Written evidence submitted by the Department for
International Development
January 2010
Once considered one of the
continent's success stories, Zimbabwe's
economy has contracted by half in the last decade. In early 2009, over seven million Zimbabweans
received food aid and hyperinflation had reached the second highest level in
history. The migration of skilled
labour, combined with shrinking government budgets and increased corruption,
led to the deterioration of the country's previously impressive education and
health systems.
Zimbabwe's decline is the result of years of
neglect, repression and economic mismanagement.
The roots of the crisis stretch back before independence and involve a
succession of policy failures. These
include failures to build robust democratic institutions, to challenge
structural inequality, to make sound economic decisions and to expand
opportunity to more people. Over the
last ten years, the ruling ZANU (PF) party - in power since Independence - has overseen the increasing
securitisation of the Zimbabwean state and the independence of key institutions
has become increasingly compromised
Since its installation in
February 2009, following the Global Political Agreement (GPA) in September
2008, the Inclusive Government has largely succeeded in stabilising the
economy. However, there has been far
less progress in restoring the rule of law and ensuring human rights are
respected. The Inclusive Government
remains Zimbabwe's
best hope, but the transition from crisis to full recovery is promising to be
messy, protracted and complex.
DFID Zimbabwe has developed an
adaptive and flexible approach to working in these circumstances. We have targeted life-saving assistance to
those who most need it but also taken opportunities to address the underlying
causes and effects of poverty and marginalisation. Our aid is making a real difference in a
difficult environment. Examples of this
include: improving food security for more than two million people through the
distribution of seeds and fertiliser; supporting the provision of textbooks to
5300 primary schools; providing supply kits of essential medicines
to approximately 1300 primary care clinics and rural hospitals; and helping to
deliver anti-retroviral drugs to 58,000 people.
DFID delivers its aid programme
in Zimbabwe
through UN agencies and established NGOs; no money at present goes through
Government systems. However, in line
with the cross-Whitehall strategy for Zimbabwe, we have recently begun to
provide technical assistance and policy support to reforming Ministries to help
build momentum for political and economic change. Prime Minister Morgan Tsvangirai and Finance
Minister Tendai Biti have both acknowledged the impact of DFID support. We are ready to provide additional assistance,
as part of a coordinated response by the international community, if we see
further progress in implementing the GPA.
There is a clear recognition on our part that the current dispensation,
for all its faults, presents a unique opportunity to reform and improve the
situation in Zimbabwe.
1.1 For almost the entire period since
independence, Zimbabwe has been governed by the Zimbabwe African National
Union-Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF), under the leadership of Robert Mugabe. A prolonged spiral of decline in recent years,
exacerbated by failed government policies, has led to protracted economic,
political and humanitarian turmoil. The
ZANU (PF) regime has generally reacted to this decline - and growing political
opposition - with electoral manipulation, abuse of state power and increasing
intimidation of political opponents and civil society.
1.2 However, political pressure on the regime
has grown since the late 1990s with the formation, from trade union roots, of
an independent and credible opposition - the Movement for Democratic Change,
under Morgan Tsvangirai (MDC-T). A
shambolic Presidential run-off election led to the SADC-brokered Global
Political Agreement which, in turn, culminated in the formation of the Inclusive
Government, in February 2009, between ZANU (PF), MDC-T and the breakaway MDC-M.
1.3 The MDC Minister of Finance, Tendai Biti,
has made impressive advances in stabilising the economy, aided by US dollarisation
and the abandonment of the Zimbabwean currency.
Key achievements include:
· an increase in monthly revenues from only $4 million in January 2009 to
almost $100 million by autumn;
· payment of monthly salaries to public servants, initially of $100 pcm
and now in a range from $100 to $225;
· signs of recovery in the banking sector, with deposits doubling between April
and August 2009;
· the 2010 budget - Zimbabwe's first realistic budget in many years, the
preparation of which DFID supported;
· and schools and medical facilities have reopened.
Ministry
of Finance officials project a realistic resource envelope of $1.4 billion,
funded through domestic revenues, for 2010.
1.4 As well as restoring
macro-economic stability, Biti has also greatly contained ZANU (PF)'s access to
resources; largely by promoting legislative changes in the governance of the
Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe (RBZ) and by some improvement in public financial
management. The RBZ's power therefore
continues to be significantly reduced. However,
the problematic Reserve Bank Governor, Gideon Gono, remains in post.
1.5 DFID and other
international donors, in an effort to boost progress on reform, have been
providing essential expertise and technical assistance to these economic and
governance processes.
1.6 The international community, including DFID, has also played a critical
role in helping to improve the humanitarian situation. In 2008/09, Zimbabwe experienced its worst
ever cholera epidemic, with nearly 100,000 cases and over 4,000 deaths. DFID helped the World Health Organisation (WHO) establish
a Command and Control Centre to ensure a more rapid and effective response. With the support of other donors, DFID is now focusing
on maintaining basic health services, including the funding of vital medicines
and supplies and the retention of health workers. We are also working to repair and restore
water and sanitation systems, promote good hygiene practices and deliver items
such as water purification tablets and soap. As of mid-December, there have
been only 146 cholera cases this season and 5 deaths, compared to nearly 18,000
cases and 877 deaths during the same period last year.
1.7 Seven million people received food aid at the
height of the last hungry season in early 2009. DFID provided £9 million to the World Food
Programme (WFP) to ensure that food was in place when it was needed.
This year saw a better harvest and improved availability of food. Even so, the WFP estimates that 2.8 million
people are likely to need food aid in early 2010. We have therefore allocated £4 million to the
WFP effort.
1.8 In theory, the Zimbabwean
national constitution guarantees many basic human rights, but the state has
consistently failed to protect citizens.
Institutions, such as the judiciary and media, have in the past shown a
reasonable degree of independence and integrity but now exhibit serious
weaknesses regarding fundamental freedoms of participation, expression and
association.
1.9 The
widespread repression and human rights abuses seen at the time of the 2008
elections have decreased under the Inclusive Government. However, arrests of trade unionists and civil
society activists, land invasions and politically motivated legal action against
parliamentarians have continued, with weak and inconsistent responses from the
judiciary. The period immediately
following the MDC's decision (in October 2009) to disengage from some functions
of government saw a particular ramping up of violence. Serious human rights abuses have also been
reported in the Marange diamond fields, drawing significant international
reaction.
1.10 Reform of
the security and justice sector into a set of professional and accountable institutions
is essential, but opportunities are limited in the current political context.
One important opportunity is the Constitution-Making Process under the GPA. A successful review and implementation of the
Constitution would likely strengthen the separation of powers and could
increase the prospects of free and fair elections. DFID, alongside other donors, is considering
support which can make this a more open and accountable process, including
strengthening parliamentary oversight and supporting wider civil society
engagement.
1.11 Zimbabwe was on its way to
achieving several of the MDGs in 2000.
Impressive gains were made throughout much of the 1990s and early 2000s,
including in:
· reducing HIV prevalence (from 24% to 15.6% and currently 13.7%);
· raising primary school enrolment (over 90% in 2004);
· extending adult literacy (over 90% for men and women);
· and increasing access to improved water and sanitation services in both
rural and urban areas.
1.12 These gains were made in
spite of the government's shrinking budget and the steady migration of skills.
Demand for services in Zimbabwe remained high and continued to grow until just
a couple of years ago. Parents'
participation in education coupled with a strong sense of duty and accountability
amongst teachers ensured that the education system survived for many years
beyond the ability of the government to fund it properly. Similar patterns were evident in the health
sector and social welfare.
1.13 The fastest decline was
found in services dependent on foreign exchange: for example, immunisation
services collapsed completely by 2002 due to the lack of foreign exchange for
fuel, vaccines and syringes (all import dependent commodities). Donor support
was therefore needed (and provided by DFID, UNICEF, WHO and others) to enable Zimbabwe
to rebuild and maintain a functional vaccination programme. Donor assistance also enabled Zimbabwean women
to plan pregnancies (almost certainly a contributor to lower than expected
child malnutrition and stable child mortality rates).
1.14 The continuing
deterioration in physical infrastructure, lack of materials and supplies and
the economic opportunity costs of being a teacher or nurse have more recently
eroded service provision. In the absence
of sustained government commitment and core funding, especially for salaries,
MDG indicators have deteriorated rapidly in the last couple of years. In 2006
WHO declared that Zimbabweans had one of the world's lowest life expectancy
rates, at 37 years for men and 34 for women.
1.15 Pre-existing gender
inequalities have been exacerbated further by ten years of economic decline and
political repression. Maternal mortality
has risen sharply as services have collapsed and access, especially in rural
areas, decreased. Young women, physiologically and economically more
vulnerable, are disproportionately affected by HIV and twice as likely as young
men to be infected. Women bear the
burden of care for the chronically ill and are disadvantaged under customary
law.
1.16 Young men under 24 years
of age made up over 70% of Zimbabweans deported from South Africa until the
recent (and temporary) lifting of visa requirements. With fewer young people able to stay in
school, the number of disaffected youths who have little stake in today's
Zimbabwe has burgeoned with serious consequences for future stability.
1.17 Despite some clear success
from 15 years of programmes to reduce stigma and discrimination, one in four
children in Zimbabwe grows up without one or both parents and many face
psychological problems, heightened risk of abuse and decreased access to education
and health care. Repressive actions by
the former government have led to growing numbers of people displaced - by land
reform, urban 'clean up' operations and sporadic crackdowns on illegal settlements
and mining activities.
1.18 Zimbabwe's future remains uncertain and
things could change for the better or worse.
A flexible and adaptable strategy is therefore required, to ensure that
DFID can continue to deliver a high impact aid programme under volatile and
challenging conditions and under a range of potential scenarios, from strong
reform and change to sharper decline and deterioration.
1.19 DFID Zimbabwe committed £60 million in
development assistance to Zimbabwe for 2009/10, the highest total to date. The core of our programme provides practical
assistance to poor and vulnerable people in greatest need, including
humanitarian assistance and protracted relief and basic services. All aid is delivered in line with the Paris
Declaration and OECD/DAC Fragile States Principles.
1.20 We are also seizing opportunities to bolster
reform and build momentum for change, by providing technical assistance to
reforming Ministries and supporting opportunities to strengthen the
accountability and responsiveness of the State towards its citizens. With international partners, we are pressing
for implementation of the GPA, including a Constitutional Review that could
increase democratic space and strengthen the prospects for free and fair
elections.
1.21 Our aid is making a real
difference in a difficult environment.
Some of the specific results UK aid is working to deliver in Zimbabwe
include:
· distributing
agricultural inputs such as seeds and fertiliser to about 375,000 smallholder households,
reaching more than 2 million people;
· fighting HIV by
promoting behavioural change including distribution of 70 million male condoms
and 4 million female condoms;
· leading the
establishment of the multi-donor Expanded Support Programme for HIV and AIDS
that is on target to deliver Anti-Retroviral Treatment to 58,000 people in
2009;
· helping WFP to
deliver emergency food aid to an estimated 1.6 million people by March 2010;
· supporting UNICEF and
partners to reduce the impact of cholera and other waterborne diseases by
improving access to clean water and sanitation for over two million people;
· supporting
nutrition outcomes in children: no
district in Zimbabwe suffers from emergency levels of malnutrition;
· supporting the provision of textbooks and critical learning
materials to 5300 primary schools;
· and providing technical assistance to the Office of the
Prime Minister and the Ministry of Finance to strengthen their capacity to
implement reforming policies and supporting a payroll audit to identify ghost
workers.
Our programmes have been designed to continue operating
effectively in either improving or deteriorating contexts in the future.
1.22 Our engagement is guided by a cross-Whitehall strategy on Zimbabwe, agreed among key
departments, including DFID, FCO, MoD and HMT.
The strategy recognises that the Inclusive Government is Zimbabwe's best
chance for economic recovery and political change, justifying a structured and
incremental re-engagement by the UK and international community. It seeks to calibrate UK support against
implementation of the GPA. The strategy
is built around strong cross-departmental working, both in London and in Harare
where the DFID office and UK Mission are co-located.
1.23 Zimbabwe's recovery in 2009 was in many
respects remarkable, if still fragile.
At the beginning of the year, the country was on the brink of collapse,
with prices doubling every 24 hours, schools and clinics shut down, a cholera
epidemic underway and millions dependent on food aid. At the year's end, inflation was down to
single digits, public servants were being paid and food was available in city
shops.
1.24 Pro-active South African mediation,
following the Maputo SADC Summit in October, has further added to the pressure
for change and, if maintained, adds an important new element to the
equation. Opponents of reform retain
control of the security services and the option of violence, but overall the
balance of advantage seems to be steadily swinging behind the reformists, with
a growing sense that progress cannot easily be reversed.
1.25 Nevertheless, the political
situation remains volatile and unpredictable and the tipping point has not yet
been reached. Recovering the quality of
life, diversified economy and high calibre civil service that once existed will
take some years of sustained effort and good government. Zimbabwe appears to be in a transitional
phase but it is a transition that is likely to continue to be protracted, messy
and probably non-linear.
1.26 DFID will need to remain flexible
and opportunistic, calibrating our engagement to progress on the ground. The core of DFID's programme going forward
will remain focused on support for basic services, livelihoods and humanitarian
needs. Resources will continue to be delivered
through the UN and NGOs in the near future.
1.27 We will also continue to
seek opportunities to build momentum for change by building capacity in
reforming Ministries, (especially the Office of the Prime Minister and the
Ministry of Finance) and strengthening the accountability of the Executive by
building on commitments in the GPA. This
is likely to include support to the Constitution Making Process, elections,
Parliament, media, civil society and possibly additional small-scale support,
with other donors, for security and justice sector reform.
2. Prospects for a closer relationship
between DFID and the Government of Zimbabwe
2.1 After 2000, DFID was
unable to maintain a credible development engagement with the ZANU (PF) regime
and, from that period, no funds have been passed through the government. However, DFID and other donors continued to have
some engagement with public institutions in Zimbabwe to deliver basic services
- where these institutions and national policies were essentially sound and
consistent with international standards.
This was especially the case around HIV prevention and treatment. This approach has helped to slow the decline
of public systems to some extent and has helped avoid the need to establish
parallel service delivery structures.
2.2 This approach also positioned
DFID well to support a more legitimate government when it arrived. For example - because of our longstanding support
to the national treatment programme for HIV, which involved working with
existing public health institutions - DFID were able to lead donor work with
the Ministry of Health to deliver funding to retain health workers during the
cholera crisis. The health retention
payments were, though, paid directly to health workers' bank accounts rather
than through government systems.
2.3 The formation of the
Inclusive Government in February 2009 changed the balance of risk and
opportunity and justified a structured and incremental reengagement with
Zimbabwe. A key component of mitigating
the risks and realising the opportunities is a coordinated approach by the
international community. Donors have
been able to maintain a cohesive position around the kind of changes that would
signify a return to democratic government and the rule of law. We have focussed on aligning behind the
Government of Zimbabwe's own commitments as agreed by the three main parties in
the GPA. This cohesion has been time-consuming
to build and maintain but it has become a very useful mechanism to communicate
clearly with the Inclusive Government around the kind of reform needed in
Zimbabwe for donors to increase their support.
2.4 Donor reengagement is
calibrated against implementation of the GPA and progress towards the "Hague
Principles" (agreed by like-minded donors in 2007). These principles include full access to
humanitarian assistance, a commitment to the rule of law, economic reform,
respect for internationally agreed human rights and a commitment to free and
fair elections.
2.5 For DFID, the Inclusive
Government has created greater opportunity for engagement and better working
relationships with some elements of government.
As an uneasy cohabitation between political antagonists, the Inclusive
Government is not yet the partner we require to sustain a full development
relationship. Nevertheless, it provides
a platform to continue to develop the programme away from short-term relief and
to address underlying, longer-term causes of humanitarian crisis.
2.6 In April 2009, the
International Development Secretary announced a further £15 million of aid to
Zimbabwe, including funding to rehabilitate Zimbabwe's water and sanitation
systems, whose disrepair was a key contributory factor to the 2008/09 cholera
pandemic. In June 2009 the Prime
Minister, Gordon Brown, welcoming Morgan Tsvangirai to London, further
increased the size of the UK's development assistance to £60 million for 2009/10
- our largest ever programme in Zimbabwe.
This included an additional £5 million for food security and for
education (approximately £4m and £1m respectively).
2.7 We have also begun to
provide technical assistance and policy guidance to key reforming Ministries
and institutions. We have supported the
Ministry of Finance to prepare the 2010 budget, Zimbabwe's first
credible budget in nearly a decade. At
Prime Minister Tsvangirai's request, we have also
provided flexible TA to his own Office to perform essential policy,
parliamentary and other leadership functions.
2.8 Although it does not yet
have a poverty reduction strategy as such, the Inclusive Government has
developed an agenda to meet immediate needs in the Short Term Emergency
Recovery Plan (STERP), the 100-Day Plan and its successor the Government Work
Programme. An early priority for DFID
was to align its programme of assistance with the priorities set out in the
STERP and 100 Day Plan. For example, we are
providing £3 million in 2009/10 for the rehabilitation of Zimbabwe's six major
referral hospitals, including those in Harare and Bulawayo.
2.9 All UK aid is currently
delivered through the UN, NGOs and contracted partners. It is unlikely that
this will change in the foreseeable future.
However by taking steps with other donors to align our assistance to the
2009 and 2010 budgets, we are providing support to Government priority areas
and easing budgetary pressures by paying for essential humanitarian and basic
services assistance through parallel donor financing.
2.10 The Inclusive Government is an interim arrangement: the political
struggle between the ZANU (PF) regime and the MDC has continued within as well
as outside government. Our strategy is
to provide support to build momentum for change, by working to leverage reform
where we see an opportunity, not just by responding to progress as it
occurs. Most
observers believe that the next elections will be held in the first half of
2011 at the earliest. The period up to
then will be difficult and painful, with periods of both improvement and
deterioration likely. DFID will need to
remain nimble and opportunistic in our response to events. Our development programme, our relations with
the region (especially with South Africa) and our approach to the sanctions
issue will all impact directly on the prospects for real change.
3. How
DFID works with other donors, multilateral agencies and NGOs to deliver
assistance
3.1 DFID delivers its aid programme in Zimbabwe
through key strategic partners such as UN agencies and established NGO
partners. At present, no money goes through Government
systems or the RBZ. South Africa was the
only donor who provided $35 million of budget support in 2009 and has signalled
the intention of continuing to do so in 2010.
We also understand that China has provided $5 million into Zimbabwe's
systems; however, there are uncertainties around the how the aid would be spent
and exact volume of China's contribution.
Donors have maintained coordinated positions in line with the
Paris/Accra Aid Harmonisation agenda and OECD/DAC Principles for best practice
in working in Fragile States. Aid
coordination is good and donor funding is increasingly jointly funded or
pooled, with DFID leading pooled funding arrangements in several areas.
3.2 As mentioned above, ensuring
a consistent and agreed approach by the international community to the
situation in Zimbabwe has been critical.
On the ground in Harare there has been a major focus on ensuring that
aid is coordinated and delivered through agreed mechanisms and processes. During
2008 and building on the Hague Principles, donors have developed fuller plans
and processes for gauging progress by the Government and sketching out recovery
plans and aid volumes and how it will be spent. DFID continues to play a
prominent role in developing the emerging aid architecture and donor strategy.
3.3 Representatives from
donor capitals also met in Berlin in October 2009 to review progress since the
inception of the Inclusive Government.
There was a general recognition that Zimbabwe has entered a transitional
support phase where definite progress has been made but remains highly fragile.
DFID support (both service delivery and technical
assistance) is designed to help strengthen the government's capacity to handle
pressing issues (eg. its current fiscal problems) and to help support reform
through a difficult and fluid political situation.
3.4 Examples of key donor
coordination processes include:
· UN monthly coordination meetings with donors and bi-monthly meetings
with Ambassadors and Heads of Mission.
· The World Bank Multi Donor Trust Fund Policy Group, which includes heads
of aid agencies of contributing countries and the UN.
· Sector cluster groups for health, governance, and orphans and vulnerable
children.
· The like-minded group - an informal but highly cohesive and influential
aid coordination and policy group. There
are no hard and fast rules as to membership, but typically the EC, US, UK,
France, Germany, Norway, Sweden, Canada, Netherlands, Australia, Denmark and
Finland participate.
3.5 DFID Zimbabwe funds many organisations
indirectly. Most of our programming goes
through strategic partners who in turn implement their programmes through civil
society organisations. For example, our
livelihoods programme (Protracted Relief Programme Phase II) goes through a contracted
managing agent to support the work of 19 NGOs.
3.6 The UN and CSOs continue to be vital partners. Parts of the UN family, especially UNICEF and
WFP, have offered effective and practical ways of working to respond to
critical needs, ranging from food aid to essential drugs and chemicals to
ensuring safe drinking water. They have national
coverage and are able to negotiate access in politically challenging
situations. The UN remains the largest
manager of DFID funding, as they are for most other donors active in Zimbabwe.
3.7 In the past we have questioned
whether the UN could be more vocal about the humanitarian situation. UNICEF and the WFP have responded well to the
humanitarian crisis and continue to respond to DFID and other donor evaluation
processes. About half of our programme
will be delivered through the UN in 2009/10.
3.8 CSOs enable donors and UN
agencies to reach out to communities across the country and to the poorest
within those communities. Zimbabwean
civil society organisations also have an important role in strengthening state
accountability. This includes protecting the human rights of Zimbabwe's
citizens, supporting their participation in key decision making processes,
strengthening the media and doing more to monitor state performance. Key
priorities include the Constitution-Making Process, media, Parliament and the
next elections.
3.9 There are several funding channels which
contribute to these objectives alongside the main DFID programme. We support
civil society in Zimbabwe through our central funding channels - (i) the Civil
Society Challenge Fund (CSCF), (ii) Programme Partnership Agreements (PPAs) and
(iii) the Governance and Transparency Fund (GTF). We also support civil society from the
Country Office through the Africa Conflict Prevention Pool and a Gender Support
Programme.
3.10 Close working between DFID,
the FCO, HMT and MoD is also vital for the success of UK government
efforts. In Zimbabwe, all departments
are focused on supporting the country to implement the GPA and improve the
lives of the poorest and most vulnerable people. Since moving into the joint compound in April
2009, relations have become even closer and more integrated. The Ambassador, Head of DFID and Defence
Attaché office work together on the shared agenda and staff freely share
information and seek input across departments.
In London, DFID staff work very closely with the FCO Zimbabwe Unit, HM
Treasury, the Cabinet Office and No. 10 guided by a cross-Whitehall strategy
agreed and monitored by the National Security
International Relations and Development Cabinet
Sub-Committee (NSID).
3.11 World Bank and AfDB
engagement is limited by Zimbabwe's arrears to both banks. As Zimbabwe begins a process of credible
re-engagement, both institutions are stepping up their involvement. The World Bank acts as the secretariat of a
Multilateral Development Trust Fund (MDTF), managing technical study and
assistance funds agreed in multi-donor sector groups. A second MDTF mechanism focused on major
programme funding will now enable donor funding to flow into infrastructure
investment, using World Bank procedures to ensure funds are allocated and
implemented effectively. These funds
will be mostly targeted at critical poverty reducing and growth enhancing
investments (e.g. water supplies and possibly energy) where the World Bank is
especially well placed.
3.12 The AfDB is also now
engaging in Zimbabwe, providing technical assistance and some funding to critical
areas. It is especially well placed to
support more politically sensitive areas, for example in supporting Zimbabwe's
capacity to manage its external debt and developing an effective approach to
this challenge.
3.13 Zimbabwe's IMF voting
rights were suspended over arrears. Zimbabwe's recent positive direction of
economic policy implementation and re-engagement with the IMF create a concrete
prospect for voting rights to be restored soon. The IMF has partially lifted
the ban on technical assistance to Zimbabwe and started providing some
limited assistance since May 2009, and has subsequently developed an effective
relationship with the Ministry of Finance. This is an initial step towards a formally
approved IMF programme. This would be
important in providing a signal on Zimbabwe's commitment to sound economic
policy and would help build confidence between government and donors. We are
discussing this prospect with Board members and IMF staff, to ensure that the
conditions for a successful programme are right.
3.14 The European Commission
including ECHO is one of the three major donors in Zimbabwe, alongside USAID
and DFID, that has been continually active over the last decade. The EC also ensures that funds do not pass
through government systems. The EC has
been a particularly valuable partner in the health sector for DFID, and been
well placed to play an important role in donor re-engagement of the education
sector.
3.15 The Global Fund for AIDS,
TB and Malaria has approved three rounds of funding to Zimbabwe. However, implementation
has been challenging. The capture of
Global Fund resources by the RBZ taken out of local bank accounts in early 2008
($14 million in total, returned in late 2008) led to the freezing of Global
Fund resources. The situation has now
been resolved and Ministry of Health,
donors and other stakeholders are
working hard to ensure these critical funds flow more effectively in future. DFID is now one of the two donor
representatives on the Global Fund Country Coordinating Mechanism (CCM).
4.1 Analysis suggests that
humanitarian assistance will continue to be needed in Zimbabwe for at least two
more years. The impact of failed policies - including chaotic land reform,
economic mismanagement and collapse, the erosion of basic services and the general
challenge of erratic rainfall - has been hunger, and disease outbreaks, coupled
with the inability of the most vulnerable to access life-saving services.
4.2 Wherever possible, DFID Zimbabwe
is providing multi-year funding to respond to predictable hunger and
vulnerability. Examples include the wide-ranging
Protracted Relief Programme - which
helps people to grow food and meet basic health, education and other social
costs (see Figure 3) - and support for
IDPs through the International Organisation for Migration (IOM). Where necessary, DFID Zimbabwe has also
responded quickly to sudden onset emergencies: in 2008/09 up to 36,000 were displaced
by post-election violence, over 7 million people received food aid, and there
were about 100,000 recorded cases of cholera.
4.3 In a deteriorating
environment, there will need to be a greater emphasis on direct humanitarian
assistance while in an improving environment we will use more social protection
interventions.
Direct humanitarian assistance Social protection
Deterioration Improvement
4.4 DFID works closely with
other humanitarian agencies and donors to develop a shared understanding of
humanitarian need through the Common Humanitarian Assessment Process and
Consolidated Appeals Process (CHAP and CAP). Progress and emerging need is
monitored through the Humanitarian Country Team/Donor meetings. DFID is also supporting the UN to improve
coordination.
4.5 Last year's hungry season
in Zimbabwe was an extraordinary time and the UK gave WFP £9 million to respond to the growing food crisis in the country
and avert a major disaster. WFP
and its cooperating partners effectively assisted more than five million people
per month in both February and March 2009.
4.6 Most food-security actors
agree that WFP adapted well to this highly volatile environment and learned
valuable lessons. It was able to address
perceived needs and increase logistical operations to deliver massive amounts
of assistance in a relatively short timeframe.
DFID's contribution to the operation allowed WFP to swiftly pre-position
food as the Programme began to scale up activities.
4.7 Food availability has improved since last
year following a good harvest, an end to the Grain Marketing Board monopoly on
importing cereals into the country, dollarisation of the economy and
availability of donor-funded agricultural inputs. Extensive humanitarian support will remain critical
to avoid the erosion of livelihoods and protect the health and nutrition status
of the vulnerable. DFID funding of £4 million for WFP operations in Zimbabwe
this year will contribute to food aid for up to 1.6 million people.
4.8 Zimbabwe's cholera
outbreak between August 2008 and July 2009 was on an unprecedented scale. In total, there were nearly 100,000 cholera
cases with nearly 4,300 deaths of which more than 60 percent were at the
community level (not in a hospital).
4.9 In early 2008 in
anticipation of waterborne disease outbreaks, DFID Zimbabwe released £1 million
to UNICEF for the procurement and pre-positioning of IV fluid and water tablets.
This enabled NGO partners to rapidly respond to cholera and other disease
outbreaks and improve water and sanitation hygiene (WASH) provision at clinics
and health facilities.
4.10 A
further problem during the cholera crisis last year was the very low number of
health workers still going to work.
Spiralling hyperinflation rendered their pay meaningless and a basic
salary did not even cover transport costs.
In response, DFID Zimbabwe led a process to establish a national Health
Workers Retention scheme that paid health workers a US$ allowance that enabled
nurses and other essential health workers to return to their clinics. The
retention scheme was joined in early 2009 by several other donors and was then
taken over by the Global Fund.
4.11 New
cases of cholera began to appear again in September 2009. By 13 December, the
total cumulative caseload stood at 146 cases and 5 deaths.
By comparison, this time last year, there were 17,908 cases and
877 deaths. The situation is encouraging
although the humanitarian community remains cautious as the rainy season will continue
for many more weeks.
4.12 This year
(2009/10) there was a big push by the international humanitarian community to
carry out preventive rehabilitation work on the water systems and to get
supplies in place early to minimise the worst effects of another cholera
outbreak. The GoZ has also put $17 million directly
into targeted water and sanitation rehabilitation works primarily in Harare and
surrounding areas.
4.13 As part of this general
effort, the UK gave £4.7 million to UNICEF in advance of the rainy season in
early October 2009. This will supply
safe water and access to sanitation services for the most vulnerable population
groups. UK aid is being used to:
· improve water and sanitation services through emergency rehabilitation
interventions;
· enable urban councils to provide equitable water services to all
residents;
· ensure health institutions, schools and communities in most "at risk"
districts have access to reliable water, sanitation and hygiene;
· increase coverage of critical Non-Food Items (see above) to prevent the
spread of cholera; and
· prevent the spread of cholera and other diseases through improved
environmental health risk management.
4.14 Ultimately, long-term
predictable investment is needed to increase the number of households with safe
water and access to sanitation and to decrease the incidence of waterborne
disease. DFID Zimbabwe is planning a
significant investment to move from emergency preparedness and response this
year to transition and long-term recovery in future years. This will complement the water, sanitation
and hygiene support already provided to rural communities through DFID's other
basic service programmes.
4.15 The UK is also providing
life-saving health services for vulnerable people including the provision of
essential medicines to all 1300 primary care clinics and rural hospitals in the
country. Since it began, the Emergency Vital Medicines Support Programme has
absorbed £15 million from the UK and about as much again from ECHO, Canada and
Ireland. Combined with the Health Worker Retention Scheme, the two programmes
have ensured that Zimbabwean health facilities are open and functional across
the country.
4.16 More than 1.5 million
people have been displaced by the policies of the GoZ since 2000 (including the
Fast Track Land Reform from 2000 to date and Operation 'Murambatsvina' - drive out trash - in 2005) and also by post-election
violence since 2008. Despite the establishment
of the Inclusive Government, farm invasions continue today and the risk of
displacement for remaining farm-worker families remains a serious concern.
4.17 DFID Zimbabwe has had a
programme with IOM Zimbabwe to provide emergency humanitarian assistance to
IDPs and humanitarian assistance at border crossing points since 2006/07. DFID
extended this programme in May 2009. It
will now run until March 2010 and its total value is £6.5m (with £1.5m of that
provided in 2009/10).
4.18 IOM continues to be at the
forefront of responding to new displacements and emergencies. IOM has also developed an impressive
multi-media information campaign, which appears to target accurately the groups
identified as most likely to become potential migrants. The Beitbridge centre was established in May
2006 and by the end of May 2009, it had assisted 320,000 returned migrants.
5.1 The ability of the
Inclusive Government to deliver quality basic services to its people is weak
following years of underinvestment and turmoil.
The challenge of rebuilding basic services is massive and far exceeds
the public purse available. Basic service-related MDG indicators for Zimbabwe
are currently a mixed bag (paragraphs
1.12 to 1.15).
5.2 DFID Zimbabwe has been a
major donor in the provision of basic services for many years, working through
the UN and other providers (such as Crown Agents) and, when feasible, with GoZ
line ministries. Basic services account
for over 43% of the UK aid programme in 2009/10. Additional support is provided through other
programmes with basic services elements such as those in the humanitarian
portfolio (for example, IDP health services or water and sanitation in cholera
response or through our broader programme for OVCs).
5.3 Over the last fifteen
years, we have made a significant and sustained investment in health including
the prevention and treatment of HIV and AIDS.
Health related services account for the vast majority of our basic
services spending (about £25 million). The
next section of the memorandum (section 6) looks specifically at the results
and impact of our health funding. In
2009, DFID Zimbabwe also entered the education sector through a joint fund
managed by UNICEF.
Education
5.4 By early 2009, the
education sector in Zimbabwe was in crisis. The sector suffered from high staff
attrition and poor teachers' salaries, which were insufficient to cover even transport. The number of teachers more than halved from
about 120,000 to less than 60,000. On
top of this, education was severely disrupted for much of 2008 because of
political violence, some of which was actively targeted at teachers, as well as
disrupting normal community life for several months.
5.5 On joining the Inclusive
Government, the MDC initiated foreign currency allowances
($100) to all civil servants, including teachers. This has had a positive effect on the
education system and it is now showing some early indications of revival and
most schools are open and functioning again, although at diminished capacity.
The new minister has wrestled his way to a reasonable schedule of fees and
levies (although with insufficient monitoring) and enrolment is now up
again.
5.6 In the summer of 2009,
DFID Zimbabwe, along with many other donors, agreed a new level of involvement
in the education sector in Zimbabwe. We
are spending £1 million in 2009/10 to provide
technical advice and seed funding to a pooled financing mechanism called the Transitional
Education Fund. The fund's objectives
are to support procurement of education commodities (textbooks, exercise books,
classroom furniture, etc) and technical assistance and to provide funding for a
strong education technical expert based within the EC to guide, influence and
inform policy developments in this neglected sector.
5.7 UNICEF
manages the fund and our other partners are the EC, Australia, Germany, Sweden,
New Zealand, the Netherlands and the World Bank. Additional donors are expected
to join in 2010. The fund is just getting started. Amongst other things, it will provide
textbooks and learning material to 5300 primary schools across the country. We will assess the impact of the fund after
its first year.
Vital Medicines
5.8 By
2008, national procurement of adequate medicines was impossible for the
Ministry of Health and Child Welfare.
The situation had become a serious humanitarian crisis with under-funding
and erosion of essential health services and an exodus of health
professionals. There was a huge shortage
of essential supplies and equipment.
DFID Zimbabwe began an emergency programme to procure and distribute
essential drug supplies to stock health facilities across all districts in
Zimbabwe. This is now a two year
programme worth £11.5 million (plus an additional £5 million in 2009/10) that
helps meet national health policy goals with a particular focus on the needs of
under-fives and women and the
prevention and treatment of transmissible diseases.
5.9 The Emergency Vital
Medicines programme has become the main vehicle for providing basic medicines
and surgical supplies in Zimbabwe. Other
donors are ECHO, Canada, Ireland, Netherlands and Australia. The
programme has been instrumental in ensuring a basic supply of drugs and
sundries are available at all 1531 health facilities in Zimbabwe and especially
at rural health centres and district hospitals.
In combination with the Workers Retention Scheme, the two programmes are
underpinning access to life-saving services by poor people in Zimbabwe and have
kept health services functioning at a very difficult time.
5.10 UNICEF manages the programme and their reports indicate that the
programme has successfully led to increased stock in most parts of the country
and that stocks of vital medicines are improving. Morale, patient attendance and perceptions of
quality are also strengthening.
Emergency
Health Support
5.11 In the spring of 2009, the
Deputy Prime Minister's office appealed to DFID for funding for a specific
programme of work to improve referral hospital infrastructure in six key
hospitals, including the larger cities of Bulawayo, Masvingo, Harare and
Mutare. Health services in key referral
hospitals were compromised due to lack of key equipment and damage to
infrastructure in theatres, laundries, boiler rooms, kitchens and
mortuaries. This short-term investment
should quickly yield visible improvements.
We will contribute £1 million over 2009/10. Crown Agents is managing the project which is
due to complete in the spring of 2010.
Emergency
Malaria Spraying
5.12 Malaria is the third
leading cause of morbidity and mortality in Zimbabwe, after HIV/AIDS and
tuberculosis, with over two million people suffering from this preventable
disease annually. The most vulnerable
are under-fives, pregnant women, the elderly and people living with HIV and
AIDS. Improved treatment with new
malaria drugs procured through the Global Fund should lower the mortality rate
further whilst the roll out of bed net programmes will improve prevention.
5.13 The bedrock of Zimbabwe's
national malaria prevention programme though is indoor residual spraying which
is estimated to avert up to 4 million cases per year and over 1000 deaths. This year the Ministry of Health has secured
$750,000 (of the total cost of $1.5 million) from the Treasury, which is an
excellent sign of their commitment and strong prioritisation of this
programme. USAID, which funded $1 million of the costs last year
(alongside DFID contributions), is unable to support the programme this year so
DFID has met the other half of the need.
6.1 DFID's programme has had significant
impact in recent years, ensuring that:
· the health system
in Zimbabwe is still largely functioning and each clinic retains a basic
complement of staff, drugs and services.
People in Zimbabwe still have access to basic health and HIV services,
despite the near collapse of government in late 2008;
· access to
anti-retroviral treatment continues to increase and has been increasing for the
last 5 years;
· malnutrition
rates in children across Zimbabwe remain below emergency levels in every district
despite the economic and political turmoil;
· contraceptive use
continues to grow and unmet demand is shrinking: birth spacing is one of the main components
in reducing child mortality and saving mothers' lives;
· and HIV
prevalence continues to decline mainly because of behaviour change across the
population.
6.2 The drive for clearer and more
robust evidence of results has meant that impact
assessments (or impact evaluations) are playing an increasing role in our
monitoring, enabling DFID to assess more effectively how projects or programmes make
a difference and how cost-effective they are. Impact evaluation provides a rigorous assessment of the impact
of a development intervention on the lives and welfare outcomes for poor
people, including what changed and why - a process that is critical to lesson
learning especially across different countries.
6.3 A review of our health portfolio earlier this year
found that without DFID support the following key health-related impacts would
be severely compromised.
· Strong national
prevention messaging backed by voluntary counselling and testing and condoms
via Population Services International.
Condom use has grown substantially through social marketing, which has
complemented public sector provision.
Part of the reduction in the prevalence rate of HIV in Zimbabwe can be
attributed to this long standing programme.
· Rapid scale up of
Anti-Retroviral Therapy (ARV) - DFID provides close to 30% of the ARVs, which
save 40,000 lives a year.
· Provision of
essential drugs - as the largest funding partner, the majority of essential
drugs distributed through the public health sector are provided by DFID. Without this funding, the public health sector
would not have enough basic essential drugs to prescribe.
· The process to ensure the return and
retention of health workers, which DFID led. By October 2008, health services
were close to closure, with many hospitals physically closed. The retention scheme enabled these facilities
to re-open in January, and by February 2009, they were almost fully functional.
6.4 DFID Zimbabwe has two
multi-year programmes that specifically and singularly target HIV and
AIDS. These are our Behavioural Change
Communication programme and our participation in the Expanded Support Programme
for HIV and AIDS.
Behaviour Change Communications
6.5 DFID funds Population
Services International (PSI) Zimbabwe's HIV Behaviour Change Programme, which
aims to increase adoption of safer sexual behaviour in Zimbabwe. Behaviour change is well established to be a
major determinant in the reduction of HIV transmission and, ultimately,
premature death from AIDS. The programme
supports communication campaigns to address issues such as HIV related stigma
and multiple partnerships as well as increasing HIV prevention, testing and
counselling services, and availability of socially marketed male and female
condoms. We are providing £22 million from 2006-2011 (£4.6 million in
2009/10). USAID also fund this
programme.
6.6 With well over a year remaining under the grant period, the
programme is making good progress and has already met or exceeded three out of
six major targets for programme outputs, including condom use, HIV testing and
post-test treatment.
The Expanded Support Programme (ESP)
6.7 DFID participates in the Expanded Support Programme for HIV
and AIDS in Zimbabwe. The ESP aims to
support scale up of the national HIV and AIDS response in Zimbabwe including
increased access to Anti-Retroviral Therapy through a common mechanism
supported by five bilateral donors (Canada, Ireland, Norway, Sweden and the UK)
who have committed over $50 million to the ESP during 2007 - 2009.
The programme is now in its third year of operation. We are contributing £35 million over 5 years
(£6 million in 2009/10).
6.8 The ESP was established at a time when
relations with the government were increasingly strained. Yet, the national plan to expand treatment
with Anti-Retroviral medicines to people living with HIV was sound and
consistent with international best practice.
The results have been significant for the treatment of AIDS and for
support to broader health services including safe blood services, laboratory
support and transport, training and management.
The impact of the programme on other, non-contributing donors was also
significant. Having established a dialogue with national HIV and AIDS
authorities, the ESP demonstrated it was possible to support national policy
and public services without passing money through the government and without
becoming entangled in political debate.
6.9 The recent annual review recognised
that the ESP has been a significant source of funding for HIV and AIDS and has
made an important contribution to the national response and delivery of HIV and
AIDS services in the 16 ESP-supported districts. It recognises the ESP as an
efficient and flexible funding mechanism that is well coordinated. Progress
includes: a five-fold increase in numbers accessing treatment; significant
increases in take-up of ARVs; and comprehensive coverage of behaviour change
activities.
Impact of DFID funding on HIV
6.10 An impact assessment of the
ESP programme is being planned for 2010 at the end of a three-year implementing
period. Attribution to DFID spend is difficult but DFID was the main funder of
the programme and the main driver in getting the programme established. The
issue is complicated further because impact
indicators such as HIV prevalence declines and numbers of HIV infections
averted are difficult to attribute to specific programmes and activities. Two
important factors have contributed to the decline in prevalence.
6.11 Firstly, the Government of
Zimbabwe demonstrated effective leadership at a very early stage. For example, the government established the
AIDS levy which set aside 3% of tax revenue to fund the prevention and
treatment of HIV and they established an independent National AIDS Council with
clear responsibilities and duties.
6.12 Secondly, donors have delivered
sustained and consistent funding over the last 15 to 20 years to HIV prevention
programmes. This has enabled behaviour change programmes (such as through ESP
or PSI) to focus on consistent messaging around using condoms, reducing the
number of partners, and ensuring protection during pregnancy and breastfeeding.
The fact that DFID and others have made sustained investments in health, family
planning, and HIV prevention over a long period is very likely to have
contributed significantly to the decline in Zimbabwe's HIV rates.
6.13 DFID is working with our partners to reduce maternal and infant
mortality.
This programme aims to protect the lives of mothers and
newborns, especially those affected by HIV and AIDS and to maintain access to
family planning services (including contraceptives) and to life-saving
obstetric services and newborn care. DFID Zimbabwe is investing £25 million over
5 years (£4.85 million in 2009/10).
6.14 Despite challenges, the
programme has made progress in improving procurement of commodities, increasing
mother to child transmission (PMTCT) services, influencing national policy and
programming (e.g. around user fees).
6.15 DFID contributes £22 million to a
multi-donor Programme of Support for Orphans and Vulnerable Children (OVCs) in
line with Government priorities. The total pooled fund is worth $85 million. Our
funding is for the period 2006 - 2010 and is managed through UNICEF to
implement the National Action Plan for OVCs helps these
children, plus those who are vulnerable because of other factors (such as abuse
and neglect, economic hardship, displacement).
6.16 Examples of results to date
are below:
· By July 2009 a total of 353,409 children had been reached: 185,893
girls, and 167,516 boys.
· By the end of the second year of
the project, 205,000 children, who otherwise would have missed school, accessed
education.
· In 2009/10, we expect to see a
surge in OVCs accessing school, with over 700,000 children accessing schooling
through the roll out of the BEAM (Basic Education Assistance Module). Through
this system, school fees are paid directly to schools.
· 4243 children have been issued
with birth certificates so far. The purpose is to boost birth registration in
Zimbabwe, which has declined from 74% in 2005/6 to only 37% in 2008/9 but is essential for children to
gain access to basic services like schooling.
· With no inflation challenges, we expect
that BEAM will ensure that around 700,000 vulnerable children will be able to
access education in the 2009/10 school calendar year without having to pay
school fees.
Impact of DFID funding for OVCs
6.17 An exercise to assess the
impact of the programme on reducing the overall vulnerability of OVCs in
Zimbabwe is planned for March 2010. The impact assessment will focus on three
particular areas:
· the emerging impact of interventions on children as well as number of
children being reached by UNICEF and its partners;
· an analysis of the cost effectiveness of the different approaches to
reduce children's vulnerability;
· an analysis of the different approaches to reduce the vulnerability of
OVCs in Zimbabwe to identify the specific benefits of different approaches
together with their strengths and weaknesses.
This will highlight opportunities, challenges and lessons learned for
the design of a future programme.
7.
Support for and strategies for rural development and land reform
7.1 DFID
Zimbabwe's flagship community development programme is the large and successful
Protracted Relief Programme which is now in its second phase (PRP II) It aims
to reduce poverty and protect livelihoods by supporting poor and vulnerable
households. The PRP reaches 54 out of 60 rural districts and also
targets the most vulnerable in urban centres.
Managed through a coordinating unit which provides technical and
programmatic oversight, it is made up of 27 technical and implementing
partners. Together with their stakeholders they provide a dynamic and wide-ranging package
of livelihoods support, food security, water and sanitation support and social
protection, including support to the chronically ill.
7.2 This planting season, the
programme will reach 375,000 poor and vulnerable households with fertilisers,
maize seed, seeds for small grains, and legume seed. The package received is designed to be
appropriate to the specific locality and aims to enable a household to meet
most of its food needs for the following year.
The PRP coordinates closely with the FAO and other donor support to
ensure close to national coverage and limit geographical duplication of similar
schemes. The FAO estimates that a total
of 742,000 households will be reached with seed and fertiliser packages this
season between the PRP and other donor funded interventions. This has ensured
the poorest 50% of rural households will benefit. As a result, dependency on humanitarian
assistance should be further reduced over the next year, and it will enable
rural communities to start re-building their livelihoods.
7.3 Finally, PRP II makes a
significant investment in water, sanitation and hygiene (WASH)
interventions. A minimum of 500 new
water points are being installed each year, working with the community and
local district technicians to help ensure maintenance is also in place. Rural schools and clinics benefit from
sanitation provision, as do some particularly vulnerable households. The programme supports health clubs, which
have been shown to be effective at encouraging sound hygiene and health practices,
working where possible with village health workers and government environmental
health technicians to help ensure a more sustainable impact.
7.4 The UK has made clear to
the Government of Zimbabwe its concerns over continued farm invasions by
ZANU(PF) supporters since the formation of the Inclusive Government, which
contravenes the SADC ruling of November 2008 and the terms of the GPA. The seizure of many of the few remaining
commercially productive farms exacerbates Zimbabwe's capacity to return to
sustainable economic growth and provide critical employment opportunities. The Zimbabwe Government's refusal to protect
property rights will also deter regional and international investors just when
Zimbabwe most needs to rebuild its economy. Above all, violent invasions
demonstrate a lack of respect for the rule of law and we have urged the police
and judicial authorities in Zimbabwe to take action.
7.5 The UK has taken a
consistent position on land reform. We
have always emphasised that reviving the commercial agricultural economy will
be an important part of Zimbabwe's recovery although we recognise there are
many ways to do this. We have always expressed our willingness to work with
other donors to support a fair, pro-poor and transparent process of land
reform. We would be willing to consider
supporting this process as part of the wider recovery package assuming it would
be designed to provide broad based recovery. We have not agreed, though, that
the UK should accept responsibility for compensation.
7.6 Zimbabwe inherited a dual
agrarian structure from Rhodesia,
with two distinct agricultural systems: a commercial farming sector, which was
predominately owned by Zimbabwean white ethnic minority, and a traditional
(communal) agriculture farming sector. Funded in part by donors including UK ODA, the
Zimbabwean government made some attempt at land reform programmes mostly in the
mid 1980s transferring around 9% of total rural land to re-settled farmers
through a "willing buyer - willing seller" approach. The UK
alone provided £40 million in the 1980s, of which £3 million was returned to
the UK
by the Government of Zimbabwe.
Beneficiaries of these earlier schemes remain in place, referred to as
"old resettlement areas".
7.7 In February 2000, the
Fast Track Land Reform Programme (FTLRP) was launched ostensibly to address the
inequitable distribution of land once and for all. The FTLRP was initially designed to ensure a
maximum size of land ownership which did not discriminate on racial or
political grounds. In practice, implementation
of the programme was neither just nor sustainable, and the ensuing occupation
of thousands of commercial farms was at a high cost to the economy and the
people in general.
7.8 Since
the onset of the FTLRP over 200,000 farm workers have lost their jobs. Including families and dependents, over one
million people have been displaced from commercial farms and total commercial
agricultural production has more than halved.
7.9 Land
remains a highly emotive issue in Zimbabwe and this often obscures
objective analysis, policymaking and implementation. Land distribution at independence was unequal
and unsustainable. Following the FTLRP,
distribution remains unequal, although more for political than historic reasons.
Moving forward on land
7.10 Land and agriculture remain
the backbone of the Zimbabwean economy and are central to any recovery
strategy. Commercial agriculture prior
to Zimbabwe's
current political and economic crisis was the largest formal sector employer in
the country. The smallholder sector is
critical for ensuring food security and poverty reduction and has potential for
greater economic productivity.
7.11 In Zimbabwe, much of the prognosis for agriculture
is tied up with the broader political questions of when Zimbabwe will make the transition
to a democratic, technocratic Government that protects the rule of law. As long
as access to land remains a politicised issue, it is impossible to envisage a
viable policy to start returning production in the commercial farming sector
towards 2000 levels. The smallholder
sector that is interdependent with the commercial sector has been neglected by
government in the wake of erratic land reform policies, despite its potential
to contribute up to 70% of the country's cereal production.
7.12 The encouraging signs of
recent progress under the inclusive government, particularly on economic
reform, hold out the prospect for deeper DFID engagement on land issues. The GPA commits the Inclusive Government to
undertaking a comprehensive land audit.
Donors are broadly positive about this.
7.13 Assuming a regime which
genuinely wished to increase production levels and has the political will to
put appropriate policies in place, a recovery programme for commercial farming
could be set out containing the following elements, some of which have already
happened:
· a completed land
audit as part of a process leading to a constitutionally guaranteed, saleable
form of land tenure;
· the return of
the rule of law and the resuscitation of institutions providing appropriate
land administration services;
· market
liberalisation: the positive impact on the ground seen over 2009 has been very
substantial, though constraints remain (credit, marketing, etc); and
· government and,
where appropriate, donor support to help the sector recover - albeit avoiding
subsidies.
7.14 Options for deeper
engagement are being considered in a number of different forums. Key issues in current discussions include:
· how to handle the multi-farm ownership issue that is holding any process
back;
· how to handle expectations on compensation and restitution;
· and the importance of a land audit being part of a wider process, rather
than a stand-alone event.
7.15 DFID, with other donors, will
consider proposals from the Inclusive Government, with discussion on a
potential land audit being an immediate potential step. In the meantime, DFID continues to engage
with structures developed for support to agriculture. DFID is a key member of the Agriculture
sub-group chaired by the Netherlands,
which meets as part of the World Bank's Multi-Donor Trust Fund mechanism and is
supporting analysis and discussions on land as well as the wider agricultural
sector.
8. Zimbabwe's relations with its regional neighbours and their
impact on economic recovery and development
8.1 The Zimbabwe economy and
international relations are tied into the region in three main ways: firstly,
by the prominent political role played by Zimbabwe in regional institutions
such as the Southern African Development Community (SADC), and the Common
Market of Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA); secondly, through trade links
facilitated by these institutions; and thirdly, by significant outward migration
from Zimbabwe
to the region.
8.2 Since
independence in 1980, Zimbabwe
has played a prominent role in both SADC and COMESA. Until the end of Apartheid in 1994, Zimbabwe was the de facto regional centre in
Southern Africa and a very wide range of businesses, NGOs and media
organisations were headquartered in Harare. Most have moved to South
Africa thereby diminishing the role of Harare in the region considerably.
8.3 Over
the past ten years, Zimbabwe's
trade volumes have significantly declined.
South Africa
is now overwhelmingly the main trading partner - absorbing 31% of trade - followed by the EU
(12%), while other SADC countries represent a relatively small 8%. The EU is the only trading partner that
imports more from Zimbabwe
than it exports.
8.4 Over
the past ten years, Zimbabwe
has seen consistent and large emigration flows, especially to neighbouring South Africa and the United Kingdom. Estimates of diaspora
figures suggest at least three million Zimbabweans were living abroad at the
end of 2007 - roughly one person in each household. These figures increased as the economic
crisis and political violence reached its peak in 2008. South Africa has the biggest population of Zimbabwe emigrants (with an official estimate of
just over one million though the real number is likely to be significantly
higher), followed by the UK
(200,000-300,000) and Botswana
(100,000-300,000). Emigration is particularly concentrated among high-skilled
populations, with surveys indicating that 82% of emigrants hold a formal
qualification and 38% holding a first degree or higher.
8.5 The
large Zimbabwean diaspora is playing a crucial role in providing financial
flows into the country. Estimates
suggest remittance flows are between $500m and $1.3 billion a year (14% to 38%
of GDP, funding approximately one quarter to a half of Zimbabwe's imports). This places Zimbabwe amongst the highest
recipient of remittances in Sub-Saharan Africa as a percentage of national
income.
8.6 Close
economic and political links are shaping SADC and especially South Africa's involvement in Zimbabwe. South Africa is providing $35
million a year in aid directly to the budget.
Most importantly, South
Africa facilitated the mediation effort that
led to the signing of the GPA.
8.7 As the
guarantor of the GPA, SADC has shown little inclination to put pressure on
ZANU(PF) to implement the agreed actions. The decision by
MDC-T to disengage from the Inclusive Government in October 2009 prompted the
more direct involvement of President Zuma, leading to a SADC Summit in Maputo on 5 November. The MDC-T subsequently agreed to re-engage
with the Inclusive Government.
8.8 The 6 December
SADC deadline for progress on GPA implementation lapsed without agreement on
the way forward but the South African facilitation team remains engaged. South Africa considers instability in Zimbabwe a domestic South African problem, given
the large Zimbabwe
diaspora in RSA and the social implications of further migration. The continued proactive involvement of South Africa is the best hope of a
successful transition.
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