9. Memorandum submitted by the Northern Ireland
Office in response to Questions from the Committee relating to
the Main Estimate (ME) 2008/09 and the Spring Supplementary Estimates
2007/08
2007 Comprehensive Spending Review DSOs
1. For DSO 1, indicator 1 "the devolution
of policing and justice", the APR notes that this has been
delayed by a political impasse (p 23). However in the foreword,
the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland states that
"an agreement [was] announced on 17 November
by the First and deputy First ministers on the process to facilitate
the devolution of policing and justice powers to the Northern
Ireland Assembly. This agreement also brought to an end several
months of political impasse which had prevented meetings of the
Northern Ireland Executive".
What is the impact of the agreement announced
on 17 November on who has responsibility for the DSOs and PSAs
related to policing and justice?
The agreement announced on 18 November by the First
Minister and deputy First Minister was a significant step and
set out a process which, when completed, would see the devolution
of policing and justice in Northern Ireland.
As part of that process, they proposed initial arrangements
for the Ministerial oversight of a justice department. They also
proposed that, on devolution, responsibilities relating to the
appointment of judicial office holders should transfer to the
Northern Ireland Judicial Appointments Commission.
The Northern Ireland Act 2009 received Royal Assent
on 12 March. It paves the way for that process to take effect
by making a number of changes to the Northern Ireland Act 1998,
the Judicature (NI) Act 1978 and the Justice (NI) Act 2002.
Devolution will not take place, however, until the
Assembly makes the necessary request and a series of Orders transferring
legislative competence and executive functions has been considered
and affirmed by both Houses of Parliament, in accordance with
the process set out in section 4 of the Northern Ireland Act 1998.
Until that time, responsibility for the DSOs and
PSAs relating to policing and justice will remain with the NIO.
On devolution, both the future NIO and the new Northern
Ireland Department of Justice will have to develop new DSOs and
PSAs reflecting the division of responsibilities post-devolution.
2. For DSO 1, the APR notes an improvement in
the indicator "an approach to the past capable of commanding
cross-community support" even though the priority action
"report of the Consultative Group on the Past to be completed
in summer 2008" has not been achieved (p 23). The APR notes
that "the Group's final report is expected later this year".
Why does the NIO judge that there has been an improvement in this
indicator 'an approach to the past capable of commanding cross-community
support' when the priority action has not been achieved?
While the report of the Consultative Group on the
Past was not launched until January 2009, the additional time
taken reflected the extensive public consultation undertaken by
the Group. The Group met with over 100 organisations and held
seven public meetings. The number of meetings held is a reflection
of the level of interest in this issue within Northern Ireland
society. Although the report of the Consultative Group had
not been launched at the time of the NIO's 2008 Autumn Performance
Report, this evidence of considerable public engagement with the
work of the Group was considered to be a positive sign. The significant
debate that took place when their report was launched, particularly regarding
the proposal to make recognition payments to the relatives of
those killed during the Troubles, demonstrates that the legacy
of the past remains a very sensitive subject. Nevertheless, discussion
of these difficult issues is important as we strive to achieve
an approach to the past capable of commanding cross-community
support.
3. The APR notes that for DSO2 based on performance
during the first half of the year, the Northern Ireland Prison
Service expects to achieve all the priority actions in three out
of four key performance indicators, including meeting its cost
per prisoner place target for the year (p 26). Which indicator
is the NIO not on track to meet its priority actions? What is
the NIO doing to improve its performance in this area?
At the end of the first half of the year (April -
Sept), the Northern Ireland Prison Service indicator relating
Secure Custody i.e. no more than 3 escapes per 1000 Category B,
C or D prisoners was potentially in doubt due to three escapes;
in April a Category B prisoner escaped custody while at an outside
hospital and a young offender escaped from prison officers while
being escorted from the Court Room at Downpatrick. In August
a prisoner escaped from Prison Officers while at Larne Court.
All three were subsequently returned to custody within a few
hours. This target is now back on track, there having been no
further escapes.
Investigations have been carried out into all escapes
and a number of recommendations made are being implemented.
The Prison Service Performance and Standards Unit
conduct security inspections in NI Court Houses from a NIPS perspective
of security and risk management.
Additionally a further joint review by the Court
Service and the Prison Service commenced in May 2008. This includes
reviewing standards in custody areas across the court estate.
The Court Service is committed to continuously reviewing court
estate security and engages with Prison Service officials to agree
enhancements, where Court Service resources permit.
The Court Service is developing a Court Estate Strategy
which will consider the long term suitability of venues and their
capacity to continue to meet business and legislative demands.
Court Service resources are constrained and the availability
of capital resource will determine the scale of this programme.
4. For the third
indicator within DSO 2: 'safety and prisoner health', the Department
has the priority actions: ' the number of staff assaulted by prisoners
is less than a ratio of 3 per 100 prisoners'; ' the numbers of
prisoners assaulted by prisoners is less than a ratio of 4 per
100 prisoners'. The APR shows that in the first 6 months of the
year, a total of 10 staff have been assaulted by prisoners (0.7%)
which is less than a ratio of 1 per 100 prisoners and that a total
of 5 prisoners have been assaulted by prisoners (0.3%) which again
is less than a ratio of 1 per 100 prisoners (p 26). The achievements
appear to be well below the targets. On what basis were the targets
set? Has consideration been given to making the targets more ambitious?
The assault targets were set nearer to the creation
of Agency status for the three UK Prison Services, and at a time
when Treasury placed a premium on comparability. The key performance
indicators were agreed as part of the quinquennial review.
In light of the Committee's comments, the Prison
Service has reviewed the assault targets and the performance against
these over the past five years. The Minister has agreed amended
targets for the 2009/10 Business Plan period. The Service's eleven
key targets and development objectives for 2009/10 will be published
in the Corporate and Business Plan 2009/12 in April.
5. For DSO 3: "To deliver an independent,
fair and effective criminal justice system which supports and
protects the community", the APR notes that "of the
seven key performance indicators associated with this DSO: one
shows strong progress, three show some progress and the remaining
three are in the not yet assessed category" (p 27). Can you
provide us with a breakdown showing which indicators show 'strong
progress', which show 'some progress' and which are in the not
yet assessed category?
Based on the data available when the Autumn Performance
Report was compiled, the following assessments were made:
- Time taken to trial in Crown,
Magistrates' and Youth Court cases - strong progress.
- Levels of anti-social behaviour incidents - some
progress.
- Monitor acquisitive crimes - some progress.
- Improved range of options for the judiciary (sentencing
review) - some progress.
- Levels of overall/serious reoffending - not yet
assessed.
- Confidence in the fairness and effectiveness
of the criminal justice system - not yet assessed.
- Victim and witness satisfaction - not yet assessed.
6. The Committee notes that for the indicator,
'monitor acquisitive crime' within DSO 3, "domestic burglaries
for the period April to August have risen by 8% compared with
the same period last year, though theft of/from vehicles have
reduced by 9% in the same period" (p 27). What is the view
on why domestic burglaries have risen by 8% compared to the same
period last year? What is the NIO doing to combat this increase?
While the increase at August 2008 was 8% compared
to the previous year, by 3 March 2009 this increase had reduced
to 5.9%. For the period April 2007 to 3 March 2008
the domestic burglary figures were 6071, whereas, for the same
period in 2008 - 09 the figures had risen to 6429.
The PSNI is organised across eight Districts and
on the basis of the recorded crime figures, two Districts show
a reduction and six show an increase in domestic burglary. Over
the period April 2008 to 3 March 2009 one District in Belfast
accounted for 62% of the increase while two other rural districts
account for another 34% of this increase.
If, however we compare April 2008 to September 2008
with October to December 2008, there are some notable variations,
including:
- Between April and September
all four Rural Districts experienced an increase in the level
of domestic burglary - ranging from 7% to 30%. Three of the four
Urban districts saw decreases.
- Between October and December all four Urban Districts
saw increases ranging from 10% to 51%. One Urban District accounts
for 27% of the total increase in domestic burglary incidents in
this quarter. Two Rural Districts had decreases.
The main factors identified as contributing to
this 5.9% increase are:
- Increase in burglaries in houses
of multiple occupancy (e.g. student accommodation) when more than
one room is burgled (and under Home Office accounting rules each
burgled room counts as a separate burglary).
- The high percentage of homes with doors and windows
being left open or unlocked.
- Significant number of burglaries carried out
by opportunist individuals who find doors and windows left unlocked.
- Many of the items stolen are small in nature,
they are easily hidden (e.g. wallets, purses, handbags, laptops
and cameras) and easily disposable. Sheds are also being targeted
for power tools.
- The current financial and economic climate is
recognised as a potential factor in the increase.
- In towns and villages in rural areas, where houses
may be isolated and farmhouse doors are left open, and there is
ease of access to main arterial roads. These are contributory
factors for some Belfast based criminals.
- Some rural crimes are perpetrated by offenders
from Southern Ireland.
- In addition to these factors, there are three
other points worthy of note and these are:
- Seasonal burglaries in holiday homes and caravans
have been an increasing problem in some areas;
- Distraction burglaries continue to present some
problems, and
- Known prolific offenders are targeted - subjected
to increased bail checks.
Response to 'what is the NIO doing to combat this
increase':
The NIO works in partnership with a range of organisations,
including the PSNI to try to combat this issue of domestic burglary.
There are a number of initiatives in place to tackle
this issue, including:
- Regional media campaigns that
deliver specific messages to target audiences; in 2008 the NIO,
together with the PSNI and the NI Policing Board, launched the
media campaign "Close It Lock It Check It". This built
on previous campaigns aimed at home security.
- Working with Department of Social Development
and the Department of Regional Development to implement design
standards that address crime; co-operation has been secured to
two approaches to promoting Crime Prevention through Environmental
Design: (a) all new and refurbished social housing projects must
be completed to ACPO 'Secured by Design' standards or DSD grants
are not paid to developers; and (b) the PSNI is working with the
Department for Regional Development, to develop a framework for
assessing all planning applications for new developments, including
commercial, to ensure crime prevention / community safety issues
are taken into account at the outset.
- A campaign targeting students who live in houses
of multiple occupancy; in September 2008, the PSNI in partnership
with the NIO Community Safety Unit and the Students Union launched
Campus Watch. This provided students with a range of crime prevention
advice, including information on how to reduce the risk of domestic
burglary.
- Two regional campaigns that target householders
who might be subjected to a distraction burglary, a bogus caller
or unknown caller; In October the PSNI in conjunction with NTL
and Fold Telecare launched Quickcheck, a freephone number which
provides a secure method of identifying callers to houses and
gaining police help if this caller is suspicious. In addition
to this PSNI scheme the NIO, working in partnership with Help
the Aged and a number of other organisations, regularly promotes,
via a television campaign, how to respond to an unexpected caller
at the door.
- An initiative called Handyvan targeting older
people who require improved home security. To improve the provision
of good quality home security measures, the NIO Community Safety
Unit also support Help the Aged with a Handyvan scheme in the
Greater Belfast area (this initiative now extends beyond Belfast).
This provides a free service to those eligible.
- Free crime prevention advice by PSNI crime prevention
officers.
- The PSNI also promote property marking schemes
including, Red Web, Smart Water and Datatag.
PSNI specific initiatives
In addition there are a number of local PSNI initiatives
being implemented on an area, district or regional basis, such
as:
- Regular meetings between PSNI
and An Garda Síochána officers who police the border
regions. A number of cross border operations have been implemented.
- Op Heartbreak is an Urban Region initiative focused
on reducing domestic burglary, improving the detection rate and
co-ordinating district activity by targeting offenders as well
as the hotspot areas. The Operation has been in place since January
2009 and the operation has led to a total of 97 arrests, including
55 for burglary charges.
- Heartbreak Assist, is a further series of operations
following on from Heartbreak. It is again focused in Urban Regions
and directly involves two neighbouring Rural Regions - (as operations
may displace criminals and the crime).
7. For DSO 4: "To work with PSNI and other
policing partners to deliver effective and accountable policing
services that can secure the confidence of the whole community,
the APR (p 29) notes that "of the seven key performance indicators
associated with this DSO: one shows strong progress, three show
some progress and the remaining three are in the not yet assessed
category". Can you provide us with a breakdown showing which
indicators show 'strong progress', which show 'some progress'
and which are in the not yet assessed category? On what basis
have you assessed this DSO objective as having "strong progress",
when only two out of the seven indicators appear to be showing
strong progress?
Breakdown of the Key Performance Indicators' for
DSO 4:
- A strategic vision for policing
- some progress.
- Revised policing structures and numbers - no
progress.
- A more representative police force - strong progress.
- Parading/public order strategy implemented -
strong progress.
- Levels of more serious violent crime - no progress.
- A reduction in the impact of organised crime
- not yet assessed.
- Increased public confidence in policing -some
progress.
Guidance for completing the Autumn Performance Report
indicates that where there is 50% or more improvement across the
Key Performance Indicators, the progress should be rated as "strong".
For DSO 4, there has been some progress in four of the seven indicators;
therefore the overall assessment is strong progress.
8. With regard to the indicator within DSO 4 'a
strategic vision for policing', it was agreed that a strategic
vision was not appropriate given the proximity to devolution and
the target was adjusted to set a strategic framework that would
help set the context for developing a long term vision within
the devolved setting by end of December 2008 (p 29). Has the strategic
vision now been set? What will the priority action for the indicator
now entail?
The strategic framework will consist of information,
processes and structures which will enable the preparation of
a strategic vision for policing following devolution. It is not
the NIO's intention to set a strategic vision prior to devolution.
Key elements of the framework include a robust
tripartite relationship between the PSNI, Policing Board and NIO;
the existing strategic priorities for Northern Ireland as set
out in the Policing Plan and the Secretary of State's long term
objectives for policing; analysis of the strategic direction being
taken forward in other jurisdictions; and the principal factors
affecting policing in Northern Ireland in the coming years.
Priority actions for the Department in this
year include the preparation of new Framework Documents for the
PSNI and Policing Board for devolution; a review of key processes
that support the tripartite relationship; and further research
into factors affecting policing in the future.
9. The APR notes that "as at 11 September
2008, Catholic representation within PSNI Regular Officers stood
at 25.04% against a target of 25.5% composition by 31 March 2009"
and that "3194 recruits have been selected for appointment
under the temporary recruitment provisions" (p 30). Does
the 25.04% statistic include the recruits taken under the temporary
recruitment provisions? What do the temporary recruitment provisions
entail?
The 25.04% statistic includes officers appointed
before November 2001 and those appointed since the introduction
of the temporary 50:50 recruitment provisions.
The temporary provisions are:
- Sections 44(5) to (7), 45 and
46 of the Police (Northern Ireland) Act 2000;
- Article 40A of the Race Relations (Northern Ireland)
Order 1997; and
- Article 71A of the Fair Employment and Treatment
(Northern Ireland) Order 1998.
With the exception of section 45 of the 2000 Act,
the temporary provisions give effect to the 50:50 recruitment
arrangements for police trainees and police support staff.
Section 45 provides for the appointment to the PSNI of external
candidates at the ranks of sergeant and above i.e. lateral entry.
Under the 50:50 recruitment arrangements, applicants
who meet the qualifying standard for appointment as police trainees
are placed in a merit pool. The Chief Constable, in accordance
with The Police (Northern Ireland) Act 2000, then appoints an
even number of persons from the pool, one half of whom "
shall be persons who are treated as Roman Catholic; and one half
shall be persons who are not so treated".
The same provisions apply for appointment as police
support staff where there are 6 or more posts of similar nature
and level to be filled at about the same time.
The provisions are temporary in that they will expire
on 28 March 2010, unless renewed by the Secretary of State, either
in their entirety or in part. The 2000 Act does not provide
for the provisions to be amended.
10. For PSA Outcome 1 Indicator 1: 'Increase public
confidence in the criminal justice system' the APR notes that
the baseline could not be formulated because a question on confidence
in the fairness of the criminal justice system was not included
for fieldwork for the second half of the 2007-08 Northern Ireland
Crime Survey. The APR notes that the baseline data will be available
in March 2009. Given that the baseline data will only be available
in March 2009, when will the NIO be in a position to make its
first assessment of the indicator?
The NIO will make its first assessment of PSA Outcome
1 Indicator 1: 'Increase public confidence in the criminal justice
system' in June 2009. It will continue to assess progress on
a quarterly, rolling 12-month basis until June 2011, when the
final out-turns for confidence in the fairness and effectiveness
of the criminal justice system become available.
11. The APR reports that within PSA Outcome 1,
there has been slippage in performance of the indicator "time
taken to trial in Magistrates' Court case" against the previous
financial year. Average days required at first appearance during
Q1 2008-09 was 181 days compared with 174 days during 2007-08
and the milestone set for end 2008-09 of 171 days. What factors
underlie the increase in the time taken to trial in Magistrate
Courts from 174 days during 2007-08 to 181 days in 2008-09? What
is the NIO doing to reduce the time taken?
A key contributor to the time taken to trial has
been the inclusion of additional jurisdictional data, reflecting
the final stage of the roll-out of the Public Prosecution Service
in taking over all police prosecutions. These data included some
historic, longstanding cases which have had a negative impact
on the overall magistrates' courts adult summons cases figures.
While these are more complex cases, as they are disposed of it
is expected that this should positively reflect on performance.
Another significant influence on time taken
in summons-related cases is in relation to a small number of cases
(approximately 20%), where service of summons is unsuccessful
on the first occasion and multiple attempts are required to achieve
service. While there will always be some such cases, an inter-agency
group is addressing a range of summons reform issues aimed at
making processes more effective and at speeding them up. Meanwhile
the piloting of an Early First Hearing Initiative, currently
operating across 25% of the NI court jurisdiction, aims to increase
the use of charge as opposed to summons in appropriate cases.
While these initiatives involve cultural as well as administrative
changes (and some will need legislation), Ministers are actively
involved in the identification and prioritisation of actions and,
with the Criminal Justice Board, in giving robust direction and
support.
12. The APR reports that with PSA Outcome 2, data
for the 5 month period ending 31 August 2008 show that at 701
offences, the level of serious violence recorded by the police
is 12% higher than during the same period in the 2007-08 baseline
year (626) (p 44). The increase relates mainly to wounding offences.
What are the reasons underlying the increase? What is the NIO
doing to help the police combat this increase?
Reasons underlying the increase
The volume of woundings is increasing, but the profile
of the crimes remains the same. The Police are seeking to identify
the reasons underlying the increase. Despite detailed analysis,
statisticians are unable to pinpoint any particular factor to
explain the rising trend. The increase is spread evenly across
Northern Ireland and the proportion of domestic violence, alcohol
related and knife related woundings remains constant, with a general
increase across the board. Statisticians remain certain that
there has been no change to the way in which serious violent crime
is recorded in Northern Ireland.
What is the NIO doing to help police combat this
increase?
The PSNI believe that alcohol continues to be a significant
factor behind a large proportion of these crimes and a significant
proportion of incidents may be categorised as domestic violence.
The PSNI is already linked closely into the work underway to
tackle these issues by Government departments, industry groups
and community organisations. The lead on alcohol policy and domestic
violence policy is with the DHSSPS in Northern Ireland.
The NIO liaise with DHSSPS, the Policing Board and
PSNI at a policy level. Work is ongoing to ensure that the existing
strategies to tackle alcohol-related crime and domestic violence
are pulling in the same direction.
13. This second indicator in PSA Outcome 2 "level
of harm caused by crime" appears quite complex (p 45). First
it has been divided into five priority areas and then some priority
areas have been further divided into two parts. A lot of the priority
areas appear to be not yet assessed. Has the NIO given any consideration
to simplifying this indicator?
The key performance indicator is multi-layered to
reflect the difficulties associated with measuring harm caused
by Organised Crime. Priority areas 1 and 2 provide a focus in
terms of developing a baseline, methodology and target for harm
reduction. The supporting text outlines how we propose to
take this work forward. However, in view of the complexities,
both in terms of defining and measuring harm caused, it has
proved difficult both in NI and GB to develop meaningful
indicators. Work in this area is ongoing and consideration
will be given to simplifying this indicator.
Turning to Priority area 3, a Northern Ireland Assets
Recovery Action Plan for 2008/10 (see attached link) was published in
July 2008.
http://www.octf.gov.uk/index.cfm/section/publications/page/publicationList/viewArchives/true/month/Jul/year/2008
The outcome in terms of the recovery of assets (Priority
area 4) will be published in the Organised Crime Task Force Annual
Report in June 2009.
14. The APR reports that consideration is currently
been given to the suitability of the indicator "levels of
police engagement with people in local communities" (p 50).
What reservations does the NIO have about this indicator? On what
basis will it make the decision as to whether or not to include
it?
It is not that reservations existed about the suitability
of this indicator per se but rather following guidance from Treasury
that, where possible, NIO should mirror Home Office targets.
Time was taken to consider if questions (a) and (b) below should
both be included as a measurement tool and, if so, whether we
should report on our target using two separate figures or a composite
figure.
How much would you agree or disagree that the police
and other agencies, including district councils:
(a) seek people's views about the anti-social
behaviour and crime issues that matter in this area?
(b) are dealing with the anti-social behaviour
and crime issues that matter in this area?
The Home Office have recently decided that question
(b) should be the single top-down target for the police in England
and Wales.
The NIO felt that to mirror the Home Office directly
and only use question (b) as a measurement tool would prevent
the full picture of engagement in Northern Ireland from being
captured. As a result of historical issues in Northern Ireland,
community engagement in relation to policing issues has always
been a priority and received a lot of attention from Government
and statutory agencies. In particular, we have a formal engagement
mechanism in place i.e. District Policing Partnerships (DPPs)
which have the potential to deliver significant public engagement
with policing.
In November 2008 we obtained Ministerial approval
to use both questions to measure the level of police engagement
with local people and to report against the PSA using a composite
figure. In addition to measuring engagement, by including question
(b) as part of our measurement tool it will be possible to compare
results in Northern Ireland with those for England and Wales.
2004 Spending Review
15. For target 3, part 2 "reducing the rate
of reconviction", the 2008 Departmental Report noted that
"for the 2004 offender cohort there was a 15.3% reduction
in the reconviction rate against the predicted level". The
2008 APR notes that for 2005 offender cohort there was only a
6.8% reduction in the reconviction rate against the predicted
level (p 18). The NIO has still exceeded its target. Why is the
gap between the reconviction rate and the predicted rate much
larger for the 2004 cohort than for the 2005 cohort? Does this
signify an increase in the reconviction rate from 2004 to 2005?
The reconviction target does not track all offenders
in 2004, but instead looks at a cohort made up of offenders who
commenced a community disposal or were discharged from prison.
Predicted reconviction rates are an estimate of the percentage
of the cohort who are likely to re-offend and be convicted within
a two year period, having controlled for changes in offender characteristics.
Actual reconviction rates are the percentage of offenders who
are subsequently convicted in court, for any offence, within two
years of their baseline in 2004. Statistical modelling of
the criminological characteristics of offenders contained in the
2004 cohort predicted a reconviction rate of 45.4%. The
actual reconviction rate at the end of the two year follow-up
period was 38.5%. This represents a reduction in reconviction
of 15.3% compared with the predicted rate.
The corresponding figures for the 2005 cohort were
a predicted reconviction rate of 45.9% and an actual reconviction
rate of 42.8%, representing a reduction in reconviction of 6.8%
compared with the predicted rate.
In both years the target of 5% has been surpassed.
The actual reconviction rates can not be compared
between years due to the varying criminological characteristics
of each year's cohort of offenders
20 April 2009
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