Examination of Witnesses (Questions 117-158)
RT HON
SHAUN WOODWARD
MP, MS KATIE
PETTIFER AND
MR NICK
PERRY
24 JUNE 2009
Q117 Chairman: Secretary of State,
could I welcome you most warmly, and could I welcome both of your
officials, Nick Perry and Katie Pettifer. We are glad to have
you here. We have discussed this session and we are trying to
accomplish our questions within the hour (I know you have other
appointments) and then the Committee will have ten minutes to
a quarter of an hour with you privately to discuss one or two
other matters. The substance of the questions from the Committee
this afternoon is the Eames/Bradley report on the Consultative
Group on the Past. Have you anything you would like to say by
way of opening submission before I ask the first question?
Mr Woodward: I would, with your
permission. I am very happy to have my two colleagues, Sir Patrick,
and I would like to thank the Committee this afternoon for asking
us to appear before you. I thought it might just be helpful to
say one or two things at the beginning, Sir Patrick, about the
work that we are doing in relation to the report. I think it is
absolutely right for me to send out my thanks, at the very beginning,
to Lord Eames and Denis Bradley, and their colleagues, for the
work that they did. It was an enormous undertaking; it took a
considerable amount of time; they gathered many views and, as
we know, they emerged with 31 recommendations. Without wishing
to rehearse the history of the launch of the document, I think
it is probably just worth saying at the beginning there was one
recommendation which dominated all the discussion and, whether
or not that was the consequence of the way the document was launched
or the interest it provoked, what I think there is no debate about
is that one recommendation became the focus of everybody's attention.
As you know, I made very clear very shortly afterwards that I
thought it would be helpful to provide some clarification by the
Government that said that we were not minded to accept this proposal
(and I am very happy to take questions from the Committee this
afternoon on that) because we fundamentally felt that it was very
important that we stimulated discussion of the other 30 recommendations,
many of which, I think, are extremely good. So what we are doing
today is launching a new consultation on Eames/Bradley. What we
want to stimulate across the next few months, until the beginning
of October, is a debate, and what we want the political parties
to do in Northern Ireland is to accept the responsibility as well
as anybody else in Northern Ireland of actually having that debate
about the recommendations, because what we do not know, in truth,
is where there is a consensus on some of these recommendations,
which is why, in some sense, we have devised a rather simplistic
response form which does ask people to tick a box that says: "Yes/No/Other",
because, in one way, we would like to establish those things about
which there is a clear consensus. There may be only one or two
of the recommendations, there may be many of the recommendations—we
do not know. Secondly, we do want people to give us very detailed
answers under the box called "Other". It can be as long
as people want, but what matters is that people actually set out
their views supported by facts. I say this, really, with two things
in mind: the first is that I remain confident that we will, in
the coming months, be able to see the Assembly and the Executive,
perhaps, reach agreement on stage 2 devolution. If they are able
to do that, in the months ahead we will, hopefully, see the votes
take place in Stormont and here, at Westminster, for the transfer
of powers. If that happens the issues relating to the past will
remain to be dealt with, and one of the things I am very conscious
of, Sir Patrick, is that this cannot be an imposed, top-down set
of solutions to the people in Northern Ireland; if we are to learn
anything it must be that there is a consensus in Northern Ireland
and that this must be owned by the people in Northern Ireland
and it must be guided and led by the co-operation with the institutions
created by the peace process and the political process. So I see
it as absolutely fundamental that in reaching conclusions on the
proposals in the Consultative Group on the Past work that we have
a genuine consultation, that the political parties take up their
responsibility of responding to this document, and that we also,
therefore, have time to take on board the deliberations and work
of this Committee. I know that the work that you are doing in
this Committee is going to be an invaluable part of that process.
So it is my intention in the autumn of this year to bring together
the work of the Consultation, the work of this Committee as well
as, I hope, the consequence of a letter I am writing today to
the Chief Constable which will be asking him to look at the possibility
of conducting a short, interim review of the work of the HET so
that we are actually able to study the efficiency of the HET,
the problems that there may be—or may not be—with
a mind, therefore, to being able to bring all of these things
together in the autumn of this year before the Government, either
at the very end of this calendar year or at the very beginning
of next year, will publish its official, full response to the
Consultative Group on the Past work.
Q118 Chairman: Thank you very much
indeed for that. Could I begin by saying that although there may
be differences of opinion among the Committee on aspects of the
Eames/Bradley report, the Committee is united in admiring the
enormous amount of work that was put in by Lord Eames and Mr Bradley
and their colleagues, and does not, for a minute, question their
impartiality and integrity; it is a question of looking now to
see what aspects of the report can and should be implemented with
the one aim in mind that matters to us all, which is to improve
the situation in Northern Ireland. I do not want us to get bogged
down this afternoon on the controversial recommendation, which
you have effectively parked to one side. You do mention it in
your consultation paper because you want to find out what people
think about it, but we all know that it would be utterly impractical
for any Secretary of State to attempt to implement that unless
there was a broad degree of agreement right across the province.
Could I ask you one question on that: does your opinion, as you
have implied today, remain the same as it did when you first gave
a comment on this?
Mr Woodward: My opinion does remain
the same, but I think it is important to put two points on to
the record. The first is that in reaching this recommendation
(and in subsequent discussions I have had with the Consultative
Group), I am very firmly of the view that this was not an idea
promulgated only by the group; nor, indeed, was this an idea solely
from one section of the community in Northern Ireland. I believe,
therefore, it is important, as we live in a democracy, that, despite
the views that I have expressed about what I am minded to do,
which clearly reflects the Government's position, nonetheless,
we allow, however much of a minority voice it may be amongst some
parts of Northern Ireland, people to put forward their arguments
for and against this proposal. So I am entertaining, and I would
like to have, very strong cogently argued arguments for and against
this proposal; not because I have changed my position but because
I genuinely believe Eames and Bradley reflected proposals they
have heard. I think, in good faith, they reflected them in their
report, but perhaps they took them a little too far into formulating
them into a permanent recommendation.
Q119 Chairman: Thank you very much.
I am sure the Committee will have strong views on this particular
proposal, and when we have made our report, which you have made
quite plain you will take into account before the Government finally
comes to any conclusion, we will certainly make our views known.
It is too early for me to say whether those will be the unanimous
views of the Committee; I suspect they probably will be, but we
will see when we come to deliberate. Could you just, before I
bring colleagues in to talk about the Legacy Commission, and so
on, very briefly, tell the Committee what consultations you have
had up to now, and with whom, in the preparation of the document
that you publish today?
Mr Woodward: They have been informal
conversations; they have not been formal.
Q120 Chairman: Of course.
Mr Woodward: They have been with
leaders of the political parties—again, informal and not
formal.
Q121 Chairman: With all of the political
parties?
Mr Woodward: I want to tell you
yes, but I can immediately think, for example, I have not had
a consultation with the Green Party, which I would regard as a
significant political party in Northern Ireland and, therefore,
in saying that, I do not want to suggest it has been comprehensive
because, quite rightly, there will be small parties in Northern
Ireland whose voice should rightly be heard. Hence, my saying
it was an informal process.
Q122 Chairman: But DUP, Sinn Fein,
SDLP, UUP, Alliance—
Mr Woodward: Informal consultations
with those parties. Of course, my colleagues have done the same.
What has been extremely important is to understand that the proposals
put forward certainly reflect a degree of opinion but that I think
I can already say it is not an established set of opinions. Therefore,
part of the work ahead, whether the Legacy Commission were to
be established or not, would actually be marshalling opinion towards
something which I think is a very important component part, Sir
Patrick, which is in Northern Ireland we have established a very
successful peace process and a very successful political process.
In the establishment of those, as moments of their development
have occurred, sometimes road blocks have been hit, and the response
has been to deal with them sometimes in a piecemeal way and sometimes
in a coherent way—always, I think, a sensitive way. So,
therefore, what we have in terms of a reconciliation process,
which might be considered to be the third part of this work, has
been arrived at in a slightly different way from a comprehensive
peace process and a comprehensive political process. Therefore,
part, perhaps, of what I may be hinting at this afternoon is also
for those responding to the document to look at the idea, not
necessarily in a big bang, perhaps staged, but the work that might
be done by a Legacy Commission (or something similar) could be
staged but it would be part of a reconciliation process that is
comprehensive.
Q123 Chairman: I know my colleagues
want to explore that in greater detail, but just establishing
your conversations, could you just tell me briefly have you had
informal consultations with the PSNI, have you had informal consultations
with the Ombudsman and have you had informal consultations with
the Government of the Republic?
Mr Woodward: I have had informal
consultations with everybody because it has been part of my discourse
with them over the last few months to talk about the work of Eames
and Bradley and, indeed, it had been part of my discourse with
them in the months leading up to the publication of the report.
As I think it is very important that I do not mislead the Committee
into thinking there has been a comprehensive process of informal
consultation, as might be being hinted at here, what there has
been is enough conversation and consultation to indicate to me
that we needed to launch a formal consultation process that would
be comprehensive.
Q124 Chairman: A consultation process
on a consultation group—it is all a bit sort of convoluted.
Nevertheless, we understand why you are doing it. My final question
to you, at this stage: is this document this morning, which we
did not see until this morning—and have not had a chance,
therefore, to peruse in detail—is this work something that
you have discussed with any of these other parties, or is this
exclusively and absolutely your own document?
Mr Woodward: It has been discussed
as a proposition with some of the parties; it has certainly been
discussed at length with Lord Eames and Denis Bradley, with whom
I have had several meetings in the last few months, the most recent
of which was a lengthy meeting on Saturday of last weekend.
Q125 Chairman: Fine. Up to now you
have had no "formal" consultations (I use the word deliberately)
with anyone.
Mr Woodward: No "formal"
consultations, no, because that is the purpose of the document.
Chairman: Thank you very much indeed.
Q126 Stephen Pound: Secretary of
State, I understand entirely why you are responding in a slightly
elliptical way on some occasions, and I can understand the circumstances
of it. With regard to the question about Ireland, one of the suggestions
of the Group is that the Republic of Ireland be involved not just
in funding but, also, in implementing some of the recommendations.
Did you have discussions on either of those subjects?
Mr Woodward: No.
Q127 Stephen Pound: Would you intend
to have discussion on either of those subjects?
Mr Woodward: I would very much
intend to have it, because on the back of this documentation that
we are launching today we would expect the Irish Government to
play a full and active role in that consultation along with ourselves.
That will form part of a series of exchanges which I would anticipate
taking place through the summer months and through the autumn.
Q128 Stephen Pound: "We"
being Her Majesty's Government?
Mr Woodward: The British Government
and the Irish Government, who very clearly have an interest in
this matter.
Q129 Stephen Pound: I am sorry, sir;
you said: "we feel that the Irish Government should have
a part in", so that is official British Government policy?
Mr Woodward: Official British
Government policy is to be inclusive, and I do not wish to launch
an exclusive exercise in which, at the very moment I am trying
to achieve reconciliation, I am already setting out, at the beginning,
that some people have a lesser status than others.
Q130 Stephen Pound: I am actually
on your side here, Secretary of State. I just wanted to establish—
Mr Woodward: I am very cautious,
Mr Pound, of the need in a forum like this about—and if
one looks at the lesson of the launch of this document, one misunderstanding
at the beginning, one over-attention to one recommendation actually
led to the failure of this consultation exercise to succeed in
being a proper debate. Therefore, if it is convoluted, Sir Patrick,
I apologise but I do it having learnt the lessons of the launch
of this document.
Chairman: Can I just, before bringing
in Mr Hepburn, express the hope that you will learn another lesson
this afternoon, which is that it would have been helpful, knowing
that you were coming before us on this very subject, if we could
have had this 48 hours ago, because none of us has had the opportunity
to read it from cover to cover, which we would like to have done.
Q131 Kate Hoey: You have said yourself
there that you had discussions on this with Lord Eames and Mr
Bradley. I understood, when they came and gave evidence, that
they said that was them finished; they had done their report.
Are you saying now that they are still both heavily engaged in
this and what happens next?
Mr Woodward: I am saying that
I, first of all, gave them the courtesy of knowing what I intended
to do with their work; that I believe that as well as being remunerated
for the work they did they care with a passion about achieving—even
if it were not to be in the form they set out—the end they
desired, which is reconciliation in Northern Ireland. Unremunerated,
I am absolutely confident that they will be ambassadors to the
end of their lives on this earth for bringing about peace and
reconciliation in Northern Ireland. Therefore, in whatever form
this takes, I think they are rather useful people to have on board.
Q132 Christopher Fraser: Could I
ask a supplementary to that, on the point of remuneration? I do
not know about the rest of the Committee, I was not personally
aware that was the case—that they were remunerated for the
work—
Mr Woodward: That they were paid
for the work they did when they were forming the report?
Q133 Christopher Fraser: Yes. Would
it be possible, separate to this conversation, for you to furnish
us with information of the costs?
Mr Woodward: I am very happy to
write to the Committee with details of what they were paid.[1]
I think the Committee will know that the consultation had to be
publicly funded—
Q134 Chairman: Of course.
Mr Woodward: They put in huge
amounts of time for the work, and, yes, of course, they were paid.
Chairman: Fine. I am sure nobody could
conceivably object to that, but it is a relevant question.
Q135 Mr Hepburn: Just going to the
core recommendation of the Legacy Commission, could you let the
Committee know what your opinions are on that particular recommendation,
and have the Government got the view that the recommendation should
go forward in exactly the same sort of structure and functions
as the Group actually recommended and outlined?
Mr Woodward: In answering the
question, Mr Hepburn, the immediate difficulty is it is necessary
for me, on the one hand, to suggest that I do want to have a consultation
because I do not have a fixed view, but, therefore, in answering
it, perhaps, I am doing two things: one is to give you an answer
to your question of what I personally think, and, second, I may
wish to be a little provocative and, also, to stimulate some kind
of debate. It is my personal view—but, equally, I invite
the views of everybody else—that what we may end up with
is not something that is called the Legacy Commission. One should
not immediately reach for thinking I am therefore proposing a
truth and reconciliation commission either; I am simply identifying
the fact that I do not necessarily see that it ends up being called
"The Legacy Commission". Secondly, I would beg the question
as to why it might need an international chair and two other commissioners—whether
or not that might be the appropriate structure. I do understand
why some members of the community in Northern Ireland would feel
very strongly about an international chair, so that this would
be somebody who would be regarded, as it were, as not in some
way carrying baggage from the past in relation to any particular
community and, therefore, might be seen as being able to be more
fair. On the other hand, it has always been my view that the best
person should get the job based on their ability, not on anything
else. So I think that is another area where there should be a
sensible discussion about the kind of person it should be. I am
equally concerned, for example, about a structure which could
be very top-heavy in terms of international commissioners and
major commissioners but might be rather light on a really good
chief executive who might take on this work. I am also minded
to say that I think that the Legacy Commission might be conceived
in two parameters; the first is that the proposition in the brilliant
work by Eames and Bradley was to conceive of a Legacy Commission
that might last five years. One of the ideas I have is that, perhaps,
this actually might be a Legacy Commission (or whatever it could
be) conceived not in any one time frame but, perhaps, two, which
might include a second more comprehensive stage than the first,
and that the first might be much lighter but might include terms
of reference which would require an evaluation of all the institutions
within Northern Ireland that are seeking to reconcile, work with,
victims and survivors, with a view to evolving into a more comprehensive
structure. Equally, I think it is very important, Stephen, to
underline one thing: this cannot be top-down; this has to be something
that is owned by people in Northern Ireland and wanted by people
in Northern Ireland. It may require leadership and direction—I
am not abrogating, at this point, the responsibility of people
to say: "This might be difficult but we should try"—but
I think, in all of this, we should remember that time is our friend
and that too often in Northern Ireland it has been the problem
of deadlines that sometimes has given more trouble than anything
else. So I am trying to be sensitive to different feelings; I
am trying to be sensitive to different communities, and I am trying,
in answering your question, to just give a flavour of the way
I would like people to approach the recommendations, which is
not a simple "Yes/No" response; it is that but it is,
also, to say: "If you have a better idea or a different way
of approaching this, we want to hear that".
Q136 Lady Hermon: I am delighted
to see you here this afternoon, Secretary of State, and your colleagues.
Can I come back, Secretary of State, to the second thing that
you have announced this afternoon? I must say that, in fact, I
was greatly taken aback by the publication today, at the very
end of June. I take it this is a 12-week consultation that will
overlap the summer holidays, and it does strike me that, in fact,
perhaps an earlier consultation document would have been more
helpful because I think a lot of people will be very surprised
that this has taken the Northern Ireland Office such a long time
to respond to what was a very important document. Setting that
aside, can I come back to your comment about HET? Let me just
check that I have understood this. You will ask the Chief Constable,
Hugh Orde, to undertake a review of HET and that is to be completed
by the autumn. Is that because you have concerns about the efficiency
of HET, or is it because, in fact, there is now, in your head
or in the Northern Ireland Office somewhere, a deadline that,
come the autumn, there will be something like a Legacy Commission—but,
maybe, not that term—which will take over the work of HET?
Where does HET stand? How will the people in HET respond today
when they know that, in fact, their jobs are being reviewed?
Mr Woodward: I think there are
two or three questions contained within that. The first is just
a minor correction, which is that it is not 12 weeks but 14 weeks.
I realise that the Assembly may be rising in a week or so's time
but, certainly, this House will continue to work until the end
of July. I think, however difficult it is, most people would assume
that Members would take three or four weeks, perhaps, away in
the summer and not 14 weeks, and, therefore, perhaps, it is not
too onerous, particularly in the current political environment,
to suggest that 14 weeks is not too demanding for people to give
a response, although I do accept that if somebody were to write
to me and say: "An extra four weeks would make all the difference",
we are not going to be so small-minded that we would not accept
responses after that time. I am trying to give a little bit of
guidance here. Secondly, in relation to the launch of this, I
have partly tried to do it with respect to this Committee, which
is to recognise that we actually look for a date when it would
be possible to come, and there were a series of events which arose
which is why we arrived at this date, and I wanted to use this
Committee as an opportunity to launch this report. Thirdly, I
think I could have been quite heavily criticised for, of course,
launching a document during purdah, which of course did take place
until the time of the European elections. Fourthly, Lady Hermon
(and you, as much as anybody on this Committee, I know, is as
sensitive to this issue as anybody else), we might have launched
earlier had it not been for the terrible events at the Massereene
Barracks, which, I am afraid, both for myself and my colleagues,
for the PSNI and everybody else, pretty much occupied us for the
four to six weeks immediately after that took place. Immediately
after that was Easter and then we were into purdah. So, I am afraid,
I think there is a good explanation and it is one which I have
tried to do whilst respecting the courtesies which I think should
be given to this Committee, which has shown such a strong interest
in the report. In relation to the HET work, may I simply say this:
I think the HET work is some of the most outstanding work that
has been carried out by the PSNI. If we think of the more than
3,000 people who lost loved ones in the course of the troubles,
for those people to have been able, through a chronological system,
to have been given the most basic information which, in many cases,
some of them have been denied—for the parents of a soldier
murdered in the 1970s who did not even know that, when he was
murdered on the streets of Belfast, in the last hours of his life
he was cradled by two passers-by who happened to be Catholic,
but they had nursed hatred against Catholics because they thought
Catholics could not care about their Protestant son—I know
you, as much as anybody in this room, would care deeply about
those things, may I simply say the HET's work has been exemplary.
Therefore, one of the things that I felt in launching the consultation
was that simply, as it were, to follow a recommendation which,
effectively, was simply going to dismantle the current operation
and move it, without, effectively, giving the HET, whose work
I think, and I say again, is exemplary, in the political peace
process and the new PSNI work, would be totally unfair to them.
So I am not asking them to launch a defence of their work, and
knowing that the Chief Constable is a rather forthright man who
will deliver in a pretty no-nonsense way, I think, a quite short
review, to invite him to give me his sense of the work of the
HET, as well as inviting the HET to respond is not to give them
a greater bureaucracy, it is not to unduly delay them but it is
to make sure that they have a proper chance to represent their
work—which, as I say, I think is exemplary.
Chairman: I think we would all agree
with you on that latter point. We have visited and we were very
impressed. Just one other point I must make at this stage, following
Lady Hermon's question: this Committee hopes to deliver its report,
too, during the month of October. It depends on various factors
whether it will be the first half or the second half, but we hope
to get it to you during the month of October. Lady Hermon, did
you wish to follow up at all on that?
Q137 Lady Hermon: I was slightly
taken aback, I have to say, Secretary of State. I understood that
the Eames/Bradley report had been launched at the end of January
2009. I have tried to look through the consultation document,
simply placing before the public the recommendations that have
been made and the questions below: "Do you agree with the
recommendation? To what extent?" It was not an in-depth analysis
that had to be taking place; purdah did not begin for some time
after the publication of this report. So I have listened carefully
to the reasons I have been given, but I am not convinced—
Mr Woodward: Forgive me, Lady
Hermon. I think it is terribly important to get this on the record.
The document was actually launched by Eames and Bradley at the
end of January/beginning of February. We took initial soundings
from people, but you will remember the entire debate through February
was completely skewed by a discussion about recognition payments.
Then, very, very shortly after that, we had the attacks at Massereene,
and all our time and resources, I think, were rightly devoted
on that issue at the time. It is from that we emerged with the
idea of a consultation, and it is from that we emerged with actually
making it very, very simple. I apologise if it has not been done
in a timeframe that you would have preferred, but it has not been
to do any disservice to Eames and Bradley's work; it has been
to recognise that we needed to go back to some first principles.
Q138 Mr Murphy: Secretary of State,
one of the recommendations in the report was the proposed setting
up of an information recovery and thematic investigations scheme
and one of the recommendations attached to that was that in order
to try and increase public engagement anyone coming forward to
make a statement should have that statement protected; whilst
there would not be a general amnesty whatever they said could
not be used in a court either against them or anyone else. Is
that not in fact a de facto amnesty?
Mr Woodward: The word "amnesty"
as we know, when it was used in a public meeting in relation to
the earlier work that Eames and Bradley were preparing, again
occupied about a week of newspaper headlines in Northern Ireland
and being now in my third year as Secretary of State for Northern
Ireland I may be just about smart enough to know that the use
of that word is potentially highly, shall we say, difficult. I
will not be too tempted therefore to use that. The proposals that
they have put forward are interesting; they are not without complication;
they bring together a number of major issues that needed to be
confronted. The whole idea of breaking up the way that an investigation
and inquiries could be conducted, the challenging of the orthodoxy
that, for example, you would just have an inquiry, clearly all
of that has been thrown up at the moment by the costs and the
questions that are surrounding the Saville Inquiry. The whole
issue of people having legal representation, the whole issue of
whether or not actually you would be able to have an effective
inquisitorial system without an adversarial system under the proposals
that are put here, the fact that people could perhaps still implicate
themselves and whether or not they would indeed have an effective
immunity by what they say—all of those arguments need to
be worked through and rehearsed. The proposition is sound because,
as I say, there is the whole business surrounding particularly
the Saville Inquiry, the value of which is inestimable but the
costs of which are clearly daunting -£200 million of which
£100 million has been spent on legal representation. We are
of course rehearsing on the main floor of the House today an argument
around an inquiry into Iraq. The whole problem, for example, of
any proceedings taking place in public involves people saying
things for which they may feel they require legal representation.
We know, for example, that the opening speech by counsel on Saville
took nine weeks. I say all these things because they are invited
by what Eames and Bradley have thrown out, and whilst I absolutely
understand where they were trying to go with this, the fact that
actually it has not in some cases had the support of some of the
people they thought it had the support of at the time they launched
their document just suggests to me that this is far more difficult
and controversial than might have been appreciated at the time,
which again is why we will look forward to hearing representations
from people across the community. For example, a very obvious
case in point is that I will be very interested in hearing a response
from the Finucane family to the proposal that is there.
Q139 Mr Murphy: Have you a personal
view on protected statements?
Mr Woodward: It would be injudicious
for me to give a personal view on protected statements because
I have to recognise that actually it could play a part in a proceeding
at a later date.
Q140 Stephen Pound: Secretary of
State, you anticipated me by referring to the business on the
floor of the House. In the consultation on the consultation on
the consultation recommendation 20 refers specifically to the
problems caused by public hearings, and there is a sentence which
I have to say resonates with me personally that says that "Thematic
examination will take place without public hearings because this
would facilitate more open and frank disclosure and avoid the
constant publicity of present inquiry proceedings." I entirely
understand the point that is being made there and I understand
the points that you have made, but when you have a situation such
as the Omagh judgment, which then leads to more inquiries and
the statements made are so powerful as to be almost impossible
to ignore, how do you actually have those two things sit together
when you are quite rightly and objectively and scientifically
saying there is a real problem, not just of cost but of confidentiality,
of frankness, of individuals being prepared to give statements
with the entirely legitimate and clearly very strongly articulated
call for public inquiries?
Mr Woodward: I would add to your
list of prerequisites fairness, which is absolutely essential
in any process that takes place. There is no simple answer to
your question but, equally, let us remember that a public inquiry
takes place because it is in the public interest and the public
interest has got to be placed alongside the context in which it
takes place. For example, I have said that I believe the Saville
Inquiry to have been and to still be invaluable, but when it was
set up it was envisaged it would report in two years and cost
in the region of £11 million. We are now in its ninth year,
it is about to cost nearly £200 million, such are the problems
of having an independent inquiry. I am perfectly prepared to make
a very strong case for an independent inquiry and in reference
to—since you tempted me I may just briefly respond—the
inquiry being offered on the floor of the House at the moment,
that is actually going to look at a seven or eight-year time period,
not just the events of one day. It is being asked to do this if
possible within a year and indeed, as we know, there are many
people who would like it done in six or eight months—I remind
everyone that the opening statement by counsel for the Saville
Inquiry took nine weeks, and that was because if you have a public
inquiry people want representation. There are therefore huge public
interests around cost which have to be addressed and around time.
One of the things that concerns me about the Saville Inquiry is
that many of the people for whom this inquiry is being made will
not be on this earth when it reports.
Q141 Chairman: A lot of them have
died already.
Mr Woodward: That is of the public
interest too because if this is for the families or for the individuals
and they have died because they have died waiting in a Bleak
House Jarndyce and Jarndyce type of way, at the end of the
day where is the public interest? As I say, I believe the strongest
part of the public interest in Saville, as well as setting out
to establish the truth, was that the British Government was prepared
to put itself in the box, and there is no question that in doing
that it helped transform a moment in the peace process. But that
is a question of public interest and the issue of the public interest
has got to be put into this equation, and that was something which
I felt was necessary to actually add into the proposal that is
here. But it is also necessary for us to test this with lawyers
and explore actually the consequences of what is being proposed
here because the one thing I would not want to do, if I followed
this proposal, would be to create something which, as it says,
"the unit would operate in private" and yet we know
that on the floor of the House downstairs the opposition that
is being displayed, perhaps opportunistically by some but nonetheless
being displayed quite genuinely by others, is a concern that unless
it is in the open there is a problem. But the problem is, as we
also know, that if you are touching on issues of national security
for example much of that cannot take place in the open because
you would compromise national security and individuals, and yet
there must be a judicial process—and that is again part
of the problem of Northern Ireland because we are permanently,
Sir Patrick, being judicially reviewed on restriction notes and
for information that we cannot put out there. That is all relevant
to trying to find a better way forward.
Q142 Chairman: You will also know,
Secretary of State, that this Committee has already said in one
of its earlier Reports that we do not believe there should be
further costly public inquiries—and it is impossible to
have one that is not costly—unless there is a genuine demand
right across the political spectrum in Northern Ireland. I do
hope that as you conduct your consultation exercise we are not
going to reach a stage where there is consensual demand for things
that then cannot be provided because they are too costly.
Mr Woodward: I do not think that
you can in that sense put a price on justice.
Q143 Chairman: No.
Mr Woodward: But I do equally
feel—and this Committee and the members of this Committee
and when the members of this Committee have as it were reconfigured
themselves on the floor of the House in Northern Ireland questions
sometimes along party lines (and not only of course in Northern
Ireland)—that nonetheless people quite rightly have been
pressing me on the cost of Saville and it would be irresponsible
if I did not at some point say that I do have a responsibility
to the public purse because of course the public purse has no
money in it except for the money that it takes from the members
of this Committee and the rest of the public in taxation. That
is part of the public interest too and indeed that has turned
out to be a problem with Saville because it is not possible for
us, because of its independence and not being established in the
way that we would now establish an inquiry, to have perhaps the
kind of public accountability on an annual basis that we might
like now to have seen.
Q144 Stephen Pound: I do not want
to deconstruct everything you said but I think one of the comments
you made earlier on was extremely important, it is not just a
question of semantics. You defined a public inquiry as being a
public interest inquiry.
Mr Woodward: No, a component part
of a public inquiry is to understand the public interest in the
inquiry. For example, somebody may wish because of an incident
to have a public inquiry. It is a crucial question to ask, is
this in the public interest perhaps to commit X amount of money,
X amount of time, X amount of whatever, and therefore the public
interest test here has to always be relevant because otherwise
for example in Northern Ireland, for reasons everybody in this
room would understand, I could probably if I wanted to please
everybody establish about 1000 inquiries tomorrow.
Q145 Stephen Pound: That figure is
probably on the low side.
Mr Woodward: It probably is actually.
Q146 Stephen Pound: The point I am
trying to make is that the public inquiry which is in the public
interest could therefore, by your definition, be held in public,
in private or, dare I say it, in a public/private partnership.
Mr Woodward: Yes, but you would
have to recognise that there would be issues raised in the course
of that inquiry, the kind of issues that were understood in the
context of the Inquiries Act and the passage of that Bill through
this House which recognised that issues of national security have
to be taken into consideration. For example, it is of great interest
to me and it may be helpful, Sir Patrick, if I just share with
the Committee that for reasons I absolutely understand—so
there is no criticism implied here—despite the openness
of the Saville Inquiry, despite the representations that took
place to ensure that the workings of that inquiry could be in
public, I have received numerous representations to ensure the
anonymity of certain people in that inquiry continues. In other
words, even with the idea of having an open inquiry we have to
understand that there are certain dimensions which cannot be open.
I just put that on the record because I do think in this particular
climate, as we discuss Iraq as well as these issues, sometimes
those pressing for openness are perhaps a little disingenuous
with the public because what might be felt to be openness quite
quickly is realised to be something that cannot be achieved.
Chairman: We must not pursue the Iraq
analogy this afternoon. Christopher Fraser please.
Q147 Christopher Fraser: Going back
to something that Sir Patrick mentioned earlier has ruling out
recognition payments allowed the sensible discussion that you
saw when you met us three months ago? I was not clear from your
opening statement that that was the case.
Mr Woodward: You use slightly
different words to describe what I said about recognition payments.
I have said that I am not minded to do so and it is not my intention
to do so, and clearly it would be completely pointless to ask
people to send me genuine representations on this issue if I had
categorically said "No not ever". However, I have made
my position very clear and the Government's position clear: we
are not minded to do so, but I have invited, because we live in
a democracy, those people who genuinely want to make their representations
for and against to put them on the record because I do believe
it is invaluable that we take some of the heat out of the argument
of recognition payments and put some light on the issue, not least
because one of the issues that got unfortunately confused in the
discussion around recognition payments was the definition of victim.
The definition of victim as we know is a matter for the Assembly
but equally it is something that got somewhat confused in the
debate that took place about recognition payments, because some
people formed a view that what might be being argued was that,
for example, a paramilitary individual who may have lost his life
should be considered to be a victim, and very clearly that is
not the definition that has been established by Bloomfield and
others afterwards of what a victim is. One of the reasons I am
quite keen to do the consultation exercise in relation to this
particular recommendation is that we actually re-establish the
facts and the context and move away from some of the heat which
had the unfortunate consequence of somewhat muddying that definition,
and it is a critical definition for many of the other recommendations
if we are to establish a reconciliation process and not get drawn
into tangential arguments which may serve a political purpose
but actually may do nothing to help with reconciliation.
Q148 Christopher Fraser: I have a
couple of points on that which I will take in order as I have
written them down. First of all on recognition payments, are you
actually saying "not never" so that you will revisit
it potentially in the future? You have not drawn a line on this.
Mr Woodward: I cannot commit a
future Parliament on anything any more than this Committee can
commit a future Parliament, so I have a recognition of the limits
of my authority which probably might end in a few months time
if we are successful in getting to stage two, so let us be quite
sensible about this. My very strong sense about this, Christopher,
is that there is absolutely no consensus on a recognition payment,
so short of a Monty Python sketch of hitting my head against a
brick wall it is not going to happen.
Christopher Fraser: That is why I was
asking the question. The second point you made about the recommendation
and the consultation about the definition of victim, you could
tell us today that you feel the definition as it stands under
the 2006 legal definition could be revisited. Are you suggesting
that today?
Mr Woodward: I am going to respond
to that, just for the benefit of Hansard—and most of the
members of the Committee will know and therefore those who may,
if they have a little insomnia, turn to Hansard at this point,
by reminding the Committee of the words of Alan McBride whose
wife, as we know, was killed in the Shankhill bomb. He said: "I
have often acknowledged, as in the case of losing my wife, that
the mother of bomber Thomas Begley hurts much like myself. Mrs
Begley should receive all the help that society can give her to
deal with her own tragedy, but I will always stop short of suggesting
that that should be monetary." That is really helpful. There
are many, many different views and everyone is entitled to their
view and should be respected, but somebody who has been the victim,
somebody who has suffered such a terrible loss, who has the compassion
and the ability to reach out and understand—there are lessons
to be learned from those remarks about the understanding of the
nature of being a victim, which of course refers to the family
of those who were bereaved. This is not to get into an argument
about moral equivalence where I know sometimes people like to
draw this, it is not to get into an argument about a hierarchy
of victims, it is simply to understand that there are families
left behind who hurt and whose pain is awful. In the words of
Alan McBride there is a lot we can all learn. Whether we are all
ready—and that is the point about time—to actually
act on that is something else, but I do believe there is something
for certainly me to learn in that and, therefore, rather than
pronouncing my wisdom on this issue this is something where I
actually feel I have got a lot to learn and a lot to bring to
bear on this. Ultimately, however, the definition of victim, Sir
Patrick, is a matter now for the Assembly because that is actually
something that falls into their devolved responsibilities and
not mine.
Chairman: I am glad you mentioned Mr
McBride. He was one of the most impressive witnesses the Committee
had and we did of course refer to his evidence in an earlier Report.
Mr Fraser.
Q149 Christopher Fraser: A last point
which we have asked before but I would like to put to you because
I am not sure we got a clear answer necessarily from other witnesses.
Do you believe the report increased tensions between communities
in Northern Ireland or not?
Mr Woodward: One of the issues
that the report rightly touches on is how we work towards reconciling
communities which have been ridden with, in some cases, almost
institutionalised sectarianism. Again, one of the propositions
in the report—and this is a personal view which is not yet
the Government's view because we will form that when we have seen
the responses—was for example a component part of the Legacy
Commission that would have £100 million to spend on projects.
I have a question in my mind about the appropriateness of that,
not because I do not think the projects need pursuing, they absolutely
do, but one of the issues touched on repeatedly in the recommendations
is the question of overlap with institutions that are already
carrying out some of these functions. Secondly, the responsibilities
rest either in the Office of the First and Deputy First Minister,
or with the Executive or indeed with the Assembly to carry out
some of these functions, and therefore it might be a consideration
that part of this body should it be formed, or an advisory forum
that might be formed around it, would seek more to be an integrated
part of influencing the other existing institutions—whether
it is the Assembly, the Executive, or the Community Relations
Council, the Victims' Commissioners—with what they do. Of
course everybody would always like more money and one of the issues
the report does not answer is where of course they think the £100
million will come from, which is a pretty important question to
resolve, particularly in the middle of a recession.
Q150 Christopher Fraser: There are
still tensions,
Mr Woodward: Anybody would be
aware of the tensions, but if I immediately again just put this
right, an unfortunate phrase was used by somebody last week on
television—a woman who I actually respect a lot—which
was in the context of the terrible acts of intimidation against
Romanians, that Northern Ireland was addicted to hatred. As I
said in interviews over the weekend I do not believe that is the
case, I believe Northern Ireland has not only been weaned but
is weaning itself so far away from that that fortunately what
we saw last week, for all the horror of the incident, was the
universal condemnation of every community, every political leader
and the institutions against those acts, and that is a very different
Northern Ireland from the one of 20 years ago.
Q151 Chairman: Secretary of State,
I would like to ask the question that I know Dr McDonnell, who
is unavoidably detained this afternoon, would want to ask you
because he brings this up time and again, regarding the need for
effective health care provision for those affected by the Troubles,
particularly in relation to mental illnesses related to the conflict.
Do you think that the current services are sufficient to meet
this need and are you determined that they will be improved, however
much or little of this report is finally implemented?
Mr Woodward: Again, the health
service of course is a devolved matter.
Q152 Chairman: Of course.
Mr Woodward: And I would like
to pay tribute to the work that is being done by people in the
health service in Northern Ireland. We know that across the United
Kingdom—and this would certainly be true in the Republic
as well—those working in mental health anyway would regard
themselves very often as the Cinderella service within the health
service, so even without the Troubles those working with mental
health issues would have a very strong case for more resources
when they can be found, but Northern Ireland undoubtedly presents
a compounded set of mental health issues. An issue when I was
the Health Minister when we were in the period of direct rule
that I became particularly concerned about in this area was young
male suicides, which are staggeringly disproportionately higher
than they are in other parts of the United Kingdom. But equally
as I began to delve inside this issue—and it is an issue
which I suspect members of this Committee have also been concerned
about—if we were simply to pass away an explanation for
the numbers of young male suicides by saying they are about the
Troubles—which in many cases they may be in some related
way—we would also miss some other fundamental issues. For
example, I will never forget the visit I made to the home of one
family when I was the junior health minister where the parents
had a son who died, and it became very apparent to me that the
son was gay. It was also very apparent to me that it was something
the parents just could not possibly come to terms with. So there
are social issues which will exist in a society that may have
had considerable difficulty with, for example, equality issues,
which also need to be understood for what they are and not explained
away as symptoms of the Troubles, or they may be compounded as
such. What this report rightly raises is that the health issues
and the mental health issues which arise because of the Troubles,
which have compounded a mental health problem that exists elsewhere
in the UK, do require special attention and do require more attention
than they have currently got, but whether this is the body that
effectively should be acting on those as opposed to advising on
them is a very interesting question.
Q153 Kate Hoey: I have just a couple
of quick points, but can I congratulate you on your robust defence
of Northern Ireland against someone whom I know you actually worked
with before, and I thought they had very misguided and actually
rather ignorant views about people and the state of Northern Ireland.
Can you just remind me of the cost so far of Eames-Bradley? I
do not mean how much they are being paid, I mean overall what
we spent including this new consultation document.
Mr Woodward: The cost of the new
consultation document I am very happy to write to the Committee
about but I think you will find it is truly very modest and I
therefore perhaps apologise for the form, because it does look
like something we photocopied and put together, but that is exactly
what it is. In relation to the consultative group's work, the
total cost of their work so far—and I say so far because
it may be that there are a few extra pounds to go into it but
we are talking of very, very modest remaining amounts if indeed
there are any at all—is £1.2 million.
Q154 Kate Hoey: We are a long way
away from the Saville inquiry.
Mr Woodward: I am pleased to say
that we are about £195 million short as they say.
Stephen Pound: Even Saville started
off low.
Kate Hoey: It has taken six months
and I accept that there were reasons for that, to get to this
stage, and Lady Hermon has asked about that. We now have until
October for people to fill in their tick boxes and their explanations.
The timetable from then on, given that there could well be a general
election some time in the next year—
Chairman: There has to be.
Q155 Kate Hoey: I mean there may
well be one long before next year. When you are at your most optimistic
on this, where do you see things being before a general election
comes, should say a general election come next May?
Mr Woodward: Realistically this
could only possibly be proposals before a general election takes
place. We know that it must take place before June of next year
and it may be helpful just to remind the Committee that it is
actually four and a half months not six months since it was published,
so it is not 50% longer than that. Secondly, it was not my original
intention when I presumed the publication of Eames and Bradley
was coming that this is what we would end up doing, but it was
precisely because of the kind of conversations I had with major
political leaders in Northern Ireland that led me to realise that
actually there was not a consensus that could easily be found
on some of the really critical issues. When you pressed them on,
perhaps, 60% or 70% of the other recommendations they said "Those
do not trouble us too much at all" but it was not entirely
clear to me that actually they were the same 16 or 17 recommendations.
So as one went round informally talking to people it just became
apparent to us that for us to have responded in the way that I
had originally anticipated just would have been inappropriate
because I would have responded in a way that immediately would
have launched a new set of arguments, but again would have simply
put more heat out there and a little less light.
Q156 Kate Hoey: In all honesty do
you think anything will really ever come of this?
Mr Woodward: Yes, it has to come
of it, because unless we actually, I believe, establish a reconciliation
process which is owned by the institutions of Northern Ireland
in a comprehensive way and which is seen to be fair and sustainable
and tackles some of the issues, not necessarily as I have said
in a big bang approach but in an evolutionary way, then the potential
for some of the wounds of the past not to be healed but to be
at best Band-aided will remain there. I do think they need to
be addressed.
Q157 Chairman: In that context may
I ask you a final question in the public session. When he was
Prime Minister Tony Blair made it quite plain that without the
John Major/Albert Reynolds dialogue the Good Friday Agreement
would not have happened. The people who contributed from both
sides of the political spectrum in the United Kingdom have been
one of the good features of the lengthy troubles and difficulties
in Northern Ireland, and there has been more or less a bipartisan
policy across the House here in the UK. Without wishing to anticipate
the result of the next general election, which must happen within
the next year, are you having any sort of conversations and are
your officials having any sort of conversations to ensure that
there will be continuity on this—and you have just indicated
you believe that something must come of it—to ensure that
something does come of it?
Mr Woodward: I have a regular
conversation with the Shadow spokesman for the Conservative Party
in Northern Ireland and also with the Liberal Democrats on a number
of issues and we have discussed, both in its evolution and at
the time of publication, Eames-Bradley. What we will now do obviously
is have the same conversation in relation to the consultation
but I hope as this Committee knows, Sir Patrick, and I hope as
you know I have never sought to gain political advantage from
the work we do in Northern Ireland.
Q158 Chairman: I am not even beginning
to suggest that.
Mr Woodward: As such I have no
intention to depart from that policy in how we will respond to
the consultation document on Eames and Bradley because I believe
it has been an enormous strength to the peace process and the
political process that that bipartisan approach by all parties
is maintained and has been maintained.
Chairman: And of course this Committee
has only been able to work on that basis as well. Thank you very
much indeed for that, Secretary of State. We are grateful for
your answers which we will obviously be pondering on as we prepare
our own recommendations for you. We are most grateful to your
officials for coming. That concludes the public part of this session;
if you would be kind enough to remain behind for a few moments.
Thank you.
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