UNCORRECTED TRANSCRIPT OF ORAL EVIDENCE To be published as HC 168-ii

House of COMMONS

MINUTES OF EVIDENCE

TAKEN BEFORE

INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT COMMITTEE

 

 

DFID'S PROGRAMME IN NEPAL

 

 

Tuesday 12 January 2010

PROFESSOR ANTHONY COSTELLO, MS LINDA DOULL and MR SIMON BROWN

DR MARY HOBLEY and PROFESSOR MICK MOORE

Evidence heard in Public Questions 34 - 102

 

 

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Oral Evidence

Taken before the International Development Committee

on Tuesday 12 January 2010

Members present

Malcolm Bruce, in the Chair

John Battle

Hugh Bayley

Mr Nigel Evans

Mr Mark Hendrick

Mr Mark Lancaster

Mr Virendra Sharma

Andrew Stunell

________________

Memoranda submitted by Merlin and VSO

 

Examination of Witnesses

Witnesses: Professor Anthony Costello, Director of University College London Centre for International Health and Development, Ms Linda Doull, Director of Health and Policy, Merlin, and Mr Simon Brown, VSO, gave evidence.

Q34 Chairman: Good morning. Thank you very much for coming in to help complete our evidence on our report on Nepal. Can I thank all of you for coming and, for the record, could you introduce yourselves, please?

Professor Costello: I am Anthony Costello. I am Director at the UCL Institute for Global Health. I lived in Nepal in the 1980s and I have been working with Nepali groups for the last 25 years.

Ms Doull: I am Linda Doull. I am the Director of Health and Policy with the UK NGO Merlin and we have had a programme in Nepal since 2006.

Mr Brown: I am Simon Brown. I was a VSO volunteer in Nepal and recently the Assistant Country Director for VSO in Nepal.

Q35 Chairman: Thank you. As you know, the Committee visited Nepal at the end of last year and had a look at quite a lot of different aspects. The Committee split into two groups and went to different parts of western Nepal. That will inform some of our questions. If we start off looking at health where, in one sense, DFID are able to point to quite good indicators of improvements in health but, nevertheless, both the groups of the Committee visited hospitals and were made aware of the things that were problematic. I wonder if I could start on that. Which do you think are the groups that are least likely to be able to access healthcare and have the most problems? The thing we obviously appreciated is you do not have to travel very far in Nepal to realise people are living away from roads, there is very mountainous terrain, so access is difficult, plus the cost of travelling, and also in the hospitals we went to, whilst the people we saw were extremely good and committed, there were not enough of them to do what was expected. Which are the groups that we probably did not even see that are not getting the benefits or are suffering from the least access to healthcare provision at the moment?

Ms Doull: From Merlin's experience, I would just say that our programmes are based in Pyuthan and Rolpa districts, which are in the Mid-Western region, which are already very remote and mountainous, so de facto geographically there is a physical access barrier for many people who live there. Within that, there are the usual cultural exclusions that you experience throughout Nepal, particularly for the women, which obviously has an impact on reproductive health, and then on a caste basis. From our own information the Dalits still have a problem accessing healthcare. To that end, free health services have been introduced for reproductive health, which is a very positive move from our side, and DFID are very supportive of that.

Q36 Chairman: Is that only for reproductive health? I thought it was more general than that.

Ms Doull: For reproductive health services. This is positive from our side but it is too early yet, we need to indicate to what extent that has made a difference. Free services alone are not the only issues that people take into consideration about decision-making, about accessing healthcare, and for women a lot of those issues are still related to their power within households, their own ability to decision-make or not. The difference that free health services make for reproductive health needs to be tracked quite closely. Certainly we have insufficient evidence to say whether that is working or not. That said, more women are delivering at health facilities. Whether that is purely down to free care or is a wider cultural change that has occurred through awareness raising activities that we have been doing particularly with women's groups, trying to create greater demand for services, we have yet to see.

Q37 Chairman: You have talked about empowerment and I suppose what you are saying is that men are reluctant to allow their women to go to clinics or wherever they can get safe delivery. If so, is that for reasons of cost or power or control? How do you get through that? Clearly, from the men's point of view one would like to think that they would not like to see their wives suffering possibly a disability as a result of poor delivery, or children being sick. It affects the men as well as the women, so it is not rationally in the interests of men to deny it. What is the root of that problem?

Ms Doull: It is fair to say men have an impact on the decision-making, but we also know that in places like Nepal and elsewhere in South East Asia actually it is mothers-in-law particularly. When a woman marries into a new household it is the mother-in-law who has a very strong control over her decision-making power as well. We have evidence or experience where people recognise the need, whether those are men or women, for women to seek care but then it does come down to an issue of poverty and whether they can actually afford that, which is why we are very supportive of DFID's strategy of free health services. Even if there is free healthcare you then have to get from A to B, so the care may be free when you get to the clinic but you still have to travel and that remains a barrier for many people.

Professor Costello: I think it is a rational decision for many of them to stay at home because their nearest health facility would be a sub-health post that does not offer delivery. Health posts generally have very low quality or absent access to delivery care, so if they are going to go they have got to go usually to a primary healthcare centre or a district hospital which, for the great majority of people, is a long way away. The really interesting thing about Nepal is why it has seen such improvement in its health indicators as it has. It is on target to achieve both Millennium Development Goals 4 and 5 and yet access to health services remains really quite poor. We are getting up towards an overall figure of about 19% delivering in hospital but that is distorted a lot by the urban figures - in many of the rural populations less than 5% or 8% will actually go - yet we are seeing this decline in maternal as well as child mortality rates. Under-5 mortality rates are now down to about 60. The latest figures from this, I think as yet unpublished, report from Options is a maternal mortality figure of around 230 for the country with, of course, variation. Generally, the further west you go in Nepal the indicators are worse than the east, as you will have discovered from your trip. It does raise the issue of why that is the case. One factor that I have noticed was when I lived in a district called Baglung in the 1980s---

Q38 Chairman: We visited there.

Professor Costello: That is an interesting place because when I was there it was a two day walk to get there, but now there is a road and it has quadrupled in size. In those days, if you went out to the health posts very few of them had regular supplies of drugs and that was the only option for people. In the 1980s and 1990s the government trained up a great number of people called community medical auxiliaries - CMAs - and they were not taken into the government system and a very large number of those - there are thousands and thousands of them - set up their own pharmacies and diagnostic facilities. To a large extent that private sector care does deliver a lot of the care to households in the more remote, mountainous areas. It is not just about the government facilities providing, say, access to antibiotics. I think that is one of the reasons why maternal mortality rates have come down, that even the poorest people in remote areas can get access to some lifesaving drugs even if they cannot get access to skilled birth attendants or a hospital delivery. The other thing to say is the quality of care at health facilities often remains very poor. Although DFID has done a lot to improve maternity care at some of the major hospitals, very often they are treated badly so, therefore, there is a big incentive for them to stay at home.

Chairman: The problem we saw in Baglung was that the place we visited was supposed to have seven doctors and it had two. They were very good doctors and we had a very good presentation but clearly they had an awful lot of work.

Q39 Hugh Bayley: My question would be what should donors be doing to try and strengthen the health delivery systems locally?

Professor Costello: That is a big question. Personally, I think the biggest gap in Nepal, and this has got a political undertone, is the weakness of local government. After the democracy movement in the early 1990s when you had a return to democracy, in the mid and late 1990s local government really began to take off and my experience of working in districts then was finally you had some very committed people trying to make changes and it was quite successful. Effectively, for the last seven or eight years local government has been virtually dead in Nepal. The constitution has not really resuscitated elected government. You have got civil servants there and I think that is absolutely crucial because with accountable local politicians and better systems, that is going to be the most sustainable way to maintain the quality of local services.

Ms Doull: I would concur on some of that. From Merlin's perspective, while there are very good policies and strategies in place in terms of health system strengthening, and reproductive health in particular, to what extent those are applied effectively at local level is the challenge. What we see are gaps in relation to that in having a proper skilled workforce in place. In the districts where we worked previously, during the conflict a lot of health staff fled and, although there have been significant improvements, probably 85% of the staff are in the facilities where they should be on a relatively permanent basis, there is still that 15% gap to fill. Also, the incentives that have been introduced to retain staff in the remote areas do not necessarily filter through as they should do, there is a lack of transparency around that. There needs to be much more accountability and monitoring that these initiatives are actually happening and being used for the correct purpose. I would agree with what you were saying earlier about staff at community level, non-government staff, and the emphasis on building up the cadre of community workers and creating a connection between them and the formal health system to create that stronger compact between the communities which are using the services and those who are providing them, so again there is greater accountability and awareness of what services should be available to people. From our perspective of where DFID is, some of the other donors in Nepal are much more engaged at the regional and district level with health services whereas our perception is DFID is slightly more Kathmandu centrally based. There are perhaps ways that we can strengthen that regional engagement that may be quite useful to add some sort of pressure on local government and accountability mechanisms.

Q40 Hugh Bayley: Is it a wish list or a policy? If there were active, strong effective local government I quite understand that would provide the framework for promoting and holding accountable health services, but at the moment there is not, and if we were to say, "Well, donors, you would be strengthening local government", it could be a long time before you would have the delivery systems and you could be five health emergencies down the track. What could be done without resuscitating local government to create local accountability structures of the kind that you think are needed to improve delivery?

Ms Doull: There is a very robust civil society movement throughout Nepal, even in the most remote areas, but there is insufficient engagement with those groups. There are fora but, again, they are fairly centrally focused, so if there are ways in which those fora could be encouraged for those discussions to take place, because unless you create that dialogue you do not create demand for accountability, it could almost come from a bottom-up approach. That is where organisations like ourselves can facilitate civil society to take that step and work, because we work with the district health authorities, to encourage those agencies or groups to come together. I think it is important that there is donor engagement in that as well. It does not have to be particularly often but at least so there is some sort of tripartite dialogue going on. I think there is a potential mechanism there but it is not being as encouraged as it should be.

Mr Brown: Coming back on to local government, it is right that there has to be a very strong Ministry of Health and health programme and there has to be a very strong local government. We need to recognise that those things are beginning to happen as well, there is an active DFID and other organisations' sponsored programme to resuscitate local government and get it moving, and that will take time, but in the interim there still needs to be an improvement of health services. There is, and has been, a very strong national health sector programme. The first five year strategy is now ending and finishing this year, the next one is just being created. We need to recognise there are things that are very positive that can be built on. The Ministry of Health, particularly, are recognising that women are disadvantaged in access to healthcare and there are very specific parts of maternal healthcare that need to be addressed with more vigour - for example, there is a huge problem of prolapsed uterus in Nepal - and there are other groups that need specific support, such as mental health. We need to recognise that DFID sponsored programmes that are happening already are doing quite a decent job and need to be encouraged to do even more. There is good work going on there.

Q41 Mr Sharma: Very briefly, and you have touched on it, there are the village doctors as I would call them, those who go into the remote villages but are not qualified under the present system. How much recognition do they have or any working relationship between the official health state and those people who traditionally have given the service and maybe have closer links with the communities? What is the link there, if there is any?

Professor Costello: I would want to go and look at some of the evidence on this from latest surveys, which I do not have. Compared with, say, Bangladesh, where a lot of the village doctors are self-appointed and untrained, the difference in Nepal is a lot of these people running pharmacies did receive quite good training. A community medical auxiliary would have two years of training. They understand the basic conditions and are probably as good as a lot of the auxiliary workers in the health posts and have got access to drugs. I suspect the quality of care issues there are not too much of a problem, but there will be variation and in the remote areas you will probably find them the least qualified. There will be quacks. Unquestionably there will be quacks in many parts of the country.

Q42 Mr Sharma: What impact has the Safe Delivery Incentive Programme had on the numbers of women giving birth in health clinics and attended by skilled health workers? What we are looking at is what the main weaknesses in this area are. For example, has it reached the poorest women in the more remote areas? Are there sufficient numbers of trained health staff available to meet increased demand created by this scheme?

Professor Costello: The incentive scheme was introduced in 2005. It was after a report prepared by one of our researchers, Jo Borghi, for the DFID programme which had shown that there were quite substantial costs for any woman even having a normal delivery at home, but certainly if they went to hospitals. At that time, which was during King Gyanendra's time in charge, one of the royalist ministers said, "Right, we're going to roll an incentive scheme out across the whole country", when the proposal at the time was to evaluate this in a number of different districts to see how it would work, but they said, "No, across the country". I think DFID were slightly wrong-footed by this, but agreed to stump up the cash for a lot of this programme. We were asked if we would evaluate the maternity incentive scheme and we got Tim Powell-Jackson, who is a health economist from the London School, to get involved. Then DFID ran into financial problems because they had spent too much on the tsunami and the money was cut for that evaluation, but we were extremely keen that should go ahead and, fortunately, Tim managed to get an ESRC scholarship, so we carried on doing that evaluation with the DFID funded Safe Motherhood Programme and also looking at one of the sites where we have been doing continuous surveillance of maternity outcomes in a large population for about 10 years. What was interesting about that was the figures that Tim came up with were that the economic cost for a normal delivery to any household, out of pocket payments, was $63 and if you had a caesarean section it went up to $350. That would account for almost 20% of your entire household income for a year. The incentive scheme in the Middle Hills was 1,000 rupees, which is about $15, in the Terai it was $500 and in the high Himalayas it went up to 1,500 rupees, but there was no targeting of the poor. When this programme was rolled out they did an evaluation of what happened. There was not very high awareness of the scheme and when they reviewed this a couple of years ago only about 30% of women knew about it and only about 30% of women who went to facilities where the scheme was supposed to be implemented actually received the incentive. We looked from our household data in Makwanpur at what happened to delivery rates before the introduction of the incentive and then immediately afterwards to see if there was a time series effect. The effect was about a 6% increase in institutional deliveries, but when we broke it down by socioeconomic quintile, richest 20%, poorest 20% and the rest, we found that almost all of the incentive was taken up by the wealthier quintile groups. That was not surprising because most of those who lived close to hospitals were in towns and better off so they went to receive the incentive. The conclusion overall was it is having some impact but there is not sufficient targeting and it remains open to question how you should continue. Obviously things have changed a little bit in the last year because now services are offered free and, therefore, that changes a little bit of the economic equation but, unlike the Latin American example of conditional cash transfers where there was a lot of targeting towards poorer groups, that has not happened so far in Nepal.

Ms Doull: We do not have as detailed information as that to provide because we have not done a study. As I said before, while there has been an increase in the number of women delivering at health facilities, it is only about 16% overall in the areas in which we worked, which is still quite low, which indicates there are other factors beyond the incentive as to whether people choose to go to the facility. Of course, the challenge then is to provide the quality of care once women have reached that centre, hence a lot of the focus of the work we have been doing is trying to ensure that there are 24-hour services available. Similarly, with the health worker incentives we know there are issues that when people get to the clinic the incentive is not necessarily disbursed.

Professor Costello: There was some evidence also that providers were charging more to women who were receiving the incentive. So you would go in, you would receive the incentive but then the cost would go up. That may have changed now. I do not know enough about the actual implementation of this free at the point of delivery scheme that the Maoist government introduced a year go and do not know how far that has been rolled out. It highlights the importance of whenever you do these policy interventions, and DFID has spent a lot of money doing this, it is really important to evaluate them. Something similar is also happening with DFID support in India in Orissa and informally I was told in India last month that has had a much better effect on institutional deliveries. I asked for the figures but they did not give them to me. Anecdotally I have heard that it has been much more successful. It would be interesting to compare and contrast those two policy initiatives.

Mr Sharma: The Safe Delivery Incentive Programme is only one element in the Support for Safe Motherhood Programme in Nepal which DFID has supported and which we praised in our 2008 report on maternal health. What other elements of the SSMP have made it such an effective intervention? What other strategies should donors pursue to support Nepal towards achieving the MDG of reducing maternal mortality? Long question, long answer!

Q43 Chairman: When we were doing the maternal health report, DFID was highlighting how much they had achieved in Nepal and it was one of the things we were particularly interested to follow up when we visited.

Professor Costello: I think they have done a great job in strengthening central ministry capacity. Their scheme meant that very good quality people kept a presence in the Ministry of Health, whereas if they had not been there I think they would have left. Some of them were being paid at different levels from civil servants but, nonetheless, it kept an integral Safe Motherhood group together over an extended period of ten years when otherwise I think things would have fallen apart. There has been a high emphasis on maternal healthcare in Nepal. Also, through this scheme they have done a lot to improve quality of care at district hospitals. Curiously, I would contest the idea that all of this necessarily has been the main reason why maternal mortality rates have come down; I think that might be explained by other factors. Nonetheless, generally I would give good marks to DFID for having sustained this investment and, indeed, having gone with this conditional cash transfer scheme. Although I have been a little bit critical in evaluating it, I think it was a very courageous decision to do this, it is a very important policy initiative for developing countries and we can learn the lessons from it to make it more effective.

Ms Doull: In addition to that, the one thing I would add within the strategy is the emphasis on having skilled birth attendants at different cadres. We all know that human resources in a health gap is a major issue, not just in Nepal but in many other countries, and without that sustained focus I think there would have been less advances made. As I said earlier, one of the issues was where those skilled birth attendants are located and deployed and there has to be consistent monitoring of ensuring that skilled birth attendants are put as far out into remote areas as possible, and if you are going to deploy them to remote areas how do you ensure that they stay there. That will demand incentives of some kind, not always financial, perhaps housing or whatever. Without that I think you will see quite a high attrition rate. We are relatively pleased about the degree of retention in the areas where we are working, but it is still quite a fragile base and it would not take much for people to be attracted back to the main urban areas.

Q44 Mr Evans: Can you tell us something about the HIV/AIDS problem in Nepal?

Professor Costello: There are about 75,000 people estimated to have HIV in Nepal. Personally, I have not worked a great deal in this area. I know a little bit about some of the people working in this area and there has been quite a strong HIV/AIDS group within the Ministry and a lot of civil society groups particularly looking at the high risk groups, the trucking routes, the commercial sex workers, some men who have sex with men and, I think, the growing problem of intravenous drug use. It is still a relatively small problem and I would not like to say any more about the efficiency and effectiveness of the interventions that have happened to try and ameliorate the problem.

Mr Brown: VSO do have a programme in HIV/AIDS in Nepal. You are right, it is a concentrated epidemic with about 0.49% of the population living with HIV/AIDS. It has been estimated by organisations like UNAIDS that it is around about 70,000 people. Official registration is now between 14,000 and 15,000. Historically, the most at risk parts of the population have been female sex workers, men having sex with men, injection drug users and migrant labour. Recent surveys suggest, and it is still very much a suggestion although there has been a Family Health International survey run through the Ministry recently, that the prevalence amongst female sex workers, men having sex with men, and injection drug users is actually falling, which is very good news, and hopefully it will be reinforced by other surveys. It is very good news that the programmes that have been there, mainly run through civil society, have been the most effective advocacy and awareness programmes and provision of testing and counselling and do seem to be having a good impact. However, the most at risk population then shifts quite alarmingly towards migrant labour and particularly the wives of migrant labourers having sex with their husbands who have returned from places like India where they have had unprotected sex. Overall, it is very good news in the effectiveness of civil society's awareness and advocacy, but concerning news that prevalence amongst migrant labourers, and the wives of migrant labourers, seems to be increasing.

Professor Costello: One of the issues that I have always wondered about, and I do not know any figures and do not know how reliable they would be anyway, is the scale of the problem of trafficking of women from the traditionally trafficked groups with the Tamang women from around the Kathmandu Valley, many of them being told they were going to go to carpet jobs or service jobs in India and then being taken to the red-light districts of Calcutta or Mumbai. I have seen all kinds of figures bandied around. Some people talk about 200,000 and others talk about much smaller numbers. It certainly goes on and it is difficult to know how many of those women come back and how many of them are infected.

Q45 Mr Evans: It is a hugely religious society, is it not? Do you believe there is a big stigma attached to HIV/AIDS in Nepal?

Professor Costello: Definitely.

Q46 Mr Evans: How do you tackle that stigma? Do you think the government can help or do you think it just ignores what is going on?

Mr Brown: Gosh, that is a huge question. Yes, there is a huge amount of stigma and discrimination. There are a lot of programmes that are funded to try and encourage people who feel they have been exposed to HIV to test, to go to clinics. Within the family, within the religion, there is a massive amount of stigma and discrimination of people who have disclosed their positive HIV status. How do you tackle it? I guess you continue to try and break those things down. There are programmes that are trying to make people more aware of HIV/AIDS, that it exists, and of the risks of contracting HIV/AIDS, and you continue to try to support those programmes that try to make people more aware, particularly amongst youth. Both the Ministry and a lot of other agencies are recognising that particularly youth sexual and reproductive healthcare is an area that needs a lot of attention and part of that is making youth more aware of the risks, making them more willing to talk about the risks, and avoiding, hopefully, what could be very disastrous.

Professor Costello: I think things are changing. People are talking more openly now. Certainly in Kathmandu young people talk more openly about sexual behaviour. The world is changing and you are moving towards nuclear families now. The other big factor, of course, is the availability of anti-retrovirals. In Africa that has transformed the situation because you have now got opportunities for treatment whereas that was not the case maybe half a dozen years ago. Things are changing a bit, but the worry is that the donors are losing interest in HIV and whether that will affect the funding of programmes for HIV will be interesting to see.

Q47 Mr Evans: Is the government proactive on this? What do they do about educating people to the dangers?

Mr Brown: It is mainly a civil society activity at the moment. It is in the national health sector plan for the next few years, and it does have some very important indicators on the awareness of youth of HIV/AIDS and sexually transmitted infections, but so far it has been very much a civil society activity.

Q48 Mr Evans: Can you say something about the health provision that is made available for those who are tested if they test positive? Can anybody get access to anti-retrovirals?

Ms Doull: In the districts where we work there is very limited provision, if at all. Basically it is awareness raising activities, prevention, but there is no access, there is no voluntary counselling and testing - VCT - in many of the facilities and there is certainly no access to anti-retrovirals.

Q49 Mr Evans: There is no access?

Ms Doull: In the areas where we work there is not. My understanding is that around the Kathmandu area there is.

Q50 Mr Evans: If you can get tested, it is a death sentence?

Ms Doull: You cannot get VCT or you would have to travel and that has a cost.

Professor Costello: The rates of positivity are very low in those areas. A lot of the HIV is focused in the Kathmandu area and the trafficking routes, the bigger towns, and certainly there you can get access to anti-retrovirals. There is quite a good scheme run by the Teku Infectious Disease Hospital in Kathmandu and all the major hospitals in the Valley would be able to provide that as well.

Q51 Mr Evans: You mentioned something about the donors. Could you say something about the funding? Do you think there is sufficient funding for the needs of Nepal on HIV/AIDS?

Professor Costello: I was talking more about a worldwide thing. I was talking to Mark Dybul, who was the Director of PEPFAR, who was saying that interest in HIV/AIDS in the Senate and in America had plummeted in the last couple of years. I do not know how that will relate to Nepal.

Q52 Mr Evans: You are not aware of DFID's involvement in this particular sector?

Professor Costello: No.

Mr Brown: DFID has been leading the work across the sector in HIV/AIDS. It will be replaced by the World Bank, which was supposed to happen this year but is probably going to happen a year late so DFID will continue to lead. Is it enough? It is very difficult to say. It is an epidemic, it is 0.49% of the population, but probably more people die from other waterborne diseases at the moment so it is very difficult to say it is enough. Clearly the Ministry have recognised that their ability to provide services is not good enough and it wants to do more. The money that has been spent on advocacy and awareness has been well used. Clearly with some most at risk groups showing a decline in prevalence it is working. Civil society groups are being included in policy by government. The government has recognised that their service delivery is inadequate, so to improve it they recognise they will have to spend more money on it and where that money comes from, whether it is donors or other sources within the country, is something they will have to work on. On the awareness, and right awareness, it is going very well; on service delivery clearly not enough is being spent.

Q53 Mr Evans: Do you have a view about the World Bank taking over lead responsibility for this?

Mr Brown: In what way?

Q54 Mr Evans: Do you think it will be a good thing?

Mr Brown: I do not necessarily think it should be a bad thing. Within the bilateral and multilateral donors they have come to the conclusion that the World Bank is probably best placed to do it.

Q55 Mr Evans: If you get it and prove positive, do you lose your job? How bad is the stigma there?

Professor Costello: I would not have thought so, but you may be able to find anecdotes of that happening. These days if you are positive and on treatment most people are not going to know, you are going to look pretty well unless you get lipodystrophy or something.

Mr Brown: If people do find out you will probably lose your job.

Professor Costello: Really?

Mr Brown: Yes.

Q56 Mr Evans: Can testing be done confidentially so that people will not know that you are being tested for it?

Mr Brown: There are discreet testing facilities, but how discreet they are I do not know. They are places you go into that do HIV/AIDS testing so if you are seen going in there is probably going to be some suspicion that you are going in to be tested, which naturally starts rumour. There are places where you can be tested and they are readily available for people just to walk in when they feel comfortable.

Q57 Mr Hendrick: DFID's evidence tells us that Nepal is on track to meet its Millennium Development Goals for universal access to primary education and gender equality in education. We are told that the enrolment of Dalit children is up to nearly a million and we are getting gender parity now. Certainly on our visit to one of the schools we looked at there seemed to be a lot more girls than boys and I was told that a lot of the boys work out in the fields with their fathers. Leaving that aside, can you tell us how you feel that social exclusion and inequality are affecting access to education? Do you feel that multi-donor support for the government's education programme is addressing these issues effectively? What about the quality of education? Do you feel that the children are getting a decent quality of education?

Mr Brown: I am surprised DFID say that Nepal is on target because the target is 100% and I cannot see that they will get to 100% by 2015. The Education for All Programme has clearly done some really good things in increasing enrolment. The not so recent Millennium Development Goal assessment by the government with UNDP suggested that they would not hit it, but that is quite old, that is a 2005 review. I would not say to get to 100% is impossible, but it is really challenging. To get to 100% of children enrolled in primary school and 100% of literacy in youth with complete gender parity is going to be really difficult. The current School Sector Reform Programme recognises that and that it has done some good work in Education for All, but recognises that it is not going to get close to the Millennium Development Goals without another programme, another initiative. Even that does not target the 100%, it only gets to 98% of enrolment in class one. The government's programme is less than the Millennium Development Goal. It is very close - 98% of 100% - but it is not the Millennium Development Goal, which is why I say it is surprising.

Q58 Mr Hendrick: Can you just back that up a little. DFID is saying through its Community Support Programme that it has contributed to the construction of 2,500 schools and also that 8% of children remain out of school in the primary age group, which is down from 16% in 2004, which is effectively half. There seems to have been some great progress.

Mr Brown: That is what I am saying, there has been fantastic progress through the Education for All Programme. It is very important to have the schools but it is a lot more than building the schools, it is about getting the community involved and making them aware of the specific availability of subsidies and grants to help children get into school, but it is not going to be 100% enrolment by the government's own target. They are targeting 98%, which is still quite close, to be fair. The government through its own analysis recognises that it is still quite a long way short of that. To get from that, if you take the 92%, from 92% to 98% is going to be a stretch. Even that 98% figure comes through the Education Management Information System which, again, is a government statistic, a government database of enrolment and retention. The UNDP have questioned the accuracy of that data, that there may be some double counting.

Q59 Mr Hendrick: Do they know how many Dalit children there are enrolled, for example?

Mr Brown: Yes. In EMIS the number of Dalit children is quite considerable and in certain districts exceeds the population projection from the 2001 Census, so you have got more Dalits in school than the population projection was saying would be eligible to go to school. Again, we should be congratulating Nepal and the education system, the government, DFID and all the others for getting this data going but there is a lot of cleaning to be done in the data still, it is not necessarily 100% accurate, and UNDP through the Millennium Development Goal report certainly questioned that maybe it is not quite as high as we think. Yes, Dalits and girls still have less access than others and it is not uniform across the country. If we look at the top 25% of districts in terms of primary school enrolment there is very good gender parity, almost 100% gender parity, but if we look at the worst then it goes down to between 0.6% and 0.7% in terms of gender parity. It is not geographically equally dispersed and neither is it equally dispersed across caste groups.

Professor Costello: My impression, and this is just having been there and visited, is that there is huge demand for education, and I am sure the supply has met some of that demand, but there is a huge issue around the quality of what goes on in schools - class sizes, availability of teaching materials, motivation, supervision of teachers - and I think that is a massive issue, but I do not have the statistics to hand about it or to what extent there have been quality evaluations.

Q60 Mr Hendrick: On the quality issue, like a lot of other countries it is slate and chalk for writing with, which takes you back to my parents' generation in this country.

Professor Costello: Yes.

Q61 Mr Hendrick: In the English class we saw the teacher had trouble conversing with us, never mind teaching the kids English. I think there is a serious issue around quality.

Mr Brown: Again, the School Sector Reform Programme, so the Ministry of Education, is recognising that. It is a programme that is funded through DFID and others and is one that is very positive. They recognise that it is about getting children into school and not only into class one, into primary school, but also into pre-primary school, that is a very important foundation, and we need to get into the quality of teaching, that it is learning by rote. ECD facilitators, until recently, only had 15 days' training. 15 days from nothing to then being eligible to teach or facilitate 20-25 pre-primary children day in and day out. They are recognising there is a lot of work to be done on training, on qualification, on in-service training, on infrastructure, both in terms of building new schools and new classrooms but also within the classrooms in making them more child-friendly. All of these things are in the School Sector Reform Programme. That is a very stretching, hugely ambitious programme, but at least there is the recognition that it is more than just getting the kids through the door, it is getting the quality of the institution, the teaching staff, the support staff and the school governors increased to provide a quality education.

Q62 Mr Lancaster: Some of the evidence we have received has suggested that DFID should be doing more to support capacity building in civil society and, indeed, I think VSO's evidence said just that. A simple question: what should DFID be doing and in what areas? What specific programmes should we be doing more to support?

Mr Brown: I think it is more about finding a balance. In the submission, some of our civil society partners - in fact a lot of our partners - felt that organisations like DFID had moved away quite significantly from supporting civil society to almost uniquely supporting the government. It is about finding the balance, to go from there to there - it is something quite aggressive. It is finding somewhere in the middle. All countries need very strong governments, very capable governments, to provide services, essential services. Equally, all countries, particularly developing countries, need a very sovereign and strong civil society movement to advocate for people's rights, to hold the government to account and, where appropriate, to support the government in the provision of some of the services, whether they be HIV services or education services or whatever. I think it is more finding the balance, and I think, particularly in the case of Nepal, there is still money that is available that DFID contribute to but it is not directly providing it; it is going into a basket of funds that are coming from lots of different organisations. It is making civil society aware that those funds exist and how to access them that is probably the biggest thing that DFID could do right now.

Professor Costello: Our research has been on looking at the impact of working with women's groups in quite poor and remote populations, and some of this has been DFID funded. We published a paper a few years ago showing that if you just mobilise women's groups to help themselves on issues around reproductive health and particularly new born care, we showed a 30% reduction in new born mortality rates, just through that process over a two-year period, and that most of those women's groups have actually sustained themselves after we withdrew funding. We have just repeated this in Jharkhand and Orissa in India with even bigger impact - a 45% reduction in neo-natal mortality. This is using a cluster of randomised control trials. One of the interesting things there was how do you scale that up? It is not something necessarily that really fits into a ministry of health that is struggling to deal with supplies of drugs, vaccines, and the like. Ideally, it would go through local government but local government is a problem in Nepal until you get the constitutional settlement. Do you work through major civil society organisations? Yes, a bit, but ultimately you need some kind of public/private solution whereby the local government does take it on, because there is a local development office and, also, women's development offices, but you also need the help of civil society organisations. I think DFID could look at that because the benefits are not just directly on health; they improve women's access to money, to credit and probably they improve forestry. We showed in India, actually, that post-natal depression rates were halved as a result of this initiative because women felt the solidarity, and it brought a lot of these family issues out into the open - the mothers-in-law attended the groups and a lot of the power issues seemed to be improved. So I think this is an area about mobilising women which has multi-dimensional effects and could be invested in on a large scale through both government and civil society.

Q63 John Battle: I would be interested to look at the kind of wider question. You refer to the balance of civil society and the institutions of the state, really. It does not only apply, of course, in Nepal. I wonder, as someone who does believe that you have got to have really strong advocacy groups championing it and trying to get to the parts the state never reaches - to lift up the poor and, as we said in the first questions, building up from the base - whether we need to question civil society groups, organisations and NGOs as well, and ask whether they have got it right, whether they really are reaching the parts that other groups are not and whether, in fact, by providing services as well as championing they do not act as a displacement of local government, for example, or even undermine the possibilities of local government. One of our witnesses has suggested that in Nepal, in particular, some of the groups could be highly exclusionary of both the extreme poor and the socially marginalised. I would be disappointed if that was the case, because I look to NGOs, civil society groups and the community to be the very groups that must be with the people building it up from the base. Is there a tension there? How do you respond to that challenge of not really reaching the parts that it should and that they are undermining local government?

Professor Costello: One thing, forming an NGO has been a route to corruption. When the Maoist government came in they clamped down a lot on NGOs and certainly a number of my friends said a lot of people were on the make here; they would set up an NGO as a way of getting money and then cream it off. What the extent of that problem was is difficult to quantify, but certainly it is the case that people were using the format of NGOs, and so when they had to be reregistered I think a lot of them were put out of business. You could say, also, with the international NGOs, that if they are going in and trying to set up their own management systems it undoes some of the other, local systems, and, also, you may have differential salaries. So the huge UN problem is always there; that you are taking out the really creative, talented people from the national systems and sticking them into international organisations and producing lots of reports. So I think these are important issues.

Ms Doull: I cannot really say for Nepal, per se, but I think there are examples from other fragile states - Afghanistan being quite an interesting one - where the role of civil society and local NGOs has very much been promoted, certainly within the health sector in terms of delivering and partnering. One of the stipulations of an international NGO in that country delivering services is that you do partner with national NGOs and build capacity over a period of time with de facto then handing over whatever service delivery or advocacy role within an agreed time frame. That is agreed from the top down as part of a kind of overall national strategy. We certainly had experience of that in terms of delivering basic health services in Northern Afghanistan where, over a period of three years, we have now completely handed over to a national NGO, who is now delivering and is perfectly capable of doing that. That required that all parties understood what the joint objective or shared objective was, and that there were also sufficient resources not just financial but, also, in terms of technical assistance to capacity build as part of that programme. So I think there is work to be done because inevitably small groups will go off on self interests, and you see that everywhere. If there is a greater shared understanding of what is being tried to be achieved ---

Q64 John Battle: I do not even think we have got it right in Britain, because I am worried about the trickle down theory. Sometimes, as NGOs, you get involved in the mezzanine floor and really to reach the poorest of the poor in difficult circumstances is just too hard; the spark, the ideas and imagination come and you have to train people to even get to there. Would you, in your NGO, for example, make it a policy priority to regularly be checking and asking yourselves: "Are we really reaching the poorest of the poor", and then, perhaps, encouraging local NGOs to ask the same question, so they have a responsibility to really try and reach those that government systems do not reach, local authority systems do not reach and even NGOs do not reach? Would you think that was one of your policy priorities as an NGO?

Mr Brown: Absolutely, yes. We are doing that right now in terms where we have been questioning ourselves: are we reaching the people who are the most poor, the most in poverty and the most unequal in society, and really questioning ourselves. Do we encourage our partners to do the same? Absolutely, through their own strategic planning processes, to really understand who are the people who are wanting this help. As Linda said, and I think it is a very important point, it has all to be joined up; there has to be some plan there.

Q65 John Battle: Just to push the logic a bit further, would you push that question at DFID, with whom you have a partnering relationship, to make sure that they are aware of and asking that same question?

Mr Brown: Are they working for the most poor?

Q66 John Battle: Are they working with NGOs that are working for the most poor? DFID can get caught into the idea: "We have gone with some NGO" and then they find out later that that NGO is corrupt - to use the worst example - or are they find they are working with an NGO that is in the mezzanine floor and not really reaching the parts we need to. Maybe DFID needs to be focused as well as you are so focused.

Professor Costello: I was just going to state the importance of measurement here. For anything you do now, measuring the impact across poverty quintiles is very, very important. So the example of the incentive scheme, like so many things that you try and supply from the top, is that the better-off groups tend to benefit over the poorest - the inverse care law. The thing we found with women's groups, because you are setting them up across all communities, in India is that actually the mortality effect was bigger in the poorest groups than in the wealthiest groups. So it was not just a pro-poor, it was an excessively pro-poor, intervention. I think you need to do the measurement on of all of these things and really test them out.

Q67 John Battle: Following on then (and I am grateful for that emphasis on measuring because we can move away from that), is DFID doing enough to support measuring and investing in it?

Professor Costello: I would say one thing, and I have said it previously in Bangladesh: try and get DFID (and DFID are aware of this problem but somehow organisationally it happens) to link up the research groups that they fund with the country programmes. We do do it informally; we have had some very good links with the DFID programmes in Nepal (rather less so in Bangladesh) but I think if that could be structurally done you would get much better bang for your buck. We in the research community would love to do that, because looking at stuff at scale is what you want; you do not want to do just all these pilot projects.

Ms Doull: Can I just add to that? Again, you are not going to know whether you are reaching the poor unless you have got some robust monitoring and evaluation and that requires resources to do that, both financial, technical and human. I think an example that we are experiencing now from Congo not Nepal is where DFID has made gestures to support that research but seems quite undecided whether that is something they should or want to do or not. We have gone through a very difficult negotiation with them; this is actually to be measuring the impact of the abolition of user fees and it is not helpful when the goalposts keep changing throughout the programme and process. I think, again, it is understanding right at the beginning what is it you are trying to achieve and that all partners are engaged in that process, that resources are applied and that you stick with that for clear outcomes. I think to change policy halfway through programming does not help monitoring and evaluation.

Mr Brown: Also, patience; patience and simplicity. Do not overburden with too many measures or a collection of indicators; get it simple and be patient.

Chairman: Thank you for that. The Committee's question always is: "What works?" and that is actually what interests us. What we are finding out about Nepal is that, on the face of it, nothing should work but, in reality, quite a lot does. Obviously, it is a complicated situation post-conflict but I think your contribution has been very helpful. We have one more evidence session with the Minister after the second half of this one, which will enable us to do a report. It is particularly interesting - I think it is unique - there is no country like it, I guess. Your evidence has been extremely helpful. Thank you.


Memorandum submitted by Dr Mary Hobley & Associates

Examination of Witnesses

Witnesses: Dr Mary Hobley and Professor Mick Moore, Research Fellow, Governance Team, Institute of Development Studies, gave evidence.

Q68 Chairman: Thank you very much for waiting. Just for the record, could you just introduce yourselves, please?

Dr Hobley: Yes. Hello, I am Mary Hobley. I have worked on and off in Nepal for 20-plus year with frequent visits. I used to live in two districts and worked in a couple villages there near Kathmandu. So I have had a long association in Nepal and, also, in the South Asian region as well. I am currently working as an independent consultant.

Professor Moore: I am Mick Moore; I am a researcher/political scientist from the Institute of Development Studies. I do quite a lot of work for DFID around issues of governance, broadly speaking. I do not know Nepal anything like as well as Mary does but I have been there several times for DFID in the last few years in relation to political and governance issues.

Q69 Chairman: Thank you for that. I guess as a case study Nepal must be an interesting political study. One of the things, of course, that DFID has stated in its recent White Paper is that it is focusing more attention on fragile states, and by any definition Nepal has to be classified as a fragile state; very much, hopefully, in a post-conflict situation but one that is still full of tension. We were discussing in the previous evidence sessions the extent to which things have actually happened in terms of poverty reduction in Nepal, but the interesting question is to what extent do you think Nepal is a country where DFID can make a difference? What are the particular features, circumstances or characteristics of Nepal that possibly offer that compared with other post-conflict countries? That seems to be what is coming back.

Dr Hobley: I think there are several characteristics about Nepal. Yes, it is fragile and it is post-conflict now but it has previously had a very long period of settled political process - very difficult in many ways - but a period where a lot of investment went into building a capable public service and a capable government structure. So in some ways it is a country that still has that; it is not a country where it has failed in every form of its governance; it has not and it has got those elements of governance that people understand and wish to continue to try and rebuild. So you are building on a strong base rather than a weak base. You often hear people say: "Capability is not very great" but I think, as we have already heard this morning, actually out there in the villages there is a lot of capability and there is a lot of willingness now for educated people with good technical skills to go back out into the districts and to deliver services. So, in a sense, although, yes, fragile there are some huge building blocks there that I think distinguish it from other countries which have not had that sort of history of engagement and support. For the UK there is a very particular reason to remain engaged and positive there because of our own long history working in Nepal, but for me it is that which distinguishes it from other fragile states - that it has this strong basis of civil society, it has strong local organisations and it has a strong base of educated and able people.

Professor Moore: I think, Mr Chairman, the central paradox is the one you mentioned earlier, that on paper nothing much should work in Nepal but, in fact, an awful lot does work. As you say, it is such a fascinating country to study. I would add, I think, to what Mary said that we have a very small formal government in Nepal, a very small number of people and an even smaller number of professionals in government, but still things get done. I think it is partly because of past training but partly because there is this inheritance of what you might broadly call the feudal monarchy, which was really quite recent, and Nepal has this very long tradition of just managing at sub-national level; things get done. It is very hard to say exactly how it happens, and I am sure it varies from place to place, but there is an enormous resilience there that you might not find in many other of those countries we call fragile states. I suppose if I can make a comment on fragile states in general, I think it is a little bit (excuse the cliché) Tolstoy: every happy family is alike but every unhappy family is unhappy in its own way. I really think fragile states are quite different one from another. Nepal, partly because it was not a British colony and it did not have a modern civil service, is quite distinctive; it does have this resilience about it. There are parts of the government that actually do work surprisingly well. Fiscal management has actually been very good in Nepal in the last few years despite civil war and conflict, which I think is quite striking. So there is a lot we can build on. I would just add one thing about the role of DFID, which I think is an issue with the international context of all this is. From my perspective, the biggest single problem that Nepal faces at present is the difficulty of constructing an effective, authoritative government when it is in that context where you have the India/China problem. To be frank, I think India has been playing a slightly negative role in recent months, in particular, particularly because the government of India has a very close relationship with the Nepali Army. That army is more or less autonomous, and all the time you have an army that is autonomous and is not under the control of a civilian government it is very hard to get effective governance more broadly. I think DFID plays a very important role because it is not India, it is not China, it has these very long links and traditions and it is very widely trusted; I sensed very little hostility or suspicion towards Britain. It is not just DFID; it is the British Embassy as well - let us say it is the British presence, not DFID. I think that is actually quite important. There is every reason to think that Nepal will do rather well. I happen to think that the biggest single factor about the future of Nepal - one is governance and the second is the Indian economy. The Nepali economy is a bit of a fiction because it is so integrated with the Indian economy on all sides - people are crossing the border all the time - and the Indian economy is doing very well, again, and I suspect Nepal will do very well on the back of that.

Q70 Mr Lancaster: It is fascinating. I have got a long history with the place, for reasons I will not bore with you, but it is very hard, is it not, to actually put your finger on how it works, particularly at a local level. This, really, I suppose, begs the question whether or not you feel that DFID has the expertise to be able to deal with that very complex situation, not least because, as we have talked about, local government does not really exist. I was impressed at the number of local staff that DFID were employing, which I think is very encouraging, but do we have the expertise to be able to deal with this very complex society in-country? If not, what do you think we should be doing?

Dr Hobley: My feeling is that because Nepal is highly complicated and the understanding of the local is so important in terms of understanding how the whole will work that I do not think DFID has sufficient local political intelligence to help it inform the national level policy decisions that are being made. I say that because of the complexity of the country, because understanding how the political process is happening in the villages and towns across Nepal is incredibly important to understanding how conflict arises at the high levels. I think DFID has done very well in terms of engaging local staff but there is something very different about having people from outside as well as local staff. People from outside are able to ask questions that for local people are often quite hard to ask; they are also able to move up and down the system in a way that is different from Nepalis, but of course, also linking into Nepalis to understand their own networks and relationships and how informal decisions are made and how those informal decisions affect major policy decisions and operations. So, for me, reflecting back on the evidence we were hearing earlier, I would be looking for more DFID engagement at the local level, which I think would require staff to have good local language skills and would also, I think, require them to remain in-country longer than is currently the case. This whole process of how you hand on political and institutional knowledge within DFID, I think, is a crucial issue and a very important one, particularly in these types of contexts where complexity is key to understanding how the future of that country is going to run through. I would definitely be looking for staff with both much deeper local knowledge and local historical political knowledge than they have necessarily, and a longer commitment to the country and much stronger local political networks as well as ones within Kathmandu.

Professor Moore: My sense is that relative to other countries where DFID works they are rather good in Nepal at employing local staff and knowing what is going on in the countries (it is relative) but it is very challenging. I absolutely agree with Mary on this; this is not pre-agreed. I do think, particularly when we are talking of working in fragile states, there is a structural problem in the DFID's employment practices. People really do not spend that long in-country. I do not know what the actual average tenure is of people in jobs, as opposed to the formal tenure, but it not long enough; people do not have enough expertise, they do not learn local languages and I think that in terms of working in fragile states this is probably the biggest single thing that DFID should do. Let me say here (I hope DFID people will forgive me), I know there is an enormous resistance in DFID to doing anything about this issue because it is quite inconvenient for a whole lot of people and there are families and everything else, but if we are going to be serious about ----

Q71 Chairman: Could you put it the other way round, just to probe you on that (I take your point entirely): is it difficult to get people who are prepared to make that kind of commitment, or is your argument that if they went out and changed that practices they could get people who would make that commitment?

Professor Moore: Under the current remuneration system it is difficult to get people to do it and people will commit for three years, but sometimes people will leave in less than three years because they get another posting. However, there are no rewards to spending longer in-country and learning the local language. I believe, although this is only on the basis of what people have told me, that there may be problems in the remuneration structure for local employees such that after a few years it is no longer very remunerative for them to stay with DFID, so experienced people will then move on to the World Bank, to give a recent example. I do not know the details but I do think this is something that DFID should look at very seriously.

Q72 Mr Lancaster: Whilst you were talking the lovely little Nepali word which they use to describe this has come back to me, which is Ghajimaji (?), which means mixed up, which I think sums the whole thing up. (I have just realised I am going to get a note from Hansard. I will write it down, do not worry.) It perhaps then goes back to your quote earlier. Do you think, given the situation as you have described it, given the need for local expertise and given how Nepal is unique as a fragile state, as indeed all fragile states are (I think that was the point you were making), and given that in broad terms the current government White Paper is saying that 50% of all bilateral spending should be on fragile states, do you think the skills that we are learning in Nepal are potentially transferable to other fragile states, or is your quote highlighting that what we are doing in Nepal is simply so unique that we cannot take those skills elsewhere, and vice versa?

Dr Hobley: I think at a certain level, of course, they are transferable, but at another level they are not. Obviously, at the very local level it is very particular. Just having been in Cambodia, which was a very fragile state and is still in some regards also very fragile, I think there are some quite interesting lessons. It is back again to this business of being able to engage long enough in a country to really understand where the key actors are operating. They may be all over the place. Looking at people in Kathmandu, yes, there are power brokers there but there are so many other power brokers all over Nepal, and unless you are there long enough it is very hard actually to know where to go and who to engage with to be effective. Looking at Cambodia, where aid agencies have been most effective are those that have remained there long enough to get that knowledge and understanding, and where their staff have remained there long enough to build those connections. I think there are things around processes and types of aid instruments as well that are probably transferable between these fragile states, but how you engage on the ground, obviously, is completely specific. So what you can transfer from Nepal to these other countries is very much about how you work with local organisations, how you work with the various political parties but, also, about how you remain completely responsive to change as it emerges so you do not come in with great big programmes that necessarily cut across the whole of Nepal, or the whole of any other country like that, but are responsive to the very local conditions, which requires a different type of staff to be able to do that and, as Mick was saying, a different set of incentives. These are incentives about being able to engage over the long term, incentives about taking risks as well, and often with the types of processes that DFID is involved in it is very difficult sometimes for people to take those types of risks. I think there are a variety of ways in which there is a little bit of crossover between these countries.

Professor Moore: Two or three things. I think, in general, the type of people that DFID recruits and employs are around right - I do not think they are radically wrong - because they are, on the whole, pretty much generalists. DFID is no longer recruiting lots of medics or engineers or people like that, and even if they do they end up with fairly broad portfolios. So we have got people who are generalists, which is in a sense what we want. There is quite a lot of overlap in practice, I think, with the people who will work in the Foreign Office, which is another issue but that is probably what we would want, but I think the issues are incentives. Also, and this is a very difficult issue to tackle, the whole question of can they take risks? On the one hand, in fragile states you want people to play a long game and you want them to be able to take risks and be rewarded, or not punished. On the other hand, the system that DFID has, the targets, the country assistance plans, etc, are not terribly conducive to that kind of thing. This is one of the big contradictions, I think, of all aid agencies (I am not sure we can crack this very easily), but I think in certain fragile states we need some shift away from, as it were, the programmed approach to the more flexible approach.

Q73 John Battle: I wonder if I could switch to a policy area of security and justice because DFID, in their White Paper, suggested that they want to treat access to justice and security as a basic service, really. I wondered if you could give us your impression of what has been described to us when we were there and in other submissions as a culture of impunity in Nepal, and a lack of sanctions. Do you think it is a fair impression, and how is it manifest?

Dr Hobley: I think it is a fair impression. I think there have been a lot of abuses at different levels that have not been brought to justice, and there is a real sense, when you talk to people, particularly in the villages, of fear. It is a growing fear particularly in the Tarai, and people are afraid to step out of line or to challenge because of what might happen. It is not just people living in villages but it is district staff who are being put under huge pressure to deliver particular services to particular groups and if they do not they are threatened regularly on their mobile 'phones that awful things will happen to their families. So there is a sense of fear that pervades a lot of areas in Nepal.

Q74 John Battle: Fear of whom? Who does the 'phone calling?

Dr Hobley: Fear of criminal gangs; fear of the youth elements of the political parties - obviously, the Young Communist League - but it is not just that. There is this very growing fear of the youth elements of the parties and not just in the Tarai; it is also come across quite a lot in the hills now. Again, people are beginning to say they are afraid to speak out; they are afraid to challenge somebody from one particular political party because of what might happen to them. So, in a sense, impunity has come down to a very individual level in that way that there is a real fear that there is no clear recourse to justice, and if you stand out and challenge, even at the most local level, you will be put into trouble for that. This comes back to this whole thing, because it is not that there is a political vacuum at the local level; there is not; there are political parties operating there and controlling the political level, but because there is no formal local government institutions and a lot of what goes with that it is much more difficult for people to see how they move themselves round the system to get access to services, to get access to benefits and to get access to justice. So a lot more informal and difficult systems are evolving and have evolved during the conflict around patronage and who gets access to what and how. These are, in a sense, becoming reinforced by the ongoing local government vacuum where political parties are really now struggling to get down to the very local level and to control resources as much as they can. So, yes, at the higher levels I do not have so much experience, but at this very local level I feel there is a greater sense of insecurity.

Q75 John Battle: So it is the pressure of political parties bearing down on people and it is affecting their everyday lives. I get the impression the situation is getting worse and more oppressive.

Dr Hobley: Yes, it is.

Q76 John Battle: What, then, would you see the main obstacles in the way of actually improving security? Where would you go to change things? Where would you start?

Professor Moore: To me, yes, Mary is absolutely right, there are these problems, but I do not see that trying to intervene here at any sub-national, local level is going to be very helpful. What we have got is a government that, even with a good will, cannot reliably call on the armed force that any government, ultimately, needs to defend its borders and keep its criminals out. The army are in barracks; the Maoist Army are, effectively, in camps. Bring one of those out and you will know what would happen. The police are not very large; some of them, particularly the armed police, have a very compromised reputation as a result of the civil war, and to me the answer is something has to be done pretty quickly about an agreement over the army and recruitment into the army and some kind of compromise between the two sides over this. If a government is in a position it can call the army out of the barracks then you can get the police to work, because if the police do not do it they can call the army.

Q77 Andrew Stunell: You have mentioned the police and, obviously, in a peaceful society you would expect that that would be the force. Poor people in the villages, how often do they see the police? What is their perception of the police? There also seems to be quite a bit of evidence of direct political interference with the police, not perhaps at national level but, maybe, the local political parties, or whatever, and manipulating outcomes. Do you see a way of moving forward on that?

Professor Moore: To me the way to move forward is that you have a cabinet and a government that does reach an agreement over the military and the police and then that the leaders of the political parties can begin to discipline their own people. That is part of the problem here, that the political party leaders have good intentions (many of them do have good intentions - they do not want to see Nepal fall apart) find it very difficult to actually discipline their own cadres, their own people lower down. I am afraid I do see this as the army being the central issue here. I do not see how it is going to be resolved otherwise.

Q78 Andrew Stunell: Okay. In some other countries DFID has programmes working with the police at local levels to develop community policing, if you like, to change the culture within the police force. Are you saying that that is going to be a waste of time until we have got the central political and constitutional issues resolved?

Professor Moore: I do not think it does any harm to have small programmes like that that send a signal that says: "We are interested in doing this and if you sort out your other problems we will give you more resources", but I do not think in terms of real impact on the ground you are going to see anything for years from small programmes for the police.

Q79 Andrew Stunell: The justice system - magistracy, or whatever it might be - the local justice system? Is that redeemable prior to a constitutional settlement?

Dr Hobley: I do not think I have got enough experience. The things that I have seen that have worked quite well are the paralegal committees, where they really do help at the very local level. It is back to small, local stuff does make a difference. No, I am not sure the justice system is redeemable until some of the bigger elements are in place, most particularly the constitution. Until you see some of these big planks in place I do not see how you are going to get the right types of pressures on to the justice system and the political parties starting to pull back from the way they are using the justice system. So, no, I think there is a way to go. As I say, I do not have enough experience to be able to give you clear guidance on that area.

Q80 Andrew Stunell: If you were in charge, you would say that the UK's collective input - not necessarily DFID's - should be on getting that constitutional settlement PDQ.

Dr Hobley: Absolutely. Definitely. Also, helping to inform that settlement by getting very, very clear vision and understanding at the more local levels about what forms of governance do people really want; just trying to get that understanding at the district, whatever level it is. However, that dialogue is not sufficiently in place, so what you are getting instead is these political parties trying to control those spaces without a bigger decision about what local government, local governance, local structures should be. For me, I think this is a real role for something like DFID, and, particularly with their support to the local government community development project, this is an opening. However, there is a real lack of vision at those lower levels about what this could be, and an informed understanding and challenge to the parties to help open up that space at the local levels. I would be very, very keen to see that happen.

Q81 Andrew Stunell: Does that suggest that DFID should be investing some time and effort in educating or, at least, conversing with the political parties?

Dr Hobley: Yes, but at lower levels as well as at the Kathmandu level; so getting down there. Also, just opening up debate, more sort of town hall debates about what is the future of Nepal at the local level, so that it is not just all happening in Kathmandu.

Chairman: Corruption is also a problem, which I guess requires a settlement.

Q82 Mr Lancaster: Yes it is endemic in Nepalese society, so I suppose the obvious question is where do you think it is at its worst, and how can donors such as DFID engage to try and tackle it? Certainly when we went on our visit there was a stated political will to try and deal with it, although whether or not that has actually seen much action in reality is a different matter. What can we do to try and help tackle it?

Professor Moore: I have rarely seen as corrupt a country as Nepal, in the broad sense of the term. That is partly just people stealing money but I also mean, when I say that, the extent to which it is a very exclusionary political system and there are small numbers of people who steal money, and they are setting the system up so they can stay in power to carry on stealing money. So it is awful at the local level. I think my pragmatic attitude to this - I think it is pragmatic - will be to say that, frankly, there is very little we can do. We have to do certain things, as I understand DFID is trying to do at present, which is to say: "You are not stealing our money". We have to try and protect the British aid programme. I was told the stories there (Mary probably knows many more) about more or less direct intimidation over tenders and contracting, etc., and real attempts to do something about that. My own view is that given the size of the security and order problems, generally speaking, to really try to tackle corruption, at this stage, would be a waste of effort. I think there is very little we can do about it. What we need is a little more order and, hopefully, with a little more order if the Indian economy carries on growing the general economic environment will get better and I think it will be much easier to tackle that somewhere down the road, but not at present as a major concern. That would be my view.

Dr Hobley: I think that is probably a very sad reflection on the truth. It is very interesting and you often hear - and I do not know true this is - some people say that corruption has been important in maintaining the peace and, in a way, it buys off particular groups and people who may cause more problems. I am not sure I subscribe to that but maybe there is a short-term period in which corruption has to be accepted but managed, and it is only when some of these other, bigger parts of the state are in place that it can really be dealt with. For me, when corruption hits at the lowest level and for the poorest people I do find it very difficult to say: "Yes, let's just turn a blind eye to it". We are back, again, to these issues of how you begin to build more accountable systems at the local level. Again, I think, even though the political settlement is not properly in place, there is still a moment now to be building the right types of accountability at the local level in order to start addressing some of these issues around corrupt practice so that it is not allowed to embed. I have seen in other countries where corruption has been allowed to foster and to build that it embeds itself so deeply in the system (Cambodia is a very good example of this) that it is almost impossible to unpick it when the state becomes more stable. It becomes the way the state and citizens expect services - everything - to be delivered; you have to pay, you have to do this. For me, in Nepal, yes, corruption is very bad but let us try not to embed those structures that are already being developed at the moment and look at how we can start pushing back and making sure that we get the right forms of local government accountabilities in place, even at this very early stage, to try and start pushing back up the system.

Professor Moore: Could I just add one thing there, Mr Chairman? I think a very good short-term target would be that more of the corrupt money actually goes into the central coffers of political parties rather than into the pockets of individual politicians, because the more parties we have with a decent amount of resourcing, who can actually employ staff and campaign, the better politics will be. One of the very unpleasant features of so much that goes on in Nepal at present is that corruption really does go into the pockets of individuals; politics is very "fashionalised"; people join parties and leave parties very quickly.

Q83 Mr Lancaster: Just picking up on one thing you said, can we be confident that British taxpayers' money is not involved in this? You are smiling, which I sense means that we cannot be confident. When DFID is running its programmes, you hinted that you thought that, perhaps, DFID money was - not intentionally but as part of the culture - being siphoned off and heading elsewhere.

Professor Moore: Mary, you should answer this in more detail, but I know that this is a major concern, at least it has been in the DFID office. I talk to people, and a lot of effort is going in to trying to make sure it does not happen, in terms of auditing - I had descriptions of attempts at intimidation on tenders for DIFD projects and how they tried to circumvent that. So this is something that DFID are concerned about for very understandable reasons.

Q84 Mr Lancaster: So the short answer is yes, or historically yes.

Dr Hobley: And very, very difficult to know exactly where every single bit of money is going; really difficult to track it. As Mick says, a huge amount of effort is going in to making sure that money is being correctly used and is going to the right places, but it requires an enormous amount of monitoring to do it. All the donors are really concerned about this and I think DFID has done a huge amount to try and address these problems, but you hear the Swiss, everybody - they are all looking at how they can better track the way money is being used. It is not just money; it is who the services go to, what the money is buying and who actually benefits from this? You see so much corruption in that way as well where money is supposed to go to the very poorest groups; you go down to the villages, they are not getting it, it is going to another group because of the way the patronage system works at that level. Unless you have incredibly able, independent and politically removed people facilitating these processes it is very difficult to erase those forms of corruption, where services are directed to a particular group of people away from another group. So, yes, I think you can do as much as is possible to protect but, again, unless at the local level you are building systems where accountability can really be built in a more democratic process then it is going to be very hard to challenge, at those local levels, who gets the services and who does not, and who is included and who is excluded.

Q85 Chairman: We have talked briefly about the lack of local government. Those of us who were in Baglam had a couple of examples - and those were really a positive feedback about the desire for it - first of all, I think, in the forest community where, particularly the women, were saying: "We used to have a jolly good local chairman of the local council who was a woman, who we could turn to and now there is nobody local". The agent who was effectively charged with delivering services locally commendably said: "I am here on behalf of the government to do this, but my problem is I am not accountable or responsible." So he was anxious to say: "I would like to have a locally accountably and a locally elected body". What are the chances of this happening and what can donors do to bring it about?

Dr Hobley: Unfortunately, a lot of it is still dependent on getting the constitution in place by May 2010, and that will then determine the structure of the state and then determine when the local government elections can happen. In the interim there is, at the very local level, a committee of political parties and other interested people who are supposed to provide this initial form of decision making, accountability and local development planning and budgeting. There is, as you know, through the local governance programme and now through government, large amounts of money going down to the village development committees, which are for planning local development activities. So there is now an active process of trying to re-engage government and citizens at that local level. In a sense, the more that can be done to strengthen that and to occupy it in a way that is not going to lead to greater patronage, I think, is a very important thing, because this is what it is demonstrating to people what the future of Nepal may be. This is now where they are beginning to feel: "Okay, local government is coming back into place". I think the work that DFID is doing with the other donors in the national programme around local governance and community development is very important, but it does come back, again, to needing to build this understanding of what local government should be like and not what local government has been even during the civil war and was previous to the civil war, where a lot of the local government experience was still around highly patronage-based politics. So how we reconstruct that understanding of local government at that local level, to me, is critical to how people take Nepal into the future. So, yes, the constitution is essential but building the blocks underneath is really, really critical, and some of the things I was seeing recently were around how, again, the political parties are trying to control the different projects and services that are coming down, and are trying to allocate those to their party members or co-opt particular local groups - forestry groups, mothers groups, whatever it is - to those particular political parties. These are the future vote bank so there is a huge amount of effort going in by the political parties to start really positioning themselves to control the space. So I think this is a very, very important moment in time. This next year/two years are really critical for Nepal looking forward into a future where it has a different form of political process. It is obviously going to take a long time to embed it but what I think we do not want to do is reinforce what was there in the past and people's expectations of the past.

Q86 Andrew Stunell: Dr Hobley, you have given us evidence to show that, if you like, the community-based organisations are a somewhat ambiguous concept and you have mentioned the political parties' influence on them, and it is not all Age Concern and CAB when it gets down to the village level; it is perhaps something which the community based organisations convey that might not quite translate well. Can you say something about the balance of the provision that they make and the influence and advocacy that they have against the risks there are to having the kind of independent local government system you have got? If I could just press you a little bit on that, is it perhaps a little bit naïve to think that you could have a local government structure where the local politics was essentially removed?

Dr Hobley: It is impossible to have local politics removed, but what I think you would hope to see is some balance to the way politics are being used at the local level. Obviously, that is around, again, how you build people's ability to engage in these political processes. At the moment, in a lot of villages, not all, there are a lot of community-based organisations which do a variety of things. The forestry ones are interesting because they have a resource, they have money and they have a large number of members. Because of that they can actually act in a way like a local government; they can decide who gets access to the resource, they can decide who gets access to funds, and a lot of very positive things have happened from that process. Also, what they are tending to do now is to occupy what should be the local government space because they have funds, they have services and all the rest of it, which, during the period of conflict was important; they did deliver and they did maintain a level of social cohesion that I think was quite critical. Again, I think what we should be now looking at is how you balance those dangers and the positive sides of these community-based organisations with their relationship with an emerging local government and how you can balance the power of that so that the decisions that are being made about who gets access to services are not ones that just remain the very patronage-based ones which generally they are (particularly in the Tarai areas they very much are), but are based much more on careful exploration of who really requires the services and why they are getting them. So how that interface between over 400,000 more of these community organisations plus local government is developed is critical to make sure that local government itself has the power, the space and the authority to start making decisions for the whole citizenship and not for an interest group based on forestry or an interest group based on water or on mothers' health, or whatever else it is, but is looking across the whole populace. At the moment, there is a real issue of these different groups dividing up territory within the local area, and if you are not in a group you do not have a voice and you do not have access to services. For the very poor there are very high transaction costs to being involved in all these different groups to get access to services and often they both do not go into them because of the high transaction costs but, also, they are excluded because of their own social conditions. So local government should be sitting over this and should be able to take a whole overview of all the systems that are within that. The problem we have and the one we need to guard against is to avoid the community-based organisations remaining and the de facto way in which decisions are taken about who gets access to services and who does not. So it is redressing that balance that is going to be crucial in getting local government into a position and at a sufficiently high level as well as local level to be able to take decisions that are not influenced by politics or by patronage. Of course it will continue to happen but we need to be aware and understanding of how to try and prevent that.

Q87 Andrew Stunell: Can I take you just a little bit further on that? We visited a forest management project and we were given the impression that that, also, encompassed the fact that a school was being built, water and sanitation, bio-gas - a whole lot of projects seemed to be integrated there. Are you saying that that is a pretty unusual case?

Dr Hobley: It is not unusual. A lot of the forestry groups have, over the years, taken on a local developmental role and not just a forestry role, for good reason: they did have the funds and there was a real belief that this was a way of trying to get local development going. I do see considerable dangers in that becoming a reasonably unaccountable form of decision-making about who gets what, and I am not sure that for the future of Nepal this is necessarily the way to continue. I would like to see some of those activities moved into the local government space and not remain within these forestry groups where the levels of accountability are not very great and you have either a strong voice within it or no voice within it. Definitely for a lot of the groups where they are very poor people, although they may be members, they do not necessarily have access to the facilities.

Q88 Andrew Stunell: I would just comment on that that if I was on the village committee or the forest management group and local government was set up in my area I would want to be on that local government. So I think, actually, you would see quite a transfer across. I would also comment that we were told and introduced to people who were members of the Dalit community who had apparently benefited from that. Could I possibly take you off in a completely different direction for a moment?

Professor Moore: Can I go back to an earlier point, Mr Chairman, before we go there, which was what can donors do? I would like to say I think there is one thing donors could do in terms of local government which is they could provide more active encouragement for setting up a reasonable urban property tax system to give at least urban governments and local governments a financial basis. They do not have one, at present. I think we are a long way away from ----

Q89 Chairman: We are back to this country, again!

Professor Moore: They also do not have a system of central fiscal transfers from Kathmandu, so really sub-national governments have very little funding. It is not actually that difficult to do these days, and I think that would be one very positive thing that donors could encourage.

Q90 Andrew Stunell: The point I was going to make is that drawing on the experience of visiting one project of about two our visit, obviously, I am a world expert on this! However, it seemed as though the provision of services was being reasonably well integrated; it seemed as though it was being provided or, at least, made available to all members of the community including Dalit members, and so on. Indeed they seemed to have census figures and a very clear perception inside the village of who were high-paid, low-paid, Dalits, etc, etc. So that looked like a good model. Can I just test you on another project that we visited, which was relating to the retired Gurkha village development project? You have expressed concern that, maybe, aid and projects are not getting to those at the bottom of the pile. Would it be your judgment that in the case of the retirement projects that is happening, or is there a selection of villages and, maybe, people within villages there which is not pro-poor?

Dr Hobley: I think it is quite difficult for me to comment on because I do not know the project at all. It is very interesting if you do not look at projects but you look at people, and you go and spend time with people and say: "Okay, what are you doing? How are you getting your livelihood together? What services are you getting? What credit are you getting?" They will reel off, maybe, ten groups that they are members of to get access to water, to get access to education, to get access to different types of credit, and they will tell you how many hours they spend in each of these groups and different types of meetings. For some people it is a huge amount of time. Then you start looking at who these people are, and what you find is that those who are more capable are able to spend more of their time accessing these groups and accessing services, and also what you find is that those who are generally the wealthier or were former patrons within the village often control most of these groups and control access to them as well. So what it is is a very conditional way in which development is allowed to people. If you go further down the system to extremely poor or to particularly marginalised groups, the forestry programme has been very good at trying to get the Dalits involved but this is not the case across all projects. Even though people talk about it, actually when you go down there and look what you find is that a clustering of people who get access to services are generally those who are more able, and a clustering of those who are extremely poor who really get access to very little at all. Often they would also be in the most dire situation and a lot of them will have to migrate for the very poor labour services; there is very little agricultural labour left because of the change to the Land Reform Act in 1997, which meant that the tenancy arrangements there changed a lot. So, again, there is a lot of agricultural land that is not being properly used now, so local labour opportunities are very limited. In the absence of that these people are looking for daily labour - that is what they spend their days doing - and trying to get into these groups is very difficult for them; they do not have the time, they actively exclude themselves and they are, also, passively excluded by the groups because they cannot pay regular amounts of money on credit, which is usually a requirement to be part of that group. So there are lots and lots of barriers, why projects are causing further exclusion, and lots of reasons why they do that, and it is not until you start looking at people, rather than projects, that you start to see this. If you look at one project it actually looks quite successful but if you look at the people in that area and look at all the projects that they are involved with, actually there is a large number who are not in any of these projects, and you start seeing a very different story. It is interesting, once we start getting these questions going, that lots of projects have started asking the same questions and found the same answers across much of Nepal, that what looks good from a project perspective is not so good when you look at it from an individual household perspective instead of from a project eye.

Q91 Andrew Stunell: Is there a way of dealing with that? Could the donors, and DFID in particular, take a different approach which would overcome that problem or mitigate it?

Dr Hobley: Yes, moving away from projects, obviously (and DFID has been good about trying to reduce the use of projects), and, again, looking into the future around how you get more sub-national budgeting which allows decisions to be made at the more local level for all the citizens rather than on a highly-projectised basis approach where you do X project delivering X services, where, again, the accountabilities are very clear. When you ask people where that money has come from and who are you going to hold to account, it is the NGO that has delivered the project or it is a donor that has delivered the project - it is not government. They are not putting pressure on local government or the district or central government and saying: "Why are you not doing this"; they are putting pressure back on to the project: "Why are we not having more of this? Why are we not having more of that?" Again, how do you reconstruct relationships where people are looking into the government, into the local government and into those that should be providing the services to push there for greater accountability? The projects, because of the conflict, have really got in the way of that.

Q92 Andrew Stunell: My point about Gurkha retirement villages?

Dr Hobley: I have only been to one and that was on a casual walk-through, so I cannot answer you. I am really sorry. If I had been there and looked at it more carefully I could answer.

Q93 Mr Lancaster: I am going to embarrass you, actually, Mary, and say that apparently you describe yourself as one of the main international commentators on community forestry, which I am sure is the case, so can I ask you, perhaps, to comment on the effectiveness of DFID's forestry programmes? In particular, they claim that for every £35 spent on the LFP one person is permanently taken out of poverty, which sounds fantastic. Is that what you would expect? Is that realistic, or are they perhaps being a touch - well ...

Dr Hobley: I think they are being a touch optimistic there. Currently, they are about to do some longer-term evaluations in looking at exactly these issues and to look at their poverty impacts. I think, hopefully, those will provide a more systematic and more careful analysis. That was a fairly quick study. Actually, the forestry programme is very interesting in DFID because this is an example of where DFID has committed over a very, very long period to one sector (we are talking 20, 25 years) and what we are seeing in many ways is the good harvest of that investment. If you are looking at it in terms of forests, so environmental impact, it is massive: there are trees now where there were never trees and there is huge change across the hills of Nepal. If you are looking at in terms of people's access to forest resources who are members of forest user groups, it has changed. The question always is: who has it changed for and by how much has it changed? My life started out in community forestry and most of my work was in community forestry - I was a great believer in it - but, as I have been saying, one of the things I am very concerned about is how it forms interest groups rather than forming a political process where everybody has a chance to make decisions about how resources are allocated. So I think, for the future of community forestry and the future of DFID's involvement, it is how it looks wider than just forestry and it looks at these interfaces between the groups that are being formed and the local government processes that are being put in place, and that is where I think it should be shifting. In terms of investment, in building a huge network of organisations that are able to mobilise and to manage resources, it is an extraordinary success. If you look at the Tarai, however, it is nowhere; you have very valuable forest resources, government will not hand them over to communities, they are a source of large corruption, they are a source of huge amounts of money and they are now also a source of huge political tension because they are areas where the Maoists are pushing land encroachments for landless peoples. So forests in the mid-hills are an easy story; there was already a very strong informal structure there. Forests in highly contested areas are very difficult, and I think, again, for the future for DFID, how it deals in the Tarai in forestry is going to be a very critical element of how peace or conflict starts to continue within the Tarai. The Madhesh issues, the indigenous issues around the forests are huge - really, really huge. The questions around land and those forests are also very big. Yes, success after a huge amount of long-term investment (and I think that also is interesting in the sense of how much time do you have to invest to bring success), but also the very, very big thorny questions that even over these 20 years DFID has not been able to address in the Tarai, which are going to grow even more.

Q94 Mr Evans: How difficult is it to encourage more private businesses to set up in Nepal?

Professor Moore: One thing that was quite striking to me was in 2008 when the Maoists were about to come into power and came into power. The private sector actually was not terrified, and you think they would have been, but they seemed to be relatively happy. The biggest problem the private sector face is not particular political parties or particular policies, it is just the general insecurity and everything that goes on around it - the extortion, etc. All the surveys and talking to business people just give you the same answer: if they had a government that could actually keep order and deliver on what it said it was going to deliver, frankly, I do not think they would care which party or which combination of parties was in it. The other very big issue over this is because most economic activity in Nepal is in the Tarai, not far from the Indian border, there is so much cross-border activity that it is very hard, often, to say if you are talking about the Nepali economy or the Indian economy. There are lots of reasons for businesses to shift both sides of the border. So I think there is every reason to think that with a reasonable amount of political order the private sector would be okay. It is interesting, the rate of private investment in Nepal. If you look at success stories, it has gone up in the last ten years quite appreciably as a proportion of national income, even during the course of the civil war. So, clearly, the private sector sees profit opportunities here; this is not regarded as a hopeless case.

Q95 Mr Evans: Is this something that you think donors can help in trying to support?

Professor Moore: My sense is that because the primary problem is the security there is nothing that donors can do directly about that. There are all kinds of little things that need to be done about the investment climate, but I think they are only secondary at present, and they are the kind of things - small changes in legislation - that could take place later. I do not think donors need to do more than give the right signals. I would also add on that that much to my surprise I do not see that the Maoist party, even, is anti-private sector. What is quite interesting about the Maoists is that they controlled enough of rural areas for long enough that they learnt how you tax people, and they realised that a thriving private sector is good for them and good for everyone else. So although there is a lot of rhetoric, of course, at one level, I think in reality there is no big problem here.

Q96 Mr Evans: What could they do? You mentioned taxing. What more could they do to strengthen the taxation system to get the revenues in and to have better public finance management?

Professor Moore: The Maoist finance minister claims - I cannot remember whether it was in the first six months he was finance minister - he increased tax revenues by something like 30%, I think (I cannot remember the exact figure). However, there is a tremendous amount of leakage, and that is partly because the dominant source of tax revenue is the border with India, and that is where its import duties and VAT - most taxes - are levied, and that is a very corrupt operation. My understanding is that they raised more taxes just because there was more oversight of what was going on and probably a lot people were frightened of carrying on with the previous corruption. So my sense of this is that it is not that you need major reform of the tax system; it is just improving the current system and making sure there is less leakage and corruption and you would be okay. The government of Nepal is not big enough or competent enough to spend much more money very quickly. You would not actually want them to have masses of money. I do not think there is a sort of fundamental fiscal problem there.

Q97 John Battle: If I can ask a brief question about employment. You mentioned that the economy of Nepal is a function of the development and growth in India, but we met people that wanted to know where are the jobs for young people, particularly, and DFID, again, have made that a priority. There is some suggestion that jobs can be generated in agriculture, in tourism and, indeed, in renewable energy and water for the region. Are there realistic prospects there? Should DFID be involved in employment generation at that level?

Professor Moore: I think there are a lot of realistic prospects. Agriculture in Nepal has done very badly over the last 30 years or so - surprisingly badly when you compare it to India next door where agriculture, on the whole, has been booming. As the Indian economy grows India is going to run short of labour and they are going to want to import agricultural commodities from Nepal. So I think there are real prospects and people have all kinds of ideas - bio-tourism, and many other things. There are real possibilities. Whether DFID can actually do much at this level I am a bit sceptical. I think it is right, Mary (and you know more than me), that the big donor investments in agriculture in Nepal, as opposed to forestry, have ended up not terribly successful.

Dr Hobley: No.

Professor Moore: There is just a sense now that the country does not have the agricultural extension experts, the researchers and everything else that they would really need. I do not see any kind of "big bang" here in the agricultural sector. One thing the other donors could do, we have in India now the National Rural Employment Guarantee scheme, which does mobilise large numbers of people on public works - roads etc. There is quite a lot of expertise in that region, especially in India, in running these things in a not-too-corrupt fashion, and Nepal could do that. I think from the political point of view there is a lot that will be very advantageous for any government in Kathmandu to have one flagship programme saying: "Look, we're generating a lot of employment", and there is something very visible. If you could get a decently designed scheme and DFID were willing to fund it, that would be fine.

Q98 John Battle: What has come across very clearly in this session, as Mary puts it, is the need for these those bigger questions politically (in the full sense of political not party political) of governance to be right up there and tackled first or we are getting nowhere.

Dr Hobley: One of the things around employment, one of the things I found really startling, going round the villages, is how few young men there are between the ages 18 to 40; it is almost like an absent generation. You ask questions where they are; they are in Malaysia, they are in the Gulf, they are in India. You ask young men before the age of 18: "What do you want to do?" and the last thing they want to do is stay in the villages in agriculture. They said it is a complete waste of time; there are no markets, it is drudgery - they are not interested. I have seen (again, on small scales) interesting things around developing the skills for people to migrate, which is a dreadful thing to do, and, basically, Nepal has been a migration remittance country for generations, but that is what it does to be able to help them migrate more effectively. There are problems now, of course, with the Gulf and the downturn and all of that. What you do see is a lack of willingness for people to stay. Or, if they do stay, they want service jobs; they do not want to be in agriculture.

Q99 John Battle: It will be controversial to say it but I was quite strangely disturbed over the break when Gurkhas that can now come to Britain came to see me at my advice surgery in inner city Leeds to tell me they are very disappointed in Britain because their jobs and cars were not there. I said: "And you were expecting to get straight to a job?" Partly it was: had they got a licence, could they drive a car and what jobs could they get? So sometimes the expectation is part of the problem.

Dr Hobley: Very definitely. This is a new generation that has those expectations; they have different exposure now and they are not prepared to accept what was there before.

Q100 John Battle: Sadly, they were asking could they be arranged to go back having just arrived because they felt that they had been misled into expectations. So balancing the expectations and impressions (I think was the word you used earlier on) is very difficult, internationally as well.

Professor Moore: Could I just add one other point on the private sector? The big thing in Nepal is hydropower. The potential is enormous. No one wants to risk their money at present, for very good reasons. India, once again, is key to this - it is going to be Indian capital that does this. If you got significant Indian private money in hydropower you really could flip expectations in a major way in the country.

Q101 John Battle: You control the water table.

Professor Moore: Yes. It could do extremely well.

Q102 Chairman: Thank you both very much indeed. We have found the whole experience of Nepal a bit different from other developing countries, fascinating and interesting. There are a lot of good stories but, obviously, the political settlement is key to the future. We are very grateful for the background experience you have and for sharing it with us. Thank you very much indeed.

Professor Moore: Thank you.

Dr Hobley: Thanks.