Seventh supplementary memorandum submitted
by Ministry of Justice
JUSTICE REINVESTMENT SELECT COMMITTEE BRIEFING
The purpose of this note is to respond to the
questions raised in the writing of the Justice Reinvestment Report.
This note has been co-ordinated by Ian Maris, National Offender
Management Service with contributions from across the Ministry
of Justice (specifically Criminal Justice Group, OMS Analytical
Services and NOMS) and also former members of the independent
Lord Carter Review of Prisons (2007).
The question raised and the responses are detailed
below
Q1. Para 34 of NOMS' strategic and business
plan states that the plans are based on assumptions about the
rate of growth that is sustainable with available facilities and
resources and the Agency's ability to achieve a certain balance
between demand and supply. Please can we have information on these
assumptions and how they might change.
R1. Current assumptions on future prison
population volumes are set out in the latest National Statistics
on prison population projections, released by the Ministry of
Justice in September 2008 (see attached Annex A). The prime driver
of these assumptions is the population forecasts, which in turn
are driven by a number of factors such as impact of new legislation,
behaviour of the courts and magistrates and growth or falls in
crime figures (projections of which are provided by the Home Office).
Currently the projections for probation capacity
are in need of further development and an action to develop an
effective measure of probation capacity is set out in the latest
NOMS Strategic and Business Plan.
Following the specifications and costing work
that is currently being taken forward NOMS will be in a better
position in the future to cost the implications of changes and
prioritise where necessary.
Additionally, NOMS is aiming to make available
more intensive alternatives to short term custodial sentences
for less serious offenders assessed as not posing a risk to the
public. Additionally funding has been provided to support this
work and the Agency will monitor results closely to ensure that
the desired outcomes are produced in terms of demand management.
Q2. We were provided with an outline of the
red, amber and green packages of reform that were provider to
Carter. Please can we have full information on the content of
each of these packages and why options were not considered.
R2. The Carter Review team identified a
significant deficit of prison places between 2009 and 2014 if
no new additional supply or demand measures were taken. In order
to address this projected growing deficit of prison places the
Carter Review Team developed a number of options to both manage
the use of custody and to further increase the number of prison
places.
The attached spreadsheet (Annex B) sets out the main
options for the supply of additional prison places and also options
for reducing the demand for custody sentences, it also demonstrates
the anticipated timelines for each option to be effective.
In terms of supplying new prison places the
green and amber options were recommended (in addition to 8,500
new prison places already planned), with regard to managing prison
demand only the green options were recommended by the Lord Carter
Review.
WHY OPTIONS
NOT CONSIDERED
The Carter Team evaluated the identified options
over a number of weeks, some options were immediately discarded,
others were appraised by the team members then graded as Green
(relatively straightforward to implement), Amber (some implementation
challenges) and Red (difficult to implement). The option appraisal
considered the suitability of each option in terms of meeting
the main objectives of the criminal justice system. Additionally
each option was assessed in terms of acceptability to the key
stakeholders—the key stakeholders being victims of crime,
the general public, government ministers, judiciary and service
providers (e.g. HM Prison Service, private contractors). The Carter
Team also reviewed the feasibility of each option to determine
whether it could be realistically delivered (e.g. an option that
was dismissed at an early stage was Tall Prison Buildings, as
this would have presented operational and planning difficulties).
More specifically the options (particularly supply
options) were evaluated against Cost. The Green Options had the
lowest lifespan costs, Red the most expensive (e.g. Secure Mental
Health facilities considerably more expensive than other options).
Location was also factor in the evaluation of
options. For instance location was a determining factor in placing
former military bases as "amber", as the sites identified
during the Carter Review were not close to areas of relatively
large population from which the offenders would be drawn and which
would also provide a pool of staff recruitment.
Time taken for a supply option to become available
was also a determining factor. Rapid Build Residential Units and
Floating Accommodation were put forward as they could be made
available in a relatively short time span but become an amber
option as their life cycle costs were relatively more costly.
Planning implications were also considered when determining the
options.
Overcrowding of prison places became an amber
option as there was the opportunity to overcrowd new accommodation
but it diverged from the strategic objective to limit overcrowding.
The overcrowding figures were produced after dialogue with providers
with safety the primary consideration.
The demand options were largely rated on how
palatable they would be to the key stakeholders (e.g. victims
of crime, general public, lobby groups, judiciary, and government
ministers).
Additionally the Lord Carter Review looked at
the option of enabling certain offences to be eligible for release
at 40% of their sentence length (as opposed to 50% currently).
This was not recommended as it was anticipated that it would undermine
the credibility of the Criminal Justice System.
Q3. When is information likely to be available
on the (preliminary) outcomes of the Specification Benchmarking
and Costing Programme?
R3. The Specification Benchmarking and Costing
(SBC) Programme has been split into two parts. The first part
was the Early Priorities work, which delivered reports at the
end of October 2008 containing options for achieving cashable
savings in prisons and probation from 2009-10. These reports exposed
choices for service delivery in prisons and probation which were
discussed with Ministers who have agreed the components to be
implemented during 2009-10. These changes will deliver up to £50m
of efficiencies next year.
Since November, the focus has been on the second
part of the SBC Programme which is establishing the long-term
programme to develop a full framework of costed service specifications
covering all services funded by NOMS and delivered to offenders
and others. The first full service specifications, for probation
victim contact, is due to be signed-off at the end of March 2009.
Costed service specifications for prison visitors centres, chaplaincy
and probation unpaid work will follow, by end April 2009. Further
service specifications will be completed in time to support business
planning for 2010-11.
Q4. When is additional information likely
to be available on the costs of cluster prisons and the details
on their likely efficiency and effectiveness?
R4. An analysis of the costs and benefits
has been outlined in draft form, with a number of options evaluated
taking into account capacity requirements, transportation costs
and local community impacts. These will be presented to Ministers
shortly and released during the Spring (2009).
Q5. Has any research been conducted recently
to examine the relationship between levels of crime and levels
of imprisonment, particularly quantifying how much of the reduction
in crime/victimisation can be attributed to increased levels of
imprisonment? If not, why not? If so, please can we have it.
R5. The most consistently reliable evidence
suggests that the CJS most effectively deters crime by increasing
the likelihood, or certainty, of punishment. For example, research
from the Home Office, and from other international studies, suggest
that heightened visible policing and increasing arrest rates (a
driver of the likelihood of being caught and punished) can deter
offending.
Evidence on severity of sentence as a deterrent is
less convincing (although there is one good quality study in the
US which suggests it did have a deterrent effect). It is important
to recognise that there should be no presumption that increasing
sentence severity will act as a deterrent if: 1. the implications
of a specific policy change are poorly communicated to, or understood
by, the target population; 2. if offenders, and those at risk
of offending for the first time, perceive their likelihood of
being punished to be sufficiently low and 3. detection rates are
so low that any change in sentence severity amounts to a very
small change in expected sentence severity.
There is self-report evidence to suggest that
a proportion of offenders claim they can be deterred by sentence
severity (but, as mentioned above, this is affected by awareness,
motivation, impulsivity etc.). This in itself is insufficient
evidence to conclude that sentence severity does have a deterrent
effect.
Self-reported evidence or observed changes in
crime trends cannot necessarily be attributed to any change in
sentencing policy without more rigorous and detailed analysis
that would seek to rule out other explanatory factors. OMS Analytical
Services is currently in discussion with HO economists about conducting
a more detailed and rigorous analysis around this issue. This
is likely to involve doing some modelling of crime trends around
the introduction of the mandatory minimum sentence for gun crime.
Between 2000 and 2006 there have been substantial
reductions in the rate of reoffending for offenders discharged
from long prison sentences—whilst this may show that we
are getting better at dealing with offenders on long sentences,
it does not demonstrate that prison itself has a positive impact
on reducing reoffending (i.e. sending someone to prison will reduce
their future reoffending).
Q6. Has the Ministry done any projections
regarding the impact of the recession on offending and re-offending
rates and on the prison population? Is this accounted for in current
projections?
R6. No. The trends in crime are calculated
by the Home Office and they have not, at this time, provided any
information on impact of the recession of future crime figures.
Q7. Are there any projected estimates of the
impact of IPP on probation in future?
R7. Probation workload is estimated in terms
of starts of court orders or licence supervision. IPPs are included
in the calculation of projected probation starts.
Ian Maris
Strategy and Effectiveness Group
March 2009
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