Train to Gain: Developing the skills of the workforce - Public Accounts Committee Contents


Memorandum from the Association of Learning Providers

  Following are examples of the problems that providers are currently encountering with regard to the funding of the Government's Train to Gain skills programme. Many of these can be traced back to the non-resolution of issues surrounding the overspend on last year's adult skills budgets, whilst others are merely indicative of the current and ongoing state of LSC financial management.

All the examples given have been anonymised but the details quoted are correct:

PROVIDER A

  Due to last year's overspend on Train to Gain, the LSC this year have ringfenced two tranches of contract values within the current 2009-10 contracts—one amount which cannot be exceeded within Periods 1-8 (August 2009 to March 2010) and the balance for Periods 9-12 (April to July 2010). Taken together, they represent the full contract value for the 2009-10 contract year.

Provider A has supplied us with copies of their profiles for Train to Gain starts for this year and last year, as follows:


Period
Actual Starts 2008-09Profile 2009-10 Variance from 2008-09
197 -2
2587 -51
3537 -46
4247 -17
517 6
6677 -60
7277 -20
8837 -76
Sub Total Periods 1-8322 56-266
978266 188
1033266 233
1138266 228
1262266 204
Sub Total Periods 9-12211 1,064853
Total5331,120 587



  The result is that due to the ringfencing of contract values within Periods 1-8 and 9-12, the provider is being expected to increase their start rate between March and April 2010 from seven individuals to 266, a rise of 3,800% in one month.

  In order to make this happen, the provider will have to resource their sales force at least two to three months in advance. However, because starts have dropped from 62 per month at the end of the previous contract year to seven per month at the beginning of this contract year, their sales force has been depleted due to an inability to maintain a cost for which no income was being generated. Operationally, this profile is therefore almost undeliverable. However, as it is sadly very typical of almost all contracts for Train to Gain (and indeed other strands of adult skills funding) being issued by the LSC this year, it goes a long way to illustrate why ALP believes that the Train to Gain will in all likelihood be underspent this year despite having nominally gone up from last year when it was overspent. The way that contract values have been allocated against profiles is simply unsustainable and makes no operational sense.

PROVIDER B

  Provider B has been a highly successful deliverer of training to a specialised industry, operating Train to Gain with a success rate of over 95% under sub-contract through several Colleges of Further Education. However due to the imbalanced ringfencing of contract values between periods 1-8 and 9-12 imposed by the LSC, most of these Colleges have now decided to completely cut any funding to their subcontracted provision in order to protect their own direct delivery. Provider B has applied to become a direct deliverer of Train to Gain in its own right but was unsuccessful in winning contracts despite its high success rates. Despite having companies with learners ready to start, the funding is therefore not being made available and they are beginning proceedings to wind the company up.

PROVIDER C

  Provider C, in common with all other Train to Gain providers, has been given a contract with a maximum contract value for Periods 1-8 and another for Periods 9-12. However, their starts profile shows no payments being made beyond March (Period 8), which effectively means that they have been given a contract which only guarantees them about half of the contract value for two-thirds of the calendar year. Furthermore, of the allocation that is guaranteed, only 18% of it is profiled to cover Periods 1-7 with no less than 82% being profiled for delivery in Period 8. This is clearly operationally undeliverable, particularly in view of the fact that start profiles for the following Periods have not been confirmed, making it almost impossible to judge whether increasing the sales resource to meet the high Period 8 starts target is in any way a sustainable proposition.

PROVIDER D

  Provider D was offered a contract worth £318k at the beginning of the 2008-09 contract year. Due to excellent performance this was during the course of the year extended to a total value of £527k.

At the end of 2008-09, the total contract value delivered was £522k, less than 1% below the contracted value for the year, and well within the 3% annual tolerance allowable. The difficulty involved in steering contract delivery in at the end of the year so close to an (extended) contract value should not be underestimated. The provider was therefore rightly pleased with performance that had not only come in on target and budget, but had maintained excellent quality standards throughout.

  The provider has now been told that £8.2k of this money is to be clawed back by the LSC, on the basis that in the last quarter only of the contract year they delivered 94% of profile, ie outside of the 97% tolerance.

  In Quarter 3 they had however delivered over 98% of their profile, within the 97% tolerance. Had they withheld the "extra" 1% and instead claimed it in Quarter 4, the LSC would not now be clawing any money back at all.

  Therefore, despite delivering 99.02% of their entire contract value, the provider is now being punished for providing accurate and timely data in the period in which it was delivered, instead of artificially manipulating claims to meet profiles—something the LSC has only recently written to all providers about to discourage. Furthermore, the provider is now in the situation whereby it is to have money taken back from them, for work it has already satisfactorily delivered in excess of all required quality standards and in a timely fashion.

PROVIDER E

  This London provider has been told that their contract at Period 3 is being re-adjusted as they have underperformed by £50k, and this amount will be taken out of their permitted maximum contract value for the year. The provider's LSC Contract Manager has told them that this is because 16-18 Apprenticeships have overperformed in London, and contract monies therefore need to be reallocated to overperforming providers who require funding.

The National Apprenticeship Service however is telling them that there is "a significant amount" of underperformance on 16-18 apprenticeships across London, so the provider is now very unclear as to what the actual state of performance is in London, and whether or not it is appropriate for them to be having their maximum contract value reduced.

  Furthermore, it has emerged that the profile the provider has been working to is not the one the LSC are using. It is believed that in part this has arisen as the provider was required to submit so many reprofiles before any agreement was reached that the LSC has lost track of which one was the "right" one. In the meantime the provider nevertheless stands to have £50k of contract value withdrawn.





 
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