House of Commons - Outsiders and Insiders: External Appointments to the Senior Civil Service

Outsiders and Insiders: External Appointments to the Senior Civil Service - Public Administration Committee Contents

5 Implications for the recruitment process

76. Having examined the extent and effects of outside appointments, we now consider implications for the SCS recruitment process. As with all civil service recruitment, appointments to the SCS are governed by the Recruitment Principles set out and monitored by the Civil Service Commissioners. The Principles maintain that recruitment to the civil service is based on merit, on the basis of fair and open competition. In this chapter, we examine two aspects of this fundamental principle that apply particularly to external SCS recruitment: the openness of the SCS recruitment process, and the involvement of ministers in senior recruitment. We also consider how the role of the centre of government might be strengthened to support more effective SCS recruitment.

Open competitions for senior recruitment

77. According to the Civil Service Commissioners' Recruitment Principles, open competition for civil service posts means that "job opportunities must be advertised publicly and potential candidates given reasonable access to information about the job and its requirements, and about the selection process".[83] At SCS level, however, not all posts are open to external competition. As outlined earlier,[84] in 2007-08 only 305 of the 771 competitions for SCS posts were open to applicants beyond the civil service.

78. The process for deciding whether recruitment will involve open competitions was explained in detail earlier.[85] Basically, at the lower levels of the SCS employing departments decide whether to open up recruitment to external competition, while the decision on whether to open up higher level appointments is made by the Senior Leadership Committee.[86] Janet Paraskeva explained to us the protocol for Top 200 civil servants that appointments will generally be subject to open competition, with certain exceptions:

We have a protocol for the Top 200 posts that assumes there will be not only competition but open competition unless there is a business need to do otherwise; or unless people just do not believe that the market could provide the sets of skills that are required; or if a speedy appointment is required.[87]

79. For less senior SCS posts, there does not appear to be any clear guidance to departments setting out the circumstances in which recruitment should involve external competition and those where it might not be appropriate. The Cabinet Office might usefully provide clarification and guidance on this matter, in order to promote consistent practice among departments. Alternatively, the Civil Service Commissioners could include guidance on open competitions as part of their Recruitment Principles or their overall guidance on senior recruitment, as they do for other procedural issues such as involving ministers in the appointments process.[88]

80. More broadly, there has been high-level support for opening up all senior appointments to external competition. In March 2009, the then Cabinet Office Minister Liam Byrne said that the practice of advertising job vacancies only to existing civil servants should be "the exception rather than the rule", and stressed the need to create a "truly meritocratic civil service".[89] Others have been more uncertain about the merits of full open competition in recruitment. Janet Paraskeva, when asked directly whether she thought there should always be open competition to senior posts, said she simply did not know.[90] Jonathan Baume of the FDA union opposed the idea outright:

I think the idea of some that, for example, every senior civil servant post should be advertised in the Sunday Times is just plain wrong. I think public advertising will have a role but I think it should be the exception rather than the norm.[91]

81. Another relevant concern is the cost of recruiting externally. Open competitions make the recruitment process more expensive: Ernst and Young estimated a typical recruitment cost of £40,000 per head for senior civil service posts, in addition to the time cost of those involved in the recruiting process.[92]

82. In his review of the SCS workforce, Sir David Normington did not pronounce on the merits of mandatory open competitions for senior recruitment, but did urge greater clarity about why open competitions might be conducted:

The Civil Service needs to be smarter about managing open recruitment. There must be clarity about why and when the organisation goes to the market to recruit the skills and behaviours sought, and certainty that they are not available from within the Civil Service.[93]

83. There are certainly valid reasons for wanting to "test the market" in order for departments to be assured that they have appointed the best candidates, even where there might be a reasonable number of suitably qualified candidates among existing civil servants. Set against this, however, is the cost of running external competitions, and more broadly the sense (previously discussed) that there is already too much external recruitment. It would seem counterintuitive to seek to hold more open competitions while at the same time striving to reduce the extent of external recruitment overall.

84. We recognise that, over the years, there has been a move toward greater open competition for senior civil service posts. We acknowledge that in some cases this has brought benefits, although we believe that the emphasis of workforce policy for the SCS in future should focus more strongly on developing the civil service's own skill base from within. We therefore conclude that current arrangements, which provide for discretion to be exercised about whether to open up senior posts to external competition, are broadly satisfactory. We do not think it would be desirable to open up recruitment to all SCS posts to external competition as a general rule. It would, however, be helpful for the Cabinet Office or the Civil Service Commissioners to issue guidance to departments on the circumstances in which they would expect to see open competition and those where it may not be appropriate.

Ministerial involvement in senior recruitment

85. Ministerial involvement in making top-level civil service appointments is a highly contentious issue. We have recommended in the past that ministers could play a greater role in processes for appointing senior civil servants, with the necessary safeguards against inappropriate or improper influence on appointments.[94]

86. Janet Paraskeva forcefully expressed the Civil Service Commissioners' opposition to the idea that governments might be able to appoint people to the civil service who did not want to work under different political administrations (other than as special advisers):

There are all sorts of ways in which people can work for the Government of the day in a political sense that is outside of the Civil Service. There are special advisers and there are other public appointments where the Government of the day sets up an organisation to carry out a piece of policy for them where ministers have a much greater say in the appointments to that organisation. If we believe in continuing what we have, which is an impartial Civil Service, we have to say to people, "however strong your personal political views are, they have to be left at the office door". Otherwise, how can we have a Civil Service which can be trusted by any government?[95]

Similarly, the civil service union Prospect asserted that: "Direct ministerial involvement in appointing external recruits would create challenges for impartiality and could confuse lines of accountability".[96]

87. Guidance from the Civil Service Commissioners sets out in detail the extent of ministers' possible involvement in senior external recruitment processes. Ministers may be involved in setting job and person specifications for senior civil service posts, but they cannot interview candidates or express a preference among them. The candidate recommended for appointment must be the one placed first on merit by the selection panel, and the minister cannot choose another candidate instead. Provision is made for the rare cases where the minister does not feel able to appoint the lead candidate. In such cases, the matter is referred back to the selection panel, which may revise the ordering of candidates' merit if panel members agree with the reasons given by the minister. The case must also be referred to the Civil Service Commissioners as a whole for their collective approval.[97]

88. The Civil Service Commissioners believe that current arrangements accommodate the interest ministers have in senior appointments, while protecting them from accusations of undue influence and allowing for candidates to be selected on merit. The Commissioners point out that the robustness of the present system is illustrated by the fact that ministers have only very rarely declined appointments.[98]

89. In our 2007 report on Politics and Administration, which explored the relationship between ministers and senior civil servants, we came to the following conclusion:

It remains essential in our view that there should be no entrance into the civil service through ministerial patronage. Appointments should be made, as now, on merit, through a process which is rigorous, and which is policed by the Civil Service Commissioners. The ability to work impartially with governments of different political persuasions should be a key factor in deciding whether a particular candidate is appointable.

Nonetheless, we need to ensure that changes in appointment systems, or in patterns of recruitment, do not have the perverse effect of reducing democratic accountability. It is possible to guard against patronage without removing all ministerial choice about suitable appointees. Such choice should be exercised only in cases where there is external recruitment to extremely senior posts. There should be no ministerial involvement in recruitment below the senior civil service, and even at senior civil service level it should be confined to key appointments. In such cases, if a competition produces more than a single candidate who would be suitable for the post on offer, we believe that it is entirely legitimate for ministers to be given an opportunity to meet them, and to be asked to express a preference, as is the case with appointments to NDPBs.[99]

90. The reason we formed this recommendation was that it seemed to us anomalous that ministers can be consulted on some high-level appointments, notably very senior appointments involving internal civil service candidates only, when their involvement in recruitment processes open to external competition is much more circumscribed. Lord Butler told us during our Politics and Administration inquiry that throughout his time as Cabinet Secretary, top-level internal appointments did involve genuine consultation and discussion with ministers:

The Civil Service would initiate proposals for appointments, there would be a civilised discussion with Ministers, and sometimes Ministers would have a preference and that was a preference that you could go along with, but there was a good role of the Civil Service in it and I certainly did not find myself feeling during my time that appointments were being made on the basis of ministerial favouritism.[100]

91. It therefore struck us as incongruous that ministers did not have the same ability to be involved in the choice of very senior external appointments. We also argued in our Politics and Administration report that ministers are entitled to have confidence in those serving them, and that commanding the confidence of ministers should be seen as one aspect of the "merit" of candidates when assessing their suitability for appointment.[101]

92. It is anomalous that ministers may be consulted about the appointment of internal candidates to top-level civil service posts, while their involvement in senior external recruitment is much more restricted. Consideration should be given to resolving this anomaly in a way that minimises the risk of undue political interference in civil service appointments and promotions.

Strengthening the centre

93. Part of the concern about external recruitment may be attributed to a perceived lack of capacity at the centre of government to monitor civil service employment trends and adjust recruitment policy accordingly. As we have seen earlier, the call for a workforce strategy for the SCS and for the wider civil service is one proposal for dealing with this situation. Another possibility is to re-examine the role of central bodies with responsibilities for civil service recruitment, in particular the Cabinet Office and the Civil Service Commissioners.

94. The Cabinet Office is the central government department responsible for co-ordinating recruitment activity across government, although in practice it focuses mainly on senior civil service appointments. Much of this work is carried out by the Civil Service Capability Group within the Cabinet Office under the direction of Gill Rider, head of the government HR profession. Meanwhile (as discussed above), the Civil Service Commissioners are charged with overseeing civil service appointments to ensure that they are made on merit through fair and open competition.[102] In practice this occurs through checking compliance with the Recruitment Principles. For senior civil service recruitment, the Commissioners also have role in chairing some competitions for senior positions.

95. Efforts have been made to professionalise the government HR function in recent years, as part of a broader focus on supporting specialist professions within the service (such as through building networks of professionals in areas including finance, procurement and communications, as well as HR).[103] The aim has been to build professional HR capability throughout the whole of the civil service. Nevertheless, there still appears room for further improvement. Ernst and Young believed that government HR practices needed to be sharpened up:

Improvements need to be made to the HR processes...too often, sourcing has lacked rigour and induction has been poor both on basic orientation and on "how things get done".[104]

96. The results of a "stakeholder survey" commissioned by the Cabinet Office in 2007 indicate some of the areas for improvement. The survey, conducted by Ipsos MORI and involving surveys and in-depth interviews with senior civil servants, found a demand for the Cabinet Office to perform a larger role in coordinating departments on civil service issues. The stakeholder survey also found that the Cabinet Office's role in improving skills and capability across the Civil Service was regarded as one of its most urgent priorities, but was also rated as a key weakness.[105] Ipsos MORI reported that:

...many cite a need for clarity in managing the Civil Service. It is not always clear what is the role of the Cabinet Office and what is the role of the departments, and more direction from the Cabinet Office on this would be welcome...Additionally, when it comes to working with departments to manage the Civil Service more effectively or ensuring clear workforce policies and processes, the Cabinet Office has the opportunity to improve. Many of those interviewed in depth express an interest in the Cabinet Office spreading good practice across Whitehall.[106]

97. The NAO's examination of external recruitment to the civil service below SCS level echoed these criticisms, pointing to the need for more effective central guidance and coordination of civil service recruitment processes. While the focus of that report was on wider civil service recruitment, the basic conclusion that the Cabinet Office could take a stronger lead on coordinating civil service HR applies to the SCS as well. The NAO found that:

Central government organisations do not hold the necessary management information to forecast annual demand for recruitment and undertake accurate workforce planning.
There is no systematic monitoring and testing of the effectiveness of external recruitment processes.
There are variations in how departments apply Cabinet Office guidance and the Civil Service Commissioners' Recruitment Code.
There is insufficient interdepartmental coordination to improve the consistency of these interpretations or to spread good practice on how to recruit for posts below the senior civil service.[107]

98. Sir David Normington's review likewise proposed a greater role for the Cabinet Office in SCS workforce planning.[108] Prospect, however, sounded a note of caution about the Cabinet Office's ability to lead effectively on civil service workforce issues:

There needs to be greater "corporate" oversight and accountability of permanent secretary decisions. Normington's vision of a greater role for the Cabinet Office is useful in this regard but we do have doubts, based on experience, over the Cabinet Office's ability to exercise effective influence. Whilst an expanded role must be supported by an appropriate level of resourcing, action will be needed in parallel to mount a concerted challenge on deeply rooted SCS culture.[109]

99. There appear to be two main areas where civil service HR could benefit from a stronger central presence. The first is in the provision of central coordination and guidance for employing departments so that their recruitment policies are consistent, rigorous and follow good practice. The second relates to the monitoring of recruitment trends, particularly in order to determine potential areas of future concern (such as pay disparities between internal and external recruits), and to provide advice on implications for recruitment policy. This would include many of the observations we have made elsewhere in this report about the need for more robust monitoring data on areas including pay differentials, performance, retention and external recruitment below the SCS.

100. Much of this work, especially on guidance and central coordination, would seem to fall logically within the orbit of the Cabinet Office; although some monitoring work might, as we suggested earlier, be undertaken by the Civil Service Commissioners (if so, the monitoring and advice function could be similar to that performed by the Senior Salaries Review Body on top public sector pay). At this stage, however, it is probably less important to decide who does what than to define the scope of what needs to be done.

101. Evidence from senior civil servant surveys and from the National Audit Office suggests that central coordination and monitoring of civil service recruitment could be more effective than it currently is. We recommend that the Cabinet Office consult with departments about how it could best support them in their senior recruitment processes; for example, whether it would be useful to provide more detailed guidance on matters such as when to hold open competitions and the conduct of salary negotiations. There should also be more extensive central monitoring of recruitment trends, some of which could be undertaken by the Civil Service Commissioners and some by the Cabinet Office. Such monitoring could focus on areas including pay, performance, retention and external recruitment below the senior civil service, as we have suggested elsewhere in this report, in order to help government develop appropriate and informed employment policy responses.

83 Civil Service Commissioners, Recruitment Principles, April 2009, para 1 (available at http://www.civilservicecommissioners.org) Back

84 See para 10. Back

85 See para 9. Back

86 The Senior Leadership Committee is chaired by the Cabinet Secretary (Sir Gus O'Donnell) and its current membership comprises several permanent secretaries , the First Civil Service Commissioner (Janet Paraskeva), the head of Profession for Civil Service HR (Gill Rider), and two non-executive members from the private sector. Back

87 Q 52 Back

88 Civil Service Commissioners, Guidance on Senior Recruitment, June 2005 (available at http://www.civilservicecommissioners.org); see in particular paras 2.14-2.22 Back

89 BBC Online, "Civil service 'unfit for purpose'", 5 March 2009 Back

90 Qq 53-54 Back

91 Oral evidence taken before the Public Administration Select Committee on 12 March 2009, Civil and Public Service Issues, HC 352-i, Session 2008-09, Q 42 Back

92 Ev 35 Back

93 Normington report, p 27 Back

94 Public Administration Select Committee, Politics and Administration, paras 83-85 Back