Written evidence from Assistant Commissioner
Cressida Dick QPM, Metropolitan Police Service
1. I have been asked to attend the Committee
on Issue of Privilege (Police Searches on the Parliamentary Estate)
on 18 January. I understand the Committee will wish to focus on
my involvement in the scoping exercise and formulation of the
terms of reference for the investigation which led to the search
at Mr Damian Green MP's office on the Parliamentary Estate.
2. This short statement is intended to assist
the Committee by giving some further details of these early stages.
I also outline the extent of my involvement in the leak enquiry
overall.
3. At the material time, I was Deputy Assistant
Commissioner Specialist Operations (DACSO) in the Metropolitan
Police Service (MPS). There were two DACs in SO at the timeDAC
John McDowall who was the National Co-ordinator for Terrorist
Investigations and me. I was responsible for Security and Protection.
I was AC Quick's nominated deputy when he was away, acting as
Assistant Commissioner in his absence.
4. On 9 October 2008, AC Quick briefed me
about several matters that he wished me to be aware of and progress
in his absence as he was due to travel abroad the following day
on official business. One of these matters was a potential sensitive
leak enquiry referred to AC Quick by the Cabinet Office apparently
relating to the Home Office.
5. He asked me to oversee this in his absence
and ensure the Senior Investigating Officer (SIO) was properly
supported and resourced and to contact the Cabinet Office and
make sure they understood that we would initially limit MPS involvement
to scoping before deciding on whether to undertake any investigation.
I was also to brief the then Deputy Commissioner, Sir Paul Stephenson.
AC Quick and I agreed that it would be important that, were it
appropriate for us to mount an investigation, clear terms of reference
for such an investigation were written by the MPS and agreed with
the Cabinet Office.
6. I read the letter of 8 October 2008 (erroneously
dated 8 September) from Mr Chris Wright, Director of Security
at the Cabinet Office, to AC Quick. I subsequently spoke to Chris
Wright to outline what I saw as the next steps. I also described
the kind of issues we would consider in deciding whether to mount
an investigation. There was no doubt in my mind that Mr Wright
fully understood that any decision to investigate was an operational
decision which would be made independently by the police on behalf
of the Commissioner.
7. I also briefed the Deputy Commissioner
who supported the staged processie firstly, a scoping exercise
to establish what, if any, offence had been committed and whether
an investigation was a proper use of police resources. This would
be followed, if appropriate, by an investigation with clear terms
of reference made known to the Cabinet Office. I should perhaps
add that this formal approach is entirely normal in sensitive
and/or complex enquiries and is, in fact, only a slightly more
formal version of our every day process where someone wishes to
report what they believe to be a crime. The Deputy Commissioner
was particularly concerned that the MPS did not become involved
in an investigation which appeared only to involve "conduct"
matters ie anything where no substantive crime appeared to have
been committed. He also indicated he wanted to be consulted before
any decision was made to investigate and he wanted to be aware
of the terms of reference.
8. In the following days I had several conversations
with the Senior Investigating Officer. He and his deputy were
undertaking the scoping exercise which involved meeting Cabinet
Office officials and examining material relating to the alleged
leaks. They conducted background research and held discussions
with the Crown Prosecution Service. In addition, the SIO was identifying
the resources he might need were he to begin an investigation
and starting to define structure and systems that might allow
him to conduct such a sensitive and confidential enquiry effectively.
9. On 29 October 2008, Mr Wright wrote to
me (in a letter I understand the Committee has seen) making it
clear that he understood that a scoping exercise would take place
and that he understood the proposed terms of reference. These
terms had been written by the SIOhe had earlier consulted
me in relation to them. They had also been discussed by the SIO
with Mr Wright's Deputy.
10. The scoping exercise revealed that,
of the 31 leaks initially identified, 5 appeared to be linked.
It appeared that Christopher Galley was one of only a very few
people who were in a position to leak the relevant material. The
leaks appeared to be to different journalists at different newspapers.
A common feature was that each newspaper article contained comments
from Conservative spokespeople.
11. In relation to these five identified
leaks, the initial view from the CPS was that Official Secrets
Act offences might not be made out. However, the advice was that
the offence of misconduct in public office appeared to have been
committed. Clearly, this advice was not definitive, as it never
would be at such an early stage.
12. I was familiar with the offence of misconduct
in public office having had knowledge of cases in relation to
police officers and other public officials. It has been used in
a wide variety of circumstances including financial and sexual
misconduct as well as unauthorised disclosures of information.
13. I discussed the progress of the scoping
exercise with AC Quick (upon his return from abroad) and the Deputy
Commissioner. Both were content that it was appropriate to move
from scoping to active investigation and I made that decision
at the beginning of November 2008. I also discussed the draft
terms of reference with both of them and they were content. I
therefore confirmed the terms of reference with the SIO.
14. The investigation was started as there
were grounds to suspect that a crime, or crimes, had been committed
and on the basis of what we knew at that time, a suspect might
be identified and there was a reasonable prospect that sufficient
evidence might become available to support a successful prosecution.
The resources required by the MPS to investigate such a matter
were a reasonable and proportionate use of public money. It also
appeared that the offences were not trivial and regarded seriously
by the complainant hence the complainant was prepared to assist
the investigation and support a potential prosecution. Finally,
the identified suspect was in a highly trusted position with access
to very sensitive material. The apparent misconduct did not appear
to be an isolated event but a pattern of behaviour over a period
of time. It was reasonable to suspect that he might have stolen,
disclosed or be in improper possession of secret or sensitive
material.
15. I rang Mr Wright and told him that the
MPS would be going ahead with the investigation according to the
terms of reference. At no time did Mr Wright seek to put pressure
on me or the SIO to launch a criminal investigation nor did he
or his staff seek improperly to influence the terms of reference.
16. On 12 November 2008 I agreed with AC
Quick that the SIO and his Detective Chief Superintendent should
hereon report to DAC McDowall and that I should have no further
involvement in the investigation. This decision was made as AC
Quick was fully available, the investigating officers all normally
came under DAC McDowall's command and I was due to go abroad for
several days. I informed Mr Wright that DAC McDowall was now the
ACPO Officer for the investigation and that I would take no further
part.
17. Mr Galley was arrested whilst I was
abroad. Quite properly, I was not consulted about this, nor was
I told about it until after I returned to the UK.
18. I had no further involvement in (or
briefing on) the investigation until 25 November 2008 when AC
Quick asked me to attend the "Gold Group" meetings on
the following day to discuss the potential arrest of Mr Damian
Green MP and the associated searches of his various premises.
My role at these Gold Group meetings was to challenge and submit
ideas. I was not a decision maker although I fully supported the
decisions made and the rationale for them.
19. On the evening of 26 November and the
morning of 27 November 2008 I was fully engaged with the MPS response
to the terrorist attacks in Mumbai.
20. I was not briefed on the progress of
the searches or the attempts to locate Mr Green during the morning
of 27 November. However, as AC Quick was engaged with other important
operational matters that afternoon, he asked me to brief various
people once Mr Green had been arrested. This I did. I was also
present later that day when AC Quick briefed Kit Malthouse of
the MPA about the day's events.
21. I had no further involvement in the
investigation, submissions to CPS or related MPS decision making.
My subsequent involvement was limited to speaking to Mr (now Sir
Ian) Johnston as part of his review and to Denis O'Connor for
the HMIC review.
18 January 2010
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