Written evidence submitted by Dr Steve Kibble
Assessment of the Global Political Agreement (GPA)
"The government must give as much attention to securing human rights reforms as they are to seeking economic resources. There seems to be no sense of real urgency to bring about human rights changes on the part of some government leaders. Words have not been followed by effective action." (Amnesty International Secretary-General Irene Khan, 18 June 2009 at a press conference in Harare.)
"The ... detention of our party treasurer, Roy Bennett, has brought home the fiction of the credibility and integrity of the transitional government. It has brought home the self-evident fact that Zanu-PF sees us as a junior, fickle and unserious movement' Morgan Tsvangirai on 16th October announcing that his party was boycotting the Inclusive Government'. Guardian (UK) 17 October 2009[1]
Preface I was asked to produce this paper as background comment on the current situation rather than addressing directly the concerns of the IDC re DFID's humanitarian assistance to Zimbabwe.
Introduction On 11 February 2010, we will have had nearly one year of the 'Inclusive (or Unified) Government' (IG/GNU) following the signing of the 'Global Political Agreement' (GPA); the context remains, however, the militarisation and 'militia-isation' of the Zimbabwean state often referred to as a 'silent military coup' under the control of the Joint Operations Command (JOC)[2]. The political environment is rocky, the economy has only partially restabilised and the humanitarian situation is precarious. In late January 2009, Zimbabwe's Movement for Democratic Change (MDC)[3] succumbed to the relentless pressure from regional heads of state in the Southern African Development Community (SADC) and agreed to become part of an 'inclusive government' with Robert Mugabe's ZANU-PF. The GPA, signed in September 2008, after the post-electoral violence of April - June 2008 that led to this government was far from the desired outcome for the vast majority of Zimbabweans. It was hailed by the SADC summit a few days later as 'problem solved', but the GPA effectively 'rewarded' ZANU-PF by offering it a seat in government despite overwhelming evidence of their responsibility for the violence. Additionally the GPA is a very badly drafted document, and in the context of the problems facing Zimbabwe (especially on human rights violations and related security sector reform needs) is replete with omissions. Most analysts agreed that it lacked a time-frame, was riddled with contradictory statements[4] and laid up as many problems as it solved, as indeed has become apparent. Issues of political control were left undecided which gave the opportunity for Mugabe to sow division amongst his opponents - something at which he is adept.
Morgan Tsvangirai's installation as Prime Minister on 11 February 2009 meant legitimacy was restored to Robert Mugabe as president of Zimbabwe and raised the possibility of the end of targeted 'sanctions' and an injection of Western capital into the country's beleaguered economy. MDC and civil society activists feared that if Mugabe and his party achieve these three things, there will be little to reverse the trademark tactics of attacking and undermining the MDC and civic associations through kidnappings and extra-judicial killings (including 'car accidents') and assassinations, imprisonment on trumped up charges and intimidation particularly in the rural areas as part of the strategy to retain power at whatever cost. It is noteworthy here that the tragic car accident that killed Morgan Tsvangirai's wife Susan on 6 March 2009 triggered immediate fears that this was another attempt to assassinate the new Prime Minister given that there had been four previous attacks on him[5]. Recent reports of arrests of members of civil society, journalists, human rights activists, lawyers and MDC officials continue to undermine rule of law, the building of a democratic space and public confidence in the political process. A South African delegation was in the country in early December 2009 to try to help break the deadlock in the 'unity talks', but there was little optimism of an early breakthrough[6].The biggest problem is that despite an undertaking in the GPA to deal with violence and perpetrators, despite the overwhelming amount of empirical evidence in this regard, impunity continues to characterise the situation and there is no sanction on the use of these tactics. While levels of violence / intimidation have reduced, a recent survey suggests that requisite levels of fear and related immobilisation will be maintained[7].
What is the GPA[8]? The GPA was essentially an uneasy compromise between the two MDCs and ZANU-PF, and resulted from: the weakening of the former single ruling party, ZANU-PF, and the opposition, the weakening of the support base - civil society and trades unions - of the MDCs; the rapid spiralling down of the economy allied to a disastrous humanitarian situation; pressure from SADC, especially after the flawed presidential election second round of June 2008; and growing international isolation of the Mugabe regime. The GPA provided an opportunity for ZANU-PF to maintain its repressive, kleptocratic and economically bankrupt rule and attempt through the MDC to reverse economic decline and normalise its international relations. The MDCs, by contrast, entered the agreement as their only possible viable route to power, and to begin a process of national political and economic revival, but also, no doubt, for some a chance to enjoy the rewards of office.
GPA problems and SADC The major MDC faction (MDC-Tsvangirai)'s partial disengagement from the IG on 16 October 2009[9] signalled the fragility of the GPA and the lack of political will by parties for genuine change[10]. The pullout was in response to the failure of ZANU-PF to live up to its signed commitments in the GPA and the lack of pressure up till then nationally or regionally (on the guarantors of the GPA) to implement the agreement. According to the human rights organisation Sokwanele which monitors GPA progress in its November 2009 report[11], ZANU-PF was responsible for 89% of the violations of the GPA. The Southern Africa Development Community (SADC), as guarantor of the GPA, urged all parties to respect the deal and to engage in dialogue before mid December[12]. There was then a slight pull back from gridlock as MDC-T signalled on 6 November 2009 that it would return to working with ZANU-PF. After agreeing to rejoin the IG Tsvangirai gave his 'partners' in government 30 days to address outstanding issues[13]. The SADC Troika urged that: The GPA parties should fully comply with the spirit and letter of the agreement and SADC Summit decisions of 27 January 2009; the parties should not allow the situation to deteriorate any further; the parties to engage in a dialogue in order to find a lasting solution to the outstanding issues towards the full implementation of the GPA; the Facilitator (the Republic of South Africa) on behalf of the Troika should remain seized with the developments on the implementation of the GPA; the Troika should continue monitoring the progress closely and report to the Chairperson of the SADC Organ Troika on Politics, Defence and Security Cooperation; and the international community to lift all forms of sanctions on Zimbabwe.[14] The Troika meeting also decided that; The political parties signatory to the GPA should engage in dialogue with immediate effect within fifteen (15) days not beyond thirty (30) days; the dialogue should include all the outstanding issues emanating from the implementation of GPA and SADC Communique of 27 January 2009; the Facilitator should evaluate progress and report back to the Chairperson of the Organ on Politics, Defence and Security Cooperation.[15]
There was a follow-up SADC Troika meeting in Maputo in mid January 2010, which Mugabe attended but not Tsvangirai[16]. Despite supposedly 16 of the GPA outstanding 27 issues having been agreed, none of them are at the core of the power-sharing dispute[17]. Indeed ZANU-PF claims, somewhat improbably, to have fulfilled their side of the bargain and charges that MDC has failed to get 'sanctions' lifted - something that is of course not within that party's control. The recent ZANU-PF congress in December 2009 suggested a hardline approach, although some of that was for internal consumption[18].
Half the new government ministers are from Mugabe's ZANU-PF party and Tsvangirai's authority is restricted with ZANU-PF retaining (with the exception of Finance Ministry) the most important portfolios in terms of reflecting 'power'. Mugabe chairs the cabinet; Tsvangirai a council of ministers. It is clear that a divided government is not the best mechanism for addressing the crisis (and also that ZANU-PF in particular has no ideas at all on reversing decline[19]). Although MDC controls the finance and spending ministries[20], it could not win control of the police. Under the deal it shared responsibility for the interior ministry with ZANU-PF, which has already in certain cases seemed unworkable. The Cabinet sets overall policy, but Tsvangirai is in charge of government business in parliament and oversees the implementation of government policies through chairing a Council of Ministers made up of cabinet ministers, and at which Mugabe is not to be present. Tsvangirai would supposedly act as the deputy chair in cabinet meetings, but Mugabe continues to resist this[21]. Perhaps most importantly, Tsvangirai was scheduled to be a member of the Mugabe-chaired National Security Council which supposedly will replace the JO Command, but firstly looks likely to be still composed of the senior army and police officers who directed the post March election violence and who swore they would not recognise a Tsvangirai-led government (and did not show up for the swearing into office), and secondly has met only once with no indication of the military accepting that Tsvangirai has any power over them. The possibilities for endless conflict over responsibilities and the unwieldy relationship between Council of Ministers and Cabinet allied to Mugabe's divide and rule tactics made this agreement fragile even before 16 October 2009. There is no evidence that the ZANU-aligned civil servants, military or police are obeying any new MDC minister and plenty of evidence that they are being obstructive[22]. It is even less likely that the youth militia and war veterans would do so. The agreement pointed to the adoption of a new Zimbabwean constitution within 18 months subject to a Yes vote in a referendum. A parliamentary select committee comprising the three parties was established to guide the constitution-making process[23]. But there are already significant differences over whether a previous 'Kariba Draft[24]' for a new constitution with substantial presidential executive powers should be the basis, or a more 'people-driven' one as called for by civil society and some within the MDC[25]. Despite the existence of a Constitutional Parliamentary Committee (COPAC), one of its three chairs has recognised that 'a culture of fear gripping a population that has endured years of political violence.. could hamper free debate[26]'. Tsvangirai's predicament was reflected in his statement that "this government will serve as a transitional authority leading to free and fair elections"[27], whereas Mugabe disagrees and considers himself president for a full term of office. As well as the question of equality of posts within the government there is continuing violence[28], farm invasions[29], farmworkers being thrown off farms[30], human rights abuses including in the Marange/ Chiadzwa diamond fields[31], the failure to abide by the SADC Tribunal judgement that commercial farmers were dispossessed of their land illegally, and corruption. Three days after the Troika meeting on Nov 5th, the President of the Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions (ZCTU) Lovemore Matombo and four other ZCTU officials were arrested in Victoria Falls under the Public Order and Security Act (POSA)[32]. There also continue to be concerns over the continuing politicisation of aid under the drought relief committee, a state-appointed committee found in the country's 63 districts, chaired by district administrators, with similar concerns over the district councils[33].
The SADC troika appears at least initially to have put pressure on Mugabe to stick by the GPA and acknowledge the communiqué preceding it as binding[34] - given that it mentions his unilateral appointments of Reserve (Central) Bank Governor and Attorney-General and the appointment of permanent secretaries, provincial governors and diplomats[35]. SADC could subsequently have mentioned his staffing the boards of government-controlled media establishments with military officers[36] and of the ZANU-PF appointees to the parliamentary select committees with MPs known to have been involved in the 2008 election violence[37], and his private meetings with the supposedly disbanded Joint Operations Command (JOC)[38]. It was on the basis of that communiqué in January 2009 that the MDC agreed to form the IG.
All the major players in the multiple crisis that is Zimbabwe are experiencing problems in carrying out their plans and in some cases holding on to their support- both MDCs, ZANU-PF, civil society and churches. None of the three parties in the IG, but particularly ZANU-PF ('the state within a state'[39]) have attempted to use the two year breathing period to put forward their strategic view or look to bring in major structural change. Although MDC were largely able to hold mass rallies from October 2009 to explain their position on pulling out of the IG, increasing (if fluctuating) levels of violence[40] will undermine this and mean their supporters come under greater threat. Most of those I interviewed[41] thought that MDC-T was right to join the IG but also right to suspend cooperation[42]. There was a feeling though that the timing had been unfortunate since one of the issues was Mugabe's refusal to swear in Roy Bennett as MDC-T Deputy Minister of Agriculture on the spurious grounds he was facing (highly contrived) charges of treason[43]. ZANU-PF attempted, unsurprisingly, to play the race card on this saying MDC were only interested in getting their white man into power[44]. A legal academic thought MDC were also right not to advise SADC of their intentions to pull out as they would only have been told to stay in[45].
Although MDC-T controls the Finance Ministry under the terms of the Global Political Agreement (GPA) signed with ZANU-PF, they do not have a free hand to deal with the economy. Reserve bank Governor Gideon Gono[46] remains in place (although at one point he looked to be going to leave under immunity clauses and joining ZANU-PF structures[47]) having been unilaterally re-appointed by Mugabe against at least the spirit of the GPA and contrary to the communiqué of January 2009 preceding the installation of the IG. Gono remains a key part of the ZANU-PF funding/ security/ information base.
The strategies of the parties MDC, under simultaneous pressure from ZANU-PF and its own desire to turn round Zimbabwe (and enjoy the trappings of power) has moved from being prepared to compromise on most issues to keep the IG afloat (notably on media reform[48]) to a more critical stance - although without seeming able to inform its base or society on general on its basic thinking and strategy. Without movement on security sector reform given a weak parliament and a strong executive, the ZANU-PF grip is unlikely to slacken, with a strategy of not changing its ways and of squeezing the opposition (it knows few other strategies). Although ZANU-PF is losing some of its power[49] and its ability to pay and feed its client networks, it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that it does have a strategy - brutal but in the past an effective one - and MDC does not have a Plan A let alone B. A profound illustration of this is that MDC did not turn out to visit UN Special Rapporteur on Torture Professor Manfred Nowak[50] when he was turned back at the airport on 27 October 2009 despite having been invited to enter - an invitation withdrawn at the last minute, triggering a personal invitation from Tsvangirai, although to no avail[51].
While having the disgraced former Minister for Information Jonathan Moyo[52] back was thought to have been a plus for one of ZANU-PF's faction leaders Emmerson Mnangagwa[53], the fact that the former is driving the project for ZANU-PF control is not necessarily one for the party as a whole. Although capable of Machiavellian strategies he is largely discredited and unpopular in the country, although with some political and electoral support[54]. One human rights activist thought that the return of Moyo might push ZANU-PF 'over the brink' since Mugabe tends to be more cautious. Despite the state-controlled press insisting that Mugabe was acknowledged in the GPA as the legitimate head of state and was therefore the election winner[55], his party has no legitimacy to run the country given the MDC mandate from the elections of March 2008. 'ZANU-PF is bussing in people for rallies from outside on promise of maize and bank loans, but when they find there is no food people run away[56]'. Quasi fiscal extra-budget spending still continues to a lesser degree, but Gono is unable to print money as he was accustomed to. ZANU-PF appear to have miscalculated allowing MDC the finance portfolio believing it would see the lifting of 'sanctions' relatively quickly, and therefore access to foreign money to service the patronage networks, but this has been undermined by devices to avoid this such as the Multi-Donor Trust Fund bypassing government ministries.
The nature of what are parallel structures in government is that MDC-T control of economy means it is not releasing any money to government ministries before being approved by Cabinet. The MDC partial withdrawal of cooperation with ZANU-PF for three weeks meant that Finance Minister Tendai Biti did not attend Cabinet meetings. ZANU-PF are desperate to ensure that Gono and Attorney-General Tomana remain in post as these are crucial areas for ZPF control of some finances and the use of state security to demoralise the opposition[57]. A politics professor reckoned that if sanctions were lifted ('which hurts them personally'), ZANU-PF can retrieve their money and use it as a war chest. '$50,000 apiece could bend the country over' with a violent campaign and then elections like those of June 2008 (although of course SADC did not recognise that as free and fair). 'Key members of the elite undoubtedly have that kind of money somewhere as they stopped banking in West and went to Dubai and further east[58]'.
However according to a CIO contact of a human rights activist, ZANU-PF is down to its 'bare bones'. To some extent this appears corroborated by the polling organisations Mass Opinion Poll and Gallup reporting that support for the former sole ruling party support has dropped to below 10% even in areas that were no-go ones for MDC[59]. The majority of the population appear to credit MDC with turning round the economy[60] and see that the former sole ruling party has little to offer (bar land and many know the problems associated with lack of inputs and the elite seizing land from new settlers). ZANU-PF's problem is that if anything changes in key areas such as losing Gono or Tomana, it undermines Mugabe's own support, but if there is no movement, he comes under increased regional pressure - and the region having supported him so long may eventually run out of patience. ZANU-PF will need a high level of violence to win an election but then such high levels of violence could lead to either/or SADC rejecting it and MDC refusing to participate. ZANU-PF high-handedness was also apparent in it arresting NGO leaders and turning back Nowak in the week that the SADC Troika charged with overseeing GPA progress arrived. Added to this are the conflicts between the ZANU-PF factions[61], epitomised by the divisions inside the Harare party and over the vice-presidential succession[62] Either way the party conference (postponed and poorly-funded[63]) showed the divisions[64] (although there was never any doubt that Mugabe would be confirmed as the only leader/ presidential candidate). ZANU maybe more in turmoil than MDC, for some not so much over political differences but more between those more disposed towards political violence to solve problems and those who see the dangers. We could yet see, according to another church activist, the factions becoming a kind of 'pre-warlordism'.
The Social and Economic outlook Zimbabweans look to the IG to rebuild the economy, with indications of a small turnaround, but questions as to its sustainability[65] in escaping from the interlinked political, humanitarian[66], HIV and AIDS, economic and social crises. The economy has shrunk by 80+% since 1999 - a record for a country not at war[67] and seen disastrous land reform policies[68], draconian measures curbing civil and political liberties[69], the plundering of the economy by the government, a devastating HIV and AIDS epidemic, cholera[70], widespread hunger and dependency on outside food aid, a situation exacerbated by the regime in the period June-September 2008 not allowing humanitarian agencies to distribute much needed supplies of food, fertilisers or seeds. This was on the back of threats to deregister all foreign NGOs and to actually ban those working on human rights and governance issues. Zimbabwe's once admired social services have collapsed in the face of the economic crisis and the HIV and AIDS epidemic[71]. Zimbabwe has one of the highest HIV and AIDS prevalence rates in the world, despite a reported drop from 24.6% to 20.1% of the sexually active population in 2006, and subsequently to 15.3% in 2007[72]. Life expectancy dropped from 61 years in 1990 to 34 for women and 37 for men in 2006 and given the unreliability of statistics since then, it may now be lower. Infant mortality is 76 per 1000 live births and under five child mortality is 123 per 1000 live births. The 85% unemployment in the formal sector has driven tens of thousands of professionals to leave the country to find work abroad[73], millions of less-skilled others into the southern African region[74] and Europe[75]. There were announcements in March 2008 of the government seizing majority shares in all foreign-owned businesses - threats renewed in July 2008 once the international community extended and tightened personal financial sanctions against the elite (in addition to the arms ban and travel ban on named individuals). EU special measures ('sanctions') against the ZANU-PF elite were renewed on 26 January 2009[76]. Zimbabwe has fallen 29 places over the last decade in the ranking of the world's poorest countries and stood as the 151st poorest out of the world's 177 ranked countries three years ago (UNDP Human Development Report 2006). Indications are that this has now declined further[77]. It could indeed qualify for LDC status but has until now refused to engage with relevant institutions to do so. The MDC-T Minister of Finance, Tendai Biti as part of his Short Term Economic Recovery Programme (STERP) effectively dollarised (or in the Bulawayo area 'randised') the economy. There are now goods in shops although these are 100% imported South African and very overpriced. Employment is creeping up with capacity utilisation around 30% according to recent survey by the Confederation of Zimbabwe Industries (CZI) and with Biti having a goal of 60%[78] by year end, although this did not occur, unsurprisingly. Some factories are either opening up or if they survived through the crisis are scaling up. This improvement in livelihoods in the urban areas is not necessarily reflected in the rural areas, where those without access to dollars are worse off and dollarisation has meant prices are three to four times higher than in South Africa. Rural poor are more or less out of the mainstream economy and are dependent on harvesting, trading, and survival. At Marymount hospital in Chinhoyi, 90% of people cannot even afford the $1 medical fee according to the local bishop. School fees rises means that the percentages of pupils at those and universities are small (although not all institutions are imposing the fee rises). Although the harvest may be marginally better this year[79], the need for aid is acute - with 80% of the population having been in need of food aid. Initial estimates in a crop report by the UN Food and Agricultural Organisation (FAO) and World Food Programme (WFP) are that about 2.8 million people will need food assistance until April 2010, contrary to claims by Mugabe that the country no longer needed outside assistance[80]. Zimbabwe has been fighting a cholera epidemic that killed more than 4,000 and made more than 60,000 ill since August 2008. Although more under control there are indications of a reappearance[81]. The collapse of the health and sanitation infrastructure had made it impossible until the IG to bring the disease under control[82]. Major hospitals had almost closed down due to staff exodus and unavailability of drugs.
The new government has as a priority unlocking overseas aid, needed for rebuilding the shattered economy[83]. Western diplomats in Harare pointed out that development aid hinges on economic and political reform, but donors are only too familiar with the long history of Mugabe reneging on agreements[84]. Foreign donors from the IMF[85] to the EU suggest they are on standby with a rescue package for economic recovery, including lifting the targeted 'sanctions' and pumping in $1 billion in aid that is estimated to be needed if the new deal is implemented and appears to be working, with $8.6 billion being the estimate for economic recovery over the next five years[86]. The IMF is prepared to offer limited technical (rather than any kind of budgetary) support for the first time since 2003[87]. Major funding will not, as funders made clear during Tsvangirai's June/July 2009 tour of Western Europe and USA, occur until there is a political will and ability to break decisively from disastrous previous policies; the investment attraction is limited within a context of little liquidity globally and probably many better opportunities.
The United States and Britain, Zimbabwe's biggest aid donors, are reportedly unhappy that the deal leaves Mugabe in charge of security and the military and that he re-appointed Gideon Gono as head of the central bank. Britain provides £40m of emergency aid each year to Zimbabwe. That could be increased to £200m overnight if it is decided that Tsvangirai's premiership will bring progressive government. Gordon Brown reportedly told Tsvangirai that the national unity government must pass a series of stringent tests to allow international donors to treat it as an "ordinary country", and step up efforts to secure the long-term recovery of the ravaged Zimbabwean economy. Key measures include the immediate release of political prisoners; moves towards greater freedom of the press; the opening of talks with the International Monetary Fund and other bodies about an economic recovery plan; and a "road map" towards fresh elections[88]. How quickly the agreement can help address the concerns of ordinary Zimbabweans, desperately searching for food and survival, is extremely unclear. Tsvangirai did obtain increases in humanitarian aid - USA gave $73 million, although not directly through the government, Germany pledged €30 million (for improvements in health, farming and the education sectors) and Britain announced an extra £5 million in transitional aid, bringing the annual total to £60 million.[89]
Biti acknowledged that the country had debts of $5.7 billion, 150% of the GDP, although there was some talk from the IMF Director for Africa of writing off some of Zimbabwe's multilateral debt[90]. Gono can no longer print money to fund the war machine and elections but is still in place[91]. Credit is very limited and banks are still operating on short lease lending. The battle between Gono and Biti over who controls the IMF special drawing rights of $510 million and how to use them [92]continues with Biti claiming in Parliament in late October that he had 'sole authority' over the deal[93]. An IMF team visiting in October 2009 also reported that the Reserve Bank has continued to finance 'quasi-fiscal projects', eroding state coffers and meaning that the RBZ was $38.6 million short of assets required to bail out banks in any liquidity crunch[94]. They were also gloomy about 'the macro-economic outlook for 2010 [as] subject to significant uncertainty' although it could record a possible 3% growth due to commodity exports increases[95]. The IMF also noted that despite Zimbabwe promising in April 2009 to meet its quarterly loan payments to them, nothing had yet been received[96].
Outside investors are still very cautious, despite some interest and some delegations visiting. As well as uncertainty about stability and violence, there is concern around the economic indigenisation strategies of the government. The head of an international development agency in Harare told me how a visiting trade delegation from his country were welcomed by Vice-President Joice Mujuru but were advised not to invest in land - given the 'land reforms' (and continuing invasions with farmworkers being thrown off the land[97]) - 'so where would we build anything - in the sky?' was their response. As shown in its response to the visit to Europe and USA of Prime Minister Morgan Tsvangirai, and the visit of the European Union delegation to Harare on 7th September 2009, the international community (aside possibly from the Chinese[98]) is not going to provide significant financial aid and support until there is a demonstrated return to the rule of law, respect for property rights and freeing of the media[99].
Human Rights concerns There was some initial scaling down of the violence directed against civic and opposition members from the extreme repression of 2008. However, 'despite the signing of the ... GPA... little progress has been made in the protection and promotion of human rights in Zimbabwe as seen by the sustained levels of violence from month to month[100]... Some reports received by the Human Rights Forum indicate that ZANU-PF bases that were used as places to torture and maim supporters and purported supporters of the MDC during the electoral violence... are still operational or re-activated.... The harassment and intimidation of human rights and MDC activists was persistent'[101]. Additionally the Sokwanele Newsletter notes in its Zimbabwe Inclusive Government Watch of 6 July 2009 (with similar reporting in the September and November reports) 'violent and unconstitutional invasions and seizures of property and farms, harassment and deprivation of freedom of individuals through contrived arrests on spurious charges, wanton politically motivated violence , deprivation of the rights to freedom of speech and association and deliberate misinformation by senior public figures'[102]. The National Security Council met for the first time in July and apparently has met once subsequently in late November/ early December, but to little avail[103]. The council supposedly replaced the Joint Operations Command (JOC), a pillar of Mugabe's previous regime which brought together the army, police and intelligence chiefs. There has been continued intolerance of any views contrary to those expressed by the previous ZANU-PF government with major denunciations in the state-controlled press and with Mugabe continuing his tirades against the West at the signing of the GNU agreement and subsequently[104]. Hate speech continues in the state-controlled media with the 'The Herald' very splenetic when the MDC pulled out of IG and with the Zimbabwe Broadcasting Corporation at that time referring to Tsvangirai as the opposition leader. Despite promises of media reform no licences for independent daily newspapers or local radio have yet been issued such as for the proposed NewsDay[105]. Many ask what is the point of the MDC parliamentary majority if it cannot bring in legislation for media freedom and repeal repressive legislation such as the Public Order Security Act (POSA) and Access to Information and Protection of Privacy Act (AIPPA) - widely used to crack down on any dissent[106]. Given the problems that ZANU-PF is facing as outlined above, it is not surprising that its response is militaristic. It is widely alleged that the arms from the Chinese ship[107] did eventually arrive but never went through any armoury, and are thus available for use. There are parallel allegations of arms thefts allegedly to frame the MDC from Pomona barracks in October 2009 in Borrowdale, Harare and subsequent raids on their houses - a trademark ZANU-PF strategy seen in 2007 and 2008 (and with similarities to the last years of apartheid). An undisclosed[108] number of soldiers have been tortured in connection with this and several are reported to have died under interrogation. Since then, a member of the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC), Pascal Gwezere, has been arrested, allegedly tortured, and charged with the theft[109]. There is no evidence that the JOC (still meeting despite its supposed disbandment) has any intention of abandoning its strategies of maintaining its power, its sources of revenue and is determined to avoid international or domestic prosecutions for human rights abuses[110]. The JOC's main focus will be on winning elections with the youth militia ('Green Bombers') being mobilised under the control of the senior military as the shock troops for a ZANU-PF victory[111]. As ZANU-PF has more or less destroyed the education system it now has available and pliable youth at its disposal[112]. Their use of targeted violence against specific groups and specific areas, as in the Operation Mavhoterapapi attacks in Mashonaland after March 2008, but also before shows that there is a strategic purpose and organisation in this being driven by JOC[113] and that senior military and police officers ... are involved in on-the-ground operations of the militia[114]. One can also note the refusal of the police to deal with such 'political' incidents, especially from the early 2000s onwards.
A report from the Auditor-General report said that 10,000 youths were employed contrary to the constitution with 30,000 being employed in other areas - security sector, park rangers and even teaching (without expertise). There was also the reporting that such militia payments were paid illegally in the past. New settlers intimately tied into ZANU-PF's client networks on land seized from commercial farmers are also reportedly being recruited. Their land is often next to communal areas and a human rights activist put their threats against them this way 'MDC will take land off you and we will if you don't do as we say'.
Zimbabwe has a high level of violence[115] and patriarchal attitudes are extremely harsh on women, There are still 40,000 girls raped annually before they turn 17 according to the Girl Child Network[116]. Rape is also reported to be used as a political weapon[117]. The legacy of nine years of abuses against Zimbabwean citizens still has to be addressed. An estimated 25,000 people have been the victims of human rights abuses, along with 200,000 displaced, endemic torture, beatings and murders. It is already clear that there will be great difficulties for the MDC-T in ensuring that the Ministry of Home Affairs, the police, army and CIO can be brought under the effective control of all parties to the inclusive government agreement[118]. Pointers to the future There was a period of quiet immediately after the GPA and the swearing into office of the IG - although abductions of opponents continued and violence and intimidation were still common in the rural areas. ZANU-PF now feels more in charge and violence and violent rhetoric are on the increase - contrary to the terms of the GPA. With the inability of MDC to force major decisions through the IG, it has become apparent that any problems there are not technical but political. Mugabe retains control of the military and intelligence ministries and the whole system of governance ('organised chaos') from the JOC downwards to ZANU-supporting civil servants and security forces is geared to maintaining the old regime's rule at whatever cost[119]. Faced with the refusal of the West to remove personal sanctions against him and other members of the ZANU-PF elite (as well as the opinion polls referred to above showing ZANU-PF support running at 6%), Mugabe has recently upped the 'anti-imperialist' rhetoric[120]. MDC now appears to be coming to terms with its previous optimistic hopes that once there is a return to orderly administration and the rule of law, power will leak away from the JOC. Tsvangirai seems to realise that the task of trying to assert his authority not only to ensure he can control Mugabe's ministers, but to reassure foreign donors who have laid down rule of law and respect for property rights as a precondition for funding to revive Zimbabwe's wrecked economy[121] is extremely difficult. Tsvangirai has talked of "parallel forces" at work and blatant defiance of the power-sharing agreement. Among other things, he accused Mugabe of reneging on a promise to release dozens of imprisoned civic and opposition activists. Money is unlikely to be forthcoming while farms are being confiscated, a fact Tsvangirai acknowledged, saying land seizures are "undermining our ability to revive our agricultural sector and restore investor confidence." But the perpetrators, farmers' groups say, are allies of Mugabe. Mugabe himself has a number of farms and has talked of clearing out all the last remaining 300 white-owned farms. There were worries that Tsvangirai on his 2009 European and North American tour attempted to play down the invasions, as well as attacks on his own members and supporters as isolated incidents. There are a number of immediate tasks in both winning international confidence and, more importantly for the wellbeing of ordinary Zimbabweans, in bringing change for the majority. Humanitarian agencies need to have unrestricted access to the up to seven million Zimbabweans who desperately need emergency food supplies[122]. While the ban has been lifted for humanitarian if not human rights NGOs to operate, NGOs still face harassment and bureaucratic delay, and Mugabe has on occasion again threatened to ban NGOs[123]. Secondly the repressive legislation restricting freedom of assembly and speech, the Public Order and Security Act (POSA) and Access to Information and Protection of Privacy Act (AIPPA) needs to be immediately repealed[124]. Thirdly there will need to be restoration of the rule of law, commitment to the democratic process and timely elections and respect for human rights, with some commitment to security sector reform[125]. Fourthly there needs to be assessment of how the key elite personnel should be dealt with.
An activist amplified this in the following way: 'a) Given the evidence of recalcitrance and refusal shown in the hardline stance at the December 2009 ZANU congress, Chihuri [chief of police] refusal for an audit of the Police numbers/personnel, the blocking of Morgan [Tsvangirai] visiting prisons and the Attorney Generals further contempt of law, and courts, all of which point to the need for the security sector to be monitored, restrained, brought under democratic/civilian control;
b) The vital importance of a successful land audit AND post audit policy, not least because around 30% of polling stations for a referendum or future election are on 'farm land'. This means the need for donors/HMG to support i) the principle and policy ii) practicality of bringing Mozambican, Tanzanian, S[outh]A[frican] land reform experts and experienced workers to assist in the audit and the planning of followup to the audit;
c) Need to see media law reform not just as technical, but the population being able to see in the flesh/in print /on the air real media plurality;
d) Importance of supporting encouraging/ resourcing the guarantors, including the AU here, towards mechanisms such as international monitoring - implementation of GPA - presence (beyond diplomats and the fifth estate);
e) recognise the likelihood of both constitution and national healing processes being stalled/ hijacked - e.g. the principle that 'true national healing' can only come about when the political party representing the interests of victims of violence has a dominant role in the national process'. One should have a fallback position in terms of the Constitution that at the very least (if the full constitution process is impeded) progress means creating adequate conditions for a 'democratising election' (Nigerian concept) - ie changes in media conditions, in security and safety, and in electoral practicalities such as the voters roll, ID documents, given that the current UNICEF estimate is that 60% of Zimbabweans do not have birth certificates, and therefore no ID documents.The current backlog on passports is 78,000[126]. The situation is currently at stalemate, with no reason other than outside, especially regional, pressure to believe that ZANU-PF would readily implement the GPA agreement since it is entirely against their interest to have a free media, repeal of repressive legislation, reining in of the youth militia, an independent judiciary and a return to the rule of law[127]. As elections approach, violence looks set to increase[128]. There may be a period of intense instability including faction-fighting over the succession within ZANU-PF which could actually lead to a worsening of the repression, but also frustration at the inability of the GNU and specifically the MDC ministries to turn things around.
Necessary Short Term Indicators of Improvement in the Overall Environment (Three Months) · Resolution of outstanding issues of the Unity Government that include appointments of key government officials and ambassadors. · Cessation of arbitrary arrests of journalists, lawyers, trade union leaders, civic leaders, human rights activists and MDC members. · Unconditional dropping of politically-motivated charges facing political prisoners, human rights activists and lawyers. · Cessation of inflammatory reporting in broadcast and print media. · Cessation of politicisation of food aid and threats to INGOs. · Halting of fresh farm seizures. · Respect for the Rule of Law and Court orders. · Stop State's interference with the Judiciary. · Stopping of political violence. · Disbanding of militia bases in rural communities. · Putting in place legislative and media reform.
Recommendations to the UK Government · To closely monitor the situation against the indicators listed above. · To urge SADC member states to impress on President Mugabe the need for him to respect the GPA and resolve outstanding issues, as SADC is the guarantor of the GPA. · To advocate at all levels for cessation of arbitrary arrests of civic leaders, lawyers, human rights activists and MDC officials. · To continue in their response to the humanitarian crisis, taking due caution to ensure that aid is delivered to the beneficiaries targeted. · To advocate at all levels to ensure that the space for humanitarian interventions remains open and safe. · To intensify liaison with civil society groups that are on the ground monitoring progress in relation to the GPA and monitoring conditions on the ground more generally · To advocate at all levels for repeal of repressive pieces of legislation such as the Public Order and Security Act and Access to Information and Protection of Privacy Act. · Advocate at all levels for the Zimbabwe administration to put in place urgent mechanisms to effect legislative and institutional reforms as spelt out in the GPA. · Advocate at all levels for the putting in place of mechanisms to safeguard and protect human rights such as the creation of an Independent Human Rights Commission as outlined in the GPA. · To agree with EU partners to maintain the Special Measures due for renewal in February 2010and consider extending these to include those mining companies currently operating with the Zimbabwe government in the Marange/ Chiadzwa. To engage with the South African and other companies that have an interest in these companies seeking their disinvestment from such companies.
Dr. Steve Kibble 19 January 2010. [1] See 'Bennett imprisonment unacceptable' Zimbabwe Lawyers for Human Rights. Press statement 15 October 2009 [2] Although it is not uncommon for states to undergo these processes they manifest themselves in a very particular way in the Zimbabwe context in terms of deployments into certain sectors of the state, and the role that key military figures have played in big business, especially as it relates to primary extractive industry. [3] There are two factions - one under Prime Minister Morgan Tsvangirai and a smaller one under Deputy Prime Minister Arthur Mutambara. The latter, however looks to be in a fractured state - 'MDC-M splits into 3' The Zimbabwean vol 5 (33) 20 - 26 August 2009. [4] Essentially the document is an amalgam of ZANU-PF 'anti-imperialism' concerns over land, sovereignty, external interference and 'sanctions' with MDC concerns over a new constitution, national healing, the role of traditional leaders, youth militias, prevention of violence, a new constitution, and political freedoms. [5] See The Zimbabwean vol 5 (10)12-18 March 2009 on no-one at the funeral believing it was an accident. [6] See 'Zimbabwe's Mugabe, S Africa's Zuma seen meeting on climate summit sidelines' VOA Studio 7 15 December 2009; 'Phony [sic] issues cloud Zimbabwe unity talks' VOA News 6 December 2009; 'Gloomy picture of unity talks emerges' www.swradioafrica.com 1 December 2009;'SA mediation team hopeful of positive outcome in Zimbabwe' (which despite headline mentions 23 new disputes between MDCs and ZANU-PF) www.sabcnews.com 1 December 2009. [7] MPOI survey from May 2009 (results released in Sept) found over 80% of Zimbabweans have not demonstrated or protested, and nearly 60% said they never would. [8] The background to the GPA is of SADC attempting negotiations from 2007, a process widely seen as flawed under the auspices of Thabo Mbeki. For the text of the agreement see www.nimd.org/document/807/zimbabwe-agreement. [9] As is often the case, terminology is a minefield, Local terminology refers to a Government of National Unity (GNU), whereas purists insist it is really an Inclusive Government as essentially the MDC was invited to join the ZANU-PF government, and is certainly far from the transitional government first talked of by the MDC. [10] The pullout was not unexpected and reflected dissatisfaction with the failure to deal with a gamut of outstanding issues relating to the implementation of the GPA (13 months after the deal had been designed). Disengagement was designed to ensure more robust SADC intervention. It is a moot point on the extent to which this has materialised with the removal of the Mbeki team, the establishment of a new team, the acceptance of the January 2009 SADC declaration about the outstanding issues. [11] Sokwanele ZIG Watch November 2009 newsletter@sokwanele.com [12] Repeated in a communiqué from the Maputo Heads of State SADC meeting -' Summit also noted with appreciation the efforts of SADC Facilitator in assisting Zimbabwe to fully implement the Global Political Agreement (GPA) and urged the parties to implement decisions made'. The Double Troika summit spent far longer on Madagascar. Communique of the Double SADC Troika Summit sanf@zol.co.zw 15 January 2010. [13] But the timetable is massively behind schedule with the recent month's delay meaning no signs of any faction being in a hurry 'Mugabe in no hurry - Shumba'; 'Talks to resume on political agreement' The Zimbabwean vol 6 (1) 7 -13 January 2010; 'Negotiators break off talks without breakthrough' SW Radio Africa 8 December 2009; 'Tsvangirai's GNU deadline expires' The Standard 6 December 2009; 'Talks resume between Zanu PF and MDC formations' SW Radio Africa 23 November 2009. [14] SADC Troika Communique, Summit Of The Troika Of The Organ On Politics, Defence And Security Cooperation, Article 11, 5 November 2009 [15] Ibid, Article 12; 'Zim crisis danger to World Cup' Zimbabwe Independent 11 December 2009; 'South Africa's Zuma pressures Harare power-sharing partners for results in talks' VOA Studio 7 4 December 2009; 'SA's new Zim team plays it safe' Mail and Guardian 4 December 2009 [16] 'Regional summit this week on Zimbabwe, Madagascar'. http://news.yahoo.com 13 January 2010. [17] Or relate to the major problems such as the security sector, media reform, but look instead at 'sanctions' and 'pirate' radio stations. [18] 'Zanu Congress: An exercise in fulility' The Zimbabwean vol 5 (50) 17 December 2009 - 6 January 2010. [19] 'Lamentations of Robert Gabriel' www.thezimbabwean.co.uk 15 December 2009. [20] There is also concern about the overwhelming male predominance and the lack of ministers from Matabeleland which would help the revived ZAPU - the Zimbabwe African National Union formerly in power with ZANU-PF, but which re-formed as an independent party after the Global Political Agreement.. [21] 'Zanu keeps stranglehold on Cabinet meetings' The Zimbabwean vol 6 (2) 14-20 January 2010;'Cabinet frozen as Mugabe goes on leave' nehandaradio.com 13 January 2010. Mugabe argues that in terms of protocol Tsvangirai ranks below the vice presidents so cannot attend cabinet meetings since there will always be an acting president. [22] Alongside the security / military issue and the deployment of tens of thousands of youth militia into the civil service (and accompanying payroll / stipend issues), many in civil society charge that the MDC-T made a blunder by accepting (after first rejecting) the reappointment of the permanent secretaries in the various ministries . As an activist wrote to me 'It effectively means that ZANU-PF apparatchiks maintain pivotal functional roles within each Ministry no matter how progressive their new Ministers are'. See 'ZANU-PF working to frustrate civil servants audit' SW Radio 23 November 2009 www.swradioafrica.com [23]'$43m [US] for new constitution';'70% of rural Zimbabweans disapprove of Mugabe - Gallup Poll' The Zimbabwean vol 6 (1) 7-13 January 2010; '425 member constitutional reform team named' www.zimonline.co.za 17 December 2009. [24] Although this draft was agreed by senior party members from each of the three groupings in the context of negotiations in 2007, it is now rejected by many in MDC-T. It is, however, specifically mentioned in the GPA document, which has contributed to the ambiguity around its status. [25] 'We can make it a people-driven process - John Makumbe' www.thezimbabwean.co.uk 12 January 2010.;'Onslaught to mislead the masses intensifies' The Zimbabwean 6 (1) 7 - 13 January 2010; 'Kariba draft - the facts as ZANU drags its feet' The Zimbabwean 5 (26) 2-8 July 2009.'ZANU-PF terrorising villagers ahead of constitutional talks' www.radiovop.com 13 January 2010;'Zimbabwe belongs to everyone, NOT war veterans - Mugabe's thugs told' www.thezimbabwean.co.uk 13 January 2010.. However key MDC-T allies are boycotting the process and actively 'de-campaigning'. [26] Douglas Mwonzora of MDC-T - 'Culture of fear could hamper Zim reforms' www.zimonline.co.za 14 January 2010. One can also note that a number of people appeared to have tried to get themselves on the list of commissioners, swelling their ranks from the supposed 530 to nearly a thousand - 'Constitution Parliamentary Select Committee to launch an audit' www.thezimbabwean.co.uk 13 January 2010'Reforms body postpones consultations' Zim Online 18 January 2010. Human rights organisations have produced lists of named perpetrators of political violence who are 'Constitutional Outreach' members and chairs/ co-chairs of commissions set up under the GPA/ IG (available from me). [27] 'Robert Mugabe has whip hand in coalition of convenience' Sunday Times (UK), 1 February 2009 [28] Violence never went away, it merely 'abated' according to a prominent local lawyer. On widespread continuing human rights abuses see Zimbabwe Inclusive Government (ZIG) Watch Issue 11 Sokwanele 8 December 2009; on questions of rape as a political weapon see IRIN 'Zimbabwe Blasted for Condoning Sexual Terror'. Aids-free World 14 December 2009. [29] 'MDC takes tough stance on ongoing land attacks' www.swradioafrica.com 13 January 2010;'Land grab - true beneficiaries exposed' The Zimbabwean vol 6 (1) 7- 13 January 2010. [30] Figures on this are hard to verify such as the 66,000 often quoted (but seemingly referring to previous years), but cases continue to be reported - see 'GAPWUZ to press parliamentary committee over farmworkers' The Zimbabwean Sunday edition 6 December 2009; 'The truth behind farm invasions' The Zimbabwean vol 5 (48) 3-9 December 2009. [31] 'Rights violations, illegal diamonds exports said to continue in Zimbabwe Field' www1.voanews.com 13 January 2010; 'Narrowly-avoided diamond sale raises grave concerns' (Zimbabwe Lawyers for Human Rights) www.thezimbabwean.co.uk 13 January 2010;'UK company demands eviction of SA firms on diamond claim' Mail and Guardian 7 December 2009 [32] See also 'State blocking release of tortured MDC employee' SW Radio Africa 7 December 2009 [33] 'ZANU-PF looting natural resources www.thezimbabwean.co.uk 12 January 2010 for details of these allegations. [34] Certainly the impression that Arthur Mutambara gave NGO activists at their meeting of 3 November 2009. [35] 'Mugabe in major GNU climbdown' The Standard 1 - 7 November 2009 [36] 'Second TV station for Zimbabwe' Radio VOP 16 December 2009; 'Mugabe tightens media ahead of elections' The Zimbabwean vol 5 (40) 8- 14 October 2009. [37] 'ZANU thugs head parl'y committees' The Zimbabwean vol 5 (41)15-21 October 2009;'ZANU-PF loyalists set to become Rights Commissioners' www.radiovop.com 23 November 2009. [38] 'Private meetings 'worst violation' of GPA' The Zimbabwean vol 5 (38) 24-30 September 2009 [39] In the view of a local academic. [40] 'The MDC-T's pullout was followed by an increase in violence and intimidation and their return to the IG saw this spike in incidents dissipate' - communication from South African-based human rights activist 16 January 2010. [41] Although certainly not the trade unions. [42] An action described in Shona as 'tinoirega ikaputika makatarisa' ('we will leave and let it blow up in your face'). . [43] MDC Minister of Finance was also facing similar charges before being sworn in, and many people see the Bennett saga as illustrating ZANU-PF dislike of Bennett as a white former commercial farmer popular with his constituents, fluent Shona speaker and someone who spent time in prison after a fight with current Justice Minister Patrick Chinamasa following continual taunting from the latter. Latest twists in this saga are in 'Judge slams prosecution in Bennett's case' www.swradioafrica.com 13 January 2010;'Hitschmann denied access to own lawyer' www.thezimbabwetimes.com/?p=26477 13 January 2010;'Bennett witness faces impeachment' www.zimonline.co.za 14 January 2010;'Bennett trial : No proof of Hitschmann's account' Zim Online (SA) 24 November 2009 [44] 'MDC officials label Mugabe a Racist' www.radiovop.com 17 December 2009. [45] Although a South African analyst told me in early November 2009 that Jacob Zuma was angry at being informed of this decision by the press rather than Tsvangirai. In general this does seem to reflect an ongoing problem that MDC-T have had with communicating effectively with SADC, the Troika & its appointed mediators. [46] Frequently described as the 'world's worst central bank governor'. [47] 'Gono gets senior ZANU PF position' www.thestandard.co.zw 23 November 2009. [48]As an activist wrote to me 'it's worth noting, however, that media is a luxury in Zim .... The most accessible media is broadcast media, with about 50% of Zims have fairly regular access to radio and about 33% to TV. Only 6% read the papers on a regular basis and about 1`% have regular access to the internet! Reaffirms the importance of other information dissemination strategies, but of the fundamental importance of freeing the airwaves' Communication 7 January 2010. [49] 'Mini cabinet reshuffle imminent' www.thezimbabwean.co.uk 16 December 2009. [50] It is tempting to see the return of cholera and the Nowak deportation as metaphors for the health of the political process. 'Harare races against time as cholera resurfaces' The Standard 1 - 7 November 2009. [51] 'Govt deports UN torture expert' Zimbabwe Independent 30 October to 5 November 2009. [52] 'Moyo denies any role in Tsholotsho II.. but secret doc details plans for new party' www.thezimbabwean.co.uk 13 January 2010 (taken from the Zimbabwe Mail);'The disturbing spectre of Jonathan Moyo' silencechihuri@googlemail.com 16 December 2009 [53] As a legal expert opines there is the 'question of whether Moyo has an eye on a senior post - maybe the top one - but is misreading the mood that no-one believes him?' 'Mugabe endorsed to remain ZANU-PF chief' Mail and Guardian 8 December 2009 [54] 'Moyo a disgrace' The Zimbabwean vol 6 (2) 14-20 January 2010. [55] The wording of the GPA is along the lines of 'Robert Gabriel Mugabe will continue as president of Zimbabwe.' But one can note the tacit admission of defeat in the elections by Mugabe at the recent ZANU-PF annual congress. [56] Interview with a human rights activist. November 2009. [57] 'ZANU plans war-chest to sponsor terror - Makumbe' The Zimbabwean vol 5 (40) 8-14 October 2009 [58] The view of a Catholic social activist. [59] There has to be some care in relation to this figure since over 30% of sample refused to answer who they would support. An analyst commented 'when you read the rest of the survey it is evident from the levels of support for reactionary positions on political and civil freedoms etc, that the survey has between 15% and 25% who are 'reactionary' - of course this doesn't mean they're ZANU-PF supporters, but I reckon the figure is closer to 15 to 20% support - and that's enough to cause serious problems'. Communication from south African-based activist 16 January 2010. Most activists and activists, however, saw MOP as fairly reliable pointing out that they were more or less right on the 2008 elections. [60] 'Govt revenue set to increase - Biti' Zimbabwe Independent 30 October to 5 November 2009 [61] Perhaps epitomised by physical punch-ups between different factions in the Women's League. See also 'Masvingo drops Muchinguri following pressure' www.thezimbabwetimes.com/?=25323 about nominations for vice-president in ZANU-PF. [62] 'New twist to VP battle' Zimbabwe Independent 30 October to 5 November 2009. [63] Bill Watch 40/2009 bill-watch@veritas.co.zw 24 November 2009. [64] It showed divisions, but it also showed how Mugabe and senior party can stage manage. 'I was told that a uniformed military officer was strategically placed in every row to 'ensure discipline' and that dissent didn't spill over .. the Congress also had no plenary, which is remarkable, but avoided providing any platform for dissent to arise - church activist. Interestingly most commentators have seen the ZANU-PF congress as a victory for the Mujuru faction against Mnangagwa (e.g. 'ZANU falls apart' The Zimbabwean vol 6 (2) 14-20 January 2010), but a counter argument might be that this is simplistic and that Mnangagwas was party to this decision. ZANU-PF need a steady hand on the tiller in government and with Mnangagwa as Defence Minister and now acting Mines Minister, he can play a pivotal role there. There is an interesting and inconclusive debate over the factions not transcending fundamental areas of joint interest. [65] 'Zim economy shows signs of recovery' says IMF' Reuters 3 July 2009, but stresses Zimbabwe needs to clear its $1.1 billion debts before it can qualify for IMF financial aid. See The Zimbabwean vol 5 (20) 23-29 July. [66] ZANU PF threatens to interfere in Relief Food Distribution' Radio VOP 2 November 2009 and the response by Save the Children Fund that they would pull out of distribution if that was to happen. [67] Amnesty International reported on 25 July 2007 that the standard of living was at its lowest level for thirty years and it has declined substantially since then. [68] 'Final push to remove white farmers' SW Radio 18 February 2009; 'Farmers under siege' The Standard 16 January 2010. [69] 'Zimbabwe journalists urge new minister to improve media environment' www.apanews.net 18 February 2009. [70] 'Daily cholera update and alerts available from WHO. [71] 'School attendance plummets to just 20%' The Zimbabwean vol 5 (1) 8-14 January 2009. Schools have now reopened but not yet universities. [72] www.unicef.org/infobycountry/zimbabwe_statistics.html [73] Even diplomats are struggling with some not having been paid for five months and being forced to live in the embassy. 'His Excellency Mr Moonlighter' Mail and Guardian (SA) 23 February 2009. [74] 'South Africa struggles to cope with Zimbabwe refugees' www.voanews.com 18 February 2009. [75] 'Zimbabwe's brain drain gathers pace' The Zimbabwean vol 5 (2) 15- 21 January 2009; '635% leap in Zim asylum seekers' Cape Argus (SA) 11 January 2009. [76] Council Common Position 2009/68/CFSP obtainable from European Commission website or Official Journal of the European Union. 'Sanctions' will be up for renewal on 20 February 2010. [77] Zimbabwe is amongst countries not measured in the Human Development Index 2008, although it comes at 117 in the 135 countries on the Human Poverty Index. Hdr.undp.org/en/media/HDI_2008_ENTables.pdf . 2009 also does not have Zimbabwe listed due to lack of data. [78] Although precisely what capacity utilisation means in this context might be a little unclear. [79] 'Bumper Harvest eases Zimbabwe food shortage' The National (UAE) 6 July 2009 - although after two bad years, many rural households are still struggling to survive accord to Jan Delbaere of WFP. [80] 'Aid agencies reject food claims' The Zimbabwean vol 5 (40) 8- 14 October 2009. [81] IRIN 'Renewed cholera fears for Zim' 9 July 2009 and 'cholera maybe making a comeback' 26 August 2009. [82] Figures at 18 February 2009 were of nearly 4,000 being killed and 65,000 affected 'Jailed politician refuses Zimbabwe amnesty deal' CNN 18 February 2009 [83] See 'Pay up or Zimbabwe deal fails, warns Biti' Guardian 13 March 2009. And also Lyndal Curtis 'Australia to support Gov of Zim directly for payment of nurses and health staff 'The World Today - 12 March 2009 http://www.abc.net.au/cgi- bin/common/printfriendly.pl?http://www.abc.net.au/worldtoday/content/2008/s2514331.htm [84] Aid from non-Western sources apart from a small SADC contribution seems unlikely except for China. [85] There have now been a number of IMF provisional assessment missions. 'IMF needs to see good governance' The Zimbabwean vol 5 (10)12-18 March 2009 and an IMF Special Drawing Rights issue - which will be fought over between Reserve Bank governor Gono and Finance Minister Biti - see 'I am in charge of IMF funds - Gideon Gono' the Zimbabwean vol 5 (36) 10- 16 September 2009. There are signs of shifting Western support however - 'Western donors say Zimbabwe's budget needs their support' VOA News 4 December 2009. [86] The European Commission is the main donor having provided $572 million in humanitarian and developmental aid since 2002 - Southscan vol 24 (3) 13 February 2009. Any aid coming in, if donors decide that substantial change has happened, is likely to come via the UNDP Multi Donor Trust Fund framework for recovery and reconstruction. According to Tsvangirai when in South Africa to try and raise funds, $5 billion will be needed in the longer term .'Zim to feature in talks between Motlanthe, UN chief' www.zimonline.co.za 24 February 2009. [87] EIU Country Report Zimbabwe June 2009 p.6 [88] 'Britain lays out conditions for increasing Zimbabwe aid' The Independent (UK), 21 February 2009 [89] The Zimbabwean vol 5 (25) 25 June - 1 July 2009 and 5 (24) 18-24 June 2009; 'UK announces £5m aid for Zimbabwe BBC News 22 June 2009; See also 'It's too early to lift Zimbabwe sanctions' speech by Lord Malloch-Brown 19 June 2009 personalisation@e-media.fco.gov.uk. In terms of whether such humanitarian aid includes salaries a DFID contact states' There has been a retention scheme in the health sector, stemming from the period around 08/09 when health services were pretty much falling apart - and there was a huge cholera outbreak of course. During the initial stages this was funded by UNICEF with other donors. More recently funding has been picked up by the Global Fund. This is an additional incentive scheme only, government have been paying salaries for some time now. Nothing in the education sector from donors but Government now paying salaries here too'. Communication 18 January 2010. [90] 'Biti positive about economic growth' The Zimbabwean vol 5 (40) 8- 14 October 2009 [91] Grace Mugabe being reportedly very upset that Nestle had under international pressure stopped buying milk indirectly from her stolen farm illustrates that the process of restraining ZPF finances is biting according to a law professor I interviewed. [92] 'Zim seeks to liquidate IMF reserves' The Financial Gazette 29 October - 4 November 2009 [93] 'IMF funds tug-of-war enters legal arena' Zimbabwe Independent 30 October to 5 November 2009 [94] Let alone repay the money taken from NGO etc bank accounts by Gideon Gono. [95] 'RBZ continues quasi-fiscal projects' Zimbabwe Independent 30 October to 5 November 2009 [96] 'Zimbabwe fails to pay IMF' The Zimbabwean vol 5 (38) 24-30 September 2009 [97] 'The truth about land reform' The Zimbabwean vol 5 (40) 8- 14 October 2009; 'Secret doc reveals land grab plans' The Zimbabwean vol 5 (38) 24-30 September 2009 [98] There was disagreement between the Prime Minister and Minister of Finance (both MDC-T) over whether or not Zimbabwe leveraged a loan of $5 billion and $950 million credit line from the Chinese government. See Reuters 3 July 2009 'Zimbabwe to re-evaluate all mining contracts'. [99] Peta Thorneycroft 'Donors sidestep Zim's tainted central bank' Cape Argus 5 July 2009 [100] And the arrest in October 2009 of the leadership of the National Association of Non-Governmental Organisations (NANGO) despite the presence of an MDC minister at their AGM. [101] Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO Forum 'Political Violence Report May 2009'. [102] Sokwanele ZIG Watch no 6 July 2009 newsletter@sokwanele.com The 4 August and 8 November issues contains similar charges. See also David Smith 'A new beginning? Food in the shops and functioning hospitals, but the beatings go on' The Guardian (UK) 10 August 2009. ZIG Watch November (Issue 10) reports 'Despite Robert Mugabe's outrageous claim to the contrary, Sokwanele has logged an incredible 3,850 breaches of the GPA by Zanu PF since the start of the ZIG Watch project, making this party responsible for 88.8% of all breaches..' See also the Civil Society Monitoring Mechanism for similar analysis. One can additionally note that although civil society has reported many such violations, it has been unable to get an audience with SADC or the facilitators - there are some hopes that the new team might be more sympathetic. [103] Although this is disputed. [104] See www.herald.co.zw . Even though according to the MOU hate speech is not supposed to occur, there are still instances of this, including Mugabe's speech on Heroes Day August 11th 2008. The Zimbabwean vol 4 (32) 14 -20 August 2008. See also 'Mugabe still scares the hell out of ZANU-PF politicians' The Sowetan 19 September 2008. for latest see 'Mugabe ups hate speech' The Zimbabwean vol 5 (27) 9- 15 July 2009. Similar rhetoric was employed against EU and UK over the weekend of September 2009 before the EU visit (the first for seven years) to Zimbabwe. 'President Robert Mugabe on Friday lashed out at Western sanctions against him, condemning "bloody whites" for meddling in Zimbabwe's affairs, on the eve of a landmark European Union visit. "Who said the British and the Americans should rule over others? That's why we say down with you. We have not invited these bloody whites. They want to poke their nose into our own affairs. Refuse that," AFP 11 September 2009 'We have not invited these bloody whites'. [105] 'Senior Zimbabwe official admits media laws restrictive' www.zimbabwejournalists.com 20 November 2009; 'New Zim paper to debut online before print' TechCentral (SA) 8 December 2009. [106] In terms of lack of media freedom, recent survey material demonstrates that majority of Zimbabweans believe that the 'sanctions' are actually hurting ordinary Zimbabweans and the economy at large and not 'targeted' - comment from South African based human rights activist. [107] The subject of a regional and international campaign against unloading such arms which had substantial success. [108] 120 is a figure that has been mentioned and a human rights defender alleged that they had confirmed that three were dead. [109] 'MDC official Wins Bail, but Still in Custody' www.thestandard.co.zw 23 November 2009; 'State invokes Act to Keep MDC transport manager in Custody' www.radiovop.com 20 November 2009. Morgan Komichi, deputy organising secretary of the MDC, told IRIN that Gwezere's arrest was part of "short- to long-term strategy" by President Robert Mugabe to destabilise the MDC. "What we are witnessing is a ZANU-PF tried-and-tested strategy which has been used since the 1980s, so that they can crack down against our party [MDC]. Searches [by the police and military] have already been conducted at one of the houses used by senior party officials in Harare, while the transport manager [Gwezere] was kidnapped and now faces charges of stealing the guns," Komichi said. "My interpretation of the development is that there are elements, especially from the military, who are [allegedly] behind the break-in; who, in the event of a constitutional referendum or election, would use the guns to terrorise people," he said. "If, as is expected, the MDC wins the next election - if it is free and fair - we could see the emergence of armed people with roots in ZANU-PF who would create an unstable environment for an MDC government." [110] 'The Mugabe regime has moved swiftly to stop all investigations into murders committed by Zanu (PF) www.thezimbabwean.co.uk 18 February 2009. [111] Although there appears to be a fightback by MDC supporters who were attempting to regain properties stolen in 2008 during the anti-MDC electoral violence. www.zimonline.co.za 24 February 2009. [112] 'Dogs of war still prowl' Mail and Guardian 11 December 2009;'MDC accuses ZANU PF of rolling out terror campaign' www.swradioafrica.com 20 November 2009; '80,000 complete youth service: minister' www.newzimbabwe.com 24 November 2009; 'Thugs ransack homes in anti-MDC attack' The Zimbabwean vol 5 (1) 8 - 14 January 2009; 'ZANU thugs bomb MDC homes' The Zimbabwean vol 4 (49) 11-17 December 2008. One can note that after low-ranking soldiers rioted in Harare after being unable to get their own money out of the banks, there are reports that military disaffection means soldiers are no longer armed and many have been sent home as there is no food for them. See The Zimbabwean vols 5 (2) 15-21 January 2009 and vol 4 (49) 11-17 December 2008. [113] Martin R. Rupiya (2004) 'Contextualising the military in Zimbabwe' in Brian Raftopoulos and Tyrone Savage (eds) Zimbabwe: Injustice and Political Reconciliation. IJR Capetown. [114] Communication with human rights activist. See Human Rights Watch. Bullets for All of You July 2008 [115] An activist writes 'Survey results indicate that over 10% of Zimbabweans have been directly affected (i..e physical violence) by political violence since 1980. When extrapolated this is hundreds of thousands of people ... and we know the post- 99 human rights documentation shows a huge number of these occurred in the last decade'. 16 January 2010. [116] IRIN 'Zimbabwe Blasted for Condoning Sexual Terror'. Aids-free World 14 December 2009. The Zimbabwean 2009 online. [117] 'Mugabe troops use rape as weapon' Daily Telegraph 20 June 2008 [118] See 'Mukoko abducted by state security, admits minister' The Zimbabwean vol 5 (1) 8 - 14 January 2009. [119] 'Zanu's secret plan' The Zimbabwean vol 5 (49) 10-16 December 2009 [120] See 'Mugabe ups hate speech' The Zimbabwean 5 (27) 9-15 July 2009. [121] Return to rule of law, Tsvangirai tells cabinet. Guardian 18 February 2009 [122] 'Higher production but food insecurity persists' WFP 25 June 2009. [123] IRIN 29 July 2009 'Mugabe threatens to ban NGOs again' [124] Although the Media and Information Commission is now theoretically legally defunct, meaning journalists should not need licences until the new Zimbabwe Media Commission was in place, this is not in practical terms the case with journalists being refused entry to the Comesa Summit in Harare - Walking a Thin Line. SPT June 2009. [125] See Justin MacDermott 'Breaking the Mould in Zimbabwe' FOI - Swedish Defence Research Agency. June 2009. [126] Information from the Director of small conflict resolution NGO in Harare 18 January 2010. [127] ;Mugabe will never fully implement the GPA - Atholl Trollip' www.politicsweb.co.za 17 December 2009. [128] Dzie (Dzimbabwe) Chimbga 'An overview on the Inclusive Government (IG): six months on'; Beloved Chiweshe 'Six months of Watching Progress and GPA Violations'; Steve Kibble '6 Months of the government of national (imp)unity and where are we?' ZEN Newsletter vol 1 (1) August 2009. www.zimbabweeurope.org |