impact of DFID’s funding for health and HIV, and its support for orphans and vulnerable children;

17. Given the severe shortage of health professionals partly due to the exodus of nurses and doctors, the DFID and other aid agencies should support training programmes for health professionals and explore ways of encouraging them to stay in the country through salary incentives.145

18. HIV/AIDS remains a serious public health problem in sub-Saharan Africa. In Zimbabwe, the situation has been further exacerbated due to the social, economic and political crisis. A number of donors including DFID and USAID have provided substantial assistance through a network of NGOs. Nevertheless, there are significant gaps which the DFID may be in a position to fill in.

19. The DFID and other donors should consult, and collaborate with, the trade union movement to secure their cooperation in order to enhance the effectiveness of their interventions. The majority of the PLWHA, being of working age and, generally, in their prime of productivity, interventions through workplace initiatives are found to be particularly relevant, cost-effective and conducive to the protection of their employment and human rights. The unions in the health sector will be in a position to improve the quality of services and expedite their delivery to the people living with HIV/AIDS (PLWHA).

20. It is not clear whether the transport sector is included in the national multi-sectoral plan on HIV/AIDS despite its potentially critical role in the prevention of the pandemic in the country. The DFID and other donors need to include the transport sector in their programmes and work in close collaboration with the Zimbabwean affiliates of the International Transport Federation and enlist their support and cooperation.

21. So far, the involvement of PLWHA has been minimal in the national prevention strategies in Zimbabwe. The DFID and other donors should use their influence to persuade the authorities to consult the organisations representing the interests of PLWHA in the design, implementation and monitoring of programmes.

22. At present, due to the widespread prejudice in society, little attention has so far been paid to the need to prevent the spread of the pandemic among vulnerable groups—sex workers, intravenous drug users, prison inmates, gay and lesbian community etc. Donor agencies like the DFID should consider interventions targeted on vulnerable sections in society. The gender dimension of the pandemic, too, needs to be addressed, as women have to bear a disproportionately large share of the burden of care for PLWHA.

23. While appreciating the need for targeted interventions for orphans and vulnerable children where appropriate, the TUC believes that the most effective way of ensuring their safety and welfare is through an integrated approach consisting in supporting the parents’ and/or carers’ efforts to look after them. The DFID should also consider, where appropriate and feasible, targeted programmes of psychological support for the affected children, perhaps, in collaboration with UNICEF and other agencies, as psycho-social needs have so far received little attention from the authorities in Zimbabwe. The DFID should continue its support for the multi-donor Programme for Orphans and Vulnerable Children through UNICEF and NGOs.

24. We welcome more assistance to prevent the mother to child HIV transmission as an effective way of reducing the number of children infected with HIV. We also understand that the DFID is helping the Government of Zimbabwe to develop a national gender action plan and hope that both the DFID and the Zimbabwean authorities will consult and work with the trade union movement in Zimbabwe which has long been involved in the promotion of gender equality. The TUC commends the DFID support for community-based care for PLWHA and hopes that it will expand it further.

Strategies for rural development;

25. Zimbabwe continues to experience serious food shortages with harvests in recent years being particularly bad.147 The development of the rural sector is pivotal to the country achieving self-sufficiency in food.

26. Land reforms are integral to a long-term solution to the landlessness among workers and peasant farmers. The empowerment of peasants including rural women148 cannot be achieved without comprehensive land reforms being put in place with a view to distributing suitable, cultivable land among the landless. The DFID and other agencies need to work closely with the General Agriculture and Plantation

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145 DFID supports similar schemes in Malawi, see DFID Malawi Country Assistance Plan, para 131.
146 “Over 33 million people are living with HIV/AIDS. Nine out of every ten are adults in their productive and reproductive prime.” Why AIDS is a workplace issue, ILOAIDS. http://www.ilo.org/public/english/protection/trav/aids/indexmore.htm
147 The national production of maize is said to have increased by 130% in 2009 relative to that in 2008, Special Report, FAO/WFP, Crop and Food Security Assessment, June 2009.
148 “Rural women work 16 to 18 hours a day, spending at least 49% of their time on agricultural activities and about 25% on domestic activities”, Role of Women in Agriculture, Factsheet, FAO.
Workers’ Union of Zimbabwe which has played a vital role in the defence of employment and human rights of farm workers, especially, in the aftermath of President Mugabe’s disastrous land reform, leading to farm invasions and destruction of farm workers’ dwellings. Moreover, there are a number of other issues to be addressed in a viable rural development strategy.

27. The economic and political crisis has taken a heavy toll of the rural sector, further impoverishing small-holder farmers and making it difficult for them to purchase seeds, fertilizers and other inputs. Research and development has long been neglected while the extension services remain poorly resourced and do not seem to reach those most in need. Smallholders find it difficult to have access to high-yielding drought-resistant varieties of essential crops like maize and soya. The marketing of agricultural produce has been a problem in many parts of Zimbabwe partly due to the distortions introduced by the Government of Zimbabwe in a futile attempt to curb hyperinflation. Farmers have in the past been forced to dispose of their produce at artificially reduced uncompetitive prices. There is a need for appropriate advice to be made available to farmers on the production, processing and marketing at village level. There is also a need for the provision of training in modern agricultural methods including the use of fertilizers and agricultural machinery and pest and disease control for rural farmers. It is also important that the farmers learn modern methods of storage and preservation of crops.

28. Livestock farming has had many setbacks in the past few years. Some 90% of livestock farmers are said to be in dire need of financial assistance. The development of livestock farming will not only contribute significantly to the rural economy, but it will also help fulfil the nutritional needs in many rural households. Its potential for gainful employment for the rural population remains largely untapped. The development of livestock farming alongside suitable crops should be encouraged, as it will create more income-generating opportunities for rural households and provide a much-needed impetus to the rural economy.

29. The lack of affordable credit and crop insurance facilities has hampered rural development. Smallholders have not been able to make the necessary improvements to their farms in order to increase productivity and enhance the nation’s food security. Rural electrification needs to be given priority, as it will bring some of the modern comforts to the countryside. It is likely to be a potent catalyst in transforming the rural economy.

30. The DFID and other donors need to collaborate with the Government of Zimbabwe, the World Bank and the African Development Bank to explore the possibilities of contributing to a rural development fund to address at least some of those issues.

Prospects for a closer development relationship between DFID and the Government of Zimbabwe;

31. Since the formation of the Unity Government, there has been some improvement in the economic and social conditions in the country. The TUC believes that the DFID should engage with the Unity Government with a view to supporting its efforts to re-build the economy, improve the delivery of vital public services and restore the rule of law. It is, however, imperative that the DFID secures credible assurances from the Government of Zimbabwe on its willingness to allow the free exercise of democratic rights of all its citizens. Moreover, it is necessary to ensure that DFID support is used exclusively for the implementation of clearly identified specific projects and not as general budget support—a view shared and supported by the ZCTU and its affiliates.

32. We also believe that the Government of Zimbabwe should be made aware of the possibility of the UK’s role in mobilising further support from the European Union, USA and the international financial institutions for the successful implementation of any national recovery strategy which depends on substantial development assistance from external sources.

Zimbabwe’s relations with its regional neighbours and their impact on economic recovery and development.

33. The crisis in Zimbabwe has had repercussions on the relations with its neighbours, especially with South Africa, Botswana, Zambia and Mozambique. The exodus of some 2–3 million economic refugees into the countries concerned has caused some problems, creating tension in areas where they seek employment and compete with the local population for essential services. The forcible deportation of refugees has added to the tension and led to occasional outbreaks of anger.

34. Some neighbouring countries with skills shortages have benefited from the exodus of teachers, nurses, doctors and other professionals from Zimbabwe. Some of the professionals who left Zimbabwe are likely to return home when conditions improve in the home country. The dollarization of the economy and the circulation of regional currencies have given a temporary boost to regional trade prospects. The imports from neighbouring countries, notably, South Africa, Botswana and Zambia have helped ease shortages of essential items.

149 The GAPWUZ is pressing the Parliamentary Portfolio Committee on land and agriculture to investigate the violations of farm workers’ rights by the Mugabe regime.
150 See Rural Poverty in Zimbabwe, http://www.ruralpovertyportal.org/web/guest/country/home/tags/zimbabwe
151 The recent reforms have liberalised the market, resulting in the availability of food in local shops. However, the dollarization of the economy has meant that basic necessities still remain out of reach of many rural households.
35. On the whole, the relations between Zimbabwe and its neighbours have been reasonably good and stood the test of time despite numerous vicissitudes. For the moment, there is no reason for any deterioration in the near future which could have an adverse impact on development prospects.

**LIST OF ZCTU AFFILIATES**

1. Associated Mine Workers Union of Zimbabwe (AMWUZ)
2. Cement & Lime Workers Union of Zimbabwe (C&LWUZ)
3. Civil Service Employees Association (CSEA)
4. Commercial Workers Union of Zimbabwe (CWUZ)
5. Communications & Allied Services Workers Union of Zimbabwe (CASWUZ)
6. Federation of Food Workers Union of Zimbabwe (FFAWUZ)
7. General Agriculture and Plantation Workers Union (GAPWUZ)
8. Motor Vehicle Manufacturing Workers Union of Zimbabwe (MVMWUZ)
9. National Airways Workers Union (NAWU)
10. National Engineering Workers Union (NEWU)
11. National Union of Clothing Industry (NUCI)
12. Progressive Teachers Union of Zimbabwe (PTUZ)
13. Railway Artisan Union (RAU)
14. Railway Association of Enginemen (RAE)
15. Transport & General Workers Union (T&GWU)
16. Zimbabwe Amalgamated Railway Workers’ Union (ZARWU)
17. Zimbabwe Banks & Allied Workers Union (ZIBAWU)
18. Zimbabwe Catering & Hotel Workers Union (ZCHWU)
19. Zimbabwe Chemicals, Plastics & Allied Workers Union (ZCPAWU)
20. Zimbabwe Construction & Allied Trades Workers Union (ZCATWU)
21. Zimbabwe Domestic & Allied workers Union (ZDAWU)
22. Zimbabwe Education Scientific Workers Union (ZESSCWU)
23. Zimbabwe Energy & Electricity Workers Union (ZEEWU)
24. Zimbabwe Furniture, Timber & Allied Traders Union (ZFTATU)
25. Zimbabwe Graphical Workers Union (ZGWU)
26. Zimbabwe Leather Shoe & Allied Workers Union (ZLSAWU)
27. Zimbabwe Pulp & Paper Workers Union (ZP&PWU)
28. Zimbabwe Rural District Council Workers Union (ZRDCWU)
29. Zimbabwe Textile Workers Union (ZTWU)
30. Zimbabwe Tobacco Industrial Workers Union (ZTIWU)
31. Zimbabwe Urban Councils Workers Union (ZUCWU)
32. Zimbabwe Union of Journalists (ZUJ)
33. Zimbabwe Security Guards Union (ZISEGU)
34. Railway Association of Yard Operators Staff (RAYOS)
35. Zimbabwe Metal, Energy and Allied Workers’ Union (ZMEAWU)

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**Written evidence submitted by WOMANKIND Worldwide**

WOMANKIND Worldwide is an international women’s rights and development charity working in partnership with organisations around the world.

Our aim is to enable women in developing countries to voice their concerns and claim their rights and to work globally for policies and practices which promote equality between women and men.
The main focus of our work is to:

— Eliminate violence against women.
— Advance women’s status and wellbeing, through increasing their political and civil participation.
— Inform and influence policy and practice at local, national, regional and international levels.

WOMANKIND Worldwide has been working in Zimbabwe since 1998 in partnership with local and national NGOs. At the moment we are working in partnership with the Zimbabwean Women’s Lawyers Association, MUSASA Project, Women in Politics Unit and the Women’s Coalition of Zimbabwe (WCoZ). The Coalition is a network representing 56 women’s organisations.

WOMANKIND Worldwide welcomes the International Development Committee’s enquiry on DFID’s Assistance to Zimbabwe. Our response focuses in particular on DFID’s work to promote gender equality and women’s human rights in the country, as we believe this must be at the heart of any plans to reduce poverty and increase accountability. It also focuses on some recent initiatives DFID has developed in Zimbabwe, such as creation of the Gender Support Fund jointly with the European Commission.

Key Recommendations:

1. Promotion of gender equality and women’s rights as explicit goals of DFID’s strategic objectives for Zimbabwe, and set measurements to assess progress on gender equality and women’s rights in all aspects of Zimbabwe’s Assistance Plan.

2. Assess the effectiveness of the Gender Support Fund and ensure this funds women’s organisations.

3. Strengthen accountability of the government by supporting civil society and, in particular, women’s organisations.

4. We encourage DFID to put forward solutions to the economic crisis that include measures to address the impact on poor women, and ensuring poor women are consulted in policy-making, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of responses to the economic crisis.

5. To strengthen DFID’s institutional capacity in the country to enable increased focus and impact on gender equality and women’s rights.

1. Promotion of gender equality and women’s rights as explicit goals of DFID’s strategic objectives for Zimbabwe, and set measurements to assess progress on gender equality and women’s rights in all aspects of Zimbabwe’s Assistance Plan

— As DFID has itself acknowledged in its 2007 Gender Equality Action Plan and 2009 White Paper, gender equality and women’s empowerment are essential pre-conditions for eliminating world poverty. None of the themes, which DFID’s is focusing in Zimbabwe, are gender-neutral. For instance, in the case of governance, there is a failure to recognise violence against women as a governance issue, to act to prevent violence and uphold the rights of women to protection and participation. In the case of livelihoods and growth, economic patterns impact women and men in different ways due to gender inequalities in access to jobs, resources, markets and decision making. Prevention and control of HIV and AIDS have an impact on gender equality and women’s empowerment as well.

— It is crucial to remind that the Millennium Development Goals cannot be achieved without urgent and radical steps to improve the rights and status of women and girls—gender inequality and discrimination against women hinders economic growth, sustainable development, peace and human rights.

— In this sense, it is crucial to ensure that a gender analysis is factored into all the programmes DFID has in Zimbabwe, to ensure that they advance rather than undermine progress on gender equality and women’s rights. This would also be consistent with existing commitments made by the UK government on gender equality and women’s rights, in particular the Convention for the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) and the Beijing Platform for Action (BPFA).

— In the information available from DFID regarding the programmes it is funding in Zimbabwe, although it mentions that the aim is to provide direct support to the poorest and most vulnerable, it does not state clearly how DFID’s work in Zimbabwe will empower the most marginalised people who are mostly women. It is important to remember that women are the poorest and most excluded, and a proactive approach to addressing gender and social exclusion is fundamental. Progress on promoting gender equality and women’s rights in the context of each programme should be measured through gender-sensitive indicators and sex-disaggregated data.
2. **DFID’s funding in Zimbabwe for women’s rights—assessing the Gender Support Fund**

- DFID has in the past taken a lead role in promoting gender equality and women’s rights and it needs to continue having that role by increasing pressure on other donors and institutions to prioritise gender equality issues in all aspects of planning, monitoring and evaluating the effectiveness and impact of development work. **It is important as well that DFID does that at country level and an analysis of the achievement of gender equality is factored in all processes.**

- We welcome initiatives DFID has taken in country such as the recent creation in 2009 of the Gender Fund together with the European Commission (EC) to support the promotion of gender equality in Zimbabwe. However, although the EC has stated that its funds will be accessible only to women’s rights organisations, DFID funds are available to any organisation working on gender. We believe that this increases the competition for resources in a reality in which women’s organisations do not stand the same chance than mainstream organisations working on gender when seeking funding.

- It is important to remind that one of the key objectives of DFID’s Gender Equality Action Plan is to support civil society in promoting gender equality. We believe that this is one of the important roles that DFID can and should play. **Women’s organisations have proven their ability to address women’s needs and rights effectively and their contribution, voice and experience have made a valuable contribution to processes of governance and accountability. Yet these organisations are almost always small, under-resourced and operate in a political environment that threatens both the continuity of their work and their ability to access funding.**

- We consider that at the moment, given the high poverty levels amongst women in Zimbabwe due to the political and economic crisis, it would be important to see **more resources allocated for women’s rights and for women’s rights organisations.** We also consider important initiatives like this as mechanisms to set aside resources for women’s rights work, but expect this does not restrict women’s rights organisations access to resources through other funding streams/channels.

- In this sense, the Gender Fund DFID/EC is a first good step but we would like to see the fund increased as it is very small for the level of need that women in Zimbabwe face (DFID’s allocation is £950,000 over three years and EC’s allocation is 1,000,000 Euros over three years). It is also important to assess the costs of managing the grants. At the moment UNIFEM has been appointed as the fund manager, and our partners in Zimbabwe believe it is important to assess how much goes to the projects and find ways in which administrative costs are reduced so the impact of the work can increase with more funds available.

3. **Strengthen accountability of the Zimbabwe’s government by supporting civil society, in particular, women’s organisations**

- We welcome DFID’s commitment to promote capable, accountable and responsive governance. DFID should continue its “catalyst of change” function through a range of actors. We believe it is key that as a minimum these include representatives of national women’s organisations, indigenous organisations and disabled people’s organisations.

- Any political analysis on governance should include a gender dimension and recognise that women are central to improving governance. DFID needs through its funding and programmes in Zimbabwe to promote women and men’s equal representation and participation in informal and formal governance systems and structures, create spaces for women’s political participation and develop women’s leadership.

- Women’s organisations’ experience on the ground have been valuable resources to processes of governance and accountability, yet in the last ten years women’s organisations around the world have seen a reduction in their funding creating obstacles both to the delivery of long term programmes and their organisational sustainability. We are concerned that the emphasis of donors, including DFID, on basket funds for civil society may have a detrimental impact on the capacity of women’s organisations that tend to be the poorest and most under-resourced, to access the funds, deliver their work and to hold their governments to account.

- Women’s organisations in Zimbabwe have already seen a noticeable reduction in funding available in recent years and a reduction in some donors and funders’ responsiveness to gender equality issues. These organisations need sustainable, long-term funding, not “quick fixes” if they are to tackle the deep-rooted inequalities and power imbalances that perpetuate gender inequality and discrimination against women.

- DFID should recognise NGOs as a crucial resource in providing advice, analysis and background studies and ensure the local NGO sector, and in particular women’s organisations, are consulted on policy and governance issues and allowed the time and space to input on such matters.

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152 The fund has been set up due to the commitment of the EC and DFID. The EC has allocated €1,000,000 over three years and DFID £950,000 over three years.
4. Importance of using a broader definition of development and inequality

— DFID’s plans for the region focus on implementation of the Millennium Development Goals, but this definition of development is very narrow and should be expanded to include other key measures of progress on women’s rights and gender equality, in particular CEDAW, the BPFA, and other human rights instruments, if DFID is to improve the quality and effectiveness of its aid.

— Although Zimbabwe is showing signs of economic recovery, it is important to ensure that progress on tackling inequality is not only analysed in economic terms. The social inequality faced by women, indigenous and disabled people accessing public services is not decreasing. We encourage DFID to use a holistic concept of inequality that goes beyond measures of economic inequality.

— It is important to mention that the current financial crisis will increase its impact on poor households and women, and addressing this particular is likely to become more urgent in the year ahead:
  — The burden of women’s domestic and reproductive work is likely to increase as household incomes shrink and cuts are made to essential services, which in Zimbabwe are very few and depend on donors funds such as the education and health sector.
  — Women are more likely to be fired first when jobs are scarce because men are perceived to be the “legitimate” job-holders.
  — As well as receiving lower wages, women are more likely to work part-time, and are often not covered by social-safety nets.
  — Economic inequalities often exacerbate violence against women—women have less access to resources, which increases their dependence on men and their vulnerability to violence.

— We encourage DFID to put forward solutions to the economic crisis that include measures to address the impact on poor women, such as directing funding to women farmers and ensuring poor women are consulted in policy-making, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of responses to the economic crisis.

5. Importance of increasing DFID’s institutional capacity in Zimbabwe to increase focus and impact on gender equality and women’s rights

— We believe that the commitment reflected in DFID’s 2007 Gender Equality Action Plan needs to be reflected at country level. It is important that DFID staff in the Zimbabwe office receive ongoing training and support to ensure they are able to promote and monitor progress on implementation of gender equality objectives and to ensure consistency of approaches across the work.

— It is crucial to equip staff to understand and work with the complexities of gender discrimination in all aspects of DFID’s work in Zimbabwe. This will help to guide and support those staff responsible for integrating a gender equality perspective into traditionally gender-neutral subject areas, such as governance or HIV and AIDS.

— DFID Country Assistance Plan in Zimbabwe should be used to guide planning and implementation at country level, so we believe it is essential that it includes clear goals and targets on gender equality and women’s rights that go beyond actions limited to health and education. This should be consistent with a country and/or regional GEAPs.

December 2009

Written evidence submitted by World Vision UK

World Vision is a Christian relief, development and advocacy organisation dedicated to working with children, their families and communities to overcome poverty and injustice. Motivated by our Christian faith, and the belief that no child should live in poverty, we work with communities of all faiths and none to improve the lives of children. We are the world’s biggest local charity, working in 100 countries and helping 100 million people worldwide. We have three million supporters and employ 40,000 locally based staff, 97% of whom are nationals of the country in which they work.

World Vision believes the best way to change the life of a child is to change the world in which they live. We see children and their communities as active participants in shaping a better future, empowering them to find sustainable solutions to poverty.

World Vision welcomes this opportunity to provide written evidence to the International Development Select Committee on DFID’s assistance to Zimbabwe. Our evidence considers both the approach of the UK Government’s Department for International Development (DFID) to assistance to Zimbabwe and some of the thematic areas in which it works.
1. **World Vision in Zimbabwe—Our Work and Relationship with DFID**

1.1 World Vision started operating in Zimbabwe in 1973 mainly through supporting alternative care options for children. The organisation’s main focus was to offer relief to Zimbabweans in holding camps and institutions. After independence in 1980, the focus changed to rehabilitation and small-scale development programs. World Vision Zimbabwe now has 24 Area Development Programs across the country and 10 Relief Districts that are located in marginal areas. Major areas of programming are health, water and sanitation, food security, education, HIV and AIDS.

1.2 Our experience of working with DFID Zimbabwe has been, on the whole, very positive. World Vision has had a funding arrangement under the Protracted Relief Programme (PRP I) since 2005 and is currently working under PRP II, to implement programming in food security, social protection, water and sanitation, partner capacity building and co-ordination in Bulawayo and the two adjacent rural Districts of Matobo and Insiza. Under PRP II, World Vision is working to prevent destitution and protect and promote livelihood opportunities of the poorest and most vulnerable households by focusing on building the resilience of vulnerable households to cope with transitory and chronic shocks to their current livelihood strategies.

1.3 Since 2007, World Vision’s other area of direct engagement with DFID funding has been with UNICEF on the Programme Of Support to the National Action Plan for Orphans and Vulnerable Children (NAP POS for OVCs) to support the education, food security and the provision of health care for OVCs in 9 rural districts across Zimbabwe. Through implementing this programme, World Vision has worked to support and build capacity in Community Based Organisations (CBOs) through training and subgranting; thereby economically empowering communities to better care for OVCs. 11,508 OVCs are currently being supported by CBOs under this programme; through income generating activities, provision of educational supplies and social protection work. This programme also works to develop mechanisms for meaningful child participation and providing greater food security in the community.

2. **DFID’s Approach in Zimbabwe**

2.1 World Vision welcomes DFID’s continued engagement in Zimbabwe in support of the nation’s recovery. In particular, we welcome the announcement in 2009 that DFID’s support for Zimbabwe would increase in the 2009–10 period from £40 million to £60 million with a focus on those who are most vulnerable. DFID programmes must be designed to facilitate government-to-government assistance when political conditions allow. As DFID moves towards a focus on long term recovery, every effort must be made to build the capacity of the Government of Zimbabwe to make the necessary social and economic reforms for sustainable development.

2.2 As a child focused non-governmental organisation (NGO), World Vision supports DFID’s focus on supporting the vulnerable. Specific policies have worked to ensure that DFID addresses key vulnerabilities:

- A focus on Social Protection, especially drawing on the work and policy recommendations of The International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI).
- DFID Sustainable Livelihood Framework.
- DFID paradigm of “Provision, Protection and Promotion”.

**Supporting children’s rights**

2.3 World Vision believes that children are among the most vulnerable populations in Zimbabwe. Zimbabwe has seen a worrying and rapid decline in children’s rights indicators. Recent projections of the percentage of Zimbabwe’s children orphaned due to AIDS in 2010 have been put at 88.8%. The economic conditions have led to an increase in rates of child abuse, such as child labour, forced marriage and physical and sexual abuse. Indeed, recent focus group discussions with children in one of World Vision’s areas of operation confirmed that emotional and physical abuse, forced labour, forced marriage, lack of food and ill health were among the key issues they were facing (see annex 1).

2.4 Given DFID’s commitment to the most vulnerable in Zimbabwe, World Vision believes that a Child Rights Situational Analysis (CRSA) should be used to inform DFID’s Country Assistance Plan (CAP) for the country.

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153 Large geographical areas in which World Vision works for a period of up to 15 years. An ADP varies between rural and urban areas and is designed to facilitate and assist members of a community to improve and sustain their quality of life. It is also partially defined by geography, focusing on an area in particular need. Community groups are formed to help run the development process in ADPs.


155 For example, the Family Support Trust have recently revealed that it has, in the last four years, treated nearly 30,000 sexually abused children in Harare, which is likely to be only a small percentage of those who suffer sexual abuse. See: http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/africa/8349788.stm

2.5 A CRSA is an analysis of the extent to which children’s rights have been realised and the factors affecting this within a particular country. The benefits of undertaking a CRSA are:

— it would enable the status of children’s rights and well-being to be monitored and can be used to guide the way in which DFID delivers and monitors the impact of aid in order to ensure that children are taken into account;

— it can challenge preconceptions about development and how it works and can provide a unique and illuminating perspective on “old” problems; for example, looking at child budget analyses can highlight discrepancies between resources allocated to fulfilling children’s rights and resources allocated to military expenditure; and

— it provides a different perspective on governance structures and might flag up crucial areas of concern such as an erosion of space for children and young people to participate in society and to be involved in decisions taken by government which affect them.

2.6 Undertaking a CRSA as part of DFID’s development of its CAP for Zimbabwe will also allow DFID to better engage with the Government of Zimbabwe on issues affecting the wider population in the country. A report in September 2007, commissioned by World Vision UK and others \(^{157}\) in partnership with DFID, highlighted the fact that DFID Zimbabwe is already prioritising children’s rights issues in its interactions with the Government of Zimbabwe, as the de-politicised nature of children’s rights in Zimbabwe serves as a useful entry point for the discussion of wider issues. For example, an examination of the situation for children in prison enabled a discussion on the highly sensitive issue of the condition of prisons generally. Following a parliamentary committee report on this issue, World Vision Zimbabwe has been able to support efforts in this area.\(^{158}\)

Coordinating with other donors

2.7 DFID Zimbabwe is currently leading the Donor Steering Committee in the country. World Vision commends their leadership in this but believes that coordination among donors needs to be further improved in order to address current inconsistencies and overlaps in donor funding. Though we are encouraged to see the formation of a Multi-Donor Trust Fund (MDTF) and DFID’s pivotal role in the development of this, we urge DFID to go beyond this initiative and lead the development of a broader common strategy among donors for Zimbabwe which should include common needs and especially impact assessments for the whole country. Though the latter is happening to a certain extent through the cluster system, it should also be a factor of assessments for recovery in long term development.

Removing barriers to civil society effectiveness

2.8 Throughout our work with DFID, through their Management, Technical, Learning & Coordination Unit (MTLC) under PRP II, we have found them interactive, flexible and understanding of the context in which we work. The implementation of PRP II has been greatly helped by the highly participatory nature of DFID’s design process, which takes into consideration local realities and changing contexts. Further, interaction with DFID in Zimbabwe has included work to build capacity for the monitoring and evaluation of World Vision’s projects and the flexible channelling of additional funds in order to meet programme goals.

2.9 However, MTLC’s impact measurement and meeting requirements are, at times, excessive and a symptom of a lack of internal coordination. For example:

— monthly and quarterly narrative and financial reports are required and training and data collection for Longitudinal Impact Monitoring & Evaluation (LIME) regularly requires two weeks for assignments of World Vision Monitoring and Evaluation staff to monitor other partner’s programmes;

— monitoring and evaluation of the PRP II programme demands excessive requirements for meeting attendances with an average of three meetings and/or training programmes a month, called by various sectoral teams of MTLC. These meeting are often called at relatively short notice, which undermines World Vision’s ability to make the journey to attend; and

— compliance and field visits to all the target districts by the various technical support units and monitoring and support visits of the PRP II technical partners are numerous and impacts upon World Vision’s capacity to deliver quality programmatic work.

2.10 In order to cut back on the bureaucratic impediments to the delivery of PRP II, we strongly recommend that greater coordination within the MTLC is encouraged through simple systemic changes which address to the silo-ed nature of the unit. A coordinated approach to implementing partner cooperation would put less strain on capacity, whilst retaining the same high quality of monitoring and evaluation and consistent indicators.


\(^{158}\) See http://www.thezimbabwecan.co.uk/2009121527549/weekday-top-stories/world-vision-to-clean-up-prisons.html
2.11 In addition, the initial success indicators developed for the PRP II programme were both unrealistic and too numerous. Although this has been recognised and is now being revised, World Vision believes that DFID’s design process should have picked up this issue and the initial success indicator logframe should have been much leaner. Future programme design should learn from this with more realistic targets based on in-depth context analysis.

2.12 Partnering with UNICEF is an essential component of DFID’s country engagement; however, World Vision’s interaction with UNICEF, in the NAP POS for OVC programme, has raised concerns about UNICEF’s decision making and approval mechanisms—which are too centralised. As a result, processes are often lengthy and inflexible. Our projects have been, at times, negatively affected by UNICEF’s slow procurement system; for example, motor cycles that were intended for use throughout the lifespan of the project were only delivered in the final year, whilst other vehicles were over a year late. Furthermore, disbursements can take up to three months after all the relevant documentation has been presented.

2.13 World Vision believes DFID should work with UNICEF to:
- streamline its decision making process, in order to ensure operational activities are not unnecessarily affected by bureaucratic impediments; and
- ensure that it provides a dedicated coordinator to oversee issues of disbursements and reports for PRP II.

World Vision also recommends more robust monitoring of UNICEF as a partner, in order to ensure programmatic success.

3. THEMATIC AREAS OF DFID’S WORK

Health and nutrition

3.1 Zimbabwe faces many long term complex issues in relation to health, including a high HIV prevalence rate, deteriorating livelihood conditions, pervasive poverty, environmental degradation, poor governance and economic shocks. Therefore DFID’s attempts to support an improvement of health in Zimbabwe must look beyond the immediate humanitarian situation and also target the universal provision of basic health services, particularly for the most vulnerable members of the population.

3.2 During the past 10 years, the health system in Zimbabwe has been compromised by critical shortages of finance and declining infrastructure. Key health personnel have become demoralized by poor pay packages and their inability to practice their medical professions because of shortages of diagnostics, drugs and support systems. Many health professionals have left Zimbabwe, leading to a critical shortage of human resources especially in the rural areas. Many of the clinics established in rural areas during post-independence development are no longer functioning. Even in larger urban areas, health care has been dramatically compromised by the economic crisis in Zimbabwe. A number of District Hospitals have been closed in the past few months, and services at referral hospitals in major cities have been severely limited. The surveillance and monitoring of disease outbreaks depends to a great extent on having personnel in place at functional community health care clinics, so surveillance has also been severely compromised—to the extent that data completeness is estimated to be only 30%.

3.3 The impact of the decline in the health system is made clear by those statistics that are still being collected. A donor-backed Multiple Indicator and Monitoring Survey (MIMS), conducted in May 2009, reported a alarming 20% rise in under-five mortality compared to 1990 rates. Children in rural areas and those in the poorest section of the population are the worst affected and have least access to even basic health services. The 2009 survey also showed that half of pregnant women in rural areas are now delivering at home and that 40% of all deliveries happen without a skilled attendant, posing huge dangers for both mothers and newborns. There have been suggestions that user fees and other financial barriers are limiting women’s access to life-saving maternal health services.

3.4 World Vision believes that DFID’s multi-country commitment to support access to quality health services free at the point of use should be expanded to include Zimbabwe as a priority. Working within current limitations, DFID must continue to plan and implement health programmes in Zimbabwe that are designed to facilitate government-to-government assistance when political conditions allow. This is of current limitations, DFID must continue to plan and implement health programmes in Zimbabwe that are biannual child health days.

3.5 DFID’s 2009 annual report attests the recent increase in child mortality and cites DFID efforts to address child mortality through vaccination and vitamin A supplementation. However, the majority of the child mortality burden in Zimbabwe is accounted for by HIV and AIDS, neonatal complications and infections, pneumonia and diarrhea. World Vision believes it is important that DFID supports a compound response to child health that is more systematic and thorough than can be delivered through biannual child health days.

159 Marcus Cox and Nigel Thornton, DFID Engagement in Countries in Fragile Situations: A Portfolio Review, (2009), 2.35
3.6 Levels of chronic malnutrition have risen steadily over the past few years, with the latest data showing that one third of all children under the age of five in Zimbabwe are chronically malnourished. As undernutrition contributes to over one third of child deaths globally, it will be almost impossible for Zimbabwe to reverse the worsening child mortality rates without addressing the critical issue of nutrition. DFID should ensure that they prioritise efforts to address the crisis of undernutrition in Zimbabwe, and that these are cross-sectoral in nature.

3.7 In line with the 2015 deadline of the MDGs, World Vision has launched a five year global campaign, *Child Health Now*, with the aim of galvanising support from communities to governments to renew commitments and progress towards MDGs 4 and 5 in particular—the two health-related goals that are currently furthest off track. World Vision is calling for a clear, costed and time-bound plan of action to address MDGs 4 and 5 for Zimbabwe, and all other countries with a high burden of child mortality. DFID and the international community have a duty of care to support national efforts to reach the MDG targets and to ensure that no national health plan is allowed to fail for lack of resources and support.

**Humanitarian response**

3.8 World Vision welcomes DFID’s recognition and efforts to address the complex causes of vulnerability in Zimbabwe. DFID appropriately balances the needs of relief and transitional work in Zimbabwe; World Vision especially welcomes the focus on social protection and the rights of vulnerable groups. These policies have led the way for funding to be available to agencies not previously engaged with human rights issues. Across humanitarian contexts, funding that tackles the root causes, as well as the symptoms, of neglect and vulnerability is important for sustainability.

3.9 However, during the cholera outbreak in 2008–09 funding under PRP II was tailored more to mitigating the symptoms as opposed root causes. DFID should work together with other donors, NGOs, local councils and other frontline providers to ensure that humanitarian assistance is balanced with the developmental, particularly those addressed in sections 3.1 to 3.6. World Vision’s analysis is that an innovative model of cooperation between these agencies to provide a holistic and coordinated humanitarian and development programme, would be very influential in tackling the proxy causes of humanitarian emergencies, such as the cholera outbreak.

3.10 The cholera outbreak has differed from previous outbreaks in being mainly urban and with a high case-fatality rate. Breakdown in the supply of clean water has been the main underlying cause but breakdown in health service delivery in Zimbabwe also contributed to the magnitude and severity of the outbreak.

3.11 DFID’s response was timelier than most donors and NGOs. However, all agencies, whether donor, NGO or Government, were slow to see the outbreak as a priority concern. A number of other factors contributed to the rapid spread of cholera. First, twice during 2008, the Government ordered a ban on all NGOs to stop operations. Second, available safe drinking water was increasingly difficult to access and sewerage was blocked due to poor maintenance. Finally, the poor health facilities and lack of awareness on how cholera spreads contributed to the lack of effectiveness in containing the epidemic.

3.12 Once the outbreak was seen as a priority, World Vision believes that the Cholera response, coordinated through the UNICEF-led WASH cluster, was well coordinated. PRP, in addition provided guidelines on a uniform approach to Participatory Health and Hygiene Education (PHHE) of PRP partners, especially in the promotion of the concept of “health clubs” for hygiene education and behaviour change. World Vision was lead agency for the responses in four clusters covering the provinces of Bulawayo, Mashonaland Central, Mashonaland East and Matabeleland South.

3.13 World Vision recommends that DFID promotes a community led response to any further humanitarian crisis in Zimbabwe. Communities are the first responders to any crisis and therefore there is a need to strengthen Community Disaster Preparedness Plans. Development must be done with disaster preparedness in mind for it to be sustainable, especially as many areas in Zimbabwe have poor access to clean water and sanitation facilities. In Bulawayo, the cases of cholera were very low compared with the cases of cholera in Harare. It is assumed that the reason for this is that since 2003, World Vision with partners have been working a) on a very large water and sanitation project in Bulawayo. b) on unblocking sewerage systems and c) garbage collection from the city council in all suburbs in Bulawayo, although the city council was on strike prior to the cholera outbreak.

**Cash transfers and long-term recovery**

3.14 World Vision recommends that DFID’s programmatic focus should shift from short term relief to recovery. As part of this shift, we recommend that cash transfers should be a part of the PRP II. There is strong evidence that cash transfers protect and promote the livelihoods of households. In conjunction with community level interventions, these projects would provide vulnerable households with cash for a

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162 Emerging Problems in Infectious Diseases, Zimbabwe experiences the worst epidemic of cholera in Africa, Peter R. Mason Biomedical research & Training and the University of Zimbabwe College of Health Sciences, Harare, Zimbabwe, 2009.

certain period of time to enhance their ability to meet urgent food and non-food essential needs. Concurrently, these programmes would provide them with Income Generating Activity (IGA) support packages to enable them to move from cash transfer support. In addition, World Vision is pleased that DFID understand the benefits for cash transfers to the chronically vulnerable households with no or little capacity for IGA; the “exit” strategies for these households would be referral to government cash transfer/social protection programmes that have started in 2009 and that will likely be expanded during this and the following years.

3.15 As DFID moves towards a focus on long term recovery, every effort must be made to build the capacity of the Government of Zimbabwe to make the necessary social and economic reforms for sustainable development.

4. SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS

**DFID’s approach in Zimbabwe**

1. DFID programmes must be designed to facilitate government-to-government assistance when political conditions allow. As DFID moves towards a focus on long term recovery, every effort must be made to build the capacity of the Government of Zimbabwe to make the necessary social and economic reforms for sustainable development.

2. Given DFID’s commitment to the most vulnerable in Zimbabwe, World Vision believes that a Child Rights Situational Analysis (CRSA) should be used to inform DFID’s Country Assistance Plan (CAP) for the country.

3. We urge DFID to go beyond this initiative and lead the development of a broader common strategy among donors for Zimbabwe which should include common needs and especially impact assessments for the whole country.

4. In order to cut back on the bureaucratic impediments to the delivery of PRP II, we strongly recommend that greater coordination within the MTLC is encouraged through simple systemic changes which address to the silo-ed nature of the unit.

5. Future programme design should learn from this with more realistic targets based on in depth context analysis.

6. World Vision believes DFID should work with UNICEF to: streamline its decision making process, in order to ensure operational activities are not unnecessarily affected by bureaucratic impediments; and ensure that it provides a dedicated coordinator to oversee issues of disbursements and reports for PRP II. World Vision also recommends more robust monitoring of UNICEF as a partner, in order to ensure programmatic success.

**Thematic areas of DFID’s work**

7. DFID’s attempts to support an improvement of health in Zimbabwe must look beyond the immediate humanitarian situation and also target the universal provision of basic health services, particularly for the most vulnerable members of the population.

8. World Vision believes that DFID’s multi-country commitment to support access to quality health services free at the point of use should be expanded to include Zimbabwe as a priority. Working within current limitations, DFID must continue to plan and implement health programmes in Zimbabwe that are designed to facilitate government-to-government assistance when political conditions allow. This is of particular importance with regards to DFID staffing in-country to ensure that sufficient technical health expertise is available, to support current and future health programming, and for example to facilitate assistance for Zimbabwe as required from the forthcoming Centre for Progressive Health Financing.

9. World Vision believes it is important that DFID supports a response to child health that is more systematic and thorough than can be delivered through biannual child health days.

10. World Vision is calling for a clear, costed and time-bound plan of action to address MDGs 4 and 5 for Zimbabwe, and all other countries with a high burden of child mortality. DFID and the international community have a duty of care to support national efforts to reach the MDG targets and to ensure that no national health plan is allowed to fail for lack of resources and support.

11. DFID should work together with other donors, NGOs, local councils and other frontline providers to ensure that humanitarian assistance is balanced with the developmental, particularly those addressed in sections 3.1 to 3.6.

12. World Vision recommends that DFID promotes a community led response to any further humanitarian crisis in Zimbabwe.

13. World Vision recommends that DFID’s programmatic focus should shift from short term relief to recovery. As part of this shift, we recommend that cash transfers should be a part of the PRP II.
Annex 1

ISSUES AND HOPES IDENTIFIED BY CHILDREN IN A WORLD VISION-LED FOCUS GROUP IN ZIMBABWE IN NOVEMBER 2008

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age Group</th>
<th>Issues Identified</th>
<th>Hopes and Dreams</th>
<th>Comments and case stories (Through an interpreter)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>8–12 year olds</td>
<td>“We think too much”, emotional and physical abuse, illness, shouting and scolding, poverty</td>
<td>Adequate food, good furniture</td>
<td>The children said they think too much and used their local language to identify the emotional and psychological trauma they are experiencing from adults.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13–15 year olds</td>
<td>Beatings, lack of food, death of parents, forced marriage</td>
<td>School fees, food, jobs</td>
<td>A 15-year-old girl dreamed of being married with her truck driver boyfriend. She already has a small daughter. Since she told her story in her group (not interviewed), it is not known whether she is married or not, whether she was forced to marry, who the father of her child is.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16 year olds</td>
<td>Forced labour, poor transport network, poor education, poverty, lack of shelter</td>
<td>Clothing, good schools, good roads, clinics</td>
<td>Forced labour was not identified by adults during the visit.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17 year olds</td>
<td>Poor technical know-how, poor medical facilities, high inflation rate</td>
<td>Pass exams with high colours</td>
<td>It is interesting to see how this group have not also identified issues identified by younger children.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

January 2010

Supplementary written evidence submitted by the Department for International Development

5 MARCH 2010

IDC Inquiry into the DFID Support to Zimbabwe: Additional Information

During the evidence session on Tuesday 23 February, you asked for some additional information on the Protracted Relief Programme (PRP) Phase 2. The Committee asked DFID to outline what proportion of PRP funds is spent on:

i. management agents;

ii. civil society and

iii. commodities for recipients on the ground.

Funds are channelled as follows:

— 6% of costs go to the management agents to cover: administration of the programme; technical advice and support; best practice and knowledge sharing; and monitoring and evaluation.

— 3% covers financing and procurement fees and also the costs of working as seamlessly as possible in a difficult and rapidly changing environment. Examples of the latter would include, the costs of staff training and adaptation of financial systems following major economic changes like dollarisation.

— 25–30% goes to delivery on the ground—including NGO overheads and the costs of local community staff who provide services for poor households—including home-based care, income generation and improved agricultural practices (conservation farming). Indeed, the PRP has played a critical role in ensuring that skilled personnel and their organisations continue to function and survive and provide a strong foundation for future social services support in Zimbabwe.

— Over 60% covers actual physical transfers to households in the form of, for example, agricultural inputs, small livestock support, soap and hygiene items and small-scale food and cash transfers.
DFID also noted the Committee’s request to provide a humanitarian update before the publication of the report. As mentioned during the hearing, the main UN food assessment is likely to be released towards the end of March. We will keep the Committee informed.

I hope you find this information useful and look forward to reading your report.

Gareth Thomas

Supplementary written evidence submitted by the Department for International Development

MARCH 2010

1. DFID PROGRAMME OVERVIEW

Basic Services

Behaviour Change Communications £22 million over 5 years

DFID’s consistent support to HIV and AIDS prevention programme over the last decade has helped contribute to the decline in the numbers of people living with AIDS. However at 13.7%, the HIV prevalence rate remains high. DFID is providing £22 million to a five year behaviour change programme co-funded with USAID. This funding enables Population Services International (PSI) to develop communication campaigns to address issues such as HIV related stigma and multiple partnerships, as well as increasing HIV prevention services, availability of socially marketed male and female condoms and a network of testing and counselling centres.

Expanded Support Programme for HIV and AIDS in Zimbabwe (ESP) £35 million over 5 years

DFID is providing £35 million over five years for HIV and AIDS prevention, care and treatment. This is a multi-donor common funding mechanism that supports the National Strategy for HIV and AIDS, relies on UN agencies for implementation, and is managed by a working group made up of government, donors, UN agencies and civil society. In 2009, the ESP provided ARVs for 58,000 people. Other donors contributing to the ESP are Canada, Sweden, Ireland and Norway.

Health Worker Retention Scheme £1.9 million over 2 years in addition to $4.1 million through the ESP

This programme is delivered through Crown Agents and supports basic retention payments for health workers. DFID initiated this programme in December 2008 in the worst cholera affected areas with a $1 million contribution that paid US$ allowances to nurses and other essential health workers enabling them to get back to their clinics. The scheme helped result in the number of health workers increasing from under 10,000 in December 2008 to over 26,000 by February 2009. DFID provided an additional £1.335 million in August 2009 with the money channelled through the ESP programme (above). Other donors (UNICEF, UNFPA, EC, and Australia and Denmark) also contribute to the scheme that as of October 2009 was adopted by the Global Fund.

Maternal and Newborn Programme £25 million over 5 years

This programme aims to protect the lives of mothers and newborns, especially those affected by HIV and AIDS. It aims to maintain access to family planning services, including contraceptives and to support access to life saving antenatal, obstetric, and newborn care services. DFID supports the Ministry of Health and Child Welfare priorities by funding implementing partners to implement activities to reduce maternal and infant morbidity and mortality. The funding goes through partners such as Crown agents, and NGOs. The programme is built on a strong evidence base. The programme includes subgrants to EGPAF who support national efforts to prevent of mother to child HIV transmission and to Žvitambo who are supporting nutritional interventions for pregnant women and children under 2 years. In addition DFID spends more than £2 million annually on the procurement of reproductive health contraceptives through Crown Agents Zimbabwe who work with the Zimbabwe National Family Council (ZNFPC) and JSI Deliver in the distribution of these commodities to all public sector service delivery points around the country.

Support to Orphans and Vulnerable Children £22 million over 5 years

Zimbabwe has the highest proportion of children orphaned by AIDS in the world. Over 25% of all children have lost one or both parents. DFID together with the European Commission, Australia, Germany, Sweden, the Netherlands and New Zealand EC will give $85 million in support that will be managed by UNICEF to implement the National Plan of Action in Zimbabwe. DFID’s £22 million contribution over 5 years (2006–2010) represents over 40% of the total multi-donor basket. This supports orphans and vulnerable children across the country including support to keep children in school and to provide protection from all forms of abuse. Civil society organisations implement the programme. As of July 2009, a total of 353,400 children have benefited from the programme. The programme aims to reach 1.5 million children next year with school fees support.
Emergency Vital Medicines Support Programme £16.5 million over 3 years

DFID has provided £16.5 million to UNICEF for the procurement and distribution of essential drug supplies in Zimbabwe. This programme will ensure that all health facilities across all districts in Zimbabwe will be stocked with the most essential medicines and supplies. The programme will help meet national health policy goals with particular focus on the needs of children under five years, women, and the prevention and treatment of transmissible diseases. ECHO (EC), Canada, Ireland, Australia and the Netherlands are also contributing to this programme.

Emergency Malaria Spraying Campaign £0.75 million over 2 years

Malaria is endemic in eight rural provinces Zimbabwe and occurs in 45 districts out of 62. It is the third leading cause of morbidity and mortality in Zimbabwe after HIV and AIDS and tuberculosis with over two million people suffering from this preventable disease annually. The most vulnerable are under-fives, pregnant women, the elderly and people living with HIV and AIDS. DFID is providing £0.5 million for the procurement of indoor residual sprays in 2009–10, building on last year’s contribution of £0.25 million. This is a short-term intervention, implemented by Crown Agents.

Education £1 million over 1 year

By early 2009, the education sector in Zimbabwe was in a crisis. The sector suffered particularly from high staff attrition and teachers’ salaries were insufficient. The number of teachers dropped from about 120,000 to less than 60,000. On top of this, education was severely disrupted for much of 2008 because of political violence. In the summer of 2009, DFID Zimbabwe along with other donors agreed a new level of involvement in the education sector. We are spending £1 million in 2009–10 to provide technical advice and seed funding to a pooled financing mechanism called the Transitional Education Fund (TEF) managed by UNICEF. The fund’s objectives are to support procurement of education commodities (textbooks, exercise books, classroom furniture, etc) and technical assistance and to provide funding for a strong education technical expert based within the EC to guide, influence and inform policy developments. This support for textbooks and other learning materials compliments DFID Zimbabwe’s support through the OVC programme of support that provides assistance for OVCs to access education. DFID Zimbabwe is currently preparing a larger multi-year education programme.

Livelihoods

Protracted Relief Programme Phase II £54.8 million over 5 years

The DFID funded Protracted Relief Programme Phase II (PRPII) assists the poorest and most vulnerable households suffering from the effects of erratic weather, economic decline and the HIV and AIDS epidemic. Its main objectives are to improve the food security of the poorest through production and income-generating activities, to improve access to water and sanitation, and to provide social protection and care to the most vulnerable such as the chronically ill. The programme is reaching over two million poor and vulnerable people. DFID has engaged a management consultant (GRM) for the co-ordination and management of the programme which is delivered through 27 technical and implementing partners. The PRP has now become a multi-donor funded project, with several donors funding through DFID or directly through GRM. These donors are Australia, Denmark, Norway, Netherlands, the European Commission and World Bank who together will contribute at least £24 million over the lifetime of the programme in addition to DFID’s contribution. This positive development has expanded the capacity of the PRP partners to reach and support vulnerable communities and increase the number of beneficiaries.

Humanitarian

Emergency Food Aid £4 million for 1 year

Food availability in 2009–10 has greatly improved from last year following a good harvest, an end to the Grain Marketing Board monopoly on importing cereals, dollarisation of the economy and availability of donor-funded agricultural inputs (such as through the PRPII). Nonetheless, hundreds of thousands remain food insecure. In November 2009, DFID Zimbabwe contributed £4 million to help the World Food Programme (WFP) feed the most vulnerable through the leanest time of year. Our funds will help 1.6 million people through a combination of household distributions (1.2 million) and targeted feeding of acutely vulnerable groups including IDPs (0.4 million). Our support is also helping WFP pilot innovative programming in places of household distribution where the ability to purchase from the market is the obstacle, not the availability of food.

International Organisation for Migration £6.5 million over 4 years

More than 1.5 million people have been displaced by the policies of the GoZ since 2000 (including the Fast Track Land Reform from 2000 to date and Operation “Murambatsvina”—drive out trash—in 2005) and post-election violence (2008). Despite the Inclusive Government, farm invasions continue today and the risk of displacement for remaining farm-worker families remains a concern. DFID Zimbabwe has had a programme with IOM Zimbabwe to provide emergency assistance (food, non food items, and temporary shelter) to IDPs along with humanitarian assistance at border crossings. IOM continues to be at the
forefront of responding to new displacements and emergencies. The IOM are now working in 29 out of 57 districts in 10 provinces and they are currently assisting 251,000 individuals. Beitbridge Reception Centre on Zimbabwe's border with South Africa was established in May 2006 and by the end of May 2009, it had assisted 320,000 returned migrants. The programme will run until March 2010 and its total value is £6.5 million (with £1.5 million provided in 2009–10).

Water and Sanitation £4.7 million over 1 year

Zimbabwe’s cholera outbreak from August 2008 to July 2009 was a sharp indicator of the state of the water and sanitation infrastructure across the country and the consequences of its neglect over the last twenty years. In total, there were nearly 100,000 cholera cases reported with an overall case fatality rate of 4.3%. In 2009, there was a big push by the international humanitarian community to carry out preventive rehabilitation work on the water systems and to get supplies in place early to minimise the worst effects of another cholera outbreak. The UK gave £4.7 million to UNICEF in early October 2009 to help to supply safe water and access to sanitation services for the most vulnerable population groups through: (1) distribution of emergency Non-Food Items (oral rehydration kits, soap, jerry cans for water, purification tablets), (2) improvement of hygiene and sanitation access and practices, (3) rehabilitation of water and sanitation systems throughout the country in both rural and urban areas. Cholera in the 2009–10 rainy season is a fraction of what is was during the 2008–09 season. By mid-December 2009, the total cumulative caseload stood at 146 cases compared to 17,908 cases the year before. DFID Zimbabwe is currently working to develop a multi-year water and sanitation programme.

Emergency Health Infrastructure Support £1 million over 1 year

In the spring of 2009, the Deputy Prime Minister’s office appealed to DFID for funding for a specific programme of work to improve referral hospital infrastructure in six key hospitals including the larger cities of Bulawayo, Masvingo, Harare and Mutare. Health services in these hospitals were compromised due to lack of equipment and damage to infrastructure in theatres, laundries, boiler rooms, kitchens and mortuaries. Our short-term investment should quickly yield visible improvements. Crown Agents is managing the project and it is schedule to be completed in the spring of 2010.

Gender Support Programme £0.95 million over 3 years

In May 2009, DFID approved a three-year gender support programme in collaboration with the EC and UNIFEM. This is a follow-up programme to a one-year gender scoping study that developed a gender strategy and tools and mechanisms for a multi-donor funded programme. The main objective of the programme is to promote gender equality and women’s empowerment in Zimbabwe. The EC is also contributing £0.98 million to the programme and UNIFEM is the fund manager.

2. Background information for Committee site visits in Zimbabwe

The International Development Committee visited Zimbabwe from 1 to 4 February 2010. The following briefing was provided by DFID as background information to several site visits that the Committee undertook whilst in-country.

BULAWAYO SITE VISITS

Addressing vulnerability and social protection

One of the serious effects of ten years of political upheaval and economic decline has been the increased vulnerability of young people, children, families with small children, the elderly and the chronically ill. Household assets have been depleted over time to manage illness, keep children in school and compensate for poor harvests. The exposure to repeated external shocks in a context where social networks are fragmenting and formal social assistance is greatly diminished has rendered many households unable to achieve even a reasonable level of subsistence let alone to thrive.

DFID and its partners have been building programmes that aim to help households manage these shocks, re-establish a measure of control over their fortunes and to begin to thrive again. The principle of these programmes is to give a leg up to struggling households that will enable them to get back into the economy and become independent again. This may involve a combination of programmes that:

— get key members of the household onto anti-retroviral medicines to help the ill become healthy;
— provide school fees or other support where there are orphans or particularly vulnerable children in the household;
— provide cash transfers to help re-establish livelihoods and help adults young people to earn their own living;
— assist farmers to get more from their land and strengthen their food security.

This field trip will make a series of stops that, taken together, illustrate the inter-relationship of these types of support and demonstrate how DFID and its partners are addressing the complexity of vulnerability.
HOUSEHOLDS BENEFITING FROM A PACKAGE OF INTERVENTIONS

Background

The programme is delivered by Catholic Relief Services (CRS) as a component of the Joint Initiative in Bulawayo and works through Sibambene and Oxfam, two other NGOs. Sibambene implements Internal Savings and Loans, Income Generating Activities and Home Based Care that have Youth Friendly Centres. Oxfam working through a local NGO called Lead Trust implements the food voucher programmes together with cash transfers and Low Input Gardens.

Outcomes

— 1127 households are receiving Home Based Care after 258 Care givers trained
— 50 households have started to benefit from cash transfers
— 657 Internal Savings and Loans trained in Business Management Skills had accumulated savings of US$15,279 over a 6 months period.
— 600 Income Generating Activities trained in Business Management Skills
— 520 Low Input Garden groups were trained and realized profits of US$17,660. Of this total, 76% was from individuals and the balance from groups.
— Food voucher distribution and cash transfer reported 100% redemption on a monthly basis.

IOM BULAWAYO SAFE ZONE SITE VISIT

Background

For many young people in Zimbabwe, the future seems hopeless and the prospect of gaining skills or employment is poor. They face few alternatives. One option many young people elect to try is to jump the border to Botswana or South Africa to work on farms or in cities. They are exposed to exploitation, prostitution, and other risks. The Safe Zone concept was developed to reach young Zimbabweans between the ages of 15 and 24 to inform them on the risks and realities of irregular migration and encourage safe health practices, as part of the Safe Journey Information Campaign.

The opening of this centre was made possible through a partnership between IOM and Bulawayo City Council, which provides the infrastructure for Safe Zone activities. The Bulawayo Safe Zone is the second such centre in Zimbabwe after Chiredzi, which opened in February 2007. Young people are assisted to make the right choices for a safer future, by imparting knowledge, building self-esteem, teaching life and livelihood skills and empowering them to adopt safer migratory and sexual behaviour.

The Bulawayo Safe Zone is a hub of activities for both in-school and out-of-school youths. Structured lessons ensure that the target group is well-guided and occupied. The centre helps make a difference in the lives of young people by raising their risk perception through formal and informal lessons on safe migration, gender-based violence, human trafficking, and HIV and AIDS.

Outcomes

The Safe Zones in Bulawayo and Chiredzi are currently operating on a budget of US$86,523 for the period September 2009 to June 2010 and has achieved the following:
— In Bulawayo and Chiredzi, benefited approximately 204,218 youths and other community members through its activities in the centres and in the communities
— Engaged a vocational training institution for pilot livelihood initiatives in Bulawayo.
— Peer educators have received intensive training on gender-based violence, human trafficking and HIV and AIDS to enhance their peer to peer messaging.
— Produced an edutainment video on the Safe Zone concept. This video includes a documentary on the Safe Zones, About IOM, music, drama and discussion clips from peer educators at the two youth centres.

VISIT TO BULAWAYO—HEALTH SERVICE DELIVERY—HIV PREVENTION AND MATERNAL HEALTH

In the context of political upheaval and economic decline, the HIV epidemic has been adding an additional burden to the lives of many people in Zimbabwe especially women and children. Zimbabwe has an innovative HIV programme and the results are impressive: a decline in prevalence and an increase in treatment.

The key to the successful and steady decline in prevalence and incidence rates has been the provision of coherent, high quality and accessible services across the country consistently over a long period of time. While community level engagement in understanding factors that drive the epidemic is important, people need to be able to act on their determination to change their own behaviour: to get a test, to receive high quality counselling, to take measures to prevent themselves and their loved ones becoming infected.
This field trip will enable the team to see a range of services delivered close to community level all of which give individuals, couples and families better control over their own risk and their own behaviour. The services to be visited will illustrate the range on offer from straightforward testing and counselling, post test management of a positive HIV result, male circumcision as a prevention strategy and maternal and newborn management to prevent transmission from mother to baby (including from father to mother to baby during pregnancy and breastfeeding).

**Mpiolo Hospital—Maternal Health and HIV Services Including Prevention of Mother-to-Child Transmission (PMTCT). Elizabeth Glazier Paediatric AIDS Foundation (EGPAF) & Their Partners**

**Background**

The national PMTCT programme is well established in Zimbabwe. However, the majority of sites are still delivering only the single dose Nevirapine (sdNVP) drug regimen which is not the most recent guidance. Through a programme of intensive training and supervision, the more efficacious drug regime (MER) has been rolled out slowly to new sites. Bulawayo has successfully introduced these new regimens with support from the EGPAF Family AIDS Initiative programme through Kapnek Trust.

Kapnek Trust supports Mpiolo Hospital through in-service training of health workers on PMTCT, including HIV rapid testing, infant and young child feeding with family planning integrated within the core PMTCT modules. Kapnek also carries out site support visits providing supervision, data reviews and mentorship. District review meetings are held to promote peer support, monitor progress and plan for future activities.

**Results:**


- Estimated number of HIV+ pregnant women: 50,702 (15.6% prevalence)
- 224,637 pregnant women booked for a first ANC visit
- 226,713 pregnant women were counselled for HIV and 78% were tested.
- 24,896 HIV-positive pregnant women received prophylaxis (91% of total nos. of HIV positive pregnant women identified).
- 17,570 HIV-exposed infants received sdNVP (63% of mothers identified).

Results from the Mpiolo Hospital site 2009 include:

- 2,085 women seen in the Antenatal Clinic;
- 397 tested positive for HIV;
- 614 women given antiretroviral drugs for prevention of mother to child transmission of HIV; and
- a total of 121 babies from the identified HIV positive mothers put on antiretroviral drugs for prevention of mother to child transmission.

**Overall Outcomes of the EGPAF-Family AIDS Initiative Program**

The EGPAF Family AIDS Initiative programme is supported by USAID (US$5 million) and DFID (US$1m). The programme operates in 32 districts and cities (out of 62 possible districts) with 620 PMTCT sites now supported. The programme has:

- Reached 146,412 pregnant women in ANC;
- Counselling and tested 132,506 pregnant women; and
- 18,117 (93%) pregnant women with HIV and 14,318 (71%) HIV-exposed infants received ARV prophylaxis

**Bambanani “New Start” Voluntary Counselling and Testing Centre; “New Life” Post-Test Support Centre with Population Services International;**

**Background**

New Start testing and counselling (T&C) services aim to promote sexual behaviour change and also serve as an entry point to care, treatment, and other post-test support services to those who test HIV positive. Strong referral systems are in place to ensure that all HIV positive clients receive access to post-test support services.

In addition to the New Start centre network, PSI also manages a network of New Life post-test support services centres (currently 12 sites). New Life centres are offering individual psycho-social counselling sessions; information on HIV and AIDS, positive living, and nutrition for people living with HIV and AIDS;
and ART adherence counselling. The centres are providing services at the site and through mobile services which are offered at workplaces, to PLWH support groups, and to patients accessing health care at public sector hospitals.

DFID supports PSI under their five-year, £20m Behaviour Change Communications Programme which includes an average of £2 million per year in support of the New Start/New Life network in Zimbabwe. Key results to date include:

- Nationwide network of 18 static and 23 outreach teams
- Implementation through 14 partners, NGOs, city health clinics, private sector partners
- 1.6 Million people reached since inception, currently 35,000 per month
- High national coverage, 55% of monthly client flow are reached through mobile units
- 18% of clients visiting the centres as a couple
- 10% of clients are vulnerable population groups (displaced, mobile population, people at remote workplaces)
- Integration of TB screening, about to start laboratory services, 5 sites
- Integration of CD4 cell count laboratory services, 6 devices for 4 sites
- Strong referral and referral tracking system—PSI T&C and post-test counselling centres referred 128,150 clients for tuberculosis treatment, opportunistic infections, anti-retroviral treatment, psychosocial support, family planning, social welfare, and other non-governmental organizations for livelihood support of various kinds in 2009.

Organisation

The Bambanani (“collaboration” or “unity” in Ndebele) centre in Bulawayo opened in August of 2001. The site has attended to 210,000 clients since it opened its doors. About 4,000 clients are seen each month, with over half of the clients accessing the services through mobile units covering several districts around Bulawayo.

BULAWAYO MALE CIRCUMCISION CLINIC

Background

There is now solid evidence that male circumcision can prevent transmission of HIV infection. It is a cost effective and efficient intervention. For example, in Zimbabwe, it is estimated that, given the adult HIV prevalence of 13.7%, Zimbabwe could avert almost 750,000 adult HIV infections between 2009 and 2025 if 80% of adult men and newborn boys were circumcised. The resulting savings are estimated to amount to as much as US$3.8 billion between 2009 and 2025 in treatment and broader economic costs.

Despite the high level of interest and support for male circumcision (MC) by all stakeholders and the development of a roadmap to rapidly scale up MC services, only limited funds have been available for expanding services in Zimbabwe and PSI is using their own discretionary funds as well as receiving support through USG and DFID. This is certainly a growth area in HIV prevention though and services are expected to expand in the coming years.

Zimbabwe’s national MC training programme was established in April 2009 and a central level MC training centre has also been established in Harare.

Outcomes

DFID is supporting this initiative under their Behaviour Change Communications Programme. They support research and staffing components of the National Training Programme. Key results to date include:

- Supported the Ministry of Health to set up MC pilot phase with one training site and four implementation sites
- Recruitment of MC clients through New Start centres
- Services include safer sex counselling, MC procedure, follow up services and review
- 3000 men have been circumcised since start in May 2009, rapid expansion is expected in 2010
- Provided technical assistance in policy and strategy development

Organisation

The Bulawayo male circumcision site is housed in the Bulawayo Eye Clinic and has been operational since September 2009. Approximately 300 procedures are performed every month at this site. More than 92% of the clients are referred from the New Start testing and counselling (T&C) centres. The site also provides T&C services for walk-in clients.
SITE VISIT TO TSHOLOTSHO

So far, the community and service delivery visits have taken place in urban and peri-urban locations. This field trip will focus on the challenges to different kinds of households of overcoming vulnerability in order to build and maintain a successful livelihood in a rural area of Zimbabwe where crops don’t grow well. The trip will take place in deep rural part of Matabeleland Province (North) moving to three different rural communities. The two Matabeleland Provinces (North and South) are the poorest in Zimbabwe and were the sight of the Gakurahundi massacres in the 1980s, a continuing source of conflict and mistrust between different peoples in Zimbabwe. The farming is poor in this part of the country and nutrition gardens and conservation farming techniques are important to getting as much as possible from available arable land. Water is also scarce and often situated very far from households or cattle/livestock corrals. Improving access to potable water is a critical element of strengthening livelihoods and future household prospects for people in Matabeleland, especially women.

This day trip aims to demonstrate, through a combination of visits, how DFID is supporting the strengthening of livelihoods and income generation, the reduction of women’s labour on water collection and household exposure to disease through water and sanitation assistance and the mitigation of HIV and other high impact chronic diseases through the delivery of home based care.

The programmes to be visited include support to micro finance schemes and income generation schemes.

FIELD VISIT TO A SAND ABSTRACTION POINT (WATER AND SANITATION AND HYGIENE (WASH), INTERNAL SAVINGS & LOANS, NUTRITIONAL GARDENS)

Background

Catholic Relief Services is installing sand abstraction systems in Tsholotsho, a technology which draws water from sandy river beds. The water is used for drinking, watering livestock and gardening. The support from DFID will see the installation of 14 sand abstraction and micro-irrigation systems for communal gardens by June 2011. The self-help groups are trained on the internal savings and lending methodology which is meant to economically strengthen the community groups around the sand abstraction point, including the water point and garden committees and some of the most vulnerable individual households.

Outcomes

Water is a scarce commodity in this dry and livestock-breeding district. Both people and livestock walk for considerable distances (up to 5km) to access water, taking up much of their productive time. The technology has not only reduced walking distances to water points, but has also made an improvement in household nutrition resulting from the tendency to use more water together with the introduction of nutrition gardens. The self-help groups have made it possible for the communities to manage their own water points and gardens, making the projects more sustainable.

The following activities have been carried out to date:

- 10 sand abstraction & micro-irrigation systems installed.
- 3489 households benefiting from self-help groups.
- 10 communal garden latrines and 94 household latrines constructed
- 300 Elephant pumps installed

FIELD VISIT TO A JUNIOR FARMER FIELD SCHOOL (JFFS)

Background

JFFS have acted as vehicles for knowledge transmission as they involve a practical approach to agreed study topics. A JFFS can engage support from AREX officers in matters in which they could have limited knowledge. JFFS have been used to integrate the orphaned children into normal life after discovering that they tend to isolate themselves when they lose either of their parents.

Outcomes

CRS has provided training and agricultural inputs through DFID to the JFFS. The trainings have reached out to 3,636 FFS members. The total cost for the training is valued at £27,000.

FIELD VISIT TO SMALL LIVESTOCK BENEFICIARY

Background

Catholic Relief Services (CRS) has been implementing the small livestock project since 2008–09 when funding for PRP II started. The program provides the poor and vulnerable households with small livestock of their choice which include poultry and goats. The farmers are also trained in Livestock management, feed production, livestock disease management and construction of affordable housing.
Ev 102  International Development Committee: Evidence

**Outcomes**

CRS has provided small livestock to poor and vulnerable households. The small livestock have been multiplied and sold to meet school fees expenses, food expenses and have been converted to bigger stock such as donkeys, cattle and pigs.

The program is funded to the tune of £121,200 over three years. To date the following activities have been implemented

- 6,270 households have been trained in small livestock management.
- Livestock distribution

**SITE VISIT TO MATABO**

The trip will take place in deep rural part of Matabeleland Province (South) beginning with a district town and moving to three different rural communities.

The first stop though will be to the Kezi Maphisa Hospital to see the impact of a flexible and innovative HIV and AIDS treatment programme that has reached thousands of people outside urban areas since it started in 2006. The Expanded Support Programme has been an important driver of expanding access to ARVs outside urban areas even in the context of collapsing systems.

**VISIT TO EXPANDED SUPPORT PROGRAMME FOR HIV AND AIDS (ESP) TO OBSERVE HIV AND AIDS CARE AND TREATMENT SERVICES AT KEZI MPHISA DISTRICT HOSPITAL**

**Background**

The ESP programme started in 2006 and provides HIV and AIDS treatment and care support to 16 districts and some national programmes. The ESP enabled the national ARV roll out programme to make significant progress despite the economic downturn.

Maphisa district hospital—as with other health facilities in Zimbabwe—has faced numerous challenges in recent years. The hospital is serving an under privileged community of 99,723 people. This site visit will focus more on the HIV care and treatment aspects of the response. It will emphasise the important links between HIV services and the broader health system.

ESP programme results:

1. Channelled $50m into HIV treatment and care including laboratory support and safe blood services over the last three years.
2. The number of people on treatment in the 16 districts has increased from 5,266 in April 2007 to 27,140 in September 2009, a more than 5-fold increase in less than 3 years.
3. ESP supported procurement of ARVs for treatment of 58,000 patients in 2009 (28,000 in ESP districts and 30,000 through the national ART programme), approximately 30% of total national coverage.
4. More than 1,200 health workers have been trained in HIV counselling and testing (rapid testing and provider-initiated counselling and testing) and 900 in ART/OI management in ESP districts since April 2007.
5. ESP support has helped to strengthen coordination and Monitoring and evaluation. Training for Provincial and District AIDS Coordinators has been completed. District HIV and AIDS action plans have been developed in all ESP districts.
6. Kezi Matobo district has 2 ART initiating sites. This district had no patients on ART at start of 2007, compared to 2,206 on ART by end 2009.

**MEETING AN HOME BASED CARE (HBC) GROUP AND GOAT BENEFICIARY IN SONTALA WITH WORLD VISION INTERNATIONAL**

**Background**

The small livestock programme is targeting 150 households for the chronically ill, disabled; child-headed household, elderly and generally vulnerable asset poor households. The beneficiaries were trained on goat husbandry with the focus on health, shelter, feeding and breeding. Each household was given 2 female goats and 1 in every 10 households got an additional buck. By standard, one HBC caregiver is supposed to work with five patients. About 1000 patients are reached through the HBC programme in Matobo.

**Outcome**

The goat programme was started in 2008–09 funding year. 85% of the distributed goats have kidded. Households are currently benefiting from goat milk and manure. The small livestock programme is being funded by £10,000 from DFID. As a result of the training, farmers are now better equipped to manage the goats. The HBC programme is being funded to the tune of £94,000. This has lessened pressure on hospitals and clinics as patients are no longer travelling long distances for medication.
FOCUS ON WATER AND SANITATION AND HYGIENE (WASH)
VISIT TO HOUSEHOLD BENEFITING FROM LATRINE CONSTRUCTION

Background
This is a 3-year programme running from 2008–2011 targeting 150 households. The program includes capacity building on latrine builders for Households and school latrines, health and hygiene education to school health masters and communities, community based management training to Water Point User Committees and Village Pump Mechanics.

Outcomes
- 80% behaviour change on hygiene practices for example hand washing method of run to waste is adopted. Time taken for an individual household to collect water from a water source was reduced by above 50% from 30 minutes to 15 minutes. Improvement on general cleanliness of the water points and minor maintenance spearheaded by the Water Point User Committees.

MEETING A CONSERVATION FARMING BENEFICIARY

Background
Conservation farming is in its second year running for the current beneficiaries. 500 vulnerable households benefited from the programme. These households will be taken through 3 years of intensive training on conservation farming. Farmers are given seed and fertilizer packs which cover about 0.6-0.7ha. Farmers are trained on the conservation farming principles. The training involves theory and practical training at demonstration sites. This culminates into field day which is a platform to share lessons learnt for others that are not targeted by the program.

Outcomes
The programme is in its second year running, was started in 2008–09 farming season. The 2008–09 season saw farmers producing good harvest from the conservation farming plots. The activity is being funded to the tune of £130,000. Farmers' knowledge on conservation farming has also improved greatly.

HARARE PROGRAMME VISIT TO HARARE HOSPITAL

The backbone of basic health service provision is sound hospital-based services that can train staff, develop new interventions, act as referral centres and ensure quality and comprehensive support to peripheral primary services. Some services are only appropriately delivered in a centralised way (specialised child rape management) or are so specialised as to require concentration of skills and equipment. Yet, they are also vital to well being just as basic treatment is. This visit will look at how DFID support to both the referral level of health services and to the main pillars of health services delivery (vital medicines, human resources, information systems) has supported the broader health system during a period of economic collapse and crisis and has enabled some specialist services to continue at least to some extent.

MALE CIRCUMCISION TRAINING CENTRE AND CLINIC

Background
PSI/Z provided technical and financial support to set up a national MC training site in Harare as well as four MC pilot sites. PSI provided technical support in the establishment of the national MC training program, which started in April 09 with the training of 14 national trainers. The program, which was adapted from the WHO MC training guidelines, consists of three days theoretical and 4 days practical training using the forceps guided method as the standard surgical procedure. 104 health workers have been trained since the initiation of the training program. A phased approach comprising of a learning phase with pilot sites, each representing one model of service delivery, has been used to initiate MC in Zimbabwe. An evaluation of the pilot phase, conducted through technical support by PSI, is currently underway to inform the MC strategic plan for the next five years, which will be developed in February.

Outcomes
DFID is supporting this training site initiative under their Behaviour Change Communications Programme. They support research and staffing components of the National Training Programme. Key results to date include:
- 3,000 male circumcisions have been conducted since May 2009.
- 104 practitioners trained to perform forceps guided method MC
- Most MC clients are recruited through PSI’s New Start Counselling and Testing centres. Services include safer sex counseling, MC procedure, follow up services and review
VITAL MEDICINES AND MATERNAL HEALTH (DRUGS AND COMMODITIES) DELIVERY TRUCK TOPPING UP (DTTU) SYSTEM AND EMERGENCY HOSPITAL INFRASTRUCTURE REPAIR AND REFURBISHMENT WORK SUPPORTED BY DFID.

Background

DTTU

Zimbabwe has one of the highest contraceptive prevalence rates for modern contraceptive methods in Africa. Contraceptive use increased from 38% in 1984 to over 60% now. DFID Zimbabwe has supported the provision of contraceptive since the mid-1990s. Under the current five-year programme, DFID Zimbabwe has provided over £2.5 million for the procurement and distribution of reproductive health commodities annually. Distribution of commodities, vital medicines and HIV test kits is done through the DTTU which is jointly funded by DFID and USAID and implemented by Zimbabwe National Family Planning Council, National Pharmaceutical Company, Crown Agents Zimbabwe and JSI Deliver.

Vital Medicines

DFID has provided £16.5 million for vital medicines through UNICEF over the past two years. Other donors including ECHO, Canada, Ireland, Netherlands and Australian Aid have also contributed to this programme. This programme has been instrumental in ensuring a basic supply of drugs and sundries are available at all 1531 health facilities in Zimbabwe and especially at rural health centres and district hospitals. Procurement of drugs is done through UNICEF. The drugs are packaged into primary health care packages which are distributed through DTTU system. UNICEF, Crown Agents have received funding from DFID to conduct a Vital Medicines Availability and Health Services Survey in order to obtain a “snapshot” view of the state of the health delivery services across Zimbabwe. This survey is carried out on a 3-monthly basis in order to identify and trends. Data collection takes place during routine essential drug supply visits to over 1300 health facilities throughout the country. Data is collected by DTTU staff during their drugs delivery rounds and the data analysed and a report drafted by UNICEF.

Health Restructuring Project

DFID has committed £1.1 million for the refurbishment of three main hospitals and three provincial hospitals in Zimbabwe. The aim is to ensure that these important health facilities are able function and provide basic services. Support has included replacing equipment such as reticulation systems, boilers, incinerators, laundry and kitchen. Crown Agents is implementing this project.

Key results to date

DTTU and ZNFPC

1. Delivery Coverage—there are over 1300 health facilities in Zimbabwe and DTTU makes deliveries to approximately 95% on each delivery run once every three months. The missed facilities are mainly due to finding clinics closed as staff would have gone for funerals, pay etc.

2. Stock outs are less than 5%. At the inception of the programme the stock out rate was higher than 40%.

3. The majority of women get their contraceptives from the public sector. According to recent reports 98% of women know about at least one method of contraception

4. The number of children per woman is also decreasing from 5.4 in 1988 to 3.8 in 2006.

5. HIV Prevalence rate has declined. This can be attributed at least in part to increased condom usage. Condoms are distributed via the DTTU system.

Vital Medicines

Results from the recent national Vital Medicines and Health Service survey (VMAHS) which collects data from all health facilities every two months.

1. The number of health facilities with at least 50% of the selected essential drugs in stock increased from 44% in Round One to 65% in Round Two and to 72% in Round Three of the vital medicines quarterly survey. Stock-outs of all the selected antibiotics declined from 20% in Round One, to 7% in Round Two, and to 2% in Round Three.

2. The range of fees charged for maternity consultations decreased from a maximum of US$250 to US$100 in the second survey.

3. The number of health facilities offering free consultation services to children younger than five years increased from 66% to 70% in the second survey.
ANTENATAL CLINIC FOR MATERNAL HEALTH

Background

Background information on the national PMTCT programme was provided earlier in the Bulawayo section of the brief.

National figures: (From 2008 MOHCW annual report)

- estimated number of pregnant women with HIV: 50,702
- 224,637 pregnant women booked for a first ANC visit
- 226,713 pregnant women were counselled for HIV and 78% were tested.
- ANC HIV prevalence was 15.6%
- 24,896 HIV-positive pregnant women received prophylaxis (91% of total nos. of HIV positive pregnant women identified).
- 17,570 HIV-exposed infants received sdNVP (63% of mothers identified).

Site level statistics:

- Nos. of pregnant women booking at ANC: 296
- Nos. of pregnant women tested, and received results: 387
- Nos. of pregnant women with an HIV positive test: 67
- Nos. of HIV-positive pregnant women receiving ARV prophylaxis or ART: 84
- Nos. of deliveries: 3,224

Overall Outcomes of the EGPAF-FAI programme

The EGPAF-FAI programme is supported by USAID (approx US$5 million) and DFID (US$1 million) annually. Between Oct 2008 and Sept 2009, the EGPAF-FAI programme expanded into 32 Districts and cities (out of 62) with 620 PMTCT sites now supported. The programme has:

- Reached 146,412 pregnant women in ANC;
- Counsell and tested 132,506 number of pregnant women; and
- 18,117 (93%) pregnant women with HIV and 14,318 (71%) HIV-exposed infants received ARV prophylaxis

FAMILY SUPPORT TRUST AND VICTIM FRIENDLY CLINIC (CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE SUPPORT AND TREATMENT CENTRE)

Background

Family Support Trust (FST) is a locally registered Private Voluntary Organisation (PVO) with the primary aim of providing holistic, child friendly, comprehensive, medical and psychosocial support services to sexually abused children and their families and to fighting all forms of child sexual abuse (CSA) in Zimbabwe. FST recognizes the profound and long-term damaging effects to children and communities of CSA.

FST has been running the Victim Friendly Clinic for more than a decade in Zimbabwe, supporting child victims of sexual abuse. The project has been supported by the Programme of Support (PoS) since 2007 for a total of US$1,118,806 over three years to scale up both the response and prevention aspects to child sexual abuse. Other funding partners include Children First, Save the Children Norway, and Firelight Foundation as at December 2009.

DFID Zimbabwe is the biggest contributor to the multi-donor PoS, which is managed and coordinated by UNICEF. PoS supports the implementation of the National Action Plan (NAP) for OVC through strengthening community-level organizations providing care and protection for vulnerable children and to put in place a mechanism to ensure increased, more predictable funding for OVC.

FST has a good working relationship with the Ministry of Health and Child Welfare who have offered the NGO, office and clinic space in four government hospitals for the victim friendly clinics. The clinics are in the following cities and districts: Beitbridge, Chitungwiza, Harare (head office) and Mutare. Plans are underway to establish such a clinic in Bulawayo’s Mpilo Hospital.

FST is part of the “referral chain” meaning that it is a critical part of ensuring child victims of exploitation, abuse and violence receive specialized health and welfare support. Support is also provided by FST pre-and post- trial should the case be taken forward in the legal system. FST also offers capacity development workshops to medical personnel (nurses, doctors) and the police for better child friendly techniques in gathering information that can then be used in court cases from child victims.
Outcomes.

— FST clinics: 353 boys and 501 girls children received medical and psychosocial support from the four operational clinics from January 2007 to November 2009 as indicated in the table below.

— FST worked with Government and NGO partners in various outreach activities to promote the messages of zero tolerance, outreach and awareness for child sexual abuse in communities beyond the FST clinics.

— Awareness has been raised on prevention and response to child sexual abuse for both adults and children.

HARARE PROGRAMME VISIT ON ORPHANS AND VULNERABLE CHILDREN (OVC) PROGRAMME

Mavambo Learning Centre

Mavambo Learning Centre caters for 48 illiterate children/year on an accelerated education project and who are also provided with nutritional support and psychosocial support services. Tafara 1 Primary School has a total enrolment of 1,600 children. The school contains children supported through the PoS, some from families displaced as a result of Operation Murambatsvina, living in temporary accommodation on Caledonia Farm nearby.

Background

DFID Zimbabwe is the biggest contributor to the multi-donor PoS, which is managed and coordinated by UNICEF. PoS supports the implementation of the National Action Plan (NAP) for OVC through strengthening community-level organizations providing care and protection for vulnerable children and to put in place a mechanism to ensure increased and more predictable funding for OVC.

Until June 2009 DFID’s support for education was primarily through the “Programme of Support” (PoS) for Orphans and Vulnerable Children (OVC) which by mid–2009 had provided school fees and materials for 200,000 children. Since June 2009, PoS has been used to scale-up education provision through the revitalisation and roll out of the BEAM—the Basic Education Assistance Module in an attempt to rapidly increase the number of OVCs reached. This system pays school fees and levies for orphans and vulnerable children in primary schools and special schools for children with disabilities. It improves access to education for poor children and helps schools deliver good quality education as the programme enhances their financial capacities. This year BEAM will support about 610,000 OVCs with the payment of fees and levies.

In June 2009, DFID also initiated and developed a new Education Transition Fund. To date DFID has committed £1 million to this fund primarily for the provision of text books and other learning materials for schools as well as some Technical assistance for the education sector. The fund is managed by UNICEF and is supported by other donors including USA, EU, Australia, Denmark, Sweden, and Norway.

Mavambo Trust was established in 2001 to target illiterate OVCs with an Accelerated Literacy and Numeracy Education which is a fasttrack educational program to prepare them for entry into the formal school system. Mavambo provides a holistic approach to education. Other services provided include HIV and AIDS Life-skills, psychosocial support, nutrition, facilitation of Birth Certificate acquisition, Child Rights Training and vocational skills training (staff and community). Mavambo works with the community volunteers (Shamwari Dzedu) for identification of the beneficiaries, home visits and data collection. Furthermore, Mavambo provides educational support to OVC in formal schools, such as Tafara 1.

Outcomes

By November 2009 PoS had:

— 247,987 children assisted with school related assistance
— 188,157 children were provided with basic social services, including nutrition, water, sanitation, medical support and ART
— 49,967 children were reached with livelihoods including lifeskills and vocational skills
— 10,970 children were provided with child protection interventions including legal assistance and reunification within family environment
— 9,030 children assisted to obtain birth certificates
— 1,857 children trained in child participation
Since 2007 Mavambo has:
  — Fast-tracked 150 illiterate children into the formal school system
  — Assisted 9,000 children to attend school
  — Assisted 97 children to get birth certificates since 2007.