Regenerating the English Coalfields - Public Accounts Committee Contents


Examination of Witnesses (Question Numbers 20-39)

MR PETER HOUSDEN, SIR BOB KERSLAKE, MR RICHARD MCCARTHY AND PROFESSOR STEVE FOTHERGILL

11 JANUARY 2010

  Q20  Mr Mitchell: That needed to be done, did it?

  Mr Housden: There was a legal requirement to do it, but actually, the communities themselves were not wanting to have unsightly, dangerous, unusable land, in huge areas. I mean, the acreage of pit sites typically—

  Q21  Mr Mitchell: I can understand that, it is an eyesore, but on the other hand, there is a kind of romantic attachment to it, and it is more important to get viable vibrant companies there than to have beautiful landscaping.

  Mr Housden: Bob Kerslake might want to talk about this, but one of the things that English Partnerships and the Homes and Communities Agency have done through the life of the programme is to look at the totality of that land and say where and what types of land could most readily be converted for industrial use, and bring jobs into the coalfield.

  Sir Bob Kerslake: Yes, just to add a few points on that, firstly, it is right to say there were legal requirements on the UK Government for remediation. Secondly, you cannot create the platform for employment or housing unless you have remediated the land, and something like 1 million square metres of employment space has been established by the programme to date, something like 2,600 houses are complete. You could not have achieved that unless you have done the remediation, the two things have to sit hand in hand.

  Q22  Mr Mitchell: How much of it has been taken up in fact by employment?

  Sir Bob Kerslake: Substantial amounts of it have been taken up, as the NAO Report says, but not all of it yet. It is always the case that the take-up—full outputs will take longer than the timescale for the physical remediation.

  Q23  Mr Mitchell: Having done it up, you will then sell it on.

  Sir Bob Kerslake: Absolutely, if you look at the case of Glasshoughton, in fact, as one of the positive examples of a site that is both completed, generated employment activity, and in fact a net receipt has come back as a result of the selling on of land.

  Q24  Mr Mitchell: The number of jobs created, and the claim in paragraph 4.6 that 75% of them "would not have happened without the initiatives", I mean, that looks very tentative. The estimate is based, it says, on benchmarks, and does not draw on a representative survey of businesses and households to identify whether jobs are taken by people outside the target areas, and it emerges further on that 43% of the jobs created are taken by people from outside. These are very back of the envelope calculations, are they not?

  Mr Housden: The figure we recognise, I think, is 38%. I think one of the things that is important to recognise here, and the Report pays testament to this, is the depths and the longevity of the deprivation in many of these areas is such that you have a shortage of skills particularly, a lot of people with poor health, so the available pool of labour at the time when these programmes were running at their strongest will have been smaller than it should have been. If you are looking particularly for additional skills, those may well come from people outside the area. So personally, I was not surprised by that balance, and 62% within the coalfield area seems to me to be a credible number. It is not an exact science, doing all of this, but we have had a range of evaluations in addition to the current NAO one: an organisation called SQW did an independent evaluation for us, the Audit Commission did one in 2008. So we feel we have a reasonable factual basis, Mr Mitchell, for those estimates.

  Q25  Mr Mitchell: I accept what you are telling me about the deprivation, broken down people, in a sense, broken by mining, but on the other hand, it was also an industry which had skills, and a lot of very tough and adaptable workers, and a lot of those would have gone, if they had any sense, and got jobs outside, in Sheffield or Rotherham or wherever. Do you have any calculations about that?

  Mr Fothergill: I think it is important to put these coalfield initiatives into context. They are only part of the overall jigsaw of what has been going on. There has been a lot of other regeneration activity, led by other parts of central government—

  Q26  Mr Mitchell: But not co-ordinated.

  Mr Fothergill: —or European funding or local authorities. We do have a handle on overall what is happening, and I think it squares the circle and fits in with the 150,000 figure that was mentioned by the Minister, because actually if you look at the growth overall of jobs held by men in the coalfields, the numbers are towards the 150,000 mark higher now than—well, those are the extra jobs that have been created in the coalfields, compensating for the loss of around about 200,000 jobs in the coal industry. Some of that has been to do with the general growth in the national economy, but some of it is undoubtedly the result of the very specific initiatives which have gone ahead in the former mining areas.

  Q27  Mr Mitchell: When you say created in the coalfields, you do not know how many have actually gone to work outside the coalfield.

  Mr Fothergill: There has been a flow in both directions. Rather like Peter Housden, I think the 62% of jobs going to residents within the coalfields seems a very reasonable figure, because there are two-way commuting flows. The days have gone when the labour market operated on a highly localised basis, when there was a place of work and everybody who worked there lived a couple of hundred yards down the road, and walked to work. These days, labour markets operate over wide geographical scales, so if you are creating jobs in the coalfields, you would expect some of those jobs to go to non-coalfield residents; but equally, if you were creating jobs in adjacent areas to the coalfields, in the likes of Sheffield and Leeds, for example, you would expect some of those new jobs in the cities to be filled by commuters from the coalfields, and that is exactly what has been happening.

  Q28  Mr Mitchell: But we do not know numerically which pays, the regeneration of Sheffield, which was going on apace, or the regeneration of the coalfields. Which gives a better return?

  Mr Fothergill: We do know the balance of the overall numbers, we do know that numerically, there has only been a really quite modest net increase in out-commuting from the coalfields, so mostly, the balance in the labour market has not actually been restored by, on balance, more people having to travel to work elsewhere. A great deal of the balance has been restored by new job creation within the coalfields themselves.

  Q29  Mr Mitchell: Well, the point about the Report is that these initiatives were badly co-ordinated. A suggestion which came from the Select Committee I think two years ago, that some of the initiatives should be better co-ordinated, led to a co-ordination committee which has not done very much; is that correct?

  Sir Bob Kerslake: I think there are two points I would make about that. One is to say to make an impact in terms of co-ordination, it is not just about the coalfields funds. Steve has said actually, when you go to a place like Sheffield, South Yorkshire, there is a whole range of funds going on, European, other government funds, and the key challenge—

  Q30  Mr Mitchell: You are very lucky compared to Humberside.

  Sir Bob Kerslake: We did reasonably well, let us put it that way, but I think the key point I would make is that it is the local co-ordination that tells you whether you have got the impact right, and there is plenty of evidence, I think, in South Yorkshire, for example, of all the different funding schemes being co-ordinated, both within the coalfield areas and indeed beyond. So actually I think there is an issue about national co-ordination, but I think at local level there is a very strong story to tell.

  Q31  Mr Mitchell: From the map at figure 2 on page 12, why do some coalfields benefit from one initiative, some from another, and not many from all of them? How is that decided? What does that mean?

  Mr Fothergill: Can I take that one, because I think in many respects, I have probably been responsible for drawing the original coalfield map that everybody uses. Firstly, you have to remember here that not all of the former pit sites went into what is now the Homes and Communities Agency sites programme, so there were obviously going to be some mining communities that were not covered by action by HCA or EP previously. Also, there were a small number of sites brought into the programme that had been lying derelict for so long, and I am talking here—

  Q32  Mr Mitchell: In other words, before the closures of—

  Mr Fothergill: —right back to the 1960s, that I think it was argued for example by the Coalfields Regeneration Trust that the communities that were around those sites were no longer coalfield communities, so there was in some instances going to be a disjuncture between on the one hand a sites programme, which was dealing with the physical dereliction, and community programmes, which perhaps were more attuned to where mining communities were still very much alive and kicking.

  Q33  Mr Mitchell: Does it not create a patchwork quilt? Why not put them all in one lump, with one regeneration sum programme?

  Mr Fothergill: It is very attractive, but on the ground, I think it would be a great injustice to some of the former mining communities to exclude them from some parts of the initiative, because they did not have a site that was included in the English Partnerships/HCA programme. There is obviously in some instances going to be disjuncture. Ashington is a good example; in the former pit sites in Ashington in Northumberland, the dereliction was addressed early by the County Council in particular. As a consequence, Ashington, which claims to be the biggest pit village in the world, does not have a site within the HCA/EP programme. You would not wish to exclude Ashington from the activities of the Regeneration Trust, just because of that historical process, and just because they were so keen to tackle their problems before central government.

  Mr Mitchell: I would just rather more was done for South Yorkshire but Northumberland, but never mind, that is a partisan point.

  Q34  Mr Bacon: Mr Housden, you said, in talking about why there was not as much co-ordination as there should have been, that there was not a reliable means to bring the different departments to the table. Why not?

  Mr Housden: Well, it is a good question. I think the circumstances before 2008 were really when Communities and Local Government wanted to draw the attention of other departments to the needs of particular communities, it was an uphill struggle. I do not think there was a culture that was interested in bending national programmes to particular circumstances, so it was all ad hoc, let us have a meeting to do this, or the other. Our own Select Committee, for example, talked to us with justification about coastal communities in the past. What happened in the 2006 White Paper, and live from 2008, was there was a common cross-government mechanism endorsed by the Treasury to create in each of 150 principal local authorities, sorry about the jargon, a local area agreement, where national and local priorities were brought together. This enabled those authorities serving coalfield communities to really prioritise those with government. Then underneath that, as Bob and Steve have said, the real meat of the co-ordination is at local level, where you get the agencies pooling their programmes. I am not trying to wriggle out of the point here, I think we should have done better in terms of—

  Q35  Mr Bacon: Being a central department, why did not the Cabinet Office process, through a Cabinet committee, identify earlier that there were a lot of different departments here who were interested, or who ought to be interested, and drive co-ordination?

  Mr Housden: Well, again, I think that is a good question. What you did have at the beginning of this, you will recall, was a very strong political impetus, the original report was signed by four Secretaries of State, but to my knowledge, there was not a Cabinet Committee established to drive progress, perhaps that would have been a good thing—

  Q36  Mr Bacon: You think that should have happened?

  Mr Housden: I think that would have been a good thing.

  Q37  Mr Bacon: Did anyone suggest it? If you have four Secretaries of State signing off on something, presumably they all have their own civil servants, who have all advised them, "Minister, sign here". Does no one in the civil service say, "Hello, would it not be a good idea to have a Cabinet Committee on this?"

  Mr Housden: John Prescott is sort of a one-man Cabinet Committee, I am sure he led this with huge drive and e«lan. I do not know the answer to your question, whether that was suggested or not, I think it would have been a good thing, but I am not trying to wriggle out of saying that notwithstanding what ministers might have done, I think my department could have been more skilful and more persistent in bringing departments to the table on this thing. I think where we have got to now though, Mr Bacon, is a better place, because we are not about a series of ad hoc requests, would it not be a good thing to think about X or Y—

  Q38  Mr Bacon: Can you just remind us of the departments: Children, Schools and Families, DTI or BIS; who else apart from you?

  Mr Housden: The Department for Transport have made important contributions, and the Department for Work and Pensions similarly, who do employment and benefits and so forth.

  Q39  Mr Bacon: There has been some talk about interdepartmental budgets held interdepartmentally, it is an interesting concept, but it has as many possible risks as advantages, namely that nobody is accountable, but it also would focus minds if the money is being spent in an interdepartmental way. Do you think that would have helped, or would it have not made a difference, or would it have made things worse?

  Mr Housden: I think you could solve the question of accountability, but I am not sure it would help. The problem always with ringfenced budgets is it creates incentives for people to only put that amount of money on the table, so if you pooled a budget from four departments and called it coalfields, that means everything else would just shrink away from it. I think Mr Mitchell's questions are brought out quite clearly, what you have got is quite a complicated picture where in the north-west, for example, there was quite strong eligibility for European and other types of programme, so if you were dealing with the coalfield, there were all sorts of other things you could mix and match. Other areas are less eligible and therefore had a different sort of service. So to be clear, I doubt whether in this circumstance a pooled budget would have made a huge difference.



 
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