MEMORANDUM
FROM WILL
COOPER
In response to Tony Wright's request in today's
Guardian for examples of "bad language" from the public
sector, I'd like to nominate the entire lexicon surrounding the
Private Finance Initiative (which in itself would be better described
as part-privatisation).
I understand that the subject is a complex one
that requires its own internal lingo, but I feel strongly that
the public simply don't know what it is, let alone understand
the political principles underlying it, largely because the language
used to describe its workings is so eye-wateringly arcane. I would
even venture to suggest that this may be one of the prime objectives
of PFI; some of the terminology is purposefully euphemistic, the
upshot being that the public have neither the confidence nor the
understanding to question its mechanics or its prevalence. The
result is that, just as the financial figures for PFI are off
the balance-sheet, so are the principles behind it, masked by
endless layers of meaningless verbiage.
Any documents to which the public have access
on this subject should, in my opinion, be vastly simplified. This
includes documents available to, but not targeted specifically
at, the public, since often viewing these is the only way one
can glean detailed information about what is going on with PFI.
A few examples:
"public-private partnerships"—implies,
I think, that the public sector has a far more central role in
running PFI projects than it actually does;
"the Third Way"—ambiguous, hazy
and (I suspect) designed to stifle further conversation since
it presumes everyone knows what it's supposed to represent;
"identify additional capital resources"—spend
more taxpayers' money;
"significant capital expenditure"—a
lot of taxpayers' money;
"independent sector involvement in the provision
of public services"—private companies will run our
hospitals and schools;
"modernisation programme"—back-door
privatisation;
"increased PFI deal flow"—more
privatisation, and faster;
"PFI credits"—money from central
government to allow them to purchase services from the private
sector that they wouldn't get otherwise;
"lower revenue expenditure"; "increased
efficiency"—cost-cutting;
"conventional procurement"—ie
non-privatised public-sector projects;
"risk transfer strategy"—measures
to ensure that the public won't lose out should the project collapse;
"infrastructure support solutions";
"facilities management services"—pay us to run
your council/school/hospital for you;
"SPV (Special Purpose Vehicle)"—a
company created solely to allow a PFI project to go ahead;
"DBFO (Design, Build, Finance, Operate)
schemes"—in which complete control of every aspect
of a (supposedly) public building is given to a private contractor;
and
"optimism bias"—unblinkingly
accepting the notion that the lowest cost outcome is inherently
the most desirable;
One sample from the Treasury's news pages (the
first paragraph is nigh indecipherable to the average member of
the public) is appended to this memorandum.
The language surrounding the move to PFI has
inevitably contributed to the fact that those of us who use public
services (ie all of us) are being "rebranded" from citizens
or residents to "customers". This implies some kind
of cosy business arrangement between us and our public bodies,
when actually the emphasis should be on statutory duty. Rather
than building schools, hospitals and leisure centres we now "procure
projects" in a way that emphasises a business venture
aimed at profit, rather than the state's responsibility for public
welfare. It has also resulted in a complete lack of transparency—to
get to the bottom of what PFI is and means requires a lot of painstaking
research, when the facts should be there in plain English so we
can decide whether or not we agree with them. I am sure you have
detected a general political bias against PFI in my argument here,
which I freely declare; but I hope you will also recognise that
the sort of language used on this subject prohibits the public
from forming any opinion on the scheme, one way or the other.
April 2009
APPENDIX
HM TREASURY PRESS RELEASE—14 JULY 1999
TREASURY TASKFORCE
PFI STANDARD CONTRACT
GUIDANCE LAUNCHED
A platform for generating increased Private
Finance Initiative (PFI) deal flow and reducing the costs of tendering
will be the outcome of new contract guidelines published by the
Treasury Taskforce, Chief Secretary to the Treasury Alan Milburn
said today.
The new contract guidelines will act as a blueprint
for the future development of PFI and ensure that future PFI contracts
across different public services will be able to follow a consistent
approach by incorporating standard conditions into the contracts.
Mr Milburn said:
"Consultation with hundreds of interested
parties has produced guidance which provides the public sector
with a practical toolkit for delivering the very best value to
the taxpayer. The guidance will avoid the pitfalls of the past—where
the public sector, let alone those in the private sector, have
had to re-invent the wheel at considerable expense every time
a hospital or a college entered into a PFI arrangement.
"The challenge for both the public and the
private sectors—now that the road is clear—is to expand
the PFI. We want to see more deals done. We want to see PFI working
in sectors like further education where it has not worked before.
And we want to see it making an even greater contribution to producing
modern public services that are shaped around the needs of the
public.
"We must now use the PFI to drive forward
the Government's modernisation programme for our public services.
We do not want to see business as usual in our public services.
We want to see change for the better. The PFI is part and parcel
of that change process."
The Treasury Taskforce contract standardisation
guidance marks the end of two years work involving consultation
with literally hundreds of stakeholders. The contract standardisation
guidance has already commanded a great deal of positive comment
in the market.
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