Memorandum from the Civil Service Commissioners
INTRODUCTION
1. As part of its scrutiny programme, the Committee
has launched an inquiry into outside appointments to senior levels
of the Civil Service. The Committee wishes to examine the effects
of making such appointments on the nature, ethos and performance
of the Civil Service.
2. The Civil Service Commissioners welcome this
inquiry. The Government's White Paper "Modernising Government",
published in 1999, initiated a reform programme aimed at developing
a Civil Service for the 21st Century. It called for a substantial
increase in recruitment through open competition, to bring in
new talent and to increase diversity. Since then, external appointments
to the senior ranks of the Civil Service have been substantial.
It is therefore timely that the effects of that programme were
examined.
3. In this response, we set down, for the sake
of clarity, the role of the Commissioners in external recruitment
before offering some insights related to the questions raised
by the Committee in their consultation paper.
4. This written evidence supplements that given
by the First Civil Service Commissioner, Janet Paraskeva, at her
appearance before the Committee on 5 March.
BACKGROUND
5. The Commissioners' role in relation to outside
appointments to the Home Civil Service and Diplomatic Service
is essentially regulatory. As required by the Civil Service and
Diplomatic Service Orders in Council, it is to give an assurance
that appointments into it are made through the application of
the principle of appointment on merit on the basis of fair and
open competition.
6. This principle and the role of the Commissioners
in upholding it are earthed in the Northcote-Trevelyan Report
of 1854. They were devised as a means of bringing to an end the
system of patronage which had been identified as one of the main
reasons for the then Service's endemic inefficiency and public
disrepute. However we believe that the principle remains as important
today—not just because it has always been there, but because
it continues to provide a robust and flexible framework for recruitment
at a time of change.
7. The recent round of departmental Capability
Reviews has given emphasis to the need for the Civil Service to
continue to develop its leadership capacity. If, then, the Service
is to be equipped to meet the new demands being placed upon it,
it must be able to guarantee that its members have been recruited
for their skills and ability to do the job—that is on merit
and merit alone—rather than as a consequence of the people
applicants happen to know and the political and/or personal prejudices
they may happen to share with them. Equally important is the concept
of fair treatment and open access. Assurance that selection is
by fair and open competition and not because an individual is
known to a select group—however good he or she might be—is
as necessary to protect the rights of potential candidates as
it is in providing the best candidate for the job.
THE COMMISSIONERS'
ROLE IN
RELATION TO
SCS APPOINTMENTS
8. For the majority of posts up to and including
SCS pay band 1 level, departments and agencies are free to conduct
open competitions[10]
without direct Commissioner involvement. In doing so, the Orders
in Council require them to adhere to the Commissioners Recruitment
Principles (which replaced the Recruitment Code with effect from
1 April 2009). Recruitment at these levels is also subject to
an audit regime which the Commissioners undertake on an annual
basis.
9. The Commissioners are directly involved when
a vacancy within the top pay bands of the Civil Service—SCS
pay band 2, SCS pay band 3 and Permanent Secretary (a total of
around 600 posts)—is subject to open competition. We may
also chair the recruitment boards for some other posts by agreement.
It is for government departments to decide whether or not to go
to open competition at SCS pay band 2 level. At SCS pay band 3
and Permanent Secretary level (top 200 posts) the decision is
taken by the Senior Leadership Committee on which the First Commissioner
sits. In doing so, it is guided by a "Top 200 Protocol"
agreed in July 2007 between the Commissioners and the Senior Leadership
Committee. This provides that:
— appointments will generally be subject
to competition, unless there is an exceptional case of immediate
business need or a lateral move is desirable; and
— appointments will go to open competition,
unless the business requirements are such that there is little
prospect of recruiting someone from outside the Civil Service.
10. The recruiting department decides the characteristics
of each competition and the terms and conditions on offer, including
the level of remuneration to be awarded to the successful candidate,
seeking advice and, if necessary, approval from the Cabinet Office.
The Commissioners oversee the process of selection by chairing
the recruitment panel. In that capacity we approve the final versions
of the job and person specifications; the advertisement and publicity
strategy; the assessment processes to be used; and, ultimately,
the appointment to be made.
11. Commissioners record in their annual reports
the number of appointments to the SCS which require their approval.
The key statistics in recent years are:
Year | Appointments from Commissioner-
chaired open competitions at SCS
Payband 2 and above
| Sources of successful candidates
|
| | Civil Service
| Wider Public Sector
| Private Sector
|
2007-08 | 105 |
43 (41%) | 23 (22%) | 39 (37%)
|
| 2006-07 | 90 | 36 (40%)
| 21 (23%) | 33 (37%) |
| 2005-06 | 111 | 42 (38%)
| 30 (27%) | 39 (35%) |
| 2004-05 | 91 | 38 (42%)
| 17 (19%) | 36 (39%) |
| 2003-04 | 89 | 43 (48%)
| 19 (21%) | 27 (30%) |
| 2002-03 | 97 | 29 (30%)
| 26 (27%) | 42 (43%) |
12. Taking these six years as a whole, it will be noted that
candidates from the private sector were successful in 37% of the
competitions and that candidates from the Civil Service or wider
public sector were successful in 63% of the competitions.
13. Under the terms of the Top 200 protocol, Commissioners
also now chair internal competitions[11]
at SCS pay band 3 and Permanent Secretary level. In accepting
this broader remit, we saw it as a logical extension to our role
in relation to open competitions. As we have previously highlighted
to the Committee, we hope that in time the Government might come
to see value in the independent regulation of promotion at all
levels.
14. Civil Service Commissioners play no part in ministerial
appointments to boards of public bodies which are regulated by
the Commissioner for Public Appointments, nor in the many thousands
of public sector appointments including, for example, executive
appointments to other non-departmental public bodies, which fall
outside of both the Commissioner for Public Appointments' and
the Civil Service Commissioners' regulatory regimes.
THE APPROACH
TO RECRUITMENT
Q2 How effective are the existing arrangements for making and
overseeing outside appointments to the Senior Civil Service?
Q4 Should there be ministerial involvement in appointing outsiders?
If so, what mechanisms would need to be in place to safeguard
against inappropriate political influence in the recruitment process?
15. When chairing a competition, the primary role of the
Commissioner is to ensure that the process applied is consistent
with the principle of appointment on merit on the basis of fair
and open competition. Departments are responsible for deciding
the characteristics of any particular competition.
16. However we have sought to be influential in ensuring
that the senior recruitment processes are rigorous and enable
appointment decisions to be made on the basis of extensive evidence
of suitability, and that good practice is shared. For instance
in recent years we have pressed for:
— competitions to be fully pre-planned at the outset;
— careful consideration to be given at the outset to
the preparation of the job and person specifications since they
are used as the basis for the selection criteria;
— opportunities for candidates to be extensively briefed
to ensure there is a comprehensive understanding of the job to
be done;
— testing other than interview to be incorporated into
the selection process where appropriate. For instance candidates
may be tested for their presentation skills or media handling
skills where relevant; and
— interviewing time to be extended, which might include
more than one opportunity for candidates to be interviewed by
the panel, in the light of research that the validity of recruitment
decisions can be improved by the addition of extended, structured
interviewing.
17. We have also recently published a new Guide to the approach
of the Commissioners when chairing competitions. The Guide describes
the outcomes required by the Recruitment Principles at each stage
of a competition and the Commissioner's and the recruiting department's
respective roles in securing them.
18. Our impression is that departments value our interventions
and, increasingly, are developing more sophisticated senior recruitment
processes and allowing time from the outset for them to be properly
applied. There remain, though, instances where recruitment exercises
are rushed with insufficient thought being given to the characteristics
of the competition at the outset. As departments increasingly
recognise the value of involving their HR Directors in senior
appointments, we hope that they will resist the temptation to
rush these critical competitions. Apart from the direct costs
of mounting an open competition, which are not inconsiderable,
there are potentially the much greater costs to an organisation
of making a wrong appointment at these senior levels.
19. Commissioners recognise that ministers will have an interest
in appointments to certain senior posts. However that interest
has to be accommodated within a system which selects on merit,
is free from personal or political bias and ensures that appointments
can last into future Administrations or, indeed, simply a change
of minister of the same political complexion.
20. Our Recruitment Principles (which replaced the Commissioners'
Recruitment Code on 1 April 2009) make it clearer than ever before
that for those appointments where ministers have an interest,
departments should ensure that they are:
— consulted at the outset to agree the terms on which
the post is advertised, the job and person specifications and
the criteria for selection, including the composition of the selection
panel;
— kept in touch with the progress of the competition
throughout, included being provided with information about the
expertise, experience and skills of the candidates;
— given the opportunity to have any further views they
may have on the balance of expertise, experience and skills required
for the job conveyed to the selection panel; and
— given the opportunity to brief the Commissioner chairing
the panel, who may invite the minister to brief the selection
panel and/or each of the shortlisted candidates.
21. We believe this approach works well in practice and is
generally welcomed by ministers. It continues to provide assurance
about the integrity of the appointment process. On the one hand,
it maintains the principle of an impartial and permanent Civil
Service with appointments being made on the basis of a recommendation
by a panel chaired by a Civil Service Commissioner to assess and
decide merit between candidates taking all the evidence into account;
on the other, it accommodates the interest of ministers in the
senior appointments being made in a way that protects them from
accusations of improper influence.
22. Ultimately, a minister can decline to make any appointment
if he or she is not persuaded about the suitability of the candidate
ranked first in the panel's order of merit. However, our experience
is that this has happened only very rarely.
THE POLICY
OF OPEN
RECRUITMENT
Q1 Is the current level of external recruitment to the Senior
Civil Service justified? Does it achieve the objectives set out
for it (eg filling skills shortages in the Civil Service, ventilation
with new ideas and ways of working)?
Q8 Is there the right mix of external appointees in terms of
where they came from? Should there, for instance, be greater or
fewer appointments from the private sector?
23. From the beginning, the role of the Commissioners, while
based in regulation, has been about ensuring an efficient and
effective Civil Service respected by the public. The Commissioners
have always valued open competition as a means of securing the
best available people for the Civil Service while, at the same
time, benchmarking internal talent.
24. It is for that reason that we supported the introduction
of the current Top 200 Protocol with its presumption in favour
of open competition when the most senior posts fell vacant. We
saw this as a means of ensuring that the best people were being
appointed to the most senior posts in the Civil Service, pending
the development of a more sophisticated internal senior talent
management system.
25. Nevertheless, we have always recognised that open competition
might not be the right approach in every case. For that reason
we encourage a proper analysis of each upcoming vacancy at the
outset as to whether the nature of the post and the context in
which it is set is such that it should be filled internally, or
whether an external competition is indeed the appropriate course.
That is the judgement which SLC has to make in respect of the
Top 200, and which departments continue to make at lower level.
THE EFFECTIVENESS
OF EXTERNAL
APPOINTEES
Q3 What steps should be taken to ensure outside recruits, once
appointed, are able to operate effectively within government?
Q6 What evidence is there to demonstrate the difference made
by senior outside appointees to the performance of their departments?
Q9 How could the effects of making outside appointments be
most effectively monitored?
26. We have long encouraged careful induction of new appointees
with appropriate "buddying" arrangements put in place.
And our sense is that departments increasingly recognise the costs—direct
and indirect—involved in recruiting from outside and the
need to take all reasonable steps to ensure that the appointee
is successfully introduced to the working culture.
27. The Cabinet Office is now beginning to track the performance
of appointees to the SCS. However we have yet to see any evidence
that feed back systems are sufficiently robust to inform the development
of improved recruitment processes or of the success of the overall
policy. The recent report of the Group chaired by Sir David Normington
on the "Senior Civil Service Workforce and Reward Strategy"
recommends more analysis; we would support this. We hope that
any analysis will, though, recognise that an external appointee
who is in post for a relatively short period is not necessarily
a sign of failure. Some external candidates go on in short order
to secure another Civil Service appointment, while others leave
having achieved the objectives which were set for the appointment.
We need to bear in mind that increasingly people view their Civil
Service appointment as a step in their long-term career profile.
28. Ultimately, these are issues for departments, and the
Cabinet Office. Capability Reviews will provide the ultimate test.
PAY CONSIDERATIONS
Q5 One issue of significant concern is that of pay differentials
between those appointed from outside and existing civil servants.
Is the practice of paying higher salaries to some external recruits
justified?
29. Whenever a post is being advertised, it is for the department
concerned, in consultation with the Cabinet Office, to decide
what it should offer. For our part, we recognise that departments
need to set the compensation package taking account of the market
being tapped and the availability of people with the skills demanded.
This will inevitably lead to different rates being offered for
appointments requiring different skills even within the same SCS
pay band. We also accept that this can lead to the offer to an
internal candidate being pitched lower than to someone with particular
expertise from outside.
30. In accordance with the principle of "openness",
however, our concern is that all potential applicants are clear
about the benefits package that might be available to them, including
any scope for flexibility depending on their background, skills
and experience. This, then, provides the framework within which
the competition can be run and for candidates, eventually, to
be placed in merit order. Offers of appointments can then subsequently
be made within the advertised salary range and in a way that also
recognises the link between the successful candidate's particular
attributes and the pay which they justify.
31. In our 2006-07 annual report we mentioned that there
had been a number of occasions where salaries awarded to successful
candidates did not match those advertised. We expressed particular
concern about the payment of salaries considerably in excess of
those quoted since this challenged the principle of openness:
had the job been advertised at the higher rate it may well have
attracted a stronger field. Underpayments do not cause us the
same concern though clearly they could lead to some potential
corporate management issues for departments. At the very least,
such cases may be an indication that the job has not been properly
thought through prior to advertisement. In our 2007-08 annual
report we reported that the picture was more mixed and less extreme.
32. When commenting in this area we recognise the need for
a degree of caution. Salary is only one element of the compensation
package. Sometimes the scope for variable pay and for flexing
all the compensation elements within the total value of the package
to better suit the circumstances of appointees might lead to an
outcome apparently at odds with the advertised salary.
33. Overall, our experience is that current practice in the
way compensation packages are described varies between departments,
and that there is also some uncertainty about what factors to
take into account in deciding how to pitch an offer to the successful
candidate especially when it is an existing civil servant. We
believe that additional guidance from the Cabinet Office on these
matters would be welcomed. It should include information on how
the compensation package at these senior levels is best determined
in the first instance, particularly where specialist skills are
sought. It should also give advice on how the package on offer
might be best described to allow for it subsequently to be flexed
in relation to the successful candidate.
THE IMPACT
ON CIVIL
SERVICE VALUES
Q7 What are the implications of making external appointments
for the culture of the Civil Service, including effects on the
morale of civil servants and on shared values such as the public
service ethos?
34. With our responsibility for helping departments promote
the Civil Service Code we regard it important that new appointees
understand the values of the Civil Service. In relation to recruitment
we require departments to ensure that all applicants are made
aware of the Civil Service Code. For those competitions we chair,
we will often test candidates at interview on their understanding
of the Civil Service values and ethos.
35. We have commented on many occasions that departments
should build on this in their induction arrangements; indeed this
was one of the recommendations in the "Best Practice Checklist"
published jointly by Permanent Secretaries and Civil Service Commissioners
in 2007. We shall be probing the extent to which departments have
applied the Checklist as part of our forthcoming audit of work
to promote and uphold the Civil Service Code.
36. Cabinet Office and departments will, we understand, also
be using the regular staff surveys which now take place as a means
of securing more information about the extent to which Civil Service
values are understood by all staff.
PRACTICE OVERSEAS
Q10 What can be learnt from the experience of the devolved
governments or other countries when it comes to making external
appointments to the senior ranks of the Civil Service?
37. As the Civil Service in Scotland and Wales (and certain
elements of the Civil Service in Northern Ireland) is part of
the Home Civil Service, appointments are subject to the same regulatory
regime as applies in England. The Commissioners' Recruitment Principles
and the Top 200 Protocol apply equally for Civil Service appointments
in the Scottish Government and the Welsh Assembly Government,
and Civil Service Commissioners chair competitions in Edinburgh
and Cardiff.
38. Appointments to the Northern Ireland Civil Service are
subject to a separate Order in Council with their own Northern
Ireland Civil Service Commissioners. However the regulatory regime
is similar to the one that operates in the Home Civil Service,
and the Commissioners there also play an active role in chairing
competitions at senior level.
39. Our understanding is that in terms of regulation of appointments
into the Civil Service, Westminster-style democracies operate
similar principles as the UK. Even the US—which has a large
number of political appointees—operates a merit system for
its permanent officials.
April 2009
10
An "open" competition is one that is externally advertised
and open to all-comers, including existing civil servants. Back
11
An "internal" competition is one that is internally
advertised and can only be filled by existing civil servants. Back
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