Written evidence from BBC Panorama
PANORAMA SUBMISSION
AT THE
CONCLUSION OF
WITNESS EVIDENCE
TO THE
NORTHERN IRELAND
AFFAIRS COMMITTEE
ON THE
OMAGH BOMBING:
ACCESS TO
INTELLIGENCE
Summary
In his evidence to NIAC on 13 May, Sir
Peter:
1. Confirmed he "deliberately did not"
investigate the key issue identified by Panorama: why "any
intercept material" shared between GCHQ and Special Branch,
was not also shared with the CID who were trying to identify the
bombers.
2. Confirmed his terms of reference from the
Prime Minister were "limited".
3. Said it was "not apparent to me"
this was an issue which the Chairman of the Omagh Support and
Self-Help Group Michael Gallagher might wish to discuss with him.
4. Refused to confirm or deny if any intercept
material, in fact, existed, acknowledging only that he reviewed
"classified material" while his classified report into
how "any intercept material" was shared runs to 60 pages.
5. Asserted "without any equivocation at
all" that the "classified material" he reviewed
would not, anyway, have been of any assistance to the CID in their
efforts to identify suspects quickly.
6. Did not explain how he reconciled this assertion
with the 2001 finding by the Police Ombudsman for Northern
Ireland that "objective assessment of all available intelligence
" (which included the GCHQ intercepts) would "have
produced other details by (Monday) 17 August 1998 of
'firm suspects' when maximum forensic opportunities were available".
The government has acknowledged that Sir Peter "had access
to all that was given to the" Ombudsman.
7. Did not explain how he reconciled his assertion
with the fact that telephone numbers alone would have given the
CID names of their registered subscribers and thereby an early
paper trail to their users on the day of the bombing.
8. Acknowledged that the Special Branch were
"cautious" about what little sanitised intelligence
they did share with the CID but nonetheless, gave the Branch the
benefit of the doubt as to why they were "cautious"
without investigating the reason why.
9. Told MPs they would "have to ask Special
Branch" if they wished to know why telephone numbers intercepted
by GCHQ were withheld from the CID whilst CID officers spent nine
months trawling through records of millions of calls to try to
identify the bombers.
10. Said that it was "not up to GCHQ"
what intelligence derived from GCHQ monitoring should have been
shared with the CID whereas in paragraph 23 of his Review
he also said that "strict conditions" were "imposed
by GCHQ" about dissemination to Special Branch and beyond.
11. Did not resolvenor was he asked to
resolvethe apparent conflict between his finding that "there
was nothing that was not passed fully and quickly to Special Branch"
with the recollections of the then head of Special Branch South
(GCHQ's "customer") and the overall head of Special
Branch, that they were not briefed about the intercepts until
19 August, three days after the bombing.
12. Continued to insist that Panorama had
put GCHQ "in the firing line" despite the script containing
no assertion by Panorama that the bombing could have been
prevented by GCHQ, or that GCHQ was responsible for the failure
to share the intercept evidence with the CID.
13. Acknowledged that his Review "hasn't
achieved
all that much" in answer to NIAC Chairman
Sir Patrick Cormack when he said it was hard to accept it had
done "anything really to help. We've still got nobody who
has been found guilty; we've still got grieving families, we've
still got no real answers. What actually did it achieve?"
DETAILED RESPONSE
TO SIR
PETER GIBSON
EVIDENCE TAKING
INTO ACCOUNT
WITNESS EVIDENCE
[All References below to Questions 120 to
170, are to statements made by Sir Peter Gibson or questions put
by members of the Committee to Sir Peter Gibson on 13 May.
The full official transcript of that session may be found at Ev
20 to 26 of this Report, and the QQ numbers relate to
the questions asked within that session.]
QQ 121 to 122
This was an unusually long opening statement.
Since the entire session lasted 50 minutes, only about 40
minutes were left for questions. Inevitably the surface was somewhat
skimmed.
Sir Peter says he is "aware of criticism
that I failed to deal with a number of issues."
This criticism is hardly surprising.
In announcing Sir Peter's Review the Cabinet
Office said its terms were "to review any intercepted intelligence
material available to the security and intelligence agencies in
relation to the Omagh bombing and how this intelligence was shared".
When his Review was published Sir Peter said
it was established "following the BBC Panorama programme
broadcast on 15 September."
The title of that programme was: "Omagh:
What The Police Were Never Told".
At the core of the programme lay the disclosure
that the numbers of telephones intercepted by GCHQ were withheld
from the CID detectives trying to identify the bombers.
In his evidence to NIAC, however, Sir Peter
disclosed that the terms of his Review were "limited
to those identified to me by the Prime Minister in those terms,
whether or not other issues featured in the Panorama programme
or Sunday Telegraph article."
The "criticism" comes from those who,
not unreasonably, assumed that since the Review had been instigated
by the Panorama programme, its terms would address the
main issue embodied in the title of the programme.
The Cabinet Office never made explicit that
the Review would be limited to what passed between GCHQ and the
Special Branch, and avoid inquiring into why the intercepted telephone
numbers and their content were not shared with the CID, even though
a former PSNI ACC claimed on the programme that had the numbers
been shared, the CID would have been better placed to identify
quickly some of the key suspects, arrest and charge them.
Despite a decade long inquiry, and ministerial
promises that "no stone would left unturned" in bringing
the bombers to justice, no bombers have been brought to justice.
Sir Peter says Panorama made some "very serious
and damaging " allegations "to the good name of the
agencies and I found no substance whatever in those allegations."
The Northern Ireland Secretary has said likewise.
If that is what the government believes, why
could not they have put their points to John Ware by agreeing
to his request for a background briefing long BEFORE transmission.
The government knew what the programme was going to say and they
were offered every opportunity to respond.
Both the Police Service of Northern Ireland
and the government were supplied with considerable detail about
the programme's content two months in advance of transmission.
John Ware sought a response in whatever way the government chose
to provide one.[1]
He was told the government declined to comment on any of the matters
on or off the record.
Whilst we appreciate media relations on intelligence
matters are not the subject of NIAC's inquiry, nevertheless can
we suggest that it provides an opportunity to recommend a more
constructive and less hidebound approach by government to media
inquires of this kind.
We do not, in any event, accept that Panorama
made "allegations" against GCHQ, and evidence from
witnesses to NIAC shows Sir Peter's finding of "no substance
whatever" in the Panorama programme to be demonstrably
wrong.
Sir Peter says that John Ware's sources "were,
it seems, relying on their memories of events 10 years ago."
Sir Peter does not know the identities of John
Ware's sources, nor if, and at what stage over the last 11 years,
they have seen documents containing references to intercepted
conversations. Obviously we are not going to elaborate, save to
say we are satisfied that information from our sources about the
intercepts was reliable, with the exception of one mistaken recollection
about a date. A source had told us the coded warning "Bricks
in the Wall" was first heard on 2 August 1998 (The
Banbridge Bombing). In his Review Sir Peter says: "My conclusion
is that there was no information on or before 15 August that
could reasonably indicate by reference to the events of Banbridge
[our emphasis] that a further bomb attack was about to take
place."
We now understand the phrase "Bricks in
the wall" was first heard on 30 April, ie during the
attempted car bombing of Lisburn. The fact that the warning was
known to the intelligence services three and a half months before
Omagh as opposed to two weeks, adds tonot detracts fromits
significance. We note that Sir Peter makes no mention of Lisburn
and confines his conclusion that there was no information
available, on or before 15 August that a further bombing
attack was imminent by reference to Banbridge only. This illustrates
the highly selective nature of Sir Peter's Review.
Sir Peter complains that there have been many
"misconceptions" about his Review.
In a report as circumscribed as his, and one
that he acknowledges did not deal with the key issue (amongst
others) raised by Panorama, speculation about what lies
behind his careful wording is inevitable.
Sir Peter says he is "not aware of any request
made by Special Branchto GCHQ that was not complied with."
Does this mean that Sir Peter believes that
had the Special Branch sought GCHQ's permission to disseminate
the content of the intercepts and the numbers to the CID, GCHQ
would have assented to that request? He does not say.
For Special Branch South to have shared with
the CID or even other parts of the Special Branch the content
of the intercepts, or the numbers intercepted, or to have disclosed
that interception had taken place, GCHQ's authority would have
been required.[2]
For GCHQ's assent, there would have to have been some relaxation
of what Sir Peter refers to as the "strict conditions imposed
by GCHQ."
If Sir Peter is suggesting that is what would
have happened, it is firmly at odds with the experience of detectives
in the CID and Special Branch to whom we have spoken.
In 2001, the Police Ombudsman for Northern Ireland
found there were no criteria for determining what information
Special Branch should disseminate to CID. However, Norman Baxter,
the recently retired Detective Chief Superintendent in charge
of the Omagh Bomb Inquiry told NIAC there was a policy "and
that policy was not to disseminate."
By the same token, we have been told that based
on custom and practice, in 1998 the response from GCHQ to
a request from Special Branch to disseminate the contents of an
intercept and its telephone number would have been "No."
Special Branch officers with knowledge of that era have told us
that in order to comply with the provisions of the then Interception
of Communications Act 1985, there was a firewall which meant that
CID officers were not informed that intercept was the source of
any intercepted telephone intelligence. This, apparently, was
to protect methodology and technology by preventing even the fact
that interception had occurred from seeping into the evidential
chain. As Ray White, former RUC/PSNI Assistant Chief Constable
has told the BBC: "That was the choke hold." Mr White
is well qualified to know. Not only did he serve in Special Branch
but prior to his retirement he was PSNI Assistant Chief Constable
in charge of both Special Branch and CID at police headquarters.
We note that the "choke hold" that
prevailed in 1998 was reflected in the evidence given to
NIAC by PSNI Assistant Commissioner Drew Harris:
Mr Murphy: There was a suggestion that
any information that was passed from GCHQ to Special Branch could
not be passed to a third party without the explicit permission
of GCHQ and indeed GCHQ had also to authorise the form in which
that information was released. During that period, could that
have affected the investigation?
Mr Harris: That is correct. The information
in effect is shared by computer monitor. Some of it would have
been printed off, but only for a short time, and then would have
been returned to GCHQ. In effect, the RUC did not actually own
that information. It was lent to them and to use it in any form
beyond a very tight group would have required permission and in
a form of words to be agreed between either RUC headquarters in
terms of Special Branch, or Special Branch in South Region with
GCHQ. That would have required some negotiation." (our emphasis)
Sir Peter says there was "no hint of criticism
of GCHQ procedures" in the Crompton report.
That is hardly surprising.
Sir Peter is referring to the Review of Special
Branch carried out in 2002 by Her Majesty's Inspector of
Constabulary by Mr (now Sir) Dan Crompton.
Sir Dan himself has said he had no knowledge
that GCHQ had intercepted some of the telephones of the bombers
in Omagh and in previous linked bombings in the first place.
Sir Peter says it was not "apparent to me
why Mr Gallagher should seek to learn" the terms of reference
for his inquiry "from me when the prime minister had made
them public."
Although Sir Peter clearly believes there was
no ambiguity about his terms of reference, that was not the case
for either the BBC or the Omagh families or, it now seems, for
Norman Baxter, who was still in post as the Detective Chief Superintendent
in charge of the Omagh Bomb Inquiry when Sir Peter's Review was
announced. Mr Baxter told NIAC:
"
it would be my view that the inquiry
which the Prime Minister announced was far away from the terms
of reference that Sir Peter Gibson was given and therefore the
expectations of the families who are still seeking closure were
raised to a point that Sir Peter couldn't meet because he was
looking at a narrow area of intelligence."
Mr Baxter is surely correct. The Cabinet Office
announcement of the Review appeared to cover all links in the
intelligence dissemination chain: from GCHQ to Special Branch
to CID, what was and was not disseminated and why. It is true
that the announcement referred only to the word "how"
intelligence was disseminated. But is it seriously being suggested
that "how" obviously excluded "why"?
When John Ware was alerted by his own sources
to the fact that Sir Peter was not, after all, going to examine
why GCHQ intercepts were not shared with the CID, he checked with
the Cabinet Office. The spokesman told him: "
as to
what SB did with it, that won't be part of it because I've been
told that's all been looked at in some depth. An investigation
by Merseyside was mentioned to me. I don't think Gibson is actually
allowed to look at what the RUC did with the intelligence."[3]
Therefore, so far as the Omagh families were
concerned, the position was far from clear.
In writing to Sir Peter to seek a meeting, perhaps
Mr Gallagher was merely attempting to have Sir Peter's terms of
reference clarified by Sir Peter himself, which seems to us to
be a perfectly understandable thing for Mr Gallagher to have wished
to do, particularly since Sir Peter has now acknowledged his terms
were "limited" and excluded the main issue of why detectives
were not given any telephone numbers at all.
QQ 123 to 127
Chairman: Can you guarantee to this Committee
that there is nothing in the classified material which supports
the concern among the Omagh families about whether those who carried
out the bombing could have been quickly identified and arrested
in the immediate aftermath? You will understand that they have
asked us this question; we are not able to answer it because we
have not seen the full report. Can you give that assurance?
Sir Peter Gibson: I can and do.
Chairman: Without any equivocation?
Sir Peter Gibson: Without any equivocation at
all.
On the face of it, Sir Peter's assertion seems
inexplicable. We said that telephone numbers from intercepts conducted
on the day of the bombing did exist and witnesses have confirmed
there were indeed numbers which were not shared with the detectives.
Most of the numbers later shown by cell-site analysis to have
been involved in the bombing were registered to named individuals.[4]
In what way could knowledge of those numbers not have been of
very considerable assistance to the detectives in identifying
suspects?
In explaining the background to her December
2001 report into the Omagh Bomb Inquiry, the then Police
Ombudsman for Northern Ireland Dame Nuala O' Loan told NIAC:
"I will confirm that there were numbers
and names which Special Branch could have given to CID officers
on 15 August. They could have advised them in general terms,
not saying, 'These are your bombers', but saying, 'These are possible
suspects who you may wish to investigate' and that did not happen."
Dame Nuala explained that she knew this because
her investigators had been allowed access to classified material
from the security services though she had not been allowed to
refer to this, either in her published or confidential report.
We are satisfied this access included extracts of GCHQ intercepts.
Assistant Chief Constable Drew Harris also confirmed
to NIAC that numbers existed which were not shared with the CID:
"In not handing over mobile phone numbers,
that is what Sir Peter refers to as (Special Branch) being cautious.
From this distance, 11 years later, and from my own assessment
of it, I have to conclude that there are a couple of elements
in that. One was the sensitivity of the relationship with GCHQ
and then the sensitivity of the particular phone numbers."
Dame Nuala said that had the telephone numbers
been shared with the CID, they could have helped identify the
bombers and might also have led to admissions:
"Had they (Special Branch) passed those
phone numbers on, had they passed a couple of names on, I have
no doubtif you think about it, and I think I am relying
on parliamentary privilege now, my understanding is that if you
can get access to someone immediately after a bomb explodes who
may have been involved in that bomb, and my understanding is also
there is information to suggest that the bombers themselves were
taken aback at what happened, that they did not intend to kill
all these people, and if you were then able to arrest them and
bring them in it is possible you might have a much more coherent
and complete conversation with them. It would also give you the
opportunity to go to their homes to search their homes for their
mobile phones, for example. One of them, and again I am relying
on parliamentary privilege, was seized five months after the bomb
exploded."
The intercepted conversations of which we are
aware on the day of the bombing are consistent with having occurred
during the bomb run between the border at Aughnacloy and Omagh.
For example, we understand the words "Crossing
the line" (or words to that effect) were recorded at around
the time the cell-site analysis shows that an Eircell 585[5]
mobile in the scout car called an Eircell 980 mobile in the
bomb car as both vehicles passed through the Aughnacloy cell (mast)
at 13.29.
We have now been told the content of four intercepted
calls and it is noteworthy that cell-site analysis shows four
exchanges between the 585 (scout) and 980 (bomb) in
the fifty minute journey from Aughnacloy to the bomb car being
parked in Omagh.
Our sources insist the words "Bricks in
the wall" (or words to that effect) were recorded in Omagh
with a figure for the number of bricks signifying minutes left
to detonation.
Was the 585 being intercepted?
The number was registered to Colm Murphy, known
by the Special Branches of both the RUC and Garda as a dissident
republican active in the Newry/Dundalk area.[6]
We have also been told by reliable sources that the 585 number
was already known to both Special Branches as having been connected
to the Banbridge bombing on 1 August.
We cannot say for certain if the 585 or
980 were being intercepted. And whatever number(s) was
being intercepted, we have been told its location is unlikely
to have been immediately apparent. The ancillary data accompanying
each intercept would probably have been restricted to number,
time, duration and content.[7]
However, connecting the intercepts to the Omagh
bombing should have been apparent almost immediately transcripts
were available to the Special Branch (which Sir Peter says was
almost immediately after a call had been listened to) because
of the reappearance of the coded phrase "Bricks in the wall"
previously intercepted during the Lisburn bombing on 30 April.
The location of the intercepts by reference
to a cell or mast (usually the nearest) and the numbers of telephones
called and received by the intercepted mobile(s) could have been
available within 24 to 48 hours if the intercepted
number(s) had been used to interrogate the billing data held in
the Call Data Records of the relevant communication service provider,
(for example Vodaphone UK).[8]
Was the location data from the intercept(s)
immediately sought by any of the security services, including
the Special Branch? We do not know. Sir Peter does not say.
Even if the 585 number was not being intercepted,
its involvement in the Omagh bombing should have been evident
to the security services.
Approximately 10 minutes into the bomb run the
585 was called from a PCB on the forecourt of Barney's filling
station on the Dublin Road, Newry, Co Armagh.[9]
According to our sources, this PCB was being intercepted by GCHQ
on behalf of Special Branch.[10]
Nine calls were made from this PCB between 12.39 and
12.59.[11]
We have also been told that the identity of the caller was assessed
as Liam Campbell, so called "OC" of the Real IRA and
in overall charge of the Omagh bombing.[12]
The calls followed a clear pattern. Three were
test warning calls to the Irish News in Belfast, the Samaritans
and Ulster Television (UTV).[13]
In Omagh, the Samaritans and UTV did receive
three real warning calls between 14.29 and 1431.[14]
This PCB had previously been used to make warning
calls in relation to the Lisburn car bombing on 30 April.
Again three of these calls were to the Irish News, the Samaritans,
and UTV.[15]
BT records on the day of the Omagh bombing show
that the call to the 585 mobile from Barney's filling station
PCB lasted 23 seconds and was tightly sandwiched between
the test warning call to the Samaritans and UTV.[16]
However the CID had no reason to inspect the
BT records because neither the fact that the calls from the PCB
were being intercepted, nor even that the PCB had been used for
test warning calls, was disclosed to the CID.[17]
The test warning calls were followed by two
calls to numbers registered to a company associated with Oliver
Traynor, a known dissident activist.[18]
Had the CID been informed that Barney's filling
station PCB had been used for test warning calls, BT records would
have led detectives to the 585 number and then to its registered
owner, Colm Murphy and possibly also to Oliver Traynor. Why were
the CID not immediately told anything about the role of this PCB
in the bombing? Again, Sir Peter does not tell us.
Both the 585 and the 980 were Eircell
registered mobiles roaming on the Vodaphone UK network.
The evidence that the 585 had four exchanges
with the 980 in Northern Ireland en route to Omagh and that
both mobiles had been to Omagh could have been retrieved through
cell-site analysis from Vodaphone UK within 24 to 48 hours
by interrogating the network's Call Data Records (CDR).[19]
Since both Eircell registered mobiles were roaming
on the Vodaphone network, the location by reference to a mast
of both outgoing and incoming calls would have been available
from the CDR because for each mobile any calls made or received
were charged.[20]
Knowing that the 585 had been called during
the bomb run from a PCB involved in the bombing, that the 585 had
four exchanges with the 980, both of which had been to Omagh,
would have given both the RUC and Garda detectives a rapid paper
trail to Colm Murphy and then to the owner of the 980, Terence
Morgan with the prospect of early arrests of those suspected of
having used the phones during the bombing.
A paper trail to Murphy and Morgan is precisely
what did emerge in November 1998 when the RUC, with the assistance
the Garda and Vodaphone finally managed to identify the exchanges
between Murphy and Morgan's respective 585 and 980 mobiles
through cell-site analysis.[21]
Two other core numbers were also identified.
This analysis took so long because the detectives
were not given any number known to have been involved in
the Omagh bombing with which to interrogate the CDRs of Vodaphone
or Eircell. In effect, both CIDs were looking for a needle in
a haystack.
The search was then expanded to 10 other bombings
between January and October 1998 with the assistance of other
communication service providers (CSPs) Eircell, BT Cellnet and
E-Sat Digiphone.[22]
During this expanded search, the owner of the
980 mobile, Terence Morgan, was arrested and he spoke freely
to the RUC. His information led to the arrests of other key suspects
including Seamus Daly whom the Police strongly believe to this
day was the "hands on" manager of the bombing in the
scout car.
It was the major turning point in the
inquiry. Unfortunately by now six months had elapsed and the forensic
trail had gone cold. Yet this paper trail could have been discovered
to the RUC and Garda within days of the bombing had the RUC been
pointed to the BT records of Barney's PCB, and had the intercepted
number(s) also been shared allowing both the RUC and the Garda
to interrogate the billing data held by CSPs.
By June 1999, a matrix of mobiles involved in
five linked incidents including Omagh had been plotted out.[23]
In total this had involved a nine months trawl through many millions
of numbers. This analysis indicated a total of 22 personalities'
telephones had been used in the five incidents: 18 of whom
were resident in the Republic of Ireland while four were resident
in Northern Ireland.[24]
Like Dame Nuala, Mr Baxter has also told NIAC
he believes Sir Peter's assertion that the "classified material"
would have been of no assistance whatsoever "isn't correct."
He said that for an investigator the key piece of information
that "sat behind" an intercept "would be the telephone
number."
Mr Baxter said that had "such things as
telephone numbers" been known to the intelligence community
"on the day or leading up to Omagh, that should have been
shared with the investigators at a very early stage. I think Sir
Peter Gibson has indicated a different view that wouldn't have
been of assistance
Sir Patrick Cormack: This is a fairly
important area. So you are saying you do not view this in the
same way as Sir Peter did?
Norman Baxter: From an investigator's
perspective, I think in fairness to Sir Peter he does indicate
he was not in the criminal bar."
Mr Baxter also said: "
. if the intelligence
community knew telephones were used in a bomb mission then it
was their moral, if not their statutory duty to ensure that the
investigators knew " and that it was "hard to believe
that any state organisation which would have information which
would help solve the murder of 29 people and not ensure that
it was part given to investigators. I think that any organisation
which had information that didn't do that is culpable."
The difficulty for us, the families and the
general public is that because Sir Peter has adopted the government's
"neither-confirm-nor-deny" rule as to the existence
of GCHQ intercepts, it is almost impossible to engage with him
or the government as to what exactly lies behind his assertion
that the classified material he saw would have been valueless
in assisting the CID officers to identify the bombers.
How, for example, does Sir Peter reconcile his
certainty with the findings of Dame Nuala's December 2001 report
which said that "firm suspects" could have been
"identified
then have been subject to
prompt and proper investigation" when "maximum
forensic opportunities were available" had there been
"objective assessment of all (our emphasis) available
intelligence" . [25]
There can be no doubt that when Dame Nuala referred
to "all available intelligence" she was including intercept
intelligence because she said that in "referring to all the
material which I had seen, some
was Special Branchmaterial
and some
was material received from the Security Services."
Which of the "security services" was
Dame Nuala referring to? Evidently GCHQ was one.
She told NIAC: "Lady Hermon, I cannot confirm
the material which I saw came from GCHQ. It would be a criminal
offence for me to do that."
The television recording of her evidence to
NIAC (though not the transcript) shows Dame Nuala then said: "
but
the material which I saw and whichyou see, we went to GCHwell
.".[26]
This (highlighted) section of her evidence is
omitted from the transcript which picks up as follows: "
we
went across a number of evidential opportunity lines when we were
conducting our investigation and we went to the security and intelligence
services."
Dame Nuala also referred to the confidential
section of her report which had said "critical intelligence
was available on 15 August." We are satisfied this reference
to "critical intelligence" included intercepts.
Sir Peter must have known that Dame Nuala's
investigators had access to GCHQ intercepts from the day of the
bombing because in a letter to MP David Davis the Northern Ireland
Secretary says: "In terms of the material you may wish to
note that he (Sir Peter) had access to all that was given to the
then Police Ombudsman Nuala O' Loan when she conducted her investigation
in 2001."[27]
However, we understand that Sir Peter did not
interview Dame Nuala. Therefore he would have had no appreciation
of the value to the CID that she and her investigators placed
on the intercepts. Why did Sir Peter not interview her? And how
does that square with statements by the Prime Minister that Sir
Peter's review was "comprehensive and authoritative"[28]
and by the Northern Ireland secretary that it was "thorough
and exhaustive"?[29]
There are two further exchanges which may have
been of particular significance on 15 August.
We have recently been told that one of
the Omagh intercepts recorded after the bomb run had passed Aughnacloy,
said "have you signed me in?" or words to that effect.
On 11 February, the Prime Minister met some of the Omagh
families at Downing Street. Present was Victor Barker, whose son
James was killed. Mr Barker took a note and he is a solicitor.
The judge had retired to consider his verdict against five men
whom the Omagh families were suing in the civil courts. The families
alleged the five had been involved in the bombing. Mr Barker noted
that the Prime Minister said that there was nothing in the classified
version of Sir Peter Gibson's report that would assist their case.
Had there been, the Prime Minister said he would have been prepared
to change the law. Mr Barker took that to mean that the Prime
Minister was prepared to lift the ban against intercept evidence
being admissible in court. One of the five defendants was Seamus
McKenna who in August 1998 was working on a building site
in Dublin with Terence Morgan owner of the 980 mobile. When
arrested Morgan told the RUC that on 14 August, the day before
the bombing, McKenna had asked Morgan to sign him in for work
on the 15 August. Morgan also said the foreman Colm Murphy
had also asked him for a loan of his mobile. Morgan obliged. The
families' case against McKenna rested on the fact that there had
been a call from the 980 mobile to the Northern Ireland home
of McKenna's estranged wife Catherine at 15.41, 80 minutes
after the 980 mobile had been in Omagh when the bomb car
was parked. When interviewed by the RUC she first denied it had
been her husband who had called, then she admitted he had, then
she said he had not. Mrs McKenna, like her husband had a history
of alcohol dependence. The judge considered her to be an unreliable
witness and McKenna was acquitted. Ifwe stress ifthis
intercept did, or does still exist, and if evidence of its existence
had been admissible, it would no doubt have been considered a
very material piece of evidence and may have persuaded the judge
to find McKenna guilty.
At 15.26 a 198 second call
was made from Sean Hoey's home to Seamus Daly's Ready to Go Mobile.
Daly was now safely back in the Irish Republic. Hoey has admitted
he made the call.[30]
We understand that Hoey's telephones had been intercepted for
several months. He had been identified by the Special Branchas
the bomb maker for the first of the dissident bombs that destroyed
the centre of Markethill in Co Armagh in September 1997. However,
we understand the Branch specifically instructed there was to
be "no downward dissemination" of this intelligence
to the CID. In interviews with the PSNI, Hoey denied he had called
Daly out of curiosity as the bomb maker about how the Omagh bomb
run had gone. The content of any intercept from this call was
never made known to the Omagh Bomb Inquiry.
Sir Peter may be convinced the intercepts and
numbers would have been of no assistance to the CID in helping
to identify the suspects. But he has not explained why he is convinced
of this.
That is clearly not the view of the Ombudsman's
investigators who were experienced senior police officers. Mr
Baxter pointed out that Sir Peter has no experience at the criminal
bar.
Are we to prefer Sir Peter's assessment that
the "classified material" he saw would have been valueless
to the Police over the Police's professional assessment that it
could have been invaluable?
QQ 128 to 140
Kate Hoey: "
.Can I ask you one further
question, just to get it on the record really? Are you absolutely
clear that there is nothing that any better intelligence that
was there and what you saw could have made a difference? In other
words, is it clear that the Omagh bombing could not have been
prevented by the better use of any of the intelligence that might
have existed at the time?
Sir Peter Gibson: Yes."
This assertion by Sir Peter is also hard to
accept at face value.
Omagh was the culmination of a series of bombings
from 1997 and came just two weeks after an identical car
bomb had caused a near massacre in Banbridge.
Norman Baxter told NIAC the Omagh bombing may
well not have happened had all the intelligence available to the
Special Branch from the previous bombings have been better exploited.
As we have demonstrated, that intelligence clearly included intercept.
Mr Baxter said that the "bomb team had
free reign from the middle of 1997, and the authorities, whoever
they were, allowed this to continue." He said it would have
been "inconceivable" for there not to have been arrests
had there been bombings on the mainland. "What I do know
is that there were opportunities to intervene after each explosion."
Sir Peter says the Special Branch did "not
identify to GCHQ any particular phone number as being of particular
importance or relevance to a potential bombing."[31]
Nonetheless, Sir Peter also says that "before,
on and after 15 August" GCHQ were supplying "any
interception that might have been relevant to RUC Special Branchfor
its operational purposes"by which presumably Sir Peter
means GCHQ were, in fact, supplying intercept intelligence to
the Branch.
Presumably, also, this intercept intelligence
was in respect of particular phone numbers identified by the Special
Branch to GCHQ. Sir Peter says it "included near real time
provision of information by telephone (that is almost immediately
after a call had been listened to itself in near real time) in
accordance with pre-agreed criteria."[32]
In his Review, Sir Peter drew attention to the
2002 Crompton Report that said "the majority of Special
Branch work has concentrated on proactive disruption operations."[33]
For what purpose other than disrupting or even
arresting the bombers, might the Special Branch have given GCHQ
telephone numbers for near real time monitoring in the first place
if the Branch did not believe the numbers could be exploited in
some way for such a purpose?
This question, understandably, has perplexed
MPs.
Dr McDonnell: "
.The bafflement
hereand again I think this affects families and everyone
else involved in Omaghis why was all this work, costing
a fair amount of money, not put to some use?
Once again, Sir Peter does not enlighten us
and it seems from his evidence to NIAC that he does not know the
answer.
Sir Peter Gibson: "Special Branch
would have to answer for itself, but they were in one sense the
people gathering intelligence by asking GCHQ to provide it, by
seeking it by their own means, and they no doubt had their own
particular reasons. I know not whether there were disruption activities
going on or what it was that was preoccupying Special Branch."
Narrow though Sir Peter's terms of reference
were, they did at least include whether the bomb could have been
prevented. Yet he acknowledges that he does not know "whether
there were disruption activities going on, or what was preoccupying
Special Branch." Again we ask: how can his Review be described
as "comprehensive, authoritative, thorough" and "exhaustive"
when he does not even attempt to provide an answer as to what
the Special Branch were doing with all the intelligence they were
gathering if they were neither using it to disrupt bombings, nor
sharing it with the CID to help them catch those carrying out
the bombings?
It is a fundamental question going to the heart
of the Omagh debacle. And yet Sir Peter cannot answer it because
he appears not even to have asked the question.
In April 1998 when dissidents tried to
blow up the centre of Lisburn, Co Antrim with a car bomb, we have
been told that a coded warning was intercepted and that Oliver
Traynor was assessed as having spoken the words: "The bricks
are in the wall" (or words to that effect) with a number
for the bricks signifying the time left to detonation. Traynor
and Sean Hoey were known to be close associates.[34]
Hoey had come to the attention of Special Branch
six months earlier as the alleged maker of the Markethill bomb
in September 1997.[35]
On 29 April, the day before the Lisburn bombing, Hoey had
been issued with a new SIM card.[36]
Cell-site analysis shows this mobile was very
active from early in the morning at the start of the bomb run.
The phone made and received a total of 13 calls to and from
telephones which were clearly involved in the bombing.[37]
In December 2007 Hoey was acquitted of all charges in connection
with Lisburn, Omagh and other bombings which the prosecution claimed
were linked. Mr Justice Weir could not be satisfied beyond a reasonable
doubt that DNA identified as Hoey's on parts of four devices,
including Lisburn was due to contamination, accidental or otherwise.
The Lisburn telephone evidence was not introduced at his trial.
Cell-site analysis from telephone billing also
shows that a second mobile registered to Traynor was involved
in Lisburn and was the most active of his two mobiles, travelling
as far north as the millennium mast in Banbridge at the time the
bomb car was parked. Traynor's mobiles either made or received
15 calls in helping to coordinate the bombing.[38]
The alleged involvement of Hoey and Traynor
in Lisburn could have been discovered by the CID at the time had
the intercepted telephone number(s) been shared with the detectives.
This would have allowed the CID to interrogate the communication
service providers for other telephones with which the intercepted
number had been in contact leading detectives to names and addresses
of their registered owners.
In all, cell-site analysis shows that five of
the Lisburn phones or their users were subsequently involved in
two further bombings (Newry Courthouse and Banbridge) prior to
Omagh, and that seven (including the five) of the Lisburn phones
or their user went on to play leading roles, both in the preparation
for Omagh and on the day of the bombing itself.[39]
It is clear from extracts of Special Branch
files that they were building up a clear picture of the key bombers
months before Omagh. For example:
On 18 May 1998 intelligence
was received that "The Provisional (IRA) leadership is aware
that Michael McKevitt (overall leader of the RIRA) is attempting
to increase the co-operation between CIRA (Continuity IRA) and
dissident PIRA elements associated with the 32CSC." (32 Country
Sovereign Committee)
Colm Murphy was shown by intelligence
to have been linked to both CIRA and RIRA
On 23 May (the day of the Good Friday
Referendum) there is a reference to Liam Cambell and Declan McComish
being involved with two brothers who attempted to transport a
900 lbs bomb across the border. We understand McComish was
intercepted making one of the actual warning calls from a PCB
in Silverbridge Newry on the day of the bombing.
On 20 July Campbell is reported
to have been "deep in conversation" with another suspect
the day before a mortar attack on Newry on Corry Square RUC Station
Newry. We have been told that a conversation involving Campbell
was intercepted where Campbell had become concerned that his team
had been compromised so he asked an associate to do the attack.[40]
What did the Special Branch do with the leads
that were available from interception, telephone billing and their
informants?
What Mr Baxter says is that in each of the bombings
prior to Omagh "there were opportunities to intervene."
But "these people were not arrested."
Who was responsible for the intelligence gathering
from the Markethill bombing onwards not being given to the CID
investigating each of these bombings? "Whoever was in charge
of the intelligence community," says Mr. Baxter. "I
can't say who made the individual decisions. There seems to have
been a policy and that policy was not to disseminate."
Does Sir Peter know the answer to any of these
questions? If so, he does not tell us.
QQ 141 to 144
Sir Peter says the BBC "got it completely
wrong."
We do not accept this all-embracing condemnation
of our work. It is unjustified and it is clear from the evidence
to NIAC that Sir Peter's criticism is untenable:
We said there were interceptsand
clearly there were, despite the government and Sir Peter's refusal
to confirm or deny their existence. Sir Peter explains that "those
who say that I have not denied an allegation cannot properly interpret
such non denial as a confirmation." Notwithstanding this
"NC" rule (neither confirm nor deny) however, the Northern
Ireland Secretary appears to have departed from it on two occasions.[41]
Why, anyway, would the Prime Minister have ordered a Review of
"any intercept evidence" had there been no intercepts
to review? And why would the classified version of Sir Peter's
report have run to what he says was about 60 pages if there
were no intercepts to report on?
We said there were telephone numbers.
Both ACC Drew Harris of the PSNI and the former Police Ombudsman
for Northern Ireland Dame Nuala O'Loan have confirmed this.
We said these numbers were not shared.
The former Omagh Bomb Inquiry Senior Investigating Officer Norman
Baxter, his deputy David McWilliams, Dame Nuala and ACC Drew have
confirmed this.
We said theses numbers should have been
shared. Both Mr Baxter and Dame Nuala have agreed they should
have been shared.
We said the CID were left to their own
devices to identify the numbers which they did over several months
by examining the billing records for millions of numbers. Both
Mr McWilliams and Dame Nuala have confirmed this.
We said had the numbers been shared they
might well have led to arrests. Both Mr Baxter and Dame Nuala
have said likewise.
Since transmission, two riders need to be added
to what we know:
As stated, the reference to the first
occasion to when the code words "Bricks in the wall"
were intercepted should have been attributed not to the Banbridge
incident, but to an earlier one. We now understand the phrase
was first intercepted at Lisburn three and a half months before
it was again intercepted at Omagh. Although this reinforces the
link between Omagh and previous bombings, Sir Peter chose to highlight
only the fact that we said this was used at Banbridge,
omitting any mention of the phrase's earlier use at Lisburn.
On the issue of the tracking of mobiles,
Sir Peter's report concludes that GCHQ could not track mobiles
in real time in 1998. Our script made it quite clear that we did
not know if the mobiles were being monitored in real time
and that the possibility of the bombing being prevented
only arose had this been so. At no time did we assert
the bombing could have been stopped. Any reasonable person would
expect the BBC to have explored the question as to whether the
atrocity could have been avoided once we were satisfied, as we
are, that interception had occurred. Our subsequent research suggests
that GCHQ's capability was so limited that it was dependentperhaps
entirely soon that of Vodaphone who, we have been told,
did not seriously attempt live tracking of a mobile on behalf
of the police until the summer of 2002. As we have stressed, the
government had every opportunity to explain GCHQ's limitations
two months before transmission but declined perhaps because they
did not wish to admit just how limited that capability was.
We would also point to an error in Sir Peter's
Review.
Sir Peter said: "There is no evidence whatever
before me to make good the assertion in the Sunday Telegraph
and the Panorama programme that, on 14 August,
the Garda had warned the police of a likely attack."[42]
However, we are satisfied that a briefing was
provided by a senior Special Branch officer South Region to the
acting Assistant Chief Constable, South Region on the afternoon
of 14th August 1998 indicating that information had been
received from the Garda about a potential vehicle borne device,
and that a joint police/military operation was deployed in the
South Armagh/South Down area on the morning of 15 August
1998. We also understand that Mr Baxter was the third person at
that briefing.
Presumably Sir Peter was unaware of this because
he did not cover this ground in his telephone interview with Mr
Baxter.
Sir Peter said that as a result of the BBC's
"very serious and damaging allegations
expectations
may have been raised amongst the families of the victims of the
bombing."
The families have emphasised this was not the
case because we made clear to them the limits of our knowledge.[43]
In his evidence to NIAC, Mr Baxter said it was,
in fact, Sir Peter's terms of reference that had raised "expectations
of the families who are still seeking closure" because his
terms were confined to "a narrow area of intelligence"namely
what passed between GCHQ and the Special Branchnot, as
the families and we had expectedwhat passed between GCHQ
and Special Branch and why this was not fully shared the CID.
In his evidence Sir Peter says: "
there
was nothing that was not passed fullyagain subject to this
not confirming or deny intercepts and so onthere was nothing
that was not passed fully and quickly to Special Branch, the designated
recipient of any information from GCHQ."
We understand that for his Review Sir Peter
interviewed both the head of Special Branch South and the overall
head of Special Branch at the time of Omagh. We are satisfied
from our own research that both former officers had already made
it clear to former Assistant Chief Constable Ray White, that they
did not receive the intelligence product from the intercepts until
Tuesday 19 August, three days after the bombing.[44]
Sir Peter, on the other hand, says he is satisfied there was nothing
that was not passed "fully and quickly to Special Branch."
Therefore, the following question arises:
Assuming that the two former senior officers
gave the same account to Sir Peter as we are satisfied they gave
to Ray White, has Sir Peter resolved the apparent conflict between
his finding that there was nothing that was not passed
"fully and quickly" to Special Branch, and their
recollections that they did not receive anything until three days
later? If Sir Peter has resolved this conflict, he has not explained
how he resolved it.
Q 147
Mr Heburn asks, "why did it take CID something
like nine months to trawl through literally millions and millions
of telephone records, mobile phone records, to try and trace a
suspect device?"
This question is especially pertinent in light
of the fact that the Special Branch (and presumably all the Security
Services) knew that the CID were themselves trying to identify
suspects from telephone numbers.
Why the CID detectives got no assistance with
telephone numbers was also the single most important issue raised
by Panorama. It appears also to be of considerable concern
to members of NIAC.[45]
Yet Sir Peter acknowledges that this was yet
another matter excluded from his terms of reference. "I deliberately
did not go into questions like why certain things were done or
not done" he says. Those seeking an answer "will have
to ask Special Branch."
QQ 148
Explaining why he had "deliberately"
not delved into the question of why the Special Branch acted "cautiously"
Sir Peter says it would have required him to have assessed whether
the "the police acted properly, well, non-negligentlythings
like that. Once you go down that pathand I have seen it
in my career at the Bar and judiciallyyou open the door
to legal procedures and requirements. For example, if you criticise
any person in a report, the practice these days is to send a draft
to that person; that person then raises queries on the report.
The whole procedure is lengthened very considerably."
We only observe that Sir Peter did not extend
this courtesy to the BBC. He showed no reluctance to make findings
critical of Panorama without offering the right to raise
queries. No "draft" of his criticisms of Panorama
was sent to the programme for a response. Sir Peter also refused
to give John Ware a copy of his secretary's note after he had
been interviewed. He has also refused to explain his refusal.
Q 148 (cont'd) to Q 149
Pressed on whether he might consider reopening
his inquiry into why Special Branch did not share GCHQ material
with the CID, Sir Peter "adverted to the difficulties in
finding the truth in relation to that matter. If, as I have been
led to believe, there are no documents, you are relying only on
memories."
We certainly agree that establishing the truth
about who got what, when and why is difficult which is why we
said "the blunt truth is that none of the stories match up
about who got what and when." We repeat: the programme script
was heavily qualified.
Sir Peter, however, asserted without qualification,
that Special Branch South first "identified" to the
CID " those persons it believed to have been involved in
the bombing" on 20 August".[46]
We have said no record of such a briefing exists in the Omagh
Bomb Inquiry's HOLMES system.[47]
In his evidence to NIAC, former Detective Chief Inspector David
McWilliams, deputy SIO to the Bomb Inquiry also said: "I
was not aware of anything that was passed on 20th. The first I
knew of it was from Sir Peter Gibson report." Mr McWilliams
was a senior officer on the Inquiry from the day of the bombing.
Sir Peter's assertion is also contradicted by notes available
to other senior CID officers who Sir Peter did not interview,
but who John Ware did interview.[48]
Sir Peter, in his evidence to NIAC, acknowledged
that "no documents were produced relating to what Special
Branch was doing at the relevant time." Sir Peter also said
the BBC had been "relying on" the memory of sources
"of events 10 years ago and they did not have the advantage
of seeing the documentation which I have seen." Has, perhaps,
Sir Peter been "relying on memories" when he asserts
without qualification that suspects were first identified to the
CID by Special Branch South on 20 August?
Q 149 (cont'd) to Q 150
Asked why, in his Review, Sir Peter had said the
Special Branchhad acted in a "cautious" way, he responded
that he "implied no more than
that the information
they handed over was not very extensive."
There surely is more to it than that.
When referring to Special Branch's "caution",
in his Review Sir Peter went on to say: "I do not doubt that
Special Branch South took the (cautious) actions it did for what
it considered to be good operational reasons."
Sir Peter does not explain why he gave Special
Branch the benefit of the doubt when, on his own admission, he
did not investigate the "soundness of those reasons
"
QQ 158 to 159
Sir Peter says: "GCHQ is treating Special
Branch as a customer; so it is trying to do what the customer
wants. If the customer wants something done urgently, it can say
so. If it wants further information, it can do so."
In his evidence to NIAC, John Ware also referred
to Special Branch being the "customer": "
..The
system is then interrogated, headlines are dashed off and whizzed
off by fax or whatever to the customer, Special Branch
".
And later: "To be fair, GCHQ are worker
bees. They are set tasks, as I understand it, and they are a service
provider. They are not there to analyse this and that and the
other, they provide the coverage
."
These answers again demonstrate that we understood
the relationship between GCHQ and the Special Branch and why Sir
Peter is simply wrong to persist in saying that Panorama had
GCHQ "in the firing line."[49]
QQ 159 (cont'd) to 160
Sir Peter says the transmission of GCHQ material
"from Special Branchto, say, the investigating team. That
is a matter for them. It's not up to GCHQ."
If dissemination of GCHQ intelligence by the
Special Branch to the CID is "not up to GCHQ" why is
there any requirement for the "strict conditions" about
dissemination which, according to Sir Peter's Review are "imposed
by GCHQ?"[50]
Again, he has not explained.
QQ 163 to 166
Sir Peter says that he hoped his Review "would
achieve the exoneration" of GCHQ from the "very serious
charges" which he considers were made by the BBC.
According to the Security Service, Sir Peter
Gibson is one of two "independent Commissioners" who
"oversee the activities of the Security Service and a number
of other public bodies, including the Secret Intelligence Service
(SIS) and the Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ)."[51]
Does the "exoneration" of GCHQ of
any responsibility for the failure of the Omagh bomb inquiry properly
fall within his remit? It is surely not the job of an "independent"
scrutiniser to "defend" any institution for which he
is responsible.
By exonerating GCHQ and the rules and procedures
governing dissemination of its intercepts from any bearing on
the failure of the intercepted telephone numbers to be shared
with the CID, Sir Peter turns the spotlight on to Special Branch
and the only remaining link in the dissemination chain: Special
Branch to CID. He then promptly turns it off by not investigating
all the circumstances that might explain why the Special Branch
did not share those numbers with the CID.
Q 166 (Cont'd) to Q 168
Sir Peter says: "I know Mr Ware differs from
me. He says that GCHQ, for example, was not in the firing line
at all. I am wholly unable, having seen what was said in the Panorama
programme, to agree with him on that."
Sir Peter has not distinguished between an allegation
and justifiable questions.
Panorama did not hold GCHQ responsible
either for any failure to stop the bomb, or for the failure of
the content of the intercepts and telephone numbers to be shared
with the CID. Sir Peter has for the third time ignored our repeated
references in the script and elsewhere which made it clear we
make no assertion as to who was responsible for the failure.[52],
[53],
[54],
[55]
It was because we were unable to resolve what
level of monitoring Special Branch sought from GCHQ that we never
asserted the bombing could have been stopped, just as we were
unable to resolve what GCHQ gave to Special Branch by way of intercepts
and when.
We did, as a matter of fairness to GCHQ, report
that one source had told us "the Special Branch got the intercepts
within six hours of the bombing." We also reported that the
Branch were denying this.
The core issue was what information ultimately
reached the CID and the commentary posed that question in a neutral
way:
"The question is: how much of GCHQ's intelligence
found its way to the detectives and when? The blunt truth is that
none of the stories match up about who got what and when".
The commentary simply reflected the different
positions of different parties as they were reported to us:
"If the Special Branchare complaining about
GCHQ then the CID make a similar complaint about the Special Branch.
The detectives were pleading for intelligence. But their log records
nothing until three and a half weeks after the bomb exploded.
The Special Branch say the log is incomplete. They insist they
briefed the detectives immediately. What is clear is that the
detectives didn't get everything. Special Branch says that's because
GCHQ wouldn't allow the detectives to know there had been intercepts."[56]
The fact that we were unable to include a response
from GCHQ has everything to do with GCHQ's refusal to provide
one, and nothing to do with Panorama having put GCHQ in
the "firing line."
Sir Peter's persistence in accusing us of the
latter suggests a dogged determination to defend GCHQ at the expense
of the BBC even though the BBC has raised questions which are
manifestly in the public interest, and to which no reasonable
person could possibly expect us to have all the answers without
access to the "range of very sensitive and highly classified
material" that Sir Peter says were made available to him
in his role as Intelligence Services Commissioner[57]
Is the suggestion really that the BBC had no
business posing any of these questions having satisfied ourselves
there were intercepts, without have checked everything against
the "range of very sensitive and highly classified material"
made only available to those with the highest vetting?
Sir Peter acknowledges, he doesn't know "the
details of the PSNI's internal procedures governing what should
be passed to the detectives and investigating team."
We repeat: the failure to share the intercepted
numbers with the CID was at the heart of Panorama and since
the programme was responsible for instigating his Review, we and
the Omagh families assumed he would squarely address this issue.
In fact Sir Peter deliberately avoided doing
so.
As to whether the bombing could have been prevented,
Sir Peter has addressed this in a narrow way: whether, as the
arrangements stood on 15 August 1998, the bombing could have
been stopped, as distinct from whether better exploitation of
all the intelligence, including all intercepts could have been
used to disrupt the bombers thus avoiding Omagh.
Sir Peter acknowledges that because the families
have not been convinced by his report "to that extent, it
hasn't achieved, as you suggested, all that much."
We agree it is hard to see what his Review has
achieved, beyond saying the bombing could not have been prevented
on the day.
He has shed no light on why the Special Branch
did not do more to try to prevent it by disrupting the bombers
prior to Omagh through the better exploitation of intercept and
other intelligence.
The Northern Ireland Secretary told NIAC the
sharing of intelligence had been examined by the Ombudsman in
her 2001 investigation into the Omagh Bomb Inquiry. That
is not quite how the Ombudsman herself sees it. As she explained,
she was prohibited from making any public reference to the intercepts:
Mr Murphy: Do you agree with the Secretary
of State that your report actually covered all of the issues that
were raised with regard to the evidence that was available at
that time?
Dame Nuala O'Loan: The law does not permit
anyone to refer to certain types of evidence, Mr Murphy, so my
report covered it but did not cover it explicitly, if that is
of assistance to you.
Mr Murphy: Do you think Sir Peter raised
more questions in relation to this "cautious way" in
which Special Branch
Dame Nuala O'Loan: Special Branch did
not disseminate material which they could have disseminated to
the CID officers investigating.
Chairman: Do you know why?
Nor, apparently, does Sir Peter because he deliberately
did not address that question.
Sir Peter has contributed almost nothing to
our understanding of why intercept intelligence was not shared
with the CID to help them identify and arrest the bombers, and
most particularly, why the CID could not, at the very least, have
been given the telephone numbers.
It is difficult to accept that Sir Peter's Review
has served much public good at all since it has so carefully avoided
addressing those matters which remain of greatest concern to the
Omagh families and the wider public.
16 December 2009
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