Crown Dependencies - Justice Committee Contents


Memorandum submitted by Paul Carney

  Further to recent coverage within the Jersey Evening Post, the following perspective may be of interest for the current review of the relationship between the UK and the crown dependant territories (notably the Channel islands and the Isle of Man).

  At the present time, I have a young family and I've worked within the finance industry for the past 12 years or so (based in Jersey since 2001).

  I have professional qualifications in tax and law.

  From a "selfish" perspective, the finance industry here in Jersey provides a relatively comfortable living and fosters a sense of wealth and well-being within the local economy generally. Of particular note in this context is the existence of a safe, clean & prosperous environment that would probably not be available if that industry contracted.

  Conversely, I recognise that this industry is founded in the attractiveness of the political stability a small island offers combined with a simplistic system of taxation. In particular, these islands either do not apply tax or adopt a zero rate to transactions and income generated through "investment/wealth management" vehicles that are beneficially owned by individuals, families and companies that "live" in other parts of the world.

  The size and population of the island and the evolution of political history have produced the crown dependency status which enables the islands to work with the UK in their international affairs in a manner not dissimilar to the devolved nations of the United Kingdom. In addition, the close proximity of these dependencies to the UK and awareness of cordial political relationships obviously attracts wealth from & investment into the UK via these islands.

  However, a fair "bargain" for these benefits & the most equitable point of taxation for such activities is certainly a moot point, especially when the crown dependency relationship is a key facilitator of interaction between the islands and third nations, albeit the UK already retains the power to monitor legislative developments (eg the recent Privy Council approval of Jersey's Foundations Law).

  Of course, a good proportion of the wealth managed within the crown dependencies does not originate from the UK—notably the middle east and countries within the British Commonwealth. Members of the finance industry (within both the crown dependencies and the UK) occasionally question the "optimum" point/rate of taxation arguing that any measures to increase UK tax revenues from the investment vehicles based in the crown dependencies will direct this wealth to alternative jurisdictions (especially in our global economy) and thus reduce taxable revenue, economic activity and adversely impact jobs and wealth for the population at large in each jurisdiction. For example, a number of AIM listings comprise third country companies using a crown dependency vehicle to raise investment which contributes to the economy of both jurisdictions and might be directed elsewhere in the absence of the current regime.

  In my experience, a key factor is the complexity of the UK tax system and its piecemeal development which has produced a range of differing tax rates. Most accountants and many lawyers within the UK have consequently developed differing degrees of tax planning practices to negotiate domestic residents/businesses and outside investors through this maze —which essentially, utilise opportunities to "exploit" gaps in the legislation &/or double tax treaties to manage and generate wealth —whilst legitimately paying as little tax as necessary.

  Specialist trust, company and partnership vehicles in particular can primarily act as a conduit for cash/asset flows and affect the timing of cash being accessed/used by the ultimate owners & indeed, any other party interested in the vehicle. Such practices are prevalent in all economies but the growth of the finance industry within the crown dependencies has certainly been fuelled by this practice.

  In many cases, the operation of these products is primarily focused on indicators that management and control/records are held in the dependency rather than true management and control occurring there. For example, most trustees would find it impossible to be skilled in the spectrum of investment classes that they take decisions on and whilst some proportion of investment activity is genuinely out-sourced to professionals specialised in particular investment/business classes many "decisions" result from discussions with clients and their families that verge of direct instructions.

  A root cause is greed & regardless of political allegiances, the crown dependencies thrive on income/wealth that would not be channelled into them if non resident clients did not want to avoid/mitigate their tax liabilities (occasionally there are confidentiality concerns around using an entity located in the dependencies but the tax sweetener is always relevant). The pricing of crown dependency financial products (& wealth generated within their finance industries) can reasonably be claimed to be "largesse" & certainly incorporates the very funds that would otherwise be tax revenue for the UK had wealth/investments been generated and managed directly within the UK without involving a crown dependency vehicle.

  As with other economies, there is a sense that the upper echelons of society & definitely the finance industry, have secured obscene personal wealth which is not so much sourced from aggressively sold complex financial products as the basic fact that people will pay to route transactions and financial affairs through a zero or low tax jurisdiction. Bonuses for example are often pro-rata'd per position within an organisation (& associated responsibility) , although most financial workers simply receive a relatively small addition to the normal salary unlike the "City" figures bandied about in the media.

  Another consideration therefore is the optimum use of the skills and intellectual ability applied by the finance industry.

  In one sense, much of this gainful employment basically pushes paper and assets around without generating anything of tangible value to the world at large and yet, the generation of wealth encouraged by this industry provides the very investments desired by tangible industries to utilise the planets resources efficiently and sustain economies around the globe (eg investments in farming, alternative energy sources etc). A recent BBC documentary for example, demonstrated the ability of ex City bankers to work within and assess the operations of differing businesses (a struggling dairy producer and hotel in this instance) and identify opportunities to secure:

    — income/efficiency improvements; and

    — maintain employment very, very quickly and such skills are certainly encouraged by a buoyant finance industry. As such, a social conundrum exists around whether the wealth/investments generated through & for the crown dependencies by their finance industry would be created at all if they did not offer low tax regimes and associated skills. Equally, the removal of tax advantages could very quickly result in economic disintegration for the islands themselves.

  On balance therefore, I would maintain that the UK is perfectly entitled to review and possibly maintain the existing relationship, although logical alternatives (for the UK public) include:

    — seeking to ensure that the crown dependencies adhere fully to UK legislation, thus maintaining existing rights as British passport holders etc & securing health care etc at a fair price (ie adopt & pay over UK taxes, NIC's etc); or

    — offering full independence to operate on their own in international affairs over and above their existing autonomy.

  [Such action could theoretically provoke a rapid rise in their domestic tax obligations with an associated impact on the economy, as well as impacting the relationship between government/states services and their access to UK counterparts (ie health and education infrastructure)—although again, if they're not willing to pay a fair price (tax) for access to UK facilities/expertise why should the UK be expected to provide such services primarily on the basis of an historical association.]

  The historical nature of the crown dependency relationships and the evolution of attitudes towards history has seen an increasing propensity (in my experience) for islanders to question the validity of an allegiance with the UK crown, whilst being very happy to accept wealth from UK residents or promote investment into the UK that wouldn't come anywhere near them if the vehicles that the crown dependencies can provide were subject to the same taxes as would occur for direct UK investment.

  As such, a review of these relationships appears very well timed and I look forward to seeing the outcome of this process when information from all interested parties has been considered.

August 2009





 
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