Conclusions and recommendations
1 The Real IRA and the individuals who carried
out the bombing murdered 29 people and two unborn children. Responsibility
for those deaths is theirs alone. (Paragraph 2)
2 We warmly commend those who have worked so
long to maintain the Omagh Support and Self-Help Group as a source
of information, solace and social support for victims of the bombing.
(Paragraph 7)
3 We appreciate that nothing we say can bring
total satisfaction or real comfort to the families of those who
died at Omagh, both those who continue to campaign to keep the
Omagh bombing in the public eye and those who grieve in private.
(Paragraph 8)
4 Nothing we have seen leads us to challenge
Sir Peter Gibson's conclusion that any available intelligence
could have been used immediately prior to the Omagh bombing to
prevent it. We repeat our bitter disappointment, however, that,
in spite of repeated requests, the Prime Minister has refused
to allow our Chairman to read the full report, even under supervision.
It is thoroughly reprehensible that the Government should seek
to prevent the parliamentary Committee charged with oversight
of the affairs of Northern Ireland such access, and we believe
that the Government's attitude in that respect has done more damage
than good. (Paragraph 15)
5 While there may be good security reasons for
not disclosing the content of transcripts, we are not persuaded
that confirming or denying their existence should present problems.
We invite the Government to do so. The case for or against the
use of intercept evidence being admissible in UK courts has been
argued for many years. We invite the Government to justify the
argument that the public interest is better served by withholding
such evidence, rather than by using it to bring murderers to justice.
(Paragraph 28)
6 It is the fact that dissident republicans continue
actively to seek to undermine Northern Ireland's progress towards
peace and normalisation that makes it so important to learn lessons
from the experience of Omagh. (Paragraph 29)
7 We are disturbed by the suggestion that arrests
could have been made quickly, and forensic evidence obtained,
had there been an earlier exchange of information. We are particularly
concerned by the suggestion that the names of individuals who
owned telephones, thought to have been used in the bombing, were
known to the intelligence services or the police. We seek a definitive
statement from the police of whether such names were known. If
they were, we seek an explanation of why no action was taken to
arrest or question the owners of those telephones. (Paragraph
39)
8 The desire for a speedy report on intelligence
relating to the Omagh bombing leaves crucial questions that remain
to be answered about the investigation of the mass murder that
occurred that day. (Paragraph 45)
9 We urge the Secretary of State to revise his
view that this issue has "had its inquiry" and to institute
an immediate investigation into whether, and, if so, why, this
intelligence was withheld.
(Paragraph 47)
10 Further inquiry on the Omagh bombing is required
not because inquiries naturally lead to further inquiries, as
the Secretary of State puts it, but because one substantial question
outlined in this Report remains unanswered: what public interest
justification there can be, if any, for the withholding of intelligence,
information or evidence from the team of detectives who investigated
the Omagh bombing.
(Paragraph 48)
11 It is unclear to us precisely what Sir Peter
Gibson did investigate. His terms of reference state that he was
asked to investigate how intelligence was shared. He did not investigate
Special Branch's caution in not sharing relevant intelligence,
however. We seek an explanation of why Sir Peter's published terms
of reference did not stretch as far as appeared when his review
was announced. We find all this obfuscation very frustrating.
(Paragraph 53)
12 Whatever Sir Peter's reasons for not investigating
why Special Branch acted cautiously and the soundness of its reasons
for doing so, we believe that further investigation is required
into what Special Branch gave to the investigation team, when
it was given, and what information was withheld and why. We believe
that the public interest would be served by revealing to the greatest
possible extent why information that might have led to arrests
in a mass murder case was not used. (Paragraph 56)
13 In an inquiry as important as Sir Peter Gibson's
into the uses of intelligence relating to Omagh, it is of considerable
regret that he was unable to interview all the witnesses whom
he considered relevant. This underlines the limitations and, therefore,
the unsatisfactory nature of his inquiry and subsequent report.
(Paragraph 57)
14 We are glad that the PSNI has recognised that
lessons needed to be learned with regard to practices for the
storing and sharing of information, not just in relation to Omagh,
but in the general treatment of intelligence and forensic evidence.
We welcome the assurance of the Northern Ireland Office that relevant
intelligence would today be more likely to reach the detectives
investigating a crime than appears to have been the case at Omagh.
(Paragraph 63)
15 We fully appreciate that security considerations
require Sir Peter's full report to be restricted. We remain of
the view that our Chairman should be enabled, on our behalf, to
satisfy himself that the contents of the full report conflict
in no way with the published summary of Sir Peter's review. (Paragraph
64)
16 We would again strongly urge the Prime Minister
to allow our Chairman, even at this late stage, to read Sir Peter's
full report. (Paragraph 66)
17 Meanwhile, we must reluctantly accept that
the full review is being withheld from the House of Commons Committee
for which it is material evidence. We must therefore request that
the Intelligence and Security Committee, which is allowed access
to the full report, revisit Sir Peter's conclusions in the light
of the questions raised by this Report. We also urge the ISC to
make its findings on these matters as public as is possible. (Paragraph
67)
18 We trust that the Omagh victims will be given
every possible assistance by the Government, the police and other
relevant agencies as they seek to pursue the compensation awarded
by the High Court against four individuals and the Real IRA. We
seek a statement from the NIO of what action would be taken to
provide such assistance, and we urge that such a statement be
made before the end of the present Parliament. (Paragraph 69)
19 It is a matter of deep regret that no one
has been convicted of causing the worst terrorist outrage in Northern
Ireland's history and that no one in authority holds out any realistic
possibility that those who committed the atrocity will pay the
penalty for it. Whatever the reasons may be, the criminal justice
system has in this case badly failed the victims of the bombing.
(Paragraph 70)
20 We recommend that the Northern Ireland Office
undertake consultation on how the victims of terrorist atrocities
might be legally aided, financially or otherwise, in bringing
civil actions where the criminal justice system has not brought
the perpetrators to book. We recognise that substantial safeguards
would be required to prevent the misuse of public money in this
respect, but believe that the action raised by some of the Omagh
families has highlighted an avenue largely made unavailable to
victims of terrorism on account of the prohibitive costs involved.
(Paragraph 73)
21 There is a compelling case for some further
inquiry into what did or did not occur in relation to Omagh, but
whether a full-scale public inquiry is the proper route for that
is less clear. We have recommended at paragraph 56 that further
investigation be undertaken into how intelligence provided to
Special Branch in August 1998 was used. We will defer any final
judgment on the need for a public inquiry, until after we receive
and study the Government's response to this Report. (Paragraph
81)
22 We see some potential in the suggestion that
the victims of Omagh - the relatives of those who died and were
injured - might benefit from close engagement with any Legacy
Commission if one eventually emerges from the Consultative Group
process. (Paragraph 85)
23 We believe that this Report, covering as it
does the most appalling crime committed in the history of Northern
Ireland, is in many ways the single most important Report that
the Committee has produced during this Parliament. We urge the
Government to respond fully and unequivocally to our recommendations
before this Parliament comes to an end. (Paragraph 86)
24 Nevertheless, we are conscious that the Committee
will not have an opportunity to discuss matters further after
Dissolution. We would therefore urge our successor Committee to
do so with whoever holds the office of Secretary of State for
Northern Ireland in the next Parliament, and we would also urge
that as and when policing and criminal justice issues are devolved
those who hold appropriate office in the Northern Ireland Executive
do likewise. (Paragraph 87)
25 Far too many questions remain unanswered.
The criminal justice system has failed to bring to justice those
responsible for the Omagh bombing. The least that those who were
bereaved or injured have the right to expect are answers to those
questions. (Paragraph 88)
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