UNCORRECTED TRANSCRIPT OF ORAL EVIDENCE To be published as HC 252 - i

House of COMMONS

MINUTES OF EVIDENCE

TAKEN BEFORE

INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT COMMITTEE

 

 

DFID'S ASSISTANCE TO ZIMBABWE

 

 

TUESday 26 JANUARY 2010

PROFESSOR TEDDY BRETT, DR STEVE KIBBLE and MR DONALD STEINBERG

MR ROB REES, MR WILLIAM ANDERSON and MR JUSTIN BYWORTH

Evidence heard in Public Questions 1 - 49

 

USE OF THE TRANSCRIPT

1.

This is an uncorrected transcript of evidence taken in public and reported to the House. The transcript has been placed on the internet on the authority of the Committee, and copies have been made available by the Vote Office for the use of Members and others.

 

2.

Any public use of, or reference to, the contents should make clear that neither witnesses nor Members have had the opportunity to correct the record. The transcript is not yet an approved formal record of these proceedings.

 

3.

Members who receive this for the purpose of correcting questions addressed by them to witnesses are asked to send corrections to the Committee Assistant.

 

4.

Prospective witnesses may receive this in preparation for any written or oral evidence they may in due course give to the Committee.

 

5.

Transcribed by the Official Shorthand Writers to the Houses of Parliament:

W B Gurney & Sons LLP, Hope House, 45 Great Peter Street, London, SW1P 3LT

Telephone Number: 020 7233 1935

 


Oral Evidence

Taken before the International Development Committee

on Tuesday 26 January 2010

Members present

Malcolm Bruce, in the Chair

John Battle

Hugh Bayley

Richard Burden

Mr Virendra Sharma

Andrew Stunell

________________

Memoranda submitted by Mr Donald Steinberg,

Professor Teddy Brett and Dr Steve Kibble

 

Examination of Witnesses

Witnesses: Mr Donald Steinberg, Deputy President (Policy), International Crisis Group; Professor Teddy Brett, Associate Programme Director, London School of Economics; and Dr Steve Kibble, Zimbabwe Europe Network, gave evidence.

Q1 Chairman: Thank you very much for coming in. As I think you will know, the Committee is actually visiting Zimbabwe next week and we are obviously anxious to get your expertise and your views to help us focus our questions. Can I say that we have a particularly busy week as we are going away next week, so we are a little bit tight for time? We do want to hear from you, but perhaps if you could be reasonably crisp with your answers; not all of you have to comment on every question, but do tell us what you think we need to know. If we can start with the general political situation, which is clearly complicated. The Government of National Unity has been in existence for coming on for a year. Obviously there has been dollarization of the economy which seems to have led to some recovery, and there is some indication that there are things in the shops; that schools are functioning, and so on. However, from your perspective what do you believe is the current political and economic situation; and how firmly is this global agreement embedded? It has had a pretty rocky road; so if you could give us a take on that? I should have asked you, for the record, to introduce yourselves, so if you could do that first?

Mr Steinberg: I am Donald Steinberg and I am Deputy President for Policy of the International Crisis Group.

Dr Kibble: Steve Kibble, representing the Zimbabwe Europe Network.

Professor Brett: Teddy Brett from the London School of Economics.

Mr Steinberg: Mr Chairman, when Morgan Tsvangirai and the MDC decided to join the Unity Government last January I think a lot of people said that he was setting himself up for a fall; that he was simply be the latest victim of Robert Mugabe's attempt to divide and conquer and that the Government of National Unity was doomed from the word go. In the year since that Government was formed we have seen enough evidence to justify the views of sceptics but enough evidence as well to justify the faith that Morgan Tsvangirai, Arthur Mutambara and others had in that process. We have indeed seen a solidification of the economic situation - very little new growth but stability, a currency that is stable, goods returning to market places. We are seeing a Government of National Unity that performs after a fashion; we have seen the creation of a plan for national reconstruction that has worked to at least convince international donors that something serious is going on here. At the same time we have seen a continuation of farm seizures - about 150 during the course of the last year; we have seen a continuation of intimidation; we have seen hard line elements within ZANU-PF in particular stifle the working of this Government. So the question is: are you seeing a process that is moving towards a successful conclusion or are we about to see the process fall apart? I think that there are three formal challenges that we have to see met and three informal challenges. Just very quickly, on the formal side we have to see completion of the global political agreement. There are a number of key steps that have to proceed. We have seen some good movement, both in terms of formation of the Government and formation of committees on human rights, on the media, on electoral processes, but the record is still very mixed. We have not seen the National Security Council, for example, take over the security dimension from the heinous Joint Operations Command; we have not seen the appointment of MDC governors; we have not seen a resolution of the issues regarding the Chairman of the Reserve Bank, Gideon Gono, or the Attorney General. So that is a real question. The second formal challenge is to complete the constitution. There is a process underway right now; it is stalling for the time being but I think there are some relatively good signs out there that people understand that this is not a process that can be run exclusively by the Executive and by the Legislature. It is a people-orientated process - or at least it should be. There are other signs that the Kariba Draft, which is the anti-democratic executive power structure draft that was agreed to before, is being put aside and that would be a positive element. On the elections, I think there is an emerging view that 2011 would be too soon to hold elections and we as the International Crisis Group would support that view. We believe that holding premature elections, allowing politics to reassert themselves at this point would be a somewhat dangerous process. I think the MDC is coming to that view as well, both as they try to show the people of Zimbabwe that they are reasonable stewards of the public domain, and also they are very concerned about how the military would react to the election of the MDC at that point, which I think is a forgone conclusion. On the ZANU-PF side, they are not anxious to hold elections right now. Their recent poll showed that they have about 10% of the vote; they have geriatric leadership; they are not viewed as a change agent; and they are not particularly excited about going to the polls at this point. Chairman, those are the three formal challenges. The three informal challenges are: on the first hand there is a need for political maturity in this process; both parties have to recognise that even as they are competitors in the political arena they are partners both in the Unity Government and in building the future of Zimbabwe, and on that front we are going to have to see some radical changes within ZANU-PF. It is very difficult as long as Robert Mugabe is at the helm, but there are movements beneath him - especially Vice President Joice Mujuru's movement. And at the same time the MDC recognises that they have to prove themselves to the people of Zimbabwe as reasonable stewards, not corrupt, able to run a government. The second challenge is the security side. There are a dozen or so Generals who have veto power over this transition process. It is a very dangerous phenomenon; it is the reason why MDC is not anxious to see a transform and transfer of power right now. Unfortunately - and I say that advisedly - I think that Zimbabweans are coming to the conclusion that some sort of soft landing is necessary to move these Generals on during this transition process. The final challenge that we are looking at is the challenge of rebuilding the economy. Even as we look at the very significant changes that have occurred over the last year we still see 90% unemployment; we still see an agricultural sector that this year is probably likely to produce 40% to 50% of average crops. We still see a manufacturing sector that cannot get electricity and basic raw materials, and we still see an international community that is sceptical about the process; that is not going to come in with major amounts of investment or aid unless some positive developments occur. So, again, a very mixed picture at this point.

Q2 Chairman: Perhaps you could pick up different points.

Dr Kibble: Yes. I think one of the interesting things is that the dollarization of the economy means that ZANU-PF networks are unable to be served by inflationary money printing like they were in the past, which is a step forward if you like. My major concern is the fact that the militarisation of the state that occurred over the last ten years has really not significantly been challenged - something at which Donald hinted there. To be honest, I do not think that the nature of the state has changed at all; it is still a kleptocratic state with a certain amount of what you might call social democratic interventions in the economy. To that extent I am probably slightly more pessimistic than Donald, but do see that the continued existence of the Government of National Unity-included Government is actually a plus. But the major decisions have still to be confronted, in my opinion.

Professor Brett: I think that was a very useful summary of the situation. I am just as pessimistic as Steve. It seems to me that the nature of the situation at the moment is that it is an intrinsically unstable situation - it is an interim situation because basically ZANU's objective is to recapture power, and in the memo I sent round if you look at the fifth party conference that has just taken place they are absolutely intransigent; they are totally opposed to the GPA; they are going to resist every possible concession they have to make because basically they simply do not accept the legitimacy of the MDC or the democratic process. Any call for political maturity in a context of a situation governed by gangsters and crooks who have stolen half the assets of the country - each of these army officers has his political power and has used his political power to amass huge estates and so on - the notion that somehow they are going to be willing to give this up voluntarily as a result of the democratic process is simply unjustifiable. So I think this is an argument for the postponement possibly of that electoral process because the whole process of the political conflict right now is on the fact that at the next election the MDC will, if it is a free and fair election, come to power; and that will threaten the whole structure of economic power that has been built up through this process and through the fact that the state has been allocating resources to ZANU cronies and these ZANU cronies are threatened with losing their assets, for example if there is a land reform process that the MDC introduces, because all this land that has been used by these military officers is lying unused and it is one of the reasons why Zimbabwe is dependent on food aid now. So I think the critical problem is that one has to see this as an interim situation and one has to recognise that within the next two or three years there is going to be a really major crisis that has to be confronted. My own expertise started in Uganda. In Uganda in 1987 the new Government that took over could take over and not confront this problem because it won a civil war; because it destroyed the power of the existing military apparatus. This is not the case in Zimbabwe and that is the central political problem - that you have a military economic complex of business people who have their resources out of the power of the state that actually will confront losing those resources if they lose genuine political power, and that seems to me to be the medium-term crisis that we have to confront when we think about dealing with that situation.

Q3 Hugh Bayley: A question for Donald Steinberg. You have said that there is a risk that donors will doom the Government of National Unity. The problem is this: we are damned if we do and we are damned if we do not. If we provide aid we may strengthen ZANU-PF's hand and delay the process of reform; if we stand back we may expose the reformists' weakness or inability to deliver. So what should donors do in the situation we are in now, after a year of Unity Government?

Mr Steinberg: The second threat that you identified I think is a more real threat than the first. People in Zimbabwe know that the only thing that has changed over the last year is the entry of the MDC into Government and therefore to the extent that there are positive things that are emerging the MDC gets most of the credit for that. We are now facing a situation where that first round of euphoria is about to disappear. We are, for example, seeing the possibility in February of massive civil service strikes, from teachers, from nurses, from doctors. The biggest sign that Zimbabwe was back on the road was the opening of schools, the opening of hospitals. The reason that these civil servants are about to go on strike is that they are being paid $160 a month. They are saying that that is not even enough to go to work every day. They are demanding $620 a month; the Government is saying, "We can pay $263." The bottom line is that schools are going to close, hospitals are going to close and MDC is going to be painted with the same brush that ZANU-PF is - "What have you done for me?" This is the biggest threat to the MDC right now because they are being perceived with either, "Have you gone over to the other side? Are you now Government as opposed to civil society with the people?" And the concerns that we are starting to hear about corruption are tainting them as well. So for me the clear answer here is to provide resources through clean mechanisms, including the multi-donor trust fund, which the IMF has in effect certified as being worthy of receiving $500 million of their funds; to do it in line with the Finance Ministry, to clearly put aside the Reserve Bank, which has been tainted, which is discredited, which, even in the past year when everybody has been watching, has taken millions of dollars and transferred them from reserve accounts into funding presidential scholarships and foreign diplomatic missions headed by ZANU-PF leaders, et cetera - so continuing the policies of the past. The one footnote I would put is that in order to encourage movement by ZANU-PF, sanctions have to stay in place on a personal basis. So what we are arguing for is targeted assistance but targeted sanctions as well.

Q4 Hugh Bayley: A few months ago I had quite a long conversation with Lovemore Moyo and he was encouraging a greater British engagement but was cautious of using aid to fund government services. Of course you can provide food aid through NGOs and you can provide HIV clinics and so on without engaging the Government; but to do what you are proposing, to fund schools, to put in train economic reform, to provide a network of state health services, you have to fund the Government. So how doable is that? Do you have to pick and choose government departments? And how then do you avoid the risk of favouring one candidate who got 50% of the vote as opposed to another who got 50% of the vote, which is I guess how it would be portrayed over there?

Mr Steinberg: The Government of Zimbabwe has helped in this regard by indeed setting up the multi-donor trust fund, by putting together a policy through the Finance Ministry that is clean, that has been shown to be effective so far, and so it is not a question of you as the foreign government picking and choosing and you will support a ministry led by an MDC minister but not one by a hard line ZANU-PF minister, but to simply support the process. I would say that the line does already get a little blurred here because if you go, for example, into sanitation projects by definition you have to provide resources that in some sense are fungible, that are going to be able to pay the salaries or the stipends of those people doing those projects. The same is true of agricultural development. We had focused in the past on this phrase humanitarian plus assistance, until I think most of us realised that humanitarian plus really just meant reconstruction if you define it broadly enough and it became a phrase that had no meaning. So I understand the concern but I would also say that at some point we are going to have to realise that if you want to sideline the hardliners and you want to give that country a peace dividend that will inure to the benefit of the democratic process then we are going to have to bite the bullet as an international community and support these projects.

Q5 Hugh Bayley: Can I ask Professor Brett whether you share that analysis and, in particular, should aid have been targeted on the MDC and other progressive civil organisations?

Professor Brett: I think that phrase targeted support and targeted sanctions is an extremely good way of describing the issue and of course that means that basically you need to give the aid and you need to, in a sense, give it to somebody who has the capacity how it can be used effectively, by whom, who to give it to and who not to give it to. I would want to reinforce the proposition that at this stage, given that we have a very small window of opportunity that depends upon the MDC being able to come into partial power and deliver something, that it is absolutely critical that that process be given maximum support. I also take the point that it has to take the form of tangible service delivery. I would also go on to say that while the current mode of delivering most of our aid via NGOs has been a necessity because it has not been possible to give money to either the Ministry of Health or Education under ZANU without expecting it to be simply stolen, we do need to start creating the opportunity to reconstruct state capacity with the delivery of free services, health services, education services and so on. I am not in touch with what is going on in this government collective. If it is in fact in a position to do this and to identify those sorts of things most critically what one wants is to be able to say, "We are going to give" - whatever it is - "£5 million to rebuild hospitals." And to be able to give that in a cast-iron way so that we can actually track that money and show that that £5 million ended up in new hospitals rather than in somebody's bank account. So what seems to me to be the issue is that you have to start building real relationships with particular ministries, which hopefully will be run by MDC but even if they are not run by MDC, even if they are run by ZANU officials, to give them the money in a way which makes it possible to be sure that it is going to be spent on what it is supposed to be spent on. There is always a fungibility problem which is that that money will free something else. That problem is not so strong in Zimbabwe because the Zimbabwe state actually has no other resources to spend anything on; so the money that you are giving it would not have been spent on hospitals and it is not going to free up anything that is going to go into the pocket of some ZANU politician or General, and that seems to me to be the critical issue. We have to say that we need to support obvious candidates. Health and sanitation systems - two years ago thousands or people were threatened by or died of cholera because sanitation systems had collapsed. Of course that means that you also have to strengthen state capacity; you have to be able to offer civil servants a living wage because if you do not offer them a living wage they are not going to come to work.

Q6 Hugh Bayley: Can I ask one final question? If one tends to favour or concentrate aid resources on MDC-led ministries how should Britain then avoid the neo-colonial accusation; that we are picking which leader and which team should run our former colony? There are plenty of people in Africa outside of Zimbabwe as well as in Zimbabwe who would say that. And to what extent should we be putting our aid in bilaterally or through multilateral agencies, and if it goes through multilateral agencies do we avoid that charge to some extent?

Professor Brett: There is a problem - and I tried to lay it out in my paper - that basically what we want to do is to make it possible for the MDC to take over Zimbabwe. Basically Zimbabwe is going nowhere without regime change and whether we say that out loud or whether we say it quietly that actually seems to me to be the fundamental prerequisite for the reconstruction of Zimbabwe - that ZANU loses its capacity to control policy. Obviously that creates a serious problem around issues of sovereignty and our role, which is particularly sensitive in Zimbabwe because of the whole neo-colonial story that has been used by Mugabe and others to keep himself in power. Despite the fact that that is what we are doing I think in relation to this issue it is possible to simply present this very clearly not as an issue of supporting MDC ministries, but of supporting particular kinds of basic essential services. We know that Zimbabweans are now living half as long as they were 40 years ago because of the collapse of health services and all these other kinds of things. So what we need to do is to develop a coherent strategy for the reconstruction of basic merit good services - a pro-poor service delivery strategy. We need to present that and we need to design mechanisms for delivering it on the basis of consultation with particular ministries; based on sanctions that we can use if we see that those things are not being delivered properly. Whether the minister in charge of the ministry is ZANU-PF or MDC is not going to be the criterion that you are going to use to do that. I guess - and, again, I have to admit that I do not know who controls which ministry - my sense is that ZANU-PF's people have gone into the security side and into agriculture because that is what they want to control to stay in power. I suspect they have handed over some of the health and so on, the social security ministries to MDC, in which case we do not have a problem - we will end up and say we want to spend this much on health, this much on education, this much on sanitation and so on and we will go to the ministries concerned and build a process for doing that with them, and possibly try to talk about creating some systems of administrative reform that create incentives that give officials money if they deliver services rather than if they put it in their pocket. There are all sorts of ways in which one can address that issue. Whether you do it multilaterally or bilaterally is another issue. Frankly, I am not all that concerned about being tarred with the neo-colonial brush. What comes to my mind is a conversation which I had with a young man who was trying to sell me a nine-foot high-crested crane made out of metal - very beautiful and nobody was buying it - and I said to him, "I am English," and he said, "What is wrong with your Mr Blair? Your Mr Blair has gone into Iraq and got rid of the dictator there; why has he not come here and done it for us?" I suspect that is a view that would be very widely held in the townships of Zimbabwe. That is a story that is being told by Mugabe and I do not think it carries much weight now, particularly since handing over the land to the people means handing it over to Generals who are now starving the people to death. So I think we should not be too sensitive about that issue. But I do think that by developing a well targeted and well organised and well thought through programme of supporting services through the state and building state capacity by doing this we can actually to some extent deal with that problem. As I say, the bilateral/multilateral for me would be a practical issue; I would want to know just how effective that bi/multilateral programme was. They can often be relatively inefficient and I have to say I have a prejudice against the United Nations as a service delivery organisation. Whenever I have done research - and I have done a lot of research on practical issues - the quality of DFID projects has always been significantly higher by a factor of several percentage points than any UN project that I have seen. So that is a prejudice of my own. Again, I think that that is something you would have to look at and ask yourselves, "Can we see whether that process is an effective one or not?"

Chairman: I am conscious of time and I know that Dr Kibble wants to come in, but if he does not mind can I bring in John Battle because it is a related thing, and if Dr Kibble could come back to us.

Q7 John Battle: In the background of this in my mind is the whole question of corruption because Transparency International suggests that corruption is now a major challenge, not just organisational, but economic and political. Obviously corruption would keep donors away. What is the scale of the corruption? What are the worst areas affected and its impacts? And what should Zimbabwe be doing to reassure the international donors it is a place to which they could send their money?

Dr Kibble: Transparency International reckons that Zimbabwe is the eleventh most corrupt nation in the world at the current time, despite the fact that there has been an anti-corruption unit since 2005 and despite the fact that Zimbabwe signed up to the various SADC and AU protocols on anti-corruption. In a sense the question you are asking is not just the kind of epiphenomenal stuff, it is the fact that it is embedded into the culture now and has become so widespread that it is actually part of the normal transaction system. So you have a severe problem in trying to combat this and it is not going to be an easy one. The two things go together in terms of the kleptocracy of the regime and the human rights abuses that are associated with it. So in that sense you are seeking a kind of transition and we are not even in post-conflict yet - we are still looking at transition. There are certain mechanisms that Teddy has hinted at in terms of immediate delivery of services and tracking revenues. My only proviso with that is that of course for many people Tsvangirai missed a trick when he accepted that the permanent civil servants, the secretaries, all the people staffing the ministries would remain as ZANU-PF appointments, which means that you have a major problem not just of delivery but of even any kind of acceptance that this is a legitimate thing for outside donors to be doing. But there are groups inside Zimbabwe like ZIG Watch of the Sokwanele NGO networks; so they are tracking Government performance, they are looking at the whole issues of transparency; and to some extent there is awareness as the process goes that corruption is always there. For instance, the constitutional outreach teams are supposed to be about 560 and ZANU-PF Women's League suddenly jumped in there and all of a sudden there are 1,000 people involved. So the Constitutional Commission then has to do its own audit, which if it actually produces something will be a first for Zimbabwe for several years because there are a number of audits that have taken place and no action has ever been taken against perpetrators of either human rights' abuses or, indeed, of massive plundering of state assets. So there are things that outside donors can do. There are certainly questions of supporting civil society organisations that are looking at transparency issues and Transparency International still has an office inside Zimbabwe, I believe.

Mr Steinberg: If I could address that as well because there is also a context here of a decade or more of absolute lack of accountability and transparency and I would again like to focus on the Central Bank where essentially the answer was that if you wanted to fund anything or anybody you just printed money. They invented things called the Productive Sector Facility, the Basic Commodity Supply Side Intervention, the Local Authorities' Reorientation Programme, which were just ways to print money and give it to your cronies. As long as the Central Bank Governor remains in place there is a clear sense that it is business as usual. They have passed legislation that has put a fence around the Central Bank and it is now literally broke. It is being sued by suppliers because they simply do not have resources.

Q8 Chairman: Is Central Bank the Reserve Bank?

Mr Steinberg: Right; I am using the terms interchangeably. That is a good thing because this is an organisation that, even in this last year, the IMF has reported has used $16 million of statutory reserves to pay for embassies run by ZANU-PF to pay presidential scholarships for friends of Robert Mugabe, to pay for trips for 55 people to attend a World Food Programme Summit in Rome. So you need to attack that. The other point I would make is that the MDC has been very aware of its need to avoid the taint of corruption. There are cases right now that are floating around but they have been very quick to jump in to establish codes of conduct, to establish committees, to investigate that situation because, again, they need to prove that they are different and that they are not going to be simply falling for any animal farm type exercise v. the practices of ZANU-PF.

Q9 Andrew Stunell: You have painted a very bleak picture - I am sure quite rightly. There has been huge migration out of Zimbabwe to neighbouring countries and clearly that affects the relationship of those countries with Zimbabwe. Can you say something about those developing relations there, particularly with South Africa, and the links between those countries in Zimbabwe in terms of unravelling things for the future?

Dr Kibble: Funnily enough, the last time I gave evidence to a parliamentary committee was to the Foreign Affairs Committee, specifically on the issue of why South Africa behaves towards Zimbabwe as it does; so I will put that on the record and I can always send you the relevant documentation.

Q10 Andrew Stunell: We can take a second look at what you said there.

Dr Kibble: The migration issue is a complex one. A number of people have tried to document the number of people who have actually left Zimbabwe, and you can either do this by trying to count them or you can do it by extrapolating from what you think the population would have been, bearing in mind the HIV and AIDS epidemic, et cetera. Largely speaking there seems to be some kind of calculation that up to three million Zimbabweans have left the country and they are currently in South Africa, Botswana and what is also known as Harare North, ie London and Luton. The general problem has been not just xenophobia from South Africa, although that has been a major problem - although that is not just targeting Zimbabweans - but I think the major problem has been the refusal to see this as anything other than economic migrants. So the treatment of Zimbabweans inside the region has been that of, "These people are only coming to seek jobs and it is nothing to do with the current crisis inside Zimbabwe." So there has been a disjuncture, I think, between SADC attempts to try to solve the problem politically and to some extent judicially around Zimbabwe and the kind of reaction that is often quite a populous reaction to the numbers of Zimbabweans actually inside Southern African regional countries. This slightly goes against the kind of support that nations gave to the anti-apartheid struggle inside South Africa and the liberation movement inside Zimbabwe. The problem appears to be that it is very costly to deport lots and lots of Zimbabweans every day when 35% turn round immediately and go back in again. So you have a whole problem of cross-border traders, economic migrants, political refugees all being lumped together, and if you do not have refugee status then your treatment cannot be under the specific international conventions that deal with refugees. So the problem continues and it may be that with the World Cup coming up in South Africa that there will be a greater appreciation of how to actually deal with this economic situation that has caused Zimbabweans to leave when they would much prefer to stay in their own country.

Professor Brett: If I could take up the second half of your question, which was the political implications of relationships with the SADC community and South Africa in particular. Of course that has been one of the central questions that has been asked right through the last decade, which is to say given that the ZANU regime has clearly, from the beginning of this century, been breaking every rule in the book; it has been rigging elections and all of those kinds of things, why is it that ZANU has had almost 100% support from the region? The only pressure that was applied to them by Mbeki when he was President was this notion that he had to have soft diplomacy because if you did not have that he was not going to be listened to at all and therefore he argued, probably legitimately, that if he tried to put any real pressure on ZANU to change its behaviour he would simply have been marginalised. That might have been true but of course the question is the extent to which either South Africa, or South Africa in collaboration with the other countries in the region that take leadership from South Africa, would be willing to recognise the two kinds of damages that Zimbabwe is doing to them. The one damage is very clearly economic and social, which is to say that they are confronted with three million people who are semi-indigent wandering around towns doing unpleasant things. When I lived in Johannesburg a couple of years ago one of my friends said that these two old ladies were locked up in a bathroom for half a day because there a bunch of Zimbabweans had broken into their house in Johannesburg and stolen things from them, so that whole bunch of people without real incomes are a massive problem in the region. Of course the whole loss of the Zimbabwe economy - Zimbabwe used to be the major player after South Africa in regional economy and all of that has gone - has imposed huge losses on everybody in that region. And we can see that those are clearly associated with political immoralities of various sorts and kinds. The damage that ZANU has done to the Zimbabwean people is infinitely greater than the damage that Smith did to Zimbabwean people; during the Smith UDI regimes the Zimbabwe economy grew 7% a year. This lot have basically killed half the population or forced them to leave. So you have that political question and of course that political question is deeply difficult because this whole thing happened during the period when Mbeki was talking about the new African renaissance and African states were going to police each other's actions. He then has Zimbabwe that broke every rule in the book for their programme that was set up and yet he went in and connived with this; so there is a huge loss of credibility of African governments.

Chairman: Can I bring in Richard Burden because there is a specific question arising out of that and it might be helpful to get that in.

Q11 Richard Burden: It is really about where there looks like or there could be some hope of pressures, particularly through the SADC Group - and I am thinking of the SADC Tribunal last year, which found in favour of the cases being brought and we are aware of the specific case of Mike Smith and so on; but the implications are of 79 white farmers and potentially a lot more than that in terms of land seizure generally. What is happening about this? It was November 2008 that all of this happened; so where does it go from here?

Mr Steinberg: Step back for a second and focus on the transition in South Africa because we really have seen a much different approach under Jacob Zuma than we did under Thabo Mbeki. Jacob Zuma has taken his three top advisers and put them directly on the account and these people include Mac Maharaj, who has the greatest revolutionary credentials in the world; he cannot be out-revolutionised by Robert Mugabe. No one is going to accuse Jacob Zuma of being a tool of the West. He went into Maputo following the decision of Morgan Tsvangirai to withdraw from the Government and read the riot act to Robert Mugabe in private, such that we have heard that Mugabe was shocked. He went back and within several weeks you had an electoral commission established; you had a human rights commission established; you had a media commission established. South Africa is paying attention to this issue at this point and is applying the kind of pressure that we are talking about. They need to continue to do that, and I would argue - and this addresses the previous comment - that they need to do it with the co-operation of the international community. The easiest way to avoid charges of neo-imperialism is to say that SADC negotiated this global political agreement; they are the guarantors of the agreement - "Mr Zuma, working in cooperation with you, how can we help this process move ahead?" That is the single answer to charges of British national interests overweighing these processes. The answer to your specific question about the Tribunal's decision is that the current Government of Zimbabwe, the Justice Minister, the Attorney General remains a ZANU-PF hardliner, who has basically thwarted the rule of law, who got his Government to essentially say, "This has no meaning for us," and it is now up to SADC to put his foot down and to say, "Yes, it does and we are starting to talk about issues of suspension of SADC if you do not obey the judgment of a ruling to which you were a party."

Q12 Richard Burden: But it is some time ago now - it was November 2008, the Tribunal decision, and it was probably clear before then about what the response was going to be and that the Zimbabwean legal team walked out even before the decision was there. So what are the vibes coming from South Africa?

Mr Steinberg: I will let Dr Kibble address it, but the one thing I will say is that we are not yet in a situation in Zimbabwe where the rule of law applies; it is still a situation where the rule of power applies and that is part of the reason we are so committed to this transition and, frankly, in my mind, one of the reasons why we need to see the movement of Gideon Gono and Johannes Tomana out of the positions that they currently occupy.

Dr Kibble: In terms of the SADC Tribunal, that decision in the Campbell case was November 2008. The Zimbabwe High Court has shown no great willingness to follow up the judgment. It has said it will do it in due course. It is interesting that if you look on the positive side you might see that the SADC judicial process it is actually going much further than the SADC political process. Most of the cases that have come before the SADC Tribunal so far have been to do with Zimbabwe. There is currently a case outstanding from the Human Rights NGO Forum about torture victims. So in that sense at least the SADC Tribunal under the registrar Charles Mkandawire, who is trying to push things along, has been in that sense quite a positive move. The problem is that of course SADC is the ultimate court - the SADC Council of Ministers is the ultimate court to actually bring those decisions into fruition. You can get a decision through the SADC Tribunal - fine, you get a legal judgment - but there is no mechanism for the SADC Tribunal to actually put that into practice without the SADC political organisations taking part, and that bit is obviously much trickier. The fact that the judgment exists is an interesting one and the counter factual, that if that Tribunal had found in favour of the Zimbabwe Government, you cannot imagine that that would not have been celebrated by ZANU-PF with some success. So the picture is fairly mixed on that one. The North Haldane Court currently has a case from API Forum, which is a South African land-based NGO in terms of making sure that that decision by the Tribunal becomes part of South African law, which will mean that if Zimbabwe is found to be in default of the SADC Tribunal its assets inside South Africa could theoretically at least be seized.

Mr Steinberg: If I could just say that the critical point about the ZANU Government is that it will never do anything that it does not want to do unless it is absolutely forced to do so. So the critical question is what sanctions could SADC use to push these things through? And is it politically willing to actually do that?

Q13 Chairman: Can I take that forward, both SADC and the UN, the issue of internally displaced people? We get very mixed reports - the Government say there are none and others say that there are hundreds and thousands of people migrating backwards and forwards across the border. I think actually in the discussion after we watched the film the point that was being made was that nobody knows because these are under the control of ZANU-PF and you cannot actually get at them, but they are also the means by which they can secure victory in future elections - by forcing people to vote the right way or not vote at all - by stopping them voting for anything other than ZANU-PF. The local NGOs are saying that the UN should be doing something about this; there should be some direct action; that we should be able to reach these people and we should be able to support these people. What in reality could be done?

Dr Kibble: 2005 saw Operation Murambatsvina drive out the filth in some versions, or restore order in others, which was probably 750,000 people directly affected and one and a half million at least indirectly affected, and there was the report by the UN Special Rapporteur, Anna Tibaijuka, pointing out that this was a major human rights abuse. Since then we have also had the displacement from March to June 2008 associated with Operation Makavhoterapapi, which was about displacing MDC support - burning their houses, torture, rape and mayhem in general. So there is a certain sense in which the internal displacement issue has never gone away and the impacts of it are still not being dealt with to any great extent, certainly not by the Government. It is a kind of unrecognised problem. The reason for these kinds of displacements are the subject of debate, but one effect is possibly the idea of driving MDC supporters from urban areas into rural areas where they are more under the control of the likely ZANU-PF command structures and local Joint Operations Command.

Professor Brett: There is an earlier displacement, of course, because something like a quarter of a million people of agricultural workers were displaced off commercial farms when they were expropriated. I was told when I was doing research in 2004 by a woman at the IFO that within five years of that displacement something like 50,000 of those people had died from neglect, disease and all of those things. The problem is that when people are displaced like that they do not go off as a group and appear somewhere as a million displaced people; they disappear off to farms and they just become part of the great army of the unemployed who are, in any case, 90% of the population. It is an interesting issue of whether somebody who has been displaced forcibly by the Government or somebody who simply lost his job because the whole economy has collapsed has the greater problems and greater needs. I think that that is an issue which could be addressed specifically as something we might want to target as a donor agency. I think it would be precisely the sort of thing that might be given to an international NGO to manage if one wanted to do that. But I think more broadly the problems of somebody who has lost his job as a result of economic crisis is not all that different from the problems of somebody who has lost his job because of some specific political event. So it is that bigger issue that we have to address: how do we put resources in that get the economy back to work so that we can create real employment for millions of people?

Q14 Chairman: But in this insane situation is it not the case in reality that the ZANU are very happy for these people either to disappear or to be forced into the rural area which they control? In a normal situation these people would be voting for some change so they are either not voting at all or they are voting for things to stay the same because they are beaten into submission to do so. So how on earth does the international community break that log-jam?

Mr Steinberg: One of the keys here is to reduce the power of these forces that you are talking about and we are absolutely convinced that so long as you have a dozen senior leaders who, as we have talked about before, see their personal stake and the continuation of this regime as paramount then they will do what is necessary to keep themselves there. These are Generals, senior security officials who have a series of personal motivations. Some truly believe that Tsvangirai will sell out the revolution and they have revolutionary fervour and do not want to see it returned to the good old days of Ian Smith. Others are very concerned about their personal wealth because, indeed, they have accumulated great wealth. Others are very concerned about justice being applied to them because some were in fact involved not only in the electoral abuses that we have seen over the past couple of years but going all the way back to the 1980s and their actions in Matabeleland, which most people would acknowledge is either genocide or crimes against humanity. So they are very concerned and will continue to use their power to thwart a transition process. They recognise that time is against them; they recognise that ZANU-PF in a recent poll got 10% support from the Zimbabwean people - a very credible poll in fact. So our view is that something has to be done to get those Generals to move on. It is a very disagreeable option to look at a possible amnesty, a domestic amnesty, a question of arranging a soft landing for the individuals - it is not one that we like to talk about. But it is one that the Zimbabweans themselves are talking about; they are talking about, "Are we really going to allow a dozen people to have the veto power on our future?" So I would urge the Committee to think about talking with people about those questions. Again, it is for the Zimbabweans to decide, not the international community, but they need to be able to legitimise that conversation.

Professor Brett: Can I say that this leads directly into the issue of managing the next election because all of these problems manifest themselves in attempts to control politics, control voting and all of those kinds of things; so I think all of the issues around how the next election is going to be managed, who is going to manage it, the forms that it is going to take, how you are going to avoid abuses and how you are going to monitor it, those issues need to be addressed and they need to be addressed in co-operation with people in the region because it is much more credible to bring in monitors from South Africa than from here.

Q15 Richard Burden: A credible register would be a difficulty, would it not?

Professor Brett: That whole issue is a major issue and, as I say, I think it is something on which you need to take a general position and think about what sorts of things can be put into that. The second point I would make just in terms of what you do when you get to Zimbabwe, it is very important for you to try to get close to and have serious conversations with ZANU people as well as MDC people because I think the other possible thing that might turn the situation around is the fact that ZANU as a political organisation is deeply divided. There are probably people in ZANU who do realise the enormity of the problem that confronts them and the critical point coming up is if ZANU can be split - and ZANU is clearly under huge stress, the last congress was one of the most divisive that has ever existed and even Mugabe publicly came out and said, "We are being destroyed from within" - and it is important to get a sense of what is going on inside ZANU to see whether there are possibilities from inside that you could build a much more reasonably broad-based Government that included some of ZANU without ZANU being in control.

Q16 Hugh Bayley: One of the other things that affects the electoral process is the number of Zimbabweans living abroad. I have had MDC people say to me, "You are just absorbing all our voters." To what extent are migrants deterred from returning to Zimbabwe by the economic situation and to what extent are they deterred through fear of political reprisals?

Dr Kibble: There was a judgment by the Immigration Tribunal here called RF that anybody who could not demonstrably show support for ZANU-PF was at least theoretically at risk of being returned to Zimbabwe. So the British Government to that extent - given that is a Tribunal decision - has had to reconcile that with its desire to get rid of migrants as much as possible. So there is that balance between people who are scared of what is going to happen to them if they return to either their area or an area under the control of a ZANU-PF chief who does not know who these people are and they will be suspicious. There is that element of fear of the political consequences of returning. One of the reasons that Tsvangirai was barracked at Southwark Cathedral when he said that it was time for Zimbabweans to go home was precisely because people were extremely vulnerable and extremely aware of what was to face them if they were returned to Zimbabwe. Undoubtedly people are here because they cannot make a living inside Zimbabwe, but I think the political imperative of them remaining here still remains much the same as it has been for the last two years.

Q17 Hugh Bayley: What do you estimate in the number of Zimbabweans living currently in other countries in Southern Africa and the numbers in Harare North?

Dr Kibble: Harare North, if you include Luton! I do not think that anybody really has a complete handle on it, but certainly between three and four million Zimbabweans inside Southern Africa - overwhelmingly in South Africa but some in Botswana, a few in Zambia, Malawi and Mozambique. The population here has been estimated at between 100,000 and 200,000, of whom some are undoubtedly illegal over-stayers, some have residency rights and some have refugee status. Those are the figures I have heard. I have no independent backup on those figures whatsoever, and it would be an interesting piece of research to find out. The whole issue - because of necessity certain people are overstaying on student visas and visitors' visas - is clouded with a certain mystification.

Q18 Hugh Bayley: These people are disproportionately professionals and skilled or semi-skilled workers. What impact does that absence have on the economy of Zimbabwe? And if one has to provide economic progress to create the conditions for political progress, what can be done to help those who can return to return?

Dr Kibble: I think Donald wants to come in, but just to say that if all the Zimbabwean nurses could return home and all the teachers currently teaching in South Africa that would make a major boost to the reconstruction of Zimbabwe.

Mr Steinberg: I was going to start by making that same point, that you have indeed seen, even over the last year, a brain drain that is leaving not only the social sectors that we are talking about, but the manufacturing sector, the agricultural sector, the mining sector as well, which brings up the larger question of how do you restore this economy? Indeed, I do believe that the key to getting three to four million people back from the region and the key to getting people elsewhere in the world back is to give them economic opportunities. What that insists upon is not only completing the global political agreement so that people know that this process is in fact going to take place, but you have to remember what happened in October when Morgan Tsvangirai temporarily suspended his participation in Government and people thought that maybe this was going to fall apart, and you saw a massive move of people moving outside of Harare to rural areas; you saw hoarding of gasoline and other products; you saw the stock market crash. So the economic implications of even a temporary blip in this process are tremendous. If the process were to fall apart the three or 4% growth that we have seen this last year would be a 20% decline over the next year. Zimbabweans also have to take steps themselves, though. They have right now anti-business laws and regulations. The indigenisation law is a disaster; it is scaring off foreign investment and trade. They have to provide security for ownership in their country. Zimbabwe is one of the 20 worst places to invest in the world right now according to the World Bank's estimate, and people understand that. Again, you have to put in place mechanisms for clean foreign assistance to come in, and again I would point to the multi-donor trust fund. God grant that the Zimbabwe dollar is dead forever and they have to formally accept another currency as their own currency - the South African rand would be a good choice, the American dollar would be just fine; there are other Governments around the world who do the exact same thing. Zimbabwe needs to finally put a dagger into the five trillion dollar Zimbabwe notes that I have plastered on my wall in my office. Finally, I need to stress again that the Central Bank Governor has to go because he is the single symbol of the old regime.

Chairman: We have slightly run out of time but if I could just bring in Richard Burden.

Q19 Richard Burden: Just very briefly about the DFID aid expenditure. For all the reasons we have been talking about because of the severity of the crisis in Zimbabwe a huge amount proportionally of DFID's aid is devoted now to humanitarian assistance and a number of organisations have said that whilst it is understandable that the balance is wrong and that there needs to be a way of getting that contribution more towards long-term development rather than simply humanitarian assistance. Do you agree that it is just a function of the crazy situation of the whole thing, or is there something that can be done at the moment to shift that balance?

Professor Brett: I agree absolutely with that proposition. Clearly one does not want to stop spending on the social sectors at all, but critically creating employment is the way that you make it possible for people to generate the resources they need to support their own services. I think that there are two issues: there is the formal economic sector and the informal sector. The formal sector can actually be got going virtually costlessly, simply by eliminating a whole set of controls over it that have stopped people from investing and the first control, which was the whole monetary system and doing away with that, has already produced massive results at virtually zero costs. I think that given the fact that there is 80% or 90% of apparent unemployment - it is not unemployment because if people are unemployed they do not eat and they starve to death, so they must be doing something - there is a small informal sector operating, and I think the crucial thing that DFID could do would be to build some small micro-enterprise projects that would in effect encourage people to get into small business activities of various sorts and kinds, and that could be done either using the state or, in parallel with the state, by setting up micro finance enterprises and a whole array of other sorts of things. But that seems to me to be where DFID has not actually been investing and that is where the most important investment should go, particularly given that Zimbabwe, of all African countries, actually went in and systematically destroyed that informal business sector that was responsible for the livelihoods of probably half of its populations, in Operation Murambatsvina in 2005, when they virtually destroyed half of the businesses in Harare and Bulawayo in the most devastating kind of way. That would be my major recommendation in terms of thinking about an allocation of DFID resources that would change the way they operate.

Dr Kibble: At the moment we are in a humanitarian-plus transitional phase. We are not yet in a post-conflict phase. We obviously need the humanitarian aid to continue with 2.2 million people being food insecure right now and a major shortfall in cereals, etcetera, but we do need to look at how that translates into developmental aid in a sequencing way. It is not quite as crude as a stick and carrot approach. You cannot institute development-orientated aid right now, but what you can do is to say these are mechanisms that could work, this is the money that is available, the clean kind of mechanisms that Donald is talking about. Money going through international NGOs and various other multi-lateral agencies into more and more specifically developmental long-term assistance, once certain preconditions are met, once you have indicators on the ability of the state to handle that money, the ability of all the different ministries to be able to come up with plans that are met, that have no corruption attached to them. More and more you can move into straightforward developmental assistance and possibly, lastly, you can move into direct budgetary support but that is, in my mind, quite a long way off yet.

Q20 Chairman: I think we recognise that.

Mr Steinberg: Dr Kibble's point about using aid as an opportunity to move the process ahead is very important. I would also argue that sanctions and the lifting of them should be much more deliberately tied to the steps that we really want to see here. I will give just one example on using aid as an opportunity. Right now under the Global Political Agreement there is a commitment to do a land audit and this is very significant because it gets to the heart of what land reform is all about in Zimbabwe. It is not just a technical exercise. It is an effort to say okay, we have transferred all of these large white tracts of land to someone. Who have we transferred it to? What are they doing with that land? Is it just lying fallow? Does a single general own tracts and tracts of land? Is this what we really meant when we were talking about breaking up the white farms and giving it to the people of Zimbabwe? It is going to take another step. It is going to say and what do those smallholders need? Do they need fertilisers? Do they need water? Do they need credit? This is not just a technical exercise. This is the heart and soul of this whole question about land reform and right now the Minister of Agriculture says that it is too soon to do this. Even though we committed in the Global Political Agreement, even though we have already allocated the $31 million we need for it, even though the EU have already said they will pay for 40% of that cost, apparently it is "too soon" to do that exercise. I do not understand how you could put money into a land reform programme in Zimbabwe, which is absolutely necessary. No-one is defending the past situation, and, with all due respect, I think to say that people were better off under Ian Smith than they are today or that the Government was more committed to growth then, is particularly un-useful in this exercise, but, having said that, we need to get to the root of what this is all about. Is it really land reform or is it just empowering the cronies of Robert Mugabe? That is what this is going to show us and any assistance we provide to the agricultural sector ought to be tied to the completion of an honest land audit.

Chairman: That saved me asking the last question because that was an answer. Thank you to all three of you. It has been very useful for us to have your insight. It is obviously a confused and complicated situation that could go in a lot of different directions but I think you have given us a good feel for how aid and the development of aid can interact. I want to thank you very much indeed.


Memorandum submitted by World Vision

Examination of Witnesses

Witnesses: Mr Rob Rees, Africa Advocacy Co-ordinator, CAFOD; Mr William Anderson, Country Manager Zimbabwe, Christian Aid; and Mr Justin Byworth, Chief Executive, World Vision, gave evidence.

Q21 Chairman: Can I say welcome to you and thank you very much for coming in. You will probably appreciate that we are slightly pressed for time and one or two colleagues may have to leave. We want to hear from you and if you can be crisp in your answers that would be helpful but please tell us what you think we need to hear. You have been in before and heard what has been going on in the previous session. I will start with what DFID has been doing with its Protracted Relief Programme but, firstly, could you introduce yourself for the record.

Mr Anderson: I am William Anderson.

Mr Byworth: I am Justin Byworth from World Vision.

Mr Rees: I am Rob Rees from CAFOD.

Q22 Chairman: DFID ran this Protracted Relief Programme I and II which attracted some degree of support. How effective has it been? What have its problems been? What do you think they could or should have learned which might help inform the next stage?

Mr Anderson: Let me just make a quick point. Overall, I think DFID has a very good programme in Zimbabwe. I think DFID has responded to the needs very well. It has set the agenda for all other donors really, so we should be very proud of what DFID is doing in Zimbabwe in a very difficult situation. The Protracted Relief Programme is the flagship programme of DFID particularly related to secure livelihoods. It is a key part of humanitarian plus, as it were. It is not really relief but it is recovery and in many ways development. We are in the second phase of the PRP. We have had three years and then a review period and now we are in the second three-year period, or possibly five years. I would say that it is an extremely good programme. Other donors really want to come on board and support it. One particular aspect of it, if I can come straight on to that, is conservation agriculture. DFID has supported conservation agriculture since 2002. It has supported a task force in Zimbabwe on conservation agriculture. It has supported a manual that is now out. It has done this to some opposition within Zimbabwe. There were a few agricultural academics who said that conservation agriculture does not work, particularly in the drier parts of the country. These academics have now been proved to be wrong and they have said that this is the best agricultural practice. In that respect, DFID has stuck to their guns and I think it is an excellent agricultural practice that should be promoted across Africa. I would like to see DFID promote that much more.

Mr Byworth: I agree with everything that William has said. I think PRP is a flagship programme that DFID should be proud of. World Vision and others as partners of that have seen real impact in the lives of communities that we are working with. One particular aspect of it that we welcome is its focus on the vulnerable, including vulnerable children, combined with a focus on livelihoods to lift up the communities, through such things as conservation agriculture, together with safety net and social protection programming to support those who are most vulnerable.

Q23 Chairman: Could you explain that a bit more, though, because this is in a country where the Government has been crashing around destroying things all over the place. To what extent can they be sure that this sticks? What has been the reaction of the Government to this if then they decide they want to work in an area or displace people? Has that happened or how have they managed to protect it?

Mr Byworth: Certainly where World Vision is working is at that interface between community and the lowest tier of government, particularly government service deliveries in health and education. In those places obviously in the last 12 months we have seen real progress on that in terms of staff being there and able to deliver those basic services, so certainly we are more hopeful about that now than we were 12 to 18 months ago. Of course the future is uncertain.

Q24 Chairman: Are there no-go areas, parts of the country you just would not go?

Mr Byworth: Not for World Vision. We have been working in several parts all around the periphery of the country and we do not have that issue, certainly not recently since the NGO ban, but that was a different matter.

Mr Rees: I would endorse what they have said about the programme overall. Just a slight comment though on the way that the programme is managed through a contracting agency, GRM. We recognise that DFID needs to minimise transaction costs and save its own costs, but there is a feeling that it increases the distance between civil society organisations that are actually implementing the programme on the ground and the donor. Through the partners that we work with they would like to feel that they have some opportunity for more direct contact with DFID in order to be able to get a better understanding and to ensure that DFID has a good understanding of the situation that they are working in. This applies to a certain extent in the health sector as well. At the time of the cholera crisis DFID gave the funds for the response to cholera all to UNICEF and there were a lot of delays subsequently in the provision of the relief assistance. Generally, we think that there should be some improvements in the means of communication and dialogue between civil society and DFID.

Chairman: Thank you for that.

Q25 Richard Burden: On the same area of DFID programmes around agriculture, it is good to hear what you say about the conservation agriculture programme. DFID's work in terms of improving agricultural productivity has also been praised. Are there any ways that you think that that work can be improved upon and built upon for the future? I take your point about GRM as well, about mechanisms for distributing support to small farmers.

Mr Anderson: The key part of conservation agriculture is teaching people how to better manage their land and how to get a profitable harvest. The national average in Zimbabwe is 0.2 metric tonnes per hectare. For a family of six just to be subsistent they will need 1.2 metric tonnes per annum of grain. The conservation agriculture practice enables households to get at least two, three, five and in many cases over ten metric tonnes per hectare. That is in ideal conditions. This then comes to a point where once you have got a good harvest what do you do with that maize, sorghum or millet? That is where we need to address the issue of market because if you cannot sell the maize, in particular, then that household is not able to use it. It is going beyond that and thinking about storage and about markets and about better crops, better grain, more suitable to the areas. People do prefer maize. Sorghum, millet and cassava are promoted by DFID and perhaps it is looking into this as well, how can we get across the idea that for dry areas these are the crops that are much more suitable. DFID is doing this but perhaps they can be nudged in that direction further. It is certainly not off their radar; it is on their radar.

Mr Byworth: One point to add in terms of building on that, I think it is important also in supporting agricultural development and greater food production to link from that into the area of nutrition. Obviously even where you have higher yields and higher consumption, it does not automatically translate into better nutrition for children and women. There have been examples of other projects, Healthy Harvests for example with UNICEF, where that work has been combined with greater education on good nutritional practice in the home, and certainly World Vision would advocate that a link is made between the agricultural-based programmes with also the child-focused vulnerable programmes to improve child nutrition. The levels of chronic malnutrition and stunting in young adults in Zimbabwe is horrendous. It is huge although the acute wasting malnutrition is not so high. I believe they are just doing a nationwide nutrition survey at the moment and UNICEF and many other agencies are involved in that. We should make the link from agricultural production to nutrition, particularly for children.

Mr Rees: Conservation farming is aimed at making better use of resources and particularly rainfall, but at the end of the day the overall productivity will depend on a successful rainy season. Just at the moment there is a very big fear that the rains have stopped. There has been a three-week break in the rains in many places and yields are going to be greatly reduced and possibly be in total failure unless they resume. This then adds additional complications because farmers have taken resources, fertilisers and seeds on credit and the question is whether they are going to be expected to repay those loans even though they have no harvest and how they will do that. It raises the issue of land and land ownership, which is quite a critical factor in the matrix.

Mr Byworth: I think next week some of you will be there. I was there ten days ago and I saw literally the contrast where the conservation farming had been applied or not in terms of surviving the period without rain. I have not heard good news that there has been rain, but I heard from some farmers and they said last year they had good rains and a better harvest but because of the economic and political situation they did not have access to the inputs; this year they have access to the inputs and now they have no rain.

Q26 Chairman: The Committee has a reputation for finding the rain.

Mr Byworth: That is fantastic. The rainmakers!

Mr Anderson: I have a couple of points, harking back to what was said before. One is about internally displaced persons. That is a term that cannot be used in Zimbabwe by agencies because the Government does not like it - they prefer "mobile vulnerable population" - but DFID has been consistent in its support of internally displaced persons (IDPs), and the work that they do with the International Organisation for Migration (IOM) should be commended as well. I hope you are going to look at that. It comes on to the point about how they support some of the displaced persons perhaps from Murambatsvina in communities and the existing communities there. Over a period of time the support went just to those displaced persons, which caused conflict and tension in the community. But now through IOM, with DFID support and with other NGOs, the support is more holistic, so lessons have been learned along the way as well, just to add that point. Another point is that at the local government level often the local government really wants the NGOs with DFID support to be there. They will be falling over themselves to get in the NGO support. They really want the support from NGOs. It is very different to the message of the national government. I think that is a key point as well. NGOs were really only banned for those few weeks after the first election in 2008. There was a ban and we were not able to operate but since then, I think across the country, NGOs do have access at the moment. At election time that becomes restricted and few field staff will be able to visit those areas. That is for three or four weeks before the election.

Q27 Hugh Bayley: As the health system has contracted health needs have increased. What can be done to recruit and retain and, dare I say, repatriate health staff?

Mr Byworth: That is a very good question. Obviously there is an international dimension to on which I do not think myself and World Vision are best-placed to comment in terms of the diaspora, for example, in the UK. Certainly having just been there, I was encouraged that staff - and I visited three health clinics all in southern Matabeleland - had returned to work again in the last 12 months and were being paid and were working. Certainly we have seen an improvement in that. Obviously there is a huge reliance on local community-based volunteers. Whether it is on caring for people living with HIV or whether it is on outreach programmes for children, there is a huge reliance on local volunteers where NGOs like World Vision and others can help link up to the system. Obviously one long-term policy issue we would like to see is access free at the point of service, free at the point of use. Access to health care does not exist and obviously, although economically things are much better now in a dollarized economy, prices, although they have dropped a little in the last couple of months, are still high and the cost both for the recipient and also for staff with salaries the way they are is a struggle. Long-term you need a strong health system top to bottom, but we recognise the constraints in addressing that in terms of government-to-government.

Q28 Andrew Stunell: If I could just pick up the specifics of the HIV programme where DFID has allocated £40 million over the next five years. Do you think DFID's focus on that is correct? Is it working? What would you say about the programme itself and the outcomes we might expect to see?

Mr Rees: I would say it is a major priority and DFID does have its level of commitment right. Zimbabwe now has one of the lowest levels of life expectancy of anywhere in Africa. It is 34 years for a male and 37 years for a female, with over one million orphans estimated across the country. I think there are questions, as was mentioned a moment ago, about access to health services since the dollarization. People in rural areas particularly have very limited opportunity for accessing hard currency and therefore have limited access to health services, which then raises a question of access to and distribution of the antiretrovirals (ARVs) and how the costs of distributing those will be covered.

Q29 Andrew Stunell: What about the vulnerable and margionalised groups?

Mr Byworth: As you mentioned, particularly the orphans and households made vulnerable by HIV, the scale of it is just immense. DFID has responded well to it. I think the programme of support that they have given through UNICEF has been very well received and well used. I think it is completing later this year in 2010, so we would certainly encourage DFID to look at continuing that. Rob mentioned earlier that UNICEF in terms of an intermediary and a grant-making body to NGOs and civil society has not been set up to do that as efficiently, say, as GRM have done for the PRP, so I think they either need some support to get better - we have had all kinds of problems with procurement through them - or look at an alternative intermediary. We certainly support what UNICEF is doing there and the DFID work with UNICEF. Although HIV prevalence rates have reduced, the numbers of orphans and those affected has increased, so it is going to be many years that this needs to be continued for.

Mr Rees: Within the work that we do under PRP with DFID support we try to prioritise families and communities that are affected by HIV, so single-parent families particularly and those mothers who are HIV positive will be given preferential treatment and access to support through that programme. It is a matter of targeting assistance to try to encourage and maintain self-reliance within the family and within the community because the problem is so big that institutions are not the response.

Q30 Andrew Stunell: Compared to other African countries, the amount of aid going in for HIV projects appears to be lower. Is that a function of the instability or is there government resistance or have we just not got round to it?

Mr Anderson: Lower than what? I think one of the reasons why there is not a huge amount of money is because of some of the large foundations, for example the Bill Gates Foundation and PEPFAR, which are supporting Zimbabwe at the moment. In terms of the priority of HIV/AIDS, it is a huge issue and DFID is right to concentrate on it. Coming back to the prevalence, it was about 25% five years ago and it has now come down to about 16%. That is attributed partly due to behaviour change, and I think DFID's role in that can be evidenced. It is also partly due to the number of people who have died. There are 3,000 people dying every week from AIDS-related illnesses. In terms of the actual support, there is also an organisation called Population Services International (PSI). Again that is with USAID so DFID has done well to co-ordinate its funding of that with another large donor. I think that is a good programme as well. I am not qualified to talk about it but it is something you can certainly look into. There is an extended support programme which is considerable in Zimbabwe. They work through the Government, the Ministry of Health, as well as large UN agencies as well as larger NGOs. Again that is a huge programme that I am not qualified to talk about but I would suggest you look into it as well. In terms of the priority of HIV, it is a huge issue and they are right to do that.

Mr Byworth: We certainly have not come across the social stigma that was there some years ago or a "head in the sand" political mentality about this. That has not been an issue that we have encountered locally. Programmes are able to be effective there but the need is huge. There is a great link with cross-border migration as well, with South Africa particularly, which complicates things.

Q31 Mr Sharma: In the last few years the child mortality rate has increased. What are the main causes of that and illness in the country and how do you then go about addressing these issues?

Mr Rees: I think it is a combination of factors reflecting the chaos that has prevailed within the country and within the primary health care sector: the reduction of the number of medical staff, the trained nurses and doctors who have left the country, so there are not the personnel on the ground to provide the services ;lack of basic supplies; the inability of the poorer sectors of the community to be able to pay for the services. Especially pre-dollarization where prices were going up by the minute, then it was a very difficult situation for anybody to plan ahead for and to be able to make the necessary allowances in terms of their own personal expenditure.

Mr Byworth: Certainly under five child mortality is an absolute top priority. World Vision has a global campaign on that at the moment to try and reduce the 8.8 million child deaths each year, to try and reduce the six million or so of those which are largely preventable. Certainly in Zimbabwe the major childhood killers are there to see - diarrhoea, respiratory infections, malaria, et cetera. Poor hygiene and access to water sanitation is a major factor. Poor nutrition is a major contributing factor underlying the vulnerability which leads from not getting access to health care. When you do not get access to health care it has more damaging effects. Certainly we would like to see a redoubling of focus on both the maternal and child health Millennium Development Goals not just for Zimbabwe but for all countries where child mortality is high. There are about 30 what we call "high burden" countries which have the largest percentage and largest number of children under five who die. Zimbabwe needs to be right up there with a big strong focus on it, both through strengthening health systems and community-based measures. A lot of times with child mortality it is simple, community-based preventative measures such as re-hydration for diarrhoea and those types of things that are proven to reduce mortality. If you look at Malawi just across the border, child mortality has improved significantly in the last few years in contrast to Zimbabwe and a few places like Kenya. It gets strong investment but it needs to be both community-based and also health strengthening. DFID is well placed on that at a policy level through the International Health Partnership they have been promoting A bit of a stronger capacity for DFID in country in Zimbabwe on health would be good. They are not as strong as perhaps they might be.

Mr Anderson: It is due to the breakdown of Zimbabwean society and the social services structures. It is as basic as that.

Q32 Mr Sharma: You did mention that poor child health is due to malnutrition. How effective has the food aid programme been in tackling it?

Mr Anderson: Food aid now through the World Food Programme has been going on for eight years and there are very good things in that it has stopped people from dying. It has operated during the hunger gap period from around November/December to around March/April when the harvests come in. I would say it has saved lives. In terms of how we can improve that, I would suggest that there are areas that WFP should be looking at and nudged by DFID, particularly Food for Work, because simple food aid for eight years on the trot does induce dependency on food aid and people perhaps might decide just to take the bag of food at the end of the month rather than try to grow their own food. There are also things like issuing worm tablets. It is a very simple operational activity to issue worm tablets with the food aid. There are lots of other things that could be done like that to support the food aid. In general, I think the World Food Programme could be held a little bit more to account by DFID. NGOs are under strict accountable measures through the GRM and the TLC. The TLC is very good and they have certainly improved the capacity of international and national NGOs in particular. It would be nice to see a bit more accountability for UN structures as well.

Mr Byworth: World Vision has partnered with the World Food Programme and also the USAID food programme as significant suppliers of food aid for the whole of that period, so certainly we can attest first-hand to lives being saved through that, but we would also agree that with conditions economically improving, there needs to be a move (which has happened) to greater targeting of the most vulnerable because even if you move away from general food distributions, which has not yet happened and probably cannot yet happen fully but needs to happen over the coming years, you are going to still need some targeted food assistance for particularly vulnerable groups. Yes, there will need to be a move towards more livelihood-based use of food such as Food for Work and to combine that with agricultural development programmes to reduce dependency. I would not say it is time to stop yet but it is time to start the transition to a more targeted and more livelihoods-based approach. Definitely that transition needs to happen. DFID's view on that has been largely correct. Even in the PRP they are pushing for a more economically viable approach to recovery now, which again the conditions allow for more now than they did 12 or 18 months ago.

Q33 John Battle: Just as infant mortality is rising maternal mortality is rising as well and DFID has taken some actions to try and decrease the rising rate of maternal mortality. Is it successful? Is it helping?

Mr Byworth: Not sure is the answer.

Mr Anderson: I do not know but just as an anecdote, private hospitals were extremely good in Zimbabwe but even in private hospitals now, due to the collapse of the system, there are not enough medicines to go around, certainly not enough staff, so even if you wanted private expensive medical care in Zimbabwe you might be thinking about going down to Johannesburg. At the community level/communal level outside of these private hospitals you have very little to support you.

Mr Byworth: Certainly World Vision is not as involved with maternal health except in as much as the link with that and child and neonatal health particularly. I know the number of women having deliveries at home is very high. Up until the last couple of years it is 40% or something like that. The number of skilled birth attendants is not enough and access because of distances to travel are difficult. Again anecdotally, I saw women come for ante-natal check-ups just ten days ago at a clinic in Matabeleland, and there was a women who had had a baby two years before, and she contrasted that experience with the child that she had with her of four months on her knee and she talked about the difference of both access for delivery where she it at the health centre more recently and also access to immunisation and child monitoring. She talked of a real difference and a real improvement between her second child who was a baby and her first child who was two/two and half. That is anecdotal. In terms of DFID's impact I do not have any evidence.

Q34 John Battle: DFID themselves highlight the high rate of contraceptive use in Zimbabwe. Has that made a big difference?

Mr Byworth: It links to PSIs perhaps.

Mr Anderson: I do not know the PSI programme.

Mr Byworth: They talk about the high rate of female condom usage in Zimbabwe more than almost any other country in sub-Saharan Africa, I believe, but I do not have any first-hand evidence of that.

Q35 Hugh Bayley: What were the causes of the cholera outbreak last year? Are you expecting another outbreak this year? What should DFID be supporting in terms of promoting better public health and hygiene?

Mr Anderson: Cholera has always been in Zimbabwe. Every year there are a number of deaths. This year seven people have died officially from cholera. Last year was an epidemic waiting to happen really. It was the result again of the breakdown of social services, very bad sanitation in high-density suburban areas and very poor living conditions. It was going to happen really and it was talked about at various humanitarian agency co-ordination strategy working groups even before it broke out. We were discussing it before it happened so we knew it was coming, in a way. In terms of what DFID could do further, it is all about community-based improvement of sanitation at the moment because local government do not have the funding to improve these services. DFID needs to work out how - and you talked about it in the earlier session as well - to support local government in that and how to support the community in that.

Mr Rees: In the longer term there has to be major rehabilitation of the infrastructure. Community-based responses really are just short-term measures, particularly in densely populated areas like Harare and the suburbs. It is a project for the future to rehabilitate both the sewerage and water supply systems which will then provide the protection that will be needed.

Q36 Hugh Bayley: I can see the need for the immediate response and I can see that that is possible now but what political conditions would you need for major infrastructure projects to be viable?

Mr Rees: It will be dependent upon economic recovery within the country and, as William alluded to, the financial resources being committed by the national government, whether it is from its own internally generated income or whether it is through aid packages after the resumption of normal aid and financial support from the international financial institutions. As I say, that is an issue to be dealt with in the future when those basic economic and political questions have been addressed.

Q37 Hugh Bayley: Can I ask a slightly wider question. It is a chicken and egg situation, is it not? If you wait until conditions are right, conditions will never be right. Politics is about a process of moving from the dire position you are in to a better position. How does the nexus of aid and politics help you? In other words, should you be planning this now and how would you plan it now? Should you be telling a big infrastructure player like the EU to put together a programme? How do you get to a position where you can improve infrastructure in a relatively near timescale?

Mr Anderson: There is a recovery plan and DFID was part of producing that. It was based on The Hague Principles in October 2007 and then a major donor meeting in Ottawa last year. It is all to do with, as we were discussing in the first session, whether the Government of Zimbabwe is really there for its people or there for itself. Unless that has been addressed, that is a fundamental issue where, no matter what is poured in, it might not work, it might not be targeted, it might be liable for corruption. In terms of improving these services, yes, DFID has to work as far as it can but make sure that there are certain benchmarks which they have already got in writing that are met. At this time the Hague Principles are not met and most of those benchmarks are not being met and so therefore withhold the funding and hopefully if these benchmarks are starting to be met then release some of the funding but, yes, it is very difficult.

Q38 Andrew Stunell: Can we just take a look at education and children. The DFID allocation is 2% of aid going to education. There has been talk about schools getting back to work and so on and yet there are clearly some priority areas. Could you just comment on the amount of money that DFID is allocating and the effectiveness of what it is doing. Are we short of teachers? Are we short of buildings? Are we short of security? What do you see as being the problems or perhaps there are not any problems?

Mr Rees: All of the above, I would say. There is a shortage of teachers. Along with health professionals many teachers have migrated out of the country. I heard an interesting report that some of the best educations in the countries around Zimbabwe are provided in schools where there are Zimbabwe exiled teachers. In the past Zimbabwe had a very high standard of education and a very high standard of teaching. Quite rightly it was proud of it. As with health professionals, some system and some opportunities need to be created to bring those professionals back into Zimbabwe to support the schools. There needs to be investment in schools and in school materials in the same way that there needs to be investment in primary health care facilities as well, particularly in the rural areas.

Q39 Andrew Stunell: So do you think this is something which can come through the state or DFID can only contribute through the state? In terms of the amount being given, 2% of DFID's money is going to education; is that about right, is it too much or too little?

Mr Anderson: I do not know. In terms of the Ministry of Education, it is run by David Coltart at the moment. He was the only MDC MP not to accept a brand new Mercedes Benz when he took office. He is trying to drive out corruption but again his hands are in effect tied to a large extent because of the political deadlock between ZANU-PF and the MDC. He is also completely tied by the fact that teachers are not paid so they want to go to South Africa and get a proper salary. I do not know whether the 2% is right or not but it is certainly a huge area.

Mr Rees: I do not think there is any country in Africa where there is enough investment in education. There is always a need for more.

Mr Anderson: I think in 1980 ZANU-PF said that they were going to provide free primary education. We have not seen that to date.

Q40 John Battle: I think it was Justin that mentioned that there are over a million orphans and vulnerable children. In your submission you ask DFID to carry out a Child Rights Situational Analysis. I want to ask a little bit about how effective you think that would be. I understand that many of the orphans go to stay with extended family. What is the support given to extended families with over one million children pushed out to further relatives to cope with? What is your view on the orphan situation?

Mr Byworth: We talked about it a little earlier. It is an enormous situation. Obviously family coping mechanisms are stretched beyond breaking point in many cases. World Vision's point on child rights is that in some respects DFID often uses a human rights framework to look at things and obviously that was relevant when they put together their strategy for Zimbabwe. We have certainly found as a child-focused organisation that using child rights as an entry point is a helpful one. It is less politicised and there are the wider human rights issues. Where we hear the voices of children saying things that are right, whether it is education and schools, as we talked about just now, or health services, we are able to amplify those voices of children to get them heard. It is an effective way in. We have talked about the vulnerability of children as a whole. Whether it is child rights in a framework that can be looked through or whether there is a greater understanding of the rights of children, that is certainly something we would encourage in DFID. The orphan situation needs continuing investment. It is the point I made earlier: if DFID could continue and extend either the programme of support through UNICEF or something else like that, that would be very much welcomed.

Q41 Chairman: You have all been complimentary about DFID's basic programme in Zimbabwe but you have criticisms about some of the bureaucracy. In particular, World Vision have criticised DFID for "bureaucratic impediments" and we have heard from others of you that it requires a rather intensive application of people to monitor and keep up with the system. What would you want DFID to do? How do you think it would affect their programmes? Their starting point, presumably, is they are terribly worried about leakage but you are saying that complying with their requirements, by implication, is undermining delivery?

Mr Byworth: Firstly, let me say from World Vision's perspective there is a wider issue about DFID instruments of aid and using intermediaries like GRM to move transaction costs out of DFID, the head count and all of those things, into a third party where the transaction costs are lower.

Q42 Chairman: You are suggesting it is more to do with that bureaucratic pressure within DFID than it is to do specifically with the situation in Zimbabwe, or both?

Mr Byworth: I am just saying there is a wider issue about DFID's aid instruments. I think GRM work well. We have been happy with them and they work effectively. The people and the way that they work has been good. The one major concern we have raised is we are very happy to have the highest level of compliance and monitoring in terms of standards to demonstrate impact and to demonstrate outcomes. That is not an issue for us but where you have multiple advisers on different thematic areas and you have compliance monitoring and all the frameworks that come with that, you can get three meetings in the same week from different people and they are not always very joined-up. In our case we are working out of Bulawayo and Matabeleland. If those meetings happen in Harare on a Monday, Wednesday and Friday you can imagine how much hassle it is?

Q43 Chairman: Would it be better delivered if DFID appointed one person to deal with each NGO or each programme rather than dealing with it by sectors?

Mr Byworth: We have good contact points within GRM on the programme. For good reason, they have set up an elaborate mechanism to get good technical advice and support. You mentioned, William, about the support they have given to NGOs, both international NGOs and local ones. That is welcome but they could do with being a bit more co-ordinated. Their internal systems tend toward silos. It is more about streamlining what is happening. Plus I think the point Rob made, a bit more access to DFID perhaps in terms of policy dimensions of things. If you subcontract a programme, the relationship should be subcontracted in terms of partners. If DFID had a bit more of a partnership arrangement with civil society in terms of dialoguing about bigger picture issues rather than project management issues, I think a combination of fewer silos in GRM and better co-ordination and streamlining with a bit more access and co-ordination more in the sense of policy would be helpful.

Mr Rees: I have nothing really to add to what I said before about the specific example that my colleagues informed me about. They sometimes feel that it is difficult for them to get access directly to DFID to talk about the policy issues, to talk about the broader aspects of the programme because their relationship is constrained to dealing with the managing agent.

Q44 Chairman: Is that because there are not enough people and they are too busy or do you think it is because they have created a mechanism where it just does not happen?

Mr Rees: They seem to have created this mechanism but what the real thinking is behind that, whether it is because of pressure of work and people are too busy or whether it is just a policy to simplify the management from their point of view, I am not sure.

Q45 Chairman: We can explore that obviously but do you have anything to add, William?

Mr Anderson: Just to stress my earlier point that it would be nice to see greater accountability of the UN in the same way that NGOs are held to account.

Chairman: We can all shout "hallelujah" to that. Okay, thank you for that. John Battle?

Q46 John Battle: I think you mentioned, William, that the World Food Programme perhaps needs more accountability but perhaps its operations as well. DFID gives them £9 million and will probably give more. Should we be pursuing other approaches to the World Food Programme? How could we change it to make it more effective as well as just tracking the money?

Mr Anderson: That is a very big question. In a drive for efficiency and effectiveness, the UN perhaps is not the best mechanism at the moment but it is the only mechanism we have, so DFID has to put in place some more accountability measures that hold the UN to account for that.

Mr Byworth: One of the things that World Vision does where we partner with the World Food Programme in terms of delivering food to vulnerable populations, we have established in many of our agencies work on areas of humanitarian accountability to give the people who receive the food a voice. In every place where we are doing food distribution we have a complaints mechanism and a helpdesk. I have sat there and looked at the logs of people who were meant to be receiving food complaining if someone in their family was not registered properly or if they were not happy with the rations or type of food. Building in mechanisms where the beneficiaries themselves have a voice and that is heard needs to happen more across the board, both in Zimbabwe and in many other places, but certainly the UN agencies could benefit from more of that.

Mr Anderson: Just thinking back to 2008, the UN set up the Office for the Co-ordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) against the Government's wishes in 2005 after Murambatsvina. In 2008 the head of OCHA was rather a block to NGOs trying to ensure that the operational ban did not happen or to respond effectively to what the needs were on the ground. We complained as NGOs to the donors, particularly DFID, quite a lot about this and eventually we wrote a letter to the UN in New York and the head of OCHA was actually removed. We also complained about the Resident Representative there who is now a different Res Rep. It was Augustine Zacharias and there were certain question marks over him as to how effective he wanted the UN to be in terms of standing up to ZANU-PF. Again, perhaps we felt as NGOs that our voices when they were raised with DFID were heard but we were not quite sure what happened after that.

Q47 Chairman: Obviously there is a whole substructure there about the relationship with international organisations. Just one particular point about the WFP. We did a report on them 18 months ago at the height of the crisis, as it turned out, but they were keen of course not just to respond to emergencies but actually to anticipate them, not just with emergency back-up but with actual planting programmes. Are they doing any of that kind of work in Zimbabwe or is it just food relief? Of course in that context DFID maybe is not terribly interested in supporting that aspect of the WFP and they want to just see it as a food relief agency.

Mr Anderson: I think it is pretty much business as usual, it is pretty much food relief. I know they were talking about possibly distributing some seeds and fertiliser almost with the FAO or in co-ordination with them, but, to be honest, I do not know.

Q48 Chairman: That is fair enough. We can obviously ask about that because I think we are looking at some of the basic agricultural support programmes that DFID is supporting and I just wondered whether WFP and DFID are in competition or at odds with each other on that.

Mr Byworth: I believe they have done some maize seed distributions but it has not been a massive change of strategy. Certainly World Vision, together with WFP inputs and other support, have done quite a lot of agricultural inputs. I am not sure to what extent they have shifted. As you said, it is business as usual.

Q49 Chairman: Thank you very much indeed. We appreciate the informal evidence you have given us but it is nice to have a bit of information on record which is helpful to our inquiry and the production of our report at the end of the day, so can I thank you all three of you very much indeed for coming in.

Mr Byworth: Have a very good trip for those of you who are going.