Examination of Witnesses (Question Numbers
320-339)
MR NORMAN
BAXTER AND
MR DAVID
MCWILLIAMS
11 NOVEMBER 2009
Q320 Chairman: So you did not feel
that you were being starved or deprived of the tools that you
needed?
Mr McWilliams: No, from my experience
as a CID investigator over a large number of years there always
could be reasons why information/intelligence could not be shared,
whether it is to protect the source of that intelligence or the
methodology. There could well be a reason, or whether it has been
assessed and it is of no value, or thought to be of no value.
Q321 Mr Murphy: Could I ask the gentlemen
to explain what the procedures were that were in place at that
particular time, the link between the RUC, Special Branch and
GCHQ because it seems to be quite confusing in some of the evidence
that we have taken. Sir Peter himself actually says: "The
arrangements in place at the time allowed for RUC Special Branch
to make requests in respect of further dissemination of any GCHQ
material that might have existed. The records show that no such
request was made." What were the procedures in place? Was
it your position to actually request GCHQ to provide you with
any information or would you have expected that GCHQ, had they
had any information, would have passed it down the line?
Mr Baxter: I do not want to be
negative but I do not know what the procedures were in 1998 because
I was not in Special Branch nor was I working with GCHQ, so I
cannot help you. What I would say is that it is hard to believe
that any state organisation with information which would help
solve the murder of 29 people would not ensure that it was passed
or given to the investigators. I think any organisation which
had information and did not do that is culpable.
Q322 Mr Murphy: Bearing in mind that
GCHQ were quite specific in what could be done with any information
that was passed on, it was for the eyes only of the person who
requested it, and if they wanted to pass it on to someone else
they had to receive permission from GCHQ. There has already been
an admission that that system has now changed but that system
in itself would have prevented the information being passed on
readily.
Mr Baxter: I accept that but I
come to the moral position that people should not hide behind
photo calls.
Q323 Mr Murphy: We are suggesting
the opposite actually, that we would genuinely like to find out
whether indeed the procedures that were in place at that particular
time, and obviously everyone that we have spoken to has said it
could not have prevented the bombing, but there is an indication
that if information had been passed on much quicker then it could
have assisted in arresting suspects much earlier. That is really
the angle that we are coming from.
Mr McWilliams: It is difficult
to answer in that we do not know what was there as the investigation
team in that the senior investigating officers would be in contact
with the head of Special Branch where intelligence or information
would have been passed.
Q324 Mr Murphy: But in your experience
was intelligence passed on readily and regularly from GCHQ through
Special Branch to yourselves?
Mr McWilliams: I do not know that.
I cannot answer that.
Q325 Chairman: I think Mr Murphy
is asking some important questions. Look, you two gentlemen, who
are here entirely of your own accord, and we are extremely grateful
to you for agreeing to come and volunteering indeed to come, were
living with this ghastly crime from the day it was committed,
Mr McWilliams, until, you told us, the day you retired from the
force.
Mr McWilliams: That is correct.
Q326 Chairman: You, Mr Baxter, were
drafted in some three or four years later.
Mr Baxter: That is correct.
Q327 Chairman: But again you worked
on this for a number of years until you retired. During that period
of your detailed investigations, did you remain of the same mind
or did you as you probed deeper, as you looked at people's contributions,
feel that things could have been done better at the beginning,
more information could have been shared at the beginning, and
that that might have led, in the words of Mr Murphy, and I think
I quote him more or less accurately, to some of the villains being
apprehended in consequence?
Mr Baxter: I think the point is
very good, Chairman. I think the Committee should address a wider
issue and that is the series of bombs which had been carried out
which were being detonated from 1997. We had Markethill, I think
it was October 1997, we had Moira in January 1998, we had Portadown,
we had Lisburn in April 1998, and at each one of those terrorist
incidents there was a point of intervention which could have disrupted
this terror gang.
Q328 Lady Hermon: Do you think in
fact the same could have been said of Omagh?
Mr Baxter: When I say disrupt,
post-incident investigation, there could have been opportunities
to arrest this gang after Lisburn, after bombs in May, July, and
even after Banbridge.
Q329 Chairman: Why in your opinion
were those opportunities not seized then?
Mr Baxter: Because, Chairman,
investigators did not have access to the intelligence which Mr
Tonge's investigation and review of intelligence in 2002 to 2003
produced to me, an intelligence document which contained intelligence
relating to 16 terrorist incidents. That intelligence, to my knowledge,
was not shared with investigators after those incidents.
Q330 Dr McDonnell: Are you telling
us, and this is the nub of the thing, that there was intelligence
which came to light later that would have been very useful at
the time?
Mr Baxter: Not to prevent those
incidents but to ensure that the investigators after those incidents
would have had an opportunity to look at suspects and to have
them arrested prior to the Omagh bomb.
Q331 Chairman: And if those people
had been arrested, the Omagh bomb might not have happened?
Mr Baxter: That is speculation.
Q332 Chairman: Yes, I know, I am
just asking for your comments.
Mr Baxter: Certainly disruption
may have prevented it.
Q333 Chairman: Do you think, with
your long career in the police force, that that would have been
a likely outcome with earlier apprehensions?
Mr Baxter: Chairman, this bomb
team had free reign from the middle of 1997 and the authorities,
wherever they were, allowed that to continue.
Q334 Lady Hermon: Did the bomb team
live within the jurisdiction of Northern Ireland or outside the
jurisdiction?
Mr Baxter: Some in Northern Ireland
and some in the Republic.
Q335 Chairman: And we have to choose
our words carefully because nobody has been convicted of this
crime and those who have fallen foul of the civil case are appealing,
but, in your opinion, this was a team of people who were involved
in, implicated in, plotted a number of outrages?
Mr Baxter: It was a team of people
who had broken away from the Provisional IRA, some of them were
still in the Provisional IRA, working in groups among themselves,
not clearly defined as we would know them today as the Real IRA
and Continuity IRA, but they were working in the south Armagh
and north Lough area, and I am afraid the authorities and the
Government had their eye off the ball. I think it is inconceivable
on mainland United Kingdom if you had had a series of bombs happening
every week or two weeks that there would not have been arrests
and there would not have been government intervention to ensure
that this team was disrupted.
Q336 Chairman: You have made an exceptionally
serious comment just then when you said authorities had their
"eye off the ball". Which authorities do you have particularly
in mind?
Mr Baxter: I would have to say,
Chairman, if I may be free to say so—
Q337 Chairman: Of course.
Mr Baxter: In the post-1998 settlement
there was a drive by the Northern Ireland Office to ensure that
security was reduced in certain areas and, as a serving police
officer, I was aware that that was happening, so we had Cloghogue
and other border checkpoints where the soldiers were moved off
the road, not stopping cars. We had soldiers not allowed to patrol
areas. The security policy was a failure and these people were
coming freely into Northern Ireland and carrying out attacks.
Q338 Chairman: I do not want to misquote
you and we do not want to misquote you or misunderstand you, but
are you saying that there was a political imperative that was
actually preventing the full exercise of security duties?
Mr Baxter: I would be saying that
quite clearly.
Q339 Chairman: You are saying that
clearly?
Mr Baxter: Quite clearly.
Chairman: And that is not an unfair summary
of what you are saying?
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