- Public Administration Committee Contents




MEMORANDUM FROM THE SENIOR SALARIES REVIEW BOARD (SSRB)

INTRODUCTION

  1.  The Review Body on Senior Salaries (SSRB) is an independent body established in 1971 (as the Top Salaries Review Body) to advise the Government on the pay of various groups ("remit groups") of senior public sector workers. Currently the SSRB reports annually to the Prime Minister and the relevant Secretaries of State on the pay of:

    — salaried holders of judicial office throughout the United Kingdom; — senior military officers[22] throughout the United Kingdom;

    — senior civil servants in England, Scotland and Wales; and

    — senior managers (other than those on medical contracts) in English Primary Care Trusts, Ambulance Trusts, Strategic Health Authorities and Special Health Authorities.

  In addition the SSRB reports when requested on the pay, pensions and allowances of Members of both Houses of Parliament, Members of the Devolved Parliament and Assemblies and of the Mayor of London and Members of the London Assembly. The SSRB has also carried out ad hoc reviews, for example of the remuneration of tribunals' judiciary and senior NHS managers in Northern Ireland. The SSRB's full terms of reference are at Appendix A.

 

  2.  The SSRB's reports are normally published as command documents and since 2001 have been made available on the website of the Office of Manpower Economics (OME), together with reports of research commissioned by the SSRB.

  3.  The SSRB has 10 members, appointed following advertisement and a selection procedure supervised by the Office of the Commissioner for Public Appointments. The current membership is listed at Appendix B. Members have a wide range of skills and backgrounds, including business and HR, and two are specialist labour market economists. The secretariat is provided by the Office of Manpower Economics which is staffed by civil servants.

RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS POSED BY THE PASC

1.   Are the right arrangements in place for setting and monitoring pay and other benefits for top posts in the public sector?

 (a)   Are they fair?

 (b)   Are they transparent?

 (c)   Do they produce the right results?

 (d)   Do they provide value for money?

 (e)   Do they inspire public and political confidence?

  4.  Pay review bodies exist to provide independent advice on the pay of groups of public sector workers for whom the state is the sole or major employer (eg the armed forces, judiciary, school teachers, doctors and dentists, prison officers) and especially for those such as the armed forces who are prohibited from joining trade unions and taking industrial action.

5.  The SSRB can comment only on the pay arrangements for its own remit groups. Broadly the SSRB is satisfied that it is able to obtain sufficient evidence from the Government and other parties, including members of the remit groups themselves, to make well-founded, balanced recommendations on the pay of those groups, taking account of the matters set out in our terms of reference. In most years the Government accepts and implements those recommendations although this year it reduced the SSRB's proposed pay awards for the judiciary, senior civil service and senior NHS managers to below the levels the Government had proposed in its own evidence to the SSRB.

6.  However, there is a particular problem with the pay for political posts where successive governments have declined to follow the SSRB's recommendations on many occasions. The result has been that pay of Ministers and Members of Parliament is now lower than is justified, in the SSRB's view, by the responsibilities of those posts. Thus the Prime Minister is currently paid £194,250,[23] Cabinet Ministers in the Commons receive £141,866 while Members of Parliament are now paid £64,766. These rates, especially for the Prime Minister and Ministers, are not commensurate with their levels of responsibility. This has led to a number of public sector workers being paid more than the politicians whom they serve. This might indicate that the intangible benefits of political office are significant and higher than elsewhere in the public sector. Moreover, pay for political posts in the UK is not out of line with that in most other European countries. In our report of our Review of parliamentary pay, pensions and allowances[24] we provided comparisons of the pay of Members of Parliament and Prime Ministers in selected countries, using Purchasing Power Parities to convert currencies. At that time British MPs were paid more than most of the other countries we looked at, with the exception of Canada, Italy, the Netherlands and the USA. Looking at Heads of Government using the same methodology, only the US President (who is also Head of State) was paid more than the British Prime Minister. It appears, therefore, that a substantial "political discount" operates in most countries.

  7.  At higher responsibility levels, public sector pay in the UK is significantly lower than that in the private sector, as is shown by the following chart.

Source: Office for National Statistics (Annual Survey of Hours and Earnings)

Note: Basic pay for all public and private sector employees at April 2008.

  We believe that pay levels for our remit groups, other than MPs and Ministers, are set broadly at the minimum necessary to recruit, retain and motivate suitable people.

  8.  Our arrangements are transparent. We are recruited by open competition. We consider evidence from all the parties and indeed from anyone who wishes to submit evidence to us. That evidence is normally published by the parties and we publish on the OME website any research we commission to assist us in making recommendations. We submit our reports to Government and they are normally published as command papers.

  9.  It is not for SSRB to judge whether its efforts produce the right results. For the most part the Government accepts our recommendations but occasionally it stages them (as in 2007) or abates them (as this year), at least in part. In the introduction to our Thirtieth Report[25] we argued against treating this small group of leaders and senior managers (our main remit groups total fewer than 8,000 people) in the same way, for pay purposes, as all other public sector workers. We suggested that the Government did so out of "fear that higher awards for our remit groups will lead to irresistible pressure from other, larger groups of public sector workers. In this view of the world `signalling' becomes the dominant consideration."

  10.  As to whether the SSRB represents value for money, again that is not for us to judge. Currently the Chairman of the SSRB is paid £350 per day or part of a day when on SSRB business, plus travel expenses. Other members are paid £300 a day plus travel expenses. Our secretariat currently comprises some four full-time equivalent civil servants (including one person working exclusively on the review of MPs' pensions). The approximate total cost of operating the SSRB for the last financial year was £440,000. We cannot say whether our work inspires public confidence—it is doubtful whether much of the public is aware of what we do—but the arrangements have now been in place for nearly 40 years. The SSRB continues to attract high quality members and new groups have been added to our remit: most recently the senior NHS managers. We try to meet as many members of our remit groups as possible through annual visit programmes during which we both listen to the views and concerns of members of our remit groups and explain to them how we work. We believe the arrangements of which we are a part have served the country well, helping to avoid disputes and to balance the interests of our remit groups and taxpayers.

2.   Does there need to be consistency regarding these arrangements between different parts of the public sector?

  11.  Pay varies across the public sector in part because of specific conditions or circumstances. The public sector is not a single market. Different public sector workers have different earnings potential. The demand for their skills and knowledge varies. For example, it is clear that most senior barristers or solicitors who might become High Court judges are able to earn much more in the private sector than on the bench. On balance we believe it is better to allow flexibility across the public sector to respond to differing labour market needs. Moreover, it may be necessary on occasions to recruit individuals with specialist skills, sometimes for a fixed term, for example to manage large construction contracts in connection with the 2012 Olympics, and to pay significantly above the normal rates for such posts in order to secure the services of people with skills and experience not otherwise available in the public sector. Too rigid a pay system could make it impossible to recruit specialists of the necessary calibre and would run counter to the policies of successive recent governments to encourage recruitment from the private sector into the public sector at senior levels. The current broad pay band system for the Senior Civil Service provides the necessary flexibility to fill exceptional posts.

12.  On the other hand, there are undoubtedly tensions caused by the fact that pay levels differ between different parts of the public sector and we have, for example, heard complaints from senior civil servants who tell us that they deal with and do much the same work as people in other public sector bodies, eg regulatory bodies, local authorities, while being paid appreciably less than those people.

3.   Does there need to be comparability of pay between top posts in the public sector and equivalent posts in the private sector?

 (a)   If so, how should equivalent posts in the private sector be identified?

  13.  In SSRB's view it is neither necessary nor justified as a general principle for the public sector to seek to match the pay of top posts in the private sector. Experience suggests that there is no difficulty in obtaining high quality people to work in the public sector. It seems clear that there are many factors which together can compensate for lower pay in the public sector: job interest, job security, pension, less competitive pressure, better work/life balance etc.

4.   Is there evidence of executive wage inflation caused by public sector organisations competing with one another for candidates?

14.  SSRB has heard anecdotal evidence that this may be the case, for example where poorly performing local authorities, schools or NHS Trusts compete to recruit chief executives, heads or other senior managers with successful records of improving organisational performance. However, we are not aware that this is a problem with the SSRB's own remit groups which have clearly defined pay systems. Nevertheless, as noted in paragraph 12, members of our remit groups increasingly point to other parts of the public sector where pay appears to be higher for no obvious reason.

5.   What role should consultancies play in the determination of pay for top public sector posts?

15.  It is normal for government departments seeking to fill specific senior posts to use recruitment consultants who will advise, among other things, on the appropriate salaries for posts. There is a danger that it is in the consultants' interest to set such salaries higher than strictly necessary in order to make posts easier to fill, and even because in some cases the consultants' remuneration may be linked to the salary on appointment. The SSRB has expressed concerns in the past, as have the Civil Service Commissioners, about departments' practices when recruiting externally. For example, in our Thirtieth Report we recommended that the Government urgently review the practices of allowing successful external candidates in recruitment competitions to negotiate salaries substantially above those advertised and of forcing existing civil servants successful in open competitions to accept salaries substantially below those available to similarly qualified external candidates. We are pleased to note that our concerns were echoed in the Normington report on Senior Civil Service Workforce and Reward Strategy, and that the Government appears to be acting on them, for example by providing better guidance to departments on recruitment practice.

16.  The SSRB uses consultants to carry out job evaluation of posts from time to time to ensure that pay levels are broadly correct within organisations (internal relativity) and to check levels against the wider market. However, in SSRB's view job evaluation is not a precise science and should not be the only tool used to set pay levels. As noted in paragraph 13 above, there are often benefits other than pay from working in the public sector.

6.   Is the balance right between executive pay and other benefits, eg bonus, pension?

  17.  The SSRB believes that a significant element of pay should be performance-related. Those who perform better should be paid more. We have therefore encouraged and supported the introduction and development of performance-related pay for the SCS and senior military. The judiciary argue strongly that performance-related pay is not appropriate for them. We recognise that there are some difficulties in designing and applying performance pay systems in parts of the public sector, notably for policy work, where outputs are difficult to measure. We believe there is scope to improve and extend the existing performance management and pay systems for our remit groups but we remain attached to the principle.

18.  We are fully aware of the value of public sector pensions. We have commissioned work by specialist consultants to quantify the benefit of our remit groups' pensions and we take full account of total reward when making our pay recommendations.

7.   Do the pay levels for top posts in the public sector have a direct impact on the performance or qualities of the people filling those posts?

 (a)   What impact do the performance or qualities of the people filling top posts in the public sector have on the performance of the organisations for which they work?

  19.  In our Thirtieth Report on Senior Salaries (2008) we wrote:

    "The groups of people whose remuneration is our concern are the leaders of several pillars on which British society is built: the law; the armed forces; the Civil Service, and (now added) the NHS. They command billions of pounds of national resource (of which their own pay is a tiny fraction) and the work of millions of people. Their quality, efficiency and motivation can improve our public services and save the taxpayer millions of pounds. The nation rightly expects these people to perform at the very highest level of their capability and that incompetent performance should not be tolerated or rewarded. These hugely dedicated people do not expect to receive the financial rewards of comparable leaders and senior managers in the private sector in return for this vital work, but they do expect recognition of the value of what they do, respect for their commitment to public service and fair pay."

    8.   Is there an appropriate benchmark or ceiling for top public sector salaries—eg the salary of the Prime Minister, or a factor of average pay?

      20.  We do not think there is an appropriate benchmark or ceiling because the public sector is not a single labour market. It needs to recruit and retain people with many different skills and abilities. There are different markets for eg finance directors, IT managers and HR specialists. Moreover, those markets can change over time. There are also sectoral variations, as noted in paragraph 11, above and regional differences. This makes it impossible in our view to set rigid pay rates for many public sector jobs. Moreover, as noted in paragraph 6, politicians have held down their own pay for political reasons. If the Prime Minister's salary were to constitute the ceiling for public sector pay, then either that salary would have to be increased substantially or there would be very serious difficulties in recruiting and retaining good quality senior staff in the public sector.

    9.   Can England and the United Kingdom learn from the experience of other countries or the devolved governments in this area?

    21.  As noted in paragraph 1 above, some of SSRB's remit groups are UK- wide while others are limited to parts of the UK. SSRB and its secretariat has frequent contact with pay-setting bodies in other countries. We are always willing to learn from other countries but on the whole we find that pay systems and levels (linked as they are to tax, social security, pensions and the cost of living) are highly specific to local circumstances.

    May 2009

    APPENDIX A

    REVIEW BODY ON SENIOR SALARIES—TERMS OF REFERENCE

      The Review Body on Top Salaries (TSRB) was appointed in May 1971 and renamed the Review Body on Senior Salaries (SSRB) in July 1993, with revised terms of reference. The terms of reference were revised again in 1998 as a consequence of the Government's Comprehensive Spending Review, in 2001 to allow the devolved bodies direct access to the Review Body's advice and in 2007 to add certain NHS managers to the remit.

    The terms of reference are: The Review Body on Senior Salaries provides independent advice to the Prime Minister, the Lord Chancellor, the Secretary of State for Defence and the Secretary of State for Health on the remuneration of holders of judicial office; senior civil servants; senior officers of the armed forces; very senior managers in the NHS;[26] and other such public appointments as may from time to time be specified.

    The Review Body also advises the Prime Minister from time to time on the pay and pensions of Members of Parliament and their allowances; on Peers' allowances; and on the pay, pensions and allowances of Ministers and others whose pay is determined by the Ministerial and Other Salaries Act 1975. If asked to do so by the Presiding Officer and the First Minister of the Scottish Parliament jointly; or by the Speaker of the Northern Ireland Assembly; or by the Presiding Officer of the National Assembly for Wales; or by the Mayor of London and the Chair of the Greater London Assembly jointly; the Review Body also from time to time advises those bodies on the pay, pensions and allowances of their members and office holders.

    In reaching its recommendations, the Review Body is to have regard to the following considerations:

          the need to recruit, retain and motivate suitably able and qualified people to exercise their different responsibilities;

          regional/local variations in labour markets and their effects on the recruitment and retention of staff;

          Government policies for improving the public services including the requirement on departments to meet the output targets for the delivery of departmental services;

          the funds available to departments as set out in the Government's departmental expenditure limits; and

          the Government's inflation target.

    In making recommendations, the Review Body shall consider any factors that the Government and other witnesses may draw to its attention. In particular it shall have regard to:

          differences in terms and conditions of employment between the public and private sector and between the remit groups, taking account of relative job security and the value of benefits in kind;

          changes in national pay systems, including flexibility and the reward of success; and job weight in differentiating the remuneration of particular posts;

          the need to maintain broad linkage between the remuneration of the three main remit groups, while allowing sufficient flexibility to take account of the circumstances of each group; and

          the relevant legal obligations, including anti-discrimination legislation regarding age, gender, race, sexual orientation, religion and belief and disability.

    The Review Body may make other recommendations as it sees fit:

          to ensure that, as appropriate, the remuneration of the remit groups relates coherently to that of their subordinates, encourages efficiency and effectiveness, and takes account of the different management and organisational structures that may be in place from time to time;

          to relate reward to performance where appropriate;

          to maintain the confidence of those covered by the Review Body's remit that its recommendations have been properly and fairly determined; and

          to ensure that the remuneration of those covered by the remit is consistent with the Government's equal opportunities policy.

    The Review Body will take account of the evidence it receives about wider economic considerations and the affordability of its recommendations.

APPENDIX B

SENIOR SALARIES REVIEW BODY

Bill Cockburn CBE TDProfessor David Greenaway

Michael Langley

Sir Peter North, CBE QC

Paul Williams

David Metcalf

Richard Disney

Martin Fish

Christopher Stephens

Bruce Warman















22   Senior military officers are those of the ranks of Rear Admiral, Major-General and Air Vice-Marshal and above. Back

23   The Prime Minister and other Ministers who are Members of the House of Commons receive an MP's salary plus a ministerial supplement. The figures quoted here are the sum of the two. Back

24   Report No 64, Cm 7270. Back

25   Thirtieth Report on Senior Salaries 2008, Cm 7388. Back

26   NHS Very Senior Managers in England are chief executives, executive directors (except medical directors), and other senior managers with board level responsibility who report directly to the chief executive, in: Strategic Health Authorities, Special Health Authorities, Primary Care Trusts and Ambulance Trusts. Back


 
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