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Written evidence submitted by Oliver Jones, Rural Programme Manager, WaterAid Nepal[1]
The Impact of DFID's Nepal Exit from the Water and Sanitation Sector
1. DFID 1.1. Prior to 2007, DFID in 1.2. I believe more importantly, was the work that DFID had done in supporting local civil society organisations to develop approaches to improve the delivery of WaSH services. These included working on addressing gender and social inclusion in WaSH projects, as well as on approaches to enable basic services to be implemented in conflict affected areas, something that was essential at the time. 1.3. In addition to this, DFID were playing a critical role in trying to bring increased harmonisation and coordination in the sector. At the time the World Bank and Asia Development Bank were both implementing parallel rural and urban WaSH projects, and DFID were using their influence in the sector to get them both round the table with the Government of Nepal to set out a common vision and direction for the whole sector.
2. DFID 2.1. I recognise that DFID, like any organisation, has to prioritise its activities and decisions have to be made sometimes to withdraw from certain activities or sector. 2.2. In terms of the decision to withdraw from the
WaSH sector, I have only been involved in this as an outsider and therefore
cannot provide detailed critique of the decision making process. However,
I was asked to contribute to an external review of DFID's engagement in 2.3. My understanding is that the external review
found that DFID's WaSH programme was one of its most effective interventions in
3. The nature of DFID' exit from the WaSH Sector: 3.1. What I was even more surprised by is the manner in which DFID exited the sector. It seemed like a cut and run approach, which did not look to consolidate any previous work or review the impacts of their exit on the wider sector. 3.2. To give DFID credit they did support the mobilisation of funds on a short term basis from AusAid to some of their civil society partners, which stopped a significant shock from a sudden funding decrease. 3.3. I believe DFID is an organisation committed to learning, and I was therefore surprised that despite the significant funds that they had invested into the sector, as well as resources invested in developing new and innovative approaches, that DFID made no effort to review, capture or share these lessons with anyone in the sector. 3.4. As a result a significant opportunity to improve sector approaches and strategies based on DFID's engagement was lost. I felt that DFID did not capitalise on a wealth of knowledge that its investment had created.
4. Initial impact of DFID exit on the WaSH sector: 4.1. At the time of their exit, DFID was also engaged in negotiating the process of moving towards a sector wide approach (SWAP), in which donors coordinated their funding to support one national sector plan led by the Government. 4.2. DFID had originally put themselves forward for this role however on exiting the sector drop all responsibilities to this process. This led to a complete collapse of discussions between the World Bank and ADB, and a haemorrhaging of the process. 4.3. Other sector actors, including WaterAid, WHO and UNICEF, stepped in to try to repair the damage and continue the momentum, but two years later we are now only just back to where we were before DFID's exit. 4.4. DFID lack of a planned transition of their responsibilities and role in the sector on their exit led to significant disruption to what was a very valuable process to improve sector effectiveness.
5. DFID 5.1. DFID produce an annual report on the WaSH sector, entitled "Meeting Our Promises" (http://www.dfid.gov.uk/Documents/publications/water-mop-5.pdf ). The 2009 report claimed that DFID Nepal have spent GBP 21 million and had 0.5 million beneficiaries in the WASH sector in Nepal during 2007 and 2008 - see page 26. 5.2. Due to DFID's withdrawal from the sector at the start of this period, this level of investment would have been almost impossible. On noticing this, I immediately contacted the DFID Nepal office, and was informed that there had been a "typo" in the final report and these figures were actually for a five year period. I am yet to see a public acknowledgement of this mistake and the report on their website still contain this error, which you can see from the link above. 5.3. This misrepresentation of DFID's investment in the sector is of serious concern to me and raises considerable questions about their transparency and accountability, principles that they regularly preach to developing country governments about.
6. DFID 6.1. I feel that the manner of DFID's exit, led to an opportunity being missed for the sector to learn and develop, and the lack of proper dialogue on their exit led to a vacuum in sector. 6.2. DFID reputation in the sector, and wider in 6.3. It has increased distrust in donor commitments to Government initiatives and confirmed many people beliefs about the unpredictability and inconsistency of donor funding. 6.4. DFID's misrepresentation of their continued
commitment to the WaSH sector has also led to significant questions being asked
about DFID credibility in
[1] The views given in this evidence reflect those of Oliver Jones and not those held by WaterAid. |