Written evidence submitted by the Department
for International Development
SUMMARY
Once considered one of the continent's success
stories, Zimbabwe's economy has contracted by half in the last
decade. In early 2009, over seven million Zimbabweans received
food aid and hyperinflation had reached the second highest level
in history. The migration of skilled labour, combined with shrinking
government budgets and increased corruption, led to the deterioration
of the country's previously impressive education and health systems.
Zimbabwe's decline is the result of years of
neglect, repression and economic mismanagement. The roots of the
crisis stretch back before independence and involve a succession
of policy failures. These include failures to build robust democratic
institutions, to challenge structural inequality, to make sound
economic decisions and to expand opportunity to more people. Over
the last 10 years, the ruling ZANU (PF) party—in power
since Independence—has overseen the increasing securitisation
of the Zimbabwean state and the independence of key institutions
has become increasingly compromised
Since its installation in February 2009, following
the Global Political Agreement (GPA) in September 2008, the Inclusive
Government has largely succeeded in stabilising the economy. However,
there has been far less progress in restoring the rule of law
and ensuring human rights are respected. The Inclusive Government
remains Zimbabwe's best hope, but the transition from crisis to
full recovery is promising to be messy, protracted and complex.
DFID Zimbabwe has developed an adaptive and
flexible approach to working in these circumstances. We have targeted
life-saving assistance to those who most need it but also taken
opportunities to address the underlying causes and effects of
poverty and marginalisation. Our aid is making a real difference
in a difficult environment. Examples of this include: improving
food security for more than two million people through the distribution
of seeds and fertiliser; supporting the provision of textbooks
to 5,300 primary schools; providing supply kits of essential
medicines to approximately 1,300 primary care clinics and
rural hospitals; and helping to deliver anti-retroviral drugs
to 58,000 people.
DFID delivers its aid programme in Zimbabwe
through UN agencies and established NGOs; no money at present
goes through Government systems. However, in line with the cross-Whitehall
strategy for Zimbabwe, we have recently begun to provide technical
assistance and policy support to reforming Ministries to help
build momentum for political and economic change. Prime Minister
Morgan Tsvangirai and Finance Minister Tendai Biti have both acknowledged
the impact of DFID support. We are ready to provide additional
assistance, as part of a coordinated response by the international
community, if we see further progress in implementing the GPA.
There is a clear recognition on our part that the current dispensation,
for all its faults, presents a unique opportunity to reform and
improve the situation in Zimbabwe.
1. OVERVIEW
Inclusive Government
1.1 For almost the entire period since independence,
Zimbabwe has been governed by the Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic
Front (ZANU-PF), under the leadership of Robert Mugabe. A prolonged
spiral of decline in recent years, exacerbated by failed government
policies, has led to protracted economic, political and humanitarian
turmoil. The ZANU (PF) regime has generally reacted to this decline—and
growing political opposition—with electoral manipulation,
abuse of state power and increasing intimidation of political
opponents and civil society.
1.2 However, political pressure on the regime
has grown since the late 1990s with the formation, from trade
union roots, of an independent and credible opposition—the
Movement for Democratic Change, under Morgan Tsvangirai (MDC-T).
A shambolic Presidential run-off election led to the SADC-brokered
Global Political Agreement which, in turn, culminated in the formation
of the Inclusive Government, in February 2009, between ZANU (PF),
MDC-T and the breakaway MDC-M.
Since the IG took office the economy has been
stabilised…
1.3 The MDC Minister of Finance, Tendai
Biti, has made impressive advances in stabilising the economy,
aided by US dollarisation and the abandonment of the Zimbabwean
currency. Key achievements include:
— an increase in monthly revenues from
only $4 million in January 2009 to almost $100 million
by autumn;
— payment of monthly salaries to public
servants, initially of $100 pcm and now in a range from $100 to
$225;
— signs of recovery in the banking sector,
with deposits doubling between April and August 2009;
— the 2010 budget—Zimbabwe's
first realistic budget in many years, the preparation of which
DFID supported;
— and schools and medical facilities have
reopened.
Ministry of Finance officials project a realistic
resource envelope of $1.4 billion, funded through domestic
revenues, for 2010.
1.4 As well as restoring macro-economic
stability, Biti has also greatly contained ZANU (PF)'s access
to resources; largely by promoting legislative changes in the
governance of the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe (RBZ) and by some improvement
in public financial management. The RBZ's power therefore continues
to be significantly reduced. However, the problematic Reserve
Bank Governor, Gideon Gono, remains in post.
1.5 DFID and other international donors,
in an effort to boost progress on reform, have been providing
essential expertise and technical assistance to these economic
and governance processes.
And humanitarian needs managed…
1.6 The international community, including
DFID, has also played a critical role in helping to improve the
humanitarian situation. In 2008-09, Zimbabwe experienced its worst
ever cholera epidemic, with nearly 100,000 cases and over
4,000 deaths. DFID helped the World Health Organisation (WHO)
establish a Command and Control Centre to ensure a more rapid
and effective response. With the support of other donors, DFID
is now focusing on maintaining basic health services, including
the funding of vital medicines and supplies and the retention
of health workers. We are also working to repair and restore water
and sanitation systems, promote good hygiene practices and deliver
items such as water purification tablets and soap. As of mid-December,
there have been only 146 cholera cases this season and five
deaths, compared to nearly 18,000 cases and 877 deaths
during the same period last year.
1.7 Seven million people received food aid
at the height of the last hungry season in early 2009. DFID provided
£9 million to the World Food Programme (WFP) to ensure
that food was in place when it was needed. This year saw a better
harvest and improved availability of food. Even so, the WFP estimates
that 2.8 million people are likely to need food aid in early
2010. We have therefore allocated £4 million to the
WFP effort.
But human rights and the rule of law are still
precarious
1.8 In theory, the Zimbabwean national constitution
guarantees many basic human rights, but the state has consistently
failed to protect citizens. Institutions, such as the judiciary
and media, have in the past shown a reasonable degree of independence
and integrity but now exhibit serious weaknesses regarding fundamental
freedoms of participation, expression and association.
1.9 The widespread repression and human
rights abuses seen at the time of the 2008 elections have
decreased under the Inclusive Government. However, arrests of
trade unionists and civil society activists, land invasions and
politically motivated legal action against parliamentarians have
continued, with weak and inconsistent responses from the judiciary.
The period immediately following the MDC's decision (in October
2009) to disengage from some functions of government saw a particular
ramping up of violence. Serious human rights abuses have also
been reported in the Marange diamond fields, drawing significant
international reaction.
1.10 Reform of the security and justice
sector into a set of professional and accountable institutions
is essential, but opportunities are limited in the current political
context. One important opportunity is the Constitution-Making
Process under the GPA. A successful review and implementation
of the Constitution would likely strengthen the separation of
powers and could increase the prospects of free and fair elections.
DFID, alongside other donors, is considering support which can
make this a more open and accountable process, including strengthening
parliamentary oversight and supporting wider civil society engagement.
Progress towards the MDGs
1.11 Zimbabwe was on its way to achieving
several of the MDGs in 2000. Impressive gains were made throughout
much of the 1990s and early 2000s, including in:
— reducing HIV prevalence (from 24% to
15.6% and currently 13.7%);
— raising primary school enrolment (over
90% in 2004);
— extending adult literacy (over 90% for
men and women);
— and increasing access to improved water
and sanitation services in both rural and urban areas.
1.12 These gains were made in spite of the
government's shrinking budget and the steady migration of skills.
Demand for services in Zimbabwe remained high and continued to
grow until just a couple of years ago. Parents' participation
in education coupled with a strong sense of duty and accountability
amongst teachers ensured that the education system survived for
many years beyond the ability of the government to fund it properly.
Similar patterns were evident in the health sector and social
welfare.
1.13 The fastest decline was found in services
dependent on foreign exchange: for example, immunisation services
collapsed completely by 2002 due to the lack of foreign exchange
for fuel, vaccines and syringes (all import dependent commodities).
Donor support was therefore needed (and provided by DFID, UNICEF,
WHO and others) to enable Zimbabwe to rebuild and maintain a functional
vaccination programme. Donor assistance also enabled Zimbabwean
women to plan pregnancies (almost certainly a contributor to lower
than expected child malnutrition and stable child mortality rates).
1.14 The continuing deterioration in physical
infrastructure, lack of materials and supplies and the economic
opportunity costs of being a teacher or nurse have more recently
eroded service provision. In the absence of sustained government
commitment and core funding, especially for salaries, MDG indicators
have deteriorated rapidly in the last couple of years. In 2006 WHO
declared that Zimbabweans had one of the world's lowest life expectancy
rates, at 37 years for men and 34 for women.
Gender and social exclusion
1.15 Pre-existing gender inequalities have
been exacerbated further by 10 years of economic decline
and political repression. Maternal mortality has risen sharply
as services have collapsed and access, especially in rural areas,
decreased. Young women, physiologically and economically more
vulnerable, are disproportionately affected by HIV and twice as
likely as young men to be infected. Women bear the burden of care
for the chronically ill and are disadvantaged under customary
law.
1.16 Young men under 24 years of age
made up over 70% of Zimbabweans deported from South Africa until
the recent (and temporary) lifting of visa requirements. With
fewer young people able to stay in school, the number of disaffected
youths who have little stake in today's Zimbabwe has burgeoned
with serious consequences for future stability.
1.17 Despite some clear success from 15 years
of programmes to reduce stigma and discrimination, one in four
children in Zimbabwe grows up without one or both parents and
many face psychological problems, heightened risk of abuse and
decreased access to education and health care. Repressive actions
by the former government have led to growing numbers of people
displaced—by land reform, urban "clean up" operations
and sporadic crackdowns on illegal settlements and mining activities.
DFID's programme
1.18 Zimbabwe's future remains uncertain
and things could change for the better or worse. A flexible and
adaptable strategy is therefore required, to ensure that DFID
can continue to deliver a high impact aid programme under volatile
and challenging conditions and under a range of potential scenarios,
from strong reform and change to sharper decline and deterioration.
1.19 DFID Zimbabwe committed £60 million
in development assistance to Zimbabwe for 2009-10, the highest
total to date. The core of our programme provides practical assistance
to poor and vulnerable people in greatest need, including humanitarian
assistance and protracted relief and basic services. All aid is
delivered in line with the Paris Declaration and OECD/DAC Fragile
States Principles.
1.20 We are also seizing opportunities to
bolster reform and build momentum for change, by providing technical
assistance to reforming Ministries and supporting opportunities
to strengthen the accountability and responsiveness of the State
towards its citizens. With international partners, we are pressing
for implementation of the GPA, including a Constitutional Review
that could increase democratic space and strengthen the prospects
for free and fair elections.
1.21 Our aid is making a real difference
in a difficult environment. Some of the specific results UK aid
is working to deliver in Zimbabwe include:
— distributing agricultural inputs such
as seeds and fertiliser to about 375,000 smallholder households,
reaching more than two million people;
— fighting HIV by promoting behavioural
change including distribution of 70 million male condoms
and four million female condoms;
— leading the establishment of the multi-donor
Expanded Support Programme for HIV and AIDS that is on target
to deliver Anti-Retroviral Treatment to 58,000 people in
2009;
— helping WFP to deliver emergency food
aid to an estimated 1.6 million people by March 2010;
— supporting UNICEF and partners to reduce
the impact of cholera and other waterborne diseases by improving
access to clean water and sanitation for over two million people;
— supporting nutrition outcomes in children:
no district in Zimbabwe suffers from emergency levels of malnutrition;
— supporting the provision of textbooks
and critical learning materials to 5300 primary schools;
— and providing technical assistance to
the Office of the Prime Minister and the Ministry of Finance to
strengthen their capacity to implement reforming policies and
supporting a payroll audit to identify ghost workers.
Our programmes have been designed to continue
operating effectively in either improving or deteriorating contexts
in the future.
1.22 Our engagement is guided by a cross-Whitehall
strategy on Zimbabwe, agreed among key departments, including
DFID, FCO, MoD and HMT. The strategy recognises that the Inclusive
Government is Zimbabwe's best chance for economic recovery and
political change, justifying a structured and incremental re-engagement
by the UK and international community. It seeks to calibrate UK
support against implementation of the GPA. The strategy is built
around strong cross-departmental working, both in London and in
Harare where the DFID office and UK Mission are co-located.
The future
1.23 Zimbabwe's recovery in 2009 was
in many respects remarkable, if still fragile. At the beginning
of the year, the country was on the brink of collapse, with prices
doubling every 24 hours, schools and clinics shut down, a
cholera epidemic underway and millions dependent on food aid.
At the year's end, inflation was down to single digits, public
servants were being paid and food was available in city shops.
1.24 Pro-active South African mediation,
following the Maputo SADC Summit in October, has further added
to the pressure for change and, if maintained, adds an important
new element to the equation. Opponents of reform retain control
of the security services and the option of violence, but overall
the balance of advantage seems to be steadily swinging behind
the reformists, with a growing sense that progress cannot easily
be reversed.
1.25 Nevertheless, the political situation
remains volatile and unpredictable and the tipping point has not
yet been reached. Recovering the quality of life, diversified
economy and high calibre civil service that once existed will
take some years of sustained effort and good government. Zimbabwe
appears to be in a transitional phase but it is a transition that
is likely to continue to be protracted, messy and probably non-linear.
1.26 DFID will need to remain flexible and
opportunistic, calibrating our engagement to progress on the ground.
The core of DFID's programme going forward will remain focused
on support for basic services, livelihoods and humanitarian needs.
Resources will continue to be delivered through the UN and NGOs
in the near future.
1.27 We will also continue to seek opportunities
to build momentum for change by building capacity in reforming
Ministries, (especially the Office of the Prime Minister and the
Ministry of Finance) and strengthening the accountability of the
Executive by building on commitments in the GPA. This is likely
to include support to the Constitution Making Process, elections,
Parliament, media, civil society and possibly additional small-scale
support, with other donors, for security and justice sector reform.
2. PROSPECTS
FOR A
CLOSER RELATIONSHIP
BETWEEN DFID AND
THE GOVERNMENT
OF ZIMBABWE
2.1 After 2000, DFID was unable to maintain
a credible development engagement with the ZANU (PF) regime and,
from that period, no funds have been passed through the government.
However, DFID and other donors continued to have some engagement
with public institutions in Zimbabwe to deliver basic services—where
these institutions and national policies were essentially sound
and consistent with international standards. This was especially
the case around HIV prevention and treatment. This approach has
helped to slow the decline of public systems to some extent and
has helped avoid the need to establish parallel service delivery
structures.
2.2 This approach also positioned DFID well
to support a more legitimate government when it arrived. For example—because
of our longstanding support to the national treatment programme
for HIV, which involved working with existing public health institutions—DFID
were able to lead donor work with the Ministry of Health to deliver
funding to retain health workers during the cholera crisis. The
health retention payments were, though, paid directly to health
workers' bank accounts rather than through government systems.
2.3 The formation of the Inclusive Government
in February 2009 changed the balance of risk and opportunity
and justified a structured and incremental reengagement with Zimbabwe.
A key component of mitigating the risks and realising the opportunities
is a coordinated approach by the international community. Donors
have been able to maintain a cohesive position around the kind
of changes that would signify a return to democratic government
and the rule of law. We have focussed on aligning behind the Government
of Zimbabwe's own commitments as agreed by the three main parties
in the GPA. This cohesion has been time-consuming to build and
maintain but it has become a very useful mechanism to communicate
clearly with the Inclusive Government around the kind of reform
needed in Zimbabwe for donors to increase their support.
2.4 Donor reengagement is calibrated against
implementation of the GPA and progress towards the "Hague
Principles" (agreed by like-minded donors in 2007). These
principles include full access to humanitarian assistance, a commitment
to the rule of law, economic reform, respect for internationally
agreed human rights and a commitment to free and fair elections.
2.5 For DFID, the Inclusive Government has
created greater opportunity for engagement and better working
relationships with some elements of government. As an uneasy cohabitation
between political antagonists, the Inclusive Government is not
yet the partner we require to sustain a full development relationship.
Nevertheless, it provides a platform to continue to develop the
programme away from short-term relief and to address underlying,
longer-term causes of humanitarian crisis.
2.6 In April 2009, the International Development
Secretary announced a further £15 million of aid to
Zimbabwe, including funding to rehabilitate Zimbabwe's water and
sanitation systems, whose disrepair was a key contributory factor
to the 2008-09 cholera pandemic. In June 2009 the Prime
Minister, Gordon Brown, welcoming Morgan Tsvangirai to London,
further increased the size of the UK's development assistance
to £60 million for 2009-10—our largest ever programme
in Zimbabwe. This included an additional £5 million
for food security and for education (approximately £4 million
and £1 million respectively).
2.7 We have also begun to provide technical
assistance and policy guidance to key reforming Ministries and
institutions. We have supported the Ministry of Finance to prepare
the 2010 budget, Zimbabwe's first credible budget in nearly
a decade. At Prime Minister Tsvangirai's request, we have also
provided flexible TA to his own Office to perform essential policy,
parliamentary and other leadership functions.
2.8 Although it does not yet have a poverty
reduction strategy as such, the Inclusive Government has developed
an agenda to meet immediate needs in the Short Term Emergency
Recovery Plan (STERP), the 100-Day Plan and its successor the
Government Work Programme. An early priority for DFID was to align
its programme of assistance with the priorities set out in the
STERP and 100 Day Plan. For example, we are providing £3 million
in 2009-10 for the rehabilitation of Zimbabwe's six major
referral hospitals, including those in Harare and Bulawayo.
2.9 All UK aid is currently delivered through
the UN, NGOs and contracted partners. It is unlikely that this
will change in the foreseeable future. However by taking steps
with other donors to align our assistance to the 2009 and
2010 budgets, we are providing support to Government priority
areas and easing budgetary pressures by paying for essential humanitarian
and basic services assistance through parallel donor financing.
2.10 The Inclusive Government is an interim
arrangement: the political struggle between the ZANU (PF) regime
and the MDC has continued within as well as outside government.
Our strategy is to provide support to build momentum for change,
by working to leverage reform where we see an opportunity, not
just by responding to progress as it occurs. Most observers believe
that the next elections will be held in the first half of 2011 at
the earliest. The period up to then will be difficult and painful,
with periods of both improvement and deterioration likely. DFID
will need to remain nimble and opportunistic in our response to
events. Our development programme, our relations with the region
(especially with South Africa) and our approach to the sanctions
issue will all impact directly on the prospects for real change.
3 HOW DFID WORKS
WITH OTHER
DONORS, MULTILATERAL
AGENCIES AND
NGOS TO
DELIVER ASSISTANCE
3.1 DFID delivers its aid programme in Zimbabwe
through key strategic partners such as UN agencies and established
NGO partners. At present, no money goes through Government systems
or the RBZ. South Africa was the only donor who provided $35 million
of budget support in 2009 and has signalled the intention
of continuing to do so in 2010. We also understand that China
has provided $5 million into Zimbabwe's systems; however,
there are uncertainties around the how the aid would be spent
and exact volume of China's contribution. Donors have maintained
coordinated positions in line with the Paris/Accra Aid Harmonisation
agenda and OECD/DAC Principles for best practice in working in
Fragile States. Aid coordination is good and donor funding is
increasingly jointly funded or pooled, with DFID leading pooled
funding arrangements in several areas.
Transitional Framework
3.2 As mentioned above, ensuring a consistent
and agreed approach by the international community to the situation
in Zimbabwe has been critical. On the ground in Harare there has
been a major focus on ensuring that aid is coordinated and delivered
through agreed mechanisms and processes. During 2008 and
building on the Hague Principles, donors have developed fuller
plans and processes for gauging progress by the Government and
sketching out recovery plans and aid volumes and how it will be
spent. DFID continues to play a prominent role in developing the
emerging aid architecture and donor strategy.
3.3 Representatives from donor capitals
also met in Berlin in October 2009 to review progress since
the inception of the Inclusive Government. There was a general
recognition that Zimbabwe has entered a transitional support phase
where definite progress has been made but remains highly fragile.
DFID support (both service delivery and technical assistance)
is designed to help strengthen the government's capacity to handle
pressing issues (eg. its current fiscal problems) and to help
support reform through a difficult and fluid political situation.
Aid coordination architecture
3.4 Examples of key donor coordination processes
include:
— UN monthly coordination meetings with
donors and bi-monthly meetings with Ambassadors and Heads of Mission.
— The World Bank Multi Donor Trust Fund
Policy Group, which includes heads of aid agencies of contributing
countries and the UN.
— Sector cluster groups for health, governance,
and orphans and vulnerable children.
— The like-minded group—an informal
but highly cohesive and influential aid coordination and policy
group. There are no hard and fast rules as to membership, but
typically the EC, US, UK, France, Germany, Norway, Sweden, Canada,
Netherlands, Australia, Denmark and Finland participate.
Delivery of DFID programmes through the UN and
CSOs
3.5 DFID Zimbabwe funds many organisations
indirectly. Most of our programming goes through strategic partners
who in turn implement their programmes through civil society organisations.
For example, our livelihoods programme (Protracted Relief Programme
Phase II) goes through a contracted managing agent to support
the work of 19 NGOs.
3.6 The UN and CSOs continue to be vital
partners. Parts of the UN family, especially UNICEF and WFP, have
offered effective and practical ways of working to respond to
critical needs, ranging from food aid to essential drugs and chemicals
to ensuring safe drinking water. They have national coverage and
are able to negotiate access in politically challenging situations.
The UN remains the largest manager of DFID funding, as they are
for most other donors active in Zimbabwe.
3.7 In the past we have questioned whether
the UN could be more vocal about the humanitarian situation. UNICEF
and the WFP have responded well to the humanitarian crisis and
continue to respond to DFID and other donor evaluation processes.
About half of our programme will be delivered through the UN in
2009-10.
3.8 CSOs enable donors and UN agencies to
reach out to communities across the country and to the poorest
within those communities. Zimbabwean civil society organisations
also have an important role in strengthening state accountability.
This includes protecting the human rights of Zimbabwe's citizens,
supporting their participation in key decision making processes,
strengthening the media and doing more to monitor state performance.
Key priorities include the Constitution-Making Process, media,
Parliament and the next elections.
3.9 There are several funding channels which
contribute to these objectives alongside the main DFID programme.
We support civil society in Zimbabwe through our central funding
channels—(i) the Civil Society Challenge Fund (CSCF), (ii)
Programme Partnership Agreements (PPAs) and (iii) the Governance
and Transparency Fund (GTF). We also support civil society from
the Country Office through the Africa Conflict Prevention Pool
and a Gender Support Programme.
3.10 Close working between DFID, the FCO,
HMT and MoD is also vital for the success of UK government efforts.
In Zimbabwe, all departments are focused on supporting the country
to implement the GPA and improve the lives of the poorest and
most vulnerable people. Since moving into the joint compound in
April 2009, relations have become even closer and more integrated.
The Ambassador, Head of DFID and Defence Attach
office work together on the shared agenda and
staff freely share information and seek input across departments.
In London, DFID staff work very closely with the FCO Zimbabwe
Unit, HM Treasury, the Cabinet Office and No. 10 guided by
a cross-Whitehall strategy agreed and monitored by the National
Security International Relations and Development Cabinet Sub-Committee
(NSID).
Role of International and Regional Financial Institutions:
World Bank, IMF, African Development Bank, and of the EC
3.11 World Bank and AfDB engagement is limited
by Zimbabwe's arrears to both banks. As Zimbabwe begins a process
of credible re-engagement, both institutions are stepping up their
involvement. The World Bank acts as the secretariat of a Multilateral
Development Trust Fund (MDTF), managing technical study and assistance
funds agreed in multi-donor sector groups. A second MDTF mechanism
focused on major programme funding will now enable donor funding
to flow into infrastructure investment, using World Bank procedures
to ensure funds are allocated and implemented effectively. These
funds will be mostly targeted at critical poverty reducing and
growth enhancing investments (eg water supplies and possibly energy)
where the World Bank is especially well placed.
3.12 The AfDB is also now engaging in Zimbabwe,
providing technical assistance and some funding to critical areas.
It is especially well placed to support more politically sensitive
areas, for example in supporting Zimbabwe's capacity to manage
its external debt and developing an effective approach to this
challenge.
3.13 Zimbabwe's IMF voting rights were suspended
over arrears. Zimbabwe's recent positive direction of economic
policy implementation and re-engagement with the IMF create a
concrete prospect for voting rights to be restored soon. The IMF
has partially lifted the ban on technical assistance to Zimbabwe
and started providing some limited assistance since May 2009,
and has subsequently developed an effective relationship with
the Ministry of Finance. This is an initial step towards a formally
approved IMF programme. This would be important in providing a
signal on Zimbabwe's commitment to sound economic policy and would
help build confidence between government and donors. We are discussing
this prospect with Board members and IMF staff, to ensure that
the conditions for a successful programme are right.
3.14 The European Commission including ECHO
is one of the three major donors in Zimbabwe, alongside USAID
and DFID, that has been continually active over the last decade.
The EC also ensures that funds do not pass through government
systems. The EC has been a particularly valuable partner in the
health sector for DFID, and been well placed to play an important
role in donor re-engagement of the education sector.
3.15 The Global Fund for AIDS, TB and Malaria
has approved three rounds of funding to Zimbabwe. However, implementation
has been challenging. The capture of Global Fund resources by
the RBZ taken out of local bank accounts in early 2008 ($14 million
in total, returned in late 2008) led to the freezing of Global
Fund resources. The situation has now been resolved and Ministry
of Health, donors and other stakeholders are working hard to ensure
these critical funds flow more effectively in future. DFID is
now one of the two donor representatives on the Global Fund Country
Coordinating Mechanism (CCM).
4. DFID'S CONTRIBUTION
TO THE
PROVISION OF
HUMANITARIAN AID
Need, how aid will be spent, coordination and
remaining flexible for the future
4.1 Analysis suggests that humanitarian
assistance will continue to be needed in Zimbabwe for at least
two more years. The impact of failed policies—including
chaotic land reform, economic mismanagement and collapse, the
erosion of basic services and the general challenge of erratic
rainfall—has been hunger, and disease outbreaks, coupled
with the inability of the most vulnerable to access life-saving
services.
4.2 Wherever possible, DFID Zimbabwe is
providing multi-year funding to respond to predictable hunger
and vulnerability. Examples include the wide-ranging Protracted
Relief Programme—which helps people to grow food and meet
basic health, education and other social costs (see Figure 3)—and
support for IDPs through the International Organisation for Migration
(IOM). Where necessary, DFID Zimbabwe has also responded quickly
to sudden onset emergencies: in 2008-09 up to 36,000 were
displaced by post-election violence, over seven million people
received food aid, and there were about 100,000 recorded
cases of cholera.
4.3 In a deteriorating environment, there
will need to be a greater emphasis on direct humanitarian assistance
while in an improving environment we will use more social protection
interventions.
4.4 DFID works closely with other humanitarian
agencies and donors to develop a shared understanding of humanitarian
need through the Common Humanitarian Assessment Process and Consolidated
Appeals Process (CHAP and CAP). Progress and emerging need is
monitored through the Humanitarian Country Team/Donor meetings.
DFID is also supporting the UN to improve coordination.
Food security and UK's humanitarian assistance
4.5 Last year's hungry season in Zimbabwe
was an extraordinary time and the UK gave WFP £9 million
to respond to the growing food crisis in the country and avert
a major disaster. WFP and its cooperating partners effectively
assisted more than five million people per month in both February
and March 2009.
4.6 Most food-security actors agree that
WFP adapted well to this highly volatile environment and learned
valuable lessons. It was able to address perceived needs and increase
logistical operations to deliver massive amounts of assistance
in a relatively short timeframe. DFID's contribution to the operation
allowed WFP to swiftly pre-position food as the Programme began
to scale up activities.
4.7 Food availability has improved since
last year following a good harvest, an end to the Grain Marketing
Board monopoly on importing cereals into the country, dollarisation
of the economy and availability of donor-funded agricultural inputs.
Extensive humanitarian support will remain critical to avoid the
erosion of livelihoods and protect the health and nutrition status
of the vulnerable. DFID funding of £4 million for WFP
operations in Zimbabwe this year will contribute to food aid for
up to 1.6 million people.
Water, sanitation and cholera and UK's humanitarian
assistance
4.8 Zimbabwe's cholera outbreak between
August 2008 and July 2009 was on an unprecedented scale.
In total, there were nearly 100,000 cholera cases with nearly
4,300 deaths of which more than 60% were at the community
level (not in a hospital).
4.9 In early 2008 in anticipation of
waterborne disease outbreaks, DFID Zimbabwe released £1 million
to UNICEF for the procurement and pre-positioning of IV fluid
and water tablets. This enabled NGO partners to rapidly respond
to cholera and other disease outbreaks and improve water and sanitation
hygiene (WASH) provision at clinics and health facilities.
4.10 A further problem during the cholera
crisis last year was the very low number of health workers still
going to work. Spiralling hyperinflation rendered their pay meaningless
and a basic salary did not even cover transport costs. In response,
DFID Zimbabwe led a process to establish a national Health Workers
Retention scheme that paid health workers a US$ allowance that
enabled nurses and other essential health workers to return to
their clinics. The retention scheme was joined in early 2009 by
several other donors and was then taken over by the Global Fund.
4.11 New cases of cholera began to appear
again in September 2009. By 13 December, the total cumulative
caseload stood at 146 cases and five deaths. By comparison,
this time last year, there were 17,908 cases and 877 deaths.
The situation is encouraging although the humanitarian community
remains cautious as the rainy season will continue for many more
weeks.
4.12 This year (2009-10) there was a big
push by the international humanitarian community to carry out
preventive rehabilitation work on the water systems and to get
supplies in place early to minimise the worst effects of another
cholera outbreak. The GoZ has also put $17 million directly
into targeted water and sanitation rehabilitation works primarily
in Harare and surrounding areas.
4.13 As part of this general effort, the
UK gave £4.7 million to UNICEF in advance of the rainy
season in early October 2009. This will supply safe water and
access to sanitation services for the most vulnerable population
groups. UK aid is being used to:
— improve water and sanitation services
through emergency rehabilitation interventions;
— enable urban councils to provide equitable
water services to all residents;
— ensure health institutions, schools and
communities in most "at risk" districts have access
to reliable water, sanitation and hygiene;
— increase coverage of critical Non-Food
Items (see above) to prevent the spread of cholera; and
— prevent the spread of cholera and other
diseases through improved environmental health risk management.
4.14 Ultimately, long-term predictable investment
is needed to increase the number of households with safe water
and access to sanitation and to decrease the incidence of waterborne
disease. DFID Zimbabwe is planning a significant investment to
move from emergency preparedness and response this year to transition
and long-term recovery in future years. This will complement the
water, sanitation and hygiene support already provided to rural
communities through DFID's other basic service programmes.
4.15 The UK is also providing life-saving
health services for vulnerable people including the provision
of essential medicines to all 1,300 primary care clinics
and rural hospitals in the country. Since it began, the Emergency
Vital Medicines Support Programme has absorbed £15 million
from the UK and about as much again from ECHO, Canada and Ireland.
Combined with the Health Worker Retention Scheme, the two programmes
have ensured that Zimbabwean health facilities are open and functional
across the country.
Internally Displaced Persons and the UK's humanitarian
response
4.16 More than 1.5 million people have
been displaced by the policies of the GoZ since 2000 (including
the Fast Track Land Reform from 2000 to date and Operation
"Murambatsvina"— drive out trash—in
2005) and also by post-election violence since 2008. Despite the
establishment of the Inclusive Government, farm invasions continue
today and the risk of displacement for remaining farm-worker families
remains a serious concern.
4.17 DFID Zimbabwe has had a programme with
IOM Zimbabwe to provide emergency humanitarian assistance to IDPs
and humanitarian assistance at border crossing points since 2006-07.
DFID extended this programme in May 2009. It will now run until
March 2010 and its total value is £6.5 million
(with £1.5 million of that provided in 2009-10).
4.18 IOM continues to be at the forefront
of responding to new displacements and emergencies. IOM has also
developed an impressive multi-media information campaign, which
appears to target accurately the groups identified as most likely
to become potential migrants. The Beitbridge centre was established
in May 2006 and by the end of May 2009, it had assisted 320,000 returned
migrants.
5. EFFECTIVENESS
AND IMPACT
OF DFID'S
SUPPORT FOR
DELIVERY OF
BASIC SERVICES
State of basic services in Zimbabwe
5.1 The ability of the Inclusive Government
to deliver quality basic services to its people is weak following
years of underinvestment and turmoil. The challenge of rebuilding
basic services is massive and far exceeds the public purse available.
Basic service-related MDG indicators for Zimbabwe are currently
a mixed bag (paragraphs 1.12 to 1.15).
DFID interventions
5.2 DFID Zimbabwe has been a major donor
in the provision of basic services for many years, working through
the UN and other providers (such as Crown Agents) and, when feasible,
with GoZ line ministries. Basic services account for over 43%
of the UK aid programme in 2009-10. Additional support is provided
through other programmes with basic services elements such as
those in the humanitarian portfolio (for example, IDP health services
or water and sanitation in cholera response or through our broader
programme for OVCs).
5.3 Over the last 15 years, we have
made a significant and sustained investment in health including
the prevention and treatment of HIV and AIDS. Health related services
account for the vast majority of our basic services spending (about
£25 million). The next section of the memorandum (section
6) looks specifically at the results and impact of our health
funding. In 2009, DFID Zimbabwe also entered the education sector
through a joint fund managed by UNICEF.
Figure 2
ACTIVE DFID ZIMBABWE BASIC SERVICES PROGRAMMES
IN 2009-10
Health related
— Expanded Programme of Support for HIV
and AIDS.
— Saving Maternal and Newborn Lives Programme.
— HIV and AIDS Behaviour Change Communication.
— Emergency Vital Medicines Support Programme.
— Emergency Malaria Indoor Residual Spraying.
— Health Worker Retention Scheme.
— Emergency Health Support (hospital infrastructure).
— Programme of Support to Orphans and Vulnerable
Children.
— International Organisation for Migration
which includes HIV.
Education related
— Support to the Multi-Donor Transitional
Education Fund.
Water and sanitation related
— Emergency cholera response, cholera prevention
and longer term water and sanitation system rehabilitation in
both urban and rural areas.
— Protracted Relief Programme Phase II
for saving and building rural livelihoods. (See Figure 3)
Further detail on DFID basic services programmes
Education
5.4 By early 2009, the education sector
in Zimbabwe was in crisis. The sector suffered from high staff
attrition and poor teachers' salaries, which were insufficient
to cover even transport. The number of teachers more than halved
from about 120,000 to less than 60,000. On top of this, education
was severely disrupted for much of 2008 because of political
violence, some of which was actively targeted at teachers, as
well as disrupting normal community life for several months.
5.5 On joining the Inclusive Government,
the MDC initiated foreign currency allowances ($100) to all civil
servants, including teachers. This has had a positive effect on
the education system and it is now showing some early indications
of revival and most schools are open and functioning again, although
at diminished capacity. The new minister has wrestled his way
to a reasonable schedule of fees and levies (although with insufficient
monitoring) and enrolment is now up again.
5.6 In the summer of 2009, DFID Zimbabwe,
along with many other donors, agreed a new level of involvement
in the education sector in Zimbabwe. We are spending £1 million
in 2009-10 to provide technical advice and seed funding to
a pooled financing mechanism called the Transitional Education
Fund. The fund's objectives are to support procurement of education
commodities (textbooks, exercise books, classroom furniture, etc)
and technical assistance and to provide funding for a strong education
technical expert based within the EC to guide, influence and inform
policy developments in this neglected sector.
5.7 UNICEF manages the fund and our other
partners are the EC, Australia, Germany, Sweden, New Zealand,
the Netherlands and the World Bank. Additional donors are expected
to join in 2010. The fund is just getting started. Amongst other
things, it will provide textbooks and learning material to 5,300 primary
schools across the country. We will assess the impact of the fund
after its first year.
Vital Medicines
5.8 By 2008, national procurement of adequate
medicines was impossible for the Ministry of Health and Child
Welfare. The situation had become a serious humanitarian crisis
with under-funding and erosion of essential health services and
an exodus of health professionals. There was a huge shortage of
essential supplies and equipment. DFID Zimbabwe began an emergency
programme to procure and distribute essential drug supplies to
stock health facilities across all districts in Zimbabwe. This
is now a two year programme worth £11.5 million (plus
an additional £5 million in 2009-10) that helps meet
national health policy goals with a particular focus on the needs
of under-fives and women and the prevention and treatment of transmissible
diseases.
5.9 The Emergency Vital Medicines programme
has become the main vehicle for providing basic medicines and
surgical supplies in Zimbabwe. Other donors are ECHO, Canada,
Ireland, Netherlands and Australia. The programme has been instrumental
in ensuring a basic supply of drugs and sundries are available
at all 1,531 health facilities in Zimbabwe and especially
at rural health centres and district hospitals. In combination
with the Workers Retention Scheme, the two programmes are underpinning
access to life-saving services by poor people in Zimbabwe and
have kept health services functioning at a very difficult time.
5.10 UNICEF manages the programme and their
reports indicate that the programme has successfully led to increased
stock in most parts of the country and that stocks of vital medicines
are improving. Morale, patient attendance and perceptions of quality
are also strengthening.
Emergency Health Support
5.11 In the spring of 2009, the Deputy Prime
Minister's office appealed to DFID for funding for a specific
programme of work to improve referral hospital infrastructure
in six key hospitals, including the larger cities of Bulawayo,
Masvingo, Harare and Mutare. Health services in key referral hospitals
were compromised due to lack of key equipment and damage to infrastructure
in theatres, laundries, boiler rooms, kitchens and mortuaries.
This short-term investment should quickly yield visible improvements.
We will contribute £1 million over 2009-10. Crown Agents
is managing the project which is due to complete in the spring
of 2010.
Emergency Malaria Spraying
5.12 Malaria is the third leading cause
of morbidity and mortality in Zimbabwe, after HIV/AIDS and tuberculosis,
with over two million people suffering from this preventable disease
annually. The most vulnerable are under-fives, pregnant women,
the elderly and people living with HIV and AIDS. Improved treatment
with new malaria drugs procured through the Global Fund should
lower the mortality rate further whilst the roll out of bed net
programmes will improve prevention.
5.13 The bedrock of Zimbabwe's national
malaria prevention programme though is indoor residual spraying
which is estimated to avert up to four million cases per year
and over 1,000 deaths. This year the Ministry of Health has
secured $750,000 (of the total cost of $1.5 million)
from the Treasury, which is an excellent sign of their commitment
and strong prioritisation of this programme. USAID, which funded
$1 million of the costs last year (alongside DFID contributions),
is unable to support the programme this year so DFID has met the
other half of the need.
6. IMPACT OF
DFID'S FUNDING
FOR HEALTH
AND HIV AND
ITS SUPPORT
FOR ORPHANS
AND VULNERABLE
CHILDREN
6.1 DFID's programme has had significant
impact in recent years, ensuring that:
— the health system in Zimbabwe is still
largely functioning and each clinic retains a basic complement
of staff, drugs and services. People in Zimbabwe still have access
to basic health and HIV services, despite the near collapse of
government in late 2008;
— access to anti-retroviral treatment continues
to increase and has been increasing for the last five years;
— malnutrition rates in children across
Zimbabwe remain below emergency levels in every district despite
the economic and political turmoil;
— contraceptive use continues to grow and
unmet demand is shrinking: birth spacing is one of the main components
in reducing child mortality and saving mothers' lives;
— and HIV prevalence continues to decline
mainly because of behaviour change across the population.
Monitoring, Evaluation and Measuring Impact
6.2 The drive for clearer and more robust
evidence of results has meant that impact assessments (or impact
evaluations) are playing an increasing role in our monitoring,
enabling DFID to assess more effectively how projects or programmes
make a difference and how cost-effective they are. Impact evaluation
provides a rigorous assessment of the impact of a development
intervention on the lives and welfare outcomes for poor people,
including what changed and why—a process that is critical
to lesson learning especially across different countries.
6.3 A review of our health portfolio earlier
this year found that without DFID support the following key health-related
impacts would be severely compromised.
— Strong national prevention messaging
backed by voluntary counselling and testing and condoms via Population
Services International. Condom use has grown substantially through
social marketing, which has complemented public sector provision.
Part of the reduction in the prevalence rate of HIV in Zimbabwe
can be attributed to this long standing programme.
— Rapid scale up of Anti-Retroviral Therapy
(ARV)—DFID provides close to 30% of the ARVs, which save
40,000 lives a year.
— Provision of essential drugs—as
the largest funding partner, the majority of essential drugs distributed
through the public health sector are provided by DFID. Without
this funding, the public health sector would not have enough basic
essential drugs to prescribe.
— The process to ensure the return and
retention of health workers, which DFID led. By October 2008,
health services were close to closure, with many hospitals physically
closed. The retention scheme enabled these facilities to re-open
in January, and by February 2009, they were almost fully functional.
DFID support to HIV and AIDS prevention, care,
treatment and mitigation
6.4 DFID Zimbabwe has two multi-year programmes
that specifically and singularly target HIV and AIDS. These are
our Behavioural Change Communication programme and our participation
in the Expanded Support Programme for HIV and AIDS.
Behaviour Change Communications
6.5 DFID funds Population Services International
(PSI) Zimbabwe's HIV Behaviour Change Programme, which aims to
increase adoption of safer sexual behaviour in Zimbabwe. Behaviour
change is well established to be a major determinant in the reduction
of HIV transmission and, ultimately, premature death from AIDS.
The programme supports communication campaigns to address issues
such as HIV related stigma and multiple partnerships as well as
increasing HIV prevention, testing and counselling services, and
availability of socially marketed male and female condoms. We
are providing £22 million from 2006-11 (£4.6 million
in 2009-10). USAID also fund this programme.
6.6 With well over a year remaining under
the grant period, the programme is making good progress and has
already met or exceeded three out of six major targets for programme
outputs, including condom use, HIV testing and post-test treatment.
The Expanded Support Programme (ESP)
6.7 DFID participates in the Expanded Support
Programme for HIV and AIDS in Zimbabwe. The ESP aims to support
scale up of the national HIV and AIDS response in Zimbabwe including
increased access to Anti-Retroviral Therapy through a common mechanism
supported by five bilateral donors (Canada, Ireland, Norway, Sweden
and the UK) who have committed over $50 million to the ESP
during 2007-09. The programme is now in its third year of operation.
We are contributing £35 million over five years (£6 million
in 2009-10).
6.8 The ESP was established at a time when
relations with the government were increasingly strained. Yet,
the national plan to expand treatment with Anti-Retroviral medicines
to people living with HIV was sound and consistent with international
best practice. The results have been significant for the treatment
of AIDS and for support to broader health services including safe
blood services, laboratory support and transport, training and
management. The impact of the programme on other, non-contributing
donors was also significant. Having established a dialogue with
national HIV and AIDS authorities, the ESP demonstrated it was
possible to support national policy and public services without
passing money through the government and without becoming entangled
in political debate.
6.9 The recent annual review recognised
that the ESP has been a significant source of funding for HIV
and AIDS and has made an important contribution to the national
response and delivery of HIV and AIDS services in the 16 ESP-supported
districts. It recognises the ESP as an efficient and flexible
funding mechanism that is well coordinated. Progress includes:
a five-fold increase in numbers accessing treatment; significant
increases in take-up of ARVs; and comprehensive coverage of behaviour
change activities.
Impact of DFID funding on HIV
6.10 An impact assessment of the ESP programme
is being planned for 2010 at the end of a three-year implementing
period. Attribution to DFID spend is difficult but DFID was the
main funder of the programme and the main driver in getting the
programme established. The issue is complicated further because
impact indicators such as HIV prevalence declines and numbers
of HIV infections averted are difficult to attribute to specific
programmes and activities. Two important factors have contributed
to the decline in prevalence.
6.11 Firstly, the Government of Zimbabwe
demonstrated effective leadership at a very early stage. For example,
the government established the AIDS levy which set aside 3% of
tax revenue to fund the prevention and treatment of HIV and they
established an independent National AIDS Council with clear responsibilities
and duties.
6.12 Secondly, donors have delivered sustained
and consistent funding over the last 15 to 20 years
to HIV prevention programmes. This has enabled behaviour change
programmes (such as through ESP or PSI) to focus on consistent
messaging around using condoms, reducing the number of partners,
and ensuring protection during pregnancy and breastfeeding. The
fact that DFID and others have made sustained investments in health,
family planning, and HIV prevention over a long period is very
likely to have contributed significantly to the decline in Zimbabwe's
HIV rates.
DFID support to maternal health
6.13 DFID is working with our partners to
reduce maternal and infant mortality. This programme aims to protect
the lives of mothers and newborns, especially those affected by
HIV and AIDS and to maintain access to family planning services
(including contraceptives) and to life-saving obstetric services
and newborn care. DFID Zimbabwe is investing £25 million
over five years (£4.85 million in 2009-10).
6.14 Despite challenges, the programme has
made progress in improving procurement of commodities, increasing
mother to child transmission (PMTCT) services, influencing national
policy and programming (eg around user fees).
DFID support for Orphans and vulnerable children
6.15 DFID contributes £22 million
to a multi-donor Programme of Support for Orphans and Vulnerable
Children (OVCs) in line with Government priorities. The total
pooled fund is worth $85 million. Our funding is for the
period 2006-10 and is managed through UNICEF to implement
the National Action Plan for OVCs helps these children, plus those
who are vulnerable because of other factors (such as abuse and
neglect, economic hardship, displacement).
6.16 Examples of results to date are below:
— By July 2009 a total of 353,409 children
had been reached: 185,893 girls, and 167,516 boys.
— By the end of the second year of the
project, 205,000 children, who otherwise would have missed
school, accessed education.
— In 2009-10, we expect to see a surge
in OVCs accessing school, with over 700,000 children accessing
schooling through the roll out of the BEAM (Basic Education Assistance
Module). Through this system, school fees are paid directly to
schools.
— 4,243 children have been issued
with birth certificates so far. The purpose is to boost birth
registration in Zimbabwe, which has declined from 74% in 2005-06 to
only 37% in 2008-09 but is essential for children to gain
access to basic services like schooling.
— With no inflation challenges, we expect
that BEAM will ensure that around 700,000 vulnerable children
will be able to access education in the 2009-10 school calendar
year without having to pay school fees.
Impact of DFID funding for OVCs
6.17 An exercise to assess the impact of
the programme on reducing the overall vulnerability of OVCs in
Zimbabwe is planned for March 2010. The impact assessment will
focus on three particular areas:
— the emerging impact of interventions
on children as well as number of children being reached by UNICEF
and its partners;
— an analysis of the cost effectiveness
of the different approaches to reduce children's vulnerability;
and
— an analysis of the different approaches
to reduce the vulnerability of OVCs in Zimbabwe to identify the
specific benefits of different approaches together with their
strengths and weaknesses. This will highlight opportunities, challenges
and lessons learned for the design of a future programme.
7. SUPPORT FOR
AND STRATEGIES
FOR RURAL
DEVELOPMENT AND
LAND REFORM
Rural development and safeguarding livelihoods
7.1 DFID Zimbabwe's flagship community development
programme is the large and successful Protracted Relief Programme
which is now in its second phase (PRP II) It aims to reduce poverty
and protect livelihoods by supporting poor and vulnerable households.
The PRP reaches 54 out of 60 rural districts and also
targets the most vulnerable in urban centres. Managed through
a coordinating unit which provides technical and programmatic
oversight, it is made up of 27 technical and implementing
partners. Together with their stakeholders they provide a dynamic
and wide-ranging package of livelihoods support, food security,
water and sanitation support and social protection, including
support to the chronically ill.
Figure 3
THE PROTRACTED RELIEF PROGRAMME II
The PRP II began in 2008-09, following on from
the first phase PRP, and will continue until 2012-13, with the
UK contributing £54.8 million. In 2009-10, our contribution
is £14.5 million. PRP II became a multi-donor programme
in 2009 as other donors came onboard. It now includes Australia,
Denmark, Norway, Netherlands, European Commission and World Bank
who together will contribute at least £24 million over
the lifetime of the programme, most channelling their funds through
DFID for implementation.
The goal is to reduce extreme poverty in Zimbabwe
and the purpose, to prevent destitution and protect and promote
the livelihoods of the poor and most vulnerable. Phase II aims
to reach two million people (approximately 15% of the country's
population) in peri-urban and rural areas.
In Zimbabwe last year 200809, this programme
helped:
— nearly two million of the poorest people
to grow more food;
— one million of the poorest people get
access to clean water;
— 700,000 urban poor people with food
vouchers, shelter and access to education; and
— distribute agricultural inputs to 200,577 households.
7.2 This planting season, the programme
will reach 375,000 poor and vulnerable households with fertilisers,
maize seed, seeds for small grains, and legume seed. The package
received is designed to be appropriate to the specific locality
and aims to enable a household to meet most of its food needs
for the following year. The PRP coordinates closely with the FAO
and other donor support to ensure close to national coverage and
limit geographical duplication of similar schemes. The FAO estimates
that a total of 742,000 households will be reached with seed
and fertiliser packages this season between the PRP and other
donor funded interventions. This has ensured the poorest 50% of
rural households will benefit. As a result, dependency on humanitarian
assistance should be further reduced over the next year, and it
will enable rural communities to start re-building their livelihoods.
7.3 Finally, PRP II makes a significant
investment in water, sanitation and hygiene (WASH) interventions.
A minimum of 500 new water points are being installed each
year, working with the community and local district technicians
to help ensure maintenance is also in place. Rural schools and
clinics benefit from sanitation provision, as do some particularly
vulnerable households. The programme supports health clubs, which
have been shown to be effective at encouraging sound hygiene and
health practices, working where possible with village health workers
and government environmental health technicians to help ensure
a more sustainable impact.
Land reform and UK policy
7.4 The UK has made clear to the Government
of Zimbabwe its concerns over continued farm invasions by ZANU(PF)
supporters since the formation of the Inclusive Government, which
contravenes the SADC ruling of November 2008 and the terms
of the GPA. The seizure of many of the few remaining commercially
productive farms exacerbates Zimbabwe's capacity to return to
sustainable economic growth and provide critical employment opportunities.
The Zimbabwe Government's refusal to protect property rights will
also deter regional and international investors just when Zimbabwe
most needs to rebuild its economy. Above all, violent invasions
demonstrate a lack of respect for the rule of law and we have
urged the police and judicial authorities in Zimbabwe to take
action.
7.5 The UK has taken a consistent position
on land reform. We have always emphasised that reviving the commercial
agricultural economy will be an important part of Zimbabwe's recovery
although we recognise there are many ways to do this. We have
always expressed our willingness to work with other donors to
support a fair, pro-poor and transparent process of land reform.
We would be willing to consider supporting this process as part
of the wider recovery package assuming it would be designed to
provide broad based recovery. We have not agreed, though, that
the UK should accept responsibility for compensation.
Land and agriculture background
7.6 Zimbabwe inherited a dual agrarian structure
from Rhodesia, with two distinct agricultural systems: a commercial
farming sector, which was predominately owned by Zimbabwean white
ethnic minority, and a traditional (communal) agriculture farming
sector. Funded in part by donors including UK ODA, the Zimbabwean
government made some attempt at land reform programmes mostly
in the mid 1980s transferring around 9% of total rural land to
re-settled farmers through a "willing buyer—willing
seller" approach. The UK alone provided £40 million
in the 1980s, of which £3 million was returned to the
UK by the Government of Zimbabwe. Beneficiaries of these earlier
schemes remain in place, referred to as "old resettlement
areas".
7.7 In February 2000, the Fast Track Land
Reform Programme (FTLRP) was launched ostensibly to address the
inequitable distribution of land once and for all. The FTLRP was
initially designed to ensure a maximum size of land ownership
which did not discriminate on racial or political grounds. In
practice, implementation of the programme was neither just nor
sustainable, and the ensuing occupation of thousands of commercial
farms was at a high cost to the economy and the people in general.
7.8 Since the onset of the FTLRP over 200,000 farm
workers have lost their jobs. Including families and dependents,
over one million people have been displaced from commercial farms
and total commercial agricultural production has more than halved.
7.9 Land remains a highly emotive issue
in Zimbabwe and this often obscures objective analysis, policymaking
and implementation. Land distribution at independence was unequal
and unsustainable. Following the FTLRP, distribution remains unequal,
although more for political than historic reasons.
Moving forward on land
7.10 Land and agriculture remain the backbone
of the Zimbabwean economy and are central to any recovery strategy.
Commercial agriculture prior to Zimbabwe's current political and
economic crisis was the largest formal sector employer in the
country. The smallholder sector is critical for ensuring food
security and poverty reduction and has potential for greater economic
productivity.
7.11 In Zimbabwe, much of the prognosis
for agriculture is tied up with the broader political questions
of when Zimbabwe will make the transition to a democratic, technocratic
Government that protects the rule of law. As long as access to
land remains a politicised issue, it is impossible to envisage
a viable policy to start returning production in the commercial
farming sector towards 2000 levels. The smallholder sector
that is interdependent with the commercial sector has been neglected
by government in the wake of erratic land reform policies, despite
its potential to contribute up to 70% of the country's cereal
production.
7.12 The encouraging signs of recent progress
under the inclusive government, particularly on economic reform,
hold out the prospect for deeper DFID engagement on land issues.
The GPA commits the Inclusive Government to undertaking a comprehensive
land audit. Donors are broadly positive about this.
7.13 Assuming a regime which genuinely wished
to increase production levels and has the political will to put
appropriate policies in place, a recovery programme for commercial
farming could be set out containing the following elements, some
of which have already happened:
— a completed land audit as part of a process
leading to a constitutionally guaranteed, saleable form of land
tenure;
— the return of the rule of law and the
resuscitation of institutions providing appropriate land administration
services;
— market liberalisation: the positive impact
on the ground seen over 2009 has been very substantial, though
constraints remain (credit, marketing, etc); and
— government and, where appropriate, donor
support to help the sector recover—albeit avoiding subsidies.
DFID's role in supporting reform
7.14 Options for deeper engagement are being
considered in a number of different forums. Key issues in current
discussions include:
— how to handle the multi-farm ownership
issue that is holding any process back;
— how to handle expectations on compensation
and restitution; and
— and the importance of a land audit being
part of a wider process, rather than a stand-alone event.
7.15 DFID, with other donors, will consider
proposals from the Inclusive Government, with discussion on a
potential land audit being an immediate potential step. In the
meantime, DFID continues to engage with structures developed for
support to agriculture. DFID is a key member of the Agriculture
sub-group chaired by the Netherlands, which meets as part of the
World Bank's Multi-Donor Trust Fund mechanism and is supporting
analysis and discussions on land as well as the wider agricultural
sector.
8. ZIMBABWE'S
RELATIONS WITH
ITS REGIONAL
NEIGHBOURS AND
THEIR IMPACT
ON ECONOMIC
RECOVERY AND
DEVELOPMENT
8.1 The Zimbabwe economy and international
relations are tied into the region in three main ways: firstly,
by the prominent political role played by Zimbabwe in regional
institutions such as the Southern African Development Community
(SADC), and the Common Market of Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA);
secondly, through trade links facilitated by these institutions;
and thirdly, by significant outward migration from Zimbabwe to
the region.
8.2 Since independence in 1980, Zimbabwe
has played a prominent role in both SADC and COMESA. Until the
end of Apartheid in 1994, Zimbabwe was the de facto regional centre
in Southern Africa and a very wide range of businesses, NGOs and
media organisations were headquartered in Harare. Most have moved
to South Africa thereby diminishing the role of Harare in the
region considerably.
8.3 Over the past 10 years, Zimbabwe's
trade volumes have significantly declined. South Africa is now
overwhelmingly the main trading partner—absorbing 31% of
trade—followed by the EU (12%), while other SADC countries
represent a relatively small 8%. The EU is the only trading partner
that imports more from Zimbabwe than it exports.
8.4 Over the past 10 years, Zimbabwe
has seen consistent and large emigration flows, especially to
neighbouring South Africa and the United Kingdom. Estimates of
diaspora figures suggest at least three million Zimbabweans were
living abroad at the end of 2007—roughly one person in each
household. These figures increased as the economic crisis and
political violence reached its peak in 2008. South Africa has
the biggest population of Zimbabwe emigrants (with an official
estimate of just over one million though the real number is likely
to be significantly higher), followed by the UK (200,000-300,000)
and Botswana (100,000-300,000). Emigration is particularly concentrated
among high-skilled populations, with surveys indicating that 82%
of emigrants hold a formal qualification and 38% holding a first
degree or higher.
8.5 The large Zimbabwean diaspora is playing
a crucial role in providing financial flows into the country.
Estimates suggest remittance flows are between $500 million
and $1.3 billion a year (14% to 38% of GDP, funding approximately
one quarter to a half of Zimbabwe's imports). This places Zimbabwe
amongst the highest recipient of remittances in Sub-Saharan Africa
as a percentage of national income.
8.6 Close economic and political links are
shaping SADC and especially South Africa's involvement in Zimbabwe.
South Africa is providing $35 million a year in aid directly
to the budget. Most importantly, South Africa facilitated the
mediation effort that led to the signing of the GPA.
8.7 As the guarantor of the GPA, SADC has
shown little inclination to put pressure on ZANU(PF) to implement
the agreed actions. The decision by MDC-T to disengage from the
Inclusive Government in October 2009 prompted the more direct
involvement of President Zuma, leading to a SADC Summit in Maputo
on 5 November. The MDC-T subsequently agreed to re-engage
with the Inclusive Government.
8.8 The 6 December SADC deadline for
progress on GPA implementation lapsed without agreement on the
way forward but the South African facilitation team remains engaged.
South Africa considers instability in Zimbabwe a domestic South
African problem, given the large Zimbabwe diaspora in RSA and
the social implications of further migration. The continued proactive
involvement of South Africa is the best hope of a successful transition.
January 2010
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