Examination of Witnesses (Question Numbers
140-159)
RT HON
DOUGLAS ALEXANDER
MP, MR ANDREW
STEER AND
MR MARTIN
DINHAM
25 NOVEMBER 2009
Q140 Richard Burden: Would it be
possible to let us have an idea about what that results framework
is?
Mr Steer: Yes.
Mr Alexander: Basically the first
annual report draft is in preparation at the moment and we should
be able to let you have that first annual report in a relatively
quick period. What seems implicit in your question is the same
question I have been asking Andrew and the team which is how can
we actually move this forward rapidly. I have had quite convincing
arguments put to me in terms of, in part, the sheer complexity
of some of the projects and the scale of some of the projects
that are now in contemplation. We are moving at a fairly rapid
clip. Whether it is solar power in north Africa potentially providing
power sources to Europe, these are seriously big projects that
are now being contemplated in part because we have been able to
take that downpayment of £800 million and look at it now
in a much broader multilateral context
Mr Steer: I think it is the only
place in the world today where sitting around the table are serious
officials from China, India, Brazil, Mexico and several other
emerging and developing countries, together with the United States,
the United Kingdom, Japan and the other major donors, discussing
a low carbon plan for Mexico, say, or for Egypt. That is already
happening. It is happening at each meeting. In terms of the assessment,
we could already start assessing that process, which is actually
very interesting but, as you say, much, much more important will
be a year and a half from now when we can start seeing whether
the criteria, for example in the Clean Technology Fund which was
reduced carbon at a very cost-efficient rate, do it in a way that
is truly transformational, with serious criteria as to what transformational
means, the ability to scale up and to bring down costs and so
on, and do it in a way with a legitimate governance participatory
process. That will be 18 months from now before we can really
dig deep on that.
Q141 Mr Evans: Apologies for not
being here for your opening remarks, Secretary of State. Looking
at climate change and the phenomenal figures that we hear bandied
about to tackle this particular issue, what role do you see for
your Department in having an impact on technology transfer? Getting
stuck in with industry in this country, which is involved in industry
in developing countries, we would be appalled if there were firms
here that because they are not allowed child labour here were
exporting it abroad, or indeed because sweat shops were not allowed
here they were exporting sweat shops to Bangladesh, or because
they were not allowed pollution here they were exporting the pollution
to other countries; simply because if they are not allowed it
here they should not be allowed it there. Clearly there is technology
transfer where they partner with industry within developing countries,
and I include China amongst that. Do you see yourself having a
role on that or would you partner with Peter Mandelson and other
ministers in trying to have an impact on industry here in transferring
some of the technology that they have got here out to the developing
world?
Mr Alexander: Often the constraints
on technology transfer can be more than simply the capacity to
promote it to the developing world, in the sense that when I was
in India with my colleague Ed Miliband, technology transfer and
technology diffusion was one of the central issues. The whole
intellectual property regime was an issue that was fairly regularly
being raised by Indian interlocutors and in that sense it would
seem to me that one of the issues that will be on the table as
soon as Copenhagen will be this issue of technology transfer.
There is no doubt that there is a huge appetite for technology
at the right price in the developing world and in that sense "at
the right price" contains both issues of intellectual property
and issues of funding. We have some expertise and have developed
some expertise, which I will maybe ask Andrew to say a word about,
in relation to advanced market commitments and the capacity to
use public money effectively to be able to stimulate the production
of goods at the right price. I would add two other points. China
and India are not waiting for the UK in this in the sense that
when you visit India now they share with you with their own thinking
around, for example, solar power and renewables. The scale of
their ambition is comfortably in excess of any other country in
the world in terms of their set targets now for the proportion
of power to be generated from renewables, for example. Similarly,
China is already the largest manufacturer of renewables anywhere
in the world. In that sense it seems to me there are issues of
common concern and direct relevance both to India and to China
and to other parts of the developing world. There is also a much
broader public policy issue, which is where will the British economy
be able to make the greatest contribution to the potential for
new wealth that climate adaptation creates within the whole economy,
and how do we find our place within that global value chain. We
would all anticipate, I am sure, that is not going to be at the
lower added value, low technology end of the value chain; it is
going to be in science and research in the high-skilled high wage
end of it. As I say, I came away quite humbled by the scale of
ambition that I encountered and they were not saying, "Please
can you give us money," they were saying, "We need assistance
in terms of ensuring that Copenhagen allows for the genuine diffusion
of the technologies that we believe we could use."
Mr Steer: I think there is a big
win here if it is done carefully. There is a good analogy with
drug development for tropical countries. 15 years ago there were
no new drugs being developed by the private sector for what we
call now "neglected" tropical diseases. Now there are
35 being developed, some of them about to come on to the market.
The reason is because of clever public/private linkages, where
for example the Gates Foundation, Rockefeller, ourselves have
worked with private drug companies to help push the drugs through
the system and now we are also pulling the drugs out from the
system through these advanced market commitments where drug companies
were not willing to make long-term investments because they did
not know there would be a market in poor countries. We are thinking
about the same idea for clean technology in developing countries,
so we are having a technical conference here in January that will
explore exactly that. In the White Paper we are also suggesting
that in three countries we will set up what we call technology
centres. It is not so much to generate brand new technology because,
as the Secretary of State says, that is being done in a very sophisticated
manner; it is to adapt that technology for on-the-ground development
in low income-countries primarily. Third, we are setting up what
we call a Climate Change Network which will provide for 40 countries
technical advice and research on both policies and technologies.
Q142 Andrew Stunell: The White Paper
says that half of the financing gap for meeting climate change
will come from the carbon market. I am not quite clear whether
that is half of the $100 billion or whether the $100 billion is
a half and the carbon market is the other half but, either way,
it is a very, very big sum that is coming from the carbon market.
How do you assess that figure and how do you see it actually being
delivered?
Mr Alexander: There are carbon
markets which are under development at the moment, and the general
expectation is that Copenhagen will provide a means by which those
can both be broadened and deepened in terms of their operation.
There is a great deal of technical work that is being done by
our colleagues in the Treasury and in DECC and elsewhere within
government, and indeed a lot of independent research, in terms
of the capacity for the carbon market to generate, as you say,
very significant sums of money into the future. In essence, the
effectiveness of carbon markets is driven by the emission caps
that are set, and in particular that the developed countries adopt.
In that sense the financial yield that will be secured cannot
be differentiated from the negotiations that are being taken forward.
However, there was modelling done in terms of the figures that
were produced. We therefore see that there are great benefits
as the science dictates that tighter caps are set coming out of
Copenhagen. In that sense there is quite extensive evidence both
within government and beyond government in terms of the potential
for the carbon markets to be a much bigger player in terms of
financing in the future.
Q143 Andrew Stunell: Is that half
of the $100 billion?
Mr Alexander: Yes.
Q144 Andrew Stunell: I see, fine.
There is a lot of scepticism, one might say cynicism, about whether
carbon markets will deliver and the first generation has had some
rather problematic outcomes. How satisfied are you that Copenhagen,
or indeed any other international conference, can deliver the
sort of framework which will have the integrity that is needed?
Mr Alexander: I partly draw on
my experiences as a former Transport Secretary where the Emissions
Trading System had its critics within Europe but nonetheless it
proved to be a mechanism which I think is capable of reform and
improvement. In that sense it is right to recognise whether the
Clean Development Mechanism or other initiatives that have been
taken forward at the moment have the disadvantage of not being
joined up and, like any process, it is subject to improvement
by experience. In that sense I would err on the side of confidence
that in time the carbon markets can not simply make a material
contribution towards dealing with climate change but also provide
the resources that are necessary for adaptation. There is a great
deal more work to be done and Copenhagen will be the beginning
of that journey rather than the last word.
Q145 Andrew Stunell: Are the Norwegian
proposals a step in the right direction? What is the departmental
view on that?
Mr Alexander: It has informed
our thinking in terms of the $100 billion figure. The Norwegian
notion that there could essentially be a precept in terms of the
trading that takes place is one very constructive contribution
to explain how you could deliver that scale of financing out of
the carbon markets, yes.
Q146 Mr Evans: Can we turn to the
impact or effect of population growth on climate change. Secretary
of State, could you state whether you think this is an important
contributor and something that should be addressed?
Mr Alexander: I think one has
to have a sense of relative importance. Again, I will turn to
Andrew in a moment to give you the exact figures, but if you judge
that global population is anticipated to rise up to 9.2 billion
people by 2050, of course we are going to be living on a planet
where there are more mouths to feed and more productive agricultural
land required to be able to sustain a population at a higher level.
On the other hand, as John Battle pointed out to us earlier, if
you look at the emissions per capita in a country like Uganda
and compare it with the United States or the United Kingdom, then
I think you would be hard-pressed to make the case that the biggest
challenge facing us is to stem population rise in the developing
world, as distinct from having effective cuts in per capita emissions
in the developed world, because actually when you are at 20 tonnes
per US citizen, we are in a very, very different position.
Q147 Mr Evans: Before Andrew comes
in, could I just relate what the UN Population Fund report The
State of the World Population 2009 stated. It says that population
control could be a more effective means of cutting emissions than
investing in clean energy. The world's population is estimated
to grow to 10.5 billion by 2050 from 6.8 billion today. They say
that reducing this total by one billion would save as much carbon
dioxide as constructing two million giant wind turbines. If you
could actually do both then clearly that would have a much greater
impact.
Mr Alexander: If you or your colleagues
in your party would like to advance that as a negotiating strategy
at Copenhagen to persuade Sheikh Hasina or others that their primary
responsibility is to reduce their own populations and then the
developed world will follow by cutting emissions, I wish you good
luck, but I am not sure that that is actually a realistic prospect
for securing global agreement on the timescale that we require.
In the Department for International Development we have done a
great deal of work with a number of countries on reproductive
health over a number of years, and in that sense there are very
clear correlations between improvements and development and relative
decline in birth rates within those countries. We do that as part
of our day job. It is important work to be undertaken, but I struggle
to see, notwithstanding the research that you quote, that it would
be a meaningful basis for negotiations when the world comes together
in a fortnight's time in Copenhagen.
Q148 Mr Evans: From the response
you have just given, do I assume therefore that population is
simply not being advanced at all by DFID as part of our negotiations?
Mr Alexander: As I say, the issue
of population and its relationship to development is fundamental
to DFID's mission, and in that sense it has shaped and affected
work that we have done for many years. To the extent that we contribute
to discussions across government we reflect the breadth of the
work that we take forward, including on the issue of reproductive
health. On the other hand, is it going to be a negotiating strategy
of the United Kingdom Government that we demand a reduction in
population from the developing world as the price for emission
reductions from the developed world in a fortnight's time? It
is no revelation to say that is not going to be the first requirement
that Gordon Brown or Ed Miliband is going to articulate when they
arrive in the Danish capital. Would you offer a different point
of view?
Q149 Chairman: The point is, Secretary
of State, I do not think we are suggesting that it should be a
pre-condition or part of the negotiation, but it is a matter of
concern to the Committee that these forecast populations have
a huge impact on all environmental issues and climate change issues,
and it is slightly strange that population has gone off the agenda
having been 20 or 30 years ago a much higher priority. It is not
a question of it being a pre-condition.
Mr Alexander: Forgive me, I would
not suggest that it has gone off the agenda in any way, shape
or form, whether it is the additional work we are doing on reproductive
health, whether it is the work we are doing on agricultural productivity
where we have committed £400 million to agricultural research.
I think there is quite an important issue here, from the discussions
I have had with developing countries, as to whether they would
deem this to be an appropriate or effective negotiating strategy
for a developed country like the United Kingdom to pursue in climate
negotiations, and beyond saying it is part of the work that we
do in these countries, I am struggling to see its immediate relevance
in terms of the negotiating mandate that should be taken forward.
Q150 Mr Evans: If you are saying
you are not doing it at Copenhagen, are you doing it outside of
Copenhagen then? Clearly looking at a report from The Economist,
which was talking about the fact that in most developing countries
the population rates have been falling fast in any event, and
they refer in the developing world to Bangladesh, where it has
fallen from six children per mum to three, and that has happened
over a relatively short space of time whereas in the United Kingdom
that similar fall took 130 years to bring about. Then it says
that rising populations in the areas that are most vulnerable
to climate change and will exacerbate the key impacts of climate
change: water shortages, mass migration and declining food yields,
so all of this is important.
Mr Alexander: I could not agree
more and that is why I am intrigued as to why somebody as knowledgeable
as a member of this Committee would question whether we are doing
this anywhere else. I could take you to the schools where we are
educating young girls. I could quote you, if I was not constrained
by Presbyterian reserve, the number of condoms that we are paying
for every day that are used around the world. I could remind you
that the first major announcement I made on this issue was £100
million for reproductive health at a time which the US Administration
took a very different view in terms of reproductive health services
in the developing world. DFID has policy form on all of these
issues in both areas directly related to health and also areas
directly related to education, because the emerging evidence is
very clear that if you educate a young girl she will marry later,
have fewer children, be more likely to be employed in the formal
economy and take better care of herself in terms of health outputs.
It also has form in terms of raising these issues on a regular
basis with countries and governments around the world. I took
the opportunity to discuss this issue at length with the Indian
Government, a government which, much as we admire them and work
closely in partnership with them, are often quite sensitive to
issues being raised which they regard as being issues primarily
of domestic concern. In that sense it is absolutely fundamental
to the work that DFID does that we look at this issue of population.
I am afraid there is not a single silver bullet to address the
issue, but in terms of the sophistication that we bring to this
issue we raise it through policy advocacy, we raise it through
out commitment on education, we raise it through our commitment
on health, in a whole range of different ways.
Q151 Mr Evans: We are talking about
climate change now as one of the vitally important aspects that
is going to affect the world in the future and in the near future.
If the world population does grow as fast as we have said by 2050
clearly this is a crisis also. Do you believe that this ought
therefore to be approached with the same sort of urgency that
we are approaching climate change?
Mr Alexander: In terms of the
urgency and immediacy of climate change, I would struggle to say
that population growth holds out as absolute a prospect for planetary
destruction as rising temperatures, so I think I am probably in
disagreement with you on that. In terms of the urgency of addressing
the challenge of a rising world population, I would certainly
agree with you. That is why I would commend to you the speech
that I made last year to the World Food Summit where again DFID
took policy leadership on the issue of agricultural research,
because whether it is the headline announcement that we made there
or the work that we are now doing with 14 African countries through
CAADP[6]
in terms of agricultural productivity, there are mitigation measures
that can be taken in relation to population immediately—whether
it is through raising levels of agricultural productivity in Africa
simply to levels that are being secured already in South and South-East
Asia or whether it is through a combination of better seed technology,
better irrigation and better infrastructure raising that agricultural
yield—there is a whole number of steps which can and should
be taken to anticipate now the consequences of that rise in population,
at the same time as putting in place strategies which the evidence
suggests will over a period of time moderate rises in population
as development advances in these countries.
Mr Evans: For the record, we do not disagree
so far as the impact of climate change is concerned. Clearly that
is the number one and the impact of population growth would not
be the same, but clearly the impact of population growth is vitally
important and what I am saying is perhaps it should be attacked
with similar enthusiasm.
Chairman: To be fair, I think it is a
view that the Committee has expressed although not formally in
a report and we are concerned that this seems to be a lower priority.
John Battle?
Q152 John Battle: Could I switch
to what might be called new mechanisms for raising development
funding whether it is for ODA or for climate change and adaptation
and that is the idea of a tax on global financial transactions.
It used to be called the Tobin tax. As someone who has put down
parliamentary questions and had debates and EDMs on it over the
last ten years, to be told it would be too complicated, we cannot
go alone being one country or the whole financial system will
migrate, I was a bit bemused and surprised—and pleasantly
surprised—that the Prime Minister raised it at the G20 as
a good idea. Could you give us a clue where you think we are up
to on it and whether it will be of any assistance to your budgets
or indeed the international budgets for both aid and climate change
and adaptation?
Mr Alexander: Candidly, I think
there is a political and a policy answer to that. I think politically
it is right to acknowledge that there are certain circumstances
when more space opens up for progressive change. That can be as
a consequence of a crisis or by policy leadership. A parallel
example that I would cite would be the issue of tax havens. You
have probably similarly signed EDMs and asked challenging questions
of me and of others on the issue of tax havens over many years,
and you will have had a fairly standard reply saying the Treasury
is in the lead on this matter and it is a serious issue but there
needs to be multi-lateral support. I think you could reasonably
argue that we have made more progress in the last seven or eight
months on tax havens than the international community secured
in the previous seven or eight years, and that is because the
global financial crisis exposed the existence of the shadow banking
system in all of its many manifestations, one of which was a degree
of opaqueness and a lack of transparency that everybody recognised
had contributed to the crisis. What then happened was there was
a willingness on the part of the British Government, ahead of
the G20 summit in London, to try and grasp that nettle and to
see if we could drive forward the issue of transparency, the OECD
"white list" and all of the information exchange mechanisms
that would be a means to deal with tax havens effectively. Similarly,
the issue of the so-called Tobin tax has been an issue which,
as you say, has been around the debates for a number of years,
but there has not been judged to be the capacity to translate
an idea into an achievement, and that is not yet there, frankly.
As some of the responses in St Andrews indicated, there are many
still to be convinced as to the merits of saying that there should
be a tax of this sort, but I welcome the fact that that policy
space has opened up. I welcome the remarks that the Prime Minister
has made. In terms of the specific remarks that were made in St
Andrews, it was not a classic Tobin tax to be hypothecated for
development. In fact, it was raised in the context of the issue
of the banks meeting their responsibilities to the public who
had funded them. Traditionally, the British Treasury has not been
the greatest advocate or the greatest fan of hypothecated forms
of taxation generally, as the exchequer function likes the discretion
to be able to allocate income against expenditure. In that sense
I did see the Prime Minister's statement in St Andrews as being
an exciting opportunity rather than yet an achievement. It is
the beginning of that debate and that policy discussion. In terms
of its impact on development, there is other work that is already
underway, for example the initiative that Bob Zoellick, the President
of the World Bank, and Gordon Brown led in terms of innovative
funding for health, where others have advocated a range of different
mechanisms that could be used, and there is continuing work that
is being taken forward on that, and even as recently as the last
few weeks Stephen Timms, my colleague in the Treasury, has been
attending discussions that have been taking place in Paris about
the use of innovative financing mechanisms. I do not think we
are at a point of conclusion but there is more energy in this
area on this agenda than there has been for many years.
Chairman: You have announced a stronger
focus on fragile states and we have a few questions on that. Richard
Burden?
Q153 Richard Burden: Whilst the focus
on this chimes with a lot of what we have been saying in recent
years in terms of seeing peace, security and justice as being
pretty basic services, if there is going to be an extra focus
on that, with very substantial amounts of new bilateral funding
of up to 50% focusing on fragile states, put bluntly, what are
we going to be spending less on?
Mr Alexander: There are two answers
to that. One is to say of course we have, as the earlier questions
anticipated, a rising budget line and in that sense we are in
a position to be able to do more in the future, but it does oblige
us continually to discipline ourselves in terms of which countries
we are working in and what that focus should be. We have also
reduced and are reducing the number of countries in which we are
working—and I am sure Martin has the detail of that—but
we not in a position where we do not move out of countries. We
quite regularly move out of countries as they graduate to middle-income
status, and in that sense we are constantly looking at our portfolio
to make judgments in terms of where we can have the biggest impact.
Q154 Richard Burden: Taking into
account your point about a rising budget, generally where the
reduction would be is in terms of numbers of countries rather
than the range of activities within countries?
Mr Alexander: It is interesting,
one of the discussions I had with the Africa heads of office at
the time of the launch of the White Paper was to persuade them
that as Secretary of State I did not really want them to send
me submissions that felt obliged to have a little bit about conflict
resolution, a little bit about climate change, a little bit about
economic growth and a little bit about working with the multilateral
system. I said you should regard this as country heads as being
a menu rather than a menu fixe, if you like, but they should
not feel an obligation to try and do everything, and in that sense
the real thinking behind the new commitment to fragile states
in part reflects the work of this Committee, in part reflects
other research like Paul Collier's which evidences the coincidence
of conflict and state fragility with poverty, and a certain determination
on our part that somebody needs to do this. Actually while we
would not claim yet to have all the answers of working in conflict-affected
and fragile states, we do recognise that as an international community
we need to do this better in the future, and if DFID, with all
of its strengths, its depth of understanding and the quality of
its staff, is not prepared to engage in some of these, frankly,
very tough environments, then the risk is that everybody will
choose to continue to work in the much more benign environments
where you can meet your Paris Principles but effectively write
off a billion plus people to lives lived not just immiserated
by conflict but also by poverty.
Mr Dinham: A couple of points
on the question of numbers of countries. Just looking in perspective,
we will have cut by a third the number of countries in which we
operate since 1997 and in the three years up to 2010-11 we will
have withdrawn bilateral funding from about ten countries—Armenia,
Moldova, Ukraine, the Gambia, Nicaragua and countries like that.
On the staffing level, obviously for working in fragile states
we need to have a level of expertise because it can be quite labour-intensive
and there are some really tricky issues, and so we are looking
at the overall balance of our staff and trying to maintain or,
in some cases, increase the numbers of staff in fragile states.
We are looking at, for example, the number of staff in our corporate
services to see where we can make that leaner so that frees up
some resources for working in the fragile states. It is looking
to make the most effective use of the staff that we have.
Q155 Mr Lancaster: How meaningful
is your commitment to spend 50% of new bilateral funding expenditure
in fragile states given that there seems to be no agreed definition
of what a fragile state is? There is a certain amount of wriggle
room there where definitions could be changed. Perhaps the Secretary
of State would like to set in stone what he considers a fragile
state to be.
Mr Alexander: I suppose if I had
to offer a working definition before this Committee just now I
would probably say countries where the government cannot or will
not deliver core functions of the state for the majority of its
people. In that sense, internally, we have an operating list in
terms of countries that we regard as fragile. We do not tend to
publicise that list for very understandable reasons; that it would
not necessarily enhance our diplomatic relations or our working
relationships with all of the countries, but in that sense I do
not think it is particularly difficult to recognise the attributes
of state fragility when you encounter them in country.
Q156 Mr Lancaster: I accept that
but of course cynics would say—certainly not me, Secretary
of State—that by not publishing the list (and I understand
why not) there is a degree of wriggle room here where you can
effectively change which states are currently considered to be
fragile to enable you to meet this target.
Mr Alexander: Why would we want
to do that?
Q157 Mr Lancaster: I am simply responding
to some criticisms that have been raised about the Department,
and there are concerns.
Mr Alexander: By who?
Q158 Mr Lancaster: Well, that is
fascinating. If you read some of the submissions that have been
made, people are concerned. All we are trying to do is to tie
you down to ensure that this commitment is met.
Mr Alexander: Well, I understand
Mark Lowcock was before the Committee yesterday, one of our very
esteemed officials, and he set out for you four of the key fragile
states where there is a great deal of work underway and indeed
significant resources are being committed. In that sense I do
not think there is anything particularly controversial about the
countries in which we are called on to work. It seems to me to
be a bigger and more substantive issue not to suggest malfeasance
in definition but to be honest as to the motivation, and I have
sought to say that the emerging evidence over many years of the
coincidence of poverty and conflict, the sense that unless we
as an international community do better at dealing with the consequences
of state fragility, then actually not just would that represent
a moral failure to those many millions of people condemned to
lives diminished by poverty but actually, in an era of inter-dependence,
the consequences of that state fragility in apparently remote
countries can be visited on countries on the other side of the
world. In that sense it seems to me both morally right and strategically
wise as an international community to better understand these
challenges and to commit to undertaking that work. We would probably
be more vulnerable to the kind of criticism you suggest if we
were ignoring this challenge rather than being honest about it.
Q159 Mr Lancaster: Let us move on
to the commitment in the White Paper to develop joint strategies
with the FCO and the MoD in fragile states. Of course the Stabilisation
Unit has been set up to do some of this work. The Stabilisation
Unit has come under some criticism. People, perhaps rightly or
wrongly, have said that it has effectively had its wings clipped
by the three departments who almost see it as a threat. What assessment
does the Secretary of State make of the work of the Stabilisation
Unit and how would you like to empower the unit in the future?
Mr Alexander: Firstly, I would
draw a pretty clear distinction between the joint working anticipated
in the White Paper and the important, but quite distinctive, role
that the Stabilisation Unit plays. I would not anticipate that
the Stabilisation Unit would be the principal driver of the work
that we are doing in a number of different countries where there
is a logic to working collaboratively and closely with our colleagues
in the MoD and the FCO, for example the kind of work that we are
taking forward in the DRC. I have visited Kinshasa myself and
seen that and that seems to be an area where there is quite effective
joint working underway at the moment, but it is an area where
we need to cascade and share that kind of learning elsewhere.
In terms of the Stabilisation Unit, again I am intrigued by the
line of questioning you are offering because it is a not a description
I recognise either from my own point of view or from my colleague
Bob Ainsworth's in the MoD or David Miliband's in the Foreign
Office. In what sense would we have an interest in seeing a unit
which we have jointly supported and jointly encouraged as being
a threat rather than an instrument for the advancement of the
Government's policy?
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