Written evidence submitted by the Department for International Development

 

January 2010

 

Summary

Once considered one of the continent's success stories, Zimbabwe's economy has contracted by half in the last decade. In early 2009, over seven million Zimbabweans received food aid and hyperinflation had reached the second highest level in history. The migration of skilled labour, combined with shrinking government budgets and increased corruption, led to the deterioration of the country's previously impressive education and health systems.

Zimbabwe's decline is the result of years of neglect, repression and economic mismanagement. The roots of the crisis stretch back before independence and involve a succession of policy failures. These include failures to build robust democratic institutions, to challenge structural inequality, to make sound economic decisions and to expand opportunity to more people. Over the last ten years, the ruling ZANU (PF) party - in power since Independence - has overseen the increasing securitisation of the Zimbabwean state and the independence of key institutions has become increasingly compromised

Since its installation in February 2009, following the Global Political Agreement (GPA) in September 2008, the Inclusive Government has largely succeeded in stabilising the economy. However, there has been far less progress in restoring the rule of law and ensuring human rights are respected. The Inclusive Government remains Zimbabwe's best hope, but the transition from crisis to full recovery is promising to be messy, protracted and complex.

DFID Zimbabwe has developed an adaptive and flexible approach to working in these circumstances. We have targeted life-saving assistance to those who most need it but also taken opportunities to address the underlying causes and effects of poverty and marginalisation. Our aid is making a real difference in a difficult environment. Examples of this include: improving food security for more than two million people through the distribution of seeds and fertiliser; supporting the provision of textbooks to 5300 primary schools; providing supply kits of essential medicines to approximately 1300 primary care clinics and rural hospitals; and helping to deliver anti-retroviral drugs to 58,000 people.

DFID delivers its aid programme in Zimbabwe through UN agencies and established NGOs; no money at present goes through Government systems. However, in line with the cross-Whitehall strategy for Zimbabwe, we have recently begun to provide technical assistance and policy support to reforming Ministries to help build momentum for political and economic change. Prime Minister Morgan Tsvangirai and Finance Minister Tendai Biti have both acknowledged the impact of DFID support. We are ready to provide additional assistance, as part of a coordinated response by the international community, if we see further progress in implementing the GPA. There is a clear recognition on our part that the current dispensation, for all its faults, presents a unique opportunity to reform and improve the situation in Zimbabwe.

1. Overview

Inclusive Government

1.1 For almost the entire period since independence, Zimbabwe has been governed by the Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF), under the leadership of Robert Mugabe. A prolonged spiral of decline in recent years, exacerbated by failed government policies, has led to protracted economic, political and humanitarian turmoil. The ZANU (PF) regime has generally reacted to this decline - and growing political opposition - with electoral manipulation, abuse of state power and increasing intimidation of political opponents and civil society.

1.2 However, political pressure on the regime has grown since the late 1990s with the formation, from trade union roots, of an independent and credible opposition - the Movement for Democratic Change, under Morgan Tsvangirai (MDC-T). A shambolic Presidential run-off election led to the SADC-brokered Global Political Agreement which, in turn, culminated in the formation of the Inclusive Government, in February 2009, between ZANU (PF), MDC-T and the breakaway MDC-M.

Since the IG took office the economy has been stabilised...

1.3 The MDC Minister of Finance, Tendai Biti, has made impressive advances in stabilising the economy, aided by US dollarisation and the abandonment of the Zimbabwean currency. Key achievements include:

· an increase in monthly revenues from only $4 million in January 2009 to almost $100 million by autumn;

· payment of monthly salaries to public servants, initially of $100 pcm and now in a range from $100 to $225;

· signs of recovery in the banking sector, with deposits doubling between April and August 2009;

· the 2010 budget - Zimbabwe's first realistic budget in many years, the preparation of which DFID supported;

· and schools and medical facilities have reopened.

Ministry of Finance officials project a realistic resource envelope of $1.4 billion, funded through domestic revenues, for 2010.

1.4 As well as restoring macro-economic stability, Biti has also greatly contained ZANU (PF)'s access to resources; largely by promoting legislative changes in the governance of the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe (RBZ) and by some improvement in public financial management. The RBZ's power therefore continues to be significantly reduced. However, the problematic Reserve Bank Governor, Gideon Gono, remains in post.

1.5 DFID and other international donors, in an effort to boost progress on reform, have been providing essential expertise and technical assistance to these economic and governance processes.

And humanitarian needs managed...

1.6 The international community, including DFID, has also played a critical role in helping to improve the humanitarian situation. In 2008/09, Zimbabwe experienced its worst ever cholera epidemic, with nearly 100,000 cases and over 4,000 deaths. DFID helped the World Health Organisation (WHO) establish a Command and Control Centre to ensure a more rapid and effective response. With the support of other donors, DFID is now focusing on maintaining basic health services, including the funding of vital medicines and supplies and the retention of health workers. We are also working to repair and restore water and sanitation systems, promote good hygiene practices and deliver items such as water purification tablets and soap. As of mid-December, there have been only 146 cholera cases this season and 5 deaths, compared to nearly 18,000 cases and 877 deaths during the same period last year.

1.7 Seven million people received food aid at the height of the last hungry season in early 2009. DFID provided £9 million to the World Food Programme (WFP) to ensure that food was in place when it was needed. This year saw a better harvest and improved availability of food. Even so, the WFP estimates that 2.8 million people are likely to need food aid in early 2010. We have therefore allocated £4 million to the WFP effort.

But human rights and the rule of law are still precarious

1.8 In theory, the Zimbabwean national constitution guarantees many basic human rights, but the state has consistently failed to protect citizens. Institutions, such as the judiciary and media, have in the past shown a reasonable degree of independence and integrity but now exhibit serious weaknesses regarding fundamental freedoms of participation, expression and association.

1.9 The widespread repression and human rights abuses seen at the time of the 2008 elections have decreased under the Inclusive Government. However, arrests of trade unionists and civil society activists, land invasions and politically motivated legal action against parliamentarians have continued, with weak and inconsistent responses from the judiciary. The period immediately following the MDC's decision (in October 2009) to disengage from some functions of government saw a particular ramping up of violence. Serious human rights abuses have also been reported in the Marange diamond fields, drawing significant international reaction.

1.10 Reform of the security and justice sector into a set of professional and accountable institutions is essential, but opportunities are limited in the current political context. One important opportunity is the Constitution-Making Process under the GPA. A successful review and implementation of the Constitution would likely strengthen the separation of powers and could increase the prospects of free and fair elections. DFID, alongside other donors, is considering support which can make this a more open and accountable process, including strengthening parliamentary oversight and supporting wider civil society engagement.

Progress towards the MDGs

1.11 Zimbabwe was on its way to achieving several of the MDGs in 2000. Impressive gains were made throughout much of the 1990s and early 2000s, including in:

· reducing HIV prevalence (from 24% to 15.6% and currently 13.7%);

· raising primary school enrolment (over 90% in 2004);

· extending adult literacy (over 90% for men and women);

· and increasing access to improved water and sanitation services in both rural and urban areas.

1.12 These gains were made in spite of the government's shrinking budget and the steady migration of skills. Demand for services in Zimbabwe remained high and continued to grow until just a couple of years ago. Parents' participation in education coupled with a strong sense of duty and accountability amongst teachers ensured that the education system survived for many years beyond the ability of the government to fund it properly. Similar patterns were evident in the health sector and social welfare.

1.13 The fastest decline was found in services dependent on foreign exchange: for example, immunisation services collapsed completely by 2002 due to the lack of foreign exchange for fuel, vaccines and syringes (all import dependent commodities). Donor support was therefore needed (and provided by DFID, UNICEF, WHO and others) to enable Zimbabwe to rebuild and maintain a functional vaccination programme. Donor assistance also enabled Zimbabwean women to plan pregnancies (almost certainly a contributor to lower than expected child malnutrition and stable child mortality rates).

1.14 The continuing deterioration in physical infrastructure, lack of materials and supplies and the economic opportunity costs of being a teacher or nurse have more recently eroded service provision. In the absence of sustained government commitment and core funding, especially for salaries, MDG indicators have deteriorated rapidly in the last couple of years. In 2006 WHO declared that Zimbabweans had one of the world's lowest life expectancy rates, at 37 years for men and 34 for women.

Gender and social exclusion

1.15 Pre-existing gender inequalities have been exacerbated further by ten years of economic decline and political repression. Maternal mortality has risen sharply as services have collapsed and access, especially in rural areas, decreased. Young women, physiologically and economically more vulnerable, are disproportionately affected by HIV and twice as likely as young men to be infected. Women bear the burden of care for the chronically ill and are disadvantaged under customary law.

1.16 Young men under 24 years of age made up over 70% of Zimbabweans deported from South Africa until the recent (and temporary) lifting of visa requirements. With fewer young people able to stay in school, the number of disaffected youths who have little stake in today's Zimbabwe has burgeoned with serious consequences for future stability.

1.17 Despite some clear success from 15 years of programmes to reduce stigma and discrimination, one in four children in Zimbabwe grows up without one or both parents and many face psychological problems, heightened risk of abuse and decreased access to education and health care. Repressive actions by the former government have led to growing numbers of people displaced - by land reform, urban 'clean up' operations and sporadic crackdowns on illegal settlements and mining activities.

DFID's programme

1.18 Zimbabwe's future remains uncertain and things could change for the better or worse. A flexible and adaptable strategy is therefore required, to ensure that DFID can continue to deliver a high impact aid programme under volatile and challenging conditions and under a range of potential scenarios, from strong reform and change to sharper decline and deterioration.

1.19 DFID Zimbabwe committed £60 million in development assistance to Zimbabwe for 2009/10, the highest total to date. The core of our programme provides practical assistance to poor and vulnerable people in greatest need, including humanitarian assistance and protracted relief and basic services. All aid is delivered in line with the Paris Declaration and OECD/DAC Fragile States Principles.

1.20 We are also seizing opportunities to bolster reform and build momentum for change, by providing technical assistance to reforming Ministries and supporting opportunities to strengthen the accountability and responsiveness of the State towards its citizens. With international partners, we are pressing for implementation of the GPA, including a Constitutional Review that could increase democratic space and strengthen the prospects for free and fair elections.

 

1.21 Our aid is making a real difference in a difficult environment. Some of the specific results UK aid is working to deliver in Zimbabwe include:

· distributing agricultural inputs such as seeds and fertiliser to about 375,000 smallholder households, reaching more than 2 million people;

· fighting HIV by promoting behavioural change including distribution of 70 million male condoms and 4 million female condoms;

· leading the establishment of the multi-donor Expanded Support Programme for HIV and AIDS that is on target to deliver Anti-Retroviral Treatment to 58,000 people in 2009;

· helping WFP to deliver emergency food aid to an estimated 1.6 million people by March 2010;

· supporting UNICEF and partners to reduce the impact of cholera and other waterborne diseases by improving access to clean water and sanitation for over two million people;

· supporting nutrition outcomes in children: no district in Zimbabwe suffers from emergency levels of malnutrition;

· supporting the provision of textbooks and critical learning materials to 5300 primary schools;

· and providing technical assistance to the Office of the Prime Minister and the Ministry of Finance to strengthen their capacity to implement reforming policies and supporting a payroll audit to identify ghost workers.

 

Our programmes have been designed to continue operating effectively in either improving or deteriorating contexts in the future.

 

1.22 Our engagement is guided by a cross-Whitehall strategy on Zimbabwe, agreed among key departments, including DFID, FCO, MoD and HMT. The strategy recognises that the Inclusive Government is Zimbabwe's best chance for economic recovery and political change, justifying a structured and incremental re-engagement by the UK and international community. It seeks to calibrate UK support against implementation of the GPA. The strategy is built around strong cross-departmental working, both in London and in Harare where the DFID office and UK Mission are co-located.

The future

1.23 Zimbabwe's recovery in 2009 was in many respects remarkable, if still fragile. At the beginning of the year, the country was on the brink of collapse, with prices doubling every 24 hours, schools and clinics shut down, a cholera epidemic underway and millions dependent on food aid. At the year's end, inflation was down to single digits, public servants were being paid and food was available in city shops.

1.24 Pro-active South African mediation, following the Maputo SADC Summit in October, has further added to the pressure for change and, if maintained, adds an important new element to the equation. Opponents of reform retain control of the security services and the option of violence, but overall the balance of advantage seems to be steadily swinging behind the reformists, with a growing sense that progress cannot easily be reversed.

1.25 Nevertheless, the political situation remains volatile and unpredictable and the tipping point has not yet been reached. Recovering the quality of life, diversified economy and high calibre civil service that once existed will take some years of sustained effort and good government. Zimbabwe appears to be in a transitional phase but it is a transition that is likely to continue to be protracted, messy and probably non-linear.

1.26 DFID will need to remain flexible and opportunistic, calibrating our engagement to progress on the ground. The core of DFID's programme going forward will remain focused on support for basic services, livelihoods and humanitarian needs. Resources will continue to be delivered through the UN and NGOs in the near future.

1.27 We will also continue to seek opportunities to build momentum for change by building capacity in reforming Ministries, (especially the Office of the Prime Minister and the Ministry of Finance) and strengthening the accountability of the Executive by building on commitments in the GPA. This is likely to include support to the Constitution Making Process, elections, Parliament, media, civil society and possibly additional small-scale support, with other donors, for security and justice sector reform.

 

2. Prospects for a closer relationship between DFID and the Government of Zimbabwe

2.1 After 2000, DFID was unable to maintain a credible development engagement with the ZANU (PF) regime and, from that period, no funds have been passed through the government. However, DFID and other donors continued to have some engagement with public institutions in Zimbabwe to deliver basic services - where these institutions and national policies were essentially sound and consistent with international standards. This was especially the case around HIV prevention and treatment. This approach has helped to slow the decline of public systems to some extent and has helped avoid the need to establish parallel service delivery structures.

2.2 This approach also positioned DFID well to support a more legitimate government when it arrived. For example - because of our longstanding support to the national treatment programme for HIV, which involved working with existing public health institutions - DFID were able to lead donor work with the Ministry of Health to deliver funding to retain health workers during the cholera crisis. The health retention payments were, though, paid directly to health workers' bank accounts rather than through government systems.

2.3 The formation of the Inclusive Government in February 2009 changed the balance of risk and opportunity and justified a structured and incremental reengagement with Zimbabwe. A key component of mitigating the risks and realising the opportunities is a coordinated approach by the international community. Donors have been able to maintain a cohesive position around the kind of changes that would signify a return to democratic government and the rule of law. We have focussed on aligning behind the Government of Zimbabwe's own commitments as agreed by the three main parties in the GPA. This cohesion has been time-consuming to build and maintain but it has become a very useful mechanism to communicate clearly with the Inclusive Government around the kind of reform needed in Zimbabwe for donors to increase their support.

 

2.4 Donor reengagement is calibrated against implementation of the GPA and progress towards the "Hague Principles" (agreed by like-minded donors in 2007). These principles include full access to humanitarian assistance, a commitment to the rule of law, economic reform, respect for internationally agreed human rights and a commitment to free and fair elections.

2.5 For DFID, the Inclusive Government has created greater opportunity for engagement and better working relationships with some elements of government. As an uneasy cohabitation between political antagonists, the Inclusive Government is not yet the partner we require to sustain a full development relationship. Nevertheless, it provides a platform to continue to develop the programme away from short-term relief and to address underlying, longer-term causes of humanitarian crisis.

2.6 In April 2009, the International Development Secretary announced a further £15 million of aid to Zimbabwe, including funding to rehabilitate Zimbabwe's water and sanitation systems, whose disrepair was a key contributory factor to the 2008/09 cholera pandemic. In June 2009 the Prime Minister, Gordon Brown, welcoming Morgan Tsvangirai to London, further increased the size of the UK's development assistance to £60 million for 2009/10 - our largest ever programme in Zimbabwe. This included an additional £5 million for food security and for education (approximately £4m and £1m respectively).

2.7 We have also begun to provide technical assistance and policy guidance to key reforming Ministries and institutions. We have supported the Ministry of Finance to prepare the 2010 budget, Zimbabwe's first credible budget in nearly a decade. At Prime Minister Tsvangirai's request, we have also provided flexible TA to his own Office to perform essential policy, parliamentary and other leadership functions.

2.8 Although it does not yet have a poverty reduction strategy as such, the Inclusive Government has developed an agenda to meet immediate needs in the Short Term Emergency Recovery Plan (STERP), the 100-Day Plan and its successor the Government Work Programme. An early priority for DFID was to align its programme of assistance with the priorities set out in the STERP and 100 Day Plan. For example, we are providing £3 million in 2009/10 for the rehabilitation of Zimbabwe's six major referral hospitals, including those in Harare and Bulawayo.

2.9 All UK aid is currently delivered through the UN, NGOs and contracted partners. It is unlikely that this will change in the foreseeable future. However by taking steps with other donors to align our assistance to the 2009 and 2010 budgets, we are providing support to Government priority areas and easing budgetary pressures by paying for essential humanitarian and basic services assistance through parallel donor financing.

2.10 The Inclusive Government is an interim arrangement: the political struggle between the ZANU (PF) regime and the MDC has continued within as well as outside government. Our strategy is to provide support to build momentum for change, by working to leverage reform where we see an opportunity, not just by responding to progress as it occurs. Most observers believe that the next elections will be held in the first half of 2011 at the earliest. The period up to then will be difficult and painful, with periods of both improvement and deterioration likely. DFID will need to remain nimble and opportunistic in our response to events. Our development programme, our relations with the region (especially with South Africa) and our approach to the sanctions issue will all impact directly on the prospects for real change.

 

3. How DFID works with other donors, multilateral agencies and NGOs to deliver assistance

 

3.1 DFID delivers its aid programme in Zimbabwe through key strategic partners such as UN agencies and established NGO partners. At present, no money goes through Government systems or the RBZ. South Africa was the only donor who provided $35 million of budget support in 2009 and has signalled the intention of continuing to do so in 2010. We also understand that China has provided $5 million into Zimbabwe's systems; however, there are uncertainties around the how the aid would be spent and exact volume of China's contribution. Donors have maintained coordinated positions in line with the Paris/Accra Aid Harmonisation agenda and OECD/DAC Principles for best practice in working in Fragile States. Aid coordination is good and donor funding is increasingly jointly funded or pooled, with DFID leading pooled funding arrangements in several areas.

Transitional Framework

 

3.2 As mentioned above, ensuring a consistent and agreed approach by the international community to the situation in Zimbabwe has been critical. On the ground in Harare there has been a major focus on ensuring that aid is coordinated and delivered through agreed mechanisms and processes. During 2008 and building on the Hague Principles, donors have developed fuller plans and processes for gauging progress by the Government and sketching out recovery plans and aid volumes and how it will be spent. DFID continues to play a prominent role in developing the emerging aid architecture and donor strategy.

 

3.3 Representatives from donor capitals also met in Berlin in October 2009 to review progress since the inception of the Inclusive Government. There was a general recognition that Zimbabwe has entered a transitional support phase where definite progress has been made but remains highly fragile. DFID support (both service delivery and technical assistance) is designed to help strengthen the government's capacity to handle pressing issues (eg. its current fiscal problems) and to help support reform through a difficult and fluid political situation.

Aid coordination architecture

 

3.4 Examples of key donor coordination processes include:

 

· UN monthly coordination meetings with donors and bi-monthly meetings with Ambassadors and Heads of Mission.

· The World Bank Multi Donor Trust Fund Policy Group, which includes heads of aid agencies of contributing countries and the UN.

· Sector cluster groups for health, governance, and orphans and vulnerable children.

· The like-minded group - an informal but highly cohesive and influential aid coordination and policy group. There are no hard and fast rules as to membership, but typically the EC, US, UK, France, Germany, Norway, Sweden, Canada, Netherlands, Australia, Denmark and Finland participate.

Delivery of DFID programmes through the UN and CSOs

 

3.5 DFID Zimbabwe funds many organisations indirectly. Most of our programming goes through strategic partners who in turn implement their programmes through civil society organisations. For example, our livelihoods programme (Protracted Relief Programme Phase II) goes through a contracted managing agent to support the work of 19 NGOs.

 

3.6 The UN and CSOs continue to be vital partners. Parts of the UN family, especially UNICEF and WFP, have offered effective and practical ways of working to respond to critical needs, ranging from food aid to essential drugs and chemicals to ensuring safe drinking water. They have national coverage and are able to negotiate access in politically challenging situations. The UN remains the largest manager of DFID funding, as they are for most other donors active in Zimbabwe.

 

3.7 In the past we have questioned whether the UN could be more vocal about the humanitarian situation. UNICEF and the WFP have responded well to the humanitarian crisis and continue to respond to DFID and other donor evaluation processes. About half of our programme will be delivered through the UN in 2009/10.

3.8 CSOs enable donors and UN agencies to reach out to communities across the country and to the poorest within those communities. Zimbabwean civil society organisations also have an important role in strengthening state accountability. This includes protecting the human rights of Zimbabwe's citizens, supporting their participation in key decision making processes, strengthening the media and doing more to monitor state performance. Key priorities include the Constitution-Making Process, media, Parliament and the next elections.

3.9 There are several funding channels which contribute to these objectives alongside the main DFID programme. We support civil society in Zimbabwe through our central funding channels - (i) the Civil Society Challenge Fund (CSCF), (ii) Programme Partnership Agreements (PPAs) and (iii) the Governance and Transparency Fund (GTF). We also support civil society from the Country Office through the Africa Conflict Prevention Pool and a Gender Support Programme.

 

3.10 Close working between DFID, the FCO, HMT and MoD is also vital for the success of UK government efforts. In Zimbabwe, all departments are focused on supporting the country to implement the GPA and improve the lives of the poorest and most vulnerable people. Since moving into the joint compound in April 2009, relations have become even closer and more integrated. The Ambassador, Head of DFID and Defence Attaché office work together on the shared agenda and staff freely share information and seek input across departments. In London, DFID staff work very closely with the FCO Zimbabwe Unit, HM Treasury, the Cabinet Office and No. 10 guided by a cross-Whitehall strategy agreed and monitored by the National Security International Relations and Development Cabinet Sub-Committee (NSID).

 

Role of International and Regional Financial Institutions: World Bank, IMF, African Development Bank, and of the EC

 

3.11 World Bank and AfDB engagement is limited by Zimbabwe's arrears to both banks. As Zimbabwe begins a process of credible re-engagement, both institutions are stepping up their involvement. The World Bank acts as the secretariat of a Multilateral Development Trust Fund (MDTF), managing technical study and assistance funds agreed in multi-donor sector groups. A second MDTF mechanism focused on major programme funding will now enable donor funding to flow into infrastructure investment, using World Bank procedures to ensure funds are allocated and implemented effectively. These funds will be mostly targeted at critical poverty reducing and growth enhancing investments (e.g. water supplies and possibly energy) where the World Bank is especially well placed.

 

3.12 The AfDB is also now engaging in Zimbabwe, providing technical assistance and some funding to critical areas. It is especially well placed to support more politically sensitive areas, for example in supporting Zimbabwe's capacity to manage its external debt and developing an effective approach to this challenge.

 

3.13 Zimbabwe's IMF voting rights were suspended over arrears. Zimbabwe's recent positive direction of economic policy implementation and re-engagement with the IMF create a concrete prospect for voting rights to be restored soon. The IMF has partially lifted the ban on technical assistance to Zimbabwe and started providing some limited assistance since May 2009, and has subsequently developed an effective relationship with the Ministry of Finance. This is an initial step towards a formally approved IMF programme. This would be important in providing a signal on Zimbabwe's commitment to sound economic policy and would help build confidence between government and donors. We are discussing this prospect with Board members and IMF staff, to ensure that the conditions for a successful programme are right.

 

3.14 The European Commission including ECHO is one of the three major donors in Zimbabwe, alongside USAID and DFID, that has been continually active over the last decade. The EC also ensures that funds do not pass through government systems. The EC has been a particularly valuable partner in the health sector for DFID, and been well placed to play an important role in donor re-engagement of the education sector.

 

3.15 The Global Fund for AIDS, TB and Malaria has approved three rounds of funding to Zimbabwe. However, implementation has been challenging. The capture of Global Fund resources by the RBZ taken out of local bank accounts in early 2008 ($14 million in total, returned in late 2008) led to the freezing of Global Fund resources. The situation has now been resolved and Ministry of Health, donors and other stakeholders are working hard to ensure these critical funds flow more effectively in future. DFID is now one of the two donor representatives on the Global Fund Country Coordinating Mechanism (CCM).

 

 

4. DFID's contribution to the provision of humanitarian aid

Need, how aid will be spent, coordination and remaining flexible for the future

 

4.1 Analysis suggests that humanitarian assistance will continue to be needed in Zimbabwe for at least two more years. The impact of failed policies - including chaotic land reform, economic mismanagement and collapse, the erosion of basic services and the general challenge of erratic rainfall - has been hunger, and disease outbreaks, coupled with the inability of the most vulnerable to access life-saving services.

 

4.2 Wherever possible, DFID Zimbabwe is providing multi-year funding to respond to predictable hunger and vulnerability. Examples include the wide-ranging Protracted Relief Programme - which helps people to grow food and meet basic health, education and other social costs (see Figure 3) - and support for IDPs through the International Organisation for Migration (IOM). Where necessary, DFID Zimbabwe has also responded quickly to sudden onset emergencies: in 2008/09 up to 36,000 were displaced by post-election violence, over 7 million people received food aid, and there were about 100,000 recorded cases of cholera.

 

4.3 In a deteriorating environment, there will need to be a greater emphasis on direct humanitarian assistance while in an improving environment we will use more social protection interventions.

 

Direct humanitarian assistance Social protection

 

 

 


Deterioration Improvement

 

4.4 DFID works closely with other humanitarian agencies and donors to develop a shared understanding of humanitarian need through the Common Humanitarian Assessment Process and Consolidated Appeals Process (CHAP and CAP). Progress and emerging need is monitored through the Humanitarian Country Team/Donor meetings. DFID is also supporting the UN to improve coordination.

Food security and UK's humanitarian assistance

 

4.5 Last year's hungry season in Zimbabwe was an extraordinary time and the UK gave WFP £9 million to respond to the growing food crisis in the country and avert a major disaster. WFP and its cooperating partners effectively assisted more than five million people per month in both February and March 2009.

 

4.6 Most food-security actors agree that WFP adapted well to this highly volatile environment and learned valuable lessons. It was able to address perceived needs and increase logistical operations to deliver massive amounts of assistance in a relatively short timeframe. DFID's contribution to the operation allowed WFP to swiftly pre-position food as the Programme began to scale up activities.

 

4.7 Food availability has improved since last year following a good harvest, an end to the Grain Marketing Board monopoly on importing cereals into the country, dollarisation of the economy and availability of donor-funded agricultural inputs. Extensive humanitarian support will remain critical to avoid the erosion of livelihoods and protect the health and nutrition status of the vulnerable. DFID funding of £4 million for WFP operations in Zimbabwe this year will contribute to food aid for up to 1.6 million people.

Water, sanitation and cholera and UK's humanitarian assistance

4.8 Zimbabwe's cholera outbreak between August 2008 and July 2009 was on an unprecedented scale. In total, there were nearly 100,000 cholera cases with nearly 4,300 deaths of which more than 60 percent were at the community level (not in a hospital).

4.9 In early 2008 in anticipation of waterborne disease outbreaks, DFID Zimbabwe released £1 million to UNICEF for the procurement and pre-positioning of IV fluid and water tablets. This enabled NGO partners to rapidly respond to cholera and other disease outbreaks and improve water and sanitation hygiene (WASH) provision at clinics and health facilities.

4.10 A further problem during the cholera crisis last year was the very low number of health workers still going to work. Spiralling hyperinflation rendered their pay meaningless and a basic salary did not even cover transport costs. In response, DFID Zimbabwe led a process to establish a national Health Workers Retention scheme that paid health workers a US$ allowance that enabled nurses and other essential health workers to return to their clinics. The retention scheme was joined in early 2009 by several other donors and was then taken over by the Global Fund.

 

4.11 New cases of cholera began to appear again in September 2009. By 13 December, the total cumulative caseload stood at 146 cases and 5 deaths. By comparison, this time last year, there were 17,908 cases and 877 deaths. The situation is encouraging although the humanitarian community remains cautious as the rainy season will continue for many more weeks.

 

4.12 This year (2009/10) there was a big push by the international humanitarian community to carry out preventive rehabilitation work on the water systems and to get supplies in place early to minimise the worst effects of another cholera outbreak. The GoZ has also put $17 million directly into targeted water and sanitation rehabilitation works primarily in Harare and surrounding areas.

4.13 As part of this general effort, the UK gave £4.7 million to UNICEF in advance of the rainy season in early October 2009. This will supply safe water and access to sanitation services for the most vulnerable population groups. UK aid is being used to:

· improve water and sanitation services through emergency rehabilitation interventions;

· enable urban councils to provide equitable water services to all residents;

· ensure health institutions, schools and communities in most "at risk" districts have access to reliable water, sanitation and hygiene;

· increase coverage of critical Non-Food Items (see above) to prevent the spread of cholera; and

· prevent the spread of cholera and other diseases through improved environmental health risk management.

4.14 Ultimately, long-term predictable investment is needed to increase the number of households with safe water and access to sanitation and to decrease the incidence of waterborne disease. DFID Zimbabwe is planning a significant investment to move from emergency preparedness and response this year to transition and long-term recovery in future years. This will complement the water, sanitation and hygiene support already provided to rural communities through DFID's other basic service programmes.

4.15 The UK is also providing life-saving health services for vulnerable people including the provision of essential medicines to all 1300 primary care clinics and rural hospitals in the country. Since it began, the Emergency Vital Medicines Support Programme has absorbed £15 million from the UK and about as much again from ECHO, Canada and Ireland. Combined with the Health Worker Retention Scheme, the two programmes have ensured that Zimbabwean health facilities are open and functional across the country.

Internally Displaced Persons and the UK's humanitarian response

4.16 More than 1.5 million people have been displaced by the policies of the GoZ since 2000 (including the Fast Track Land Reform from 2000 to date and Operation 'Murambatsvina' - drive out trash - in 2005) and also by post-election violence since 2008. Despite the establishment of the Inclusive Government, farm invasions continue today and the risk of displacement for remaining farm-worker families remains a serious concern.

4.17 DFID Zimbabwe has had a programme with IOM Zimbabwe to provide emergency humanitarian assistance to IDPs and humanitarian assistance at border crossing points since 2006/07. DFID extended this programme in May 2009. It will now run until March 2010 and its total value is £6.5m (with £1.5m of that provided in 2009/10).

 

4.18 IOM continues to be at the forefront of responding to new displacements and emergencies. IOM has also developed an impressive multi-media information campaign, which appears to target accurately the groups identified as most likely to become potential migrants. The Beitbridge centre was established in May 2006 and by the end of May 2009, it had assisted 320,000 returned migrants.

 

 

5. Effectiveness and impact of DFID's support for delivery of basic services

State of basic services in Zimbabwe

 

5.1 The ability of the Inclusive Government to deliver quality basic services to its people is weak following years of underinvestment and turmoil. The challenge of rebuilding basic services is massive and far exceeds the public purse available. Basic service-related MDG indicators for Zimbabwe are currently a mixed bag (paragraphs 1.12 to 1.15).

DFID interventions

 

5.2 DFID Zimbabwe has been a major donor in the provision of basic services for many years, working through the UN and other providers (such as Crown Agents) and, when feasible, with GoZ line ministries. Basic services account for over 43% of the UK aid programme in 2009/10. Additional support is provided through other programmes with basic services elements such as those in the humanitarian portfolio (for example, IDP health services or water and sanitation in cholera response or through our broader programme for OVCs).

 

5.3 Over the last fifteen years, we have made a significant and sustained investment in health including the prevention and treatment of HIV and AIDS. Health related services account for the vast majority of our basic services spending (about £25 million). The next section of the memorandum (section 6) looks specifically at the results and impact of our health funding. In 2009, DFID Zimbabwe also entered the education sector through a joint fund managed by UNICEF.

 

 

Further detail on DFID basic services programmes

 

Education

 

5.4 By early 2009, the education sector in Zimbabwe was in crisis. The sector suffered from high staff attrition and poor teachers' salaries, which were insufficient to cover even transport. The number of teachers more than halved from about 120,000 to less than 60,000. On top of this, education was severely disrupted for much of 2008 because of political violence, some of which was actively targeted at teachers, as well as disrupting normal community life for several months.

 

5.5 On joining the Inclusive Government, the MDC initiated foreign currency allowances ($100) to all civil servants, including teachers. This has had a positive effect on the education system and it is now showing some early indications of revival and most schools are open and functioning again, although at diminished capacity. The new minister has wrestled his way to a reasonable schedule of fees and levies (although with insufficient monitoring) and enrolment is now up again.

 

5.6 In the summer of 2009, DFID Zimbabwe, along with many other donors, agreed a new level of involvement in the education sector in Zimbabwe. We are spending £1 million in 2009/10 to provide technical advice and seed funding to a pooled financing mechanism called the Transitional Education Fund. The fund's objectives are to support procurement of education commodities (textbooks, exercise books, classroom furniture, etc) and technical assistance and to provide funding for a strong education technical expert based within the EC to guide, influence and inform policy developments in this neglected sector.

 

5.7 UNICEF manages the fund and our other partners are the EC, Australia, Germany, Sweden, New Zealand, the Netherlands and the World Bank. Additional donors are expected to join in 2010. The fund is just getting started. Amongst other things, it will provide textbooks and learning material to 5300 primary schools across the country. We will assess the impact of the fund after its first year.

 

Vital Medicines

 

5.8 By 2008, national procurement of adequate medicines was impossible for the Ministry of Health and Child Welfare. The situation had become a serious humanitarian crisis with under-funding and erosion of essential health services and an exodus of health professionals. There was a huge shortage of essential supplies and equipment. DFID Zimbabwe began an emergency programme to procure and distribute essential drug supplies to stock health facilities across all districts in Zimbabwe. This is now a two year programme worth £11.5 million (plus an additional £5 million in 2009/10) that helps meet national health policy goals with a particular focus on the needs of under-fives and women and the prevention and treatment of transmissible diseases.

 

5.9 The Emergency Vital Medicines programme has become the main vehicle for providing basic medicines and surgical supplies in Zimbabwe. Other donors are ECHO, Canada, Ireland, Netherlands and Australia.  The programme has been instrumental in ensuring a basic supply of drugs and sundries are available at all 1531 health facilities in Zimbabwe and especially at rural health centres and district hospitals. In combination with the Workers Retention Scheme, the two programmes are underpinning access to life-saving services by poor people in Zimbabwe and have kept health services functioning at a very difficult time.

5.10 UNICEF manages the programme and their reports indicate that the programme has successfully led to increased stock in most parts of the country and that stocks of vital medicines are improving. Morale, patient attendance and perceptions of quality are also strengthening.

Emergency Health Support

 

5.11 In the spring of 2009, the Deputy Prime Minister's office appealed to DFID for funding for a specific programme of work to improve referral hospital infrastructure in six key hospitals, including the larger cities of Bulawayo, Masvingo, Harare and Mutare. Health services in key referral hospitals were compromised due to lack of key equipment and damage to infrastructure in theatres, laundries, boiler rooms, kitchens and mortuaries. This short-term investment should quickly yield visible improvements. We will contribute £1 million over 2009/10. Crown Agents is managing the project which is due to complete in the spring of 2010.

 

Emergency Malaria Spraying

 

5.12 Malaria is the third leading cause of morbidity and mortality in Zimbabwe, after HIV/AIDS and tuberculosis, with over two million people suffering from this preventable disease annually. The most vulnerable are under-fives, pregnant women, the elderly and people living with HIV and AIDS. Improved treatment with new malaria drugs procured through the Global Fund should lower the mortality rate further whilst the roll out of bed net programmes will improve prevention.

 

5.13 The bedrock of Zimbabwe's national malaria prevention programme though is indoor residual spraying which is estimated to avert up to 4 million cases per year and over 1000 deaths. This year the Ministry of Health has secured $750,000 (of the total cost of $1.5 million) from the Treasury, which is an excellent sign of their commitment and strong prioritisation of this programme.  USAID, which funded $1 million of the costs last year (alongside DFID contributions), is unable to support the programme this year so DFID has met the other half of the need.

 

6. Impact of DFID's funding for health and HIV and its support for orphans and vulnerable children

 

6.1 DFID's programme has had significant impact in recent years, ensuring that:

 

· the health system in Zimbabwe is still largely functioning and each clinic retains a basic complement of staff, drugs and services. People in Zimbabwe still have access to basic health and HIV services, despite the near collapse of government in late 2008;

· access to anti-retroviral treatment continues to increase and has been increasing for the last 5 years;

· malnutrition rates in children across Zimbabwe remain below emergency levels in every district despite the economic and political turmoil;

· contraceptive use continues to grow and unmet demand is shrinking: birth spacing is one of the main components in reducing child mortality and saving mothers' lives;

· and HIV prevalence continues to decline mainly because of behaviour change across the population.

Monitoring, Evaluation and Measuring Impact

 

6.2 The drive for clearer and more robust evidence of results has meant that impact assessments (or impact evaluations) are playing an increasing role in our monitoring, enabling DFID to assess more effectively how projects or programmes make a difference and how cost-effective they are. Impact evaluation provides a rigorous assessment of the impact of a development intervention on the lives and welfare outcomes for poor people, including what changed and why - a process that is critical to lesson learning especially across different countries.

 

6.3 A review of our health portfolio earlier this year found that without DFID support the following key health-related impacts would be severely compromised.

 

· Strong national prevention messaging backed by voluntary counselling and testing and condoms via Population Services International. Condom use has grown substantially through social marketing, which has complemented public sector provision. Part of the reduction in the prevalence rate of HIV in Zimbabwe can be attributed to this long standing programme.

 

· Rapid scale up of Anti-Retroviral Therapy (ARV) - DFID provides close to 30% of the ARVs, which save 40,000 lives a year.

 

· Provision of essential drugs - as the largest funding partner, the majority of essential drugs distributed through the public health sector are provided by DFID. Without this funding, the public health sector would not have enough basic essential drugs to prescribe.

 

· The process to ensure the return and retention of health workers, which DFID led. By October 2008, health services were close to closure, with many hospitals physically closed. The retention scheme enabled these facilities to re-open in January, and by February 2009, they were almost fully functional.

 

 

 

DFID support to HIV and AIDS prevention, care, treatment and mitigation

 

6.4 DFID Zimbabwe has two multi-year programmes that specifically and singularly target HIV and AIDS. These are our Behavioural Change Communication programme and our participation in the Expanded Support Programme for HIV and AIDS.

 

Behaviour Change Communications

 

6.5 DFID funds Population Services International (PSI) Zimbabwe's HIV Behaviour Change Programme, which aims to increase adoption of safer sexual behaviour in Zimbabwe. Behaviour change is well established to be a major determinant in the reduction of HIV transmission and, ultimately, premature death from AIDS. The programme supports communication campaigns to address issues such as HIV related stigma and multiple partnerships as well as increasing HIV prevention, testing and counselling services, and availability of socially marketed male and female condoms. We are providing £22 million from 2006-2011 (£4.6 million in 2009/10). USAID also fund this programme.

 

6.6 With well over a year remaining under the grant period, the programme is making good progress and has already met or exceeded three out of six major targets for programme outputs, including condom use, HIV testing and post-test treatment.

 

The Expanded Support Programme (ESP)

 

6.7 DFID participates in the Expanded Support Programme for HIV and AIDS in Zimbabwe. The ESP aims to support scale up of the national HIV and AIDS response in Zimbabwe including increased access to Anti-Retroviral Therapy through a common mechanism supported by five bilateral donors (Canada, Ireland, Norway, Sweden and the UK) who have committed over $50 million to the ESP during 2007 - 2009. The programme is now in its third year of operation. We are contributing £35 million over 5 years (£6 million in 2009/10).

 

6.8 The ESP was established at a time when relations with the government were increasingly strained. Yet, the national plan to expand treatment with Anti-Retroviral medicines to people living with HIV was sound and consistent with international best practice. The results have been significant for the treatment of AIDS and for support to broader health services including safe blood services, laboratory support and transport, training and management. The impact of the programme on other, non-contributing donors was also significant. Having established a dialogue with national HIV and AIDS authorities, the ESP demonstrated it was possible to support national policy and public services without passing money through the government and without becoming entangled in political debate.

 

6.9 The recent annual review recognised that the ESP has been a significant source of funding for HIV and AIDS and has made an important contribution to the national response and delivery of HIV and AIDS services in the 16 ESP-supported districts. It recognises the ESP as an efficient and flexible funding mechanism that is well coordinated. Progress includes: a five-fold increase in numbers accessing treatment; significant increases in take-up of ARVs; and comprehensive coverage of behaviour change activities.

 

Impact of DFID funding on HIV

 

6.10 An impact assessment of the ESP programme is being planned for 2010 at the end of a three-year implementing period. Attribution to DFID spend is difficult but DFID was the main funder of the programme and the main driver in getting the programme established. The issue is complicated further because impact indicators such as HIV prevalence declines and numbers of HIV infections averted are difficult to attribute to specific programmes and activities. Two important factors have contributed to the decline in prevalence.

 

6.11 Firstly, the Government of Zimbabwe demonstrated effective leadership at a very early stage. For example, the government established the AIDS levy which set aside 3% of tax revenue to fund the prevention and treatment of HIV and they established an independent National AIDS Council with clear responsibilities and duties.

 

6.12 Secondly, donors have delivered sustained and consistent funding over the last 15 to 20 years to HIV prevention programmes. This has enabled behaviour change programmes (such as through ESP or PSI) to focus on consistent messaging around using condoms, reducing the number of partners, and ensuring protection during pregnancy and breastfeeding. The fact that DFID and others have made sustained investments in health, family planning, and HIV prevention over a long period is very likely to have contributed significantly to the decline in Zimbabwe's HIV rates.

DFID support to maternal health

 

6.13 DFID is working with our partners to reduce maternal and infant mortality. This programme aims to protect the lives of mothers and newborns, especially those affected by HIV and AIDS and to maintain access to family planning services (including contraceptives) and to life-saving obstetric services and newborn care. DFID Zimbabwe is investing £25 million over 5 years (£4.85 million in 2009/10).

 

6.14 Despite challenges, the programme has made progress in improving procurement of commodities, increasing mother to child transmission (PMTCT) services, influencing national policy and programming (e.g. around user fees).

DFID support for Orphans and vulnerable children

 

6.15 DFID contributes £22 million to a multi-donor Programme of Support for Orphans and Vulnerable Children (OVCs) in line with Government priorities. The total pooled fund is worth $85 million. Our funding is for the period 2006 - 2010 and is managed through UNICEF to implement the National Action Plan for OVCs helps these children, plus those who are vulnerable because of other factors (such as abuse and neglect, economic hardship, displacement).

 

6.16 Examples of results to date are below:

 

· By July 2009 a total of 353,409 children had been reached: 185,893 girls, and 167,516 boys.

· By the end of the second year of the project, 205,000 children, who otherwise would have missed school, accessed education.

· In 2009/10, we expect to see a surge in OVCs accessing school, with over 700,000 children accessing schooling through the roll out of the BEAM (Basic Education Assistance Module). Through this system, school fees are paid directly to schools.

· 4243 children have been issued with birth certificates so far. The purpose is to boost birth registration in Zimbabwe, which has declined from 74% in 2005/6 to only 37% in 2008/9 but is essential for children to gain access to basic services like schooling.

· With no inflation challenges, we expect that BEAM will ensure that around 700,000 vulnerable children will be able to access education in the 2009/10 school calendar year without having to pay school fees.

 

Impact of DFID funding for OVCs

 

6.17 An exercise to assess the impact of the programme on reducing the overall vulnerability of OVCs in Zimbabwe is planned for March 2010. The impact assessment will focus on three particular areas:

 

· the emerging impact of interventions on children as well as number of children being reached by UNICEF and its partners;

 

· an analysis of the cost effectiveness of the different approaches to reduce children's vulnerability;

 

· an analysis of the different approaches to reduce the vulnerability of OVCs in Zimbabwe to identify the specific benefits of different approaches together with their strengths and weaknesses. This will highlight opportunities, challenges and lessons learned for the design of a future programme.


7. Support for and strategies for rural development and land reform

Rural development and safeguarding livelihoods

 

7.1 DFID Zimbabwe's flagship community development programme is the large and successful Protracted Relief Programme which is now in its second phase (PRP II) It aims to reduce poverty and protect livelihoods by supporting poor and vulnerable households. The PRP reaches 54 out of 60 rural districts and also targets the most vulnerable in urban centres. Managed through a coordinating unit which provides technical and programmatic oversight, it is made up of 27 technical and implementing partners. Together with their stakeholders they provide a dynamic and wide-ranging package of livelihoods support, food security, water and sanitation support and social protection, including support to the chronically ill.

 

7.2 This planting season, the programme will reach 375,000 poor and vulnerable households with fertilisers, maize seed, seeds for small grains, and legume seed. The package received is designed to be appropriate to the specific locality and aims to enable a household to meet most of its food needs for the following year. The PRP coordinates closely with the FAO and other donor support to ensure close to national coverage and limit geographical duplication of similar schemes. The FAO estimates that a total of 742,000 households will be reached with seed and fertiliser packages this season between the PRP and other donor funded interventions. This has ensured the poorest 50% of rural households will benefit. As a result, dependency on humanitarian assistance should be further reduced over the next year, and it will enable rural communities to start re-building their livelihoods.

7.3 Finally, PRP II makes a significant investment in water, sanitation and hygiene (WASH) interventions. A minimum of 500 new water points are being installed each year, working with the community and local district technicians to help ensure maintenance is also in place. Rural schools and clinics benefit from sanitation provision, as do some particularly vulnerable households. The programme supports health clubs, which have been shown to be effective at encouraging sound hygiene and health practices, working where possible with village health workers and government environmental health technicians to help ensure a more sustainable impact.

Land reform and UK policy

7.4 The UK has made clear to the Government of Zimbabwe its concerns over continued farm invasions by ZANU(PF) supporters since the formation of the Inclusive Government, which contravenes the SADC ruling of November 2008 and the terms of the GPA. The seizure of many of the few remaining commercially productive farms exacerbates Zimbabwe's capacity to return to sustainable economic growth and provide critical employment opportunities. The Zimbabwe Government's refusal to protect property rights will also deter regional and international investors just when Zimbabwe most needs to rebuild its economy. Above all, violent invasions demonstrate a lack of respect for the rule of law and we have urged the police and judicial authorities in Zimbabwe to take action.

7.5 The UK has taken a consistent position on land reform. We have always emphasised that reviving the commercial agricultural economy will be an important part of Zimbabwe's recovery although we recognise there are many ways to do this. We have always expressed our willingness to work with other donors to support a fair, pro-poor and transparent process of land reform. We would be willing to consider supporting this process as part of the wider recovery package assuming it would be designed to provide broad based recovery. We have not agreed, though, that the UK should accept responsibility for compensation.

Land and agriculture background

7.6 Zimbabwe inherited a dual agrarian structure from Rhodesia, with two distinct agricultural systems: a commercial farming sector, which was predominately owned by Zimbabwean white ethnic minority, and a traditional (communal) agriculture farming sector. Funded in part by donors including UK ODA, the Zimbabwean government made some attempt at land reform programmes mostly in the mid 1980s transferring around 9% of total rural land to re-settled farmers through a "willing buyer - willing seller" approach. The UK alone provided £40 million in the 1980s, of which £3 million was returned to the UK by the Government of Zimbabwe. Beneficiaries of these earlier schemes remain in place, referred to as "old resettlement areas".

7.7 In February 2000, the Fast Track Land Reform Programme (FTLRP) was launched ostensibly to address the inequitable distribution of land once and for all. The FTLRP was initially designed to ensure a maximum size of land ownership which did not discriminate on racial or political grounds. In practice, implementation of the programme was neither just nor sustainable, and the ensuing occupation of thousands of commercial farms was at a high cost to the economy and the people in general.

7.8 Since the onset of the FTLRP over 200,000 farm workers have lost their jobs. Including families and dependents, over one million people have been displaced from commercial farms and total commercial agricultural production has more than halved.

7.9 Land remains a highly emotive issue in Zimbabwe and this often obscures objective analysis, policymaking and implementation. Land distribution at independence was unequal and unsustainable. Following the FTLRP, distribution remains unequal, although more for political than historic reasons.

Moving forward on land

7.10 Land and agriculture remain the backbone of the Zimbabwean economy and are central to any recovery strategy. Commercial agriculture prior to Zimbabwe's current political and economic crisis was the largest formal sector employer in the country. The smallholder sector is critical for ensuring food security and poverty reduction and has potential for greater economic productivity.

7.11 In Zimbabwe, much of the prognosis for agriculture is tied up with the broader political questions of when Zimbabwe will make the transition to a democratic, technocratic Government that protects the rule of law. As long as access to land remains a politicised issue, it is impossible to envisage a viable policy to start returning production in the commercial farming sector towards 2000 levels. The smallholder sector that is interdependent with the commercial sector has been neglected by government in the wake of erratic land reform policies, despite its potential to contribute up to 70% of the country's cereal production.

7.12 The encouraging signs of recent progress under the inclusive government, particularly on economic reform, hold out the prospect for deeper DFID engagement on land issues. The GPA commits the Inclusive Government to undertaking a comprehensive land audit. Donors are broadly positive about this.

7.13 Assuming a regime which genuinely wished to increase production levels and has the political will to put appropriate policies in place, a recovery programme for commercial farming could be set out containing the following elements, some of which have already happened:

· a completed land audit as part of a process leading to a constitutionally guaranteed, saleable form of land tenure;

· the return of the rule of law and the resuscitation of institutions providing appropriate land administration services;

· market liberalisation: the positive impact on the ground seen over 2009 has been very substantial, though constraints remain (credit, marketing, etc); and

· government and, where appropriate, donor support to help the sector recover - albeit avoiding subsidies.

DFID's role in supporting reform

7.14 Options for deeper engagement are being considered in a number of different forums. Key issues in current discussions include:

· how to handle the multi-farm ownership issue that is holding any process back;

· how to handle expectations on compensation and restitution;

· and the importance of a land audit being part of a wider process, rather than a stand-alone event.

7.15 DFID, with other donors, will consider proposals from the Inclusive Government, with discussion on a potential land audit being an immediate potential step. In the meantime, DFID continues to engage with structures developed for support to agriculture. DFID is a key member of the Agriculture sub-group chaired by the Netherlands, which meets as part of the World Bank's Multi-Donor Trust Fund mechanism and is supporting analysis and discussions on land as well as the wider agricultural sector.

 

8. Zimbabwe's relations with its regional neighbours and their impact on economic recovery and development

 

8.1 The Zimbabwe economy and international relations are tied into the region in three main ways: firstly, by the prominent political role played by Zimbabwe in regional institutions such as the Southern African Development Community (SADC), and the Common Market of Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA); secondly, through trade links facilitated by these institutions; and thirdly, by significant outward migration from Zimbabwe to the region.

 

8.2 Since independence in 1980, Zimbabwe has played a prominent role in both SADC and COMESA. Until the end of Apartheid in 1994, Zimbabwe was the de facto regional centre in Southern Africa and a very wide range of businesses, NGOs and media organisations were headquartered in Harare. Most have moved to South Africa thereby diminishing the role of Harare in the region considerably.

 

8.3 Over the past ten years, Zimbabwe's trade volumes have significantly declined. South Africa is now overwhelmingly the main trading partner - absorbing 31% of trade - followed by the EU (12%), while other SADC countries represent a relatively small 8%. The EU is the only trading partner that imports more from Zimbabwe than it exports.

 

8.4 Over the past ten years, Zimbabwe has seen consistent and large emigration flows, especially to neighbouring South Africa and the United Kingdom. Estimates of diaspora figures suggest at least three million Zimbabweans were living abroad at the end of 2007 - roughly one person in each household. These figures increased as the economic crisis and political violence reached its peak in 2008. South Africa has the biggest population of Zimbabwe emigrants (with an official estimate of just over one million though the real number is likely to be significantly higher), followed by the UK (200,000-300,000) and Botswana (100,000-300,000). Emigration is particularly concentrated among high-skilled populations, with surveys indicating that 82% of emigrants hold a formal qualification and 38% holding a first degree or higher.

 

8.5 The large Zimbabwean diaspora is playing a crucial role in providing financial flows into the country. Estimates suggest remittance flows are between $500m and $1.3 billion a year (14% to 38% of GDP, funding approximately one quarter to a half of Zimbabwe's imports). This places Zimbabwe amongst the highest recipient of remittances in Sub-Saharan Africa as a percentage of national income.

 

8.6 Close economic and political links are shaping SADC and especially South Africa's involvement in Zimbabwe. South Africa is providing $35 million a year in aid directly to the budget. Most importantly, South Africa facilitated the mediation effort that led to the signing of the GPA.

 

8.7 As the guarantor of the GPA, SADC has shown little inclination to put pressure on ZANU(PF) to implement the agreed actions. The decision by MDC-T to disengage from the Inclusive Government in October 2009 prompted the more direct involvement of President Zuma, leading to a SADC Summit in Maputo on 5 November. The MDC-T subsequently agreed to re-engage with the Inclusive Government.

 

8.8 The 6 December SADC deadline for progress on GPA implementation lapsed without agreement on the way forward but the South African facilitation team remains engaged. South Africa considers instability in Zimbabwe a domestic South African problem, given the large Zimbabwe diaspora in RSA and the social implications of further migration. The continued proactive involvement of South Africa is the best hope of a successful transition.