Examination of Witnesses (Questions 120
- 138)
TUESDAY 1 DECEMBER 2009
MR PIERRE
LANDELL-MILLS
AND DR
THOMAS TANNER
Q120 Hugh Bayley: You overheard the
earlier exchanges that we had about DFID funding governance improvements
within the parliament and the political parties. Does that seem
maybe a long-term but nevertheless sensible strategy?
Mr Landell-Mills: There are two
sides to governance reform. One is supply side and the other is
demand side. The donors have concentrated, DFID in particular,
very largely on the supply side; that is to say, how can we make
accounting more efficient or more accountable and less corrupt.
How can we make procurement less corrupt? How can we see the public
finance system being managed in a non-corrupt way? There are all
sorts of methodologies for achieving that and they have worked
on those consistently for a very long time. But if there is not
a demand side, and if there are no sanctions, ultimately, for
misbehaviour, you are not going to get rid of the corruption.
There has to be a focus now to try to get the balance right between
the demand side and the supply side of governance. The demand
side comes from civil society.
Q121 Chairman: Is the Public Procurement
Bill going to make any difference?
Mr Landell-Mills: I think it would
make a difference, yes. But you need civil society watchdogs,
you need the media to be watching—you need to be sure that
somebody is watching to make sure that it is being implemented
correctly. Passing a law does not achieve anything if it is not
implemented correctly.
Q122 Hugh Bayley: Civil society and
the media are important. I simplify the argument but in our earlier
exchanges I think we were being told that the older generation,
the current leadership of both parties, is so culturally attuned
to this way of doing business it is never going to change but
maybe there are some younger elements who perhaps have had international
exposure who could be persuaded to build reputations for themselves
by doing politics in a different way, in the same way that some
of the NGO leaders have won international reputations for themselves
by building a capacity for delivery of public goods in an accountable
way. Do you think it is worth pursuing that?
Mr Landell-Mills: The fact that
younger people are exposed to an international environment, getting
educated at reputable universities overseas, maybe working for
a while in environments that have integrity systems in place is
all for the good. Obviously what you get, in a sense, is a family
that has young people coming back who are appalled at the corruption.
Whether they can avoid getting drawn into it is the issue. Some
will get drawn into it but some will fight it. They will be the
key elements for the long-term reform.
Q123 Hugh Bayley: It seems to me
that until you break this stranglehold that the political class
has, this malign influence that the political class has over the
economy, you are going to abate development by 3 or 4% a year.
It is going to have a long and invasive negative effect. Even
though it may be a long haul, donors like DFID ought to be working
on governance within the political elite as well as the administrative
Civil Service.
Mr Landell-Mills: My observation
in Bangladesh was that if you went down all the significant reforms,
administrative process types of reform and governance reforms,
all of them had been promoted by the donor community over decades.
There was no significant reform that took place that I knew of
which had not been the subject of endless donor pressure. The
fact that that is being achieved is reason to continue. If you
take the telecommunications sector, it is slowly being opened
up and made more competitive; before a few people were simply
milking the telecommunications monopoly for their benefit. The
very fact that modern technology is unavoidable and is bringing
in all sorts of new ways of doing business which make corruption
more difficult is really significant. For example, e-procurement
will be a really important move. When I was there, if one of the
more powerful groups wanted to tender, they would surround the
office where you delivered the tender with mastaans, and anybody
who was not part of their group would simply get beaten up. e-procurement
will allow the submission of bids which cannot be interfered with
in that way. Land titling had always been an extraordinarily corrupt
business, because you could go into the land title registry and
change things. If it is all computerised, you can see that those
records are available, and you can track any person who goes in
to change any record, if you have electronic records, you immediately
can transform the land registry administration. Customs is hugely
corrupt, but if you carry out most of the transactions electronically
and all the payments are made electronically, it makes it much
more difficult for the customs people to take their share. There
are lots of things that can be done to curb corruption.
Q124 Mr Hendrick: Whilst you can
do some things electronically, under-the-table payments can still
take place in cash. Certainly from my knowledge of Central and
Eastern European countries, what we would regard as corruption
they either see as commission or hospitality. Is there not an
element of that in the culture still? Will it not be almost impossible
to eradicate that?
Mr Landell-Mills: You will not
eradicate it, of course. We have not eradicated corruption in
this country and we have not eradicated it in other European countries,
so it will go on. It is a constant battle. It is a battle for
integrity. But I think the important thing is to try to get the
systems functioning with a reasonable degree of efficiency and
integrity. At the moment there is so much interference in the
transactions that you have a very high level of inefficiency.
One must try to get those who are corrupt to see that certain
actions are so damaging to their own interests that that corruption
can then be tackled, although they will always be searching for
other ways of being corrupt, that is for sure. For example, at
Chittagong Port, it takes 18 days to turn a ship around, while
in Singapore they can do it in 36 hours. In relation to the inefficiency
of having ships waiting to come in and waiting to go out, there
is a huge benefit to be achieved by transforming Chittagong into
the Singapore situation that could be shared by everyone. You
could try to build a coalition of interested reformers to carry
that reform out and that is the way forward. It is the fact that
corruption in individual cases benefits a relatively small number
of people and a very large number of people who are damaged by
it. If you can mobilise the many people who are being damaged
to put pressure on the few that are gaining, then you will make
progress. It is a matter of just how you manage that process.
Q125 Chairman: Thank you. Dr Tanner,
climate change is absolutely the central issue for Bangladesh.
The impact of climate change is already happening there. Could
you give us your up-to-date thinking on the current impacts and
the developing impacts of climate change as it affects Bangladesh?
For your information, we did meet with the Prime Minister and,
of course, she is certainly going to be in Copenhagen and will
be making strong points on behalf of the country for their need
to have substantial funding for adaptation, but it would be useful
from the Committee's point of view to hear your take on where
Bangladesh is at the moment on this issue.
Dr Tanner: Bangladesh is rightly
up there with the most vulnerable countries. It always claims
it should be amongst the group of the Small Island Development
States, the most severely impacted by climate change both now
and in the future. Given that they have more islands than any
of those countries and they have more people on the largest island
than all of the other small island countries put together, that
is regularly trotted out. I will not give you a rundown of the
latest IPCC[4],
other than perhaps to stress that the thing for me and for many
people that was missing from the IPCC fifth assessment report
is the impact on sea-level rise, and, particularly, the impact
of ice changes, which was basically ignored in the IPCC fifth
assessment report. It was seen as too difficult because of so
much uncertainty. I think they made a wrong decision to leave
it out on that basis rather than put it in and say, "We accept
that there are large uncertainties around this." There was
a report released even today from the Scientific Committee on
Antarctic Research looking at the Antarctic ice sheets, which
have been under-explored (the focus has always been on the Arctic
rather than the Antarctic). The estimates of sea-level rise were
under-estimated in the IPCC report and it kind of took the wind
out of the sea-level rise element of climate change somewhat that
has always been there in Bangladesh because of the low-lying topography.
There is reason for concern. In the Bangladesh context—and
I do not think you went down to the coastal areas—my experience
there was really seeing that this is not about creating a line
on a map and saying "Sea-level rise will inundate this much,"
but it is about patterns of flooding and waterlogging. Just as
important as flooding, is waterlogging. That is heavily constrained
by human activity. The extent to which the land is drained and
has adequate drainage has been heavily compromised. That brings
me to the point I want to drive home most strongly, which is that
the reason why Bangladesh is vulnerable is in part because of
its geography and natural hazards, but it is as strongly informed
by its human development, the human component of vulnerability.
It has very large numbers of poor people, who are poorly equipped
capacity wise and living in very marginal areas. You went to the
chars, for example, and you will have seen just how marginal those
are. That is an important element. It tells us that development
solutions are these core development issues which previous witnesses
and I am sure you in your previous dealings have dealt with. It
provides some new challenges but it provides the core development
challenge of beating poverty and increasing assets.
Q126 Chairman: The impact has three
different directions, does it not? It is a greater volume of water
coming down the river from the ice melts of the Himalayas, the
increased frequency of devastating cyclones, and rising sea levels.
It is coming at them from all sides. What capacity do they have
to deal with this? You could say, in a sense, that what we saw
in the chars was a practical response to seasonal flooding, measured
by what they know the levels are and the raising of the plinths.
We were told, "Yes, you could manage that, you know what
level it is" but cyclones are unpredictable. Of course if
you have a situation of the sea level rising and more water coming
down the rivers, then things are going to happen which are not
predictable or which are way above what is predicted. In terms
of anticipating those things and in terms of doing anything about
it, does Bangladesh have the capacity? Perhaps I could put it
in this context: if at Copenhagen they got what they wanted, if
they were to be told, "We are going to give you a fund,"
what would they be able to do with it?
Dr Tanner: The level of resilience
not just to economic but to climate shocks and stresses in Bangladesh
is quite remarkable. Is it sufficient at the moment, the answer
is most certainly no, given the current level of shocks and stresses.
We see significant falls in GDP as a result of climate related
shocks and stresses, so that suggests there is much that can be
done there, but there has been great progress. If you look at
the example of cyclones, for example, although they are not readily
predictable, you can have cyclone early warning systems and you
can have improved cyclone shelters and improvements in the construction
and the thought processes around construction: having the ability
to take animals into the shelters in the low levels, and using
them as multipurpose, as schools, as well. The example of Cyclone
Sidr, which was devastating economically, and in some cases in
terms of lives, is nothing compared to the shocks in the 1970s
and earlier cyclones in terms of lives lost. We have seen dramatic
progress. Government capacity to respond is stretched, as it is
for much service delivery, but Bangladesh does have significant
experience in this and in that sense it is ahead of the curve
compared to some countries which are getting very new shocks and
stresses and do not have the history that Bangladesh has.
Q127 John Battle: If the sea rises,
it is salt water that, in a sense, infects the fields and they
cannot grow things. Is that a risk now? Is salination—if
that is a word—a real problem? How do you solve salination?
Dr Tanner: I do not know whether
it is salination or salinisation. Yes, that is a very real concern.
That is already a concern for, again, a mix of human and natural.
There is evidence that there is greater saline water coming further
inland now. Some of that is to do with a change in climate and
sea levels which are already rising, and some of that is to do
with drought conditions which can be either climate-related or
human-related, because in the dry seasons you have upstream river
control through sluices and dam barrages. Saline ingress has been
steadily increasing and this is as important for drinking water
as it is for field systems.
Q128 John Battle: Is there a filter
system? Are there technological answers to that or do people just
have to move if the salt water rushes in and floods your rice
fields?
Dr Tanner: The low-tech solution
would be to think about how you change that system. Are there
different varieties of rice or whatever crop you are growing that
are more saline tolerant? Then there is the moving to a different
type of crop or different agricultural system. There are lots
of examples of moving more to agriculture. There are lots of examples
of crab fattening and shrimps. The final one is: when do you actually
move? Another example is floating gardens, so you float reeds
on the water hyacinth and then plant crops on that.
Q129 John Battle: So there is some
technical imagination going on. In Bangladesh DFID use the Opportunity
and Risks of Climate Change and Disasters (ORCHID) methodology
to assess its programmes for climate risk. You have worked on
that assessment. What lessons have been learned from the ORCHID
assessment about the vulnerability of DFID's programmes to climate
change?
Dr Tanner: There are two things.
The main lesson, I guess—and this is common across many
donors—is that we need to start considering climate within
our due diligence processes. Currently they exist for the environment,
through environmental impact assessments and often environment
screening procedures, particularly in the multilateral banks where
you have infrastructure, and it is all about the impact of the
development on the environment. Now the thinking is about the
impact of a changing environment on the project. The IFIs[5]
met last week here in London and a major point of discussion was
how to include climate. In DFID the ORCHID pilot exercises in
a few of the countries have contributed to that change as well.
That is ongoing now, and there is a commitment in the White Paper
to integrate climate and environment and disaster screening for
its portfolio as part of policy.
Q130 John Battle: Has that been built
into the new Country Assistance plan, for example?
Dr Tanner: In Bangladesh the evidence
on the programme side of individual programmes that we looked
at?
Q131 John Battle: Yes.
Dr Tanner: I am happy that there
has been a consideration of climate in those programmes. In the
country programme it is reflected in a much stronger emphasis
on how different aspects of development can contribute to climate.
It is not: "Here is the one solution." They look at
how governance can help improve resilience to climate and other
shocks and stresses. What it misses is perhaps the regional dimension,
particularly through international water management, and the migration
question. DFID has a role to play, given its engagement in other
countries in South Asia. That, for me, is the bit that was missing
in the recommendations from that work.
Q132 John Battle: I hope that is
not just a conversation going on in DFID. Good though that is,
is that shared with the government of Bangladesh, so that they
are on side for that agenda and properly co-operating in that
risk assessment?
Dr Tanner: The ORCHID work started
while I was working in the government of Bangladesh, strangely
enough. They were involved in that work but they were involved
through the Ministry of Environment, and so the question is: is
that the place where you get much traction? It is a fairly weak
ministry. Since then, obviously, the topic of climate change has
been taken much more upstream: to the Ministry of Planning, the
Ministry of Finance and the Prime Minister's Office. For me, the
thing which perhaps has not filtered through, which is central
to the ORCHID methodology, is the idea of adaptation as a process,
as being about cycles of reflecting on what you are doing, on
what the impacts of climate are, and on what your response is
like—that kind of monitoring and reflection—and that
being central to the adaptive process. I do not think that has
quite got embedded as much as awareness around what specific adaptation
options might look like.
John Battle: Thank you.
Q133 Andrew Stunell: Following on
from that, if you were in charge, what would DFID do over the
next five years in supporting Bangladesh to adapt to climate change?
Dr Tanner: I am optimistic that
DFID in Bangladesh has made significant changes to its portfolio
oriented towards climate change. It recognises what a huge threat
it is. That is a huge change from the last Country Assistance
Plan, which really had it as a token environmental issue, if you
like. I think it does not provide enough of a driver to all its
programming, so there is still some element of, "Okay, when
we get a parliamentary letter, these are the projects that we
flag, that we are doing, and the rest is development." Things
like the primary education programme; economic empowerment for
the poorest,; whether there are mechanisms in place to ensure
that those programmes that are under development and underway
have a climate lens attached to them. That is not clear from the
plan. Second, as I have said already, is the regional aspect of
the problem. These regional country plans are very country specific
and I do not see that being matched by South Asia division's plan
for work that includes India, Bangladesh, Nepal.
Q134 Andrew Stunell: Yes. We visited
Nepal as well and it was interesting to see the interaction between
the issues in the two countries. What steps do you think that
DFID can take to help the Bangladesh government get climate proofing
into its own policy and development programmes?
Dr Tanner: The step is already
made in trying to build capacity not just in the Ministry of Environment,
but also working in the Ministry of Food and Disaster Management
and other ministries as well. That is an important first step.
There are limitations to what the government can deliver that
have been raised already. In terms of getting the screening procedure
in place, that conversation is not being had with the government.
There are existing deficits to the environment screening procedure,
but at present the discussions between DFID and the government
on climate change are at this much higher level. They are on strategic
planning, on the movement from the NAPA[6]
to the Strategic Action Plan, and on getting the Prime Minister's
Office involved and Copenhagen being at the top of that agenda.
The nuts and bolts on how to get down into the government structures
are not really on the table. The natural way to do it is through
the environmental impact assessment procedures, which are internationalised
and there are norms for. They are fraught with the same problems
of corruption and accountability as other areas of government
in Bangladesh, but, nevertheless, it is an interrelated topic
and work to internationalise standards and norms on climate risk
management is urgently needed to be able to inform that process
of change where a country like Bangladesh can integrate those
in a more systematised way.
Q135 Hugh Bayley: The government
has grand policies: a National Adaptation Programme of Action
and a Climate Change Strategy. To what extent do they identify
the government's funding priorities as far as donors are concerned?
Dr Tanner: NAPA, as you know,
was released back in 2005 and it is now largely dead and buried,
overtaken by the Bangladesh Climate Change Strategy and Action
Plan. There is a lot of criticism of NAPAs. I see them as very
worthwhile, very cost-effective. It has been overtaken by something
that is much more government-owned. It is not a UNDP[7]
project; it is something that is being led by the government.
One of the problems with the NAPAs was they created a shopping
list for priority actions to take, and so do not demonstrate the
process underlying that. Creating a cross-government committee
to create a NAPA was the first time you had this kind of engagement
from different sectors that are likely to be affected by climate
change. The Strategy and Action Plan that has resulted seems to
have very sensible headings in terms of its headlines. The priority
actions underneath those, which are all being fought out now as
to which will get implemented and how quickly, is a much more
political issue. My worry is that civil society groups in particular
have not had much say in what those priorities are, so the priority
for action now in the money that has been allocated this financial
year is very much around infrastructure. It is around dredging
canals, tree planting on embankments, and refurbishing existing
cyclone shelters. For me, there is a worry that this focus on
infrastructure can deliver literally concrete outcomes, so it
is politically very attractive and it also means a nice leeway
for corruption. It also demonstrates action to people on the ground,
and I think there is a real desire to move away from just awareness
raising. On how that pans out in terms of the priorities underneath,
my worry is that it will not be dictated by needs and influenced
by civil society groups who have a better view of what those needs
are, but, instead, it will be dictated by what is politically
expedient.
Q136 Hugh Bayley: Christian Aid said
in their evidence that it was noticeable how little money donors
had put up to fund the government's priorities. Is this because
of fears about corruption or fears about priorities being wrong?
How could and how should donors use funds to address priorities?
Should it be through NGOs or how?
Dr Tanner: There is the Multi-Donor
Trust Fund, which I am sure you have heard a lot about, which
intentionally was joint with the government. The government now
has its own trust fund and there is a donor trust fund separately.
The issue is fiduciary management. There is an international responsibility
for any international body giving money, whether it be DFID, whether
it be through the adaptation fund, or whether it be under the
UN Framework Convention, that this money is spent responsibly.
It is crucial, first of all, that there are clear lines of access
for civil society organisations to be able to access that money,
that there is work undertaken in the Multi-Donor Trust Fund—which
is managed by the World Bank, but to the chagrin of some—to
improve the capacity of the government to be able to take on that
role in the future. One of the areas of evidence is going to be:
what is the process that the government goes through now in implementing
its own trust fund? We can look at the transparency, the fiduciary
management, the access by different parties and the impacts and
the areas that it funds as an evidence-base for their suitability
to implement a multi-donor, larger trust fund in the future.
Q137 Chairman: Perhaps I could just
finish on that point. As you say, some people are not keen on
the Multi-Donor Trust, although inevitably the international community
tends to favour it. You have explained to Mr Bayley some of the
problems of the country's own proposals. Of course many people
say they want country ownership. How valid are the criticisms
of the World Bank Fund? The Bretton Woods Project say that it
is too costly, that it is donor-driven rather than country-driven,
and that the World Bank has a poor record on environmental issues.
They quote specifically the project causing the destruction of
the oldest mangrove forest in the sub-continent. How valid are
those criticisms? As a Committee we have learned that there is
a sort of inbuilt position from which certain NGOs come to that;
but, first, we have to evaluate whether or not their criticisms
have validity.
Dr Tanner: Yes, and if they are
two-handed economists on the one hand, and on the other hand ...
I do not wish to speak on behalf of the Bank, but I recognise
the need to lobby hard against the World Bank subsuming climate
change project finance in the normal World Bank way. This is not
the same deal—although this is ODA[8],
which I am sure you have also found has been raised. The concerns
about the amount of money the Bank will take in commission are
not very well-founded. The figure that was put out in the press
and by CSOs[9]
in Bangladesh is far greater than the reality. I think it is more
favourable than the UN off-take, which is about 12.5%. This ends
up at being about 8 or 8.5% from the Bank. Again it is more favourable
than a private contractor, and it is more favourable, if you take
Mr Landell-Mills' estimate, than the amount that might be lost
through corruption. One of the important considerations is that
this fund is committed through ODA from DFID. I know they justify
that repeatedly as being part of the 10% of the additional funds
that are going to come from ODA, but I think it sends the wrong
signals. That a significant new trust fund, designed specifically
for climate change, is committed from ODA at a time when the Prime
Minister is announcing that we need £100 billion new and
additional on top of ODA is a little bit out of sync. It may just
have been that the timing of that budgeting decision with a decision
and an announcement from the Prime Minister was off, but it strikes
me as—
Q138 Chairman: The Committee has
some concerns about that. In terms of the trust fund being used
as the delivery mechanism, you sound as if you are reasonably
satisfied, in the circumstances.
Dr Tanner: In the circumstances
it is about fiduciary management. What is crucial is that there
is a transitioning process that builds the government capacity
to do that job and, also, looks at the evidence of the government's
own trust fund, to ensure that within a set number of years—and
I do not think we should be thinking too short term here—this
is a fund that is likely to increase and grow, so we can look
at 10- and 20-year time horizons rather than two, three, five.
That is the crucial element for me.
Chairman: That is extremely helpful in
terms of us being able to make useful recommendations. Thank you
both very much for your contribution. It has added a lot and fleshed
quite a few things out. Thank you very much indeed.
4 Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change Back
5
International Financial Institutions Back
6
National Adaptation Programme of Action Back
7
UN Development Programme Back
8
Official Development Assistance Back
9
Civil society organisations Back
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