The Omagh bombing: some remaining questions - Northern Ireland Affairs Committee Contents


Written evidence from BBC Panorama

PANORAMA SUBMISSION AT THE CONCLUSION OF WITNESS EVIDENCE TO THE NORTHERN IRELAND AFFAIRS COMMITTEE ON THE OMAGH BOMBING: ACCESS TO INTELLIGENCE

Summary

  In his evidence to NIAC on 13 May, Sir Peter:

    1. Confirmed he "deliberately did not" investigate the key issue identified by Panorama: why "any intercept material" shared between GCHQ and Special Branch, was not also shared with the CID who were trying to identify the bombers.

    2. Confirmed his terms of reference from the Prime Minister were "limited".

    3. Said it was "not apparent to me" this was an issue which the Chairman of the Omagh Support and Self-Help Group Michael Gallagher might wish to discuss with him.

    4. Refused to confirm or deny if any intercept material, in fact, existed, acknowledging only that he reviewed "classified material" while his classified report into how "any intercept material" was shared runs to 60 pages.

    5. Asserted "without any equivocation at all" that the "classified material" he reviewed would not, anyway, have been of any assistance to the CID in their efforts to identify suspects quickly.

    6. Did not explain how he reconciled this assertion with the 2001 finding by the Police Ombudsman for Northern Ireland that "objective assessment of all available intelligence " (which included the GCHQ intercepts) would "have produced other details by (Monday) 17 August 1998 of 'firm suspects' when maximum forensic opportunities were available". The government has acknowledged that Sir Peter "had access to all that was given to the" Ombudsman.

    7. Did not explain how he reconciled his assertion with the fact that telephone numbers alone would have given the CID names of their registered subscribers and thereby an early paper trail to their users on the day of the bombing.

    8. Acknowledged that the Special Branch were "cautious" about what little sanitised intelligence they did share with the CID but nonetheless, gave the Branch the benefit of the doubt as to why they were "cautious" without investigating the reason why.

    9. Told MPs they would "have to ask Special Branch" if they wished to know why telephone numbers intercepted by GCHQ were withheld from the CID whilst CID officers spent nine months trawling through records of millions of calls to try to identify the bombers.

    10. Said that it was "not up to GCHQ" what intelligence derived from GCHQ monitoring should have been shared with the CID whereas in paragraph 23 of his Review he also said that "strict conditions" were "imposed by GCHQ" about dissemination to Special Branch and beyond.

    11. Did not resolve—nor was he asked to resolve—the apparent conflict between his finding that "there was nothing that was not passed fully and quickly to Special Branch" with the recollections of the then head of Special Branch South (GCHQ's "customer") and the overall head of Special Branch, that they were not briefed about the intercepts until 19 August, three days after the bombing.

    12. Continued to insist that Panorama had put GCHQ "in the firing line" despite the script containing no assertion by Panorama that the bombing could have been prevented by GCHQ, or that GCHQ was responsible for the failure to share the intercept evidence with the CID.

    13. Acknowledged that his Review "hasn't achieved …all that much" in answer to NIAC Chairman Sir Patrick Cormack when he said it was hard to accept it had done "anything really to help. We've still got nobody who has been found guilty; we've still got grieving families, we've still got no real answers. What actually did it achieve?"

DETAILED RESPONSE TO SIR PETER GIBSON EVIDENCE TAKING INTO ACCOUNT WITNESS EVIDENCE

    [All References below to Questions 120 to 170, are to statements made by Sir Peter Gibson or questions put by members of the Committee to Sir Peter Gibson on 13 May. The full official transcript of that session may be found at Ev 20 to 26 of this Report, and the QQ numbers relate to the questions asked within that session.]

QQ 121 to 122

  This was an unusually long opening statement. Since the entire session lasted 50 minutes, only about 40 minutes were left for questions. Inevitably the surface was somewhat skimmed.

Sir Peter says he is "aware of criticism that I failed to deal with a number of issues."

  This criticism is hardly surprising.

  In announcing Sir Peter's Review the Cabinet Office said its terms were "to review any intercepted intelligence material available to the security and intelligence agencies in relation to the Omagh bombing and how this intelligence was shared".

  When his Review was published Sir Peter said it was established "following the BBC Panorama programme broadcast on 15 September."

  The title of that programme was: "Omagh: What The Police Were Never Told".

  At the core of the programme lay the disclosure that the numbers of telephones intercepted by GCHQ were withheld from the CID detectives trying to identify the bombers.

  In his evidence to NIAC, however, Sir Peter disclosed that the terms of his Review were "limited… to those identified to me by the Prime Minister in those terms, whether or not other issues featured in the Panorama programme or Sunday Telegraph article."

  The "criticism" comes from those who, not unreasonably, assumed that since the Review had been instigated by the Panorama programme, its terms would address the main issue embodied in the title of the programme.

  The Cabinet Office never made explicit that the Review would be limited to what passed between GCHQ and the Special Branch, and avoid inquiring into why the intercepted telephone numbers and their content were not shared with the CID, even though a former PSNI ACC claimed on the programme that had the numbers been shared, the CID would have been better placed to identify quickly some of the key suspects, arrest and charge them.

  Despite a decade long inquiry, and ministerial promises that "no stone would left unturned" in bringing the bombers to justice, no bombers have been brought to justice.

Sir Peter says Panorama made some "very serious and damaging " allegations "to the good name of the agencies and I found no substance whatever in those allegations."

  The Northern Ireland Secretary has said likewise.

  If that is what the government believes, why could not they have put their points to John Ware by agreeing to his request for a background briefing long BEFORE transmission. The government knew what the programme was going to say and they were offered every opportunity to respond.

  Both the Police Service of Northern Ireland and the government were supplied with considerable detail about the programme's content two months in advance of transmission. John Ware sought a response in whatever way the government chose to provide one.[1] He was told the government declined to comment on any of the matters on or off the record.

  Whilst we appreciate media relations on intelligence matters are not the subject of NIAC's inquiry, nevertheless can we suggest that it provides an opportunity to recommend a more constructive and less hidebound approach by government to media inquires of this kind.

  We do not, in any event, accept that Panorama made "allegations" against GCHQ, and evidence from witnesses to NIAC shows Sir Peter's finding of "no substance whatever" in the Panorama programme to be demonstrably wrong.

Sir Peter says that John Ware's sources "were, it seems, relying on their memories of events 10 years ago."

  Sir Peter does not know the identities of John Ware's sources, nor if, and at what stage over the last 11 years, they have seen documents containing references to intercepted conversations. Obviously we are not going to elaborate, save to say we are satisfied that information from our sources about the intercepts was reliable, with the exception of one mistaken recollection about a date. A source had told us the coded warning "Bricks in the Wall" was first heard on 2 August 1998 (The Banbridge Bombing). In his Review Sir Peter says: "My conclusion is that there was no information on or before 15 August that could reasonably indicate by reference to the events of Banbridge [our emphasis] that a further bomb attack was about to take place."

  We now understand the phrase "Bricks in the wall" was first heard on 30 April, ie during the attempted car bombing of Lisburn. The fact that the warning was known to the intelligence services three and a half months before Omagh as opposed to two weeks, adds to—not detracts from—its significance. We note that Sir Peter makes no mention of Lisburn and confines his conclusion that there was no information available, on or before 15 August that a further bombing attack was imminent by reference to Banbridge only. This illustrates the highly selective nature of Sir Peter's Review.

Sir Peter complains that there have been many "misconceptions" about his Review.

  In a report as circumscribed as his, and one that he acknowledges did not deal with the key issue (amongst others) raised by Panorama, speculation about what lies behind his careful wording is inevitable.

Sir Peter says he is "not aware of any request made by Special Branchto GCHQ that was not complied with."

  Does this mean that Sir Peter believes that had the Special Branch sought GCHQ's permission to disseminate the content of the intercepts and the numbers to the CID, GCHQ would have assented to that request? He does not say.

  For Special Branch South to have shared with the CID or even other parts of the Special Branch the content of the intercepts, or the numbers intercepted, or to have disclosed that interception had taken place, GCHQ's authority would have been required.[2] For GCHQ's assent, there would have to have been some relaxation of what Sir Peter refers to as the "strict conditions imposed by GCHQ."

  If Sir Peter is suggesting that is what would have happened, it is firmly at odds with the experience of detectives in the CID and Special Branch to whom we have spoken.

  In 2001, the Police Ombudsman for Northern Ireland found there were no criteria for determining what information Special Branch should disseminate to CID. However, Norman Baxter, the recently retired Detective Chief Superintendent in charge of the Omagh Bomb Inquiry told NIAC there was a policy "and that policy was not to disseminate."

  By the same token, we have been told that based on custom and practice, in 1998 the response from GCHQ to a request from Special Branch to disseminate the contents of an intercept and its telephone number would have been "No." Special Branch officers with knowledge of that era have told us that in order to comply with the provisions of the then Interception of Communications Act 1985, there was a firewall which meant that CID officers were not informed that intercept was the source of any intercepted telephone intelligence. This, apparently, was to protect methodology and technology by preventing even the fact that interception had occurred from seeping into the evidential chain. As Ray White, former RUC/PSNI Assistant Chief Constable has told the BBC: "That was the choke hold." Mr White is well qualified to know. Not only did he serve in Special Branch but prior to his retirement he was PSNI Assistant Chief Constable in charge of both Special Branch and CID at police headquarters.

  We note that the "choke hold" that prevailed in 1998 was reflected in the evidence given to NIAC by PSNI Assistant Commissioner Drew Harris:

    Mr Murphy: There was a suggestion that any information that was passed from GCHQ to Special Branch could not be passed to a third party without the explicit permission of GCHQ and indeed GCHQ had also to authorise the form in which that information was released. During that period, could that have affected the investigation?

    Mr Harris: That is correct. The information in effect is shared by computer monitor. Some of it would have been printed off, but only for a short time, and then would have been returned to GCHQ. In effect, the RUC did not actually own that information. It was lent to them and to use it in any form beyond a very tight group would have required permission and in a form of words to be agreed between either RUC headquarters in terms of Special Branch, or Special Branch in South Region with GCHQ. That would have required some negotiation." (our emphasis)

Sir Peter says there was "no hint of criticism of GCHQ procedures" in the Crompton report.

  That is hardly surprising.

  Sir Peter is referring to the Review of Special Branch carried out in 2002 by Her Majesty's Inspector of Constabulary by Mr (now Sir) Dan Crompton.

  Sir Dan himself has said he had no knowledge that GCHQ had intercepted some of the telephones of the bombers in Omagh and in previous linked bombings in the first place.

Sir Peter says it was not "apparent to me why Mr Gallagher should seek to learn" the terms of reference for his inquiry "from me when the prime minister had made them public."

  Although Sir Peter clearly believes there was no ambiguity about his terms of reference, that was not the case for either the BBC or the Omagh families or, it now seems, for Norman Baxter, who was still in post as the Detective Chief Superintendent in charge of the Omagh Bomb Inquiry when Sir Peter's Review was announced. Mr Baxter told NIAC:

    "… it would be my view that the inquiry which the Prime Minister announced was far away from the terms of reference that Sir Peter Gibson was given and therefore the expectations of the families who are still seeking closure were raised to a point that Sir Peter couldn't meet because he was looking at a narrow area of intelligence."

  Mr Baxter is surely correct. The Cabinet Office announcement of the Review appeared to cover all links in the intelligence dissemination chain: from GCHQ to Special Branch to CID, what was and was not disseminated and why. It is true that the announcement referred only to the word "how" intelligence was disseminated. But is it seriously being suggested that "how" obviously excluded "why"?

  When John Ware was alerted by his own sources to the fact that Sir Peter was not, after all, going to examine why GCHQ intercepts were not shared with the CID, he checked with the Cabinet Office. The spokesman told him: "…as to what SB did with it, that won't be part of it because I've been told that's all been looked at in some depth. An investigation by Merseyside was mentioned to me. I don't think Gibson is actually allowed to look at what the RUC did with the intelligence."[3]

  Therefore, so far as the Omagh families were concerned, the position was far from clear.

  In writing to Sir Peter to seek a meeting, perhaps Mr Gallagher was merely attempting to have Sir Peter's terms of reference clarified by Sir Peter himself, which seems to us to be a perfectly understandable thing for Mr Gallagher to have wished to do, particularly since Sir Peter has now acknowledged his terms were "limited" and excluded the main issue of why detectives were not given any telephone numbers at all.

QQ 123 to 127

Chairman: Can you guarantee to this Committee that there is nothing in the classified material which supports the concern among the Omagh families about whether those who carried out the bombing could have been quickly identified and arrested in the immediate aftermath? You will understand that they have asked us this question; we are not able to answer it because we have not seen the full report. Can you give that assurance?

Sir Peter Gibson: I can and do.

Chairman: Without any equivocation?

Sir Peter Gibson: Without any equivocation at all.

  On the face of it, Sir Peter's assertion seems inexplicable. We said that telephone numbers from intercepts conducted on the day of the bombing did exist and witnesses have confirmed there were indeed numbers which were not shared with the detectives. Most of the numbers later shown by cell-site analysis to have been involved in the bombing were registered to named individuals.[4] In what way could knowledge of those numbers not have been of very considerable assistance to the detectives in identifying suspects?

  In explaining the background to her December 2001 report into the Omagh Bomb Inquiry, the then Police Ombudsman for Northern Ireland Dame Nuala O' Loan told NIAC:

    "I will confirm that there were numbers and names which Special Branch could have given to CID officers on 15 August. They could have advised them in general terms, not saying, 'These are your bombers', but saying, 'These are possible suspects who you may wish to investigate' and that did not happen."

  Dame Nuala explained that she knew this because her investigators had been allowed access to classified material from the security services though she had not been allowed to refer to this, either in her published or confidential report. We are satisfied this access included extracts of GCHQ intercepts.

  Assistant Chief Constable Drew Harris also confirmed to NIAC that numbers existed which were not shared with the CID:

    "In not handing over mobile phone numbers, that is what Sir Peter refers to as (Special Branch) being cautious. From this distance, 11 years later, and from my own assessment of it, I have to conclude that there are a couple of elements in that. One was the sensitivity of the relationship with GCHQ and then the sensitivity of the particular phone numbers."

  Dame Nuala said that had the telephone numbers been shared with the CID, they could have helped identify the bombers and might also have led to admissions:

    "Had they (Special Branch) passed those phone numbers on, had they passed a couple of names on, I have no doubt—if you think about it, and I think I am relying on parliamentary privilege now, my understanding is that if you can get access to someone immediately after a bomb explodes who may have been involved in that bomb, and my understanding is also there is information to suggest that the bombers themselves were taken aback at what happened, that they did not intend to kill all these people, and if you were then able to arrest them and bring them in it is possible you might have a much more coherent and complete conversation with them. It would also give you the opportunity to go to their homes to search their homes for their mobile phones, for example. One of them, and again I am relying on parliamentary privilege, was seized five months after the bomb exploded."

  The intercepted conversations of which we are aware on the day of the bombing are consistent with having occurred during the bomb run between the border at Aughnacloy and Omagh.

  For example, we understand the words "Crossing the line" (or words to that effect) were recorded at around the time the cell-site analysis shows that an Eircell 585[5] mobile in the scout car called an Eircell 980 mobile in the bomb car as both vehicles passed through the Aughnacloy cell (mast) at 13.29.

  We have now been told the content of four intercepted calls and it is noteworthy that cell-site analysis shows four exchanges between the 585 (scout) and 980 (bomb) in the fifty minute journey from Aughnacloy to the bomb car being parked in Omagh.

  Our sources insist the words "Bricks in the wall" (or words to that effect) were recorded in Omagh with a figure for the number of bricks signifying minutes left to detonation.

  Was the 585 being intercepted?

  The number was registered to Colm Murphy, known by the Special Branches of both the RUC and Garda as a dissident republican active in the Newry/Dundalk area.[6] We have also been told by reliable sources that the 585 number was already known to both Special Branches as having been connected to the Banbridge bombing on 1 August.

  We cannot say for certain if the 585 or 980 were being intercepted. And whatever number(s) was being intercepted, we have been told its location is unlikely to have been immediately apparent. The ancillary data accompanying each intercept would probably have been restricted to number, time, duration and content.[7]

  However, connecting the intercepts to the Omagh bombing should have been apparent almost immediately transcripts were available to the Special Branch (which Sir Peter says was almost immediately after a call had been listened to) because of the reappearance of the coded phrase "Bricks in the wall" previously intercepted during the Lisburn bombing on 30 April.

  The location of the intercepts by reference to a cell or mast (usually the nearest) and the numbers of telephones called and received by the intercepted mobile(s) could have been available within 24 to 48 hours if the intercepted number(s) had been used to interrogate the billing data held in the Call Data Records of the relevant communication service provider, (for example Vodaphone UK).[8]

  Was the location data from the intercept(s) immediately sought by any of the security services, including the Special Branch? We do not know. Sir Peter does not say.

  Even if the 585 number was not being intercepted, its involvement in the Omagh bombing should have been evident to the security services.

  Approximately 10 minutes into the bomb run the 585 was called from a PCB on the forecourt of Barney's filling station on the Dublin Road, Newry, Co Armagh.[9] According to our sources, this PCB was being intercepted by GCHQ on behalf of Special Branch.[10]

  Nine calls were made from this PCB between 12.39 and 12.59.[11] We have also been told that the identity of the caller was assessed as Liam Campbell, so called "OC" of the Real IRA and in overall charge of the Omagh bombing.[12]

  The calls followed a clear pattern. Three were test warning calls to the Irish News in Belfast, the Samaritans and Ulster Television (UTV).[13]

  In Omagh, the Samaritans and UTV did receive three real warning calls between 14.29 and 1431.[14]

  This PCB had previously been used to make warning calls in relation to the Lisburn car bombing on 30 April. Again three of these calls were to the Irish News, the Samaritans, and UTV.[15]

  BT records on the day of the Omagh bombing show that the call to the 585 mobile from Barney's filling station PCB lasted 23 seconds and was tightly sandwiched between the test warning call to the Samaritans and UTV.[16]

  However the CID had no reason to inspect the BT records because neither the fact that the calls from the PCB were being intercepted, nor even that the PCB had been used for test warning calls, was disclosed to the CID.[17]

  The test warning calls were followed by two calls to numbers registered to a company associated with Oliver Traynor, a known dissident activist.[18]

  Had the CID been informed that Barney's filling station PCB had been used for test warning calls, BT records would have led detectives to the 585 number and then to its registered owner, Colm Murphy and possibly also to Oliver Traynor. Why were the CID not immediately told anything about the role of this PCB in the bombing? Again, Sir Peter does not tell us.

  Both the 585 and the 980 were Eircell registered mobiles roaming on the Vodaphone UK network.

  The evidence that the 585 had four exchanges with the 980 in Northern Ireland en route to Omagh and that both mobiles had been to Omagh could have been retrieved through cell-site analysis from Vodaphone UK within 24 to 48 hours by interrogating the network's Call Data Records (CDR).[19]

  Since both Eircell registered mobiles were roaming on the Vodaphone network, the location by reference to a mast of both outgoing and incoming calls would have been available from the CDR because for each mobile any calls made or received were charged.[20]

  Knowing that the 585 had been called during the bomb run from a PCB involved in the bombing, that the 585 had four exchanges with the 980, both of which had been to Omagh, would have given both the RUC and Garda detectives a rapid paper trail to Colm Murphy and then to the owner of the 980, Terence Morgan with the prospect of early arrests of those suspected of having used the phones during the bombing.

  A paper trail to Murphy and Morgan is precisely what did emerge in November 1998 when the RUC, with the assistance the Garda and Vodaphone finally managed to identify the exchanges between Murphy and Morgan's respective 585 and 980 mobiles through cell-site analysis.[21] Two other core numbers were also identified.

  This analysis took so long because the detectives were not given any number known to have been involved in the Omagh bombing with which to interrogate the CDRs of Vodaphone or Eircell. In effect, both CIDs were looking for a needle in a haystack.

  The search was then expanded to 10 other bombings between January and October 1998 with the assistance of other communication service providers (CSPs) Eircell, BT Cellnet and E-Sat Digiphone.[22]

  During this expanded search, the owner of the 980 mobile, Terence Morgan, was arrested and he spoke freely to the RUC. His information led to the arrests of other key suspects including Seamus Daly whom the Police strongly believe to this day was the "hands on" manager of the bombing in the scout car.

  It was the major turning point in the inquiry. Unfortunately by now six months had elapsed and the forensic trail had gone cold. Yet this paper trail could have been discovered to the RUC and Garda within days of the bombing had the RUC been pointed to the BT records of Barney's PCB, and had the intercepted number(s) also been shared allowing both the RUC and the Garda to interrogate the billing data held by CSPs.

  By June 1999, a matrix of mobiles involved in five linked incidents including Omagh had been plotted out.[23] In total this had involved a nine months trawl through many millions of numbers. This analysis indicated a total of 22 personalities' telephones had been used in the five incidents: 18 of whom were resident in the Republic of Ireland while four were resident in Northern Ireland.[24]

  Like Dame Nuala, Mr Baxter has also told NIAC he believes Sir Peter's assertion that the "classified material" would have been of no assistance whatsoever "isn't correct." He said that for an investigator the key piece of information that "sat behind" an intercept "would be the telephone number."

  Mr Baxter said that had "such things as telephone numbers" been known to the intelligence community "on the day or leading up to Omagh, that should have been shared with the investigators at a very early stage. I think Sir Peter Gibson has indicated a different view that wouldn't have been of assistance…

    Sir Patrick Cormack: This is a fairly important area. So you are saying you do not view this in the same way as Sir Peter did?

    Norman Baxter: From an investigator's perspective, I think in fairness to Sir Peter he does indicate he was not in the criminal bar."

  Mr Baxter also said: "…. if the intelligence community knew telephones were used in a bomb mission then it was their moral, if not their statutory duty to ensure that the investigators knew " and that it was "hard to believe that any state organisation which would have information which would help solve the murder of 29 people and not ensure that it was part given to investigators. I think that any organisation which had information that didn't do that is culpable."

  The difficulty for us, the families and the general public is that because Sir Peter has adopted the government's "neither-confirm-nor-deny" rule as to the existence of GCHQ intercepts, it is almost impossible to engage with him or the government as to what exactly lies behind his assertion that the classified material he saw would have been valueless in assisting the CID officers to identify the bombers.

  How, for example, does Sir Peter reconcile his certainty with the findings of Dame Nuala's December 2001 report which said that "firm suspects" could have been "identified … then have been subject to prompt and proper investigation" when "maximum forensic opportunities were available" had there been "objective assessment of all (our emphasis) available intelligence" . [25]

  There can be no doubt that when Dame Nuala referred to "all available intelligence" she was including intercept intelligence because she said that in "referring to all the material which I had seen, some…was Special Branchmaterial and some… was material received from the Security Services."

  Which of the "security services" was Dame Nuala referring to? Evidently GCHQ was one.

  She told NIAC: "Lady Hermon, I cannot confirm the material which I saw came from GCHQ. It would be a criminal offence for me to do that."

  The television recording of her evidence to NIAC (though not the transcript) shows Dame Nuala then said: "…but the material which I saw and which—you see, we went to GCH—well….".[26]

  This (highlighted) section of her evidence is omitted from the transcript which picks up as follows: "…we went across a number of evidential opportunity lines when we were conducting our investigation and we went to the security and intelligence services."

  Dame Nuala also referred to the confidential section of her report which had said "critical intelligence was available on 15 August." We are satisfied this reference to "critical intelligence" included intercepts.

  Sir Peter must have known that Dame Nuala's investigators had access to GCHQ intercepts from the day of the bombing because in a letter to MP David Davis the Northern Ireland Secretary says: "In terms of the material you may wish to note that he (Sir Peter) had access to all that was given to the then Police Ombudsman Nuala O' Loan when she conducted her investigation in 2001."[27]

  However, we understand that Sir Peter did not interview Dame Nuala. Therefore he would have had no appreciation of the value to the CID that she and her investigators placed on the intercepts. Why did Sir Peter not interview her? And how does that square with statements by the Prime Minister that Sir Peter's review was "comprehensive and authoritative"[28] and by the Northern Ireland secretary that it was "thorough and exhaustive"?[29]

  There are two further exchanges which may have been of particular significance on 15 August.

    — We have recently been told that one of the Omagh intercepts recorded after the bomb run had passed Aughnacloy, said "have you signed me in?" or words to that effect. On 11 February, the Prime Minister met some of the Omagh families at Downing Street. Present was Victor Barker, whose son James was killed. Mr Barker took a note and he is a solicitor. The judge had retired to consider his verdict against five men whom the Omagh families were suing in the civil courts. The families alleged the five had been involved in the bombing. Mr Barker noted that the Prime Minister said that there was nothing in the classified version of Sir Peter Gibson's report that would assist their case. Had there been, the Prime Minister said he would have been prepared to change the law. Mr Barker took that to mean that the Prime Minister was prepared to lift the ban against intercept evidence being admissible in court. One of the five defendants was Seamus McKenna who in August 1998 was working on a building site in Dublin with Terence Morgan owner of the 980 mobile. When arrested Morgan told the RUC that on 14 August, the day before the bombing, McKenna had asked Morgan to sign him in for work on the 15 August. Morgan also said the foreman Colm Murphy had also asked him for a loan of his mobile. Morgan obliged. The families' case against McKenna rested on the fact that there had been a call from the 980 mobile to the Northern Ireland home of McKenna's estranged wife Catherine at 15.41, 80 minutes after the 980 mobile had been in Omagh when the bomb car was parked. When interviewed by the RUC she first denied it had been her husband who had called, then she admitted he had, then she said he had not. Mrs McKenna, like her husband had a history of alcohol dependence. The judge considered her to be an unreliable witness and McKenna was acquitted. If—we stress if—this intercept did, or does still exist, and if evidence of its existence had been admissible, it would no doubt have been considered a very material piece of evidence and may have persuaded the judge to find McKenna guilty.

    — At 15.26 a 198 second call was made from Sean Hoey's home to Seamus Daly's Ready to Go Mobile. Daly was now safely back in the Irish Republic. Hoey has admitted he made the call.[30] We understand that Hoey's telephones had been intercepted for several months. He had been identified by the Special Branchas the bomb maker for the first of the dissident bombs that destroyed the centre of Markethill in Co Armagh in September 1997. However, we understand the Branch specifically instructed there was to be "no downward dissemination" of this intelligence to the CID. In interviews with the PSNI, Hoey denied he had called Daly out of curiosity as the bomb maker about how the Omagh bomb run had gone. The content of any intercept from this call was never made known to the Omagh Bomb Inquiry.

  Sir Peter may be convinced the intercepts and numbers would have been of no assistance to the CID in helping to identify the suspects. But he has not explained why he is convinced of this.

  That is clearly not the view of the Ombudsman's investigators who were experienced senior police officers. Mr Baxter pointed out that Sir Peter has no experience at the criminal bar.

  Are we to prefer Sir Peter's assessment that the "classified material" he saw would have been valueless to the Police over the Police's professional assessment that it could have been invaluable?

QQ 128 to 140

Kate Hoey: "….Can I ask you one further question, just to get it on the record really? Are you absolutely clear that there is nothing that any better intelligence that was there and what you saw could have made a difference? In other words, is it clear that the Omagh bombing could not have been prevented by the better use of any of the intelligence that might have existed at the time?

Sir Peter Gibson: Yes."

  This assertion by Sir Peter is also hard to accept at face value.

  Omagh was the culmination of a series of bombings from 1997 and came just two weeks after an identical car bomb had caused a near massacre in Banbridge.

  Norman Baxter told NIAC the Omagh bombing may well not have happened had all the intelligence available to the Special Branch from the previous bombings have been better exploited. As we have demonstrated, that intelligence clearly included intercept.

  Mr Baxter said that the "bomb team had free reign from the middle of 1997, and the authorities, whoever they were, allowed this to continue." He said it would have been "inconceivable" for there not to have been arrests had there been bombings on the mainland. "What I do know is that there were opportunities to intervene after each explosion."

  Sir Peter says the Special Branch did "not identify to GCHQ any particular phone number as being of particular importance or relevance to a potential bombing."[31]

  Nonetheless, Sir Peter also says that "before, on and after 15 August" GCHQ were supplying "any interception that might have been relevant to RUC Special Branchfor its operational purposes"—by which presumably Sir Peter means GCHQ were, in fact, supplying intercept intelligence to the Branch.

  Presumably, also, this intercept intelligence was in respect of particular phone numbers identified by the Special Branch to GCHQ. Sir Peter says it "included near real time provision of information by telephone (that is almost immediately after a call had been listened to itself in near real time) in accordance with pre-agreed criteria."[32]

  In his Review, Sir Peter drew attention to the 2002 Crompton Report that said "the majority of Special Branch work has concentrated on proactive disruption operations."[33]

  For what purpose other than disrupting or even arresting the bombers, might the Special Branch have given GCHQ telephone numbers for near real time monitoring in the first place if the Branch did not believe the numbers could be exploited in some way for such a purpose?

  This question, understandably, has perplexed MPs.

    Dr McDonnell: "….The bafflement here—and again I think this affects families and everyone else involved in Omagh—is why was all this work, costing a fair amount of money, not put to some use?

  Once again, Sir Peter does not enlighten us and it seems from his evidence to NIAC that he does not know the answer.

    Sir Peter Gibson: "Special Branch would have to answer for itself, but they were in one sense the people gathering intelligence by asking GCHQ to provide it, by seeking it by their own means, and they no doubt had their own particular reasons. I know not whether there were disruption activities going on or what it was that was preoccupying Special Branch."

  Narrow though Sir Peter's terms of reference were, they did at least include whether the bomb could have been prevented. Yet he acknowledges that he does not know "whether there were disruption activities going on, or what was preoccupying Special Branch." Again we ask: how can his Review be described as "comprehensive, authoritative, thorough" and "exhaustive" when he does not even attempt to provide an answer as to what the Special Branch were doing with all the intelligence they were gathering if they were neither using it to disrupt bombings, nor sharing it with the CID to help them catch those carrying out the bombings?

  It is a fundamental question going to the heart of the Omagh debacle. And yet Sir Peter cannot answer it because he appears not even to have asked the question.

  In April 1998 when dissidents tried to blow up the centre of Lisburn, Co Antrim with a car bomb, we have been told that a coded warning was intercepted and that Oliver Traynor was assessed as having spoken the words: "The bricks are in the wall" (or words to that effect) with a number for the bricks signifying the time left to detonation. Traynor and Sean Hoey were known to be close associates.[34]

  Hoey had come to the attention of Special Branch six months earlier as the alleged maker of the Markethill bomb in September 1997.[35] On 29 April, the day before the Lisburn bombing, Hoey had been issued with a new SIM card.[36]

  Cell-site analysis shows this mobile was very active from early in the morning at the start of the bomb run. The phone made and received a total of 13 calls to and from telephones which were clearly involved in the bombing.[37] In December 2007 Hoey was acquitted of all charges in connection with Lisburn, Omagh and other bombings which the prosecution claimed were linked. Mr Justice Weir could not be satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that DNA identified as Hoey's on parts of four devices, including Lisburn was due to contamination, accidental or otherwise. The Lisburn telephone evidence was not introduced at his trial.

  Cell-site analysis from telephone billing also shows that a second mobile registered to Traynor was involved in Lisburn and was the most active of his two mobiles, travelling as far north as the millennium mast in Banbridge at the time the bomb car was parked. Traynor's mobiles either made or received 15 calls in helping to coordinate the bombing.[38]

  The alleged involvement of Hoey and Traynor in Lisburn could have been discovered by the CID at the time had the intercepted telephone number(s) been shared with the detectives. This would have allowed the CID to interrogate the communication service providers for other telephones with which the intercepted number had been in contact leading detectives to names and addresses of their registered owners.

  In all, cell-site analysis shows that five of the Lisburn phones or their users were subsequently involved in two further bombings (Newry Courthouse and Banbridge) prior to Omagh, and that seven (including the five) of the Lisburn phones or their user went on to play leading roles, both in the preparation for Omagh and on the day of the bombing itself.[39]

  It is clear from extracts of Special Branch files that they were building up a clear picture of the key bombers months before Omagh. For example:

    — On 18 May 1998 intelligence was received that "The Provisional (IRA) leadership is aware that Michael McKevitt (overall leader of the RIRA) is attempting to increase the co-operation between CIRA (Continuity IRA) and dissident PIRA elements associated with the 32CSC." (32 Country Sovereign Committee)

    — Colm Murphy was shown by intelligence to have been linked to both CIRA and RIRA

    — On 23 May (the day of the Good Friday Referendum) there is a reference to Liam Cambell and Declan McComish being involved with two brothers who attempted to transport a 900 lbs bomb across the border. We understand McComish was intercepted making one of the actual warning calls from a PCB in Silverbridge Newry on the day of the bombing.

    — On 20 July Campbell is reported to have been "deep in conversation" with another suspect the day before a mortar attack on Newry on Corry Square RUC Station Newry. We have been told that a conversation involving Campbell was intercepted where Campbell had become concerned that his team had been compromised so he asked an associate to do the attack.[40]

  What did the Special Branch do with the leads that were available from interception, telephone billing and their informants?

  What Mr Baxter says is that in each of the bombings prior to Omagh "there were opportunities to intervene." But "these people were not arrested."

  Who was responsible for the intelligence gathering from the Markethill bombing onwards not being given to the CID investigating each of these bombings? "Whoever was in charge of the intelligence community," says Mr. Baxter. "I can't say who made the individual decisions. There seems to have been a policy and that policy was not to disseminate."

  Does Sir Peter know the answer to any of these questions? If so, he does not tell us.

QQ 141 to 144

Sir Peter says the BBC "got it completely wrong."

  We do not accept this all-embracing condemnation of our work. It is unjustified and it is clear from the evidence to NIAC that Sir Peter's criticism is untenable:

    — We said there were intercepts—and clearly there were, despite the government and Sir Peter's refusal to confirm or deny their existence. Sir Peter explains that "those who say that I have not denied an allegation cannot properly interpret such non denial as a confirmation." Notwithstanding this "NC" rule (neither confirm nor deny) however, the Northern Ireland Secretary appears to have departed from it on two occasions.[41] Why, anyway, would the Prime Minister have ordered a Review of "any intercept evidence" had there been no intercepts to review? And why would the classified version of Sir Peter's report have run to what he says was about 60 pages if there were no intercepts to report on?

    — We said there were telephone numbers. Both ACC Drew Harris of the PSNI and the former Police Ombudsman for Northern Ireland Dame Nuala O'Loan have confirmed this.

    — We said these numbers were not shared. The former Omagh Bomb Inquiry Senior Investigating Officer Norman Baxter, his deputy David McWilliams, Dame Nuala and ACC Drew have confirmed this.

    — We said theses numbers should have been shared. Both Mr Baxter and Dame Nuala have agreed they should have been shared.

    — We said the CID were left to their own devices to identify the numbers which they did over several months by examining the billing records for millions of numbers. Both Mr McWilliams and Dame Nuala have confirmed this.

    — We said had the numbers been shared they might well have led to arrests. Both Mr Baxter and Dame Nuala have said likewise.

  Since transmission, two riders need to be added to what we know:

    — As stated, the reference to the first occasion to when the code words "Bricks in the wall" were intercepted should have been attributed not to the Banbridge incident, but to an earlier one. We now understand the phrase was first intercepted at Lisburn three and a half months before it was again intercepted at Omagh. Although this reinforces the link between Omagh and previous bombings, Sir Peter chose to highlight only the fact that we said this was used at Banbridge, omitting any mention of the phrase's earlier use at Lisburn.

    — On the issue of the tracking of mobiles, Sir Peter's report concludes that GCHQ could not track mobiles in real time in 1998. Our script made it quite clear that we did not know if the mobiles were being monitored in real time and that the possibility of the bombing being prevented only arose had this been so. At no time did we assert the bombing could have been stopped. Any reasonable person would expect the BBC to have explored the question as to whether the atrocity could have been avoided once we were satisfied, as we are, that interception had occurred. Our subsequent research suggests that GCHQ's capability was so limited that it was dependent—perhaps entirely so—on that of Vodaphone who, we have been told, did not seriously attempt live tracking of a mobile on behalf of the police until the summer of 2002. As we have stressed, the government had every opportunity to explain GCHQ's limitations two months before transmission but declined perhaps because they did not wish to admit just how limited that capability was.

  We would also point to an error in Sir Peter's Review.

  Sir Peter said: "There is no evidence whatever before me to make good the assertion in the Sunday Telegraph and the Panorama programme that, on 14 August, the Garda had warned the police of a likely attack."[42]

  However, we are satisfied that a briefing was provided by a senior Special Branch officer South Region to the acting Assistant Chief Constable, South Region on the afternoon of 14th August 1998 indicating that information had been received from the Garda about a potential vehicle borne device, and that a joint police/military operation was deployed in the South Armagh/South Down area on the morning of 15 August 1998. We also understand that Mr Baxter was the third person at that briefing.

  Presumably Sir Peter was unaware of this because he did not cover this ground in his telephone interview with Mr Baxter.

  Sir Peter said that as a result of the BBC's "very serious and damaging allegations…expectations may have been raised amongst the families of the victims of the bombing."

  The families have emphasised this was not the case because we made clear to them the limits of our knowledge.[43]

  In his evidence to NIAC, Mr Baxter said it was, in fact, Sir Peter's terms of reference that had raised "expectations of the families who are still seeking closure" because his terms were confined to "a narrow area of intelligence"—namely what passed between GCHQ and the Special Branch—not, as the families and we had expected—what passed between GCHQ and Special Branch and why this was not fully shared the CID.

  In his evidence Sir Peter says: "…there was nothing that was not passed fully—again subject to this not confirming or deny intercepts and so on—there was nothing that was not passed fully and quickly to Special Branch, the designated recipient of any information from GCHQ."

  We understand that for his Review Sir Peter interviewed both the head of Special Branch South and the overall head of Special Branch at the time of Omagh. We are satisfied from our own research that both former officers had already made it clear to former Assistant Chief Constable Ray White, that they did not receive the intelligence product from the intercepts until Tuesday 19 August, three days after the bombing.[44] Sir Peter, on the other hand, says he is satisfied there was nothing that was not passed "fully and quickly to Special Branch."

  Therefore, the following question arises:

  Assuming that the two former senior officers gave the same account to Sir Peter as we are satisfied they gave to Ray White, has Sir Peter resolved the apparent conflict between his finding that there was nothing that was not passed "fully and quickly" to Special Branch, and their recollections that they did not receive anything until three days later? If Sir Peter has resolved this conflict, he has not explained how he resolved it.

Q 147 

Mr Heburn asks, "why did it take CID something like nine months to trawl through literally millions and millions of telephone records, mobile phone records, to try and trace a suspect device?"

  This question is especially pertinent in light of the fact that the Special Branch (and presumably all the Security Services) knew that the CID were themselves trying to identify suspects from telephone numbers.

  Why the CID detectives got no assistance with telephone numbers was also the single most important issue raised by Panorama. It appears also to be of considerable concern to members of NIAC.[45]

  Yet Sir Peter acknowledges that this was yet another matter excluded from his terms of reference. "I deliberately did not go into questions like why certain things were done or not done" he says. Those seeking an answer "will have to ask Special Branch."

QQ 148 

  Explaining why he had "deliberately" not delved into the question of why the Special Branch acted "cautiously" Sir Peter says it would have required him to have assessed whether the "the police acted properly, well, non-negligently—things like that. Once you go down that path—and I have seen it in my career at the Bar and judicially—you open the door to legal procedures and requirements. For example, if you criticise any person in a report, the practice these days is to send a draft to that person; that person then raises queries on the report. The whole procedure is lengthened very considerably."

  We only observe that Sir Peter did not extend this courtesy to the BBC. He showed no reluctance to make findings critical of Panorama without offering the right to raise queries. No "draft" of his criticisms of Panorama was sent to the programme for a response. Sir Peter also refused to give John Ware a copy of his secretary's note after he had been interviewed. He has also refused to explain his refusal.

Q 148 (cont'd) to Q 149

Pressed on whether he might consider reopening his inquiry into why Special Branch did not share GCHQ material with the CID, Sir Peter "adverted to the difficulties in finding the truth in relation to that matter. If, as I have been led to believe, there are no documents, you are relying only on memories."

  We certainly agree that establishing the truth about who got what, when and why is difficult which is why we said "the blunt truth is that none of the stories match up about who got what and when." We repeat: the programme script was heavily qualified.

  Sir Peter, however, asserted without qualification, that Special Branch South first "identified" to the CID " those persons it believed to have been involved in the bombing" on 20 August".[46] We have said no record of such a briefing exists in the Omagh Bomb Inquiry's HOLMES system.[47] In his evidence to NIAC, former Detective Chief Inspector David McWilliams, deputy SIO to the Bomb Inquiry also said: "I was not aware of anything that was passed on 20th. The first I knew of it was from Sir Peter Gibson report." Mr McWilliams was a senior officer on the Inquiry from the day of the bombing. Sir Peter's assertion is also contradicted by notes available to other senior CID officers who Sir Peter did not interview, but who John Ware did interview.[48]

  Sir Peter, in his evidence to NIAC, acknowledged that "no documents were produced relating to what Special Branch was doing at the relevant time." Sir Peter also said the BBC had been "relying on" the memory of sources "of events 10 years ago and they did not have the advantage of seeing the documentation which I have seen." Has, perhaps, Sir Peter been "relying on memories" when he asserts without qualification that suspects were first identified to the CID by Special Branch South on 20 August?

Q 149 (cont'd) to Q 150

Asked why, in his Review, Sir Peter had said the Special Branchhad acted in a "cautious" way, he responded that he "implied no more than… that the information they handed over was not very extensive."

  There surely is more to it than that.

  When referring to Special Branch's "caution", in his Review Sir Peter went on to say: "I do not doubt that Special Branch South took the (cautious) actions it did for what it considered to be good operational reasons."

  Sir Peter does not explain why he gave Special Branch the benefit of the doubt when, on his own admission, he did not investigate the "soundness of those reasons…"

QQ 158 to 159

Sir Peter says: "GCHQ is treating Special Branch as a customer; so it is trying to do what the customer wants. If the customer wants something done urgently, it can say so. If it wants further information, it can do so."

  In his evidence to NIAC, John Ware also referred to Special Branch being the "customer": "…..The system is then interrogated, headlines are dashed off and whizzed off by fax or whatever to the customer, Special Branch…".

  And later: "To be fair, GCHQ are worker bees. They are set tasks, as I understand it, and they are a service provider. They are not there to analyse this and that and the other, they provide the coverage…."

  These answers again demonstrate that we understood the relationship between GCHQ and the Special Branch and why Sir Peter is simply wrong to persist in saying that Panorama had GCHQ "in the firing line."[49]

QQ 159 (cont'd) to 160

Sir Peter says the transmission of GCHQ material "from Special Branchto, say, the investigating team. That is a matter for them. It's not up to GCHQ."

  If dissemination of GCHQ intelligence by the Special Branch to the CID is "not up to GCHQ" why is there any requirement for the "strict conditions" about dissemination which, according to Sir Peter's Review are "imposed by GCHQ?"[50] Again, he has not explained.

QQ 163 to 166

Sir Peter says that he hoped his Review "would achieve the exoneration" of GCHQ from the "very serious charges" which he considers were made by the BBC.

  According to the Security Service, Sir Peter Gibson is one of two "independent Commissioners" who "oversee the activities of the Security Service and a number of other public bodies, including the Secret Intelligence Service (SIS) and the Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ)."[51]

  Does the "exoneration" of GCHQ of any responsibility for the failure of the Omagh bomb inquiry properly fall within his remit? It is surely not the job of an "independent" scrutiniser to "defend" any institution for which he is responsible.

  By exonerating GCHQ and the rules and procedures governing dissemination of its intercepts from any bearing on the failure of the intercepted telephone numbers to be shared with the CID, Sir Peter turns the spotlight on to Special Branch and the only remaining link in the dissemination chain: Special Branch to CID. He then promptly turns it off by not investigating all the circumstances that might explain why the Special Branch did not share those numbers with the CID.

Q 166 (Cont'd) to Q 168

Sir Peter says: "I know Mr Ware differs from me. He says that GCHQ, for example, was not in the firing line at all. I am wholly unable, having seen what was said in the Panorama programme, to agree with him on that."

  Sir Peter has not distinguished between an allegation and justifiable questions.

  Panorama did not hold GCHQ responsible either for any failure to stop the bomb, or for the failure of the content of the intercepts and telephone numbers to be shared with the CID. Sir Peter has for the third time ignored our repeated references in the script and elsewhere which made it clear we make no assertion as to who was responsible for the failure.[52], [53], [54], [55]

  It was because we were unable to resolve what level of monitoring Special Branch sought from GCHQ that we never asserted the bombing could have been stopped, just as we were unable to resolve what GCHQ gave to Special Branch by way of intercepts and when.

  We did, as a matter of fairness to GCHQ, report that one source had told us "the Special Branch got the intercepts within six hours of the bombing." We also reported that the Branch were denying this.

  The core issue was what information ultimately reached the CID and the commentary posed that question in a neutral way:

    "The question is: how much of GCHQ's intelligence found its way to the detectives and when? The blunt truth is that none of the stories match up about who got what and when".

  The commentary simply reflected the different positions of different parties as they were reported to us:

    "If the Special Branchare complaining about GCHQ then the CID make a similar complaint about the Special Branch. The detectives were pleading for intelligence. But their log records nothing until three and a half weeks after the bomb exploded. The Special Branch say the log is incomplete. They insist they briefed the detectives immediately. What is clear is that the detectives didn't get everything. Special Branch says that's because GCHQ wouldn't allow the detectives to know there had been intercepts."[56]

  The fact that we were unable to include a response from GCHQ has everything to do with GCHQ's refusal to provide one, and nothing to do with Panorama having put GCHQ in the "firing line."

  Sir Peter's persistence in accusing us of the latter suggests a dogged determination to defend GCHQ at the expense of the BBC even though the BBC has raised questions which are manifestly in the public interest, and to which no reasonable person could possibly expect us to have all the answers without access to the "range of very sensitive and highly classified material" that Sir Peter says were made available to him in his role as Intelligence Services Commissioner[57]

  Is the suggestion really that the BBC had no business posing any of these questions having satisfied ourselves there were intercepts, without have checked everything against the "range of very sensitive and highly classified material" made only available to those with the highest vetting?

Sir Peter acknowledges, he doesn't know "the details of the PSNI's internal procedures governing what should be passed to the detectives and investigating team."

  We repeat: the failure to share the intercepted numbers with the CID was at the heart of Panorama and since the programme was responsible for instigating his Review, we and the Omagh families assumed he would squarely address this issue.

  In fact Sir Peter deliberately avoided doing so.

  As to whether the bombing could have been prevented, Sir Peter has addressed this in a narrow way: whether, as the arrangements stood on 15 August 1998, the bombing could have been stopped, as distinct from whether better exploitation of all the intelligence, including all intercepts could have been used to disrupt the bombers thus avoiding Omagh.

Sir Peter acknowledges that because the families have not been convinced by his report "to that extent, it hasn't achieved, as you suggested, all that much."

  We agree it is hard to see what his Review has achieved, beyond saying the bombing could not have been prevented on the day.

  He has shed no light on why the Special Branch did not do more to try to prevent it by disrupting the bombers prior to Omagh through the better exploitation of intercept and other intelligence.

  The Northern Ireland Secretary told NIAC the sharing of intelligence had been examined by the Ombudsman in her 2001 investigation into the Omagh Bomb Inquiry. That is not quite how the Ombudsman herself sees it. As she explained, she was prohibited from making any public reference to the intercepts:

    Mr Murphy: Do you agree with the Secretary of State that your report actually covered all of the issues that were raised with regard to the evidence that was available at that time?

    Dame Nuala O'Loan: The law does not permit anyone to refer to certain types of evidence, Mr Murphy, so my report covered it but did not cover it explicitly, if that is of assistance to you.

    Mr Murphy: Do you think Sir Peter raised more questions in relation to this "cautious way" in which Special Branch—

    Dame Nuala O'Loan: Special Branch did not disseminate material which they could have disseminated to the CID officers investigating.

    Chairman: Do you know why?

    Dame Nuala O'Loan: No.

  Nor, apparently, does Sir Peter because he deliberately did not address that question.

  Sir Peter has contributed almost nothing to our understanding of why intercept intelligence was not shared with the CID to help them identify and arrest the bombers, and most particularly, why the CID could not, at the very least, have been given the telephone numbers.

  It is difficult to accept that Sir Peter's Review has served much public good at all since it has so carefully avoided addressing those matters which remain of greatest concern to the Omagh families and the wider public.

16 December 2009








1   See paras 71-73 Panorama response to Sir Peter Gibson Review
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/shared/bsp/hi/pdfs/12_02_09_panoramagibsonresponse.pdf  
Back

2   Para 23 Gibson Review. Back

3   JW note of Cabinet Office spokesman 3 October 2008. Back

4   Of the landlines and many mobiles subsequently shown by cell-site analysis to have been involved on the day of the bombing, and in previous bombings linked to Omagh, only a handful were unregistered "Ready To Go" phones. Back

5   For ease of reference we refer to the last three digits. Back

6   A memo from the Special Branch Omagh Bomb assessment file of Liam Campbell states that "Republican dissidents" active in the Newry/Dundalk area included Campbell and Murphy and others. Back

7   Confidential sources. Back

8   Ibid. Back

9   p82 "Cell Site Analysis Linked to Dissident Republican Activity in Northern Ireland" LKP5. Back

10   We understand most PCB interception was carried out by Special Branch. Back

11   pp81-82 "Cell Site Analysis Linked to Dissident Republican Activity in Northern Ireland" LKP5. Back

12   Confidential source. Back

13   pp81-82 "Cell Site Analysis Linked to Dissident Republican Activity in Northern Ireland" LKP5. Back

14   p2 Ibid DC Barr, memo 10 December "R-v-Seamus Daly-Telephone Analysis for Omagh and Linked Series". Back

15   pp10 & 11 Ibid.
An attempted bomb warning call had also been made to the Irish News exactly two weeks earlier in relation to the Banbridge car bombing. Because it was a Saturday the paper was closed and the caller had to fall back on the BT 999 system where calls are known to be recorded. 
Back

16   p82 "Cell Site Analysis Linked to Dissident Republican Activity in Northern Ireland" LKP5. Back

17   Confidential source. Back

18   Town Glass Ltd, a company owned by Seamus McGrane, a leading dissident. It is also said by the PSNI to have been "Oliver Traynor's business which employs Liam Campbell." (DC Barr, memo 10 December "R-v-Seamus Daly-Telephone Analysis for Omagh and Linked Series" Two mobiles registered to Traynor had also been very active in the earlier Lisburn bombing on 30 April where the coded warning "Bricks are in the wall" was first intercepted. We have been told that the person speaking was assessed as Traynor. A mobile registered to him had also been used in a hoax bombing in Newry on 1 April. Back

19   Confidential sources. Back

20   Police statement of Raymond Green Fraud and Investigations Manager Vodaphone Ltd 28 April 1999: "When a mobile phone from an overseas company is 'roaming' on the Vodaphone network, any calls received or made are charged. The cell site used will usually be the site which is nearest to the mobile telephone or one that is immediately adjacent if the nearest cell site is congested or obstructed.". Back

21   "Omagh Bomb Investigation Current Situation Report" December 1999. Back

22   Ibid: "…it was decided to look at the bomb attacks carried out by distance during 1998 to see if a similar method of running the bombs to their destination using mobile phones had been used. The bombings chosen were:
Moira:20/02/98
Portadown:23/02/98
Newry Railway:01/04/98
Lisburn:30/04/98
Armagh:16/05/98
Newton Hamilton:24/06/98
Newry Courthouse:13/07/98
Newry RUC:21/07/98
Banbridge:01/08/98
Omagh:15/08/98

 Back

23   Ibid. The five incidents were:
Newry Railway: 01/04/98
Lisburn: 30/04/98
Newry Courthouse: 13/07/98
Banbridge: 01/08/98
Omagh: 15/08/98 
Back

24   Ibid. Back

25   "Objective assessment of all available intelligence would, however, have produced other details by 17 August 1998 of 'firm suspects', when maximum forensic opportunities were available. The individuals then identified could then have been subject to prompt and proper investigation. This intelligence in an incomplete form was not passed to the SIO until 9 September 1998." Internal PONI report para 26.20. Back

26   at 1.03.43. Back

27   Shaun Woodward to David Davis 24 February 2009. Back

28   Letter from Gordon Brown to Sir Patrick Cormack 5 March 2009. Back

29   http://www.parliament.the-stationery-office.com/pa/cm200809/cmhansrd/cm090121/debtext/90121-0001.htm Back

30   PSNI interview with Sean Hoey 3 September 2003. Back

31   Para 28 Gibson Review. Back

32   Para 27 Gibson Review. Back

33   Para 15 Gibson Review. Back

34   For example, in September 2000 when Panorama filmed Traynor covertly at his plastics window workshop, Hoey was captured hovering in the background, checking out the customer that the Panorama producer was posing to be. Back

35   Confidential source. Back

36   Eircell reported Hoey mobile stolen on 14 April 1998. Eircell did not supply Hoey with a new phone, just a new SIM card maintaining the same 0872210452 number. Laster in same interview DC Brown says: "We're putting dates to you, that you reported your telephone to Eircell on 14 April. You got a new SIM card on 29th, you remained at that same number until the Police seized that phone." This mobile had been seized by Police in September 1998. I/V Hoey by DC Brown & DC Quinn RUC Castlereagh on 22 June 1999 starting 1432 and ending 1515. At next interview starting 1522, DC Brown says: "…you were issued with a new SIM card which allowed you to retain the same phone number which I believe was activated on the 29 of April." Back

37   pp98-105 "Cell Site Analysis Linked to Dissident Republican Activity in Northern Ireland" LKP5. Back

38   Ibid. Back

39   Ibid. Back

40   Confidential sources. Back

41   "if there is something to be taken from a Review of the way the intercept evidence was shared at the time, then we will look at that … we will look at the use of the intercept evidence and how it was shared that day." Northern Ireland Secretary Shaun Woodward interviewed BBC NI 18 Sept 2008. On 15 October replying to a parliamentary question from MP Andrew McKinley, Mr. Woodward again referred to intercepts from the day of the bombing: "He will know that the Prime Minister has asked Sir Peter Gibson to conduct an urgent Review to consider the way in which the intercept evidence was shared and used that day." Back

42   Para 28 Gibson Review. Back

43   Para 70 Panorama response to Sir Peter Gibson review
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/shared/bsp/hi/pdfs/12_02_09_panoramagibsonresponse.pdf 
Back

44   Para 48 Ibid. Back

45   See for example Q99 from Lady Hermon
http://www.parliament.the-stationery-office.co.uk/pa/cm200809/cmselect/cmniaf/c359-ii/c35902.htm 
Back

46   Para 33 Gibson Review. Back

47   Para 26 Panorama response to Gibson review. Back

48   Ibid. Back

49   http://www.parliament.the-stationery-office.co.uk/pa/cm200809/cmselect/cmniaf/c359-ii/c35901.htm Back

50   Para 23 Panorama formal response to Sir Peter Gibson review
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/shared/bsp/hi/pdfs/12_02_09_panoramagibsonresponse.pdf 
Back

51   http://www.mi5.gov.uk/output/judicial.html Back

52   Programme transcript. Back

53   Q&A: Omagh GCHQ intelligence http://news.bbc.co.uk/panorama/hi/front_page/newsid_7613000/7613407.stm Back

54   JW letter to Sir Peter Gibson 8 December 2009. Back

55   Paras 53, 54, 59 & 60 Panorama response to Sir Peter Gibson Review
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/shared/bsp/hi/pdfs/12_02_09_panoramagibsonresponse.pdf 
Back

56   Panorama "Omagh: What The Police Were Never Told". Back


57   Para 2 Gibson review. Back


 
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