Crown Dependencies - Justice Committee Contents


Memorandum submitted by Lord Wallace of Saltaire

  I have followed the relationship between the Crown Dependencies and the UK since, as an academic then working on European international politics at the University of Manchester, I was asked to provide a memorandum for the Kilbrandon Commission on the Constitution on the subject of the constitutional implications of the UK joining the European Community. I read with interest the parallel submission on the Crown Dependencies, and the lack of clarity governing their relations with the UK. I then followed the negotiations over their relations with the EC/EU, in which the Crown Dependencies chose to remain formally outside, while Gibraltar as a European overseas territory chose formal association with UK membership. Since then I have visited the Dependencies, have held discussions with officials from the Dependencies both there and in London, have asked a number of parliamentary questions, and recently have challenged the "Extent" clause of several bills with reference to them.

Many of the issues which relate to management of relations with the Crown Dependencies also relate to management of relations with the Overseas Territories. The Foot Review of offshore financial centres under UK sovereignty, for example, which is due to report this autumn, covers both. It is anomalous in a number of ways that the FCO is responsible for managing relations with Gibraltar, an Overseas Territory within Europe that shares with the Crown Dependencies a complex dependent relationship with the European Union (although with a different pattern of opt-outs and opt-ins). A staff member of The Guernsey Press told me some months ago that there are some within Guernsey who think it would be more rational for the FCO to be their first point of contact within Whitehall, given the importance of external interests and representation for them, than the historical anomaly which has made this the MoJ. I hope that the Committee will press the MoJ and the FCO in particular on how actively and carefully they coordinate UK policy on Crown Dependencies and Overseas Territories, since so many issues of governance and international obligations apply to both categories.

  I would like to note three aspects of the relationship which would benefit from your scrutiny:

    (1) the application to the Crown Dependencies—and the implementation by the Crown Dependencies—of international treaties and conventions which HMG has signed;

    (2) the appropriate level of reimbursement for the services the UK provides to the Crown dependencies, in terms of international representation, defence, assistance to citizens abroad, etc; and

    (3) the issue of external audit of the quality of governance in the Crown Dependencies.

1.   Implementation of international agreements signed by HMG and their application to the Crown Dependencies

  The 1973 Kilbrandon Commission on the Constitution noted the ambiguity as to how far the Crown Dependencies were bound by international agreements signed and ratified by the UK government. In the 35 years since then the progress of globalization has led to a remarkable expansion of multilateral conventions, covering environmental protection, climate change, immigration, policing, and human rights as well as issues such as financial regulation and taxation which are central concerns for the Crown Dependencies as financial centres. I moved amendments to the "Extent" clause at committee stage on two bills during this session—the Borders Bill and the Marine and Coastal Access Bill—and received only very limited answers from ministers as to why their reach did not extend to all three of the Crown Dependencies.

  Indeed, I was informally told during discussions on the amendments I had tabled that "there is a settled reluctance in Whitehall to address this question." The Extent clause is almost the last clause in most bills presented to Parliament. It is reached only at the end of the committee stage in either house, when most of those involved are anxious to conclude, and the criteria for the inclusion of some Crown Dependencies and Overseas Territories and the exclusion of others is rarely challenged.

  Under international law, the UK Government signs treaties and conventions on behalf of all UK territories. For some international obligations—for example, the maritime and coastal conservation issues covered in the Marine and Coastal Access Bill—the Crown Dependencies and Overseas Territories are responsible for a large proportion of the coast, sea, birdlife and fisheries concerns to which HMG has signed up. One early paper on the Marine and Coastal Access Bill illustrated responsibilities for marine conservation around the British Isles with a map which had a large white space in the middle of the Irish Sea, surrounding the Isle of Man. The UK Government consults with the Crown Dependencies on how far they wish international obligations to extend to them. The criteria on which these consultations take place, however, are not clear; nor is it clear whether consultations include any assessment of the resources available to the Dependencies to implement obligations agreed, or any subsequent monitoring of how effectively they have been implemented. On the Borders Bill, ministers made a number of strong interventions on the need to tighten controls on the land border with Ireland, as a weak point in the UK's external borders; but were unable to answer how the Channel Islands, potentially weak access points to the UK in a period when illegal migrants in northern France are testing alternative channels of entry to the UK, were linked in to the Border Agency.

  Bills implementing European and international obligations are presented to Parliament by most Departments across Whitehall. The question of their extension to Dependencies and Territories is, for other Departments, at best a secondary issue. The Ministry of Justice, and perhaps also the Legal Advisers to the FCO, should play a monitoring role in such legislation, in considering what implications there may be for the UK's international obligations of non-implementation in some UK Dependencies and Territories, and from time to time in initiating checks on how well such obligations have been implemented by Dependencies (and Territories) that have agreed to accept them.

  The Crown Dependencies are very active in monitoring and promoting their interests in relation to the European Union. The Committee may wish to ask how far representations from the Channel Islands and the Isle of Man in Brussels are coordinated with the policies that HMG are pursuing, and what consultations take place with the relevant Whitehall Departments when UK and Crown Dependency interest in EU proposals do not coincide.

2.   Appropriate reimbursement by the Crown Dependencies for services provided by the UK

  The UK is constitutionally responsible for defence and international representation of the Crown Dependencies, including consular assistance to their residents in third countries. The Isle of Man negotiated a Contribution Agreement with the UK in 1994, under which it contributed £2,559,278 in 2008. Jersey and Guernsey have no such agreements. Both claim that transfer to the UK of revenue received from the issue of passports constitutes an appropriate contribution for consular assistance and international representation. Jersey supports a territorial army unit, 29 members of which have served with UK forces in the past ten years, as its contribution to UK defence. Guernsey has claimed in official documents for many years that the cost (currently around £500,000 per year) of its maintenance of the Alderney breakwater—a breakwater constructed in the 1840s to provide safe anchorage for the British fleet in the event of a French naval threat—is its contribution to UK defence; but in answer to a Parliamentary Question in June 2009 the Ministry of Defence replied that it had ceased to have any interest in the Alderney breakwater in 1950.

  Lord Myners in a Written Answer in July 2009 (HL4714 and 4764) stated that "in accordance of the provisions of the Jersey and Guernsey (Financial Provisions) Act 1947, the Bailiwicks of Jersey and Guernsey occasionally surrender hereditary revenues of the Crown to the Consolidate Fund. Each payment must then be returned to Jersey and Guernsey within ten working days." The last of these apparently circular transactions with Guernsey took place in 2003; that with Jersey was in 2008. He did not answer the additional question as to when the Treasury had last assessed the cost of services provided to the Crown Dependencies.

  In the management of relations with the Crown Dependencies, this is an issue on which the Treasury is the lead department and the Ministry of Justice plays a monitoring and coordinating role. The sums involved are small, and therefore easily left unaddressed. There are, however, questions, at a time of financial stringency for the UK, of the appropriateness of providing services to these Dependencies on a different basis for each of them, at what appears for all of them to be a very modest contribution—and for which Guernsey contributes significantly less than the other two. Their low levels of taxation partly reflect the absence of contributions to international public goods such as defence and subscriptions to international organizations—though there are some voluntary contributions to overseas development.

  Payment is made for the provision of health and higher education services, at agreed tariffs. Higher education fees are currently charged at an agreed intermediate rate between home and overseas fees, for example; as non-members of the EU and non-resident within the UK, students from these Dependencies would otherwise be liable to pay full overseas fees. I am unaware of the current arrangements for reimbursing the costs of support to the island authorities from UK police forces. Does the Ministry of Justice as coordinating department monitor the overall pattern of services provided and fees charged across Whitehall for these three (affluent) Dependencies?

3.   External audit of the quality of governance

  Recent reports on UK Overseas Territories—most strikingly, the Auld Report on the Turks and Caicos Islands—have drawn attention to the problems of maintaining good governance within small communities, where social, economic and political networks are small and closely intertwined and where challenges to established practices are therefore particularly difficult. Within the UK, the minimum population size that the Department of Communities and Local Government considers appropriate for effective local government units is significantly larger than that of any of the Crown Dependencies.

  There is, in effect, a pattern of external audit of some aspects of the governance of the Crown Dependencies, primarily in financial regulation—the Edwards report of 1998, for example, and the current Foot review. It is in no way a reflection on the current good governance of the Dependencies to argue that public confidence, both within the Dependencies and outside, would benefit from a more regular and more transparent pattern of external audit in other areas. Levels of mistrust within Jersey over the handling of child abuse allegations, for example, stretching back over many years, investigated by local police and law officers unavoidably close to some of those under investigation, suggest that a more formal pattern of external inspection might be preferable to ad hoc requests for assistance from UK bodies.

  The relationship between the Crown Dependencies and the UK rests upon mutual trust, and on understandings which are partly unwritten and largely ambiguous. Like the British Constitution, which has similarly rested on unwritten conventions and on the expectation that ministers, officials and MPs would follow the code of gentlemen, this relationship has been strained by social change, globalization, financial affluence and the weakening of traditional codes of behaviour. Is it the responsibility of the Ministry of Justice to decide when external investigation or audit is desirable, or is this left to particular Departments—such as the Treasury—to decide? What are the mechanisms through which the police or legal authorities in the UK respond to requests for assistance from the Crown Dependencies, and do they report back to the Ministry of Justice on the assistance given and lessons learned?

25 September 2009





 
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