Üuf16ÝJob No: 426565 Folios:1005ÌÜuf16ÝOperator: Daramola. Date: 13/07/09ÌÜjf199ÝËNorthern Ireland Affairs CommitteeËWritten evidenceÌÜfy1ÝÜcp9.5,10.5ÝÜjf27ÝÜcf3ÝSubmission from the Omagh Support GroupËÜjf31ÝExecutive SummaryËÜjf4ÝIn support of an Oral Evidence Session given to The Northern Ireland Affairs Select Committee onÜjy16 March 2009 at Stormont BelfastËÜjf31ÝA Call for a Full Cross Border Public Inquiry into The Omagh BombingÌÜjf4ÝWe do not consider Omagh to be part of the history of the troubles Omagh happened in peace times. The then Sectary of State Mo Mowlam stated that those responsible would not be given any special treatment because this atrocity happened after the Good Friday Agreement was signed. We believe the only way forward for the families is for the Irish and British governments to grant a full cross border public inquiry into the circumstances surrounding the Omagh Bombing.ËÜjf4ÝThe purpose for the production of this document is to provide an overview of the atrocity, identifying actions taken operational strengths, weaknesses and failings.ËÜjf4ÝThe Omagh Bombing is an event, which is unique in history of our country murdering 31 innocent men women and children and injuring hundreds from three nations.ËÜjf4ÝThe Omagh bomb happened at a time when we were all looking to the future. Many families thanked God that they had survived the 30 years of the troubles and were untouched by terrorism. That illusion was to shatter for many hundreds of innocent people on that sunny Saturday afternoon. From that day many of us have made it part of our lives and our reason for living. The most important thing is to get the truth and establish the facts. We were never left in any doubt of as to who was responsible for this wicked and evil act! It was the so-called real IRA. They proudly announced that an active service unit from their group had parked the explosive laden car in market street, Omagh. Without proper warning they returned over the border to safety before it exploded with horrific consequences. The innocent men women and children of Omagh, Buncranna and Madrid were left to pick up the pieces. There still remain many unanswered questions about how much intelligence was available and how it was used by both authorities. It has now emerged that the Irish government was in secret talks with the RIRA at the highest level. The RUC murder investigation teams failure as identified by the McVicar review and the damming report by the Police Ombudsman. The Garda investigation south of the border also failed to charge one single person with murder at Omagh. Despite a confession by the person who stole the car in Carrickmacross used in the Omagh bombing. He was not even charged with car theft considering he was the person who proved the murder weapon used at Omagh. It has also emerged that the Garda had well placed informants close to and at the top of the RIRA leadership.The bomb attack was launched from the republic and the bomb team spent less than 40 minutes in Northern Ireland. The Irish government has repeatedly failed to assist the PSNI investigation team in Omagh with DNA profiles which they have repeated requested. This matter was raised with the Irish Justice Minister Michael McDowell by the Omagh relatives and the leader opposition Enda Kenny. The Garda have also refused access to the PSNI to interview an informed witness called Paddy Dixon. He is on a witness protection program run by the Irish government. The PSNI investigation team north believe this man could be a crucial witness but wasn’t being made available. After several formal requests the SIO finally interview him. The Ombudsman’s office investigated allegations by Detective Sgn. John White’s claims about having vital information regarding the RIRA and the Omagh bomb. The Ombudsman’s office carried out a thorough investigation and believed these claims to have substance. Nuala O’Lone personally delivered her finding to the Irish Foreign Affairs Minister Brian Cowan. The Irish government appointed three seniors retired civil servants to carry out the inquiry. None of these three individuals had any investigative skills. One was a former DPP and may have made decisions about Omagh. This was known as the Nally inquiry. It was selective in the witness’s that they selected for interview. Paddy Dixon was not interviewed by this team despite the fact that he was the central figure in this case. John White’s telephone records were not examined even though he gave permission for them to be acquired. Norman Baxter (SIO, Omagh) was not interviewed or other potential witnesses who made themselves available. This report completely exonerated the Garda of all blame. The report was considered not to be independent and had no judicial powers or powers of investigation and the report was not fully published.ËÜjf31ÝUpdateÌÜjf4ÝJanuary 2002. The trial of the man accused of conspiring with the Omagh Bombers Colin Murphy was sentenced to 14Üfrac12Ý years in the Special Criminal Court in Dublin but on appeal was granted a retrial when it was found that Det Garda Liam Donnelly and Det Garda John Fathy was engaged in persistent lying on oath in the course of cross-examination said the Judge Mr Justice Barr.ËÜjf4ÝOn 18 January 2005 John White was acquitted of six charges in Letterkenny courthouse in Co Donegal.ËÜjf165ÝÜjf4ÝOn 21 January 2005 Colm Murphy successfully appealed his conviction for conspiracy in the Omagh bombing and is still free awaiting a re-trial.ËÜjf4ÝOn 22 February 2006 PSNI Assistant Chief Constable informed the families that MI5 helped to stop a plot to leave a car bomb in Omagh or Derry in April 1998 this happened four months before the Omagh bomb, the Police in Northern Ireland was not informed until January 2006. Some of those involved live in the Omagh area.ËÜjf4ÝMI5 also learned from their Agent that the dissidents had decided to shorten their bomb warning time. The Omagh investigation Team was never told about this information.ËÜjf4ÝAt the same meeting the families where told that a substantial part of the testimony of Garda Det Sgn. John White was researched and found to be true and he is considered a credible witness.ËÜjf4ÝThe Police Ombudsman’s Office is currently investigating a Special Branch Officer who it is alleged made an anonymous phone call to Omagh Police Station on 4 August 1998 stating that a terrorist attack would take place on 15 August 1998 in Omagh town amazing and tragically that is what happened.ËÜjf4ÝThe Sub Divisional Commander was not informed about this call until two and a half years later.The serious threat book which records such calls has gone missing for this period and has not been found to date.ËÜjf4ÝSeptember 2006. Sean Hoey went on trial in the High Court in Belfast facing 58 Terrorist charges including the murders of 29 people in Omagh after 56 days in Court the Judge retired to make his judgment, which we received 11 months later. Mr Justice Weir took an hour and fifteen minutes in which he condemned Police Officers, Forensic Scientists and Scenes of Crime Officers he had nothing positive to say about the investigation. The Police Ombudsman has been called in to investigate the conduct of at least two Officers who give evidence in this trial.ËÜjf4Ý20 December 2007. Sean Hoey acquitted of all charges.ËÜjf4Ý21 December 2007. In a public statement Sir Hugh Orde stated that it is highly unlikely that anyone will ever be convicted in connection with the Omagh Bombing. You can now murder 31 people in our country and get away with it.ËÜjf4Ý3 July 2008. Policing Boards Independent External Review into the Omagh Bomb Investigation by Sir Dan Crompton was published and it appeared to blame the Judge for the outcome of the trial.ËÜjf4Ý15 September 2008. The BBC Current Affairs program Panorama entitled Ücf2ÝOmagh What The Police Were Never Told Ücf1Ýclaimed that GCHQ had been monitoring and recording the voices of some of the RIRA As they drove 500 pounds of explosives to Omagh on 15 August 1998. Within 36 hours of the broadcast the PM Gordon Brown ordered a review of intelligence intercepts.ËÜjf4Ý16 January 2009. Sir Peter Gibson intelligence Services Commissioner delivered his review into intercepted intelligence material relating to the Omagh Bombing. The Families received a 16 page document outlining the findings of Sir Peter we where not allowed to have any input into this inquiry despite making ourselves available and requesting the terms of reference which we never received. The conclusion was that no one done anything wrong but nowhere in the document does it indicate that intercepts did not take place and fails to say why intelligence leads where not passed on to the investigating Officer.ËÜjf4Ý19 February 2009. The Police Ombudsman meet with the Families to share their finding into the conduct of Police Officers in the Hoey trial and found no misconduct with these Officers.ËÜjf4Ý27 February 2009. In an affidavit on behalf of the Plaintiffs in the Omagh Civil Action against the RIRA it was alleged that the PSNI, Special Branch and/or Security Services have in there possession a recording and transcripts relating to conversations which indicate that some individuals had planted a recording device in the car that delivered the bomb to Omagh.ËÜjf4ÝWe have experienced nothing but failure and excuses. We were promised both publicly and privately that those responsible would be brought before the courts yet nothing is further from the truth. In this file you will see monumental failures of intelligence, investigative and administrative mishandling which undoubtedly minimized the chances of a successful prosecution of those responsible for the worst atrocity of the troubles.ËÜjf4ÝWhen people ask why do we require an enquiry into the Omagh bombing the answer is:ËÜjf10Ý— to establish the facts and the circumstances surrounding the Omagh bombing;ËÜjf10Ý— to review and revise standards and procedures;ËÜjf10Ý— to improve security readiness and crisis management;ËÜjf10Ý— to access the efficiency and effectiveness of intelligence surrounding Omagh;ËÜjf10Ý— to determine the adequacy of coordination of intelligence and anti terrorism counter measures amongst northern Irelands security services, Republic of Ireland security and business organizations generally;ËÜjf10Ý— to access issues of personal accountability for security; andËÜjf10Ý— to provide recommendations on how to prevent new attacks or minimize the damage of successful attacks.ËÜjf4ÝWe must make sure that the lessons of Omagh are learnt. So that mistakes can never happen and what is done well is past on so that others can learn from our tragedy. Never has so much been known about an atrocity and yet so little done to stop it or catch those responsible. Surely that’s the least we owe to the 31 innocent people of who lost their lives in such a cruel way.ËÜjf4ÝThe terms and powers of any new inquiry would need to be such as to inspire widespread public confidence that it would have access to all the relevant official material and otherwise enjoy full official support and cooperation, that it would operate independently, that it would investigate thoroughly and comprehensively, and would genuinely and impartially seek to establish what happened at Omagh why it happened and those who must bear the responsibility for it.ËÜjf4ÝThis type of inquiry will end all inquiries into Omagh we urge the Sectary of State and the Irish Government to work with the Omagh Support and Self Help Group to achieve public closure.ËÈÜcf2ÝMarch 2009ÈÜjf22ÝËÜuf16ÝJob No: 426565 Folios: 001ÌÜuf16ÝOperator: Dav. Date: 12/2/10ÌÜjf199ÝÜjf27ÝÜcf3ÝLetter to the Clerk of the Committee from Kevin FultonÜcf1ÝËÜjf4ÝWith reference to the evidence given to the Northern Ireland Affairs Committee by Norman Baxter on 11 November 2009 concerning the Omagh bombing, I wish to inform the Committee that Mr Baxter made some serious and untrue allegations about myself, and I am writing to put the record straight.ËÜjf4ÝAs my solicitor can confirm: ËÜjf10Ý1. I did not make a statement through him or otherwise admitting that I mislead the police Ombudsman’s investigators in my information about the Omagh bombing.ËÜjf10Ý2. I did not make a statement through him or otherwise admitting that the information I gave about the Omagh bombing was “factually incorrect”.ËÜjf10Ý3. I did not make a statement through him or otherwise admitting that I lied about the information I gave about the Omagh bombing.ËÜjf4ÝIn fact, the police never questioned me about the Omagh bombing.ËÜjf4ÝI should be grateful if you would circulate this letter to the Committee.  I should also be grateful if the Committee would agree to include this letter in the record of their proceedings.ËÜjf4ÝIt is, of course, a matter for the Committee, but they may wish to consider what it is proper to retain on the record of Mr Baxter’s evidence to them, as I am sure that they would not want to include an untruthful account in their records. The Committee may also want to consider recalling Mr Baxter so these matters can be put to him.ËÜjf4ÝThank you in anticipation of your kind assistance in this matter.ËÜbpÜfn2ÝÜbpÜfn2ÝÈÜcf2Ý20 November 2009Ücf1ÝËÜjf22ÝËÜuf16ÝJob No: 426565 Folios: 002-027ÌÜuf16ÝOperator: Dav. Date: 12/2/10ÌËÜjf199ÝÜjf27ÝÜcf3ÝWritten evidence from BBC PanoramaÜcf1ÝËÜjf31ÝPanorama Submission at the Conclusion of Witness Evidence to the Northern Ireland Affairs Committee on the Omagh Bombing: Access to IntelligenceËÜjf30ÝSummary ËÜjf4ÝIn his evidence to NIAC on 13 May, Sir Peter: ËÜjf10Ý1. Confirmed he “deliberately did not” investigate the key issue identified by Ücf2ÝPanorama:Ì why “any intercept material” shared between GCHQ and Special Branch, was not also shared with the CID who were trying to identify the bombers.ËÜjf10Ý2. Confirmed his terms of reference from the Prime Minister were “limited”.ËÜjf10Ý3. Said it was “not apparent to me” this was an issue which the Chairman of the Omagh Support and Self-Help Group Michael Gallagher might wish to discuss with him. ËÜjf10Ý4. Refused to confirm or deny if any intercept material, in fact, existed, acknowledging only that he reviewed “classified material” while his classified report into how “any intercept material” was shared runs to 60 pages.ËÜjf10Ý5. Asserted “without any equivocation at all” that the “classified material” he reviewed would not, anyway, have been of any assistance to the CID in their efforts to identify suspects quickly.ËÜjf10Ý6. Did not explain how he reconciled this assertion with the 2001 finding by the Police Ombudsman for Northern Ireland that “Ücf2Ýobjective assessment of all available intelligenceÜcf1Ý“ (which included the GCHQ intercepts) would Ücf2Ý“have produced other details by (Monday) 17 August 1998 of ‘firm suspects’ when maximum forensic opportunities were available”. Ücf1ÝThe government has acknowledged that Sir Peter “had access to all that was given to the” Ombudsman.ËÜjf10Ý7. Did not explain how he reconciled his assertion with the fact that telephone numbers alone would have given the CID names of their registered subscribers and thereby an early paper trail to their users on the day of the bombing.ËÜjf10Ý8. Acknowledged that the Special Branch were “cautious” about what little sanitised intelligence they did share with the CID but nonetheless, gave the Branch the benefit of the doubt as to why they were “cautious” without investigating the reason why.ËÜjf10Ý9. Told MPs they would “have to ask Special Branch” if they wished to know why telephone numbers intercepted by GCHQ were withheld from the CID whilst CID officers spent nine months trawling through records of millions of calls to try to identify the bombers. ËÜjf10Ý10. Said that it was “not up to GCHQ” what intelligence derived from GCHQ monitoring should have been shared with the CID whereas in paragraph 23 of his Review he also said that “strict conditions” were “imposed by GCHQ” about dissemination to Special Branch and beyond. ËÜjf10Ý11. Did not resolve—nor was he asked to resolve—the apparent conflict between his finding that “there was nothing that was not passed fully and quickly to Special Branch” with the recollections of the then head of Special Branch South (GCHQ’s “customer”) and the overall head of Special Branch, that they were not briefed about the intercepts until 19 August, three days after the bombing.ËÜjf10Ý12. Continued to insist that Ücf2ÝPanorama Ücf1Ýhad put GCHQ “in the firing line” despite the script containing no assertion by Ücf2ÝPanorama Ücf1Ýthat the bombing could have been prevented by GCHQ, or that GCHQ was responsible for the failure to share the intercept evidence with the CID.ËÜjf10Ý13. Acknowledged that his Review “hasn’t achieved …all that much” in answer to NIAC Chairman Sir Patrick Cormack when he said it was hard to accept it had done “anything really to help. We’ve still got nobody who has been found guilty; we’ve still got grieving families, we’ve still got no real answers. What actually did it achieve?”ËÜjf31ÝDetailed Response to Sir Peter Gibson Evidence Taking into Account Witness EvidenceËÜjf48ÝÜcf2Ý[All References below to Questions 120 to 170, are to statements made by Sir Peter Gibson or questions put by members of the Committee to Sir Peter Gibson on 13 May. The full official transcript of that session may be found at Ev 20 to 26 of this Report, and the QQ numbers relate to the questions asked within that session.] ËÜjf30ÝQQ 121 to 122ËÜjf4ÝThis was an unusually long opening statement. Since the entire session lasted 50 minutes, only about 40 minutes were left for questions. Inevitably the surface was somewhat skimmed.ËÜjf30ÝSir Peter says he is “aware of criticism that I failed to deal with a number of issues.”ËÜjf4ÝThis criticism is hardly surprising.ËÜjf4ÝIn announcing Sir Peter’s Review the Cabinet Office said its terms were “to review any intercepted intelligence material available to the security and intelligence agencies in relation to the Omagh bombing and how this intelligence was shared”.ËÜjf4ÝWhen his Review was published Sir Peter said it was established “following the BBC Ücf2ÝPanorama Ücf1Ýprogramme broadcast on 15 September.”ËÜjf4ÝThe title of that programme was: “Omagh: What The Police Were Never Told”.ËÜjf4ÝAt the core of the programme lay the disclosure that the numbers of telephones intercepted by GCHQ were withheld from the CID detectives trying to identify the bombers.ËÜjf4ÝIn his evidence to NIAC, however, Sir Peter disclosed that the terms of his Review were “limited… to those identified to me by the Prime Minister in those terms, whether or not other issues featured in the Ücf2ÝPanoramaÜcf1Ý programme or Ücf2ÝSunday TelegraphÜcf1Ý article.”ËÜjf4ÝThe “criticism” comes from those who, not unreasonably, assumed that since the Review had been instigated by the Ücf2ÝPanorama Ücf1Ýprogramme, its terms would address the main issue embodied in the title of the programme.ËÜjf4ÝThe Cabinet Office never made explicit that the Review would be limited to what passed between GCHQ and the Special Branch, and avoid inquiring into why the intercepted telephone numbers and their content were not shared with the CID, even though a former PSNI ACC claimed on the programme that had the numbers been shared, the CID would have been better placed to identify quickly some of the key suspects, arrest and charge them.ËÜjf4ÝDespite a decade long inquiry, and ministerial promises that “no stone would left unturned” in bringing the bombers to justice, no bombers have been brought to justice.ËÜjf30ÝSir Peter says Ücf2ÝPanorama Ücf1Ýmade some “very serious and damaging “ allegations “to the good name of the agencies and I found no substance whatever in those allegations.” ËÜjf4ÝThe Northern Ireland Secretary has said likewise. ËÜjf4ÝIf that is what the government believes, why could not they have put their points to John Ware by agreeing to his request for a background briefing long BEFORE transmission. The government knew what the programme was going to say and they were offered every opportunity to respond.ËÜjf4ÝBoth the Police Service of Northern Ireland and the government were supplied with considerable detail about the programme’s content two months in advance of transmission. John Ware sought a response in whatever way the government chose to provide one.Ümr24Ý He was told the government declined to comment on any of the matters on or off the record.ËÜjf4ÝWhilst we appreciate media relations on intelligence matters are not the subject of NIAC’s inquiry, nevertheless can we suggest that it provides an opportunity to recommend a more constructive and less hidebound approach by government to media inquires of this kind.ËÜjf4ÝWe do not, in any event, accept that Ücf2ÝPanorama Ücf1Ýmade “allegations” against GCHQ, and evidence from witnesses to NIAC shows Sir Peter’s finding of “no substance whatever” in the Ücf2ÝPanorama Ücf1Ýprogramme to be demonstrably wrong.ËÜjf30ÝSir Peter says that John Ware’s sources “were, it seems, relying on their memories of events 10 years ago.” ËÜjf4ÝSir Peter does not know the identities of John Ware’s sources, nor if, and at what stage over the last 11 years, they have seen documents containing references to intercepted conversations. Obviously we are not going to elaborate, save to say we are satisfied that information from our sources about the intercepts was reliable, with the exception of one mistaken recollection about a date. A source had told us the coded warning “Bricks in the Wall” was first heard on 2 August 1998 (The Banbridge Bombing). In his Review Sir Peter says: “My conclusion is that there was no information on or before 15 August that could reasonably indicate Ücf2Ýby reference to the events of Banbridge Ücf1Ý[our emphasis] that a further bomb attack was about to take place.” ËÜjf4ÝWe now understand the phrase “Bricks in the wall” was first heard on 30 April, ie during the attempted car bombing of Lisburn. The fact that the warning was known to the intelligence services three and a half months before Omagh as opposed to two weeks, adds to—not detracts from—its significance. We note that Sir Peter makes no mention of Lisburn and confines his conclusion that there was Ücf2ÝnoÜcf1Ý information available, on or before 15 August that a further bombing attack was imminent by reference to Banbridge only. This illustrates the highly selective nature of Sir Peter’s Review.ËÜjf30ÝSir Peter complains that there have been many “misconceptions” about his Review.ËÜjf4ÝIn a report as circumscribed as his, and one that he acknowledges did not deal with Ücf2ÝtheÜcf1Ý key issue (amongst others) raised by Ücf2ÝPanoramaÜcf1Ý, speculation about what lies behind his careful wording is inevitable.ËÜjf30ÝSir Peter says he is “not aware of any request made by Special Branchto GCHQ that was not complied with.”ËÜjf4ÝDoes this mean that Sir Peter believes that had the Special Branch sought GCHQ’s permission to disseminate the content of the intercepts and the numbers to the CID, GCHQ would have assented to that request? He does not say.ËÜjf4ÝFor Special Branch South to have shared with the CID or even other parts of the Special Branch the content of the intercepts, or the numbers intercepted, or to have disclosed that interception had taken place, GCHQ’s authority would have been required.Ümr25Ý For GCHQ’s assent, there would have to have been some relaxation of what Sir Peter refers to as the “strict conditions imposed by GCHQ.” ËÜjf4ÝIf Sir Peter is suggesting that is what would have happened, it is firmly at odds with the experience of detectives in the CID and Special Branch to whom we have spoken. ËÜjf4ÝIn 2001, the Police Ombudsman for Northern Ireland found there were no criteria for determining what information Special Branch should disseminate to CID. However, Norman Baxter, the recently retired Detective Chief Superintendent in charge of the Omagh Bomb Inquiry told NIAC there was a policy “and that policy was not to disseminate.”ËÜjf4ÝBy the same token, we have been told that based on custom and practice, in 1998 the response from GCHQ to a request from Special Branch to disseminate the contents of an intercept and its telephone number would have been “No.” Special Branch officers with knowledge of that era have told us that in order to comply with the provisions of the then Interception of Communications Act 1985, there was a firewall which meant that CID officers were not informed that intercept was the source of any intercepted telephone intelligence. This, apparently, was to protect methodology and technology by preventing even the fact that interception had occurred from seeping into the evidential chain. As Ray White, former RUC/PSNI Assistant Chief Constable has told the BBC: “That was the choke hold.” Mr White is well qualified to know. Not only did he serve in Special Branch but prior to his retirement he was PSNI Assistant Chief Constable in charge of both Special Branch and CID at police headquarters.ËÜjf4ÝWe note that the “choke hold” that prevailed in 1998 was reflected in the evidence given to NIAC by PSNI Assistant Commissioner Drew Harris:ËÜjf48ÝÜcf3ÝMr Murphy:Ì There was a suggestion that any information that was passed from GCHQ to Special Branch could not be passed to a third party without the explicit permission of GCHQ and indeed GCHQ had also to authorise the form in which that information was released. During that period, could that have affected the investigation?ËÜjf48ÝÜcf3ÝMr Harris:Ì That is correct. The information in effect is shared by computer monitor. Some of it would have been printed off, but only for a short time, and then would have been returned to GCHQ. In effect, the RUC did not actually own that information. It was lent to them and to use it in any form beyond a very tight group would have required permission and in a form of words to be agreed between either RUC headquarters in terms of Special Branch, or Special Branch in South Region with GCHQ. That would have required some negotiation.” (our emphasis)ËÜjf30ÝSir Peter says there was “no hint of criticism of GCHQ procedures” in the Crompton report.ËÜjf4ÝThat is hardly surprising.ËÜjf4ÝSir Peter is referring to the Review of Special Branch carried out in 2002 by Her Majesty’s Inspector of Constabulary by Mr (now Sir) Dan Crompton.ËÜjf4ÝSir Dan himself has said he had no knowledge that GCHQ had intercepted some of the telephones of the bombers in Omagh and in previous linked bombings in the first place. ËÜjf30ÝSir Peter says it was not “apparent to me why Mr Gallagher should seek to learn” the terms of reference for his inquiry “from me when the prime minister had made them public.”ËÜjf4ÝAlthough Sir Peter clearly believes there was no ambiguity about his terms of reference, that was not the case for either the BBC or the Omagh families or, it now seems, for Norman Baxter, who was still in post as the Detective Chief Superintendent in charge of the Omagh Bomb Inquiry when Sir Peter’s Review was announced. Mr Baxter told NIAC: ËÜjf48Ý“… it would be my view that the inquiry which the Prime Minister announced was far away from the terms of reference that Sir Peter Gibson was given and therefore the expectations of the families who are still seeking closure were raised to a point that Sir Peter couldn’t meet because he was looking at a narrow area of intelligence.”ËÜjf4ÝMr Baxter is surely correct. The Cabinet Office announcement of the Review appeared to cover all links in the intelligence dissemination chain: from GCHQ to Special Branch to CID, what was and was not disseminated and why. It is true that the announcement referred only to the word “how” intelligence was disseminated. But is it seriously being suggested that “how” obviously excluded “why”?ËÜjf4ÝWhen John Ware was alerted by his own sources to the fact that Sir Peter was not, after all, going to examine why GCHQ intercepts were not shared with the CID, he checked with the Cabinet Office. The spokesman told him: “…as to what SB did with it, that won’t be part of it because I’ve been told that’s all been looked at in some depth. An investigation by Merseyside was mentioned to me. I don’t think Gibson is actually allowed to look at what the RUC did with the intelligence.”Ümr26ÝËÜjf4ÝTherefore, so far as the Omagh families were concerned, the position was far from clear.ËÜjf4ÝIn writing to Sir Peter to seek a meeting, perhaps Mr Gallagher was merely attempting to have Sir Peter’s terms of reference clarified by Sir Peter himself, which seems to us to be a perfectly understandable thing for Mr Gallagher to have wished to do, particularly since Sir Peter has now acknowledged his terms were “limited” and excluded the main issue of why detectives were not given any telephone numbers at all.ËÜjf30ÝQQ 123 to 127ËÜjf30ÝChairman: Can you guarantee to this Committee that there is nothing in the classified material which supports the concern among the Omagh families about whether those who carried out the bombing could have been quickly identified and arrested in the immediate aftermath? You will understand that they have asked us this question; we are not able to answer it because we have not seen the full report. Can you give that assurance?ËÜjf30ÝSir Peter Gibson: I can and do.ËÜjf30ÝChairman: Without any equivocation?ËÜjf30ÝSir Peter Gibson: Without any equivocation at all.ËÜjf4ÝOn the face of it, Sir Peter’s assertion seems inexplicable. We said that telephone numbers from intercepts conducted on the day of the bombing did exist and witnesses have confirmed there were indeed numbers which were not shared with the detectives. Most of the numbers later shown by cell-site analysis to have been involved in the bombing were registered to named individuals.Ümr27Ý In what way could knowledge of those numbers not have been of very considerable assistance to the detectives in identifying suspects?ËÜjf4ÝIn explaining the background to her December 2001 report into the Omagh Bomb Inquiry, the then Police Ombudsman for Northern Ireland Dame Nuala O’ Loan told NIAC: ËÜjf48Ý“I will confirm that there were numbers and names which Special Branch could have given to CID officers on 15 August. They could have advised them in general terms, not saying, ‘These are your bombers’, but saying, ‘These are possible suspects who you may wish to investigate’ and that did not happen.”ËÜjf4ÝDame Nuala explained that she knew this because her investigators had been allowed access to classified material from the security services though she had not been allowed to refer to this, either in her published or confidential report. We are satisfied this access included extracts of GCHQ intercepts.ËÜjf4ÝAssistant Chief Constable Drew Harris also confirmed to NIAC that numbers existed which were not shared with the CID: ËÜjf48Ý“In not handing over mobile phone numbers, that is what Sir Peter refers to as (Special Branch) being cautious. From this distance, 11 years later, and from my own assessment of it, I have to conclude that there are a couple of elements in that. One was the sensitivity of the relationship with GCHQ and then the sensitivity of the particular phone numbers.”ËÜjf4ÝDame Nuala said that had the telephone numbers been shared with the CID, they could have helped identify the bombers and might also have led to admissions: ËÜjf48Ý“Had they (Special Branch) passed those phone numbers on, had they passed a couple of names on, I have no doubt—if you think about it, and I think I am relying on parliamentary privilege now, my understanding is that if you can get access to someone immediately after a bomb explodes who may have been involved in that bomb, and my understanding is also there is information to suggest that the bombers themselves were taken aback at what happened, that they did not intend to kill all these people, and if you were then able to arrest them and bring them in it is possible you might have a much more coherent and complete conversation with them. It would also give you the opportunity to go to their homes to search their homes for their mobile phones, for example. One of them, and again I am relying on parliamentary privilege, was seized five months after the bomb exploded.”ËÜjf4ÝThe intercepted conversations of which we are aware on the day of the bombing are consistent with having occurred during the bomb run between the border at Aughnacloy and Omagh. ËÜjf4ÝFor example, we understand the words “Crossing the line” (or words to that effect) were recorded at around the time the cell-site analysis shows that an Eircell 585Ümr28Ý mobile in the scout car called an Eircell 980 mobile in the bomb car as both vehicles passed through the Aughnacloy cell (mast) at 13.29. ËÜjf4ÝWe have now been told the content of four intercepted calls and it is noteworthy that cell-site analysis shows four exchanges between the 585 (scout) and 980 (bomb) in the fifty minute journey from Aughnacloy to the bomb car being parked in Omagh. ËÜjf4ÝOur sources insist the words “Bricks in the wall” (or words to that effect) were recorded in Omagh with a figure for the number of bricks signifying minutes left to detonation.ËÜjf4ÝWas the 585 being intercepted?ËÜjf4ÝThe number was registered to Colm Murphy, known by the Special Branches of both the RUC and Garda as a dissident republican active in the Newry/Dundalk area.Ümr29Ý We have also been told by reliable sources that the 585 number was already known to both Special Branches as having been connected to the Banbridge bombing on 1 August.ËÜjf4ÝWe cannot say for certain if the 585 or 980 were being intercepted. And whatever number(s) Ücf2ÝwasÜcf1Ý being intercepted, we have been told its location is unlikely to have been immediately apparent. The ancillary data accompanying each intercept would probably have been restricted to number, time, duration and content.Ümr30ÝËÜjf4ÝHowever, connecting the intercepts to the Omagh bombing should have been apparent almost immediately transcripts were available to the Special Branch (which Sir Peter says was almost immediately after a call had been listened to) because of the reappearance of the coded phrase “Bricks in the wall” previously intercepted during the Lisburn bombing on 30 April.ËÜjf4ÝThe location of the intercepts by reference to a cell or mast (usually the nearest) and the numbers of telephones called and received by the intercepted mobile(s) could have been available within 24 to 48 hours Ücf2ÝifÜcf1Ý the intercepted number(s) had been used to interrogate the billing data held in the Call Data Records of the relevant communication service provider, (for example Vodaphone UK).Ümr31ÝËÜjf4ÝWas the location data from the intercept(s) immediately sought by any of the security services, including the Special Branch? We do not know. Sir Peter does not say.ËÜjf4ÝEven if the 585 number was not being intercepted, its involvement in the Omagh bombing should have been evident to the security services. ËÜjf4ÝApproximately 10 minutes into the bomb run the 585 was called from a PCB on the forecourt of Barney’s filling station on the Dublin Road, Newry, Co Armagh.Ümr32Ý According to our sources, this PCB was being intercepted by GCHQ on behalf of Special Branch.Ümr33ÝËÜjf4ÝNine calls were made from this PCB between 12.39 and 12.59.Ümr34Ý We have also been told that the identity of the caller was assessed as Liam Campbell, so called “OC” of the Real IRA and in overall charge of the Omagh bombing.Ümr35ÝËÜjf4ÝThe calls followed a clear pattern. Three were test warning calls to the Irish News in Belfast, the Samaritans and Ulster Television (UTV).Ümr36ÝËÜjf4ÝIn Omagh, the Samaritans and UTV did receive three real warning calls between 14.29 and 1431.Ümr37ÝËÜjf4ÝThis PCB had previously been used to make warning calls in relation to the Lisburn car bombing on 30 April. Again three of these calls were to the Irish News, the Samaritans, and UTV.Ümr38ÝËÜjf4ÝBT records on the day of the Omagh bombing show that the call to the 585 mobile from Barney’s filling station PCB lasted 23 seconds and was tightly sandwiched between the test warning call to the Samaritans and UTV.Ümr39Ý ËÜjf4ÝHowever the CID had no reason to inspect the BT records because neither the fact that the calls from the PCB were being intercepted, nor even that the PCB had been used for test warning calls, was disclosed to the CID.Ümr40ÝËÜjf4ÝThe test warning calls were followed by two calls to numbers registered to a company associated with Oliver Traynor, a known dissident activist.Ümr41ÝËÜjf4ÝHad the CID been informed that Barney’s filling station PCB had been used for test warning calls, BT records would have led detectives to the 585 number and then to its registered owner, Colm Murphy and possibly also to Oliver Traynor. Why were the CID not immediately told anything about the role of this PCB in the bombing? Again, Sir Peter does not tell us.ËÜjf4ÝBoth the 585 and the 980 were Eircell registered mobiles roaming on the Vodaphone UK network.ËÜjf4ÝThe evidence that the 585 had four exchanges with the 980 in Northern Ireland en route to Omagh and that both mobiles had been to Omagh could have been retrieved through cell-site analysis from Vodaphone UK within 24 to 48 hours by interrogating the network’s Call Data Records (CDR).Ümr42ÝËÜjf4ÝSince both Eircell registered mobiles were roaming on the Vodaphone network, the location by reference to a mast of both outgoing and incoming calls would have been available from the CDR because for each mobile any calls made or received were charged.Ümr43ÝËÜjf4ÝKnowing that the 585 had been called during the bomb run from a PCB involved in the bombing, that the 585 had four exchanges with the 980, both of which had been to Omagh, would have given both the RUC and Garda detectives a rapid paper trail to Colm Murphy and then to the owner of the 980, Terence Morgan with the prospect of early arrests of those suspected of having used the phones during the bombing. ËÜjf4ÝA paper trail to Murphy and Morgan is precisely what did emerge in November 1998 when the RUC, with the assistance the Garda and Vodaphone finally managed to identify the exchanges between Murphy and Morgan’s respective 585 and 980 mobiles through cell-site analysis.Ümr44Ý Two other core numbers were also identified. ËÜjf4ÝThis analysis took so long because the detectives were not given Ücf2ÝanyÜcf1Ý number known to have been involved in the Omagh bombing with which to interrogate the CDRs of Vodaphone or Eircell. In effect, both CIDs were looking for a needle in a haystack. ËÜjf4ÝThe search was then expanded to 10 other bombings between January and October 1998 with the assistance of other communication service providers (CSPs) Eircell, BT Cellnet and E-Sat Digiphone.Ümr45ÝËÜjf4ÝDuring this expanded search, the owner of the 980 mobile, Terence Morgan, was arrested and he spoke freely to the RUC. His information led to the arrests of other key suspects including Seamus Daly whom the Police strongly believe to this day was the “hands on” manager of the bombing in the scout car.ËÜjf4ÝIt was Ücf2ÝtheÜcf1Ý major turning point in the inquiry. Unfortunately by now six months had elapsed and the forensic trail had gone cold. Yet this paper trail could have been discovered to the RUC and Garda within days of the bombing had the RUC been pointed to the BT records of Barney’s PCB, and had the intercepted number(s) also been shared allowing both the RUC and the Garda to interrogate the billing data held by CSPs. ËÜjf4ÝBy June 1999, a matrix of mobiles involved in five linked incidents including Omagh had been plotted out.Ümr46Ý In total this had involved a nine months trawl through many millions of numbers. This analysis indicated a total of 22 personalities’ telephones had been used in the five incidents: 18 of whom were resident in the Republic of Ireland while four were resident in Northern Ireland.Ümr47ÝËÜjf4ÝLike Dame Nuala, Mr Baxter has also told NIAC he believes Sir Peter’s assertion that the “classified material” would have been of no assistance whatsoever “isn’t correct.” He said that for an investigator the key piece of information that “sat behind” an intercept “would be the telephone number.” ËÜjf4ÝMr Baxter said that had “such things as telephone numbers” been known to the intelligence community “on the day or leading up to Omagh, that should have been shared with the investigators at a very early stage. I think Sir Peter Gibson has indicated a different view that wouldn’t have been of assistance…ËÜjf48ÝÜcf3ÝSir Patrick Cormack:Ì This is a fairly important area. So you are saying you do not view this in the same way as Sir Peter did?ËÜjf48ÝÜcf3ÝNorman Baxter:Ì From an investigator’s perspective, I think in fairness to Sir Peter he does indicate he was not in the criminal bar.” ËÜjf4ÝMr Baxter also said: “…. if the intelligence community knew telephones were used in a bomb mission then it was their moral, if not their statutory duty to ensure that the investigators knew “ and that it was “hard to believe that any state organisation which would have information which would help solve the murder of 29 people and not ensure that it was part given to investigators. I think that any organisation which had information that didn’t do that is culpable.”ËÜjf4ÝThe difficulty for us, the families and the general public is that because Sir Peter has adopted the government’s “neither-confirm-nor-deny” rule as to the existence of GCHQ intercepts, it is almost impossible to engage with him or the government as to what exactly lies behind his assertion that the classified material he saw would have been valueless in assisting the CID officers to identify the bombers. ËÜjf4ÝHow, for example, does Sir Peter reconcile his certainty with the findings of Dame Nuala’s December 2001 report which said that “Ücf2Ýfirm suspectsÜcf1Ý” could have been “Ücf2Ýidentified … then have been subject to prompt and proper investigation” Ücf1Ýwhen Ücf2Ý“maximum forensic opportunities were available” Ücf1Ýhad there been Ücf2Ý“objective assessment of all (our emphasis) availableÜcf1Ý Ücf2Ýintelligence”Ücf1Ý .Ücf2Ý Ücf1ÝÜmr48ÝËÜjf4ÝThere can be no doubt that when Dame Nuala referred to “all available intelligence” she was including intercept intelligence because she said that in “referring to all the material which I had seen, some…was Special Branchmaterial and some… was material received from the Security Services.”ËÜjf4ÝWhich of the “security services” was Dame Nuala referring to? Evidently GCHQ was one.ËÜjf4ÝShe told NIAC: “Lady Hermon, I cannot confirm the material which I saw came from GCHQ. It would be a criminal offence for me to do that.”ËÜjf4ÝThe television recording of her evidence to NIAC (though not the transcript) shows Dame Nuala then said: “…but the material which I saw and which—you see, we went to GCH—well….”.Ümr49Ý ËÜjf4ÝThis (highlighted) section of her evidence is omitted from the transcript which picks up as follows: “…we went across a number of evidential opportunity lines when we were conducting our investigation and we went to the security and intelligence services.” ËÜjf4ÝDame Nuala also referred to the confidential section of her report which had said “critical intelligence was available on 15 August.” We are satisfied this reference to “critical intelligence” included intercepts.ËÜjf4ÝSir Peter must have known that Dame Nuala’s investigators had access to GCHQ intercepts from the day of the bombing because in a letter to MP David Davis the Northern Ireland Secretary says: “In terms of the material you may wish to note that he (Sir Peter) had access to all that was given to the then Police Ombudsman Nuala O’ Loan when she conducted her investigation in 2001.”Ümr50ÝËÜjf4ÝHowever, we understand that Sir Peter did not interview Dame Nuala. Therefore he would have had no appreciation of the value to the CID that she and her investigators placed on the intercepts. Why did Sir Peter not interview her? And how does that square with statements by the Prime Minister that Sir Peter’s review was “comprehensive and authoritative”Ümr51Ý and by the Northern Ireland secretary that it was “thorough and exhaustive”?Ümr52ÝËÜjf4ÝThere are two further exchanges which may have been of particular significance on 15 August. ËÜjf10Ý— We have recently been told that one of the Omagh intercepts recorded after the bomb run had passed Aughnacloy, said “have you signed me in?” or words to that effect. On 11 February, the Prime Minister met some of the Omagh families at Downing Street. Present was Victor Barker, whose son James was killed. Mr Barker took a note and he is a solicitor. The judge had retired to consider his verdict against five men whom the Omagh families were suing in the civil courts. The families alleged the five had been involved in the bombing. Mr Barker noted that the Prime Minister said that there was nothing in the classified version of Sir Peter Gibson’s report that would assist their case. Had there been, the Prime Minister said he would have been prepared to change the law. Mr Barker took that to mean that the Prime Minister was prepared to lift the ban against intercept evidence being admissible in court. One of the five defendants was Seamus McKenna who in August 1998 was working on a building site in Dublin with Terence Morgan owner of the 980 mobile. When arrested Morgan told the RUC that on 14 August, the day before the bombing, McKenna had asked Morgan to sign him in for work on the 15 August. Morgan also said the foreman Colm Murphy had also asked him for a loan of his mobile. Morgan obliged. The families’ case against McKenna rested on the fact that there had been a call from the 980 mobile to the Northern Ireland home of McKenna’s estranged wife Catherine at 15.41, 80 minutes after the 980 mobile had been in Omagh when the bomb car was parked. When interviewed by the RUC she first denied it had been her husband who had called, then she admitted he had, then she said he had not. Mrs McKenna, like her husband had a history of alcohol dependence. The judge considered her to be an unreliable witness and McKenna was acquitted. Ücf2ÝIfÜcf1Ý—we stress Ücf2ÝifÜcf1Ý—this intercept did, or does still exist, and if evidence of its existence had been admissible, it would no doubt have been considered a very material piece of evidence and may have persuaded the judge to find McKenna guilty. ËÜjf10Ý— At 15.26 a 198 second call was made from Sean Hoey’s home to Seamus Daly’s Ready to Go Mobile. Daly was now safely back in the Irish Republic. Hoey has admitted he made the call.Ümr53Ý We understand that Hoey’s telephones had been intercepted for several months. He had been identified by the Special Branchas the bomb maker for the first of the dissident bombs that destroyed the centre of Markethill in Co Armagh in September 1997. However, we understand the Branch specifically instructed there was to be “no downward dissemination” of this intelligence to the CID. In interviews with the PSNI, Hoey denied he had called Daly out of curiosity as the bomb maker about how the Omagh bomb run had gone. The content of any intercept from this call was never made known to the Omagh Bomb Inquiry.ËÜjf4ÝSir Peter may be convinced the intercepts and numbers would have been of no assistance to the CID in helping to identify the suspects. But he has not explained why he is convinced of this. ËÜjf4ÝThat is clearly not the view of the Ombudsman’s investigators who were experienced senior police officers. Mr Baxter pointed out that Sir Peter has no experience at the criminal bar.ËÜjf4ÝAre we to prefer Sir Peter’s assessment that the “classified material” he saw would have been valueless to the Police over the Police’s professional assessment that it could have been invaluable?ËÜjf30ÝQQ 128 to 140ËÜjf30ÝKate Hoey: “….Can I ask you one further question, just to get it on the record really? Are you absolutely clear that there is nothing that any better intelligence that was there and what you saw could have made a difference? In other words, is it clear that the Omagh bombing could not have been prevented by the better use of any of the intelligence that might have existed at the time?ËÜjf30ÝSir Peter Gibson: Yes.”ËÜjf4ÝThis assertion by Sir Peter is also hard to accept at face value.ËÜjf4ÝOmagh was the culmination of a series of bombings from 1997 and came just two weeks after an identical car bomb had caused a near massacre in Banbridge.ËÜjf4ÝNorman Baxter told NIAC the Omagh bombing may well not have happened had all the intelligence available to the Special Branch from the previous bombings have been better exploited. As we have demonstrated, that intelligence clearly included intercept.ËÜjf4ÝMr Baxter said that the “bomb team had free reign from the middle of 1997, and the authorities, whoever they were, allowed this to continue.” He said it would have been “inconceivable” for there not to have been arrests had there been bombings on the mainland. “What I do know is that there were opportunities to intervene after each explosion.” ËÜjf4ÝSir Peter says the Special Branch did “not identify to GCHQ any particular phone number as being of particular importance or relevance to a potential bombing.”Ümr54ÝËÜjf4ÝNonetheless, Sir Peter also says that “before, on and after 15 August” GCHQ were supplying “any interception that might have been relevant to RUC Special Branchfor its operational purposes”—by which presumably Sir Peter means GCHQ were, in fact, supplying intercept intelligence to the Branch.ËÜjf4ÝPresumably, also, this intercept intelligence was in respect of particular phone numbers identified by the Special Branch to GCHQ. Sir Peter says it “included near real time provision of information by telephone (that is almost immediately after a call had been listened to itself in near real time) in accordance with pre-agreed criteria.”Ümr55ÝËÜjf4ÝIn his Review, Sir Peter drew attention to the 2002 Crompton Report that said “the majority of Special Branch work has concentrated on proactive disruption operations.”Ümr56ÝËÜjf4ÝFor what purpose other than disrupting or even arresting the bombers, might the Special Branch have given GCHQ telephone numbers for near real time monitoring in the first place if the Branch did not believe the numbers could be exploited in some way for such a purpose? ËÜjf4ÝThis question, understandably, has perplexed MPs.ËÜjf48ÝÜcf3ÝDr McDonnell:Ì “….The bafflement here—and again I think this affects families and everyone else involved in Omagh—is why was all this work, costing a fair amount of money, not put to some use?ËÜjf4ÝOnce again, Sir Peter does not enlighten us and it seems from his evidence to NIAC that he does not know the answer.ËÜjf48ÝÜcf3ÝSir Peter Gibson:Ì “Special Branch would have to answer for itself, but they were in one sense the people gathering intelligence by asking GCHQ to provide it, by seeking it by their own means, and they no doubt had their own particular reasons. I know not whether there were disruption activities going on or what it was that was preoccupying Special Branch.”ËÜjf4ÝNarrow though Sir Peter’s terms of reference were, they did at least include whether the bomb could have been prevented. Yet he acknowledges that he does not know “whether there were disruption activities going on, or what was preoccupying Special Branch.” Again we ask: how can his Review be described as “comprehensive, authoritative, thorough” and “exhaustive” when he does not even attempt to provide an answer as to what the Special Branch were doing with all the intelligence they were gathering if they were neither using it to disrupt bombings, nor sharing it with the CID to help them catch those carrying out the bombings?ËÜjf4ÝIt is a fundamental question going to the heart of the Omagh debacle. And yet Sir Peter cannot answer it because he appears not even to have asked the question.ËÜjf4ÝIn April 1998 when dissidents tried to blow up the centre of Lisburn, Co Antrim with a car bomb, we have been told that a coded warning was intercepted and that Oliver Traynor was assessed as having spoken the words: “The bricks are in the wall” (or words to that effect) with a number for the bricks signifying the time left to detonation. Traynor and Sean Hoey were known to be close associates.Ümr57ÝËÜjf4ÝHoey had come to the attention of Special Branch six months earlier as the alleged maker of the Markethill bomb in September 1997.Ümr58Ý On 29 April, the day before the Lisburn bombing, Hoey had been issued with a new SIM card.Ümr59ÝËÜjf4ÝCell-site analysis shows this mobile was very active from early in the morning at the start of the bomb run. The phone made and received a total of 13 calls to and from telephones which were clearly involved in the bombing.Ümr60Ý In December 2007 Hoey was acquitted of all charges in connection with Lisburn, Omagh and other bombings which the prosecution claimed were linked. Mr Justice Weir could not be satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that DNA identified as Hoey’s on parts of four devices, including Lisburn was due to contamination, accidental or otherwise. The Lisburn telephone evidence was not introduced at his trial.ËÜjf4ÝCell-site analysis from telephone billing also shows that a second mobile registered to Traynor was involved in Lisburn and was the most active of his two mobiles, travelling as far north as the millennium mast in Banbridge at the time the bomb car was parked. Traynor’s mobiles either made or received 15 calls in helping to coordinate the bombing.Ümr61ÝËÜjf4ÝThe alleged involvement of Hoey and Traynor in Lisburn could have been discovered by the CID at the time had the intercepted telephone number(s) been shared with the detectives. This would have allowed the CID to interrogate the communication service providers for other telephones with which the intercepted number had been in contact leading detectives to names and addresses of their registered owners. ËÜjf4ÝIn all, cell-site analysis shows that five of the Lisburn phones or their users were subsequently involved in two further bombings (Newry Courthouse and Banbridge) prior to Omagh, and that seven (including the five) of the Lisburn phones or their user went on to play leading roles, both in the preparation for Omagh and on the day of the bombing itself.Ümr62ÝËÜjf4ÝIt is clear from extracts of Special Branch files that they were building up a clear picture of the key bombers months before Omagh. For example: ËÜjf10Ý— On 18 May 1998 intelligence was received that “The Provisional (IRA) leadership is aware that Michael McKevitt (overall leader of the RIRA) is attempting to increase the co-operation between CIRA (Continuity IRA) and dissident PIRA elements associated with the 32CSC.” (32 Country Sovereign Committee)ËÜjf10Ý— Colm Murphy was shown by intelligence to have been linked to both CIRA and RIRAËÜjf10Ý— On 23 May (the day of the Good Friday Referendum) there is a reference to Liam Cambell and Declan McComish being involved with two brothers who attempted to transport a 900 lbs bomb across the border. We understand McComish was intercepted making one of the actual warning calls from a PCB in Silverbridge Newry on the day of the bombing. ËÜjf10Ý— On 20 July Campbell is reported to have been “deep in conversation” with another suspect the day before a mortar attack on Newry on Corry Square RUC Station Newry. We have been told that a conversation involving Campbell was intercepted where Campbell had become concerned that his team had been compromised so he asked an associate to do the attack.Ümr63ÝËÜjf4ÝWhat did the Special Branch do with the leads that were available from interception, telephone billing and their informants? ËÜjf4ÝWhat Mr Baxter says is that in each of the bombings prior to Omagh “there were opportunities to intervene.” But “these people were not arrested.” ËÜjf4ÝWho was responsible for the intelligence gathering from the Markethill bombing onwards not being given to the CID investigating each of these bombings? “Whoever was in charge of the intelligence community,” says Mr. Baxter. “I can’t say who made the individual decisions. There seems to have been a policy and that policy was not to disseminate.”ËÜjf4ÝDoes Sir Peter know the answer to any of these questions? If so, he does not tell us.ËÜjf30ÝQQ 141 to 144ËÜjf30ÝSir Peter says the BBC “got it completely wrong.” ËÜjf4ÝWe do not accept this all-embracing condemnation of our work. It is unjustified and it is clear from the evidence to NIAC that Sir Peter’s criticism is untenable:ËÜjf10Ý— We said there were intercepts—and clearly there were, despite the government and Sir Peter’s refusal to confirm or deny their existence. Sir Peter explains that “those who say that I have not denied an allegation cannot properly interpret such non denial as a confirmation.” Notwithstanding this “NC” rule (neither confirm nor deny) however, the Northern Ireland Secretary appears to have departed from it on two occasions.Ümr64Ý Why, anyway, would the Prime Minister have ordered a Review of “any intercept evidence” had there been no intercepts to review? And why would the classified version of Sir Peter’s report have run to what he says was about 60 pages if there were no intercepts to report on?ËÜjf10Ý— We said there were telephone numbers. Both ACC Drew Harris of the PSNI and the former Police Ombudsman for Northern Ireland Dame Nuala O’Loan have confirmed this.ËÜjf10Ý— We said these numbers were not shared. The former Omagh Bomb Inquiry Senior Investigating Officer Norman Baxter, his deputy David McWilliams, Dame Nuala and ACC Drew have confirmed this.ËÜjf10Ý— We said theses numbers should have been shared. Both Mr Baxter and Dame Nuala have agreed they should have been shared.ËÜjf10Ý— We said the CID were left to their own devices to identify the numbers which they did over several months by examining the billing records for millions of numbers. Both Mr McWilliams and Dame Nuala have confirmed this.ËÜjf10Ý— We said had the numbers been shared they might well have led to arrests. Both Mr Baxter and Dame Nuala have said likewise.ËÜjf4ÝSince transmission, two riders need to be added to what we know: ËÜjf10Ý— As stated, the reference to the first occasion to when the code words “Bricks in the wall” were intercepted should have been attributed not to the Banbridge incident, but to an earlier one. We now understand the phrase was first intercepted at Lisburn three and a half months before it was again intercepted at Omagh. Although this reinforces the link between Omagh and previous bombings, Sir Peter chose to highlight Ücf2ÝonlyÜcf1Ý the fact that we said this was used at Banbridge, omitting any mention of the phrase’s earlier use at Lisburn.ËÜjf10Ý— On the issue of the tracking of mobiles, Sir Peter’s report concludes that GCHQ could not track mobiles in real time in 1998. Our script made it quite clear that we did not Ücf2ÝknowÜcf1Ý if the mobiles were being monitored in real time and that the Ücf2ÝpossibilityÜcf1Ý of the bombing being prevented Ücf2ÝonlyÜcf1Ý arose had this been so. At no time did we Ücf2ÝassertÜcf1Ý the bombing could have been stopped. Any reasonable person would expect the BBC to have explored the question as to whether the atrocity could have been avoided once we were satisfied, as we are, that interception had occurred. Our subsequent research suggests that GCHQ’s capability was so limited that it was dependent—perhaps entirely so—on that of Vodaphone who, we have been told, did not seriously attempt live tracking of a mobile on behalf of the police until the summer of 2002. As we have stressed, the government had every opportunity to explain GCHQ’s limitations two months before transmission but declined perhaps because they did not wish to admit just how limited that capability was.ËÜjf4ÝWe would also point to an error in Sir Peter’s Review.ËÜjf4ÝSir Peter said: “There is no evidence whatever before me to make good the assertion in the Ücf2ÝSunday Telegraph Ücf1Ýand the Ücf2ÝPanorama Ücf1Ýprogramme that, on 14 August, the Garda had warned the police of a likely attack.”Ümr65ÝËÜjf4ÝHowever, we are satisfied that a briefing was provided by a senior Special Branch officer South Region to the acting Assistant Chief Constable, South Region on the afternoon of 14th August 1998 indicating that information had been received from the Garda about a potential vehicle borne device, and that a joint police/military operation was deployed in the South Armagh/South Down area on the morning of 15 August 1998. We also understand that Mr Baxter was the third person at that briefing. ËÜjf4ÝPresumably Sir Peter was unaware of this because he did not cover this ground in his telephone interview with Mr Baxter.ËÜjf4ÝSir Peter said that as a result of the BBC’s “very serious and damaging allegations…expectations may have been raised amongst the families of the victims of the bombing.” ËÜjf4ÝThe families have emphasised this was not the case because we made clear to them the limits of our knowledge.Ümr66ÝËÜjf4ÝIn his evidence to NIAC, Mr Baxter said it was, in fact, Sir Peter’s terms of reference that had raised “expectations of the families who are still seeking closure” because his terms were confined to “a narrow area of intelligence”—namely what passed between GCHQ and the Special Branch—not, as the families and we had expected—what passed between GCHQ and Special Branch and why this was not fully shared the CID.ËÜjf4ÝIn his evidence Sir Peter says: “…there was nothing that was not passed fully—again subject to this not confirming or deny intercepts and so on—there was nothing that was not passed fully and quickly to Special Branch, the designated recipient of any information from GCHQ.”ËÜjf4ÝWe understand that for his Review Sir Peter interviewed both the head of Special Branch South and the overall head of Special Branch at the time of Omagh. We are satisfied from our own research that both former officers had already made it clear to former Assistant Chief Constable Ray White, that they did not receive the intelligence product from the intercepts until Tuesday 19 August, three days after the bombing.Ümr67Ý Sir Peter, on the other hand, says he is satisfied there was nothing that was not passed “fully and quickly to Special Branch.” ËÜjf4ÝTherefore, the following question arises:ËÜjf4ÝAssuming that the two former senior officers gave the same account to Sir Peter as we are satisfied they gave to Ray White, has Sir Peter resolved the apparent conflict between Ücf2ÝhisÜcf1Ý finding that there was nothing that was not passed “fully and quickly” to Special Branch, and Ücf2ÝtheirÜcf1Ý recollections that they did not receive anything until three days later? If Sir Peter has resolved this conflict, he has not explained how he resolved it.ËÜjf30ÝQ 147 ËÜjf30ÝMr Heburn asks, “why did it take CID something like nine months to trawl through literally millions and millions of telephone records, mobile phone records, to try and trace a suspect device?”ËÜjf4ÝThis question is especially pertinent in light of the fact that the Special Branch (and presumably all the Security Services) knew that the CID were themselves trying to identify suspects from telephone numbers.ËÜjf4ÝWhy the CID detectives got no assistance with telephone numbers was also the single most important issue raised by Ücf2ÝPanoramaÜcf1Ý. It appears also to be of considerable concern to members of NIAC.Ümr68ÝËÜjf4ÝYet Sir Peter acknowledges that this was yet another matter excluded from his terms of reference. “I deliberately did not go into questions like why certain things were done or not done” he says. Those seeking an answer “will have to ask Special Branch.” ËÜjf30ÝQQ 148 ËÜjf4ÝExplaining why he had “deliberately” not delved into the question of why the Special Branch acted “cautiously” Sir Peter says it would have required him to have assessed whether the “the police acted properly, well, non-negligently—things like that. Once you go down that path—and I have seen it in my career at the Bar and judicially—you open the door to legal procedures and requirements. For example, if you criticise any person in a report, the practice these days is to send a draft to that person; that person then raises queries on the report. The whole procedure is lengthened very considerably.”ËÜjf4ÝWe only observe that Sir Peter did not extend this courtesy to the BBC. He showed no reluctance to make findings critical of Ücf2ÝPanorama Ücf1Ýwithout offering the right to raise queries. No “draft” of his criticisms of Ücf2ÝPanorama Ücf1Ýwas sent to the programme for a response. Sir Peter also refused to give John Ware a copy of his secretary’s note after he had been interviewed. He has also refused to explain his refusal.ËÜjf30ÝQ 148 (cont’d) to Q 149ËÜjf30ÝPressed on whether he might consider reopening his inquiry into why Special Branch did not share GCHQ material with the CID, Sir Peter “adverted to the difficulties in finding the truth in relation to that matter. If, as I have been led to believe, there are no documents, you are relying only on memories.”ËÜjf4ÝWe certainly agree that establishing the truth about who got what, when and why is difficult which is why we said “the blunt truth is that none of the stories match up about who got what and when.” We repeat: the programme script was heavily qualified. ËÜjf4ÝSir Peter, however, asserted without qualification, that Special Branch South first “identified” to the CID “ those persons it believed to have been involved in the bombing” on 20 August”.Ümr69Ý We have said no record of such a briefing exists in the Omagh Bomb Inquiry’s HOLMES system.Ümr70Ý In his evidence to NIAC, former Detective Chief Inspector David McWilliams, deputy SIO to the Bomb Inquiry also said: “I was not aware of anything that was passed on 20th. The first I knew of it was from Sir Peter Gibson report.” Mr McWilliams was a senior officer on the Inquiry from the day of the bombing. Sir Peter’s assertion is also contradicted by notes available to other senior CID officers who Sir Peter did not interview, but who John Ware did interview.Ümr71ÝËÜjf4ÝSir Peter, in his evidence to NIAC, acknowledged that “no documents were produced relating to what Special Branch was doing at the relevant time.” Sir Peter also said the BBC had been “relying on” the memory of sources “of events 10 years ago and they did not have the advantage of seeing the documentation which I have seen.” Has, perhaps, Sir Peter been “relying on memories” when he asserts without qualification that suspects were first identified to the CID by Special Branch South on 20 August?ËÜjf30ÝQ 149 (cont’d) to Q 150ËÜjf30ÝAsked why, in his Review, Sir Peter had said the Special Branchhad acted in a “cautious” way, he responded that he “implied no more than… that the information they handed over was not very extensive.”ËÜjf4ÝThere surely is more to it than that. ËÜjf4ÝWhen referring to Special Branch’s “caution”, in his Review Sir Peter went on to say: “I do not doubt that Special Branch South took the (cautious) actions it did for what it considered to be good operational reasons.” ËÜjf4ÝSir Peter does not explain why he gave Special Branch the benefit of the doubt when, on his own admission, he did not investigate the “soundness of those reasons…”ËÜjf30ÝQQ 158 to 159ËÜjf30ÝSir Peter says: “GCHQ is treating Special Branch as a customer; so it is trying to do what the customer wants. If the customer wants something done urgently, it can say so. If it wants further information, it can do so.”ËÜjf4ÝIn his evidence to NIAC, John Ware also referred to Special Branch being the “customer”: “…..The system is then interrogated, headlines are dashed off and whizzed off by fax or whatever to the customer, Special Branch…”. ËÜjf4ÝAnd later: “To be fair, GCHQ are worker bees. They are set tasks, as I understand it, and they are a service provider. They are not there to analyse this and that and the other, they provide the coverage….” ËÜjf4ÝThese answers again demonstrate that we understood the relationship between GCHQ and the Special Branch and why Sir Peter is simply wrong to persist in saying that Ücf2ÝPanorama Ücf1Ýhad GCHQ “in the firing line.”Ümr72ÝËÜjf30ÝQQ 159 (cont’d) to 160ËÜjf30ÝSir Peter says the transmission of GCHQ material “from Special Branchto, say, the investigating team. That is a matter for them. It’s not up to GCHQ.”ËÜjf4ÝIf dissemination of GCHQ intelligence by the Special Branch to the CID is “not up to GCHQ” why is there any requirement for the “strict conditions” about dissemination which, according to Sir Peter’s Review are “imposed by GCHQ?”Ümr73Ý Again, he has not explained.ËÜjf30ÝQQ 163 to 166ËÜjf30ÝSir Peter says that he hoped his Review “would achieve the exoneration” of GCHQ from the “very serious charges” which he considers were made by the BBC.ËÜjf4ÝAccording to the Security Service, Sir Peter Gibson is one of two “independent Commissioners” who “oversee the activities of the Security Service and a number of other public bodies, including the Secret Intelligence Service (SIS) and the Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ).”Ümr74ÝËÜjf4ÝDoes the “exoneration” of GCHQ of any responsibility for the failure of the Omagh bomb inquiry properly fall within his remit? It is surely not the job of an “independent” scrutiniser to “defend” any institution for which he is responsible. ËÜjf4ÝBy exonerating GCHQ and the rules and procedures governing dissemination of its intercepts from any bearing on the failure of the intercepted telephone numbers to be shared with the CID, Sir Peter turns the spotlight on to Special Branch and the only remaining link in the dissemination chain: Special Branch to CID. He then promptly turns it off by not investigating all the circumstances that might explain why the Special Branch did not share those numbers with the CID.ËÜjf30ÝQ 166 (Cont’d) to Q 168ËÜjf30ÝSir Peter says: “I know Mr Ware differs from me. He says that GCHQ, for example, was not in the firing line at all. I am wholly unable, having seen what was said in the Ücf2ÝPanorama Ücf1Ýprogramme, to agree with him on that.”ËÜjf4ÝSir Peter has not distinguished between an allegation and justifiable questions.ËÜjf4ÝÜcf2ÝPanorama Ücf1Ýdid not hold GCHQ responsible either for any failure to stop the bomb, or for the failure of the content of the intercepts and telephone numbers to be shared with the CID. Sir Peter has for the third time ignored our repeated references in the script and elsewhere which made it clear we make no assertion as to who was responsible for the failure.Ümr75ÝÜof5Ý, Ümr76ÝÜof5Ý, Ümr77ÝÜof5Ý, Ümr78ÝËÜjf4ÝIt was because we were unable to resolve what level of monitoring Special Branch sought from GCHQ that we never asserted the bombing could have been stopped, just as we were unable to resolve what GCHQ gave to Special Branch by way of intercepts and when. ËÜjf4ÝWe did, as a matter of fairness to GCHQ, report that one source had told us “the Special Branch got the intercepts within six hours of the bombing.” We also reported that the Branch were denying this.ËÜjf4ÝThe core issue was what information ultimately reached the CID and the commentary posed that question in a neutral way: ËÜjf48Ý“The question is: how much of GCHQ’s intelligence found its way to the detectives and when? The blunt truth is that none of the stories match up about who got what and when”. ËÜjf4ÝThe commentary simply reflected the different positions of different parties as they were reported to us: ËÜjf48Ý“If the Special Branchare complaining about GCHQ then the CID make a similar complaint about the Special Branch. The detectives were pleading for intelligence. But their log records nothing until three and a half weeks after the bomb exploded. The Special Branch say the log is incomplete. They insist they briefed the detectives immediately. What is clear is that the detectives didn’t get everything. Special Branch says that’s because GCHQ wouldn’t allow the detectives to know there had been intercepts.”Ümr79ÝËÜjf4ÝThe fact that we were unable to include a response from GCHQ has everything to do with GCHQ’s refusal to provide one, and nothing to do with Ücf2ÝPanorama Ücf1Ýhaving put GCHQ in the “firing line.” ËÜjf4ÝSir Peter’s persistence in accusing us of the latter suggests a dogged determination to defend GCHQ at the expense of the BBC even though the BBC has raised questions which are manifestly in the public interest, and to which no reasonable person could possibly expect us to have all the answers without access to the “range of very sensitive and highly classified material” that Sir Peter says were made available to him in his role as Intelligence Services CommissionerÜcf5Ý57Ücf1ÝËÜjf4ÝIs the suggestion really that the BBC had no business posing any of these questions having satisfied ourselves there were intercepts, without have checked everything against the “range of very sensitive and highly classified material” made only available to those with the highest vetting?ËÜjf30ÝSir Peter acknowledges, he doesn’t know “the details of the PSNI’s internal procedures governing what should be passed to the detectives and investigating team.” ËÜjf4ÝWe repeat: the failure to share the intercepted numbers with the CID was at the heart of Ücf2ÝPanorama Ücf1Ýand since the programme was responsible for instigating his Review, we and the Omagh families assumed he would squarely address this issue. ËÜjf4ÝIn fact Sir Peter deliberately avoided doing so.ËÜjf4ÝAs to whether the bombing could have been prevented, Sir Peter has addressed this in a narrow way: whether, as the arrangements stood on 15 August 1998, the bombing could have been stopped, as distinct from whether better exploitation of all the intelligence, including all intercepts could have been used to disrupt the bombers thus avoiding Omagh.ËÜjf30ÝSir Peter acknowledges that because the families have not been convinced by his report “to that extent, it hasn’t achieved, as you suggested, all that much.”ËÜjf4ÝWe agree it is hard to see what his Review has achieved, beyond saying the bombing could not have been prevented on the day. ËÜjf4ÝHe has shed no light on why the Special Branch did not do more to try to prevent it by disrupting the bombers prior to Omagh through the better exploitation of intercept and other intelligence. ËÜjf4ÝThe Northern Ireland Secretary told NIAC the sharing of intelligence had been examined by the Ombudsman in her 2001 investigation into the Omagh Bomb Inquiry. That is not quite how the Ombudsman herself sees it. As she explained, she was prohibited from making any public reference to the intercepts:ËÜjf48ÝÜcf3ÝMr Murphy:Ì Do you agree with the Secretary of State that your report actually covered all of the issues that were raised with regard to the evidence that was available at that time?ËÜjf48ÝÜcf3ÝDame Nuala O’Loan:Ì The law does not permit anyone to refer to certain types of evidence, Mr Murphy, so my report covered it but did not cover it explicitly, if that is of assistance to you.ËÜjf48ÝÜcf3ÝMr MurphyÜcf1Ý: Do you think Sir Peter raised more questions in relation to this “cautious way” in which Special Branch— ËÜjf48ÝÜcf3ÝDame Nuala O’Loan:Ì Special Branch did not disseminate material which they could have disseminated to the CID officers investigating.ËÜjf48ÝÜcf3ÝChairman:Ì Do you know why?ËÜjf48ÝÜcf3ÝDame Nuala O’Loan:Ì No.ËÜjf4ÝNor, apparently, does Sir Peter because he deliberately did not address that question.ËÜjf4ÝSir Peter has contributed almost nothing to our understanding of why intercept intelligence was not shared with the CID to help them identify and arrest the bombers, and most particularly, why the CID could not, at the very least, have been given the telephone numbers. ËÜjf4ÝIt is difficult to accept that Sir Peter’s Review has served much public good at all since it has so carefully avoided addressing those matters which remain of greatest concern to the Omagh families and the wider public.ËÜbpÜfn2ÝÜbpÜfn2ÝÈÜcf2Ý16 December 2009Ücf1ÝËÜjf22ÝÈÈÈÜcc150x,1,8,8.5ÝÜcf5Ý57Ücf1ÝPara 2 Gibson review.ËËÜmo24ÝSee paras 71–73 Ücf2ÝPanorama Ücf1Ýresponse to Sir Peter Gibson ReviewÈhttp://news.bbc.co.uk/1/shared/bsp/hi/pdfs/12Ü_Ý02Ü_Ý09Ü_Ýpanoramagibsonresponse.pdfËËÜmo25ÝPara 23 Gibson Review.ËËÜmo26ÝJW note of Cabinet Office spokesman 3 October 2008.ËËÜmo27ÝOf the landlines and many mobiles subsequently shown by cell-site analysis to have been involved on the day of the bombing, and in previous bombings linked to Omagh, only a handful were unregistered “Ready To Go” phones.ËËÜmo28ÝFor ease of reference we refer to the last three digits.ËËÜmo29ÝA memo from the Special Branch Omagh Bomb assessment file of Liam Campbell states that “Republican dissidents” active in the Newry/Dundalk area included Campbell and Murphy and others.ËËÜmo30ÝConfidential sources.ËËÜmo31ÝIbid.ËËÜmo32Ýp82 ”Cell Site Analysis Linked to Dissident Republican Activity in Northern Ireland” LKP5.ËËÜmo33ÝWe understand most PCB interception was carried out by Special Branch.ËËÜmo34Ýpp81–82 “Cell Site Analysis Linked to Dissident Republican Activity in Northern Ireland” LKP5.ËËÜmo35ÝConfidential source.ËËÜmo36Ýpp81–82 “Cell Site Analysis Linked to Dissident Republican Activity in Northern Ireland” LKP5.ËËÜmo37Ýp2 Ibid DC Barr, memo 10 December “R-v-Seamus Daly—Telephone Analysis for Omagh and Linked Series”.ËËÜmo38Ýpp10 & 11 Ibid.ÈAn attempted bomb warning call had also been made to the Irish News exactly two weeks earlier in relation to the Banbridge car bombing. Because it was a Saturday the paper was closed and the caller had to fall back on the BT 999 system where calls are known to be recorded.ËËÜmo39Ýp82 ”Cell Site Analysis Linked to Dissident Republican Activity in Northern Ireland” LKP5.ËËÜmo40ÝConfidential source.ËËÜmo41ÝTown Glass Ltd, a company owned by Seamus McGrane, a leading dissident. It is also said by the PSNI to have been “Oliver Traynor’s business which employs Liam Campbell.” (DC Barr, memo 10 December “R-v-Seamus Daly—Telephone Analysis for Omagh and Linked Series” Two mobiles registered to Traynor had also been very active in the earlier Lisburn bombing on 30 April where the coded warning “Bricks are in the wall” was first intercepted. We have been told that the person speaking was assessed as Traynor. A mobile registered to him had also been used in a hoax bombing in Newry on 1 April.ËËÜmo42ÝConfidential sources.ËËÜmo43ÝPolice statement of Raymond Green Fraud and Investigations Manager Vodaphone Ltd 28 April 1999: “When a mobile phone from an overseas company is ‘roaming’ on the Vodaphone network, any calls received or made are charged. The cell site used will usually be the site which is nearest to the mobile telephone or one that is immediately adjacent if the nearest cell site is congested or obstructed.”.ËËÜmo44Ý“Omagh Bomb Investigation Current Situation Report” December 1999.ËËÜmo45ÝIbid: ”…it was decided to look at the bomb attacks carried out by distance during 1998 to see if a similar method of running the bombs to their destination using mobile phones had been used. The bombings chosen were:ÈÜdt8p0,1p0g,5p0ÝÜbtMoira:Ünt20/02/98ÜetÜbtPortadown:Ünt23/02/98ÜetÜbtNewry Railway:Ünt01/04/98ÜetÜbtLisburn:Ünt30/04/98ÜetÜbtArmagh:Ünt16/05/98ÜetÜbtNewton Hamilton:Ünt24/06/98ÜetÜbtNewry Courthouse:Ünt13/07/98ÜetÜbtNewry RUC:Ünt21/07/98ÜetÜbtBanbridge:Ünt01/08/98ÜetÜbtOmagh:Ünt15/08/98ÜetËËÜmo46ÝIbid. The five incidents were:ÈÜdt8p0,1p0g,5p0ÝÜbtNewry Railway:Ünt01/04/98ÜetÜbtLisburn:Ünt30/04/98ÜetÜbtNewry Courthouse:Ünt13/07/98ÜetÜbtBanbridge:Ünt01/08/98ÜetÜbtOmagh:Ünt15/08/98ÜetËËÜmo47ÝIbid.ËËÜmo48Ý“Objective assessment of all available intelligence would, however, have produced other details by 17 August 1998 of ‘firm suspects’, when maximum forensic opportunities were available. The individuals then identified could then have been subject to prompt and proper investigation. This intelligence in an incomplete form was not passed to the SIO until 9 September 1998.” Internal PONI report para 26.20.ËËÜmo49Ýat 1.03.43.ËËÜmo50ÝShaun Woodward to David Davis 24 February 2009.ËËÜmo51ÝLetter from Gordon Brown to Sir Patrick Cormack 5 March 2009.ËËÜmo52Ýhttp://www.parliament.the-stationery-office.com/pa/cm200809/cmhansrd/cm090121/debtext/90121-0001.htmËËÜmo53ÝPSNI interview with Sean Hoey 3 September 2003.ËËÜmo54ÝPara 28 Gibson Review.ËËÜmo55ÝPara 27 Gibson Review.ËËÜmo56ÝPara 15 Gibson Review.ËËÜmo57ÝFor example, in September 2000 when Ücf2ÝPanorama Ücf1Ýfilmed Traynor covertly at his plastics window workshop, Hoey was captured hovering in the background, checking out the customer that the Ücf2ÝPanorama Ücf1Ýproducer was posing to be.ËËÜmo58ÝConfidential source.ËËÜmo59ÝEircell reported Hoey mobile stolen on 14 April 1998. Eircell did not supply Hoey with a new phone, just a new SIM card maintaining the same 0872210452 number. Laster in same interview DC Brown says: “We’re putting dates to you, that you reported your telephone to Eircell on 14 April. You got a new SIM card on 29th, you remained at that same number until the Police seized that phone.” This mobile had been seized by Police in September 1998. I/V Hoey by DC Brown & DC Quinn RUC Castlereagh on 22 June 1999 starting 1432 and ending 1515. At next interview starting 1522, DC Brown says: “…you were issued with a new SIM card which allowed you to retain the same phone number which I believe was activated on the 29 of April.”ËËÜmo60Ýpp98–105 “Cell Site Analysis Linked to Dissident Republican Activity in Northern Ireland” LKP5.ËËÜmo61ÝIbid.ËËÜmo62ÝIbid.ËËÜmo63ÝConfidential sources.ËËÜmo64Ýif there is something to be taken from a Review of the way the intercept evidence was shared at the time, then we will look at that … we will look at the use of the intercept evidence and how it was shared that day.” Northern Ireland Secretary Shaun Woodward interviewed BBC NI 18 Sept 2008. On 15 October replying to a parliamentary question from MP Andrew McKinley, Mr. Woodward again referred to intercepts from the day of the bombing: “He will know that the Prime Minister has asked Sir Peter Gibson to conduct an urgent Review to consider the way in which the intercept evidence was shared and used that day.”ËËÜmo65ÝPara 28 Gibson Review.ËËÜmo66ÝPara 70 Ücf2ÝPanorama Ücf1Ýresponse to Sir Peter Gibson reviewÈhttp://news.bbc.co.uk/1/shared/bsp/hi/pdfs/12Ü_Ý02Ü_Ý09Ü_Ýpanoramagibsonresponse.pdfËËÜmo67ÝPara 48 Ibid.ËËÜmo68ÝSee for example Q99 from Lady HermonÈhttp://www.parliament.the-stationery-office.co.uk/pa/cm200809/cmselect/cmniaf/c359-ii/c35902.htmËËÜmo69ÝPara 33 Gibson Review.ËËÜmo70ÝPara 26 Ücf2ÝPanorama Ücf1Ýresponse to Gibson review.ËËÜmo71ÝIbid.ËËÜmo72Ýhttp://www.parliament.the-stationery-office.co.uk/pa/cm200809/cmselect/cmniaf/c359-ii/c35901.htmËËÜmo73ÝPara 23 Ücf2ÝPanorama Ücf1Ýformal response to Sir Peter Gibson reviewÈhttp://news.bbc.co.uk/1/shared/bsp/hi/pdfs/12Ü_Ý02Ü_Ý09Ü_Ýpanoramagibsonresponse.pdfËËÜmo74Ýhttp://www.mi5.gov.uk/output/judicial.htmlÜcf1ÝËËÜmo75ÝProgramme transcript.ËËÜmo76ÝQ&A: Omagh GCHQ intelligence http://news.bbc.co.uk/panorama/hi/frontÜ_Ýpage/newsidÜ_Ý7613000/7613407.stmËËÜmo77ÝJW letter to Sir Peter Gibson 8 December 2009.ËËÜmo78ÝParas 53, 54, 59 & 60 Ücf2ÝPanorama Ücf1Ýresponse to Sir Peter Gibson ReviewÈhttp://news.bbc.co.uk/1/shared/bsp/hi/pdfs/12Ü_Ý02Ü_Ý09Ü_Ýpanoramagibsonresponse.pdfËËÜmo79ÝÜcf2ÝPanorama Ücf1Ý“Omagh: What The Police Were Never Told”.ËË