CORRECTED TRANSCRIPT OF ORAL EVIDENCE To be published as HC 168-i

House of COMMONS

MINUTES OF EVIDENCE

TAKEN BEFORE

INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT COMMITTEE

 

 

DFID'S PROGRAMME IN NEPAL

 

 

Tuesday 15 December 2009

MS LIZ PHILIPSON, PROFESSOR SURYA SUBEDI and MS ROSY CAVE

 

Evidence heard in Public Questions 1-33

 

 

USE OF THE TRANSCRIPT

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Oral Evidence

Taken before the International Development Committee

on Tuesday 15 December 2009

Members present

John Battle

Mr Marsha Singh

Mr Virendra Sharma

Andrew Stunell

________________

In the absence of the Chairman, John Battle was called to the Chair.

Memorandum submitted by Saferworld

Examination of Witnesses

Witnesses: Ms Liz Philipson, Director, Conciliation Resources, Professor Surya Subedi, Professor of International Law, University of Leeds and Ms Rosy Cave, Head of Asia Programme, Saferworld, gave evidence.

Q1 John Battle: May I welcome you and thank you for coming in to help our Select Committee in our inquiry into aid from DFID to Nepal. Most of us visited Nepal recently and this is the first session in our inquiry. For the record, could you just let us know your names and organisations so that is clearly on the record?

Ms Cave: I am Rosy Cave from Saferworld.

Ms Philipson: I am Liz Philipson and I am a director of Conciliation Resources.

Professor Subedi: I am Surya Subedi and a Professor of International Law at the University of Leeds.

Q2 John Battle: May I start by stressing that our Committee is not the Foreign Affairs Committee, it is the Select Committee on International Development? I think the largest bilateral OECD donor to Nepal is actually Britain and obviously Nepal is a post-conflict country to which we are providing £172 million over the three years to 2012 in direct assistance. We just want to make sure that money is spent wisely and well in a difficult post-conflict situation. Could I open the conversation with a question about the politics and in particular the peace process? The Comprehensive Peace Agreement was signed in 2006 and it seems to have stalled, not least because when we were there we met with a whole range of people including the Maoists who had been in the government and were refusing to cooperate. There was talk about whether it would be possible to get the budget through parliament, though I understand that has happened. At the same time there was a lot of talk about the Maoists going back to bandhs, great demonstrations to bring the place to a stop; since we have been the situation has become slightly worse and there was a big demonstration which brought the country to a halt on 6 December. How can the peace process be reinvigorated and what prospects are there for doing that when the Maoists decided themselves to withdraw from government and be in permanent opposition? What do you think are the prospects of that peace process actually working? Would you like to give us your comments on that?

Professor Subedi: First of all thank you for providing me with the opportunity to share my views with you; for inviting me to give oral evidence to the Committee. I am very pleased to be here. In my opinion the peace process is still underway. One of the main objectives of the peace process is to draft the new constitution for the country. Although the full house has not been able to meet for some time, committee work is progressing. Different committees are working on different issues and many of them have actually completed their work and submitted their report to the full house. When there is some political compromise between the main political parties then the reports will be considered by the full house. Therefore, if there was the political will on the part of the three main political parties, having a new constitution in place within the time frame is still a possibility.

Ms Philipson: I take your point that this is not the Foreign Affairs Committee; nevertheless the peace process is inherently political by its very nature, so one needs to go to the politics of it. If one looks at the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, which you mentioned, it is not actually a comprehensive peace agreement: it is much more in the nature of a ceasefire agreement with one or two clauses added. If it were a comprehensive peace agreement, one would expect it to signify a coming together and a creation of a new social compact for the country. That is generally what we have come to expect such peace agreements to signify. It does not in Nepal: it is much more in the nature of a ceasefire agreement. Many of those fundamental issues remain at stake to this day and some of those fundamental issues have been postponed and postponed in Nepal; they have not been addressed by the peace process itself so the country has remained in a state where the war has ceased but the violence has not, as you know because you have been there. The war has ceased but progress towards peace never really got off the ground other than rhetorically. There has been much rhetorical talk of peace but in terms of fundamental progress towards that, that has been lacking. It has been lacking, going back to the politics, because the political structure of the conflict has not really changed in the sense that the political blocs which formed the conflict itself and which were part of the conflict are still as they were and still operating as they were and, to rephrase Clausewitz, the peace has indeed become war by other means.

Q3 John Battle: I know that it is retrospective in a way but the Maoists had popular support and became the government. Do you think the international community should have done more to dissuade them from resigning en bloc from the government, to hold them in there? What is your view on that?

Ms Cave: My experience of Nepal is that the international community could well have suggested that to the Maoists but I do not think that would have changed their opinion; they are very nationalistic. Everything about the peace process in Nepal is that it is meant to be Nepali led and owned. You can see that in the way that, not just the Maoists but all the political parties interact with the international community, especially the international donors. They want some of their support but there are limitations as to how much they will let that contribute to the process, externally anyway. Very quickly going back to your other point, the key thing in terms of the peace process and how successfully or not it is being implemented is partly key sticking points like integration and rehabilitation of the Maoist army combatants which politicians cannot seem to get past; they cannot seem to find a resolution to it but they cannot look beyond it at the other key issues including public security. For me there is a fundamental lack of understanding or comprehension of the security challenges which the ordinary Nepalis face on a day-to-day basis, as I am sure you saw during your trip. That is not even being factored into the implementation of the peace process or the discussions that the politicians are having so there is quite a disparity between what is happening to the ordinary Nepalis and what is happening at the political level in Kathmandu.

Q4 John Battle: Do you think that there is a danger that Nepal will fall back into the kind of civil war which they had for 10 years? I know there is conflict and violence now but do you think there is a danger of them slipping back into that kind of civil war?

Ms Philipson: I do not think it has gone away but I do not think it is imminent. I said that I felt some of those fundamental political questions had not been addressed by the peace process. I think that the elite groups in Nepal, who have held power and have dispensed power in Nepal, remain. Obviously the monarchy has gone but the elite groups who were part of that dispensation remain. Whilst they have had some big shocks in the last five years, they nevertheless have not let go of the idea that they may cling to their powerful positions and that belief is bolstered by forces both within and outwith Nepal. That is resulting in the shoring up of the conflict as it was. Going back to your point about the Maoists in government, the Maoists had their own agenda there. They were also very much on the back foot at that point in that they did not really know where to go because they had won the election, they had the trappings of power, they were the government, however, they were unable to exercise that power because of the obstacles put in the way by others not being prepared to give them the space to dispense the power. So their resignation was an acknowledgement of what was actually a reality for them at that moment.

Professor Subedi: May I take you back to your second question on whether the international community could have done something to persuade the Maoists to remain in power? I think they have regretted resigning from power in haste. They did not take long enough to consider the pros and cons of exiting from power. That is one thing. Whether the country will return to the period of conflict, in my opinion will depend very much on how they assess the possibility of winning the election when the constitution is in place. The constitution drafting process is underway and once that is in place the next big question for all political parties will be what the situation will be for them within the country. If their own assessment tells the Maoists that they are likely to win the election, then I think they will remain in the political process.

Q5 Mr Singh: What do the Maoists actually want by going back to the streets? What is their ambition by going back to the streets or do they harbour some kind of hidden agenda of trying to impose a one-party state on Nepal through revolution?

Ms Philipson: I think the Maoists have been fairly transparent about what their agendas are, for example in terms of them leaving office. I am not sure how hastily they left office at the end of the day. One of the reasons for leaving office was the frustration of not being able to take things forward, but another was that because of that frustration they were also having problems with their own party cadres and leaving office at that moment had a unifying effect on their own party and got everybody back on the same page. That was quite important at that time. In terms of hidden agendas, one-party states, they have been very clear; they have talked about competitive politics, but they do not talk about pluralism. Their positions have moved. As they have become more exposed to ideas of the outside world and ideas of democracy, their positions have moved and some of that may be rhetorical, they are after all politicians as well, but some of it is in fact - and I have interacted with some of the leaders quite a lot - actually development of their ideas. Whilst they are not quite ready to accept fully what they would call bourgeois democracy and we would call democracy, they are however talking about competitive politics, about other parties being accepted within that competitive framework, et cetera, et cetera. A hidden agenda? I think they have a fairly naked agenda that they want to change Nepal quite substantially and they have a mandate for that. They did win the election and this is something which gets lost a lot. This is not to hold any particular brief for their programme but to hold a brief for democracy in that they quite clearly won an election. Now they left office of their own volition at that moment but they had a bit of a Hobson's choice at that point and I think they regret not being in office. I do not know whether they regret leaving office but they regret now not being in office for all sorts of reasons. The fundamental thing about Nepal is that the structures remain the same and there are many small events but fundamentally those blocs and structures of the conflict have not changed at all and that is what needs to move. The Nepalis are very aware of the fact that it has not brought change and ordinary Nepalis are very politically sensitised and they are very aware of that situation and that stasis leaves open the whole area of impunity. Impunity has to be the biggest issue for the ordinary person in Nepal at this moment; above anything I would have thought.

Professor Subedi: There is a tension between the elite within the Maoist movement and the cadres. Public posturing to satisfy their cadres is one thing: actually changing their fundamental policies is another thing for them. That is the challenge. If they can have their policies with regard to state restructuring implemented, they will remain in this political process. As we speak they have been going round the country and declaring various federal units unilaterally. That should have been the job of the Constituent Assembly. Once the constitution has been drafted it will be up to the constitution to decide on how to carve out the country into different federal units. But now the Maoists have been going about declaring them unilaterally to satisfy their cadres. They realised their limitations when they decided to come back to mainstream politics or participate in the peace process. Given the geopolitical situation of Nepal they have realised that winning power through revolution was not going to be easy or possible for them. These limitations have increased. Thankfully they have been interacting with international players, national players, the leaders of the civil society organisations. The level of interaction they are having with intellectuals, civil society sector people has increased so much that it will be much harder for the leadership to do otherwise. I am hopeful that they will remain in the political process provided that they can implement some of their core agenda through the Constituent Assembly.

Ms Cave: May I add on the question of going back to the streets and build on Liz's point that they did win the election and if you look at the actual number of votes, I know it was done on proportional representation but in terms of coverage of the country, the Maoists were voted for by a large proportion of the country. Going back to the streets also demonstrates some of their popular support as well. It is also a very clear demonstration of how much power and control they have when they can shut down the entire country for a day or days at a time, which is quite a strong message to the other political parties and to the international community.

Ms Philipson: On the Constituent Assembly and the constitution-making process, I am hearing that Surya is quite hopeful on this.

Professor Subedi: Yes, because I have seen some of the reports published by different committees, because I my help has been enlisted by members of some committees so I know what is going on. The constitution-making process is moving forward slowly but surely. Once the committee stage work has completed then there would be a hope for a final draft. The Maoists themselves have said that "We haven't prevented the committee work progressing". Once the committee work is there, the final report will have to be submitted to the full house. It is there where the conflict will be because the constitution has to be adopted unanimously if possible or by a two thirds majority. Without the Maoists' support no constitution can be adopted. I am hopeful, given the work that is going on within the Constituent Assembly at the moment, as a lawyer.

Ms Philipson: People are working quite hard in the Constituent Assembly in different ways. However, there are some fundamental political issues and the big one is federalism. At the moment we have however many - I cannot remember how many though I do know how many ethnicities there are - politically formed and politically organised ethnicities there are.

John Battle: We will be looking a bit more deeply into the constitution and the federal issues but on this general question of whether democracy is rooted.

Q6 Mr Sharma: The way you presented the current situation is very interesting. I would like to mention two areas. The first is whether that is popular support or support with fear. That is the first. The second is that amongst the Maoists it is now a question as to whether they accept Western democracy. Is a section amongst that group now happy to accept Western democracy or is their hidden agenda a one-state party but through the democratic process. What do you think?

Professor Subedi: I think they will keep on saying that they have their own definition of democracy and that version of democracy is different from the one practised thus far. In my opinion that too is to satisfy their cadres. They have realised that they have to work within a democratic framework. As we know, there is no universally accepted definition of democracy. Therefore, hey will focus on the following three things. Number one is the electoral process. Number two is the federal structure. Number three is the system of governance, whether it is going to be parliamentary, presidential or a blend of both. These are the three sticking issues. How will the decision be taken on these three issues remains to be seen A lot will depend on that.

Ms Philipson: When talking about Western democracy one has to understand the historical context in Nepal in that their understanding of Western democracy is what they have had, which was a continuation of caste domination, a continuation of majority caste domination, which frankly did not deliver. What the Maoists promised was something more egalitarian than the Western democracy they had experienced. One thing is what the Maoists intend and one thing is what the people want and those two have coalesced around this election.

Q7 Mr Sharma: That leads to my question. We all accept that democracy is not yet properly rooted in Nepal. What action should the international community take, including the UK, to strengthen the democratic processes in Nepal?

Professor Subedi: My number one worry would be the issue of impunity. The country has gone through a very violent, brutal period of 10 years of conflict but people from both sides who committed atrocities have not been brought to account. The feeling that you can get away with atrocities is something which worries me. That is the number one challenge in making democracy genuine and stronger. The other one, in my understanding of the situation, is the restructuring of the state. It is a complex society. The country at the moment, looking from a positive angle, is going through a period of renaissance, political and social renaissance. People have been able to express their views and outline how they have been traditionally marginalised; they are all staking claim to power. Gradually, as the debate goes on, people will realise, that different people belonging to different ethnic, linguistic and religious groups will have to find some accommodation within the larger picture. At the moment the country is going through at period of debate. It takes time for the debate to mature. When the debate has matured, people will see that they are not the only ones staking a claim to power; there are other competing interests. When people have found that accommodation and balance, then that will be the time that the country should be able to move forward, politically speaking. From that point of view, empowering the traditionally disadvantaged and marginalised people through the constitutional process is the challenge for all political parties. For this, they have committed themselves to do adopting a federal structure. However, what sort of a federal structure the country should have is a matter of debate How will the powers be divided between the centre and the federal units and how land reform will be carried out are big issues, especially in the Terai. No meaningful land reform has been carried out in Nepal until now. One of the main issues that the Maoists raised during their campaign was to have meaningful land reform. How that will be implemented, what level of resistance that process will encounter from the privileged, remains to be seen. Therefore, if these issues are addressed, then the country will be able to move forward and that is where I think the international community, including the UK, can provide as much assistance as possible, investing in the process in such a way that it does not lead to further polarisation or disintegration of the society but makes it possible for everybody to get a fair deal from the system. That is the balance one has to strike.

Ms Philipson: I agree with what Surya has said. Impunity is the big question and will continue to be the big question and it affects everything. Impunity affects the lives of ordinary people, it affects the rule of law, it affects progress against corruption, it affects everything and it affects the running of the state itself in many ways. Impunity is very difficult but one thing is that there has been an avoidance of holding people accountable for serious crimes from the war and some are emblematic cases like Maina Sunuwar, a rape and murder case of a young girl which is very well known and the perpetrators are very well known. There has been no action on that and there are other cases.

Professor Subedi: There has been a little action in that direction in the recent past.

Ms Philipson: Very little.

Professor Subedi: I agree, very little.

Ms Philipson: Impunity is not only about crimes during the war, it is about the girl who was raped this morning and I bet there were several in Nepal as we speak and not only will there be no prosecution there will be no recourse to law. So the operation of the whole system has fallen apart and there is a relationship between those two-actually holding big people to account in order that small people can get justice today and that needs to be looked at much more carefully. It is very difficult and people back away from it because it is difficult but that [impunity] is probably the most fundamental thing. I understand you have been to the far west so you very well understand the difference between Kathmandu and other places, yet much of what we learn comes from Kathmandu. Our focus tends to be very Kathmandu focused. For DFID there is a huge analytical challenge in terms of understanding what is happening in all of these different pockets of the country. The whole less-for-more agenda means that the whole analysis tends to be farmed out rather than within DFID itself; it tends to go to consultants. I have been the beneficiary of this but I do not think it is helpful for the long-term understanding of DFID in terms of the Nepali context. That needs to be looked at. Something DFID has done very well has been that DFID's work has helped to catalyse the consciousness of the need for reform of ethnic repression in Nepal. That is something which DFID has begun to do well and can build on. Finally - sorry I am jumping around slightly - going back to impunity, DFID did some really good work on police in Nepal at one stage; a very good report. It has never been followed up on and this kind of not-following-through short-termism is also a problem. They do themselves no favours, because if they followed up on some of these things they would score more on their own work.

Q8 Andrew Stunell: I want to follow up the point you made about DFID and whether they have sufficient first-hand awareness of various parts of the country, which I understood to be what you were saying. Putting it in colloquial terms, do you think DFID should get out more in Nepal?

Ms Philipson: Yes.

Q9 Mr Sharma: At present there is a 22-party coalition government. Do you think they will stay in power? They have already agreed a Common Minimum Programme but what should be the priorities for reform if they stay in power?

Professor Subedi: My own assessment of the situation is that the political process has encountered problems of this nature in the past and some sort of compromise has been found eventually. As we speak, negotiations are underway between the Maoists and other political parties and today the three main leaders from the Nepali Congress, Maoists and the UML are meeting. People have realised that by not having this sort of consensus it will be very difficult for any of them to do anything for the country. Therefore, I would say that some sort of political accommodation is on the horizon. How far that is possible remains to be seen. Without Maoists joining the government or allowing the Constituent Assembly to function fully, they will not achieve their objectives. Whatever objectives they have for the time being they would like to have them implemented through the Constituent Assembly; it is in their own interest to re-join the political process. Whether they will be part of the government or not is a different matter but they are likely to come back to mainstream politics and let the house function fully. That is my assessment of the situation.

Ms Philipson: One of the characteristics of Nepali politics that I have observed over the last 10 years has been that they are extraordinarily skilled at brinkmanship and they go up to the wire every time. I have no doubt they will continue to do that. That does not necessarily result in very good outcomes because they tend to be cobbled together at the last minute around what is possible at that moment. So we end up with a whole list of agreements, for example particularly around the different ethnic groups, which are completely contradictory to each other and, again, lack of implementation of all of these agreements means they will come up again later. Brinkmanship. Will this government survive? I do not know that it will but I think that it may change its form somewhat in order to survive.

Ms Cave: I would agree with that but I think what you will get in government, even if there is a change in government, is just a permutation of what there already is. It is just a matter of time to see whether the Maoists will join that or not. Also, in terms of the priorities, there are the obvious ones like the constitution which need to be written and completed still; there is still the issue around the Maoist army combatants; there are still issues around justice and security; there are also issues still hanging around from the conflict in terms of transitional justice and disappeared persons. From my perspective the key things are to address the root causes of the conflict. If they really want to make change, if they really want to reduce poverty and have sustainable development, then they have to look at the root causes of conflict, they have to look at poverty, unemployment and look at those areas and what can be done there.

Q10 Mr Singh: You have already touched on the importance of the People's Liberation Army and their future in terms of the peace process. Is it possible to integrate the PLA into the armed forces? Does the leadership of the armed forces actually want that and if they were integrated into the Nepali armed forces, would they be soldiers but still under the control of the Maoist Party within the army?

Ms Philipson: These are questions which are always a problem at the end of any civil war. I do not think that these kinds of questions are unique to Nepal. In answer to your question, do the army leadership want it? I think you know the answer to that. They very plainly do not. What army, at the end of a war, did jump for joy at the thought that some of their opponents were going to come into their organisation. In terms of the PLA, I will quote a friend of mine here who says "The PLA did not fight for 10 years in order to stand guard outside some shop or forest". They had greater expectations than that and they fought for 10 years for them. That is the dilemma which is at the heart of the problem. It does go back to what I said earlier, that this is one of the things that the longer it goes on the harder it is to deal with. It would have been possible to deal with it much more easily in 2006 than it is in 2009 or will be in 2010.

Ms Cave: I agree. There is a question-mark about whether we are talking about integration in the Nepal army or into the security services and then there are other options there, although I think that Maoist army combatants want to be in the Nepal army. So the Nepal army may look at integrating them but only into lower ranks and only a small number compared with the number of people who are in the cantonments and that will not do for the Maoists. There is talk about creating a broader security force. Is that an option for them? What about private security? I do not think these are the right solutions but they are the things which are coming up. Also, from some of the contacts we have in Nepal, it seems that the high level political discussion/engagement on this issue is not sufficient at the moment to tackle this. You have the technical committee working on it, the special committee working on it, but you can see that even these are looking at this issue but they are not looking at it in a serious way to come up with answers which can then be implemented.

Q11 Mr Singh: Is the government not saying that there is an issue of numbers, that they are trying to recruit people from different sections of society and they have been doing that so there is the issue that they cannot absorb them.

Ms Cave: There is an issue about whether the 19,000 that are in the cantonments are really 19,000 combatants and UNMIN verified them so therefore they may have a role in that. I think that was just a story earlier this year but yes, the longer they are in the cantonments the bigger this issue is. You have people moving in and out of the cantonments, you have women who have become pregnant who are moving out of the cantonments who work and combatants who may still want to be incorporated into the Nepal army. The longer this takes the more the numbers will vary and the Nepal army has its own issues in terms of recruiting now which in theory they are not allowed to do; they are not allowed to increase their numbers under the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, but they also have the normal retirements of army personnel over the years. They have an issue there in that they want to start recruiting people but feel they cannot.

Q12 John Battle: We visited one of their cantonments. Do you know what the latest position is because I got the impression there have been changes in the attitude of the Maoists on resettlement packages over the last few weeks since we were there?

Ms Philipson: I do not know whether there has been any agreement on that; not that I have heard about. One or two statements have been made.

Q13 John Battle: It was for the 4,000 disqualified and what the position was there.

Professor Subedi: The total number initially was around 19,000. Some of them, whom the Maoists themselves said were not suitable to remain in the cantonments, have been allowed to go home. Therefore, the number is going down and, getting back to your question, there are two issues involved here. Integration as a Maoist bloc or in a dispersed or not in an organised manner and at which level. The thorny issue here is that the Maoists want to have integration at all levels but the army's position would be integration at lower levels and not at senior levels. If the number was small and recruited not as a bloc but in a dispersed manner, I mean as individuals, passing the normal tests for qualifications to join the army, then there could be a special recruitment package to recruit people from within the cantonment as part of the normal process, I mean individuals who would otherwise have qualified to join the army. These are the issues here. If the number was small, if the claim from the Maoist side was not to integrate right up to the highest level, then perhaps some compromise could be found. That is how I see it. The international community could provide some help in that direction.

Q14 Andrew Stunell: Perhaps my remarks should properly go to you, Professor. You are clearly playing a very active part in the constitutional work that is going on. You are very optimistic but could you just give us some basis for your optimism about reaching a conclusion. Do you think it can be done by the deadline? Will they need the extra six months? Would it even be possible after six months?

Professor Subedi: My optimism is based on my own personal observations. I go back to Nepal in different capacities quite often and interact with people at all levels. The elite, no matter to which political party they belong, realise how behind the country is in terms of economic development. As you may have witnessed yourselves during your visit to Nepal in the autumn, even in the capital city the infrastructure is poor, load shedding means nearly 14 or 15 hours without power. People have been forced to live under these conditions. These are the people who are making the political leaders aware of the situation and saying "Look, we're living in this unacceptable situation". No meaningful cooperation has been achieved with India with regard to the exploitation of hydropower; only 1% of the hydropower potential has been harnessed. The possibility of better cooperation is there but the areas have to be identified. People are fully aware of the developments within the region and internationally and comparing the situation existing within the country; no matter whether they are supporters of the Maoist Party or supporters of other political parties they have a dream for their children. To realise that dream the political process has to move forward. There is tremendous pressure applied on political leaders from people supporting different political parties, civil society. That is the sort of debate which is going on in Kathmandu. I agree with Liz that there is one situation within the Kathmandu valley and a different one outside the valley, but the decision will ultimately be taken in Kathmandu itself. I agree with you that whenever decisions have been made, they have not been very mature decisions. For example, it took a long time to discuss the issues around the interim constitution but by the time they came to decide on what sort of interim constitution should be put in place the decision was rushed; it was not a very well-thought-out document. It was more of a political document than a legal one. For a country going through such a huge process of transition one would have expected a more well-thought-out document rather than what it is today. That is also creating some problems. If I may characterise the Nepalese society, it has been a politically liberal, but culturally a conservative society but thanks to the developments within the past couple of years the society is becoming more liberal culturally as well. Once that cultural liberalism and political liberalism start to work together in society, it will be very difficult for people not to proceed, not to have compromises, not to move forward, not to have a constitution in place. On the question as to whether it will be written within the timeframe provided in the constitution - I would say the following: the interim constitution has already been amended three or four times and I cannot rule out the possibility of another one or two amendments-. In my opinion,sooner or later the constitution will be in place because politicians are coming under tremendous pressure from the people and because they have to live in that society they have to be responsive to the wishes of the people. Whether they are the elite or the activists or other civil society people the Maoists have to interact with ordinary people on a daily basis. For instance, when the Maoists were about to resign from power, a huge delegation of the civil society sector went to see the Prime Minister to see whether some kind of compromise could be found, but there was not enough time for the Maoists to consider the pros and cons of their resignation. I think they are now, with hindsight, regretting leaving power. That sort of maturity in the political decision-making process is coming; very slowly but it is there. That is the reason why I am optimistic.

Q15 Andrew Stunell: May I take you to one or two of the practical issues? Of course, after a short visit, we cannot claim to be experts but clearly there were tremendous differences between the people at the lower level on the lowlands in Nepal and the hill country, the mountain country, the ethnic divisions as well. How do you see that federal constitution being resolved? Political parties have very different interests, ethnic groups, very different interests. Your optimism has a real challenge when it comes to that federal element.

Professor Subedi: Indeed. It will depend on how many federal states there will be. When the process has reached the full house it will have to decide how many federal units, whether 14 or eight or seven or 16, 17 there should be. The higher the number the more the people are likely to be satisfied with the outcome in the short-term At the moment people are looking for a political framework, a political settlement for empowerment. What they will gain from that political settlement ultimately is a different matter but people are focusing now on a political settlement, but what sort of settlement there will be for them remains to be seen. I think if the leaders from all major political parties are able to come together and agree on the federal structure of the country that will satisfy a lot of people. Then there will be competition among all the different federal units to do as much as possible for their own unit, whatever name is given to that unit. If the energy which has been coming out at the grassroots level at the moment can be channelled in a constructive manner to strengthen the federal unit, then the people will perhaps realise that there is hope for them. At the moment the focus is on the number of federal units the country should have. But whether having more will mean more disintegration or whether they will be viable units economically or in terms of other factors remains to be seen. For instance, some of the natural resources the country has are rivers which originate up in the Himalayas and then flow through different valleys, different districts, different zones, and end ultimately into the River Ganges. Who will have a better say in the allocation of the water of these rivers? How can you agree on a formula? Even in India we have seen disputes going on between different federal states. In the United States the dispute was quite a prominent one in the 1920s and 1930s and they have settled most of their problems. When you create a new federal structure you create new problems with regard to the allocation of resources and sharing of resources. If people are able to pay attention to these possibilities of conflict before adopting a federal framework,, then the country should be able to have a more politically stable system in place.

Q16 Andrew Stunell: For the sharing of resources you need a small number of federal units.

Professor Subedi: Yes, I agree.

Q17 Andrew Stunell: For the satisfaction of ethnicity and other factors you need a large number of federal units.

Professor Subedi: Yes, that is the demand.

Q18 Andrew Stunell: Do you have a personal view about what the right number will be and its constitution?

Professor Subedi: I have expressed my personal views through articles in the national and international media and on other contemporary affairs in Nepal. My own position is that with the federal structure could be based on the existing framework of five development regions. Nepal has not seen any meaningful decentralisation over the past 60 or so years. While one of the problems is the absence of land reformthe other is the absence of genuine decentralisation of power from Kathmandu. Even today too much power is concentrated in Kathmandu in Singha Durbar. To achieve a meaningful decentralisation you could perhaps have five federal units, broadly along the existing structure. If there is meaningful decentralisation of power people would be able to understand that they will have access to the resources which belong to that particular region. I would say perhaps five to seven federal states would be better to avoid further conflict - conflicts for resources, conflicts for revenues, conflicts for other things within the country - in the future. The numbers should be smaller rather than bigger but at the same time the demand of the population is for a larger number of federal units, around 14 to 16, and that may bring some problems in the future. It depends how the constitution is able to divide power between the centre and the federal units. If more power is given to the federal units and really meaningful decentralisation takes place people may be satisfied with a smaller but viable units. Federalism is just a name, you can have devolution, decentralisation or other different schemes but the ultimate aim should be a proper decentralisation - decentralisation of power from Kathmandu, not only in the constitution but also in terms of the physical infrastructure . At the moment the concentration of education, health and other facilities is in Kathmandu, a small valley. You may have seen it for yourselves during your last visit to the country. This has meant that to access public services people have to come to Kathmandu. Why should people all the way from Doti in the far western part or from the far eastern part have to come to Kathmandu for services that they need in their own region? Decentralising the infrastructure of the central government itself, not only in terms of the power in the constitution but taking out some of the big departments, big hospitals, perhaps the big university departments to different parts of the country. Then people will be satisfied and say "Look, a big hospital has come to my part of the country and I do not have to go all the way to Kathmandu all the time". That is where the focus has to be put in the years to come.

Ms Philipson: I cannot comment on the legal aspects, that is absolutely Surya's expertise and not mine, but politically I am not so optimistic; just to register that. I think part of that is because of some of the comments made earlier about political brinkmanship in Nepal around deals, but there is another factor and that goes back to the whole area of impunity in that I am not sure they will come to a solution quickly enough to avoid social disruption. You can talk about the Madhes but the Madhes itself is so divided both caste-wise, geographically and politically in terms of political means and ends. There are massive divisions within each of these so the level of social disruption can be very high and come up very quickly. I am worried that the whole constitutional process scheduled to end in May 2010 will not get its act together quickly enough to convince these social forces and that, combined with the levels of impunity which we discussed earlier which impinge on the rule of law, even if they do get their act together, means compromises, means people having to accept compromises and one has to ask whether the rule of law is strong enough to allow that to happen. These are very big questions.

John Battle: We will have some questions on security and impunity later. Just one other question on local government which ties in with the constitutional question before we go to inequality.

Q19 Mr Sharma: What problems are arising from the absence of elected local government in Nepal over six years now since that election took place? Do you expect local elections to take place in the near future and how can donors support the development of stronger, more effective local government?

Professor Subedi: Thank you, that is one of the issues at the heart of the debate going on within the country. For ordinary people it is important to access resources and services through the local unit. However, at the moment the units are elected, in some cases not even in existence at all. Elections taking place for local bodies before the adoption of the constitution, given the situation the country is in at the moment, is unlikely. Therefore, the constitution has to be put in place, the election for the national parliament has to take place, then there will be the issue of the election of local bodies in the third or fourth phase of the political process. The absence of elected local bodies for normal people is the absence of a functioning state. Although the literacy rate has gone up to 58% or so a vast majority of the population still lives in the rural areas and for them the presence of the state, the relationship vis-à-vis the local government, does matter a great deal. They become frustrated when they do not see local authorities in their offices when they have to access public services and when they have to deal with the government. They worry how they are able to get these services. that they need That is what matters to most of the ordinary people. From that point of view the level of participation of the people in the decision making process at the local level has been ineffective or non-existent. The local bodies that were paralysed 1990s, i.e. during the conflict, are still not functioning properly. The political process has been with us for nearly three years but for the ordinary people living in rural areas the government has not come back to them.

Ms Philipson: That is right. Yes, there is no structure in place to have elections at the moment until the constitutional process carries forward. I think we should not be under the illusion that therefore there is a complete vacuum in these places. That is quite important in the sense that things have been happening, services have been delivered by somebody, somehow. Some of them may have been done altruistically, many areas of control are held by different political parties, some by the Maoists and one or two by other political parties. Actually enacting a constitution which deals with local structures will not make those go away and there are areas of potential conflict there at the local level with the imposition of a new structure and that has to be dealt with as well and has to be borne in mind and not just assumed that putting the structure down is the end of the story. On a local level it might be the beginning of the story.

Q20 Mr Singh: It is quite clear that Nepal is a very unequal society at various different levels and one of the reasons for the Maoist insurgency was about equality and inclusion. There was some hope that the peace agreement might lead to a new Nepal which was more equal and more inclusive. That seems a distant prospect, given the situation in Nepal at the moment. Apart from the Maoists does any other party have that drive and agenda for inclusion and equality? If the Maoists were back in power, do they have the wherewithal to make the necessary reforms and changes?

Ms Philipson: The Maoists have undoubtedly led the way; there is no question about that. Whilst saying it is clearly a long way from a new Nepal, and I agree with you, one has to look how far Nepal has come on some of these issues. Even in the 10 years since I have been going to Nepal there have been huge differences, not just in Kathmandu. One of the good things which came out of the Maoist insurrection was that it gave a lot of confidence to some of the more repressed groups and that confidence has continued. That of course fuels demand, which is what we were talking about earlier. In my opinion the other political parties do not have that agenda as such. If one looks at the profile of the Constituent Assembly from the different parties, what you very much have is a whole influx of new people to politics and therefore a much more ethnically mixed and gender mixed group from the Maoists and from the other political parties. Of course the other political parties already had their cadres there, so they have to get rid of them in order to bring other people in which may take longer but, if I am honest, I do not see the driving force to do that at the head of any of the traditional parties.

Ms Cave: There is greater movement within civil society and growing pressure on political parties to change that and the international community is playing a role in that. You can see it with civil society, media, et cetera and, for example, with the Madhesi movement. There is a provision within parliament for a quota of women but there are flaws in that process and a lot of the women who are parliamentarians do not have previous experience of politics. They need to understand better how that works and of course you cannot guarantee that they will necessarily promote the rights you might want to see a woman promoting. You also see it in the Nepal army and the Nepal police. They all have quotas as well in terms of caste and ethnicity and gender but then you need to look a little deeper at what positions those people hold. For example, women tend to hold more administrative and local jobs, they do not have high ranking positions generally. Some change is happening but it is really the pressure which will be put on politicians and the government which will actually make more change happen over time. It is a very long-term process. When one of the issues we look at is gender and security, you are not going to get a cultural shift in perceptions on gender overnight at all and that is something which I think other donors also need to look at in terms of the support they provide to civil society organisations, to the government and other stakeholders. You have to be in for the long term; you are not going to get quick tangible results. You may get some in the short term but it is a long-term investment.

Professor Subedi: Inequalities between different ethnic, linguistic and religious groups and the widening gap between rich and poor within the same group has been a problem. That the gap has been widening in the recent past and that is worrying. With regard to the questions as to whether other political parties are as committed as the Maoists to eliminate inequalities, I did do a survey of the political manifesto of all three major political parties when they were participating in the election for the Constituent Assembly. That was an occasion when they had to outline how they were going to govern the country if elected. The other opportunity was during the drafting of the interim constitution was taking place. All political parties submitted a comprehensive document outlining their vision for the country. If you look at these documents, you will not see much difference in terms of their commitment on paper, but who is actually serious in implementing the commitments made is a different matter. If you just look at the commitments, the set of recommendations submitted by the three major political parties in the preparation of the interim constitution and in the run-up to the election for the Constituent Assembly, the wish lists are very similar; only 10% to 15% are different. Nearly 80% to 85% of the ambitions for the country of major political parties are the same. The ground reality is the same and they are aware of this. But having it adopted on paper, taking it seriously and pursuing it seriously are different matters. The commitment on the part of some of the political parties has been lacking in this regard. For instance whether the women who now are represented in the Constituent Assembly do exercise meaningful power or not is a matter worth considering. The composition of the Constituent Assembly itself is a very encouraging thing in Nepal. Women's participation is much higher than in other south-east Asian countries and the number of people represented from Dalits and other disadvantaged and marginalised groups is much greater; whether they are able to exercise meaningful power or are actually in the decision-making level of different political parties is a matter worth examining. We have come some way in achieving that gender equality and other forms of equality in the political process itself. Social and economic inequality is a much greater issue.

Q21 Mr Singh: Are the donors, for example DFID, making any difference at all in terms of gender equality or other forms of discrimination?

Ms Philipson: This is one area where DFID have actually made some small achievements and these small achievements are big achievements actually in these things. The work that DFID have done, on the gender side particularly, but also with different ethnic groups, has and will continue to help to build the confidence of those groups to make those demands which Surya is outlining. To continue that work is very good. I go back to an earlier point, it may be - and I have not looked at in depth, so I do not know this is the case but it may be - given all of these groups have such a broad political spectrum within them, that DFID need to have a better understanding of the details of that spectrum within the various groups they are working with and where they are located, to understand the total picture. It is not just about getting out more but it is also about having an analytical capability in-house to respond to this and not just have reports which are done externally, which then get read or not, as the case may be.

Q22 Andrew Stunell: It would be interesting to pursue that point, but perhaps not just at the moment. To come back to the issue of economic power, clearly land ownership is a very important part of the equation. It has been described to us as currently being a rather feudal system, as we would understand it. What steps do you think can be taken to get more equal access to land ownership and what is the role of the donors in moving towards that?

Professor Subedi: I would say a genuine and sincere land reform project, including some sort of ceiling on land holding and compensating the the rightful owners of that land if they are going to be asked to give away their landt is where I think the conflict will come. If you believe in democracy, you have to believe in the right to property. When you are asking somebody to part with their property, how are you going to compensate them? If they are willing to give up voluntarily for the greater good of the country, so much the better, but we know human nature is not like that. First, having a policy in place and then finding a mechanism to compensate the people who will be asked to give up their land in favour of the landless, those who actually till the land, those who are actually working on the farms, is the challenge.

Q23 Andrew Stunell: As simple as that?

Professor Subedi: It is not as simple as that because it is a very complex society. It is not a homogeneous society. For instance, whether the Terai parties, which have come to prominence and are led by the elite from the Terai, actually represents the real interests of the grassroots Terai people remains to be seen. It is a long-term process and land reform cannot be achieved overnight. Efforts were made in the past, I think, in 1964, when King Mahendra introduced some form of land reform including some ceiling on how much land people can own, but that was not implemented with the degree of seriousness required. When the Maoist conflict intensified around 2001-2002, when Sher Bahadur Deuba was prime minister, action was taken at that time. But it was not through a piece of legislation but through a decision of the Cabinet to introduce some sort of land reform agenda but again that did not work that well. People know what ought to be done. Having the courage to do it and then seeing through the reform that they want to carry out in the country is the challenge.

Q24 Andrew Stunell: On the role of the donors, let us say DFID, in what action is it realistic for them to take part in supporting and promoting land reform?

Professor Subedi: Providing some comparative knowledge and experience of land reform elsewhere in other parts of the world, what the challenges were, how they addressed those challenges. Perhaps providing some models and working out some different strategies, understanding the realities within the country and sharing international experience and then encouraging the main political parties to have some common position. Political parties are mindful that if they goes too far in that direction, that may be a vote-losing exercise for them. Therfore, it is important to have a common policy agreed by the three main political parties. Some persuasion by giving examples of international experience by organisations like DfID would be helpful. Nepal is not the only country which is going through a period of transition; there have been several other countries which have been through similar experiences. It would be interesting to know how have they addressed such issues as very many countries have progressed to a better system or a more modern system, what has their experience been like, what can Nepal do, and consider what different measures and packages could be put in place in Nepal That is the challenge for DFID and other donor agencies.

Ms Philipson: In technical terms of course the whole area of land registration is a nice easy technical package which can be taken forward but to suppose that is the solution to the question would be a grave error. To understand the land question, which is acute in the Terai and much less acute in the hills, other than in specific places, one has to understand the whole feudal patron/client relationships around the caste and clan structures of the Terai and the current holdings, which of course are not properly registered in any way. That is a minefield which will require a much greater stability both in the Terai itself and at the central political level before there could be any hope of that going forward in any realistic way.

Q25 Mr Sharma: We are told that security and justice are the priorities for the poor people in Nepal, yet many people, especially women and other disadvantaged groups or marginalised groups, have very little faith in the ability of the state to protect them. What is your assessment of the main obstacles to improving security? What impact is the lack of security having on everyday life and economic development in Nepal? How can the international community support implementing it?

Ms Philipson: I have mentioned impunity several times already. I do think this is one of the most important issues. We have talked about impunity in terms of the impact holding some of the big people to account for some of the serious crimes they have committed will have on poor people in terms of restoring their confidence in the system and perhaps persuading others within the system to do their duty. I have also mentioned the police report, a very good report commissioned by DFID. I cannot remember when, but a couple of years ago maybe. I do not think this has had the follow-through it deserved and if you are talking about any kind of reform of the police, then you need to have the tenacity to take that through. You are talking about changing the behaviour of an institution, behavioural changes are notoriously difficult to manage and do take time. I personally am rather disappointed that has not gone forward because I thought it had potential. In terms of the experience in the countryside, it is very much the rule of the gun by and large at the moment. Rosy can probably say more about this in terms of some of the experiences they have and some of the research they have done with poor people. My impression is that poor people have their own networks, they have their own patron/client relationships, they have their own links to political parties which they hope will somehow haul them out of trouble when they get into trouble, or not, as the case may be. It is really rather anarchic and that is why I put impunity and the rule of law as the most important thing and I think it affects everything we are talking about today throughout all classes and castes.

Ms Cave: Saferworld does an annual tracker on public perceptions of security and justice in Nepal; we have been doing this for three years now. It is quite interesting. The key point is that it is perceptions; it is not necessarily reality. Public perceptions are changing about safety and security for them on an individual and community basis and they are not surprising findings really but after the Comprehensive Peace Agreement people were very optimistic about the future of Nepal and how they saw it moving forward and that has diminished over time. Conversely, people have become more trusting of the police and feel that it can be effective but that does not necessarily make them feel that security has actually increased for them; they still feel there is quite a lot of potential danger from the threat of violence and crime. Also, something we are finding is that when you actually break it down, looking at, say, trust in the police and their effectiveness, there are disparities between different types of groups and it is the poor who feel they are not getting what they want from the police, that they are not represented by the police. Within that group of poor, obviously you have the key marginalised and vulnerable groups like women, like disadvantaged castes and ethnic groups and they do not necessarily use the police because they think they will get discriminated against because there is corruption, there is politicisation of the police. You might get someone who is caught for committing a crime but then the local political party leader comes round to the police station and says actually that person is pretty important in what they are doing and they need to let them go. So people cannot see that the criminal justice system is necessarily effective. The police also face their own challenges in delivering their service. They are poorly equipped, under-resourced, they have poor pay, long working hours, high rotation levels, so even if there is a will and a commitment to deliver a service they may not actually be able to do that. Also, thinking about the court system, again poor groups find there is a high cost involved and they cannot afford the lawyers' fees for it, there is no provision of legal aid for people, also the trial can be very lengthy and they feel they suffer discrimination and of course there is corruption too. A lot of people do use alternative mechanisms, informal security and justice mechanisms. Less so on the security side but there may well be an increase in that linked to the release of Maoist army combatants; they may move into private security and there are all sorts of implications then at the community level as well as nationwide. In terms of informal justice mechanisms, a wide number of different mechanisms are used including paralegal committees, also speaking to community leaders. So the chief district officers, the CDOs, are actually quite powerful and often you will find that cases go to them before they are taken to the police or to the courts. That also has some problems because they are in a quite powerful position and they do not want to see the successful development of local peace committees because they feel that would be taking power away from them. There are lots of issues there about politicisation of the criminal justice system but also practical restrictions on what they can deliver. Our research is also showing that small arms are proliferating and being used more frequently. Last year in the 2008 survey we found that it was mainly Madhesi groups who were aware of the use of small arms; they saw them in their community. Non-Madhesis mostly saw guns when they were with the police or with someone who was allowed to possess a weapon. However, this year the research found that actually now all groups are becoming more familiar with small arms within their community and there are obviously issues there around porous borders, especially coming over from India, from Bihar and also UP.[1] I think you will find there is transit from other areas as well and possibly also from China. The availability of small arms is increasing; they are not very expensive to buy now and you can even buy them in Kathmandu; they are there. Especially with youth unemployment, poverty issues, you may well see an increase in their use. Just thinking about the economic question, the business community is being targeted by the increasing numbers of armed groups we are seeing in Terai and elsewhere. Extortion and kidnapping are taking place on a much more regular basis, so there is not much incentive for them to develop their businesses, to invest in their businesses, to create jobs for those target groups which really need to get jobs. A colleague of mine was saying to me that this is also true for Nepalis who are not based in Nepal but are thinking about returning. They may well be able to invest in the economy but at the moment they have no desire to do that because it does not look like a good investment, yet they could be a really good opportunity for job creation in the future.

Professor Subedi: The situation varies from one part of the country to another, especially in the Terai. There are so many different gangs operating because of the long, open and porous border. If you are talking about the hills, the situation has improved. Many people who came to live in the district headquarters or in Kathmandu have now started to return, especially to the hill areas. There is a greater confidence in the people now. Those who cannot afford to live any more in the big cities are returning. The state withdrew during the political conflict. That withdrawal was so widespread that it has taken much longer than anticipated for the state to return but it is returning and people are feeling much more confident now, especially in the hill areas; the problem is mainly in the Terai area. Another worrying trend is the high politicisation of the law enforcement agencies. Rather than developing them as professional forces, whoever comes to power tries to influence them as much as possible, changing the very structure of the institutions. That is a big risk for the effectiveness of the law enforcement agencies since whichever political party has held power they have tried to turn the law enforcement into their favour and that is a worrying trend.

Q26 Mr Singh: Obviously the poor access justice or dispute resolution through informal means, paralegal means. Should DFID be putting its money into improving access to the formal legal system or putting its money into the informal justice system?

Ms Philipson: It is not necessarily an either/or question. There is a grave need for the formal justice system to function but there is also an immediate need for there to be other systems. If you look throughout south Asia, there are very successful informal justice systems operating in different places. Indeed in Nepal there are many traditional mechanisms and some of them have all the problems associated with traditional mechanisms, of not being gender friendly, et cetera, et cetera, shoring up status quo, elite power, et cetera. Some of them are quite good and some of them may provide a basis, not only in the interim but in the longer term, for dealing with small crimes in many areas. To get a justice system in Nepal which is actually operating properly in every part of the country is going to take years. So those informal justice systems, if they are informal justice systems and not illegal justice systems - and there is a big difference and there are both in Nepal - can form a very important part of helping to provide a little more security for ordinary people in Nepal, which has to be the objective. It is not either/or: it is both.

Professor Subedi: I would agree with you there. The institution, before the conflict began, was that of local bodies known as panchayats, small bodies run by village elders under the framework of a village development committee but that process is now being replaced by the local political machine. That is a worrying trend in villages. When they have a small dispute, rather than going to the panchayat mechanism they go to the political party apparatus and that is where the problem is at the moment with regard to resolving small disputes at the local level.

Ms Philipson: I was not particularly thinking of the panchayats when I was talking about traditional mechanisms but all the different ethnic groups. Some of them have quite similar traditional mechanisms which are more socially based rather than politically or structurally based. They might provide a better way forward in certain circumstances.

Ms Cave: Our research is coming out with the same kind of findings. There may be ways to tap into the informal mechanisms and use them in the short to medium possibly even longer term but with a strong note of caution that they are not all good and they are not all equal and inclusive. You need to be very careful. One of the challenges there is that there are hundreds of different types of mechanisms, having a good understanding of what is out there first and what functions well and needs to be done before you can automatically say "Right-we should be using those in addition, to complement the formal provision of security and justice."

Q27 Andrew Stunell: Could Saferworld just say something about how you are contributing to that process? It is very interesting material about the survey and I would be quite interested if you could send some of that to the Committee, but could you just say something about the actual projects you are working on and whether that is in conjunction with DFID and how DFID might engage with that?

Ms Cave: Basically our Nepal country programme focuses on security and justice issues and we have three strands to it: the first is research where we do this annual tracker survey on public perceptions of security and justice. That is nationwide and we look at 3,000 households and supplement it with in-depth interviews, focus group discussions. We also do a series of validation work with different stakeholders including, say, the police, political party leaders, also the communities where we have conducted the research, to get them to validate or comment on the key findings that we are getting from it so that when the report is published it covers everyone's opinions. A second strand of work which is supported by DFID is a high level security policy dialogue and that is much more Kathmandu focused but it is really trying to get information from other parts of Nepal into that Kathmandu policy dialogue on security and justice issues. At the moment that is actually focusing only on integration and rehabilitation and a lot of the work we are doing is supporting a Nepali think tank to support the technical committee on supervision, integration and rehabilitation. The overall programme for that particular project is meant to look more broadly at security and justice issues. The third strand is a bottom-up civil society project on justice and security. We work with a number of different organisations, four of whom are Nepali civil society organisations. What we are trying to do there is to raise people's understanding and awareness of security and justice issues and their rights and to help them advocate more effectively for them. One of the key things we are finding, especially when we conduct a survey, is that you can ask people these questions, but they do not really know what you are talking about. I also see it more worryingly during the high-level security dialogue. People do not really have an understanding of what we may mean by security and justice or they understand it maybe on an individual basis on a particular issue but not in a comprehensive system-wide approach to security and justice in the way that the work at Saferworld addresses these issues. For us that civil-society, bottom-up component is critical. We do a number of different things there with the training of trainers to then trickle down so training can be conducted at the district level on security and justice issues also how to advocate on it, how to do media work on it. There is a series of radio programmes on security and justice issues. One is a type of round table discussion programme where there is also a phone-in function for people to use and there is an audience who can ask questions; a sort of Nepali Question Time type of thing on the radio. It is done in local languages as well as in Nepali and that is a really good opportunity to bring the different stakeholders together. We piloted it last year and, for example, the police were not very interested in participating initially because they felt it was putting them on the spot in a difficult situation but as they did participate they realised it was a good opportunity to talk about the challenges which they faced. That is an opportunity to develop those relationships between communities and the other key stakeholders, local government authorities, security service providers which is really critical and something which you can see needs to be built on to develop trust and confidence, particularly with the disadvantaged and marginalised groups. There are lots of different strands. In terms of DFID support, I think it is great that they are supporting that high level security policy dialogue but I do feel much more needs to be done from the bottom up as well and that the two complement each other, especially then having the research where you have baseline data that you can track each year to look at indicators and see what kind of progress is being made, whether there are any changes in attitudes and behaviour, et cetera. My understanding is that DFID are looking to do more at the community level and I am only talking about security and justice. I am sure they do a lot at the community level already on other issues but in terms of the work we look at they are looking to develop that next year, linking into community policing, probably building on the work they have done previously, but I know they have had problems in terms of getting buy-in from the home ministry to take that work forward. There are some developments but we would always pitch that the UK keep doing stuff from the bottom up, even when you do not necessarily get the buy-in from the high level or you could be working just with champions of change within government even when you do not have that buy-in and complement it with work you do in civil society.

Q28 Mr Sharma: We have already touched on many areas concerning the police either directly or indirectly. Generally it is a considered view that the police are corrupt, police morale is very low and everybody says that there is political interference in the police work. What impact has the recently introduced Special Security Plan had? Do you regard this as a positive step? What support for reform in this area can the international community provide to improve the police in that area?

Ms Philipson: A lot of work has been done on this and DFID already has a lot of recommendations in this regard. Yes, they are regarded as corrupt, yes, they do not get paid enough, but maybe I will just tell a small anecdote. About a couple of years ago someone I know was in Terai and looking at violence in Terai and she was interviewing different police, people in different areas. The shocking thing at the end was that there had been all these reports of violence and she asked how many people were held in custody; it was some ridiculous number like two. She expressed surprise and said "Don't you arrest them?" and the police said "Yes, we arrest them and every time we arrest someone we put them in prison and that night we get a call from a politician in Kathmandu, depending on which party they are affiliated to, and we are told to release them, so we never have anyone in custody". I think that the police, yes, are corrupt and do not get paid enough, but it is not possible for a small policeman in some small place to say no when rung by a politician or a minister and as long as that pertains then the problems will remain. In Bihar across the border they have a new defence minister who gave his mobile phone number to every police station and said "As soon as a politician walks in you ring me or you are sacked" and they are beginning to have some impact.

Q29 John Battle: Thank goodness politicians and even ministers do not have that kind of power here.

Professor Subedi: The criminal justice system is outdated. It was put in place in 1964 through a Napoleonic-style code which covered both criminal and civil matters. The involvement of a legal official in the form of a public prosecutor right from the very beginning of the investigation process, i.e. since a crime has been reported to the police, in the form of some external scrutiny, has to be there; that has been realised and the process of adopting a new criminal code for the country is underway, but it is taking a long time. Hopefully within the next two to three years the new criminal code should be in place. When that code is in place, perhaps an active involvement of the legal official, the district public prosecutor, acting on behalf of the Solicitor General or Attorney General, will minimise politicisation and the opportunity for corruption in the police. .

Ms Cave: May I respond also to the point about the Special Security Plan - it has a number of different names. People are seeing that as a result of that there is a decrease in crime and that is happening in large parts of the country. There are still some issues in Terai but in parts of Terai crime has decreased since that has been implemented. There are still perceptions though and fears and concerns about crime and violence that still exist even if actual crime rates are reducing. From our perspective, one thing which seems a bit worrying about the implementation of that plan is the use of the armed police force that has been deployed to the Terai to improve security and I do not think that is necessarily a positive step. Really that should be the role of the police and not the armed police force. That probably says a lot about the capacity and capability of the Nepal police but I think they need to focus on addressing that too.

Q30 Mr Singh: Can we come on to employment? This Committee observed in their report on Nigeria that "... in an ethnically diverse country with a long history of political instability, the existence of large numbers of young unemployed men presents risks to stability and security". Would you agree that applies also to Nepal? Would you be able to comment on the efforts of donors - obviously we are interested in DFID - in trying to generate employment for young people in Nepal, whether that has been effective or ineffective?

Ms Philipson: On the quotation, I think that the large numbers of unemployed men, if they are mobilised wrongly, present a threat. In Nepal we are at the end of a civil war and first of all one has to remember the ratio of women who were active in the Maoist militia; it is not just men we are talking about here. Demobilisation just has not happened and certainly the militia morphed into the YCL[2] and was never demobilised. So what you have is not only a lot of young men but a lot of young women who have learnt that the way to survive is through the gun. It is quite hard to generate employment at a fast enough rate at a level which gives the same gain and that is the big challenge. It is not just about creating employment, though that is important in itself and I am not saying it is not. However, it is about understanding the whole context where you have people who have not been through any transformation, have not been through any demobilisation process, who have been using the gun, where the gun is seen as the way forward. That is beyond just creating employment policies.

Q31 Mr Singh: That is specific to the demobilisation. In terms of more general employment amongst young men in Nepal.

Ms Philipson: The context is really that they are more likely to pick up a gun so it has a wider implication.

Ms Cave: I would add that a lot of the unemployed youth might be part of political armed groups but there are also increasing numbers of other armed groups which are criminal groups. The majority of the armed groups are criminal, only a very small number are political, but the political ones can have relatively high numbers and there is a direct correlation there between unemployment, poverty and the security and justice situation. From a Saferworld perspective we would very much say that you need to improve the security and justice situation before you are going to be able successfully to tackle issues around employment. You are just not going to get the business community wanting to invest in this and create jobs for them when they are worried that someone they employ is then going to kidnap them, extort from them, I do not know what. In that sense we are very supportive of DFID's white paper and security and justice being identified as basic services with the delivery of development, because we do see it as quite critical. Nepal is a really good illustration of how that needs to be addressed to achieve longer-term sustainable development.

Professor Subedi: The level of unemployment at both graduate and non-graduate level, skilled and unskilled youth, is a big problem. That will remain a challenge to democracy and political stability in the country for a long time to come. That has not been addressed properly. If you are a young man or woman aspiring to do something for your family, one of the options you look for is to leave the country and go abroad. Therefore, Nepal has been exporting its young population in large numbers to other south Asian countries, the Middle East and increasingly now to European and American destinations. When I was going through DFID's report, I thought of a couple of things. Maybe the British Government are doing what I am going to say at a multilateral or international level. The priorities identified by the DFID in Nepal are as follows: improving governance, economic growth, health and education. From my reading, Britain had a policy in Nepal until recently of investing more heavily in infrastructure-related projects. Now the emphasis seems to be more on governance, more on soft issues, the issues of the day rather than infrastructure-related investment. For instance, the road built with the support given by the British Government is still delivering business; whatever produce people have they are able to market it, send to other bigger cities and supplement their income. Also, one of the ways of generating income for a country like Nepal, which is a least-developed country is promoting exports. If you are a prospective foreign investor, it would make sense to invest in Nepal rather than in one of the neighbouring countries because any product heading for international markets from Nepal will attract dual tariffs, duty free products, free access that any product produced in Nepal will enjoy. But for this there has to be political stability, more assurance around security and so forth, That would be one way of generating income and creating employment opportunities. I did not see the issue of aid for trade figuring anywhere in the DFID report. Also another area is, perhaps moving away from infrastructure-related projects, the melting of the ice in the Himalayas. We have to consider seriously what sort of impact will it have on people's livelihoods. The irrigation network that exists today may not work properly and the flow of water may diminish, especially in the dry season. We have to consider what alternative network of irrigation the country will require Therefore, when I say infrastructure-related projects I also mean irrigation networks. That also does not seem to figure prominently in the report. Therefore, the issue of economic growth is related to youth employment, youth employment is related to supporting the activities which are more long lasting. There are so many other donor agencies working to improve governance today, helping the Constituent Assembly; it is overwhelmed actually. Every donor is interested in helping in the political process, rightly so, because unless you sort out your political problems you are not going to address much larger, longer-lasting issues. At the same time, perhaps DFID could pay more attention to infrastructure-related projects, creating employment opportunities through the expansion of aid for trade and what is also lacking is investment in higher education. What sort of quality of graduates are the universities producing? Yes, rightly the focus has been on primary and secondary education, but higher education is also a problem because you have graduates who do not have adequate skills to compete in an open market, nationally, internationally, regionally. When the economies of both China and India started to grow, India benefited, China benefited from outsourcing but when that sort of business activity graduates from India and China it should come to Nepal. Would the country be prepared to take outsourcing, if not from Europe from America, from India and China? The graduate work force, the graduates leaving universities, should be trained to tap those opportunities. This is also an area where DFID could provide more assistance. That also seems to be missing from the report of the DFID that I have read. Just to give you an example, many of the problems we have encountered are due to lack of professionalism; expertise is required, whether it is in the administration of justice or administration of other sectors of activity. When there is a grater need of expert human resources to steer the country in the right direction in so many areas of economic development, the number of scholarships, for instance, for people coming to British universities from Nepal has declined over the years; whereas it has gone up with regard to other countries. Why is this so? Maybe there are already enough countries offering that opportunity or there are some other underlying reasons which I have failed to understand. As an academic working at a university in this country I have noticed the absence of scholarship opportunities for talented Nepalese people to come and to train here and go back to offer their services to the country does. This matter not figure in the DFID report. In conclusion, unless we do something to address youth unemployment the challenges will remain and political stability will remain an issue.

John Battle: What I just want to reassure you is that in our visit climate change did feature of course, energy, water resources, the ice melt. Just looking at my notes here, we could do another three hours but we have had a good session on the security issues and I just want to close with a question on the borders, the wider relationships that you hinted at there with China and India in particular. I do not want you to get the impression we came away with a negative at all. We were very positive about the economic potential, particularly in terms of natural resources, energy, water for the whole region, agriculture and, of course, tourism and what that contribution could be if all the other factors we discussed could be sorted out in due course.

Q32 Andrew Stunell: You have already mentioned relations with India and with China from a number of different angles. It has been put to us that Nepal was "a soft fruit between two rocks." I just wondered whether you could say something about how Nepal can take advantage of its position and what the risks are for Nepal.

Ms Philipson: Historically it is being "the yam between two stones" which has been the basis of Nepal's foreign policy. My impression is that both India and China have seen Nepal as the buffer state, which is the corollary to that, but they are both perhaps not as confident of Nepal's efficacy as a buffer state as they used to be. The events in Nepal over recent years have resulted in increased Indian interest and activity around Nepal.

Q33 Andrew Stunell: You nearly said interference.

Ms Philipson: I was trying to avoid that because of its specific legal meaning; I was trying to avoid it. Yes, in ordinary language there has been. If you go to Nepal people talk about the original 12-point agreement between the Maoists and the political parties which was brokered by India in Delhi and that is now a very transparent level of diplomatic assistance, interference, whatever you want to call it. Many people saw that as positive. I certainly did at that stage. However, India sees itself and has always seen itself as a regional power and India classically mistakes influence for control and has done on several occasions throughout south Asia and it did the same thing in Nepal. India was very close to the king and had its two pillar policies of supporting the king and the democratic political parties. When the king took executive power over the country, India lost patience with the king and that resulted in the 12-point agreement. However, India has found that the political parties have also not proved so amenable, Maoists in particular have not proved so amenable to India's wishes and India continues to interfere. India sees the army as the sort of last bulwark against the Maoists in Nepal and India's continual support for the army and continual support for the traditional political parties in relation to the position on the army is worsening and it is increasingly intransigent around the issue of integration particularly. India has a very genuine interest in the Terai in terms of security issues. There are many journalists and analysts who cite India as having interfered and fomented some of the problems in the Terai. I can neither verify that nor deny it. However, there is an open border and India undoubtedly has an interest in that regard and maintains a great deal of watchfulness around that area. The other area which Surya could talk an awful lot more about is the water question which India has always been interested in and which has always been a big issue. So you have India getting more and more fingers within Nepal as opposed to influence upon Nepal. At the same time, China, which has always been quite passive but watchful, and whose main interest is Tibet and Taiwan, has become more vocal in relation to Nepal over recent years particularly through academics associated with the government of China but also more directly through an increase in activity in terms of army visits, et cetera, from the Chinese PLA.[3] So the yam between the two stones is getting a little bruised with all of this, much more than previously. It is not clear where it is going. China has not interfered internally so much as India has in the past. India has played a very negative role of late and will probably continue to do so. That is probably one of the biggest problems for the peace process, the role India has taken in relation to integration in the army. China's nervousness around Indian interference has been demonstrated by statements and very little else.

Professor Subedi: The level of China's interest in Nepal has grown in the recent past. That has given India some cause for concern; hence both are competing for greater influence in the country. That is not necessarily a bad thing. Actually it is a good thing because whatever resources the country has, if two larger neighbours are competing for greater influence and the exploitation, the value will go up. Would Nepal be in a position to exploit its natural resources in the interests of the country? That is one big challenge. The other thing is that whenever people in Nepal talk about exploitation of hydropower potential, the talk has been about big projects, big dams. I know that to build a huge hydro-dam project it requires billions, not millions, but again one could take a different approach. Given the uncertainty surrounding science, the climate change and its impact on the Himalayas, perhaps smaller scale hydropower projects scattered along the middle hills and upper hills of Nepal could generate enough electricity to support the local population and industrial activity in cities like Pokhara, Dharan or in other places in the far west and mid west. An increase competition for greater influence on the part of two of the larger neighbours is not necessarily a negative thing in my opinion. Nepal can benefit from it if she is well prepared for it. We have seen very many countries exploiting the opportunity offered by greater competition amongst the regional powers' immediate neighbours. At the same time, until recently people knew who to deal with in Nepal. There was a certain stability, but now there is an increase in the number of main political players and each of them is trying to seek favour from neighbouring countries. Prospective foreign investors too are not sure as to who to deal with and who to speak to in Nepal to do serious business in the country. That is the challenge. Once the political process, the peace process comes to a logical end, the new constitution is in place, the next challenge will be the first general election. If that election can take place in a reasonably free and fair manner and once people come to accept that even if you lose the election you must accept your role in opposition then Nepal will be on the road to democracy and stability. That will be the real test for the country. If you are more powerful, if you are bigger in size, economically and militarily, of course you want to exert as much pressure as possible or influence as much as possible the developments in your neighbourhood. That is a human nature. A state is no different from human nature. Exploitation of water resources has been a thorny issue between India and Nepal but that too can be worked out to mutual satisfaction. A system could be created if we were to focus more on smaller scale hydro-dam projects rather than waiting for one big one requiring billions of dollars. That may be the way forward. That is what DFID could consider carefully. I did put that question to the minister concerned when we had an interactive programme when the DFID report was being released. The answer was that it requires a greater amount of money than the British Government can afford but again, yes, bigger amount of money for bigger projects but smaller projects can be supported and that is where I think the future lies.

John Battle: May I thank you most sincerely for your contributions to our inquiry this morning. It has certainly deepened our questions and our research. We will have other sessions and other witnesses and we will probably interview the minister as well to see how the programme has gone. Thank you very much for your contributions this morning.

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[1] Uttar Pradesh

[2] Young Communist League

[3] People's Liberation Army