Police Searches on the Parliamentary Estate - Committee on the Issue of Privilege Contents


Written evidence from Assistant Commissioner Cressida Dick QPM, Metropolitan Police Service

  1.  I have been asked to attend the Committee on Issue of Privilege (Police Searches on the Parliamentary Estate) on 18 January. I understand the Committee will wish to focus on my involvement in the scoping exercise and formulation of the terms of reference for the investigation which led to the search at Mr Damian Green MP's office on the Parliamentary Estate.

  2.  This short statement is intended to assist the Committee by giving some further details of these early stages. I also outline the extent of my involvement in the leak enquiry overall.

  3.  At the material time, I was Deputy Assistant Commissioner Specialist Operations (DACSO) in the Metropolitan Police Service (MPS). There were two DACs in SO at the time—DAC John McDowall who was the National Co-ordinator for Terrorist Investigations and me. I was responsible for Security and Protection. I was AC Quick's nominated deputy when he was away, acting as Assistant Commissioner in his absence.

  4.  On 9 October 2008, AC Quick briefed me about several matters that he wished me to be aware of and progress in his absence as he was due to travel abroad the following day on official business. One of these matters was a potential sensitive leak enquiry referred to AC Quick by the Cabinet Office apparently relating to the Home Office.

  5.  He asked me to oversee this in his absence and ensure the Senior Investigating Officer (SIO) was properly supported and resourced and to contact the Cabinet Office and make sure they understood that we would initially limit MPS involvement to scoping before deciding on whether to undertake any investigation. I was also to brief the then Deputy Commissioner, Sir Paul Stephenson. AC Quick and I agreed that it would be important that, were it appropriate for us to mount an investigation, clear terms of reference for such an investigation were written by the MPS and agreed with the Cabinet Office.

  6.  I read the letter of 8 October 2008 (erroneously dated 8 September) from Mr Chris Wright, Director of Security at the Cabinet Office, to AC Quick. I subsequently spoke to Chris Wright to outline what I saw as the next steps. I also described the kind of issues we would consider in deciding whether to mount an investigation. There was no doubt in my mind that Mr Wright fully understood that any decision to investigate was an operational decision which would be made independently by the police on behalf of the Commissioner.

  7.  I also briefed the Deputy Commissioner who supported the staged process—ie firstly, a scoping exercise to establish what, if any, offence had been committed and whether an investigation was a proper use of police resources. This would be followed, if appropriate, by an investigation with clear terms of reference made known to the Cabinet Office. I should perhaps add that this formal approach is entirely normal in sensitive and/or complex enquiries and is, in fact, only a slightly more formal version of our every day process where someone wishes to report what they believe to be a crime. The Deputy Commissioner was particularly concerned that the MPS did not become involved in an investigation which appeared only to involve "conduct" matters ie anything where no substantive crime appeared to have been committed. He also indicated he wanted to be consulted before any decision was made to investigate and he wanted to be aware of the terms of reference.

  8.  In the following days I had several conversations with the Senior Investigating Officer. He and his deputy were undertaking the scoping exercise which involved meeting Cabinet Office officials and examining material relating to the alleged leaks. They conducted background research and held discussions with the Crown Prosecution Service. In addition, the SIO was identifying the resources he might need were he to begin an investigation and starting to define structure and systems that might allow him to conduct such a sensitive and confidential enquiry effectively.

  9.  On 29 October 2008, Mr Wright wrote to me (in a letter I understand the Committee has seen) making it clear that he understood that a scoping exercise would take place and that he understood the proposed terms of reference. These terms had been written by the SIO—he had earlier consulted me in relation to them. They had also been discussed by the SIO with Mr Wright's Deputy.

  10.  The scoping exercise revealed that, of the 31 leaks initially identified, 5 appeared to be linked. It appeared that Christopher Galley was one of only a very few people who were in a position to leak the relevant material. The leaks appeared to be to different journalists at different newspapers. A common feature was that each newspaper article contained comments from Conservative spokespeople.

  11.  In relation to these five identified leaks, the initial view from the CPS was that Official Secrets Act offences might not be made out. However, the advice was that the offence of misconduct in public office appeared to have been committed. Clearly, this advice was not definitive, as it never would be at such an early stage.

  12.  I was familiar with the offence of misconduct in public office having had knowledge of cases in relation to police officers and other public officials. It has been used in a wide variety of circumstances including financial and sexual misconduct as well as unauthorised disclosures of information.

  13.  I discussed the progress of the scoping exercise with AC Quick (upon his return from abroad) and the Deputy Commissioner. Both were content that it was appropriate to move from scoping to active investigation and I made that decision at the beginning of November 2008. I also discussed the draft terms of reference with both of them and they were content. I therefore confirmed the terms of reference with the SIO.

  14.  The investigation was started as there were grounds to suspect that a crime, or crimes, had been committed and on the basis of what we knew at that time, a suspect might be identified and there was a reasonable prospect that sufficient evidence might become available to support a successful prosecution. The resources required by the MPS to investigate such a matter were a reasonable and proportionate use of public money. It also appeared that the offences were not trivial and regarded seriously by the complainant hence the complainant was prepared to assist the investigation and support a potential prosecution. Finally, the identified suspect was in a highly trusted position with access to very sensitive material. The apparent misconduct did not appear to be an isolated event but a pattern of behaviour over a period of time. It was reasonable to suspect that he might have stolen, disclosed or be in improper possession of secret or sensitive material.

  15.  I rang Mr Wright and told him that the MPS would be going ahead with the investigation according to the terms of reference. At no time did Mr Wright seek to put pressure on me or the SIO to launch a criminal investigation nor did he or his staff seek improperly to influence the terms of reference.

  16.  On 12 November 2008 I agreed with AC Quick that the SIO and his Detective Chief Superintendent should hereon report to DAC McDowall and that I should have no further involvement in the investigation. This decision was made as AC Quick was fully available, the investigating officers all normally came under DAC McDowall's command and I was due to go abroad for several days. I informed Mr Wright that DAC McDowall was now the ACPO Officer for the investigation and that I would take no further part.

  17.  Mr Galley was arrested whilst I was abroad. Quite properly, I was not consulted about this, nor was I told about it until after I returned to the UK.

  18.  I had no further involvement in (or briefing on) the investigation until 25 November 2008 when AC Quick asked me to attend the "Gold Group" meetings on the following day to discuss the potential arrest of Mr Damian Green MP and the associated searches of his various premises. My role at these Gold Group meetings was to challenge and submit ideas. I was not a decision maker although I fully supported the decisions made and the rationale for them.

  19.  On the evening of 26 November and the morning of 27 November 2008 I was fully engaged with the MPS response to the terrorist attacks in Mumbai.

  20.  I was not briefed on the progress of the searches or the attempts to locate Mr Green during the morning of 27 November. However, as AC Quick was engaged with other important operational matters that afternoon, he asked me to brief various people once Mr Green had been arrested. This I did. I was also present later that day when AC Quick briefed Kit Malthouse of the MPA about the day's events.

  21.  I had no further involvement in the investigation, submissions to CPS or related MPS decision making. My subsequent involvement was limited to speaking to Mr (now Sir Ian) Johnston as part of his review and to Denis O'Connor for the HMIC review.

18 January 2010





 
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